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Habana vs Robles

Facts:

Petitioners are authors and copyright owners of duly issued certificates of copyright registration covering
their published works, produced through their combined resources and efforts, entitled COLLEGE
ENGLISH FOR TODAY (CET for brevity), Books 1 and 2, and WORKBOOK FOR COLLEGE FRESHMAN
ENGLISH, Series 1.

Respondent Felicidad Robles and Goodwill Trading Co., Inc. are the author/publisher and
distributor/seller of another published work entitled "DEVELOPING ENGLISH PROFICIENCY" (DEP for
brevity), Books 1 and 2 (1985 edition) which book was covered by copyrights issued to them.

In the course of revising their published works, petitioners scouted and looked around various bookstores
to check on other textbooks dealing with the same subject matter. By chance they came upon the book
of respondent Robles and upon perusal of said book they were surprised to see that the book was
strikingly similar to the contents, scheme of presentation, illustrations and illustrative examples in their
own book, CET.

After an itemized examination and comparison of the two books (CET and DEP), petitioners found that
several pages of the respondent's book are similar, if not all together a copy of petitioners' book, which is
a case of plagiarism and copyright infringement.

Petitioners then made demands for damages against respondents and also demanded that they cease
and desist from further selling and distributing to the general public the infringed copies of respondent
Robles' works.

However, respondents ignored the demands, hence, on July 7, 1988; petitioners filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Makati, a complaint for "Infringement and/or unfair competition with damages" 4 against
private respondents

The RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed.

Issue: whether or not, despite the apparent textual, thematic and sequential similarity between DEP and
CET, respondents committed no copyright infringement

Held:

Yes. The SC believe that respondent Robles' act of lifting from the book of petitioners substantial portions
of discussions and examples, and her failure to acknowledge the same in her book is an infringement of
petitioners' copyrights.

When is there a substantial reproduction of a book? It does not necessarily require that the entire
copyrighted work, or even a large portion of it, be copied. If so much is taken that the value of the
original work is substantially diminished, there is an infringement of copyright and to an injurious extent,
the work is appropriated. 27

In determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is
an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a large
portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly
diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated
by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute piracy.

Phoenix Publishing House vs Ramos

Facts:

This petition originated in an action for damages arising from an alleged infringement of petitioner's
copyright for two books entitled "General Science Today for Philippine Schools, First Year" and "General
Science Today for Philippine Schools, Second Year," both authored by Gilman, Van Houten and Cornista
and first published in 1961. Named plaintiffs as "copyright proprietors of said books" were Phoenix
Publishing House, Inc., Purita Dancel-Cornista, Phil N. Gilman, and L.F. Van Houten. The complaint
charged that defendants, now herein private respondents 'reprinted, published, distributed and sold said
books in gross violation of the Copyright Law and of plaintiffs' rights to their damage and prejudice" and
prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

The RTC dismissed the petition. The CA affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the complaint and sentencing appellant to pay attorney’s
fees.

Held:

Yes. The evidence on record however, shows that petitioner secured the corresponding copyrights ( Exhs.
U and V) for its books. These copyrights were found to be all right by the Copyright Office and petitioner
was always conceded to be the real owner thereof. It was on the strength of these facts that petitioner
filed the complaint against respondents. Through a proper search warrant (Exh. "M") obtained after
petitioner was convinced that respondents were selling spurious copies of its copyrighted books, the
books were seized from respondents and were Identified to be spurious. In the face of these facts, it
cannot be said that the case is clearly an unfounded civil action or proceeding. In a long line of decisions,
We have consistently ruled that it is not sound policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate.

CMTC vs Bhagis

Facts:

Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or Copyright Infringement and Claim for
Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Makati ( trial court).3

On February 14, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision 4 dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner.
After receiving a copy of the trial court’s Decision, petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal before
the Court of Appeals. However, despite said notice, petitioner failed to file its appellant’s brief timely.
Hence, on August 19, 2005, the appellate court issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal filed by
petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the court erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal for its failure to file the appellant’s brief within
the reglementary period

Held:

Yes. Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From
time to time, however, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most compelling
reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.

Ergo, where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the strict application
of the rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. 15 Thus, a rigid
application of the rules of procedure will not be entertained if it will obstruct rather than serve the
broader interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.

In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to file an appellant’s brief on petitioner’s
part.

Pearl & Dean vs Shoemart

Facts:

Sometime in 1985, Pearl and Dean negotiated with defendant-appellant Shoemart, Inc. (SMI) for the
lease and installation of the light boxes in SM City North Edsa. Since SM City North Edsa was under
construction at that time, SMI offered as an alternative, SM Makati and SM Cubao, to which Pearl and
Dean agreed.

Sometime in 1989, Pearl and Dean, received reports that exact copies of its light boxes were installed at
SM City and in the fastfood section of SM Cubao. Upon investigation, Pearl and Dean found out that aside
from the two (2) reported SM branches, light boxes similar to those it manufactures were also installed in
two (2) other SM stores. It further discovered that defendant-appellant North Edsa Marketing Inc.
(NEMI), through its marketing arm, Prime Spots Marketing Services, was set up primarily to sell
advertising space in lighted display units located in SMI’s different branches. Pearl and Dean noted that
NEMI is a sister company of SMI.

In the light of its discoveries, Pearl and Dean sent a letter dated December 11, 1991 to both SMI and
NEMI enjoining them to cease using the subject light boxes and to remove the same from SMI’s
establishments. It also demanded the discontinued use of the trademark "Poster Ads," and the payment
to Pearl and Dean of compensatory damages in the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00).

Upon receipt of the demand letter, SMI suspended the leasing of two hundred twenty-four (224) light
boxes and NEMI took down its advertisements for "Poster Ads" from the lighted display units in SMI’s
stores. Claiming that both SMI and NEMI failed to meet all its demands, Pearl and Dean filed this instant
case for infringement of trademark and copyright, unfair competition and damages.

The RTC decided in favour of P&D. The CA reserved the trial court on appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not SMI is liable for copyright infringement.


Held:

No. Petitioner’s application for a copyright certificate — as well as Copyright Certificate No. PD-R2588
issued by the National Library on January 20, 1981 — clearly stated that it was for a class "O" work under
Section 2 (O) of PD 49 (The Intellectual Property Decree) which was the statute then prevailing. Said
Section 2 expressly enumerated the works subject to copyright:

SEC. 2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any
of the following works:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags, and box wraps;

x x x           x x x          x x x

Although petitioner’s copyright certificate was entitled "Advertising Display Units" (which depicted the
box-type electrical devices), its claim of copyright infringement cannot be sustained.

Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. Being a mere statutory grant, the
rights are limited to what the statute confers. It may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the
subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute. 7 Accordingly, it can
cover only the works falling within the statutory enumeration or description. 8

Summerville vs CA

Facts:

Petitioner Summerville is a corporation engaged in the business of trading, retailing and


exporting/importing a variety of merchandise.6 It is a holder of a Deed of Assignment7 executed in its
favor by one Norma C. Gabriel, owner/holder of several copyrights and patents over the Royal playing
cards, Royal brand playing cards case, design for the case and packaging of a deck of Royal playing
cards.8

Ang, President and General Manager of petitioner Summerville, personally appeared at the office of the
Criminal Investigation and Detective Division (CIDD) of the CIDG, PNP, in Camp Crame, Quezon City, to
personally complain and file a letter-complaint against several persons or establishments engaged in the
unauthorized manufacturing, distribution and sale of Royal brand playing cards, the design and mark of
which are claimed to have been duly patented/copyrighted and registered. Specifically, complainant Ang
alleged that the aforesaid actions were violative of Sec. 155 9 in relation to Sec. 170,10 both of Republic
Act No. 8293,11 otherwise known as the "Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines." Among the
establishments identified to be manufacturing and selling playing cards using petitioner Summerville’s
patented Joker design and plastic container was Arotech International Corporation, owned by private
respondents Chang Yu Shui, Juliet B. Lopes (a.k.a. Veronica Lopez), and several John Does.

In the interim, in an Order dated 31 January 2002, the RTC-Manila, Branch 1, directed that the custody
of the seized items be turned over to Petitioner Summerville, subject to the condition that the key to the
said warehouse be turned over to the Deputy Sheriff of the court.

Issue:
Whether or not it is proper for the court to release and return of the seized Crown brand playing cards
and the printing machines to petitioner Summerville.

Held:

Yes. Petitioner Summerville’s assertion that the Crown brand playing cards are "subject of the offense" is
erroneous, bearing in mind the distinctive circumstances of this case, i.e., that private respondents are
the owners of the registered Crown brand. The articles seized – hundreds of Crown brand playing cards,
among other articles – had little, if any, evidentiary value for the criminal action of trademark
infringement relating to the use of the plastic containers, which petitioner Summerville filed before the
RTC-Caloocan City, Branch 123; or even one for unfair competition also respecting the use of such plastic
containers.

In the case at bar, petitioner Summerville does not dispute that the design and/or mark of the Crown
brand playing cards is owned by private respondents. In fact, there is no allegation that the design
and/or mark of such Crown brand playing cards is a reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of another registered mark legally owned by another; hence, no crime of trademark infringement appears
to have been committed or perpetrated to warrant the inference that the Crown brand playing cards are
"subject of the offense" as contemplated by Sec. 4 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

People vs Choi

Facts:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath in the form of searching
and probing questions, the applicant, MARIO P. NIETO, Intelligence Operative, Economic Intelligence
Investigation Bureau, Department of Finance, and his witnesses Max Cavalera and David Lee Sealey that
there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Christopher Choi of No. 25-13 Columbia Street,
Carmenville Subd., Angeles City has in his possession, control and custody [r]eams and packs of fake
Marlboro Red Cigarettes, as well as cardboard cases of fake Marlboro Red Cigarettes (each cardboard
case contains two (2) [m]aster [c]ases of Marlboro and each [m]aster case contains fifty (50)
reams) being distributed, kept and sold thereat in violation of Section 168, par. 2 and 3 (a) and (c) in
relation to Section 169 of R.A. 8293;

On May 12, 1999, respondent filed a "motion to quash search warrant" 9 and a "supplemental motion to
quash"10 on June 22, 1999. Both were denied by Judge Gatbalite in an order dated November 29,
1999. 11Reconsideration was likewise denied. 12

On June 19, 2000, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition 13 before the CA. He alleged
that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the search warrant,
arguing that probable cause was not sufficiently established as the examination conducted was not
probing and exhaustive and the warrant did not particularly describe the place to be searched.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the search warrant allegedly because she failed to determine probable cause pursuant to Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Held:

Yes. The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof
that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As the term implies, probable cause is
concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of
a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. 28 No law or
rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its
determination exists. 29 Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given
situation. 30 The entirety of the questions propounded by the court and the answers thereto must be
considered by the judge. 31

In this case, aside from the testimony of Sealey, petitioner judge also heard the testimony of applicant
Nieto. Given the foregoing testimonies and applying the established standards in determining probable
cause, we cannot say that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search
warrant. Her questions were sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory. The testimonies
were consistent with each other and the narration of facts was credible. The testimonies and other
evidence on record constituted adequate bases to establish probable cause that the alleged offense had
been committed.

Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the
examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses, 35 the findings of
the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon proof that the
judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason. 36 We thus find no reason
to disturb Judge Gatbalite’s findings.

Columbia Pictures vs CA

Facts:

Alfredo G. Ramos, intelligence officer of the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB), received information
that private respondent Jose B. Jinco had in his possession pirated videotapes, posters, advertising
materials and other items used or intended to be used for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution,
circulation or public exhibition of the said pirated videotapes. Ramos ascertained the information to be
true and filed a verified Application for Search Warrant dated July 28, 1986 with prayer for the seizure of
the properties described in the search warrant.

On the same date, a hearing was conducted by Judge Florentino A. Flor of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 168, wherein Ramos and his two witnesses, Analie Jimenez and Rebecca Benitez-Cruz
testified on the need for the issuance of search warrant.

On July 28, 1986, the prayer for the issuance of the search warrant was granted and, on the same date,
Search Warrant No. 23 was issued.

On July 2, 1987, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 23 on the grounds that
the Search Warrant did not state a specific offense and that, even assuming it stated a specific offense, it
covered more than one specific offense. The VRB opposed the Motion to Quash stating that Search
Warrant No. 23 was issued for a single specific offense namely, violation of Section 56 and other related
sections of Presidential Decree No. 49 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1988.

On September 30, 1987, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash finding that the Search Warrant was
issued for one specific offense. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was likewise denied.
Private respondent then filed an Urgent Motion To Lift the Search Warrant and For the Return of the
Seized Articles alleging that Search Warrant No. 23 is a general warrant, and that it was issued without
probable cause.

On May 22, 1989, the assailed order was issued by Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo, now presiding over Branch
168 of the Pasig RTC, granting the Motion to Quash and ordering the return of all seized articles to
private respondent.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the said Order in toto.

Issue:

Whether or not Search Warrant No. 23 also violates the constitutional requirements of particularity of the
description of the warrant, being a general warrant and thus, is null and void.

Held:

No. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when
the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided
in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.); or when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2,
Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). . . . If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an
offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to
prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to
strengthen such evidence. . . .

An examination of Search Warrant No. 23 shows that it was worded in such a manner that the
enumerated items to be seized bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Sec. 56 of Presidential
Decree No. 49, as amended.

In other words, it authorized only the seizure of articles used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale,
lease and other acts in violation of the said decree. The search warrant ordered the seizure of the
following properties:

(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyright motion pictures/films the titles of which are
mentioned in the attached list;

(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, brochures, invoices, journals, ledgers, and books of
accounts bearing and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per attached list);

(c) Television sets, video cassettes records, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or material used in the unlawful sale,
lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or
public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes which he is keeping and
concealing in the premises above-described.

Clearly, the above items could not be anymore specific as the circumstances will allow since they are all
used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale or lease of pirated tapes. Therefore, the pending of the
appellate court that Search Warrant No. 23 is a "general" warrant of devoid of basis.
ABS CBN vs GMA

Facts:

Overseas Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition for his
release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he was
released by his captors and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July 2004.
Occasioned by said homecoming and the public interest it generated, both . . . GMA Network, Inc. . . .
and [petitioner] made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event. 7

ABS-CBN "conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and the subsequent press conference." 8 ABS-CBN allowed
Reuters Television Service (Reuters) to air the footages it had taken earlier under a special embargo
agreement.9

ABS-CBN alleged that under the special embargo agreement, any of the footages it took would be for the
"use of Renter's international subscribers only, and shall be considered and treated by Reuters under
'embargo' against use by other subscribers in the Philippines. . . . [N]o other Philippine subscriber of
Reuters would be allowed to use ABS-CBN footage without the latter's consent." 10

GMA-7, to which Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, Soho, Dela Peña-Reyes, and Manalastas are connected,
"assigned and stationed news reporters and technical men at the NAIA for its live broadcast and non-live
news coverage of the arrival of dela Cruz."11 GMA-7 subscribes to both Reuters and Cable News Network
(CNN). It received a live video feed of the coverage of Angelo dela Cruz's arrival from Reuters. 12

GMA-7 immediately carried the live newsfeed in its program "Flash Report," together with its live
broadcast.13 Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing
footages of ABS-CBN.14 GMA-7's news control room staff saw neither the "No Access Philippines" notice
nor a notice that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS-CBN. 15

On August 13, 2004, ABS-CBN filed the Complaint for copyright infringement under Sections 177 16and
21117 of the Intellectual Property Code.18

Issue:

whether there is probable cause to charge respondents with infringement under Republic Act No. 8293,
otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code

Held:

Yes. To be clear, it is the event itself or the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz which is not copyrightable because
that is the newsworthy event. However, any footage created from the event itself, in this case the arrival
of Angelo dela Cruz, are intellectual creations which are copyrightable. Thus, the footage created by ABS-
CBN during the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz, which includes the statements of Dindo Amparo, are
copyrightable and protected by the laws on copyright.77
On the other hand, respondents argue that ABS-CBN's news footage of Angelo dela Cruz's arrival is not
copyrightable or subject to protection.
Certainly, the arrival of Angelo [d]ela Cruz, which aroused public attention and the consciousness of the
Filipino people with regard to their countrymen, OFWs working in foreign countries and how the
Philippine government responds to the issues concerning them, is "news". There is no ingenuity or
inventiveness added in the said news footage. The video footage of this "news" is not copyrightable by
any legal standard as facts of everyday life depicted in the news and items of press information is part of
the public domain.78 The news footage is copyrightable.

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