REMEDIAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

10. G.R. No. 182165   November 25, 2009

P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ,

FACTS: Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a
parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by
the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects. A complaint for
unlawful detainer was then filed to which judgement was rendered against Spouses cruz. After sometime, a Writ of
Demolition was then issued to which the Spouses filed for a Temporary Restraining Order.
The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed
several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which was for lease. Police
Superintendent Felixberto Castillo was then ordered to "protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,"
entered the property. Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, insisting that the RTC July 19,
2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter
to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Respondents
then filed a petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas data.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be barred?

HELD: At all events, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for
criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 24 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter
is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas
data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal
proceedings.

It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life,
liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then
willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the
petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)" 19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to
post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest. 20

11. G.R. No. 182795             June 5, 2008

ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners, vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS
ASS’N., I – XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS: Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their
dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished
pursuant to a court judgment. Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth
these so-called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting syndicates" - - - - the
low so defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the Government must be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from
these unscrupulous political protégées. If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System
of land registration in this Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer
for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation
in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the Private Respondents. The Courts of
Justice, including this Honorable Supreme Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in the possession of
the Private Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.

ISSUE: Whether or not Writ of Amparo is proper.

HELD: NO. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was
affirmed with finality by this Court, is not included among the enumeration of rightsfor which the remedy of a writ of
amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory
judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the
issuance of the writ of amparo.
12. G.R. No. 182161               December 3, 2009
Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF APPEALS, secretary DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents

FACTS: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. In the morning
of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame. An information was then
filed against them for the crime of rebellion. On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for
Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote
the DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales requesting the lifting of Hold Departure Order No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal
Case however despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists. A petition for Writ of
Amparo was then filed on the ground that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the
subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.

HELD: The Court see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear
prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or securitythe personal concern that the writ is intended to protectis
immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an
application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying
by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may
deny his motion to lift the HDO.28 Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any
clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy
also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of
1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders);

22. G.R. No. L-65192 April 27, 1988

DELA CRUZ vs. MOYA

FACTS: On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned to the
Intelligence and Operations Section of the 432nd PC Company, together with other PC men, received a mission order to
proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending persons who were
allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. In compliance with said mission order, Dela Cruz and company proceeded to
Maco, Davao del Norte and caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting, but said operators resisted
arrest. The soldiers left the place but they brought with them to the PC Headquarters the evidence of the crime, such as
gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfights, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto, followed the
soldiers on their way back to the PC Headquarters, catching up with them on the Tagum-Mati National Highway. Fighting
ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto.

On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao, in an information filed
by the Provincial Fiscal. While the case was pending trial, Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by
the President of the Philippines on January 16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by
members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in performance of their duties.

Claiming that the crime for which he was charged was committed in relation to the performance of his duties, Dela Cruz
filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the military authorities so he could be tried
by court martial. The motion was denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether the court of first instance of Davao has jurisdiction.

HELD: No. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. And once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation.

In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, by virtue of General Order No. 59, dated
June 24, 1977, military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll offenses
committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official duty or
which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty; Provided, that for the purpose of
determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty or whether it arose out of an act
or omission done in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense to that
effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by the President.

In the case at bar, it is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, petitioner Dela Cruz was a
member of the Philippine Constabulary, and that the shooting of the deceased Cabilto was committed while petitioner
was executing the Mission Order.

The Solicitor General points out that at the time the information was filed, Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822 and 1822-A
which vest in the courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP in the performance of their
duties were not yet in effect, the same having been promulgated only in 1981. However, General Order No. 59 cited
above applies.

23. G.R. No. 143647 November 11, 2005

FUKUZUME vs. PEOPLE

FACTS: Private complainant Javier Ng Yu is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap
wires.3 Sometime in July 1991, Yu, accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate, 4 who was the vice-president of Manila Electric
Company, went to the house of herein accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume in Parañaque. 5 Jovate introduced Fukuzume
to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum
scrap wires. Believing Fukuzume’s representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from
Fukuzume.8 The initial agreed purchase price was ₱200,000.00. 9 Yu gave Fukuzume sums of money on various dates
which eventually totaled ₱290,000.00. Fukuzume admitted that he received the same from Yu and that he still owes him
the amount of ₱290,000.00.11 Subsequenty, Yu was unable to get the aluminum scrap wires he then talked to Fukuzume
and asked from the latter the refund of the money he paid him. 22 Fukuzume promised to return Yu’s money. 23 When
Fukuzume failed to comply with his undertaking, Yu sent him a demand letter asking for the refund of ₱424,000.00 plus
loss of profits.24 Subsequently, Yu filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In an Information,
dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of Makati, Fukuzume was charged with estafa.

ISSUE: Wether the Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: No. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to
be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.39

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement
executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to
corroborate Yu’s sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was
committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, ₱20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, ₱50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and ₱170,000.00
on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that
NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the
same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of
the offense charged had been committed in Parañaque. The crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter’s house in
Parañaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his
money.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in
Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial
court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice.

24. G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989

38. ISSUANCE OF HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER OF JUDGE LUISITO T. ADAOAG, MTC, Camiling, Tarlac
[A.M. No. 99-8-126-MTC. September 22, 1999]
Topic: Hold Departure Order

Facts:
This refers to the indorsement dated March 31, 1999, of the Secretary of Justice concerning a hold departure
order issued on January 29, 1999 by Judge Luisito T. Adaoag of Municipal Trial Court, Camiling, Tarlac, in Criminal Case
Nos. 98-131 and 98-132, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Nestor Umagat y Campos." The Secretary of Justice calls
attention to the fact that the order in question is contrary to SC Circular No. 39-97 dated June 19, 1997, which limits the
authority to issue hold departure orders to the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction.
Judge Adaoag admits his mistake and pleads ignorance of the circular, explaining that the court order dated January 29,
1999 is a mere request from the Commission on Immigration to issue a Hold Departure Order, and the questioned order
was issued in two criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Court upon motion of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Tarlac.

Issue:
Whether Judge Adaoag, as MTC Judge, may issue hold departure orders in criminal cases.

Ruling:
No. Judge Adaoag was reprimanded with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. Indeed, the said Circular limits the authority to issue hold departure orders to the Regional Trial Courts in
criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction. This is to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of Hold Departure Orders
resulting in inconvenience to the parties affected, the same being tantamount to an infringement on the right and liberty
of an individual to travel, and to ensure that the Hold Departure Orders which are issued contain complete and accurate
information.

39. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TAN TENG, defendant-appellant.

[G.R. No. 7081. September 7, 1912]
Topic: Right against self-incrimination

Facts:
The sister of Oliva Pacomio, the offended 7-year old girl, discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal
disease known as gonorrhea. Oliva related to her sister that in the morning of the 15th of September 1910, Chinaman
Tan Teng followed her into her room and raped her. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her, to
which she identified Tan Teng at once. Upon this information, Tan Teng was arrested, taken to the police station and
stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore that his body bore every sign
of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the
substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having
a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering from
gonorrhea. During the trial, the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination of the substance taken
from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was
suffering from gonorrhea because to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. The
trial court found Tan Teng guilty of the crime of rape.

Issue:
 Whether the collection of substance emitted from the body of the defendant violated his right against self-
incrimination.

Ruling:
No. The evidence obtained in this way from the accused, is not testimony but his body itself. The prohibition that
a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself is a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It is
simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his
guilt, or extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating him in the commission of a crime.
An inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, cannot violate the said privilege, because it
does not call upon the accused as a witness or upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. The accused was not
compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an object found upon his body was
examined seems no more to infringe the rule invoked. The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without
his objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was
suffering from said disease.

40. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FEDERICO BENAVIDEZ y SANGCAL, Accused-
Appellant. [G.R. Nos. 142372-74. September 17, 2002]
Topic: Searching Inquiry

Facts:
Three Information were filed against accused-appellant Federico Benavidez y Sangcal for the alleged rape of her
two daughters, 14 year-old Precy Benavidez and 15 year-old Cristy Benavidez. Upon being arraigned on May 5, 1999,
Federico, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, Atty. Dante Mirabueno, entered a plea of not guilty. However, on
August 30, 1999, Atty. Mirabueno manifested that accused-appellant wanted to substitute his former plea of not guilty
with a plea of guilty. On October 5, 1999, with the assistance of Atty. Mirabueno, Federico was re-arraigned and formally
pleaded guilty to the charges of rape in the three Information. The trial court rendered a decision finding accused-
appellant guilty of two (2) counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him in each case to suffer the penalty of death, thus
this automatic review. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding him guilty of the crime of rape
based on his improvident plea of guilt. He never took the witness stand. It was only through his counsel that he allegedly
relayed his decision to plead guilty to the charges of incestuous rape. Accused-appellant himself did not tell the court why
he did not want his counsel to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and to present evidence in his behalf.

Issue:
Whether the trial judge properly conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by
the accused of the consequences of his plea.

Ruling:
No. The decision of RTC was annulled and set aside, and the case was remanded to court of origin for proper
proceedings. Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that when the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court should conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the
accused of the consequences of his plea and should require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
his culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. This procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to
observe it commits grave abuse of discretion. A searching inquiry under the Rules, means more than informing cursorily
the accused that he faces a jail term but so also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that
he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony.
The records of these cases do not show that the trial judge in fact conducted a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension by accused-appellant of the consequences of his plea. There are no transcript of
stenographic notes and minutes of the proceedings below during which accused-appellant was re-arraigned and informed
by the judge of the nature of the charges against him and informed of the consequences of pleading guilty to their
commission. Clearly, therefore, the plea of guilt by accused-appellant before the trial court was made improvidently.

BUAYA vs. POLO

FACTS: Petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to transact and underwrite
insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms
of the agency agreement, the petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and
remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit
was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was
charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX with the
respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Regional trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly
misappropriated were collected in Cebu City. Such motion was denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated March 26,
1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC Manila has jurisdiction.

HELD: Yes. It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted
and the court before which it must be tried. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal
— prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense
was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place. The subject information charges petitioner with estafa
committed "during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines”

Also, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of the
essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the
offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the
petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in
Manila.

59. People of the Philippines vs Jovito Llavore

FACTS: Jovito Llavore y Barrientos a.k.a. Boy, Joel Lobaton y Oreta a.k.a. Imbong, Rodolfo Fuentes y Castillo a.k.a.
Nene, Daniel Guillero y Alvarez a.k.a. Moran and one "Galoy" Longno were charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental.

Jovito Llavore and his co-accused, Joel Lobaton and Rodolfo Fuentes, entered a plea of not guilty at their arraignment.
Fuentes thereafter escaped from prison. Daniel Guillero was later arrested and, when arraigned, also pleaded not guilty.
"Galoy" Longno remained at large.

Jovito Llavore y Barrientos a.k.a. Boy, Joel Lobaton y Oreta a.k.a. Imbong, Rodolfo Fuentes y Castillo a.k.a. Nene, Daniel
Guillero y Alvarez a.k.a. Moran and one "Galoy" Longno were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental.

Jovito Llavore and his co-accused, Joel Lobaton and Rodolfo Fuentes, entered a plea of not guilty at their arraignment.
Fuentes thereafter escaped from prison. Daniel Guillero was later arrested and, when arraigned, also pleaded not guilty.
"Galoy" Longno remained at large.

Danilo Malata was found dead in a reclamation area along Hitalon Bridge in Cadiz City. Malata was last seen alive driving
a tricycle belonging to his sister and her husband Hernani Tancinco. At around five-fifteen on the afternoon of 30 July
1991, a unit of the Cadiz City Philippine National Police (PNP) apprehended Joel Lobaton and Perlito Pastrano in
connection with another attempted robbery case involving a tricycle owned by a certain Francisco Gerongan. During the
investigation conducted by SPO3 Jerry Montecino and SPO3 Sofronio Neri, Lobaton confessed that he, along with Jovito
Llavore, Daniel Guillero, Rodolfo Fuentes, and "Galoy" Longno, had killed Danilo Malata and took away the latter’s tricycle
which they then brought it to the house of LLavore.

On 31 July 1991, police officers saw Llavore driving a tricycle along Gustilo Boulevard in Cadiz City. When confronted,
Llavore voluntarily went with the officers to the police station using the tricycle. While Llavore was being interrogated in
the presence of Hernani Tancinco, the latter observed that the top cover of the tricycle was identical with the top cover of
his tricycle which Malata was driving at the time he was killed. Llavore admitted his involvement in the crime. The police
officers thereupon proceeded to the house of Llavore in Crossing, Cadiz City. At the backyard of the house, they saw a
maroon-colored tricycle without its top cover.6 Tancinco immediately recognized the same to be his tricycle based on its
windshield, cover of the side wheel, and its decorations. When the maroon paint of the tricycle’s sidecar was scraped, the
vehicle showed an orange paint which was its original paint. Tancinco identified the markings he placed on the top cover
of his tricycle like the hole where he inserted a wire and a brace of 3/8 steel bar. Some parts of the tricycle had been
removed. The tricycle’s motorcycle was still painted red, although the motor and chassis number had been defaced.
Tancinco pointed to other distinguishing marks on the motorcycle of his tricycle such as the welding marks on the hub,
the two uneven holes on the fender where he had attached a break light, the spline of the original transmission which
was replaced with a shorter one, the epoxy steel on the leaking tank, and the cut steel on the fork. The defense anchored
itself on denial and alibi.

On 27 February 1997, the court a quo rendered its decision finding Jovito Llavore y Barrientos and his co-accused guilty
of robbery with homicide.

Jovito Llavore, along with his co-accused Joel Lobaton and Daniel Guillero, appealed from the decision; Lobaton and
Guillero, however, later withdrew their respective appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Fuentes implicating him (Llavore) and his co-accused should not
be made the basis for his conviction as being merely hearsay.

HELD: Yes. The Office of the Solicitor General, echoing the argument of appellant, explains that indeed the trial court
should not have considered against Llavore the extrajudicial confession of Fuentes. The Court agrees. Fuentes has not
been presented to the witness stand, and there can be no way of being assured on the veracity of his statements. Most
importantly, Llavore has not been accorded an opportunity to conduct a cross-examination; the law grants him that right.

A review of the evidence on record, nevertheless, would still warrant an affirmance of the trial court’s judgment of
conviction. The crime of robbery with homicide, penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, requires proof
that (a) the taking of personal property is done through violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things; (b)
the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is done with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) the
commission of homicide (in its generic sense) occurs on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof. There must be
an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing but, once shown, it matters not whether both crimes be
committed at the same time or one be prior or subsequent to the other.

Admittedly, there is no eyewitness to the commission of the crime; a conviction can thus only rest on circumstantial
evidence. Rule 133, Section 4, of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction if - (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, direct
evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt, and facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence can well constitute
evidence which, in weight and probative force, may not too infrequently even surpass direct evidence in its effect upon
the court.

In this case, the circumstances established, in the considered view of the Court, would adequately support the finding of
guilt pronounced by the trial court.

60. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO MOLE y SANTOS 416 SCRA 520 (2003)
FACTS:

Accused Romeo Mole (MOLE), an albularyo (quack doctor) was consulted by Emerita Reyes, her husband Wilfredo and
their three children sometime in April 1997 as they have been experiencing itchiness all over their bodies. The Reyeses
were diagnosed to be victims of kulam (witchcraft). Mole went to the house of the Reyeses the next day to continue their
treatment. At about 11:00 p.m., Romeo left the Reyeses residence after receiving the payment for his services. However,
he came back at about 12:00 midnight looking for Emerita‘s youngest son, he was saying that the sorcerer will kill her
son and to save him, Romeo needed P2,500.00. The distressed Emerita immediately gave the said amount to Mole who
thereafter went to the bedroom and sprinkled an overpowering liquid on Wilfredo and their three children. Mole also
sprinkled the same on Emerita, blew something on her chest and, while looking at her eyes, mumbled as if in prayer upon
which Emerita instantly felt weak and dizzy. Romeo then hauled Emerita to the kitchen, laid her on the floor and removed
her underwear. She wanted to resist, however she was too weak and dizzy. Romeo, who was naked from waist down, lay
on top of her after removing her underwear, whereupon she lost consciousness; and that after she regained
consciousness, her entire body, including her vagina, was aching. She thus concluded that she was raped. She reported
her experience to the police and upon physically examination it was found that there was no medical basis to conclude
that she had been subjected to sexual abuse. Giving weight to the testimony of Emerita and relying on Romeo‘s verbal
admission to the police of having raped the victim, as reflected in the aforementioned datum in the Final Investigation
Report, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Romeo Mole of rape.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC is correct in convicting Romeo Mole of rape when it failed to consider certain unrebutted
substantial matters of facts tending to show the non-occurrence or at least a doubtful occurrence of rape

HELD:

Although the findings of trial courts are normally respected and not disturbed on appeal, Inconsistencies in the testimony
of Emerita put serious doubts on her claim of rape, compelling this Court to reverse Romeo‘s conviction. Emerita‘s
vacillating account of the incident failed to stand the test of consistency. The Court is thus put on guard as to the veracity
of her claim. For while minor inconsistencies do not detract from the actual fact of rape, those in Emerita‘s testimony may
not be considered minor for they relate to the fact of commission of the offense charged. The credibility of the private
complainant is of vital importance for, in view of the peculiar nature of rape, conviction or acquittal rest entirely upon her.
It has thus become doctrine that the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the victim‘s testimony by rigid
cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points. A woman raped in as state of
unconsciousness would not be able to narrate her defloration during that state, and her violation may be proved indirectly
by other evidence, Whereas, a woman fully conscious at the time of rape need only testify in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remain consistent in her testimony to convict the accused.

61. JOSUE R. LADIANA v. PEOPLE, GR No. 144293, 2002-12-04

Facts:
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
The court a quo held that his Counter-Affidavit,[11] in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused...
the victim's death,[12]  may be used as evidence against him. It underscored the admission made by the defense as to
the authorship, the authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit.[13] In short,... it ruled
that the document had sufficiently established his responsibility for the death of the victim.
the resolution of this case hinges mainly on the admissibility of the Counter-Affidavit[17] submitted by petitioner during
the preliminary investigation. He argues that no counsel was present when the Affidavit was executed. In support of his...
argument, he cites the Constitution thus: 
"SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he... must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel. ... x x x x x x x x x 
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him."
Issues:
petitioner raises the following questions in this appeal: (1) whether the Counter-Affidavit he executed during the
preliminary investigation of this case is admissible proof showing his complicity in the crime
Ruling:
The Petition is not meritorious.
It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to extra-
judicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodial  investigations.[19] Indeed, the rights enumerated in the...
constitutional provision "exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of accused persons."[20]
Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.[21]
In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the preliminary investigation, not
during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the right to competent and independent counsel also applies
during preliminary... investigations.
We disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for... trial.[22]
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be considered as being
under custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally declared that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigation is not under... custodial interrogation.[23] It explained as follows: 
"His [accused] interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing
of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutor's office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case
already pending in court (or the... public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under
'custodial interrogation' laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution [now Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the... obvious reason that he is no longer under
'custodial interrogation.'"
There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are
not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he
was under custody or... interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation as
embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case.
We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayan's characterization of petitioner's Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial
confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from
the other as follows:
"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him. 
"SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him."
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly
involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged.[26] Thus,
in... the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying
that it was done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession.
The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim when the latter was
attacking him.
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the latter's death -- but
denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether
categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him.
Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted it to the public
prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It escapes this Court how he can cavalierly
deny a document that he has... voluntarily submitted and originally relied upon in his defense.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were made by mistake. The party
may also establish that the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the
admission was made in ignorance of... the true state of facts.[29] Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why
such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case
at bar, are evidence of great weight against the... declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake.
Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was justified, and
that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor.[35] Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own evidence
and... not on the weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the
accused has admitted the killing.
Principles:
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the accused without the
assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit
voluntarily... presented by the accused during the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of
counsel, may be used as evidence against the affiant.