Hyatt Regency Walkaway Collapse
Fatima Hassan, Aisha Ibrahim, Mariam Mohammed
Abstract
Until today Hyatt regime walkaway fall is thought to be
one of the most exceedingly terrible episodes that have
occurred in the United States. This dreadful occurrence
brought about the loss of numerous guiltless individuals
lives from a basic building oversight and absence of
engineering profession. Amid a casual tea party at the atrium
lobby of the lodging because of the huge load and
movement, the walkaway of the fourth floor fell into the
second-floor walkaway and both broken down into the
primary floor, which was loaded with pure glad individuals.
In the end, this bliss was handed over a look into an
extraordinary distress that executed 114 individuals and
harmed more than 200. Afterward, examinations were made
and they have seen that numerous deceptive and flighty
activities were made amid the development of the in which
prompted the brutal crumple. Subsequently, genuine moves
were made particularly in the term of code of ethics and
engineering.
I. INTRODUCTION
On the seventeenth of July 1981, a recorded casual tea
party was held in Hyatt Regency Hotel that occurred in
Kanas city, Missouri, at the atrium lobby, where more than
2,000 individuals were going. This lobby comprises of four
floors, were the second, the third and the fourth floor
incorporates a walkway. But, with many individuals
celebrating on the walkaway in the atrium lobby, the
associations of the roof bars that were holding the second-
floor and the fourth-floor walkaway fizzled. Therefore, the
overabundance weight made the fourth-floor walkaway fall
into the second-floor walkaway and both walkaways caved
in into the primary floor that was swarmed with individuals,
while the walkaway of the third floor remained still.
II. CAUSES OF THE DISASTER
This disappointment was an aftereffect of numerous
unethical activities done during assembling and
development. After this fall examination began, and an
architectural engineer named Wayne Lischka was contracted
by Kanas City Star daily paper were he saw that there was
an undeniable change in the first outline of the walkaway
which helped in the crumple of the walkaway. Truth be told,
the fourth-floor and the second-floor walkaway was dangled
from a frail steel-tie rod, and the fourth-floor walkaway
suspended specifically over the second-floor walkaway. The
fourth-floor walkway stand was financed on three cross-bars
hanged by steel poles kept down by nuts and those cross-
shafts were tubular support produced using C-channel strips
joined with each other between them discharge space. In
addition, Jack D. Gillum and Associates unique outline
incorporates three sets of bars working from the second-
floor to the roof, subsequently this plan upheld 60% of the
base load required by Kansas City construction laws.
Moreover, this unique arrangement was questioned by
Havens Steel Company (the organization who will fabricate
the bars) since the first arrangement says that every one of
the poles under the forward floor must be screw strung so
they would have the capacity to screw the nuts to hold the
forward floor in its place. The Havens Steel Company
claimed that those strings may get harmed as the design of
the fourth-floor was lifted into position with the poles set up.
Therefore, Havens Steel Company thought of another option
configuration were two tie bars will be utilized, one for
associating the fourth-floor to the roof and the other bar for
interfacing the second-floor to the forward floor. In the end,
Havens Steel Company elective plan was affirmed and
developed while the first plan was disposed of. Afterward,
this outline change was turned out to be lethal on the
grounds that it bolstered 30% of the base load. Additionally
the first outline the heaviness of the fourth-floor walkaway
was totally bolstered by the bars, and the heaviness of the
second-floor walkaway was totally upheld by the bars, then
again, in the option plan the light emissions forward should
bolster both the forward and the second floor walkaway by
this change the nut needed to bolster the heaviness of the atrium lobby brought about numerous extreme results. This
two walkaways rather than one (the weight on the nut has was the most pulverizing United States auxiliary
multiplied). This option configuration was a genuine slip-up disappointment of time.
that brought about a dangerous disappointment that killed
many individuals. When, specialists have found that the IV. THE CONSEQUENCES
issue came about because of the absence of the The results was to many sever consequences:
correspondence between Havens Steel Company and Jack A. The company paid around 140 Million
D. Gillum and Associates. The option configuration were
Dollars as reparations.
not evaluated by the Jack D. Gillum and Associates and
B. 114 of dead and above 200 got injured.
acknowledged the new outline without preforming any
C. Closing the hotel for 3 months to fixing
numerical computations that would have demonstrated the
and repairing.
reality of this plan. Afterward, it was found that Havens
Steel Company called Jack D. Gillum and Associates and D. The structural engineer in GCE lost their
the option configuration was proposed and affirmed orally license to practice engineering in
on the telephone without seeing the representations of the Missouri.
new outline or preforming any sort of computations. Also, E. The ASCE added a new standard that says
during examination, it was uncovered that in 1979 the top of “ whoever put their stamp of approval on a
the atrium collapsed while the lodging was under set of plans holds the responsibility for the
development and the temporary workers were managing the
building and the consequences and that all
examination basically yet sadly checking the outline work
load calculations must be formally
checked by a specific chosen engineer
from the city”.

V. ETHICAL THEORIES

was not in the extent of his examination.

Figure 1: (a) The original design shows that the second and fourth floor
walkaway should have been hanged from the same rod and held in place by
nuts. (b) The actual constructed design shows that the two rods have been
used that resulted in doubling the load.
III. THE DISASTER
A. Utilitarianism
This theory is about the maximization of people’s benefiting
and happiness. In this condition walking away will be more
functional to go from one place to other rather than taking
the stairs. In our case the engineers did not bother their self
to do some calculation to verify the safety. Where the people
do not concern about the safety while entering a building.
So here in this case, we can find the Utilitarianism theory
did not apply here where it losses more than 200 injured and

The progressions of the outline that occurred in the beam 114 death people so there is no benefit or happiness. If we

box were huge issue that prompts a risky catastrophe. There will apply this theory we will find the case unethical.

was part in the atrium lobby and around 2000 individuals
went to this party. A number of the general population who
went to this gathering were on the forward walkway in the
atrium lobby which brought about an exceptionally
tremendous load on the beams of the walkway. This brought
about crushing the forward walkway that prompts the
second walkway crumple. These two walkways fallen on the
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost: 140,000,000 $ where they had to compensate the
anger families and injured gusts. Also they had to do a lot of
reconstructions so they pay even more than if they repair it
before.
Benefit: compensating people for their losses and admitting
their mistake. Also trying to restore their image and having
more safe environment.
C. Duty Ethics
The engineers did not held their duty to the people where
they did not bother them self to do a calculation to know the
load of the walkaway can handle by that they took a risk on
people’s safety. So it is unethical.
D. Rights Ethics
Every gust in a hotel have a right to be in a safe and well
structured building, because of the walkaway disaster we
can say this was unethical.
E. Virtue Ethics
Engineers in this case failed to use their engineering
judgment and communicate correctly with the fabricator. So
we can say it was unethical.
VI. ETHICAL PROBLEM SOLVING
TECHNIQUES
A. Factual issues
The Hyatt Regency Hotel in Missouri had an original
design that was changed and approved without
calculations and communication to discuss, where this
new design was done on the phone only and was not
very clear. The changes was more worse than the
original design. There was a fall during the construction
in 1979 and was announced safe after an investigation
that did not include testing the design or its calculations.
After four years of design in 1981 there was a deadly
collapse in the second and fourth walkways resulting in
the death of 114 and the injury around 200 people.
B. Conceptual issues
The new design was supposed to improve and develop
the safety of the building also avoid any errors like the
first one had. The suspended walkways were meant to
provide an easier passageway from the second to the
fourth floor. The inspection after the first collapse was
to study the drawings and recalculate the numbers to
make sure of its safety. The engineers should have been
able to predict that two rods would double the stress and
would not handle any extra load. Additionally, the
engineers were also supposed to follow the Kansas City
building codes for the minimum load and to also follow
the ASCE code of ethics.
C. Moral issues
The engineers did not take into account the safety of the
people. They had a chance to restudy the design when there
was a fall during construction, but instead no suitable
inspection was made, they lied and comforted people
falsely. They also cheated the public when they allowed
them to enter unsafe building. During the trial G.C.E denied
ever receiving a call about changing the design even though
it was clear they gave it their permission. They did not even
take responsibility for their horrible actions until after they
were proven guilty.
D. Line Drawing technique
1. Positive paradigm:
Proficient correspondence between G.C.E. also, Havens
Company, in this manner the outline was checked on and
acknowledged as a legitimate and safe plan that was fit for
holding the normal load. G.C.E. rejected Haven's
proposition to change to a two pole framework and the
outline completely upheld the Kansas City Building codes
for the base load required. G.C.E. taken after the code of
morals ASCE totally.
2. Negative paradigm:
No legitimate correspondence between G.C.E. also,
Havens Company, the new outline was not audited and
examined through the telephone. Also, was basically
affirmed by G.C.E. with no further review or
estimations. A fall amid developments happens and no
examination occurs about the plan and designing work
and wellbeing of the atrium is guaranteed. The
walkway interfacing the bolster poles that holds up the
second and fourth floor caved in on the dance hall
underneath it, killing and harming many individuals.
3. Hypothetical examples
1. If there was legitimate correspondence amongst
Havens and G.C.E.- positive.
2. If they researched the outline and settled it after the VII. FLOW CHART
fall amid development –positive.

3. If the plan was defective yet few individuals where

on the walkway in this manner it didn't crumple –
positive.

4. If the plan considered movement and revolution and

provided a notice sign that it was only for visitors
passing and can't withstand moving or unreasonable
movement –positive.

5. If the designers acted with expert uprightness and

judgment and took after the ASCE code of morals -
positive.

6. If the third walkway likewise broken down -

negative.

7. If the walkway had the base load it can deal with VIII. RISK, SAFETY AND ACCIDENTS
however broken down in any case - negative.
Safe/Risk factors:
A. Long vs. short term consequence:
8. G.C.E. executed the first plan that likewise had
hazards however less ones –negative. This deadly collapse resulted in many consequences.
The only short-term consequence that we found was
that over 200 people were injured and from this
accident. Nonetheless, the long-term consequences were
considered to be serious, very emotional and
st
economically bad. 1 failure has killed 114 people and
left their families in a sadness.2nd the hotel was forced

Conclusion: Unethical. to pay 140 million dollars to the victim’s families. 3 rd

Havens Steel Company, G.C.E. International, Inc. and
other people who were responsible for this lost their
engineering licenses due to the lack of their engineering
profession. Finally, the ASCE has now set a standard
that says, whoever put their stamp of approval on a set
of plans holds the responsibility for the building and the
consequences and that all load calculations must be
formally checked by a specific chosen engineer from
the city.
 B. Reversibility innocent people. We should be loyal to our work and
love what we are doing , and minimize the risks
the effect of injured more than 200 and death of 114
people, can’t be reversible.
around the world. so they can call us a professional
engineers.
C. Delayed vs. immediate effects
REFERENCES
Immediate effects: are the destructive death of 114 guests
and the injury of 200 others. [1] "Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse >
Delayed effects: include the grieving of families victims, the ENGINEERING.com", Engineering.com, 2016.
[Online]. Available:
emotional and physical impacts on the injured people. Also ,
http://www.engineering.com/Library/ArticlesPag
they had to close the hotel for Three months. And the e/tabid/85/ArticleID/175/Hyatt-Regency-
compensation they had to pay $140 million. Finally both of Walkway-Collapse.aspx. [Accessed: 21- May-
2016].
the companies lost their engineering license and could not
practice in that state. [2] "Failures - Kansas City Hyatt Regency
Walkways", Failures.wikispaces.com, 2016.
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[3] M. Manion and W. Evan, "Technological
A. Engineered Accident catastrophes: their causes and
The engineers in this case 1st did not design a walkway that prevention", Technology in Society, vol. 24, no. 3,
pp. 207-224, 2002.
can handle the minimum load required by the Kansas City
building codes. And after trying to fix that flaw with a new [4] "Root Cause Analysis: Think Reliability:
Walkway Collapse - Cause
design, they made it worse. The initial design had one rode Map", Thinkreliability.com, 2016. [Online].
that could handle 60% of the minimum load, while the 2nd Available: http://www.thinkreliability.com/cm-
design could only withstand 30% of it. There was a huge
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fault in the design that it would have been obvious if they
made any calculations. [5] “The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways
Collapse 1,” pp. 1–28.

B. Procedural Accident [6] Department of Philosophy and Department of

The engineers failed to follow the regulations and violated Mechanical Engineering, “Engineering ethics,”
them by not doing any calculations to make sure it can
1981.

handle the minimum code required. And even if the

engineers failed, a senior engineer should be responsible to
verify and overlook their work.

IX. Conclusion

To conclude, as engineers we should be ethical and take full

responsibility when we are doing our job . Actually, the
lives of most people in this world depends on engineers. In
our case study, Hyatt regency walkaway collapse, both
the manufacturing company and the architectural
engineer were careless. Because of this unethical
behavior, the walkaway fell down and killed many