2009 Selected

Ambiguous Elections: The Influence of Non-Electoral Politics in Ethiopian Democratisation
Author(s): Kjetil Tronvoll

Source: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Sep., 2009), pp. 449-474
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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J. of Modern African Studies, 47, 3 (2009), pp. 449-474. © Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:io.ioi7/Soo22278Xo9oo4oo5 Printed in the United Kingdom
Ambiguous elections: the

influence of non-electoral politics
in Ethiopian démocratisation'"
Kjetil Tronvoll
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo, PO Box 6yo6 St.
Olavs plass, oijo Oslo, Norway
Email : kjetil.tronvoll@nchr.uio.no
ABSTRACT
The ' non-electoral context ' of elections is often overlooked in démocratisation

studies, in order not to obscure an otherwise clear model or theory of transition.
A key challenge for research on démocratisation processes is to balance electoral
'formalities' with contextual factors, qualitative perceptions and non-electoral
issues, in order to reach a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of
democratic transitions. This article advocates a multilayered approach to - or a
'thick description' of- elections, as this will capture the diversity of real life ex-
periences and expose alternative power discourses competing with the electoralist
one in influencing the path of démocratisation. In so doing, it casts light on the
crucial impact of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war on Ethiopia's 2005 election, in
addition to other qualitative and contextual factors, which lead to the conclusion
that the advancement of democracy through multiparty elections in Ethiopia
under the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has
failed.
INTRODUCTION! UNDERSTANDING AMBIGUOUS ELECTIONS
During the fiercely contested, but seriously f

southern Ethiopia, two elderly voters express
the incumbent in the following manner: 'Th
let us only smell democracy, now they ha
* I wish to thank Tobias Hagman and Staffan Lindberg for u

this paper, and the two anonymous readers of JMAS for insigh
Work on this paper was made possible by research grant n
Research Council. Possible errors and wrong interpretations ma
alone.
450 KJETIL TRONVOLL
Election is personal and personally one m

2001). The phrase captures the ambig
transitions from authoritarian rule; the
cannot be fully measured by the ' sme
alone. Elections need to reflect the 'tas
electorate too.
Formal political procedures and the performance of the election insti-

tute itself, the ' smell ' of democracy, are of course important elements in
understanding democratic transition; however, other events and processes
outside the electoral arena may also play a crucial role in influencing the
conduct of elections. This 'non-electoral context' in which elections are
situated is often overlooked in démocratisation studies, in order not to
obscure an otherwise clear model or theory of transition. A key challenge
for research on démocratisation processes is thus how to balance electoral
'formalities' with contextual factors and qualitative perceptions of demo-
cracy, in order to reach a more nuanced and comprehensive under-
standing of democratic transitions. This article advocates a multilayered
approach - or ' thick description ' - to elections, in order to capture the
diversity of real life experiences and expose alternative power discourses
competing with the electoralist one in influencing the path of démo-
cratisation.
The coming to power in Ethiopia of the Ethiopian Revolutionary

Democratic Front (EPRDF) in May 1991 ostensibly heralded a new
paradigm of multiparty democracy, constitutionalism and human rights
protection in the country (Abbink 1995; Henze 1998; Tronvoll 2000;
Vaughan 1994). Embedded in a complex, multi-tracked and partly con-
tradictory process of post-conflict political transition, the conduct of elec-
tions in the country has been both praised and criticised by domestic as
well as international observers, to the extent that the role of elections in the
overall transition appears quite ambiguous.
Some doomed the democratic transition to fail for various reasons
already at its incipient stage (de Waal 1992/93; Engedayehu 1993;

Harbeson 1998b; Joireman 1997). Others hesitated whether elections in
themselves represented an end to (Lyons 1996) or the beginning of a
transition (Lyons 2006), or simply served as an extension of it (Harbeson
2005). The first general election of 1995 was characterised by some a
'democratic in formal structure as well as in spirit and practice' (Henze
1998), while others rebuffed such an assessment and concluded that
EPRDF rule fell way short of democratic standards and could not b
considered as an electoral democracy (Harbeson 1998a; Joseph 1998).1 All
emphasised formal democracy indicators as well as the government's
NON-ELECTORAL POLITICS IN ETHIOPIAN DEMOCRATISATION 45I
'intention' and 'will' to open up for competitive politics in their analysis,

but reached opposite conclusions.
A broad interdisciplinary study published after the second general
election in 2000, taking stock of a decade of démocratisation in Ethiopia,
emphasised the subordinate and irrelevant role of elections as a power-
distributing institution, since true political power was anchored in a
parallel non-elected shadow governmental system operated by the govern-
ment party and cadre structure, branching out to all administrative levels
of the state (Pausewang et al. 2002).
The 2005 general election also produced a challenge for democracy
assessment, as most observers were in great qualms on how to reconcile
the rather positive process leading up to election day with the tragic and
turbulent events unfolding in the aftermath of the election. The competi-
tive and open process leading up to the 2005 election, and the increased
electoral support gained by the opposition, made many scholars charac-
terise it as something fundamentally new in Ethiopian politics, to the ex-
tent that the 2005 election was labelled as 'founding', 'formative' and
' genuine ' for true democracy by leading political scientists within the field
of Ethiopian studies (Clapham 2005; Harbeson 2005; Lyons 2006). Other
scholars, however, assessing the 2005 elections from an anthropological
viewpoint and within the broader context of Ethiopian political culture
(Abbink 2006a), or from the point of view of the peasantry (Lefort 2007),
emphasised the continuation of authoritarianism in the electoral process,
which basically 'placed genuinely "free and fair" elections out of reach'
for the electorate (ibid. : 253). The latter perspectives interpret elections
within localised socio-political contexts, and argue that formal electoral
politics are governmental posture only, not allowing for true electoral
competition. This perspective also sparked a scholarly debate over meth-
odological approaches to understanding the outcome of the electoral
process, as Jon Abbink's (2006b) interpretation of authoritarian con-
tinuities was criticised by Tobias Hagmann (2006) as being ' culturalist '
and political reductionist in its interpretation. Post-election studies, fur-
thermore, assessing the elections in relation to political and judicial re-
forms and to human rights implementation, suggest that the overall
political transition in Ethiopia is markedly negative and political space is
restricted partly as a consequence of the electoral race itself (Aalen &
Tronvoll 2009b; Tronvoll 2008).
It seems clear that the role of Ethiopian elections in the process of
démocratisation can be interpreted differently, in accordance with the
criteria emphasised, time-span considered and analytical approach pre-
ferred. Focusing on electoral formalities only, it may appear that the
452 KJETIL TRONVOLL
Ethiopian democratic transition has be

political parties, broader participation
opposition during the course of three ro
'narrow3 analytical approach, these gain
cessful process of démocratisation itself,
transition are an important causal factor
(Lindberg 2006a). The conduct of Ethiopi
preted as a catalyst of democratic chang
electoral arena to include contextual and non-electoral events in the
analysis, the influence of elections on démocratisation becomes more
blurred, and may even be interpreted as an impediment to improvement.
A key challenge in studies on democratic transition is thus how to define
the 'electoral arena5, in order to include all relevant factors and processes
impinging on the democratic transition. Most observers agree that elec-
tions are only one of several indicators for a successful consolidation of
democracy. For instance, during the fifteen years of multiparty elections in
Ethiopia, the country has inter alia also experienced : a restructuring of the
system of governance from a unitary state into an ethnic federation; a full-
scale bilateral war with a former close ally (Eritrea) ; a government dissent
movement and party rupture which almost toppled the premier from
within ; and the continuation of low-scale insurgent wars from multiple
resistance movements. How we should analyse the impact of these events
in relation to the Ethiopian elections and process of transition is by no
means clear and agreed upon.
In order to exhibit the perceived ambiguity of Ethiopian elections, this
discussion seeks to identify the missing pieces in the jigsaw puzzle, so as to
explain in full the nuances of Ethiopian démocratisation. Or, in other
words, to build up a sufficient 'thick description5 of the Ethiopian démo-
cratisation process which can arrest the residual analytical ambiguity of a
more limited approach.
After a brief section on Ethiopian transitions and multiparty elections,
the first 'layer5 of analysis of Ethiopian elections is based on inter-
nationally accepted electoral indicators. These show that elections may
appear as a catalyst of change in the country. Subsequently, a second
' layer 5 of information is added, emphasising contextual politics and post-
election and between-election events. This questions the liberalising effect
of elections to such an extent that elections may actually appear as im-
pediments to improvement in Ethiopia. Finally, a third ' layer 5 of analysis
incorporating formative non-electoral political events is added in
order to reach what anthropologists term a 'thick description5 of the
political transition. At this point, we learn that the apparent contradictory
NON-ELECTORAL POLITICS IN ETHIOPIAN DEMOCRATISATION 453
democratic 'gains' and 'set-backs' experienced in the 2005 elections ar

explainable and make sense. The article concludes with some comments
on the future role of multiparty elections in the country.
ETHIOPIAN TRANSITIONS
Before adopting multiparty democracy in 199

two violent successions of government : the coup
Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1974, and the defe
military junta of Colonel Mengistu Hailemaria
EPRDF in 1991. Since the fall of the Derg and t
party political system, Ethiopia has undertake
1995, 2000 and 2005 (in addition to elections fo
in 1994, and four rounds of local elections).
Multiparty elections were launched in Ethiop
the military junta, in the 1992 local and regio
event, which was intended to symbolise the c
indicated the continuation of authoritarianism
the withdrawal of the Oromo Liberation Fron
groupings from the Transitional Governmen
elections as a protest against what these saw
nation and the curtailment of political space.
second biggest party in the TGE, after the E
component in legitimating an all-inclusive
However, just a few weeks after the establish
discord over which front should administer
Ethiopia escalated into armed clashes betwe
Despite reaching a political agreement, skirm
lated, involving various other Oromo, Somali
fought one another and the EPRDF. A new
February 1992, with the assistance of the Un
People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which requi
region to be encamped before the first local
carried out in June 1992 (de Waal 1992/93:
truce established between the two parties w
days before the election, the OLF decided to
and annulled all their candidates in the upcom
conducive democratic atmosphere in the count
the OLF also withdrew from the Transitional Government and decided to
pull its 15,000 troops out of the camps (NDI/AAI 1992). The latter move
was met with massive force by the EPRDF, and another brief civil war
454 KJETIL TRONVOLL
ensued before the EPRDF crushed t

military campaign against the TGE,
Oromo territories. Over 19,000 Orom
(AI 1995), many of whom are still linge
The 1992 local election was thus carri
armed clashes in several parts of the co
not ready, either politically or logistic
political endeavour (Joireman 1997:
International Observer Group's mission
ated due to the OLF-EPRDF confrontat
1992 election was marred by irregular
and the post-election period was mark
aftermath of the election, further non
government, which has since been com
Since the dramatic 1992 election, the
ticipating in the electoral process in t
illegal armed resistance front. By disqu
from the electoral arena, the voting
constituency in Ethiopia (constituting a
of the country) is likely to be askew a
will of the electorate.4 The political eff
lingered throughout all Ethiopian elect
the démocratisation process is impossib
The first federal election in 1995 was
culmination of the transition period, b
political space the main organised oppos
(Lyons 1996; Tronvoll & Aadland 1995).
elections, the opposition gave up its non
first time voters at national level were
EPRDF-affiliated parties. Due to both p
harassment and intimidation, the oppo
threat to the EPRDF party structure (w
the Southern region) (Tronvoll 2001). A
ising degrees of openness, as the gover
opposition leaders to conduct rallies an
But on the ground in rural areas, the
harassment by local authorities and ca
The 2005 elections to regional and fed
stituted a radical change from earlier e
cess, the electorate witnessed an unpre
plurality of political opinions through c
public media. For the first time ever, 'politics' as open critique of the rule
was initially accepted, and the collective apprehension which had pre
vailed in the population since the brutal and horrendous Red Terro
purges in the 1970s faded away (Tegegn 2008: 290). Moreover, in the 2005
election the incumbent party was for the first time truly challenge
through the ballot box by a coordinated opposition at a national leve
(Lyons 2006). Two opposition blocks, the United Ethiopian Democrati
Front (UEDF) and the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD),5
fielded candidates in most of the country's constituencies, posing a rea
political alternative to the EPRDF government party.
Immediately after the closing of the polls, however, the democratic
spirit nourished in the campaign was cowed, as the government imposed
blanket ban on freedom of assembly in Addis Ababa, and simultaneousl
suspended the counting process in many areas. The EU observer mission
assessed the closing and counting process negatively in almost half o
the urban polling stations observed, and even more in rural station
(EU-EOM 2005a: 2; see also Carter Center 2005). After a dubious process
of re-count and re-elections in certain constituencies, the Ethiopia
National Election Board proclaimed the EPRDF as the victor. Althoug
the opposition block had gained a dramatic increase in representation in
the parliament from earlier elections, winning one third of the seats, the
protested at the announcement. Renewed nationwide demonstration
were called, in which close to 200 demonstrators were killed in Add
Ababa during protests in June and late November 2005. In order to cur
the increasing resistance against the government, a nation-wide clamp-
down was ordered. About 20,000-30,000 opposition members and sym-
pathisers, mostly affiliated to the CUD, were detained for shorter and
longer periods (Abbink 2006a). The CUD leadership, including the newly
elected mayor of Addis Ababa, was arrested on charges of instigatin
violence, attempted unconstitutional change of government, and eve
attempted genocide (a charge later dropped by the court). Civil society
organisations and the private media were also targeted and closed
down. The promising 2005 electoral process as experienced prior to the
election day in May turned into a bloody and failed affair by the end of the
year.
FIRST LAYER: ELECTORAL FORMALITIES
The first layer of analysis presents the formal

through a set of internationally recognised elect
the realisation of actual participation, contestati
Λφ KJETIL TRONVOLL
Table ι
Electoral development 1995-2005
Election 1995 200° 2OO5
Political Voter turnout 94 %6 8o%7 n-d'8

participation Opposition involvement Boycott 9 Participation Part
No. of parties participating 4710 49Π 7°
No. of registered candidates 98713 i,oyju 1,847
Competition P Government's share of seats
Competition P in parliament 86%(99%)16 88%(95%)17 6o%(68%)18
Largest opposition party's share
of seats in parliament 0-2 %19 1-5 0/°2° 2O %21
Turnover of power No No No
Legitimacy Losers' acceptance of result (Boycott) So
Peaceful process Yes Partly No
Electoral regime survival Yes Yes Yes
of elections (Lindberg 2006a). By emphasising these indicators, we disco

that the Ethiopian elections appear to have contributed to a broadenin
of the politics of pluralism in the country. The third round of election
Ethiopia in 2005 in particular marked a significant improvement in ter
of political participation and competition (see Table 1).
Political participation is the fundamental principle in any kind
democracy, and the overall participation as measured through vo
turnout in the Ethiopian elections has been remarkably high in all el
tions conducted under EPRDF rule (see Table 1). The official statis
indicate that the turnout of registered voters has been between 80%
94%, a surprisingly high figure considering the size of the country and
predominantly rural population. Although we see a drop in turnout fr
the 1995 to the 2000 elections, this is probably not due to reduced popu
interest in the 2000 election, but may relate to a shift of governmen
strategy to mobilise people to vote: the coercion and intimidation em
ployed in 1995 to mobilise the rural population to the polls did not t
place (at least on a large scale) in 2000.
Participation by all political parties in the electoral process is not gi
in transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. Partial or full boy
of the electoral process may be the only leverage a strained oppositio
party can use in order to influence how the process is played out by
dominant and maybe semi-authoritarian government party (Lindb
2006b). One may thus assume that the full participation of all par
indicates a higher democratic quality in elections than if some or all of
opposition parties had boycotted. The Ethiopian electoral trajectory in

this regard represents a positive trend, as the 1995 opposition boycott
strategy was abandoned in favour of partial participation in the 2000 and
full participation in the 2005 elections.22 Furthermore, if we look more
closely at the number of parties and candidates running for election, we
see a very positive overall increase in participation, with the number of
candidates for parliament actually doubling from 1995 to 2005, with a
particular high increase in the severely contested 2005 election.
An election is the formal public organisation of political competition.
To realise this objective, it has to present (or at least allow for) true and
viable political alternatives for the electorate to chose between. There
must thus both a component of de jure recognition of the formation and
contestation of alternatives, as well as a de facto acceptance of such alterna-
tives through facilitating political campaigning and effective partici-
pation in the polls. The influence of the election on the composition of
parliament is selected as an apt indicator of the level of electoral compe-
tition. As shown in Table 1, the EPRDF party more or less held a mon-
opoly of the seats in parliament in both the 1995 and 2000 elections.
A radical change in the control of seats occurred in the 2005 election,
when the opposition in total gained control of just under one third of the
seats, and the biggest opposition party, the CUD, alone controlled about
20%.
The 2005 election clearly signals a new parliamentary paradigm in

Ethiopia, as the two main opposition parties, the CUD and UEDF, gained
109 and 52 representatives respectively.23 As electoral competition goes,
the 2005 election apparently heralded a shift in how political contestation
was channelled and facilitated through the ballot box. The ultimate indi-
cator of competition, the turnover of power, was seriously tested in the
2005 election, but remains to be recognised in Ethiopia.
Legitimacy is the most obvious distinguishing feature between elections
in democracies, non-democracies and hybrid regimes (Lindberg 2006a:
43). In Ethiopia the conduct of all three elections has been questioned and
challenged by opposition actors, through strategies of boycott in 1995,
while in 2005 both the incumbent and the opposition protested against the
results in the majority of the constituencies (EU-EOM 2005a). After a
prolonged process of investigation and re-election in certain con-
stituencies, the incumbent accepted the overall result, whereas the op-
position continued to doubt the accuracy and transparency of the process.
However, the two opposition blocks chose different strategies to pursue
their objections. The UEDF coalition conceded the overall outcome and
took up its seats in parliament, whilst the CUD leadership continued to
458 KJETIL TRONVOLL
protest and refused to take up its rightful positions in
elected offices (inter alia that of mayor of Addis
Despite the major gains achieved by the opposition
the lack of acceptance of the results by certain
undermined the overall legitimacy of the electoral
The absence of politically related violence during
critical to its overall electoral legitimacy. Violence
compass both elite and popular elements, since
perpetrated by both. The Ethiopian elections have s
in regard to the use of violence: no violence was re
events occurred in 2000, when a few constituenci
experienced certain critical incidents (Tronvoll 20
increase to large-scale and widespread post-election
about 200 civilians killed and prolonged unrest in m
several months after the election (Abbink 2006a).24
Despite the increasing level of opposition protest
the electoral regime has survived intact. The go
claimed to be furthering and consolidating democr
yet signalled any major revisions or restrictions o
system, although certain legislative 'adjustments'
(Aalen & Tronvoll 2009b).
The above trends in the conduct of elections i
three dimensions of participation, competition and
in keeping with Africa-wide developments (Lindber
particular interesting to note the significant incr
participation and competition in the third round o
only at the statistics on Ethiopia's three rounds of g
thus appear that the country has successfully evo
democracy. But is this so ?
SECOND LAYER: CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVES
Most observers of political transitions agree

cannot be fully understood by emphasising o
voter turnout, election result and acceptance,
participation, competition and legitimacy.
elections tends to overlook the reality that d
building and elections in Africa are both heav
international relations and donor interests, a
context enmeshed with traditional forms of p
authority and power. Hence, a focus on 'f
within a quantitative approach and categorised from the viewpoint of

Westphalian statehood tends to reduce the number of possible variables
impinging on the conduct of elections (Abbink 2006a). In order to avoid
falling into that trap, a second layer of contextual and qualitative analysis
is added, revealing that the Ethiopian elections may actually be conceived
as an impediment to fostering political pluralism in the country.
Revolutionary democracy and participation
To understand electoral competition in Ethiopia, it is crucial to under-

stand the ideological anchoring of the government, which influences the
norms and rules of political participation. Analysing the origin of TPLF/
EPRDF, and its ideological basis, it seems clear that the EPRDF has never
appeared as an organisation committed to pluralism for its own sake
(Vaughan 2003; Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003; Young 1997). The leadership
has its own understanding of democracy, which differs significantly from
liberal democracy (see also Milkias 2001). The party's conception of
democracy is not the liberal 'bourgeois' variety, based on individual par-
ticipation, a diversity of interests and views, and plural representation
(Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003). Indeed, the EPRDF has considered liberal
democracy to be a misfit under the social, economic and political con-
ditions prevailing in Ethiopia. What the Front calls 'popular democracy'
(or 'revolutionary democracy', see EPRDF 1999/2000) does not corre-
spond to our understanding of the concept, but is based on communal col-
lective participation and representation based on consensus. The EPRDF's
perception of democracy is formed partly by ideological conditioning
(Marxist and Maoist precepts of mass political mobilisation), and partly by
historical experience during the TPLF's seventeen-year struggle to liberate
Tigray from the yoke of the Derg regime (Tadesse & Young 2003).
Various 'levelling' policies implemented in the liberated areas during the
struggle (such as, for instance, land reform) entailed that the peasantry was
regarded as a 'homogenous mass' with common needs, interests, and
political outlook. Political participation in these 'mass' terms presumes
such commonality, which makes pluralism irrelevant. This does not rule
out debate for the purpose of arriving at the information, clarification and
persuasion required to reach consensus; but once consensus is achieved,
the community speaks with one voice, and dissent is ruled out - or rather
does not 'objectively' emerge since decisions are not made until consensus
is achieved (Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003). Such a perspective generates
all the relevant terms associated with elections and liberal democracy
(decentralisation, participation, inclusiveness of discussion, etc.). But it also
460 KJETIL TRONVOLL
invests each with a markedly different meaning, p
ties of historical materialism, rather than the vagaries
Unsurprisingly, elections promoted under the auspi
will meet practical constraints not experienced
A case in point was the critical self-evaluation (gim
EPRDF in the aftermath of the 2000 election, since
to the opposition was considered a failure of their
seats in the House of Representatives (Pausewang e
The basis of (non-)participation and (noncompetiti
Official statistics claim that the voter turnout in th

94 % (subsequent elections also show a high turnou
number in any election, and particularly so when
parties called for a boycott of the election. Th
Election Board explained the high turnout with th
been put on voter education informing the public a
participating in the election, in combination with t
aware that the present election is decisive for the
authority'.25 This interpretation was backed by go
claimed that the high registration and turnout was
popularity, in particular considering the oppositio
election.26 As political legitimacy is drawn from po
this high turnout really reflect popular support fo
in 1995 and subsequently in 2000?
Considering the nation-wide focus of elections, it
electorate has congruous reasons to participate and
overlooks the reality that different population gro
reasons to participate in elections, as they have di
lationships, experiences and perceptions of the state
and the electoral process itself. This was the ca
electorate. It is vital to understand how state power
ected and perceived at the grass-roots of society, in
peasant participation in the electoral process. Peas
well be motivated on ideological grounds, but is jus
other contextual tropes. Varying ethnic group
Ethiopian state itself, for instance, may motivate
participation, as different voters will understand t
government' differently, particularly as the Amha
government and power are fused into the singular c
ethnography of the electoral process needs thus to
Several qualitative research studies on the 1995 electoral process ques-

tion the popular basis of participation in the election (Aspen 1995; Poluha
1995, 1997; Tronvoll & Aadland 1995). Presumably, a large share of the
Ethiopian electorate registered and voted against their will and political
conviction. The main motivating factor was a combination of insecurity
of survival and coercion exercised by the local administrative structures
(kebelle). The Ethiopian peasantry make up about 85% of the population,
and the dominant mode of production is subsistence agriculture. Land-
ownership is vested in the state and access to land is administered by the
local administrative apparatus. The power over agricultural land invests
the government with direct control over the peasants, who are dependent
on the land for their own survival. The unsettled issue of land-ownership
and access to land in the aftermath of the EPRDF takeover of power in
1 99 1 created insecurity and anxiety among the peasantry, a sentiment
intensified by government threats of eviction from agricultural land if the
peasants did not participate in the election (Aspen 1995; Tronvoll &
Aadland 1995). Furthermore, in order to enforce collective mobilisation, a
rumour about forthcoming nation-wide land redistribution was circulated.
Local party cadres stressed to the peasants the importance to register and
participate in the election since the electoral roll would form the basis for
usufruct claims to land.27 Other factors related to usufruct of land, as for
instance enrolment in fertiliser development credit schemes, were also
employed in a coercive strategy to force peasants to register. Together
these mechanisms served as an efficient government tool for voter mobil-
isation, despite stated reluctance by scores of the peasantry to support the
incumbent party.
During the 2000 election it was also noted that the incumbent used
its power over state resources and institutions in order to coerce popu-
lation groups into electoral submission. The state responses were
most sophisticated in the southern region of the country, where the op-
position party Southern Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Coalition
(SEPDC) had started to organise a vibrant local constituency. At that
time, a local famine necessitated the distribution of relief food aid to
the population, as well as additional agricultural inputs (e.g. seed cereals).
This relief distribution became politicised, and the local authorities
communicated to the peasantry that only people who turned out to vote
for the ruling party would receive state donations (Pausewang & Tronvoll
2000).
Both coercion and cosmological perceptions of state and power
influence electoral participation, which may also reflect a calculated
strategy to vote for the winner, since to do otherwise carries intense risks to
462 KJETIL TRONVOLL
their welfare and even survival (Lefort 2007). Ant
peasant political behaviour in Ethiopia make comp
of power to subjugate pluralism of thought and to
quiescence (Poluha 2002; Tronvoll 2001; Zewde &
Lefort (2007: 269) observes, one of the key question
the 2005 elections was: 'With which candidate do I
reducing my chances of survival?' Since the massiv
CUD in political rallies prior to the election made it
outcome, many rural voters deliberately abstained
their ballot invalid, in order not to make a choice f
too risky.28
The participation of political parties in the Ethiopian elections may
appear, at first sight, to be truly participatory, since there have been be-
tween 47 to 70 parties running. Analysing the pattern of party coalitions,
affiliated and subsidiary parties, however, shows that the absolute majority
of the parties are affiliated to or controlled by the EPRDF (Vaughan &
Tronvoll 2003). Likewise, the participation of individual candidates cannot
be taken as an indication of a broader political pluralism in the country, as
in the 1995 elections for instance, more or less all of the individual candi-
dates were actually asked, or ordered, by the incumbent party itself to run,
in order to create a semblance of multi-choice in the elections for the
consumption of international society (Tronvoll & Aadland 1995). Behind a
façade of multi-partyism, the Ethiopian people have reported a lack of
genuine choices to vote for (see Valfort 2006). The hobbled electoral
process has undermined peoples' trust and confidence in participatory
politics. A recent survey shows that relatively few Ethiopians express
confidence in their country's social and political institutions; among the
institutions ranked, elections receive the lowest levels of trust of them all
with only 13 %.29 Elections as a mode of transition in Ethiopia apparently
do not garner trust in the process from the presumed most important
actor, the electorate.
Voters, as both individuals and collectives, have different loyalties, ex-
periences and perceptions of national politics. This will also of course
provide for differing reasons to engage - or not - in electoral processes.
Using only such formal statistics as the number of registered voters and
turnout glosses over the multiple reasons why people actually participate
in elections. Furthermore, when the incumbent regime uses the electoral
process as a means to forcefully impose conformity and political mobilis-
ation in accordance with its own political priorities, elections may actually
work against fostering politics of plurality and enhancing openness in the
country.
Claims of (il ) legitimacy
As on no previous occasion, the 2005 election engaged the electorate in a

truly contested process. During the post-election period, on the other
hand, arguably the true colours of governmental manipulation and in-
timidation became apparent, as the incumbent cracked down on any
civilian display of protest. Whilst there is ample evidence of irregularities
during pre-election, polling day, vote counting and the appeals process,
the available data are not sufficient to claim that the joint opposition forces
actually won the election at federal level, and were subsequently robbed of
it (as suggested by EU-EOM 2005b; and argued by for instance Tegegn
2008).
The donor assistance group (DAG) in Ethiopia was generally critical of
the post-election phase, and after the November 2005 political crack-
down, direct budget support was suspended in order to pressure the
government to release political prisoners and respect human rights.
However, Meles Zenawi did not alter his position, and rebuffed calls from
DAG and other international actors to 'loosen up the grip' on Ethiopian
civil society (Aalen & Tronvoll 2009b). The Ethiopian government's con-
scious strategy of resisting donor imposition, as well as donors' inability to
consistently follow coherent and coordinated strategies, have led to a
marginalisation of the donor group's influence on domestic politics in
Ethiopia (Borchgrevink 2008). At certain points, donor pressure may led
the government to open up (as allowing for international election ob-
servers ahead of the 2005 elections), but in the long-term perspective it is
difficult to trace any effect on Ethiopian policies of donor conditionality
(ibid.)30
The grievances expressed in the immediate aftermath of the May 2005
election have been sustained due to continued governmental political
manipulations and restrictions. The events that followed the 2005 election
thus reflect the pattern established for all elections since 1991, with dra-
matic closures of political space and post-election reprisals after the op-
position has made inroads into EPRDF dominance (Pausewang et al.
2002).
The 2005 election and its aftermath must thus be analysed as a phase in
a longer trajectory of political development in Ethiopia under the EPRDF.
The 2005 election may be compared to the 2000 election, only writ large.
The only research study of the 2000 election concluded that if the op-
position had been better organised in several regions in Ethiopia, the
government would have met a much suffer challenge, and the post-elec-
tion events would have been more critical for the whole of Ethiopia (ibid).
464 KJETIL TRONVOLL
Partly, this is what happened in 2005. The oppositi
and better organised, which led to a more compre
the aftermath of the elections.
Within this perspective, the post-2005 election clamp-down did not

come as a surprise. Although significant shifts in voter preferences towards
the opposition occurred, Abbink (2006a: 173) notes that the authoritarian
political tradition in Ethiopia reasserted itself in the reluctance of the in-
cumbent government to allow a transparent and accountable counting
and re-election process. The election may be interpreted as a step forward,
but did not signify a decisive, non-reversible move towards full democracy
because of the manipulated counting and re-election process, and new
institutional restrictions imposed on the broader sphere of democratic
activities (media, NGOs, parliament, etc.). The 2005 election thus follows
in the same path as the previous ones, as they 'revealed major constraints
in Ethiopia's political system, underlining that after the regimes of
Emperor Haile Sellassie (1930-74) and the military leader Mengistu
(1974-91), centralist authoritarianism is not gone but perhaps is being re-
invented in a new form' (ibid. : 174). As such, the 2005 post-election
crackdown is explainable. But the sudden broadening of participation in
the election, the opposition gains and the incumbent's losses, are hard to
explain in relation to the electoral context or on the basis of democratic
transition theory (Lindberg 2006a). Thus we need to thicken our intake of
explanatory data in order to find complementary reasons why the
government did not manage to tackle opposition participation and cam-
paigning at the grass-roots in the run-up to the 2005 election.
third layer:none -electoral events' influence

ON ELECTIONS
The significant shift in true participation, com

come occurred only during the third election
sumably, enhanced the legitimacy of the
participation in the process, as demonstrated by
pro-opposition demonstrations in Addis Abab
from government-coerced participation to genu
open process. What inspired this change of men
ate ? A possible nexus can be found in the outb
Ethiopian war in May 1998.
The war was ostensibly fought over a dispute
Tronvoll 2000; Plaut & Gilkes 1999). The two go
allies, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the TPLF/
EPRDF, mobilised huge military and monetary resources to wage the
war; at the same time, they sought to explain the war to their populations
by revising immediate past history, and designing new paradigms of
identity politics in which former allies were turned into new enemies, and
old foes into new friends (Tronvoll 2009). The paradigmatic shifts put
in motion by the 1998-2000 war had a dramatic impact on post-war
political processes which again eventually played into the 2005 election :
a government party rupture and the recurrence of pan-Ethiopian
nationalism with the subsequent political crystallisation into the electoral
process.
The TPLF 7 EPRDF party rupture
In the wake of the war, internal dissent brewed against the Ethiopian
government and party leadership.31 The main criticism against Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi originated within his own party, the TPLF, and
subsequently spread to the other component parts of the EPRDF
government coalition (Milkias 2001 ; Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003).
The main issue that instigated the dissent against Meles Zenawi and his
leadership was disagreement over the handling of relations with the
Eritrean government ; but other policy differences exacerbated the dispute
and the breakdown of trust within the party. The dissenters argued for a
stronger stand against Eritrea prior to the outbreak of the war (that
Ethiopia should not 'sponsor' Eritrean development), and after its out-
break they pushed for a more radical military strategy to beat back the
invasion and to eliminate the political and military capacity of the Eritrean
regime. Meles Zenawi, on the other hand, appeared to be more inclined to
engage in negotiations than in military options to settle the war, and was
subsequently criticised on that ground.
Later, when the internal discussion of the party moved to an evaluation
of the previous ten years, debate centred on ideological differences and
divergent development strategies. In the intense power struggle that fol-
lowed, the dissenters made the crucial mistake of withdrawing from party
central committee meetings ; they thus lost the vote in the party and were
expelled from the organisation (Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003). Following the
expulsions, the party political and military apparatus underwent a com-
prehensive and cleansing 'criticism and self-criticism' process (gimgema),
and thousands of individuals who supported the dissenters were ousted,
including rank and file members and military heroes, as well as the leaders
of the EPRDF coalition partners OPDO and SEPDF.
466 KJETIL TRONVOLL
The 2001 process of dissent altered the power rel
EPRDF and between EPRDF and the Ethiopian cons
a number of the dissenters were popular in Tigray
record both during the struggle and during the w
Tigrayans were frustrated by the handling of the
resulted in the alienation of large segments of the
and other Ethiopians sympathetic to the role played
the Eritrean-Ethiopian war (Tronvoll 2009).
Following the rupture in the ruling party in 200
his remaining leadership were forced to undertak
measures in order to reconsolidate their political
purges (Tadesse & Young 2003). Since the cor
anchored within the TPLF/EPRDF party appar
Zenawi and his leadership were associated with sta
ment of the relations between state and party was
role of party functionaries was modified to make
within the state structure, so as to preclude the e
party factions operating outside the purview of th
(Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003). The reforms resulting
newal' process (tehadso) strengthened the powers of
under the government, but correspondingly weak
atus. The power of the EPRDF and its component
was severely emasculated, which again influenced
ground to 'deliver '-by coercion or cajoling - supp
election.
Developments in the wake of the war and dissent process may be in-
terpreted in two ways (ibid.). The political reforms undertaken can be
understood as an effective 'fusion' of party and state, with the party
leadership now more or less identical with that of the government, at
federal and regional state levels. Or, alternatively, they may imply the
downgrading of the party structures in favour of the bureaucratised state
executive. Whichever interpretation one adopts - or a combination of the
two - it seems clear that below the leadership level, the role of the party
became less clear, and the organisation less active, than was previously
the case. The post-dissent political system in Ethiopia rested more clearly
on the capacity of a single structure - the state - instead of the two legs
of party and state as had been the case under the EPRDF until after
the 2000 election.32 Hence, when the 2005 election approached, the
capacity of the party at the grass-roots to wage a comprehensive campaign
was severely weakened. Moreover, the purge itself to a certain degree
delegitimised the democratic credentials of the EPRDF in the eyes of
the public, as certain political views were cleansed out of the party. Come
the 2005 election, it was a severely weakened and emasculated local party
apparatus which had to tackle the new and strong trends of resurgent pan-
Ethiopianism.
War and the resurgence of pan-Ethiopianism
First on the EPRDF agenda when they assumed power in 1991 was to
redress the ethnic question in Ethiopia. They dismantled the unitary
Ethiopian state, and emphasised ethnic equality and autonomy within a
'new' Ethiopian federal state. In order to create confidence in this new
state, every ethnic group in Ethiopia was given the right to autonomy and
secession if it so desired (Constitution 1995: Article 39). To anchor this
political argument within a politico-historical context, the EPRDF revised
Ethiopian history. By rejecting the deep historical trajectories of the
Abyssinian state, and launching the Ίοο-years of Ethiopian history5
paradigm, the EPRDF signalled that they did not believe in any unique
historical 'Ethiopianness', and discarded state policies which buttressed
Ethiopian nationalism.
The ethnic policies of the 'new' Ethiopia were highly controversial at
the time of their introduction ; and more contentious than the ethnic fed-
eral policy itself was the EPRDF's discourse on Ethiopian identity and
history, in particular for the urban middle class and intellectuals, a
driving force behind any alternative to the EPRDF. Prior to the
war, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had demeaned Ethiopian national
symbols, and provoked large sections of the Ethiopian public (Tronvoll
2009).
The Eritrean-Ethiopian war radically changed EPRDF policies on this
issue, and had a dramatic impact on how both informal and formally
sanctioned discourses on identity were expressed. Suddenly, 'Ethiopia'
rose like a phoenix from the 'revolutionary ashes', positioning herself
at the centre of political discourse on identity. Internal ethnic identity
boundaries were downplayed, and the national entity was emphasised.
The resurgence of Ethiopian nationalism due to the war contributed
to the rapid growth of the new pan-Ethiopian political coalition, CUD,
established in its aftermath. CUD grew out of the sentiments created
by the war : frustrations over a perceived failed EPRDF policy of ethnic
federalism and the restoration of a proud Ethiopianness. Although two
forerunners and component parts of the new CUD had previously cam-
paigned on a pan-Ethiopian ticket, the political context in the country was
too constrained for them to be effective in the 2000 election. The
468 KJETIL TRONVOLL
Eritrean-Ethiopian war, however, prompted a rev
politics, and the CUD filled this lacuna in the poli
country.
For the first time since the EPRDF gained power, an opposition party
managed to present itself as a national alternative to the incumbent. The
various ethnic constituencies interpreted the political discourse differently
and voted for this alternative for different reasons : the multi-ethnic/mixed
urban constituencies wanted their grievances to be heard and not ignored
as had happened under the EPRDF; the multi-ethnic south voted for CUD
as a national alternative and protest to EPRDF; parts of the Amhara
constituency wished to restore some elements of the unitary Ethiopia;
Tigrayans voted for CUD (yes, many Tigrayans in urban areas actually
voted for CUD) since they felt that EPRDF's ethnic policies were not to
their advantage, and that they had become ethnically stigmatised as regime
supporters and thus vulnerable to attack from other groups. As one
Tigrayan explained, 'Meles is pulling us all down with him'.33 And so the
list goes on.
The outbreak of new war furthermore proved that the EPRDF, in the
eyes of many Ethiopians, had failed in its core rationale : to bring peace
and stability to the country. The sustained ethnic conflicts and widespread
human rights abuses also helped to undermine the legitimacy of the
EPRDF as 'something different' from Ethiopia's former rulers (Tronvoll
2008). Even the EPRDF's promise to deliver 'development' and poverty
reduction was perceived by the electorate to have failed, as the CUD also
profited from economic grievances among large sections of the Ethiopian
constituency (Arriola 2003 [2008]).
CONCLUSIONIAMBIGUITYNOMORE
The Ethiopian case illustrates some of the inh

ating the role of elections in democratic transi
narrow formalistic approach of measuring th
effect' of elections, relying only on a set of un
criteria, since non-electoral events (which are n
election studies) may determine the conduct of
the path of démocratisation. Thus, the 'thinn
provided, the more ambiguity it contains, wh
the spectrum of partisan evaluations of the p
Looking only at the statistics of elections in Ethio
the country has evolved into an electoral d
contextual and other non-electoral information
NON-ELECTORAL POLITICS IN ETHIOPIAN DEMOCRATISAT ION 469
that the electoral process has not managed to deliver 'more democracy5 to
Ethiopia, but rather the contrary.
The altered path of Ethiopian démocratisation, with the formative pre-
and post-election events of 2005, cannot be understood without reference
to the 1998-2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian war. The war's impact on Ethiopian
electoral politics appears to be crucial. The internal dissent movement
inspired by the war almost led to the downfall of Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi, who in order to reconsolidate his power base severely weakened
the party apparatus ahead of the 2005 election. Concomitantly, centralist
and pan-Ethiopian political forces capitalised on the nationalistic senti-
ments created by the war and established an electoral platform opposing
the EPRDF on its core policy areas: emphasising Ethiopian unity and
nationalism against the argued divisive forces of ethnic federalism. The
domestic political impact of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war almost managed
to do what President Issaias Afwerki of Eritrea never came close to : re-
moving Meles Zenawi and the EPRDF from power.
The 2005 election jolted the EPRDF government, undermining their
belief that they could control the electoral outcome of 'revolutionary
democracy'. Thus, to consolidate their power, the EPRDF initiated a
party re-energising process, inter alia increasing the number of party
members from 760,000 in 2005 to 4*5 million in 2008. Parallel to the party-
enlargement, new structural and legislative obstacles to a vibrant civil
society serving as checks-and-balances to government authority were
created (Aalen & Tronvoll 2009b). Hence, since the 'founding', 'forma-
tive' and 'genuine' 2005 election, Ethiopia has undergone a markedly
negative political development, severely undermining liberal values and
the politics of plurality in the country. The conduct of the 2008 local
election, the most recent election in Ethiopia, aptly illustrates this trend.
The process leading to election day was reminiscent of the coercive and
controlling strategies employed in advance of the first 1992 local elections
under EPRDF rule; consequently the main opposition parties again
withdrew from the election in order not to give legitimacy to a result which
they perceived to be totally manipulated (Aalen & Tronvoll 2009a). By re-
arresting Birtukan Medeksa, the former CUD leader and current chair-
woman of the pan-Ethiopian opposition party Unity for Justice and
Democracy (Andinet), in late December 2008, the Ethiopian government
firmly shut the door to the liberalising 'effect' of elections. Birtukan's
earlier pardon from the life sentence she was given after the 2005 election
unrest was suspended, according to Ethiopian authorities, since she had
violated the pardon agreement (HRW 2009). She is now serving
her life sentence, and, according to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, no
470 KJETIL TRONVOLL
international pressure on the Ethiopian g

that decision (Addis Fortune 2009b).
With this action, Meles Zenawi confirm
the renowned political scientist Samue
an assignment in 1993 to assess the pros
Meles Zenawi asked Huntington (199
' Professor Huntington, I have read your
to your analysis, countries become demo
wealthy. Ethiopia is an extremely poor cou
of economic development. Does that mea
in this country? ' Huntington was prepare
admit that the overall balance of econom
Ethiopia was not favourable to démocrati
'Western style democracy5. He was qui
conceivably some other type of democra
Ethiopia, but, he added, 'whether it is or
the extent to which political leaders wan
racy. Political regimes are created not by
leaders' (ibid.: 3).
The EPRDF leadership has apparent
Ethiopian démocratisation; and the prosp
election are bleak. As this article has s
much-contested discursive and symbol
where actors clash over defining and
To capture the implications of policies ad
make sense out of the electioneering g
achieve a 'thick' as possible description of
NOTES
1 . These contributions were all published in the same issue οι Journal

had great doubts in how to evaluate the process. See editors' note, 'Is
Democracy q, 4 (1998): 39.
2. Dersr is Amharic for 'Committee', a demotic term for the militar
3. The All Amhara People's Organisation, the Ethiopian Democrat
for the Liberation of Oromia, and Gedeo People's Democratic Organ
elections at the same time as OLF (loireman 10,07).
4. The exclusion of the armed Ethiopian resistance movements from the electoral arena is obvi-
ously a challenge to how one ought to analyse how political electoral competition and support reflects
the true will of the electorate. In addition to the unknown level of possible electoral support to OLF,
parallel situations are found in the Somali region with the exclusion of Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF), in Tigray with the exclusion of Tigray National Alliance for Democracy (TNAD), and
in other regions too. This article acknowledges the implicit important roles the armed resistance
movements have in the electoral process, but it falls beyond the scope of the article to incorporate such
an assessment into the analysis.
NON-ELECTORAL POLITICS IN ETHIOPIAN DEMOCRATISATION 47I
5. The CUD coalition was effective until after the 2005 election, but is today in disarray, due to
internal skirmishes and governmental clamp-down (see below).
6. There is confusion surrounding the statistics on voter registration of the 1995 elections, and
various sources mention different numbers. The 94 % turnout is calculated on the basis of numbers
given in the 'Elections in Africa' database compiled by Oxford Scholarship Online (www.
oxfordscholarship.com), which notes that 21,337,379 people registered to vote, and 19,986,179 cast
votes. (On the validity of the election statistics from the 1995 election see Tronvoll & Aadland 1995.)
7. At a national level there were 17,458,891 cast votes (according to statistics prepared by bhaun
McGrath, a data consultant working for NEBE, presented at a donor workshop in Addis Ababa
28.6.2000), out of 21,800,000 registered voters (EU-EOM 2005a).
8. No aggregated national numbers exist. 25,605,810 voters registered, excluding the òomali region.
This is estimated to be 85% of eligible voter population, according to NEBE (EU-EOM 2005a). The
EU observer mission estimates, however, that the 'voter turnout as a percentage of registered voters
should be very high' (cf. EU-EOM 2005c: 3).
9. Political parties were still in a formative phase in Ethiopia in 1995, and the border between legal
parties and illegal resistance movements was unclear. One small national opposition coalition party,
the Ethiopian National Democratic Party (composed of five minor national and ethnic parties), par-
ticipated in the 1995 elections and won one seat in parliament. The main legally registered opposition
parties (AAPO, SEPDG and EDUP) all boycotted the polls (Tronvoll & Aadland 1995). Independent
candidates were registered in most constituencies.
10. More or less all of these parties were EPRDF affiliates/subsidiaries; cf. Tronvoll & Aadland
1995·
11. Again, the majority of these parties were LFRDl· affiliates/ subsidiaries. (Election statistics pre-
pared by NEBE in 2000, on file with author.)
12. Cf. EU-EOM 2005a.
13. 015 were party candidates (pi whom 17 were women), while 372 independent candidates regis-
tered, cf. Tronvoll & Aadland 1995.
14. 700 of these were party candidates, while 377 were independents. (Election statistics prepared by
NEBE in 2000, on file with author.) EU-EOM (2005a) states that 1,080 candidates registered in 2000.
15. Cf. EU-EOM 2005a.
16. Since it is commonly recognised that there were only one opposition party member and two
independent members of the HoR in the first parliament, these percentages reflect those numbers.
17. EPRDF obtained 481 seats out of 547 seats in the House of Representatives ; including affiliated
parties (SPDP, ANDP, BGPDUP, GPDF and HNL), they took control of 518 seats, i.e. 94.7%.
18. The EPRDF obtained 327 seats in HoR; including affiliated parties (BGPDUF, ANDP, SPDP,
GPDM, SMPDUO, HNL, and ANDO), they obtained 373 seats out of a total of 547. (This in
accordance with data from Ethiopian National Election Board website : http://www.electionsethiopia.
orff/Election%2oResults.html.)
19. Ethiopian National Democratic Party (ENDP) obtained one seat, and two independents were
elected to HoR.
20. SEPDC obtained eight seats in HoR, and the opposition in total controlled fifteen seats in the
House, whilst independent candidates numbered eleven (Pausewang & Tronvoll 2000).
21. CUD opposition block obtained 109 seats in HoR; including the UEDF block (52 seats) and
OFDM nartv in seats'), the ODDOsition Darties in total secured 172 seats.
22. As mentioned, OLF and other armed resistance movements are disqualified from participating
in the electoral race, since they are prohibited to register as political parties as long as they pursue
armed struggle.
23. The Oromo Federal Democratic Movement (OFDM) won eleven seats, while Dr JNegassso
Gidada (the former president of Ethiopia) won an independent seat. The combined opposition thus
won 173 seats in the House of Representatives (Arriola 2003 [2008]).
24. The highest level of violence in relation to the electoral process, however, occurred in the
aftermath of the first 1002 local election, when OLF forces clashed with EPRDF.
25. Election board official quoted in The Ethiopian Herald 27.4.1995.
26. Confirmed by Ato Dawk Yohannes, at that time legal advisor to the executive president Meles
Zenawi, in an interview with the author, 12.5. 1995, Addis Ababa.
27. In the aftermath of the election, only the Amhara regional state carried out land redistribution.
A comprehensive study undertaken on the Amhara land reform suggests that it did exclude or mar-
ginalise known opponents of the government (Ege 1997).
472 KJETIL TRONVOLL
28. We need to keep in mind that it is commonly believ

in Africa, that the government may find out who voted
29. Religious institutions garner most trust (68 %), whils
The national government (28 %) and the judiciary (25 %)
30. A case in point is the explanation ottered by Prime
with Addis Fortune on the 2005 election events, that he
with the foreign ambassadors to Ethiopia: ' "Look, your f
only protection is the rule of law of this country. If you cr
you - not me and not the ambassadors. Don't have illusio
the end of it without harm to pay for it. " I wanted to con
because I knew they had entertained all sorts of illusions
they are detained' (Addis Fortune 2009).
31 . A parallel process of dissent against President Issaias
fore after the war (Plaut 2002).
32. After recognising this fact in the aftermath of the
worked hard to strengthen and reconsolidate its party base,
members (Aalen & Tronvoll 2009b).
33. Interviewed February 2002, Mekelle, Tigray.
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Ambiguous Elections: The Influence of Non-Electoral Politics in Ethiopian Democratisation

Author(s): Kjetil Tronvoll

Ambiguous elections: the

The ' non-electoral context ' of elections is often overlooked in démocratisation

INTRODUCTION! UNDERSTANDING AMBIGUOUS ELECTIONS

During the fiercely contested, but seriously f

* I wish to thank Tobias Hagman and Staffan Lindberg for u

Election is personal and personally one m

Formal political procedures and the performance of the election insti-

The coming to power in Ethiopia of the Ethiopian Revolutionary

already at its incipient stage (de Waal 1992/93; Engedayehu 1993;

'intention' and 'will' to open up for competitive politics in their analysis,

Ethiopian democratic transition has be

democratic 'gains' and 'set-backs' experienced in the 2005 elections ar

Before adopting multiparty democracy in 199

ensued before the EPRDF crushed t

FIRST LAYER: ELECTORAL FORMALITIES

The first layer of analysis presents the formal

Electoral development 1995-2005

Election 1995 200° 2OO5

Political Voter turnout 94 %6 8o%7 n-d'8

of elections (Lindberg 2006a). By emphasising these indicators, we disco

opposition parties had boycotted. The Ethiopian electoral trajectory in

The 2005 election clearly signals a new parliamentary paradigm in

SECOND LAYER: CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVES

Most observers of political transitions agree

within a quantitative approach and categorised from the viewpoint of

Revolutionary democracy and participation

To understand electoral competition in Ethiopia, it is crucial to under-

The basis of (non-)participation and (noncompetiti

Official statistics claim that the voter turnout in th

Several qualitative research studies on the 1995 electoral process ques-

Claims of (il ) legitimacy

As on no previous occasion, the 2005 election engaged the electorate in a

Within this perspective, the post-2005 election clamp-down did not

third layer:none -electoral events' influence

The significant shift in true participation, com

The TPLF 7 EPRDF party rupture

War and the resurgence of pan-Ethiopianism

The Ethiopian case illustrates some of the inh

international pressure on the Ethiopian g

1 . These contributions were all published in the same issue οι Journal

28. We need to keep in mind that it is commonly believ

de Waal, A. 1992/93. 'Ethiopia: transition to what?', World Policy Journal 9, 4: 719-37.

Smith, L. 2007. 'Political violence and democratic uncer

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