Caruthers 1990 - What Is Empiricism

What Is Empiricism?
Author(s): Peter Carruthers and Cynthia Macdonald

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 64 (1990), pp.
63-79+81-92
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
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WHAT IS EMPIRICISM?
Peter Carruthers and Cynthia Macdonald

I--Peter Carruthers
Must Empiricists be committed to rejecting all forms of

knowledge? To answer this question we need an account
it means to be an Empiricist. The question is worth r
because the case for Nativism has recently become incre
powerful.' Unless Empiricism can be characterised i
way as to be consistent with Nativism, it may shortly ha
pronounced dead.
I
The Problem of Unity. We can distinguish two distinct foci of

concern which coexist within the Empiricist tradition. Firstly,
Empiricists have been opposed to any form of Nativism. They
have denied that we have any innate concepts, beliefs or
knowledge. They have also denied that we possess any innate
mental structures embodying information about particular
domains, for example within our faculties of vision or language-
comprehension. While allowing that the mind is innately
structured into distinct faculties (sensation, imagination, memory
etc.), they have insisted at least that all the mechanisms involved
in the acquisition of our beliefs should be ones of learning,
whatever that may ultimately amount to.2 Secondly, Empiricists
have denied that we may obtain substantial knowledge of the
world, or of ourselves, a priori.3 They have insisted that all such
'While I shall not consider the case for Nativism here, I have done so in the longer
work from which the paper is extracted, namely Human Knowledge and Human Nature:
a new introduction to an ancient debate, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), forthcoming
1991.
2 What distinguishes mechanisms of learning from so-called 'local triggering' of innate
knowledge? The difference must lie in the output of the system being a relatively simple
mapping or extension of a given input. For the distinctive feature of local triggering is
that the output of the language-faculty, for example, should be invariant under a wide
range of initial input.
3 By knowledge which is substantial I mean that which is either contingent, as is our
knowledge of the contents of our own minds, or is concerned with some mind-
independent reality, as would be our knowledge ofmathematics on a Platonist construal
64 I-PETER CARRUTHERS
knowledge must be grounded in sen

introspection. We may wonder which,
strands constitutes the true core of Emp
essentials of the Empiricist project sho
some third way which embraces both.
Clearly the two strands are at least part
another. For one could believe in the existence of substantial a
priori knowledge without endorsing Nativism. One could, for
example, believe in a special faculty of intellectual intuition, as
many Platonists have done. This would accord us knowledge of
a realm of mind-independent abstract objects in a quasi-
perceptual manner. Although the faculty of intuition itself
would be innate, just as the faculty of vision is innate, the beliefs
to which it gives rise would not be. Then since belief in the
substantive a priori does not entail a belief in Nativism, the sort of
attack which Empiricists mounted on the substantive a priori
cannot merely have been part of their campaign against
Nativism.
In contrast, knowledge which is innate would at the same
time be a priori, at least in the sense of not being learned from
experience. So to accept that there is substantial innate knowl-
edge would commit one to belief in some forms of substantive a
priori knowledge. It might then be suggested that the Empiricist
opposition to Nativism may be motivated by their opposition to
the substantive a priori. However, this would hardly warrant an
attack on Nativism as such, of the kind that we find in Locke.
For an attack on the substantive a priori would not, on any
account of the matter, be an attack on all forms of innateness. It
would only be innate knowledge which would be undermined,
leaving innate beliefs, concepts and information-bearing mental
structures untouched. Yet Empiricists have characteristically
denied all of these ideas also. So their motivation cannot have
been a mere consequence of their opposition to the substantive
a priori.
of its subject-matter. Note that on this account a proposition can be informative

(cognitively significant) without being substantive.
The notion of the a priori can be understood in either of two distinct ways-as
knowledge which can be arrived at by thought alone, or as knowledge which is not
learned from experience. The difference is not presently important, but will shortly
prove so.
WHAT IS EMPIRICISM? 65
It might be suggested that I have err

Empiricism purely negatively, as involvi
Nativism and the denial of substantive
Perhaps a positive characterisation might e
so: that is just what I seek. But we cannot
traditional) option, claiming that Empir
demand that all substantial knowledge m
experience. While such a demand does i
innate knowledge and a priori knowledg
unable to explain the Empiricist opposition
beliefs and information-bearing menta
which need count as knowledge. Since co
might be innate although no knowledg
insistence that all knowledge must be gr
cannot explain their belief that all con
derived from experience.
Neither will it help to suppose that the b
consists in the positive demand that al
acquired from experience. While this may
be no innate beliefs or knowledge,' it
Empiricist opposition to information-bearin
Nor is it obvious why it should be thou
possibility of substantive a priori knowl
maintained that we can arrive at substanti
aspect of the world by thought alone, d
employing empirically-acquired concepts. F
might maintain that while mathematical co
from experience, mathematical knowledge
special faculty of intellectual intuition.
Moreover, both of the above proposals w
need of an account of the motivation b
demand. Why should one believe that a
concepts, must be grounded in experience?
has so far been said, it may turn out on in
4 In fact I doubt this entailment in the case of knowledge

the experiences from which we derive our concepts are ins
how we can have learned the propositions involving
subsequently come to know. This knowledge may be trigge
be innate) rather than learned from it, while the constit
acquired.
positive characterisations given above serv

underlying disunity of motive. In which
made no progress with our question wheth
remaining true to their essential concerns,
acceptance of Nativism.
A rather different proposal might be tha
which is the core Empiricist commitme
maintains that all knowledge and thou
reduce to patterns within our own subject
presumably there can be no substantive a
any knowledge which is innate. Moreover,
question consists of unconceptualised an
data, as Phenomenalists have traditional
presumably neither concepts nor inform
structures can be innate either.
However, the suggestion is a poor one. Firstly, because it
ignores the position of Locke, who certainly thought that we
could have knowledge of objects outside us.5 Admittedly his
arguments for this view were weak, and most later Empiricists
have believed that he was inconsistent in failing to embrace
Phenomenalism, given his general claims about the genesis of
concepts and of knowledge. But be that as it may, we can hardly
maintain that a commitment to Phenomenalism was funda-
mental to his position, given his own explicit eschewal of the
doctrine.
Secondly, this proposal would still leave a question concerning
the motivation behind Phenomenalism. And here the most
plausible answer consists precisely in those doctrines which
Phenomenalism is currently being used to explain. Rejection of
innate knowledge and of substantive apriori knowledge together
entail that all knowledge must be grounded in experience. Then
rejection of innate concepts entails that our very capacity to
think must arise out of materials presented in experience. So the
experience in question must be initially unconceptualised and
(since there are no information-bearing mental structures)
unstructured--which is to say, it must consist of sense-data as
traditionally conceived of.
A final suggestion might be that the basic concern of early
5See the Essay, Bk. IV, Ch. XI.
Empiricists was with matters of justificat

unifies opposition to Nativism and to the s
that neither belief in innate concepts or
belief that we may obtain substantial in
world through reason alone, is sufficie
acceptable. In one way this proposal con
hypothesis, to be developed shortly. But I
serve, on its own, to capture the natur
objections to Nativism and the substant
should still want to understand just wh
knowledge must be insufficiently justified
II
An Historical Hypothesis. I propose that th

should be seen as lying in the idea th
constrained by science, and by Psychology
view the most basic Empiricist commitmen
claims to knowledge should only be grante
they can be rendered consistent with ou
powers of the human mind, and of the min
reality. No knowledge-claims are to be a
we can provide at least the beginnings of
of the processes through which that kn
Then the basic reason why early Empiri
Nativism, was because the only account av
time, of the process through which a belie
come to be innate, was a non-natural
intervention by God. Although they wou
intervention by God was conceptually p
with their overall attempt to fit our idea
knowledge into a broadly scientific frame
If this were really the reason why th
6 A natural process, as I understand it, is one which fal

which can in principle be subsumed within the laws of n
known by us or not, and whatever form they might ultima
that all natural processes are physical, for example). Note t
on knowledge-claims is just that-an additional constr
whatever other epistemic norms the subject may endor
identified with Naturalistic Epistemology in Quine's
normative epistemology by current science.
rejected Nativism, then why did they not

choose instead, either to argue agains
other-mostly feeble-grounds (as did Lo
against it explicitly at all? It may be that w
core commitment formed such a fund
outlook as to be almost invisible. Altern
may not have been easily expressible in
reasons. Most early Empiricists were al
those who were not had to respect the im
of the Church.' An attack upon Nativism
required us to believe in God's interventio
might have seemed like a direct attack up
exists, why should be not intervene in th
chooses to do so? Instead of facing this iss
Empiricists may have chosen either to att
ways, or to assume its falsity and render th
intervention unnecessary, by providing an
of the genesis of human knowledge throu
The main advantage of my proposal is
unify early Empiricist objections to
substantive a priori (particularly Platon
knowledge-claims were rejected because
naturalistic account of the belief-acquisiti
In the case of Nativism, the hypotheses th
concepts, or mental structures embodyi
the world are innate, were rejected bec
require non-natural intervention in th
veracious God. In the case of the subst
objection was that there could be no natur
how reason could have acquired the
knowledge of anything outside of itself
have required God's intervention to ensur
our reason accurately mapped the structur
'Witness the extent to which Hume had to hide his

Concerning Natural Religion.
8 This is why the belief that we have either innate or su
turns out to be unjustified--because in the absence of any
our mode of acquiring such knowledge, we are unjustified
general commitment to the ultimate explanatory adequacy
in section V below).
mind-independent realm. The Platonist hyp

faculty of intellectual intuition, for exam
because we cannot even begin to give a
psychological structure of such a faculty, nor
be causal contact between necessarily-existing
and the human mind.
My proposal also explains why the early Empiricists should
have engaged in enquiries which were quite explicitly psycho-
logical. From any other perspective, in contrast, the conjunction
of psychological with epistemological enquiry must appear
seriously confused. For it would surely be one thing to ask how the
mind actually works, and how beliefs are in fact formed, and quite
another to ask what we can know, and how. The one is a factual,
the other should be a normative enquiry. On my reading of
Empiricism, however, these questions are intimately related to
one another. For if epistemology is constrained by Psychology,
then you cannot begin to settle the question what we can know,
without at least sketching the outline of the various faculties and
psychological processes which are involved in the acquisition of
our beliefs. It is because the early Empiricists thought that the
theory of knowledge had to be fitted into a broadly scientific
outlook and rendered consistent with our best scientific theories,
that they regarded epistemological and psychological questions
as belonging essentially together.'
My account also fits neatly with the ways in which both Locke
and Hume explain the motivation of their work.' In the 'Epistle
to the Reader' of the Essay Locke tells us how, in the course of
discussions with friends on an unspecified topic, they came to
'Their motivation is therefore slightly different from that of A. I. Goldman in

Epistemology and Cognition (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), whose
approach is otherwise very similar. Goldman thinks Psychology is relevant to
epistemology because, as a Reliabilist, he thinks it necessary to investigate how reliable
our belief-acquisition processes actually are. The concerns of the early Empiricists were
broader, in that they were attempting to fit our picture of ourselves and our knowledge
into a scientific outlook.
'oBerkeley, however, represents something of a problem for my reading of
Empiricism, given the central place accorded to God in his philosophy. (Though even
here the role of God is limited to supplying the data ofexperience; God is not supposed to
intervene directly in the human mind.) I suspect that Berkeley's basic motives were
indeed different, and that he adopted Empiricist premises in order to serve his own
theological purposes, rather than as part of an attempt to fit our view of ourselves and our
knowledge into a broadly scientific framework.
feel that if they were to make progress w

examine their own mental powers. The
set himself was to see what subjects the h
was or was not fitted to deal with. In the
writes in similar spirit, thus:
This was that which gave the first

concerning the understanding. For I th
step towards satisfying several inquirie
was very apt to run into was to take a
understandings, examine our own powe
things they were adapted.
The project was to attempt to settle dis

extent of human knowledge by first provi
faculties of the human mind, and of the
to the world, and then to regard knowledg
to be consistent with that account. This is
maintaining to be the core Empiricist co
Similarly Hume, in describing the main a
'Introduction' to the Treatise, argues that t
the science of human nature lies at the foundation of all the
sciences, and that we may hope to make progress with the latter
by studying the former first. Now he can hardly have meant (can
he?) that we should expect particular discoveries in Physics or
Chemistry to be consequent upon advances in Psychology.
Rather, he is more plausibly read as saying that claims to
knowledge, in general, have to be rendered consistent with the
powers of mind ascribed to us by our best psychological
theories; which is again the core Empiricist commitment. Even
more explicitly, in the opening section of the Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding Hume writes:
The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these

abstruse questions [of Metaphysics], is to enquire seriously
into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an
exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no
means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects.
Here again the project is the core Empiricist one, to constrain
knowledge-claims by our best theories o

modes of access to reality."
Notice finally, that on my account the tr
insistence that all knowledge must be gr
turns out not to belong to the foundations
Rather, the early Empiricists stressed the
the acquisition of knowledge because it
acquisition process of which they co
naturalistic account. So my proposal n
Empiricist opposition to Nativism and to th
but sees these as flowing from the same un
as does the Empiricist lauding of experie
III
Empiricism and Nativism. If I have correctly

of Empiricism, then contemporary Emp
objections to evolutionary versions of at
Nativism. For unlike Divine intervention,
characteristics through evolution is certain
Indeed, it is one of which we have not o
account, but a well-developed scientif
contemporary Empiricist there can be no
to the idea of innate concepts or bel
information-bearling mental structures.
Whether Empiricist objections to innate
vanish, may depend very much upon
knowledge endorsed. But there are at lea
innate knowledge might be possible,
account. Firstly, if we accept some form
innately determined true beliefs will c
evolution is very probably a reliable
determining of innate belief is concerne
survival-value of a belief is, in general,
truth. Secondly, even if we think that
" Note how the above quotations seem to echo the Crit
the way in which Kant takes up the Empiricist challe
reason can have the power to generate substantive knowle
It is rather to claim that the basic structure of the world,
determined by the subjective constitution of the human mi
that we can have access to this constitution a priori.
justification, innate knowledge will still b

that we accept some form of Coherentist acco
For if evolution has provided us with som
coherent (and true) beliefs, which perhap
explanation of some aspect of our experie
learnable from it), then for a Coherentist th
as innately known
Contemporary Empiricists may therefore
deny the existence of innate knowledge.
provide a naturalistic account of the proc
belief might come to be innate, the Empi
knowledge-claims has no application. It t
traditional Empiricist opposition to Nativ
accident. 13
It also follows from my proposed constr
that contemporary Empiricists should ha
some forms of substantive a priori knowledg
which Nativism is true. For knowledge wh
the same time be a priori, at least in the sen
through which we acquire that knowledg
any sort of learning on the basis of experienc
a startling result. It means, not only that
Empiricist while accepting that there are in
bearing mental structures and innate knowl
accepting that there is substantive a prior
12 The problem for a Foundationalist, on the other hand,

basis of innate knowledge can be both self-justifying and gen
if it consists of truths which we find ourselves unable to deny, i
independent of our minds then there remains the question w
that our intuitions on the matter should be reliable. This was
clearly, and which led him into the notorious Cartesian
whether an appeal to evolution could have been of any gre
" There is apparently a problem for me here, concerning 20t
Russell and Ayer, who continued to oppose Nativism de
evolutionary explanations of innateness. What I maintain in
sight of the concerns which had motivated the early Empiric
human knowledge by our best conception of the mind's po
reality. They therefore become locked into the Phenomena
point where it was necessary to be so. Note how even a con
Quine makes only the most minimal of concessions to Nativ
there are innate similarity spaces (see his 'Natural Kinds' in
Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Th
data of experience have, innately, some degree of structur
world. This gives rise to a plausible objection

there is now a real danger that I have constr
such a way that its distinctness from Ration
altogether. To this issue I now turn.
IV
The Persistence of Conflict. If evolution has

substantive innate knowledge, either of our
of the natural world, then such knowledge w
be a priori. But the sense of 'apriori knowledg
than what philosophers generally unde
employ the phrase. In particular, the knowle
not have been obtained simply through think
of reasoning alone. Thus innate knowledge o
for example, would not involve beliefs which
to be true just by thinking of their subject-
their content be intuitively certain. Rather,
with those beliefs already, they would co
provided that they are both true, and either
acquired through evolution or give a cohe
human behaviour.
What therefore emerges is this. Empiricists who accept the
existence of substantive a priori knowledge, through accepting
some form of evolutionary Nativism, can still maintain their
opposition to the characteristic Rationalist thesis that we may
obtain substantial information about the world (or about
ourselves) through reason alone. Indeed they will continue to
demand a naturalistic explanation of how reason can have
acquired the power to generate truths about things outside of
itself. It seems unlikely that any adequate answer to this can be
provided, in turn, by reason alone. It will rather require the
backing of some evolutionary (and hence empirical) explanation,
if reason's claims to knowledge are to be allowed. So at least one
aspect of traditional debates between Empiricists and Rationalists
can survive my proposed account of the core of Empiricism.
The main issue remaining, then, is whether an evolutionary
Nativism can be used to render acceptable to a contemporary
Empiricist some of the particular beliefs traditionally defended
by Rationalists. I do not believe that it can. Consider Platonism,
for example. If there is a problem about how abstract objects
could affect our minds to induce in us true beliefs about the

abstract realm, is there not equally a problem about how such
beliefs might have been selected in evolution? What needs
explaining is how true beliefs about the abstract world, as such,
could have survival-value. You cannot eat an abstract object,
nor poison yourself on one. Nor can ignorance of an abstract
object lead you to be eaten by a tiger or drowned in a flood. So
how would humans who happened to have true beliefs about
Platonic objects (or an innate faculty of intuition whose
constituent structure mirrored the relations obtaining between
those objects)'4 have had a better chance of surviving or
reproducing than those who did not?
Of course mathematical and logical truths can be extremely
useful to those who possess them, for example in calculating
what would be a sufficient store of food to see one's family
through a winter. Empiricists have traditionally provided a
number of explanations of such usefulness, ranging from the
suggestion that the truths in question are concerned with
relations between our concepts, to the idea that they are in fact
high-level empirical generalisations. But what is hard to see, is
how facts about Platonic objects could enter into the explanation
of the usefulness of mathematics and logic. If abstract objects
cannot causally affect the natural world, then presumably there
is at most some sort of structural correspondence between the
two realms, in virtue of which pure mathematics can become
applied. Then knowledge of these structural features of the
natural world itself would suffice for whatever practical
advantage is to be gained from mathematics.
Another way to make the point is as follows. Mathematics and
logic, construed Platonistically, are supposed to consist of truths
which obtain objectively with respect to every possible world.
But how would true beliefs about such objective necessities
confer any evolutionary advantage in this world? The most that
one would need, to gain all the survival-value of an objectively
necessary proposition, would be a belief which is true with
respect to that segment of the set of all possible worlds which
corresponds to the set of situations which are nomologically
possible in the actual world. For human beings only have to be
"4This is the view developed by Jerrold Katz in Language and Other Abstract Objects
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1981).
fit to survive in this world, in a variety of d

possible circumstances within it. They do not
survive in all logically possible worlds. Now th
that evolution cannot secure more than is ne
needs of survival. Plainly it can, if random m
fuel the evolutionary process. It is rather
selection of belief is only a reliable process to the
is the truth of the belief which confers adva
When it comes to beliefs whose contents
structural features of the natural world whi
survival, natural selection is just as likely
which are wrong as right. It will not mat
innate beliefs are false with respect to all oth
provided that they are true in this one.
It might be replied that in disciplines suc
and logic, beliefs which are not necessarily t
false. So the only way in which evoluti
survival-value of mathematical truth-in-th
through selecting beliefs which are true in a
This is no doubt correct, if the only alternativ
necessary truths such as '2 + 2 = 4' are necessa
as '2 +2 =5'. But in fact there are also more c
such as 'In worlds close to the actual wo
whereas in all other possible worlds 2 + 2 mak
This, while perhaps necessarily false, would c
believed it all of the survival-value of '2 +2 =4' in the actual
world in which we find ourselves.'6
It appears that the Empiricist objection to Platonism remains
15 Cast inJustificationalist mode, the point is that the innateness of our beliefs would fail
to provide any reason for thinking them to be true, where their content goes beyond
anything which could aid survival in the actual world. Those beliefs could just as well be
false as true.
'6There are two distinct arguments here, depending upon what conception of
knowledge is endorsed. Suppose we are Reliabilists. Then the fact that evolution could
equally well have selected for us a psychology which would have led us to find false
mathematical beliefs intuitively acceptable, is sufficient to show that it is not a reliable
process with respect to the Platonic domain; hence undermining our claim to innate
knowledge. Suppose, on the other hand, that we accept some form ofCoherentism, while
also endorsing the Empiricist constraint. Then we shall only be justified in maintaining
our mathematical beliefs (given a Platonist construal of their subject matter) if we can
explain why evolution should not instead have given us a set of beliefs which-while we
should now be inclined to describe them as false-would yet have struck us as equally
plausible and coherent.
intact, even given my construal of the core

the consequent Empiricist acceptance of evol
I believe that contemporary Empiricists
opposed to Rationalist claims that we
knowledge of the existence ofGod, the existen
of the soul, and the freedom of the will; tho
this in any detail here. The main problem
evolution can have been reliable in selecting
with the power to obtain such knowledge. Fo
what advantage such a faculty would con
therefore conclude that my proposed acco
Empiricism may leave much of the tradition
Empiricists and Rationalists intact. While
accept the existence of innate knowled
information-bearing mental structures, they
over the general claim that substantial kn
through thought alone, as well as over many
knowledge.
V
Defending the Empiricist Constraint. Should we, today, be Empiri-

cists? Are there any convincing reasons for thinking that
knowledge-claims should only be endorsed where we can
provide some sort of naturalistic account of the relevant belief-
acquisition process? While this is too large an issue to be dealt
with properly here, there is still a point in raising it. For it will
enable us to approach the question of the underlying motivation
behind the core Empiricist constraint. Why would anyone want
to constrain epistemology by Psychology?
It is clear that knowledge-claims should not in general be
endorsed where they are in conflict with our best scientific
theories. At the very least we should suspend judgement, in
virtue of the principle that one should not hold inconsistent
" Note that in order for evolutionary selection to count as reliable, the survival-value
of an innate belief or faculty of reason has to be contingent upon truth. So it is no good
appealing to the supposed social benefits of religious belief in this connection, for
example, since those benefits would presumably remain, whether or not the belief in
question were true. The difficulty is to find some way in which truth would matter here,
without violating the Empiricist constraint of allowing only natural processes into the
account (as would an appeal to God's intervention in the world in response to prayer).
beliefs. But it might be denied that it follows from

are to claim knowledge of some matter we mus
to provide a scientific account of the process t
knowledge in question would be acquired.
surely be consistent with a body of scientific t
possession of it being explicable in terms
However, the distance between these two
smaller than it appears. For recall that the
only on the beginnings of a naturalistic accoun
belief-acquisition process. In general the re
unable to provide even the beginnings of such
current scientific theory implies that there is n
But can it really be reasonable to deny
knowledge of some matter (or at least to su
merely because our present scientific beliefs p
materials with which to frame a remotely pla
how we might have acquired that knowledge?
example in some detail, as a test-case. Suppose
or group of persons, claims to be prescient. Th
have intuitive (non-inferential) knowledge of t
us suppose that their predictions seem very
right. Suppose further, that the nature and p
predictions seems to rule out fraud, unconscio
knowledge of current tendencies, or the kind o
accuracy familiar to students of Astrology. Yet
not the faintest idea how there can be a reliabl
beliefs about the future except by inferen
tendencies. For how could a future event e
influence on the human mind? How could the m
event will take place at a particular time in the
any natural process bringing someone to believ
idea seems barely intelligible, given current
natural world. Yet in this example we woul
powerful reasons for thinking that these peop
of the future, based upon their past success. S
that we ought to grant that they have knowle
cannot provide even the beginnings of a natur
the belief-acquisition process involved, cont
Empiricist claims.
Now in one respect this example provides a t
for Empiricism than those which it has tr

there is no obvious way of reinterpreting the
in question so as to render their mod
problematic. In connection with logic
beliefs, in contrast, just such a move is
extent of its success is still controversial. E
claim in such areas that the beliefs merely
structures which are dependent upon th
most that they concern abstract objects w
minds.'8 So we might respond to the exam
Empiricist constraint on knowledge claim
claims to knowledge should not be gran
provide any sort of natural account of the
the beliefs are acquired, unless the eviden
some sort of reliable process is overwhelmi
no possibility of reinterpreting the subject
in question so as to render our mode
problematic."9
In fact we may also respond to this example more directly. We
can insist that it is merely imaginary, and that in fact prescience
will never occur. For Empiricists need not be claiming to know a
priori that all knowledge must arise through natural processes.
Rather, their attitude results from a more general commitment
to the ultimate explicability, in principle,20 of all natural
phenomena including belief-acquisition. An Empiricist will
therefore be prepared to bet that no genuine case of prescience
(not attributable to fraud, unconscious inference from current
tendencies etc.) will ever in fact occur, precisely because our
'8 See my Tractarian Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), Ch. 9 for a brief development
of this latter idea.
9 Empiricists may then, on my account, find themselves forced to allow that we have a
priori knowledge of a Platonic realm, unless some alternative construal of the subject-
matter of our mathematical beliefs can be made out, or unless one can account for the
usefulness of mathematical beliefs without supposing that they are true (as Hartry Field
attempts to do in Science without Numbers, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
"2Since Locke, for one, believed that there are natural processes which will forever
outstrip our powers of explanation, he cannot have been committed to the idea that
science will prove explanatorily adequate. Yet one could plainly have reason to think
that there is some natural mechanism underlying a given phenomenon, even if one
thought that we could never have detailed knowledge of it. The crucial commitment is to
the claim that all processes in nature are natural ones, happening in accordance with causal
law.
inability to frame even the beginnin

explanation of such a phenomenon gives
that there is no such belief-acquisition pro
Looked at in this way, Empiricist constra
claims may be seem to stem from a more
ultimate adequacy of science. The sequence
this. If in these circumstances we were to
the matter in question (the future, say) th
have to result from a natural (and reliable
current science is such that we cannot e
plausible hypothesis as to what that proces
in itself provides us with good reason to do
this is, surely, exactly how we would resp
case of prescience. Given what we alrea
world, we may be sure that it will never h
21Note that the Empiricist constraint on knowledge-claim

Plainly it cannot be, since it led the early Empiricists to de
turns out, incorrectly. It may nevertheless be reasona
commitment to the ultimate (or in principle) explanatory a
huge success of science in the past. We shall then have reaso
phenomenon will ever really occur, if we cannot begin
could ever receive an adequate natural explanation. Into
claims of prescience, but also Astrology, magic and many
" An early version of this paper was given as a talk at the
where much became clearer to me in the course of the su
grateful to David Archard, David Hills, Louis Loeb, Cynt
David Velleman and Tim Williamson for their comments on earlier drafts.
WHAT IS EMPIRICISM?
Peter Carruthers and Cynthia Macdonald
II---Cynthia Macdonald
NATIVISM, NATURALISM, AND EVOLUTIONARY

THEORY
Evolutionary epistemology has been around for some t

recently the use of evolutionary models to illuminate tr
problems in other areas of philosophy, such as those of
language, has become widespread.' In particular, the us
theory of natural selection to give substance to evo
theories of knowledge, mind, and language has
proponents of those theories to sidestep objections bas
claim that their use of 'evolutionary' is mere metap
theories promise to be more successful than earlie
naturalistic models in vindicating the claim that episte
can be naturalized.2 The reason is that biological exp
of features of organisms are teological; and tele
evidently what is needed but lacking in mere causal ac
knowledge.
Carruthers' paper embodies this conviction that evolutionary-
biological models can be successfully applied to knowledge and
mind. His argument, very crudely, has the following form:
(1) The core of empiricism lies in its commitment to

naturalism.
(2) There are naturalistic accounts of nativism, viz.
evolutionary ones.
(3) Therefore empiricists can be nativists.
I believe that the faith in evolutionary biology's capacity to
'See, for example, Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological
Categories (Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1984), David Papineau, Reality and Representation
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987), and Colin McGinn, Mental Content (Oxford, Basil
Blackwell, 1989).
2 See Brian Loar, Mind and Meaning (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981),
for an example of a causal-naturalist model and see John McDowell, 'Functionalism
and Anomalous Monism', in Earnest LePore and Brian McLaughlin, eds., Actions and
Events (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 387-98, for a critical discussion of it.
82 II-CYNTHIA MACDONALD
provide an account either of knowledge or of be

Its success depends on the plausibility of su
biological account of intentional content is fort
think that this supposition is highly implausib
In what follows, I shall concentrate mainly but
on the second premise of Carruthers' argume
aim will be to consider the case against the c
empiricism and Platonism, since this has also
liklihood of evolutionary biology's providing an
knowledge (or simply of our belief) in abstract
I
Naturalism and Evolutionary Epistemology. First, some preliminaries.

Carruthers takes the core of empiricism to be a commitment to
naturalism; and his second premise states that there are
naturalistic accounts of nativism. Crucial to both premises is the
intended sense of 'naturalism', and crucial to the second, in
addition, is the intended sense of 'evolutionary' and 'nativism'.
Naturalism can take a variety of forms. At its strongest, it is
the view, embodied in the unity of science doctrine espoused by
the logical positivists, that not only are all phenomena and
features of the world natural (in the sense of being causal) but
they are also explicable by means of the concepts of one all-
encompassing sceince.3 In the case of the logical positivists, that
science was physics, which, in the context of the unity of science
doctrine, led to the view that all other disciplines with their
respective subject matter were ultimately reducible to physics.
Other philosophers committed to naturalism have differed both
in their choice of the ultimate science as a model for other
disciplines and in their degree of commitment to full-scale
reductionism. Whereas Quine has claimed that the appropriate
science for naturalizing epistemology must be behaviourist,
Goldman's more recent attempt to naturalize epistemology uses
cognitive science as a model.4 More recently still, Millikan's,
Papineau's and, to some extent, McGinn's attempts to give
naturalistic accounts of mind (particularly of intentional states)
use evolutionary biology as a model.5 These latter accounts in
3 See Rudolf Carnap, The Unity of Science (London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1934).
4See Epistemology and Cognition (Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1986).
5 Op. cit.
particular vary in their degree of commitme

Although they all reject the logical positiv
unity of science doctrine together with its i
autonomy of biology vis-a-vis physics, they diff
the extent to which one can expect a biolo
intentional content. Millikan, for examp
ductionist, whereas McGinn is not, his view b
content can be captured by a biological ac
As these latter philosophers demonstr
naturalist without being a physicalist (i.e. wi
the reduction of all disciplines to phys
physicalist-naturalists and biological naturalis
all natural processes are causal processes. Note
belief that all natural processes should be ex
causal laws. This implies that all expla
processes is causal. But that is a much str
would imply the reduction of biology to
science, notably physics. What to some ensu
biology vis-a-vis physics is that its explanatio
functional.6 Such explanations, unlike tho
sciences, link the continued presence of a fe
members of a species with the effects th
instances of that feature had in members of
past. If they are causal in any sense, they ar
and this distinguishes them crucially from ca
the physical sciences.
In fact, Carruthers' argument for the c
empiricism with nativism requires only the
naturalist) view, which he seems also to endo
take it that it is this that is at issue in the argu
sense of 'nativism'? This term evidently is n
as applying to general (non-domain-speci
capacities, dispositions or mechanisms. Th
application is, rather, to innate concepts, beli
6 See M. Matthen and E. Levy, 'Teleology, Error, and the H

The Journal of Philosophy, LXXXI, no. 7 (July, 1984), pp.
'Reduction and Evolutionary Biology', in K. Lennon and D. C
and Anti-Reductionism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, for
7See notes 6 and 20 of 'What is Empiricism?', this volume
(where these latter evidently are to be construed

and domain-specific mental structures. So it is
forming mechanisms that are at issue in the ar
beliefs thus formed.
This is a strong conception of nativism, and it is important to
the argument that it should be, not least because the weaker
conception is too weak to need reconciling with empiricism.
Since beliefs are typically, perhaps essentially, characterised by
their propositional contents, the case for the compatibility of
nativism with empiricism must focus on content.
Given this, it is evident what the intended sense of'evolutinary'
must be. What is needed for the argument to work is a biological
account of how a belief might come to be innate. In general,
evolutionary theories are to be distinguished from others by the
fact the they are selectionist, non-biological ones being based on
analogies with the biological model. This has the following three
features: (i) a mechanism for introducing variation, (ii) a
consistent selection process, and (iii) a mechanism for transmission
(preservation and reproduction). The problematic feature for
Carruthers' argument is (iii). Non-biological models may
possess these features, but the transmission of features in such
models is typically effected in an a posteriori way. Since innate
beliefs are a priori, such models are unacceptable for anyone
wishing to reconcile empiricism with nativism.
But this is not all. Any biological account of how a belief
might come to be innate must suppose there to be a genetic basis
for the origin and transmission of beliefs. So content-that by
which beliefs are identified and individuated as beliefs-must
itself be supposed to be genetically encoded. A thoroughgoing
biological account of nativism will therefore require an account
of content itself. Those such as Millikan and Papineau accept
this reductionist consequence of naturalizing mental states like
belief. McGinn rejects the reductionist conclusion, but then he
does not purport to be naturalizing content.8 Carruthers has no
option: if a naturalistic account of how a belief might come to be
innate can be given (and how, as a consequence, an account can
be given of how there might be innate knowledge), then that
account must involve biologizing content itself.
8 See Mental Content, op. cit.
II
Evolution and Content. Let us now apply these considerations to

Carruthers' argument. This supposes that certain beliefs might
be selected for, hence be innate for individuals in subsequent
generations, but not be innate for the species, originating in
some individuals at some point as a result of random biological
change. Those beliefs that are selected for will be so because they
are fit; they contribute to the survival and proliferation of
human beings. Clearly not all fit beliefs need be innate, since
features can be fit in ways other than by genetic transmission:
learned behaviours such as crying are one good example of this.
Carruthers' argument is that, in general, fit beliefs that are
innate will be true; and that what makes them knowledge
consistently with empiricism is explicable in terms of either (a)
reliabilism, or (b) coherentism.
Three features of this argument strike me as problematic. The
first is the assumption, which lies behind the claim that there are
evolutionary accounts of how a belief might come to be innate,
that a biological account can be applied to belief. The second is
the equation of fitness with truth. The third is the combination
of either reliabilism or coherentism with a biological account of
true belief in the account of how knowledge might come to be
innate.
The first feature is absolutely critical to the argument, and I
believe that it is the most problematic of the three. The difficulty
is with two of the three characteristics of the biological model
mentioned earlier, viz. (i) a source of variation, and (iii) a
mechanism for transmission, that must be assumed to apply to
states like belief. Selectionist theories in biology assume a genetic
basis for (i); and the source of variation is 'blind'. The features
that are selected for arise as a result of chance mutation. But it is
hard to see how the idea of blind variation can apply to such
states as belief. This is primarily because the mental domain is
holistic in a rationalistic way: whether a person can be said to
possess a particular belief depends in part on which other beliefs.
desires, etc., she can be seen to possess, to which that belief is not
merely causally but logically related. This has the consequence
that the possession by a person of a belief is not mere chance but
constrained by a network of other contentful states which bear
content-connections to it. This in turn impli

change occurs, not as a matter of chance, but as a
of inferential connections between mental sta
However holistic the domain of biology may b
account cannot guarantee that the pattern of belie
from causal-historical relations between them will match the
pattern that results from logical relations between their
contents. For the latter is imposed by rationality constraints
which have no place in biology.
(iii) is equally problematic, and for the same reason. The
problem here is not merely that the identity conditions of a
belief are holistically fixed, so that if that belief is genetically
determined, it will have consequences for others. It is that
content ascription is governed by principles that are rationalistic.
Holism of a rationalistic sort precludes biologizing content, since
it has the consequence that the identity conditions of content
must transcend the actual environment of an organism.
Even supposing that content-fixing requires reference only to
actual environment, there are difficulties, notably that beliefs are
evidently too finely grained vis-a-vis actual environments. Take
the beliefs that water is thirst-quenching and that H20 is thirst-
quenching. These are distinct beliefs despite extensional agree-
ment of'H20' with 'water', since substitution of the former for the
latter following the verb of propositional attitude in sentences of
the form 'S believes that Q' may alter their truth value. The
phenomenon of opacity can be seen as arising as a result of
imposing rationality constraints on the attribution of contentful
states to individuals, specifically the constraint that any such
attribution must be consistent with other contentful states and
actions of those individuals by their own lights. This constraint on
the attribution of contentful states to individuals--that any such
attribution respect the conceptual resources of those individuals
-prohibits the use of concepts in the characterisation of such
states that there is no evidence that those individuals possess.
This makes content first- as well as third-person orientated;
what an individual believes depends in part on how that
individual conceives things. It also makes content much more
fine-grained than it is plausible to suppose input/output
9Millikan, op. cit., argues that a biological account of content can meet the holism
requirement.
relations of individuals to environments

reason is that such relations are, and must
orientated only. The actions of one and th
towards water, characterised purely extension
regard to that individual's way of conceivin
same.
This last point in particular suggests that ther

general problem here, viz. whether a causal-histori
explanation of the sort that biology invokes ca
explanatory purposes for which the notion of conten
invoked. To make intelligible a person's actions is t
her point of view, and this forces distinctions in con
beliefs, that are not discernible from a purely exte
of view. The suspicion is that a causal-histor
explanation is not up to the task of explaining con
and content itself precisely because, even though it
it is extensional. This being so, it cannot capture d
content due to an agent's own perspective on thi
All of this affects the case for nativism based
because, if one cannot biologize content, one canno
genetic origin and transmission of a belief from in
one generation to individuals of another. But let's se
to one side for the moment and focus on the issue o
Here there are further problems to consider.
One is the assumption that beliefs that are fit ar
true. Since beliefs that aren't true can't constitute
the possibility that there can be fit beliefs that
threatens the supposition that a biological account
be married to the view that there can be innate kn
plausible, if not obvious, that there can be beliefs th
not true, and so beliefs whose survival values are no
on their truth. Think, for example, of a child'
strangers are dangerous. Strictly speaking, this is
majority of strangers that a child does or even mi
are not dangerous. But the belief is nevertheless fi
single time that an instance of it is correct it may s
the child. Or think of the examples of a newborn in
at the sound of a human voice and a buck who reco
by the shapes of the shadows they cast. Much of t
newborn's 'human detector' and the buck's 'lion detector' are
wrong-: they fail to correctly identify humans a

features are fit because, when they are instan
are conducive to the organism's survival."'
Unfortunately, such examples are incon
assumption that the fitness of a belief is in ge
its truth is compatible with cases where this i
could be shown to be false in general, it can b
apply only to innate beliefs, where the above
apply. And the argument really only needs t
example of a child who believes that strang
fails to show that there can be innate fit belie
since it is not a plausible case of innately a
other examples may show that there are inna
least some of which may be belief-forming a
lead to the formation of false beliefs. But sin
that the beliefs thus formed are innate, they
counterexample to the claim that innate belief
general true.
The difficulty in actually finding counte
claim is at least partly due to the fact t
hypothesis is itself so vague. There is no
argument for the compatibility of empiricism
types of beliefs that are at issue; whether, fo
singular beliefs or general beliefs. In fact, it
both from the point of view of nativism and fro
that the types of beliefs that are involve
unrestricted in scope. But then it is possible
on the claim that innate beliefs that are fit ar
a more schematic level somewhat as follows. In
possess content which is general. This is so
environment-specific a belief is, the more like
been acquired a posteriori. But the more gene
greater the risk it runs in being false. So it is m
on a priori grounds, that innate beliefs that
general true.
Unless more can be said about the types
innateness is at issue, I do not think that mu
made on the fitness/truth issue. Let us turn
'0 Goldman, op. cit., Chapter 9, makes this point. See also G
Representation', Mind and Language, Vol. 4. no. 3 (Autum
that a biologically-based account of innate

given. According to Carruthers, the gap be
belief and innate knowledge is capable of bei
by some form of reliabilism or by a cohe
justification. About reliabilism I have not
Carruthers supposes that the move from inn
beliefs to knowledge can be legitimized via
evolution is very likely a reliable process i
innate beliefs, and I have already queried thi
My doubts about the possibility of giving a c
of innate knowledge are, if anything, m
question the compatibility of such an accoun
as characterised in section 1. One of the great
movement towards naturalism in this cen
work of Quine. His arguments against the
distinction and accompanying doubts abo
posteriori distinction led to the view that ther
distinction between science and philosophy
pursued and evaluated by the same princ
evidence. This led to a conception of kn
holistic. Quine's brand of naturalism may n
going, but it is arguable that its fundamental
abolition of the analytic/synthetic and a pri
tinctions, and the resulting epistemic holism
by any naturalist. This raises the question of
can be combined with any a priori/a posterio
sort required for innatism, given the holism
true that the notion of a prioricity at w
argument is a relative and therefore weak on
both a priori (for an individual) and aposterior
I am not concerned with how strong the notio
the a prioricity of an individual's belief c
coherentist account ofjustificationfor that ind
given that the mental domain is holistic. This
the justification of an individual's belief is a m
coheres with all of her other beliefs, includin
then in what sense can any belief that constit
priori? The problem for innate beliefs is acute if
" See 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point
Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 20-46.
beliefs to constitute knowledge, they must coher

beliefs. For this implies that innate knowledge is
conditions which are a posteriori, i.e., is not kno
'independent of experience'. The possession of su
will entail the possession of certain experential
Now one way of avoiding this problem would
any individuals who possessed innate, fit, true b
be very likely to possess innate belief-forming m
would prohibit the acquisition of any beliefs tha
with the innate ones.'2 But this highlights a seco
problem with the coherentist account, alread
connection with the content issue. The notion
that is at stake here is one of logical consisten
between the contents of beliefs. Given that the holism of the
mental is specifically of a rationalistic sort, and given that
rationalistic principles have no role to play in biology, a
coherentist account of justification undermines the claim that
one can given a naturalistic (i.e., biological) account of how
there might be innate knowledge.
III
Nativism vs. Platonism. Carruthers anticipates that there will be

problems distinguishing rationalism from empiricism if the
argument for the compatibility of empiricism and nativism goes
through. He therefore identifies platonism as a major rationalist
commitment and argues that this cannot be reconciled with
empiricism. The strategy of the argument is the reverse of that
for the compatibility of empiricism and nativism: platonism,
construed as the doctrine that there are abstract objects, is
incompatible with empiricism because no evolutionary account
of how we might come to have beliefs in abstract objects is
forthcoming.
Why should we think that there are biological accounts of
innate beliefs about concrete objects but not ones of innate
beliefs about abstract ones? Because, it seems, abstract objects
have no causal efficacy vis-a-vis the natural world. But I do not
see how this is relevant to the question. However causally
inefficacious abstract objects may be vis-a-vis the natural world,
12 This point was suggested to me by Eve Garrard.
beliefs about them may well be. And the ques

biological account of beliefs about abstract ob
is one about the survival value of having, ov
belief, not about the causal efficacy or ot
represented by the contents of that belief. Consi
in giving a biological account of how we m
innate beliefs about concrete objects in the n
that the source of variation is genetic, one c
concrete objects that are representedby the cont
to play a part in the explanation of how such
innate. To assume that they become innate a
interaction between individuals and their environment would
require some kind of Lamarckian account.
So the question of whether a biological account of innate
beliefs either about concrete or about abstract objects can be
given is one concerning the survival value of the beliefs
themselves, not one about the causal efficacy of objects
represented by their propositional contents. Carruthers supposes
that the causal efficacy of such objects is relevant because he
links the survival value of a belief with its truth, and he does not
see how a true innate belief about abstract objects could have
survival value if such objects do not causally affect the natural
world. (False beliefs about abstract objects are irrelevant here.)
But this is to equivocate between the causal efficacy, hence
survival value, of the propositional content of a belief and the
causal efficacy of the belief itself (i.e., of having, as opposed to
not having, it). Since the proposition '2 x2 = 4' is necessarily
true, it is reasonable to suppose, perhaps, that its truth won't
make a causal difference in the natural world. But what matters
in a biological account is not whether the proposition makes a
difference, but whether the belief in it does. And believing that
2 +2=4 can make a difference to survival, as Carruthers
himself notes. Indeed, beliefs concerning mathematical prop-
ositions are the prime candidates for ones that could have
become innate through evolutionary means: since their truth
is guaranteed in all environments, they possess the required
generality (see earlier), and so it is plausible to suppose that
selection pressures would favour them.
Since neither the causal efficacy of objects represented by the
content of a belief nor the causal efficacy of the content of the
belief itself is what matters to a biological accou

belief might come to be innate, I fail to see why
of how innate beliefs in abstract objects is any l
forthcoming than one for innate beliefs in c
Carruthers' reasons for thinking so are in any c
correct, they would show that innate true beliefs
be given a biological account. These concern the
truth of a belief in abstract objects. Carruthers r
the truth of a belief is what confers survival valu
the content of a true belief about abstract objects go
thing that may aid survival in the actual natura
selection is just as apt to produce beliefs that are
are true. So one cannot give a selectionist acco
might come to have innate true beliefs about ab
The crucial phrase here is 'may aid survival'.
any general belief (and so, if I am right, any inn
beyond anything that may aid survival in th
world, whether it is about abstract or about c
Now, Carruthers concedes that the contents o
beliefs (e.g., mathematical ones) might requir
only to actual environments but also to nomol
ones. His objection to a natural selectionist ac
about abstract objects is that the contents of such
beyond even the nomologically possible. If I
point here, it is that a natural selectonist accoun
beliefs might come to be innate cannot account
because they cannot fix their content. I agree
severe problems with the idea that the content of
be biologized. But then I think that these pr
content across the board. If we knew what the limits of the
nomologically possible were, there might be a case for a
principled distinction between those beliefs (about concrete
objects) whose contents can be biologized and those beliefs
(about abstract objects) that cannot. Failing such knowledge,
Carruthers' argument against the possibility of giving a
biological account of innate true beliefs about abstract objects
also tells against the possibility of giving such an account of ones
about objects in the natural world.'3
13I am grateful to Graham Macdonald, Graham Bird, Lawrence Lombard, Eve
Garrard, and Philip Pettit for comments and advice on various drafts of this paper.

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What Is Empiricism?

Author(s): Peter Carruthers and Cynthia Macdonald

Peter Carruthers and Cynthia Macdonald

Must Empiricists be committed to rejecting all forms of

The Problem of Unity. We can distinguish two distinct foci of

knowledge must be grounded in sen

of its subject-matter. Note that on this account a proposition can be informative

It might be suggested that I have err

4 In fact I doubt this entailment in the case of knowledge

positive characterisations given above serv

5See the Essay, Bk. IV, Ch. XI.

Empiricists was with matters of justificat

An Historical Hypothesis. I propose that th

6 A natural process, as I understand it, is one which fal

rejected Nativism, then why did they not

'Witness the extent to which Hume had to hide his

mind-independent realm. The Platonist hyp

'Their motivation is therefore slightly different from that of A. I. Goldman in

feel that if they were to make progress w

This was that which gave the first

The project was to attempt to settle dis

The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these

Here again the project is the core Empiricist one, to constrain

knowledge-claims by our best theories o

Empiricism and Nativism. If I have correctly

justification, innate knowledge will still b

12 The problem for a Foundationalist, on the other hand,

world. This gives rise to a plausible objection

The Persistence of Conflict. If evolution has

could affect our minds to induce in us true beliefs about the

fit to survive in this world, in a variety of d

intact, even given my construal of the core

Defending the Empiricist Constraint. Should we, today, be Empiri-

beliefs. But it might be denied that it follows from

for Empiricism than those which it has tr

inability to frame even the beginnin

21Note that the Empiricist constraint on knowledge-claim

Peter Carruthers and Cynthia Macdonald

NATIVISM, NATURALISM, AND EVOLUTIONARY

Evolutionary epistemology has been around for some t

(1) The core of empiricism lies in its commitment to

I believe that the faith in evolutionary biology's capacity to

provide an account either of knowledge or of be

Naturalism and Evolutionary Epistemology. First, some preliminaries.

particular vary in their degree of commitme

6 See M. Matthen and E. Levy, 'Teleology, Error, and the H

(where these latter evidently are to be construed

8 See Mental Content, op. cit.

Evolution and Content. Let us now apply these considerations to

content-connections to it. This in turn impli

relations of individuals to environments

This last point in particular suggests that ther

wrong-: they fail to correctly identify humans a

that a biologically-based account of innate

beliefs to constitute knowledge, they must coher

Nativism vs. Platonism. Carruthers anticipates that there will be

12 This point was suggested to me by Eve Garrard.

beliefs about them may well be. And the ques

belief itself is what matters to a biological accou

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