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Fools your enemy with Mikrotik

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BY: DIDIET KUSUMADIHARDJA

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MIKROTIK USER MEETING (MUM) 2016
JAKARTA, INDONESIA
14 OCTOBER 2016
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About Me

Didiet Kusumadihardja
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1. IT Security Specialist

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 PT. Mitra Solusi Telematika

2. Trainer & IT Consultant

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 Arch Networks

MTCNA, MTCINE, MTCWE, MTCUME, MTCTCE, MTCRE

Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id


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PT. Mitra Solusi Telematika

Gedung TMT 2. GF

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Jl. Cilandak KKO
Jakarta

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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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Global
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IT Security
Incident
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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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Global IT Security Incident 2014

Entire Network
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Canceled

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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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Global IT Security Incident 2015

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3 Tahun di Hack ( 2012 – 2015)

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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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Global IT Security Incident 2016

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s a 500 Juta Account

3 Miliar Account ???


Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
Source: Tech Times
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Indonesia
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IT Security
Incident
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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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IS

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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
Source: Akamai
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Indonesia IT Security Incident 2013

polri.go.id
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2013

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Deface
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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
Motive: Fame?
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Indonesia IT Security Incident 2016

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Teman Ahok

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DDoS Attack
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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
Motive: Politics?
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Indonesia IT Security Incident 2016

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Videotron

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Kebayoran Baru
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Jakarta Selatan

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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
Motive: Curiosity?
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.i c IT Security

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ho Gak Perlu

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Hacking
Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
Source: Carnegie Mellon University
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Hacking Tools Example

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s a Cain & Abel
Kali Linux
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.i cCybercrime as

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s a Modern Business

Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id


Source: SCMagazine
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How Hackers
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do it?
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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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Hacking Phase

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1.Reconnaissance
2.Scanning

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3.Gaining Access

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4.Maintaining Access
5.Clearing Tracks s
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Source: Ethical Hacking by EC-Council
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Hacking Phase (Cont’d)

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1.Reconnaissance
Information Gathering Device Type

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OS Detail Open Port

2.Scanning

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Application Vulnerability
Version

3.Gaining Access

a h Exploit Vulnerability
Backdoors

4.Maintaining Access
5.Clearing Tracks s
Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
Escalate Privilege

Data harvesting

Delete/overwrite Event/Logs
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Hacking Phase Analogy

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1.Reconnaissance
2.Scanning

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3.Gaining Access

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4.Maintaining Access
5.Clearing Tracks s
Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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When we fools them?

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1.Reconnaissance
2.Scanning

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3.Gaining Access

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4.Maintaining Access
5.Clearing Tracks s
Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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Why at Scanning Phase?

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TELNET SSH

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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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Scanning Tools

SoftPerfect Network Scanner

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How to fools
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them?
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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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Use a bait

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Hacker

s a Bait

Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id Honey Pot


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Web Server Example

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Web Server

HTTP HTTPS
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Confuse your enemy

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HTTP HTTPS

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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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Server Farm Network Example

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192.168.1.2  DNS Server
192.168.1.5  Web Server
192.168.1.10  DB Server
192.168.1.15  Mail Server
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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
192.168.1.0/24
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Confuse your enemy

192.168.1.1  Fake Server 1

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192.168.1.2  DNS Server
192.168.1.3  Fake Server 2

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192.168.1.4  Fake Server 3

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192.168.1.5  Web Server
192.168.1.6  Fake Server 4

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192.168.1.7  Fake Server 5

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192.168.1.8  Fake Server 6
192.168.1.9  Fake Server 7

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192.168.1.10  DB Server
192.168.1.11  Fake Server 8
192.168.1.12  Fake Server 9
192.168.1.13  Fake Server 10
192.168.1.14  Fake Server 11
192.168.1.15  Mail Server 192.168.1.0/24
Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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How we do it
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with Mikrotik?
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NAT

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(Network Address Translation)

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Fake NAT
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Fake Ports at your Web Server

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HTTP & HTTPS to
Legitimate Server

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Other Ports to
Fake Server

Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id


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Simple NAT for Web Server

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NAT (Port Mapping)

INTERNET

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ROUTER s
WEB SERVER
192.168.2.3
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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id Chain Action
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Add Additional NAT for Bait

Chain Action

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Web Server

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192.168.2.3 Fake Server

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(Honey Pot)

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192.168.2.4

Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id


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Fake Server at your Server Farm Network

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Only one legitimate
server

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Others are Fake Server

Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id


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Another Example

Chain Action

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192.168.2.3 (Honey Pot)

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192.168.2.4

Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id


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Combine with Honey Pot

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KFSensor
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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id Others HoneyPot: Honeyd, Kippo, Dionaea, Nepenthes
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What Hacker See (NMAP)

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Nmap / Zenmap

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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
After
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What Hacker See (SoftPerfect NetScan)

SoftPerfect Network Scanner

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Before
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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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I don’t want to use HoneyPot

Step 1: Chain

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Step 2: Action

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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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What we see, If someone PING

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SRC-IP ADDRESS
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What we see, If someone NMAP

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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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The Dude, Hotspot & Userman

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IP Address  MAC Address  User ID  Person
Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
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Use Case 1

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Internet Café
(WARNET) s a Insider Threat

Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id


Office
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Use Case 2

http://public.honeynet.id

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Research

Analytics
(Low Interaction Honeypot)
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Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id
For Fun
Learn hacking method
from hacker / script kiddies
(High Interaction Honeypot)
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DIDIET KUSUMADIHARDJA

Thank you
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Question?

s a didiet@arch.web.id
http://didiet.arch.web.id/
https://www.facebook.com/ArchNetID/
Didiet Kusumadihardja - didiet@arch.web.id

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