Genocide Prevention Strategies

Introduction

Ever since aftermath of World War II, when the Nazi regime slaughtered over 6 million

people based of their ethnic background, sexual orientation, or other characteristics, the

international community has been focused on preventing genocide and punishing those involved.

This paper focuses on genocide prevention strategies applied in various regions internationally.

According to the 1948 Genocide Convention, genocide is defined as an act of annihilation

perpetrated against a particular racial, religious, national or ethnic group using any of the

following methods (Schabas and William 35):

i. Killing group members;

ii. inflicting serious physical or mental harm on members;

iii. imposing conditions on the group that are assessed to result in its complete annihilation;

iv. making the group take precautions to reduce the number of births within the group; and

v. forcing children from a certain group to join another group.

The Convention establishes genocide as a felony under international law, irrespective as

to whether it occurs during periods of peace or war, and pledges parties to "avoid and condemn"

genocide. The perpetrating state bears main responsibility for preventing and ending genocide.

Strategies to Prevent Genocide by The International Community

 In this section, I'll focus on three notable US achievements. Following the post-1994

discussion on the international community's framework to the principle of a "evolving standard"

of humanitarian action, the MARO campaign, the concept of "protecting people," and the global

community's approach to genocide prevention will be examined.

The post-1994 discourse of the international community, with a special focus on

genocide prevention.

Following the genocide in Rwanda, the international community began exploring

strategies to prevent genocide, emphasizing intervention over prevention. Despite post-Holocaust

calls for "never again," the international community's interest in genocide prevention has

fluctuated, never more so than in post-1994 rhetoric. Since 1948, when the Convention on

Genocide Prevention and Eradication was signed, genocide mitigation and punitive measures

have been central to international law (Hiebert and Maureen 228).

Despite the fact that the Genocide Convention forbids genocide, political will to prevent

and prosecute genocide criminals has been lacking. When the Rome Statute of the ICC came into

force on July 1, 2002, there was no international criminal tribunal. This exacerbates the dilemma.

During the 1990s, personal responsibility for mass atrocity crimes increased to such an extent

that two ad hoc tribunals were set up to trial war criminals in Rwanda and the former

Yugoslavia: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Republic of Rwanda and The

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

In spite of the fact that international criminal law does not criminalize nations, it does

provide an additional layer of protection for victims and places the onus of prosecuting

perpetrators on governments to ensure that they are held accountable. Despite their inadequacies,
the Tribunals have demonstrated both the international community's willingness to try war

criminals and the Tribunals' emphasis on punishment rather than prevention of genocide. This

demonstrates a lack of political will on the part of the international community to support actions

aimed at preventing genocide; yet, considerable progress has been made both at the global and

individual nation-level. Perhaps the most important accomplishment of the global community is

the principle of "Responsibility to Protect" (Hiebert and Maureen 228).

1. The "Responsibility to Protect" principle (R2P).

This is a collection of moral convictions that consider sovereignty as an obligation rather

than a benefit for all states. Most importantly, the lessons learned from Srebrenica as well as

Rwanda demonstrate the crucial significance of a legally mandated legal approach for action - "a

framework that would evoke not only a moral or political absolute necessity to act, but also a

legally mandated action with legal consequences" - in order to prevent genocide." ICISS was

founded by the Canadian government in September 2000 in response to Rwanda's inability to

defend civilians from severe atrocity crimes, including genocide, and published the pioneering

report "The Responsibility to Protect" (Sarkin et al. 35).

According to the Report, the global community has a duty to avoid mass crimes as a

cornerstone for sovereignty and accountability. This includes responding to crises through

political, social, and economic tools, with the use of armed force as a very last measure, and

emphasizing the critical nature of post-conflict rehabilitation, particularly in terms of victim

security and justice. The Report advises and invites member nations to establish a strategy for

fighting crime of mass atrocity in order to gain a deeper understanding of their underlying causes

(Welsh et al. 223).

 The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document represented the most extensive

incorporation of R2P into global society to date but the Report was the first time R2P was

addressed in international discourse. the crimes included (ethnic cleansing and genocide) and

who is accountable for stopping or reacting to these crimes were defined in paragraphs 138 to

139 of R2P's definition of R2P. R2P's three pillars are summarized in the Outcome Document

(Sarkin et al. 35):

i. The obligation of the state is to defend its citizens against genocide, human rights

violations, ethnic cleansing, and atrocities.

ii. If a state is incapable of defending itself, the international community owes the state

support in building its capabilities. Developing early warning systems, resolving political

concerns, strengthening the security sector, and deploying backup forces are all doable.

iii. If a state is incapable of defending its inhabitants against mass crimes through nonviolent

means, the international community must intervene diplomatically first, followed by

coercion and, finally, militarily.

Ban has committed to 'operationalizing' and transforming the notion of R2P from 'words

to actions.' He expressed his "unwavering" support for the R2P's "idea," but admitted that at the

moment, it is neither a policy nor a reality. Despite this, the UN Secretary-Special General's

Representative on Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, asserts that R2P, or Responsibility to

Protect, "demonstrates the application of human safety concepts to a specific area of public

policy that has long baffled citizens and politicians alike." According to the 2009 report by

Secretary General Ban, the Summit Outcome's Articles 138 and 139 are "firmly rooted in well-

established principles of international law" (Gierycz and Dorota 118)."

 States are obligated to avoid and denounce genocide, war crimes, and human rights

violations both under customary and conventional international law. Furthermore, R2P has

evolved beyond a concept; its unanimity in the 2005 Outcome Document substantiates both its

claim to be a standard and its aspirations to be included into international law. As a result,

notwithstanding the restriction on the use of violence except in extremely rare circumstances,

opponents of R2P contend that it promotes humanitarian intervention and, more recently, Libyan

regime change. Additionally, there is an inclination to focus primarily on R2P's "pillar three,"

raising concerns about whether humanitarian intervention has established a "growing norm" and

posing questions about how to intervene rather than whether to intervene. (Rosenberg and Sheri

442).

2. Agenda for Protection of Civilian (PoC).

As seen by the countless mass atrocities perpetrated in Liberia, Kosovo, and Iraq in the

1990s and 2000s, civilians, especially in the post-Cold War era, have seen a growing number of

violent confrontations involving civilians. The targeting of civilians has reignited interest in

civilian security during armed conflict, especially in cases of mass atrocities such as genocide.

As a result, both academics and government officials have backed the development of the

Civilians Protection Agenda (PoC) (Breakey and Hugh 54).

The agenda is guided by global humanitarian goals, human rights standards, and notions

of refugee law. With the goal of enhancing civilian legal and physical security, the agenda is

aimed at all parties to armed conflict, including international organizations, governments, as well

as individuals. While this is not a technique for preventing genocide, it demonstrates the critical

importance of prioritizing civilian protection, as civilians are frequently the target population in

mass atrocity crimes.

 "Humanitarian imperative" was a phrase coined by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan

in 1998, and the Security Council's commitment to safeguarding people is remarkable. The PoC

agenda is critical to the larger fight against genocide because it demonstrates the international

community's commitment to humanitarian law and civilian protection agreements. Additionally,

the agenda of the PoC reflects the international community's predilection for intervention over

prevention, as well as the compliance of interveners with international humanitarian law.

While R2P and the PoC agenda are conceptually related, they are not operationally

related. R2P is defined as " a political system for preventing mass disasters and safeguarding

individuals against the most terrible types of abuse (Gagro and Sandra Fabijanić 73). Because it

encompasses all forms of armed conflict, the [protection of civilians] agenda in its entirety is

much broader than R2P."

The fundamental challenge in implementing the civilian protection agenda as a

preventive strategy is determining " if [citizen protection] strategies and policies assist to the

mitigation of genocide and mass atrocities, or act as an efficient response after they occur." R2P

was recently shown in the MARO Venture, a US-led endeavor, in regards to the operational

aspects of these two goals (Bellamy and Alex 632)

3. The MARO project (Mass Atrocity Response Operations)

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institution of the United States Army and

Harvard Carr Center for Human Rights Policy began working together in early 2007 with the

goal of making a substantial contribution to an end to genocide and ethnic cleansing in the

world.. This collaboration resulted in the development of the MARO, or Mass Atrocity Response

Operations Handbook. The project's objectives were simple: to shift the conversation away from
"whether" to intervene and toward "how" to intervene in the aftermath of catastrophic events

(Francis et al. 88).

With the ability to adapt to the specific requirements of a particular location, an annotated

planning framework (APF) was developed for use in urban planning. While the APF focuses a

strong emphasis on preventive and intervention as well as post-conflict rehabilitation, its ultimate

goal is to assist the United Nations in enhancing its capacity to avoid mass crimes rather than

merely responding to them when they occur. The African Union can also leverage the APF's

conceptualization to develop African-led mass atrocity prevention capacities, which would be

beneficial. By working together with the two scenarios that were designed by the Project to

analyze the framework's structure and represent the progression of a course of action, the APF

can help in addressing the question, "What are we attempting to accomplish?" and "How will we

accomplish it?"

The planning framework developed by MARO is designed for use by legislators,

representatives of non-governmental organizations, diplomats, United Nations officials and other

members of civil society, as well as personnel of the United States Armed Forces. It aims to

establish a 'watch-decide-act' framework that will aid decision-makers from any organization or

state in examining data and exchanging assessments of potential mass crimes, as well as in

collaboratively deciding on essential efforts to prevent or respond to future mass atrocities

(Alvarez and Alex 74).

Interagency communication and coordination have always been difficult; nonetheless, a

complex enterprise like intervention demands it. MARO's objective is to 'bridge the barrier'

between states, the United Nations and civil society organizations through improved

communication, information sharing, and action coordination. "When an intervention is

improvised as a result of a snap decision to intervene in the midst of a mass tragedy," Michael

Pryce (former MARO Project Director) continues, "response, rather than coordination, is

frequently the result (Sewall et al. 95)."

To explain a state's decline towards mass atrocity, the MARO Project employs Gregory

Stanton's "Eight Stages of Genocide" as a framework developed by the University of

Pennsylvania. This sequence of steps does not have to be followed exactly, but it is a reasonable

beginning point for the integration of "known events into a broadly predictable framework."

However, while the Project places equal emphasis on both prevention and intervention, political

will is important and must be inspired by a moral necessity, whether it is achieved by

preventative diplomacy or through military intervention. Also highlighted is the vital need of

political will in achieving the objectives of the Handbook; without it, developing a military force

particularly trained, armed, and disciplined for such a mission will not be considered a major

military threat on a global scale. A trained and equipped military response, with the necessary

political will, could serve as the "teeth" for effective preventive diplomacy.

As evidenced by the international community's historical inability to respond swiftly to

major tragedies, active prevention evolves into an entire program aimed at exerting diplomatic

pressure on the broadest possible front. MARO warns against military intervention until political

will and capability exist.

Finally, the Project deliberates on what should happen following the slaughter's

conclusion. Without a sound strategy in place before to the end of a conflict, the probability of

post-intervention and post-atrocity concerns undermining the entire attempt significantly

increases putting the entire effort at risk. After an atrocity or intervention, the MARO Project

aims to address these concerns as soon as possible, rather than thereafter, because "there is little
time for serious contemplation and thorough planning" after such events (Kuperman and Alan

62).

With the MARO Project, we have reached a watershed moment in the endeavor to

prevent tragedies while upholding the Responsibility to Protect principle. There are three

components to this method, which share the same objectives as R2P, but also emphasizes

prevention, reconstruction following a disaster or conflict. The Handbook is a first-of-its-kind

publication; there was previously no military doctrine for atrocity prevention, even when R2P

was invoked (Raymond and Dwight 86). The international community should applaud this

initiative, and other countries should work together to build their own set of standards for

avoiding, responding to, and mending atrocities. The MARO Project's findings have sparked

arguments about humanitarian action's apparent "growing norm."

Rwanda's plight

Over 800,000 Rwandans, the majority of whom were ethnic Tutsis, were slaughtered in

less than 100 days in 1994 by Hutu militia and government troops, while the world community

looked on. Mass murders began a day after a plane flying Rwanda's and Burundi's presidents was

gunned down over the Rwandan capital of Kigali. The leaders were arriving from peace talks

intended at reinforcing an already precarious peace accord and bringing an end to fighting

between the government's majority ethnic Hutu majority and the rebel army's majority Tutsi

majority. Hostilities were renewed following the plane disaster.

Inciting residents to commit ethnic Tutsi killings was a frequently utilized technique by

retreating government troops and ethnic Hutu militia. They claimed that the communities were

assisting Tutsi militants, which they used to excuse the indiscriminate killing of civilians (Power
and Samantha 98). The United Nations had sent a small peacekeeping force to oversee the

implementation of the accord, but they were not authorized to intervene. Unheeded warnings of

coming slaughter. The genocide's consequences continue to be felt today in a variety of ways,

both within Rwanda and in neighboring countries, such as in the eastern provinces of the DRC,

where Hutu militia from Rwanda and their indigenous supporters continue to dominate vast

swaths of South Kivu province. Together with other Congolese war militants, they continue to

conduct heinous human rights violations, including abductions, assassinations, and rape. Sexual

assault is pervasive, disproportionately affecting women and children.

Strategies for Preventing Genocide

Genocide does not occur in an unplanned or unannounced manner. Genocide is an

organized crime that is typically committed by governments or political parties in control of the

state apparatus. Knowing how genocide happens and developing the ability to spot warning

signals of impending genocide are critical steps towards averting future calamities. On April 7,

2004, ten years after the genocide in Rwanda, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan

initiated a five-point action plan aimed at preventing genocide (Lippman and Matthew 202):

1. Preventing military insurrection, which is regularly used as a justification for genocide

2. Protecting citizens during military confrontation, which include the use of UN

peacekeepers.

3. Putting an end to impunity through legal actions in international and domestic courts

4. Surveillance and establishment of an early warning system

5. Acting swiftly and decisively, including through military action.

1. Preventing armed conflict.

 Taking into account the fact that genocide will happen during a war, attempting to

address the roots of the problem and violent behaviour, such as intolerance, hatred, racism,

tyranny, and discrimination, as well as dehumanizing public discourse that denies the dignity and

rights of entire groups of people, is one of the most efficient ways to mitigate the risk of

genocide (Akhavan and Payam 54). Disparities in resource access are an important component of

any prevention strategy. National governments have a disproportionate share of the burden of

conflict prevention. Through diplomatic, humanitarian, political, and institutional initiatives, as

well as human rights, social, and economic development, the UN aids national efforts as well as

poverty alleviation, all of which contribute significantly to the prevention of conflict.

2. Ensuring the populace's safety, which may include the deployment of UN personnel.

When avoidance tactics fail, individuals must be prioritized. When citizens are targeted

specifically because to their membership in a particular community, genocide is a possibility. It

has been increasingly common for the United Nations Security Council to provide UN personnel

the authority to protect people from violence during the past decade. Assisting UN peacekeeping

missions in implementing efficacious techniques for probing and punishing serious legal

violations; assisting disarmed and demobilized fighters in reintegrating into societal structure;

implementing special actions to safeguard women from sexual assault; and providing

information on any "hate media" instigating individuals to commit crimes against humanity,

genocide and other violations of international law have become standard practices.

3. Effectively utilizing the judicial system to put an end to impunity.

To prevent future atrocities, the perpetrators of genocide must be brought to justice. The

creation of a preventative culture can be aided by efforts to combat impunity and create a sense
of justice for the perpetrators of genocide and other atrocities. If a state chooses not to exercise

jurisdiction over accused genocide offenders or is otherwise unable to do so, the International

Criminal Court (ICC) has the ability to investigate and prosecute the most responsible persons.

When individuals accused of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity are not brought

before the United Nations' International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal Court

(ICC) takes over as the primary prosecutor. It is a Dutch corporation with its headquarters in the

city of The Hague.

The Rome Statute, which served as the organization's founding treaty, went into effect on

July 1, 2002. So far, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has brought 14 cases to trial, with

four of those cases coming to trial in the near future. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a militia

commander in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who was charged with aiding in the

recruitment of child soldiers, was found guilty by the Court of Justice in March 2012 of his first

offense. In the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, a large number of special tribunals have been

established to trial individuals accused of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity,

among other charges. Established by the United Nations Security Council in 1993, and based in

The Hague, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia prosecutes war

criminals from the former Yugoslavia. 161 persons from the former Yugoslavia have been

charged with severe crimes of international humanitarian law, the vast majority of them were

civilians, according to the organization. More than 126 enforcement actions have been taken

against them, and 35 more are now in the works. The trials of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko

Mladic commenced in 2009 and 2012, respectively. Their actions against non-Serb Bosnian

Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and others during the years 1992 to 1995 have been charged of

genocide and other crimes against them.

 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), headquartered in Arusha,

Tanzania, which was established in 1995 in response to a November 1995 United Nations

Security Council decision, is the world's first international criminal court. It was in December of

that year that 80 of the 92 defendants' cases had been decided by the Tribunal. A total of nine

suspects eluded arrest. Among the cases that have been resolved are the life sentence given to

former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda for genocide and the historic 1998 judgement by former

Mayor Jean Paul Akayesu that rape can be deemed genocide when committed with the goal to

exterminate a specific group of people. Several other former military and government officials,

as well as the owners of hate media organizations, have also had their cases resolved.

The Khmer Rouge dictatorship's reign of terror from 1975 to 1979 resulted in the

establishment of a special tribunal in 2003, which is responsible for investigating people who are

accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Kaing Guek Eav, commonly

known as Duch, was sentenced to life in prison in February 2012 for gross violations of the 1949

Geneva Conventions and human rights. Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodian Courts were

established in accordance with a UN-Cambodia agreement to prosecute human rights breaches

and grave violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Four more former government officials

have been charged and arrested by the ECCC thus far.

4. Gathering intelligence and establishing an early warning system

The atrocities committed in Rwanda and the Balkans throughout the 1990s indicated that

the United Nations needed to take action to prevent future genocides. As a result of this

appointment, Juan Mendez was named Special Advisor on Genocide Prevention in 2004, Francis

Deng was named Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect in 2007, and Edward Luck

was selected Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect in 2008. Juan Mendez was
appointed Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention in 2004. A team of researchers led by Francis

Deng and Edward Luck is gathering information about potential genocide and other human

rights violations. The mission's sensitivity necessitates the classification of most of their work.

The Special Advisers think that expressing their concerns publicly may help to lessen the risk of

genocide and associated crimes, as happened in Syria in February 2012, or advance the cause of

peace and stability, and they make public statements to that effect. Additionally, there are special

advisors that counsel the Secretary-General and the Security Council on possible genocide

scenarios and provide recommendations on how to avoid or avert genocide.

5. Taking quick action, including, if necessary, the use of military force.

Following the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is responsible for

determining whether or not military involvement is necessary to avoid or react to genocide or

other mass atrocity crimes occurring within a country's borders.

As a result of the failure of peaceful means and the "manifest failure" of national

authorities to safeguard their inhabitants from the four mass atrocity crimes, all states agreed that

governments should cooperate cooperatively through the United Nations Security Council and, if

required, in line with the UN Charter.

International action was swift in Libya to prevent the regime from committing genocide

on its own citizens. As a result of a United Nations Security Council decision passed in March

2011, an international coalition may act to prevent the Qadhafi regime's slaughter of protestors

from continuing. Non-military options to armed force were the subject of Resolution 1970. This

was a follow-up resolution.

 In February 2012, the United Nations Security Council failed to adopt a resolution calling

for the Syrian government to stop human rights atrocities and withdraw its military from cities

and towns. Security Council Resolution 1975, unanimously adopted on March 30, 2011,

condemned human rights violations committed in the immediate wake of the November 2011

presidential elections by followers of ex - president Laurent Gbagbo and President Alassane

Ouattara, and permitted a United Nations military activity to assist in the complete withdrawal of

the use of heavy weapons against civilians. In July 2011, the Security Council unanimously

approved Resolution 1996, establishing a UN mission in Ivory Coast to help stop the use of

heavy weapons against civilians. The United Nations Security Council approved the involvement

of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei more than a month ago to monitor the North-South

Korean border. To ensure the safety of citizens and humanitarian workers in Abyei, this force

has been granted the authority to use force.

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