Tapuz, et al. vs. Judge Del Rosario, et al.

G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008

Doctrine: The Writ of Amparo should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when
it will inordinately interfere with these processes. It is not issued to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
The prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data is nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court had in
mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not.

Facts: Sps. Sanson filed a forcible entry case against Tapuz et al. and other 120 John Does before MCTC of Aklan alleging
ownership and prior possession over the disputed land, and that Tapuz et al. entered the land by force and intimidation
while armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms, and built nipa hut and bamboo structure thereon contending that
they were indigenous settlers of such land. The MCTC ruled in favor of Sps. Sanson.
On appeal to the RTC, Judge Marin granted the motion of Sps. Sanson for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. The writ—authorizing the implementation of the MCTC Decision was actually issued by Respondent Judge Del
Rosario.
Sps. Sanson moved for demolition of the structures. Despite the opposition of Tapuz et al., Respondent Judge Del Rosario
issued a writ of demolition.
On appeal to the CA, Tapuz et al. filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition.
Meanwhile, the Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate and for Demolition.
Before the Court, Tapuz et al. pray, among others, for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data. They anchored
the issuance of these writs in the following facts: that armed men intruded their property (the disputed property) who are
allegedly under the employ of Sps. Sanson, and that the armed men torched their houses resulting to threats to their life
and security.

Issue: Whether or not Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data should be granted

Held: No. The Writ of Amparo is fatally defective as to content and substance, and the Writ of Habeas Data is fatally
defective as to form and substance.

As regards Writ of Amparo: It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.

Here, what is clear from the statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the
petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues
relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has
been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied
from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons.
Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or is continuing. The remedy may lie more in ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of
the extraordinary remedy of the Writ of Amparo.
The petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of the Writ of Amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders
that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial
measure. When recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper
remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of Amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve
as a curative substitute. The writ of Amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or
certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes - the situation obtaining in the present case.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute, we see no point in
separately and directly intervening through a Writ of Amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right
to life, liberty or security is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing.

As regards Writ of Habeas Data: The fact that it is prayed for so that the PNP would release reports regarding the burning
of the houses lacks what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum. No concrete allegations of unjustified or
unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The necessity or justification for the
issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown.
The prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court had in mind
in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not.

Notes: Ultimate facts needed:

For a Writ of Amparo:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."

For a Writ of Habeas Data:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of
the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession
or in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

Caram vs. Segui

G.R. No. 193652. August 5, 2014

Doctrine: The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Since it is extant
from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child,
who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied.

Facts: Ma. Christina Yusay Caram had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III and eventually
became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino
into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time,
she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children to avoid placing her family in a potentially
embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.

When Christina gave birth to Baby Julian, Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13,
2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. Later,
Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died without knowing about the birth of his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina
disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress
and initial embarrassment. Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with Christina. After the
emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby.
On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza Cabral issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as
“Legally Available for Adoption.” A local matching conference was held and on February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched”
with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial custody then
commenced.

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the
suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together. However, the
certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months
after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made
Baby Julian a ward of the State. According to the DSWD, it was no longer in the position to stop the adoption process. It
also stated that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process, she
may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for her to regain her parental rights had already lapsed
under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523.

Christina then filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody
of Baby Julian against Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia Yangco (DSWD
officials).

The RTC issued a writ of amparo and required the DSWD officials to file a return. The DSWD officials complied with the
writ and filed their return praying that the petition be denied for being the improper remedy to avail of in a case relating to a
biological parent’s custodial rights over her child. Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of
amparo without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina availed of the wrong
remedy to regain custody of her child Baby Julian. The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for
custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegally detained by
another, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy,
pursuant to the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of
a minor child?

Held: No. The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. As to what
constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the
term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851:

a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time.

In this case, Christina alleged that the DSWD officers caused her “enforced separation” from Baby Julian and that their
action amounted to an “enforced disappearance” within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however,
the DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used
in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption,
supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she
is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental
rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule
cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a
public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty
and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
VIVARES vs. ST. THERESE’S COLLEGE
GR No. 202666; 29 Sept 2014

FACTS:
Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her
classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero who showed the said pictures
to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their graduation
ceremonies.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school
from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero,
however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials.
Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at
STC’s Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and
have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced
disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of “gathering,
collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against
abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use
of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus,
such privacy must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would
show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other than “Public”.
If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them
(as they claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact,
it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that
Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the
pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered
illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the
recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to
discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the
first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL
CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO
A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional
Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners, vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Engr. Morced Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development
Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong, an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early
morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House.
Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned
from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s
Manila-based secretary who advised Kunnong to simply wait for Tagitis’ return. On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and
Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported
Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis, the wife, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo with
the CA. The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino
I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao,
Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as
petitioners].
On the same day, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo and set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008. On
March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an “enforced disappearance”
under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled
that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the
missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis
and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security
of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the
petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the
finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved. On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider
the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition
for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts, i.e. complete in every detail in stating
the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights, is indispensable in an amparo petition.

2. Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her allegations is sufficient for the
court to grant the privilege of the writ.

3. Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged enforced
disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE/S:

1. No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause
of action showing a violation of the victim’s
rights to life, liberty and security. The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be read in light of the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty – The framers of the Amparo Rule never
intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in
any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting
the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of
the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the
victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of
situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo
Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and
security. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in
reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through
State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component
parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
2. YES, [T]he Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of
Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. The rebuttable case, of course,
must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond. Substantial
evidence required in amparo proceedings – The [characteristics of amparo proceedings] – namely, of being summary and
the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof
beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the
equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.

3. No, It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to
address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint
criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to
the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other
hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. The
concept of “enforced disappearances” is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. As the law now stands, extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component
criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and special laws.

DOCTRINES:

 While, as in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause
of action, omitting the evidentiary details, in an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of
the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty—the petitioner may not be
able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest
him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by
those who caused the disappearance.

 Burden of Proof; The characteristics of the Amparo Rule of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as
the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in
court proceedings)—reveal the clear intent of the framers to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding,
albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations; In these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs
only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above,
and prove the allegations by substantial evidence, and once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents
must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required.

The Writ of Amparo—a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and
security—does not deter-mine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies
to address the disappearance; Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence
to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies
this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties
in the proper courts; Accountability refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;
or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.
ROXAS vs. GMA
G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, enrolled in an exposure program
to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is
a member. After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo
in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly
entered the house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being
detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). She was then
separated from her companions and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes
taking off and landing, and some construction bustle. She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her
to abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named “RC” that those who tortured her came from the
“Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted because her name is included in the “Order of Battle.” On 25 May
2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon City. Before being released, however, the
abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM card, a slip of paper containing an e- mail address with password, a
plastic bag containing biscuits and books, the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. Petitioner was also
sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her. Out of
apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular
phone with a SIM card. Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas
Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on
the belief that it was the government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. The Court of Appeals was not
convinced that the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the
abduction and torture of the petitioner. The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner
merely "believed" that the military was behind her abduction. Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents
from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner. The petition was likewise dismissed as against public
respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit. Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for
the return of her personal belongings were denied. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order and production order also
met the same fate. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators is enough ground for
the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo

HELD:
1. NO. Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally inaccurate – if not incorrect. Such
doctrine is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead
a party-respondent in an amparo petition. As held in the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a protective remedy
aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the
court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. It does
not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the
applicable substantive law. Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability,
it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.
However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility does not preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded — not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but
rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
2. NO. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military
involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly
proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over
mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to
the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.

*G.R. No. 178497 February 4, 2014

EDITA T. BURGOS
vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 183711
(HABEAS CORPUS PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 99839)
EDITA T. BURGOS
vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 183712
(CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA-G.R. SP No. 100230)
EDITA T. BURGOS
vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL.
MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 183713
(WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA)
EDITA T. BURGOS
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.;
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; and Chief of the Philippine National
Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR.
x-----------------------x

The Supreme Court emphasized that its role in a writ of amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an enforced
disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance.
Facts:
The CA has previously issued a decision dismissing the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; denying the
petitioner’s motion to declare the respondents in Contempt; and partially granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
Petitioner assailed the said decision before the SC in the above entitled cases.
For the court’s resolution are the following incidents relative to the said cases:
(a) x x x
(b) The Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela (together with sealed attachments) filed by petitioner Edita
T. Burgos praying that the Court: (1) order the persons named in the sealed documents impleaded in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00008-WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly discovered evidence (the
sealed attachments to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to the Court of Appeals (CA) for further hearings on the
newly discovered evidence.
These incidents stemmed from the Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution referring the present case to the CHR as the Court’s
directly commissioned agency, tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos’ abduction with
the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. All previous investigations were less than
complete and had significant lapses. The Court highlighted the PNP-CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches of
two of the five abductors of Jonas, based on eyewitness accounts. In the same Resolution, the Court also affirmed the CA’s
dismissal of the Contempt and issuance of Writ of Amparo with respect to President GMA who was then entitled to immunity
from suit.
The March 25, 2011 CHR Report brought forth the information that the enforced disappearance of Jonas T. Burgos had
indeed transpired and that his constitutional rights to life, liberty and security were violated by the Government. According
to the report, eyewitnesses Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang who were then busboy and trainee-supervisor at Hapag
Kainan Restaurant where the abduction occurred, were bable to identify with certainty Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. as one of the
principal abductors. Meanwhile, Rebel-returnee Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @ KA MY has identified the female abductor
as a certain Lt. Fernando. Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not been for what is otherwise
called as evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up by some police and military elites.
On July 5, 2011, in light of the new evidence and leads the CHR uncovered, the Court issued a Resolution: (1) issuing anew
a Writ of Habeas Corpus and referring the habeas corpus petition to the CA; (2) holding in abeyance our ruling on the merits
of the Amparo aspect of the case; referring back the same to the CA in order to allow Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. and the
present Amparo respondents to file their Comments on the CHR Report; and ordering Lt. Baliaga to be impleaded as a
party to the Amparo petition; and (3) affirming the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for Contempt, without prejudice to the
re-filing of the contempt charge as may be warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR investigation.
On March 18, 2013, the CA issued its decision pursuant to the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution referring the Amparo and
Habeas Corpus aspects of the case to the CA for appropriate hearings and ruling on the merits of the petitions. The CA
held that the issue in the petition for habeas corpus is not the illegal confinement or detention of Jonas, but his enforced
disappearance. Considering that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the present case is beyond the ambit of a
petition for habeas corpus. Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the CA concluded that
the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents (the AFP Chief of Staff and the PNP Director General), filed a
motion for partial reconsideration of the March 18, 2013 CA decision. On May 23, 2013, the CA issued its resolution denying
the respondents’ motion for partial reconsideration. The CA also took note that as of that date, the respondents have not
appealed to this Court, as provided under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
On April 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking the Court to: (1) order the persons
named in the sealed documents to be impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of
Amparo on the basis of the newly discovered evidence (the sealed attachment to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to the
CA for further hearing on the newly discovered evidence.
Issue:
Should a writ of Amparo be issued anew based on newly discovered evidence based from the CHR Reports?
Ruling:

The Supreme Court resolved to deny the prayer to issue the writ of Amparo anew based on the newly discovered evidence.

Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of the CA that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo and its determination of the entities responsible for the enforced disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to
deny the petitioner’s prayer to issue the writ of Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the newly discovered
evidence. We so conclude as the petitioner’s request for the reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of the case by the
CA would be redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being conducted by the DOJ through the
NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by the Court in this Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation directed by the
CA in its March 18, 2013 decision.

We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address
an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides
rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investigations already
ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance.

We clarify that by denying the petitioner’s motion, we do not thereby rule on the admissibility or the merits of the newly
discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner. We likewise do not foreclose any investigation by the proper investigative
and prosecutory agencies of the other entities whose identities and participation in the enforced disappearance of Jonas
may be disclosed in future investigations and proceedings. Considering that the present case has already reached the
prosecution stage, the petitioner’s motion should have been filed with the proper investigative and prosecutory agencies of
the government.

To expedite proceedings, we refer the petitioner’s motion, this Resolution and its covered cases to the DOJ for investigation,
for the purpose of filing the appropriate criminal charges in the proper courts against the proper parties, if warranted, based
on the gathered evidence. For this purpose, we direct the petitioner to furnish the DOJ and the NBI copies of her Urgent Ex
Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5) days from receipt of
this Resolution.

As mentioned, we take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation by the DOJ, through the NBI, of the disappearance of
Jonas. This DOJ investigation is without prejudice to the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its primary jurisdiction over
the investigation of the criminal aspect of this case should the case be determined to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

As we direct below, further investigation for purposes of the present proceedings shall continue to be undertaken by the
CHR, in close coordination with the NBI, for the completion of the investigation under the terms of our June 22, 2010
Resolution and the additional directives under the present Resolution.

As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an enforced
disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance.

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case with the CA’s final
determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement
of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond
the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.

Based on the above developments, we now hold that the full extent of the remedies envisioned by the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo has been served and exhausted.
 MARICRIS D. DOLOT, PETITIONER
vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE et al RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013

Doctrine: Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality
of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective
until judgment is fully satisfied.

FACTS: On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus
Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages
and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon. The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in
2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones E nterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to
no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the
geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the
environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after
investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor
Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have
authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog; and (7)
the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code. Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the
issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog;
(2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake
the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.
RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction. Also, it
ruled that (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which
is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners
therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy
of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC erred in dismissing the case for (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) was no final court decree, order or
decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing
mandamus, (3) petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and (4) also failed to attach judicial affidavits as
required by the rules.

HELD: YES.
(1)The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners
in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners. A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-
2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court authority to define the territory over which
a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued by the Court merely
provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of
trial or the geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction
of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their
access to the courts.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a special civil action
for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect
or omission occurred x x x." In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the
Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin. But even then, it does not
warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived. Moreover, the action filed by the
petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction. At this juncture, the Court affirms the
continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 constituting the different "green courts" in the country and setting the
administrative guidelines in the raffle and disposition of environmental cases. While the designation and guidelines were
made in 2008, the same should operate in conjunction with the Rules.
(2) The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law." The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation
or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the
definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until
judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that
a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall
subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has
become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is
performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full
satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court
finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ
of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court
to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the
court’s decision."
(3) The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of
Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.
Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes. But the petition filed below does
not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale
mining operation being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in
the Municipality of Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and
the perceived indifference of the DENR and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of these matters does not
entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function.
(4)The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As
previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied
by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits,
albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be the
time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to the
petition/complaint.

Meralco v. Rosario Lim

G.R. No. 184769, October 5, 2010

The writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful—employment constitutes a property right under
the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.

FACTS: Rosario Lim is an administrative clerk at Meralco. A letter was posted in her office denouncing the respondent. Lim
reported the matter to the PNP. Because of this incident, the head of Meralco’s humar resource staffing, directed the transfer
of respondent to Meralco’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa. Lim appealed her transfer claiming it was punitive in nature
amounting to a denial of due process. Respondent requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending
resolution of the issues raised. No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas data against petitioners.

ISSUE: WON the writ of habeas data should be granted.

HELD: NO. The writs of amparo and habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when
the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under
the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for
her transfer—a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment—are what prompted her to
adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation
of respondent’s right to privacy vis-à-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the
contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is
at best speculative.
 Lee vs. Ilagan
G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014

FACTS: Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners. Sometime in
July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a while and thereafter,proceeded to his office. Upon arrival,
Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing. On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding
a purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another
woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. During the confrontation, Ilagan
allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked away. Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video
as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No.
9262, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before
the NAPOLCOM. Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to
the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and
privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted. RTC
issued a Writ of Habeas Data, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as
well as the negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within.

Lee contended that Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing
was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the
gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan. The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas
data in Ilagan’s favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and
enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same. The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of reproducing the subject
video and showing it to other people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter’s right to privacy in life and caused
him to suffer humiliation and mental anguish. The RTC opined that Lee’s use of the subject video as evidence in the various
cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of Habeas Datain favor of Ilagan

HELD: No. The writ of habeas data stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.” In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas
Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “the manner the right to privacy is violated
or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” The petition must adequately
show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other .

Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ
of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of
the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful. the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination
of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video, he failed to explain the
connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or
contrive versions of possible transgressions.

Alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are
crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition
dismissible, as in this case. All that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly
meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. Nothing therein would indicate that
Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order
to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee
even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize
the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency
of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC
Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ,
JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA
CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA R.
PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya,
GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR,
Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T.
BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign
Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN,
Secretary, Department of National Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in
Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast
Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO
0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US
Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-Director, Respondents.

VILLARAMA, JR, J.:

TOPICS: Writ of Kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park. In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the
Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. It is also
an important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding
universal value as an important and significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example
representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty and
aesthetic importance.2 On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, 3 otherwise known as the
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant
economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the
enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated
and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the
resources within the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which
shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. The US Embassy in the Philippines
requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at
the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." 4

USS Guardian arrived in Subic from Japan. Two days later, the ship departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. At 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no
reports of leaking fuel or oil.

The US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef. Subsequently,
the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization and others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition against Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander
of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling,
US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S.
Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F.
Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense),
Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine
Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore
Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant),
collectively the "Philippine respondents."
 Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to
cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with
the grounding incident.

Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry
(Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages
to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain
provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.

They prayed for the immediate issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan.

US respondents did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case. Only the Philippine respondents filed their
comment. In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and production
orders, respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become
fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form
and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America; and ( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the
damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with the executive branch.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

RULING:

1. YES. Petitioners have legal standing.

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged,
and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance." However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this
Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.12

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil
and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.14 On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not
only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future generations. The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it
refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in
environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest,
on the principle that humans are stewards of nature."16

2. YES. US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution,
is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under
Article II, Section 2. x x x.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated
in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its
admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other
states.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that ''there
can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205
U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to
be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language
of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the
state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state
may move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. 19 (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control
and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of
the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise
of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained that although UNCLOS upholds the immunity
of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required
to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article
31.

These pertinent provisions provide for the exceptions to the continued enjoyment of sovereign immunity by warships:

Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to
leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship

or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations
of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules
of international law.

Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes

Non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State
over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in
connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to preserve our vital
marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our
internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to
comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine
environment as provided in Article 197, viz:

Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into
account characteristic regional features.

3. NO. The waiver of immunity from suit under VFA does not apply in this case.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as
the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:

SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude
the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.

A ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be
found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a
writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed
absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The
Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate
civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law. 37

Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:

SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:

(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a
duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;

(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;

(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance
with the decision and orders of the court;

(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports
on the execution of the final judgment; and

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is DENIED because of the following reasons:

This petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been
accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to
protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structure and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are
concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from
the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to
negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also
declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate
methods of rehabilitation.

Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. The Court defers to the Executive
Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues
impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that
"[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-
"the political" --departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power
is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."

On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify
certain immunity provisions thereof. As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, 41 the VFA
was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The VFA being a valid and binding
agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. 42 The present
petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions.

Paje vs. Casiño

G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015

Facts: Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority· (SBMA) and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to build a 2x150-MW coal power plant in Subic Bay Freeport Zone. TCC later on
assigned all of its rights to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy). RP Energy prepared an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-fired power plant and applied for the issuance of an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the DENR. The DENR granted the said ECC. Later on, RP Energy requested DENR to amend its
ECC to indicate the additional components on its proposed plants such as inclusion of a barge wharf and the likes (first
amendment) and to change the construction from 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant to a 1x300-MWcoal-fired power plant
(second amendment). Both amendments where granted by DENR even without the submission of new EIS. Upon the
second amendment, a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan was filed with the Supreme Court by Teddy Casiño et al. against RP
Energy, SBMA and DENR Sec. Ramon Paje for the alleged grave environmental damage of the power plant and its adverse
effect on the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo.
The petition also raised the invalidity of the ECC. The Supreme Court referred the case to CA. The CA did not issue a writ
of kalikasan but deemed the ECC invalid for (1) lack of signature of Mr. Aboitiz, director of RP Energy in the ECC’s Statement
of Accountability ; (2) the ECC contained an express restriction that any expansion of the project beyond the project
description shall be the subject of a new EIA and that the Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan
(EPRMP) and Project Description Report (PDR), which RP Energy submitted to the DENR, relative to the application for
the first and second amendments, respectively, were not the proper EIA document type; and (3) noncompliance with IPRA
Law and the Local Government Code (LGC).

Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. The Casiño Group, in essence, argues that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan
as it was able to prove that the operation of the power plant would cause environmental damage and pollution, and that
thiswould adversely affect the residents of the provinces of Bataan and Zambales, particularly the municipalities of Subic,
Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo. It cites as basis RP Energy’s EIS, which allegedly admits that acid rain may
occur in the combustion of coal; that the incidence of asthma attacks among residents in the vicinity of the project site may
increasedue to exposure to suspended particles from plant operations; and that increased sulfur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen
oxides (NOx) emissions may occur during plant operations

On the other hand, the DENR, SBMA and RP Energy are one in arguing that the reliefs granted by the appellate court, i.e.
invalidating the ECC and its amendments, are improper because it had denied. the Petition for Writ of Kalikasan upon a
finding that the Casiño Group failed to prove the alleged environmental damage, actual or threatened, contemplated under
the Rules.

Issue #1: Whether or not the validity of an ECC can be challenged via Writ of Kalikasan?

Held #1: Yes. In general, the proper procedure to question a defect in an ECC is to follow the appeal process provided in
DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. After complying with the proper administrative appeal process, recourse may be
made to the courts in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. However, in exceptional cases,
a writ of kalikasan may be availed of to challenge defects in the ECC provided that (1) the defects are causally linked or
reasonably connected to an environmental damage of the nature and magnitude contemplated under the Rules on Writ of
Kalikasan, and (2) the case does not violate, or falls under an exception to, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and/or primary jurisdiction.
An example of a defect or an irregularity in the issuance of an ECC, which could conceivably warrant the granting of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of kalikasan, is a case where there are serious and substantial misrepresentations or fraud
in the application for the ECC, which, if not immediately nullified, would cause actual negative environmental impacts of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules, because the government agencies and LGUs, with the final authority to
implement the project, may subsequently rely on such substantially defective or fraudulent ECC in approving the
implementation of the project.

However, such is not the case here. In their Petition for Writ of Kalikasan, the Casiño Group’s allegations, relative to the
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, may be grouped into two.

The first set of allegations deals with the actual environmental damage that will occur if the power plant project
isimplemented. The Casiño Group claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will result in (1) thermal
pollution of coastal waters, (2) air pollution due to dust and combustion gases, (3) water pollution from toxic coal combustion
waste, and (4) acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, which will adversely affect the residents of the
Provinces of Bataan and Zambales, particularly the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo.

The second set of allegations deals with the failureto comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance
ofan ECC and amendments thereto. The Casiño Group claims that the ECC was issued in violation of (1) the DENR rules
on the issuance and amendment of an ECC, particularly, DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Procedural Manual for DAO 2003-
30 (Revised Manual), (2) Section 59 of the IPRA Law,and (3) Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC. In addition, it claims that the
LDA entered into between SBMA and RP Energy violated Section 59 of the IPRA Law.

In cases of defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC, it is not sufficient to merely allege such defects or
irregularities, but to show a causal link or reasonable connection with the environmental damage of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. In this case, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted
relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance
of the ECC. This would have been sufficient reason to disallow the resolution of such issues in a writ of kalikasan case.

However, inasmuch as this is the first time that the Court lays down this principle, the Court has liberally examined the
alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC and find that there is only one group of allegations, relative to
the ECC, that can be reasonably connected to an environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules.
This is with respect to the allegation that there was no environmental impact assessment relative to the first and second
amendments to the subject ECC. If this were true, then the implementation of the project can conceivably actually violate
or threaten to violate the right to a healthful and balanced ecology of the inhabitants near the vicinity of the power plant.
Thus, the resolution of such an issue could conceivably be resolved in a writ of kalikasan case provided that the case does
not violate, or is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction.

As to the claims that the issuance of the ECC violated the IPRA Law and LGC and that the LDA, likewise, violated the IPRA
Law, the Court found the same not to be within the coverage of the writ of kalikasan because, assuming there was non-
compliance therewith, no reasonable connection can be made to an actual or threatened violation of the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules.

To elaborate, the alleged lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians over the subject project would not lead to or is not
reasonably connected with environmental damage but, rather, it is an affront to the local autonomy of LGUs. Similarly, the
alleged lack of a certificate precondition that the project site does not overlap with an ancestral domain would not result in
or is not reasonably connected with environmental damage but, rather, it is an impairment of the right of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains. These alleged violations could be the subject of
appropriate remedies before the proper administrative bodies (like the NCIP) or a separate action to compel compliance
before the courts, as the case may be. However, the writ of kalikasan would not be the appropriate remedy to address and
resolve such issues.

As discussed, only the allegation with respect to the lack of an EIA relative to the first and second amendments to the
subject ECC may be reasonably connected to such an environmental damage. Further, given the extreme urgency of
resolving the issue due to the looming power crisis, this case may be considered as falling under an exception to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, the aforesaid issue may be conceivably resolved in a writ of kalikasan case.

Issue #2: Whether or not the ECC could be invalidated because of the lack of an EIA relative to the first and second
amendments?

Held #2: No. When the provision in the ECC, therefore, states that a new EIA shall be conducted, this simply means that
the project proponent shall be required to submit such study or report, as warranted by the DENR Rules and circumstances,
which will sufficiently aid the DENR in making a new EIA and, thus, determine whether to grant the proposed amendment
(or project modification). Consistent with DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, the DENR required RP Energy to submit
an EPRMP and a PDR relative to the latter’s request involving the first and second amendments, respectively, which led to
the new EIA of the project in compliance with the proviso of the ECC.

Verily, the various EIA documents, such as the EPRMP and PDR, are mere tools used by the DENR to assess the
environmental impact of a particular project. These documents are flexibly used by the DENR, as the circumstances warrant,
in order to adequately assess the impacts of a new project or modifications thereto. Being the administrative agency
entrusted with the determination of which EIA document type applies to a particular application for an amendment to an
ECC, falling as it does within its particular technical expertise, great respect to its determination must be accorded, absent
a showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.

Here, the first amendment (the construction of a 230-kVdouble transmission line) would result in major activities outside the
project site which could have significant environmental impacts. Thus, the appropriate EIA document type is an EPRMP. In
this case, the. EPRMP submitted by RP Energy provided the necessary information in order for the DENR-EMB to assess
the environmental impact of RP Energy’s request relative to the first amendment. It contained substantial sections explaining
the proposed changes as well as the adjustments that will be made in the environmental management plan in order to
address the potential environmental impacts of the proposed modifications to the original project design. These are
summarized in the "Project Fact Sheet". of the EPRMP and extensively discussed in Section 4 thereof.

In sum, the Revised Manual permits the use of an EPRMP, as the appropriate EIA document type, for major amendments
to an ECC, even for an unimplemented or non-implemented project with a previous ECC, such as the subject project.
Consequently, the Court finds that the procedure adopted by the DENR, in requiring RP Energy to submit an EPRMP in
order to undertake the environmental impact assessment of the planned modifications to the original project design, relative
to the first amendment to the ECC, suffers from no infirmity. The Court also applied the same framework of analysis in
determining the propriety of a PDR, as the appropriate EIA document type, relative to the second amendment to the subject
ECC.
Discussion [incidental issues]:

(1) Preliminaries
The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan, which is Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, was issued by the
Court pursuant to its power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, in particular, the
individual’s right. to a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 1 of Rule 7 provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ.- The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people’s
organization, nongovernmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to
provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of
a magnitude or degree of damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries. It is intended "to provide a stronger
defense for environmental rights through judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of enforcement, implementation
and legislation have fallen short" and seeks "to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats."
Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened
violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the
actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently
grave, in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity
of environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis.
If the petitioner successfully proves the foregoing requisites, the court shall render judgment granting the privilege of the
writ of kalikasan. Otherwise, the petition shall be denied. If the petition is granted, the court may grant the reliefs provided
for under Section 15of Rule 7, to wit: Section 15. Judgment.- Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted
for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in
violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or
restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with
the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports on the
execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
It must be noted, however, that the above enumerated reliefs are non-exhaustive. The reliefs that may be granted under
the writ are broad, comprehensive and non-exclusive.
(2) May the Court, on its own, compel the testimonies of the alleged experts in a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan?
The findings in the Final Report conducted by experts (evidence by the Casino group) were not given credence because
the experts did not testify in Court to confirm the contents of such report.
Supreme Court: We note, however, that these statements, on their face, especially the observations of Dr. Cruz, raise
serious objections to the environmental soundness of the project, specifically, the EIS thereof. It brings to fore the question
of whether the Court can, on its own, compel the testimonies of these alleged experts in order to shed light on these matters
in view of the right at stake— not just damage to the environment but the health, well-being and, ultimately, the lives of
those who may be affected by the project.
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally provide the courts with means and methods to obtain sufficient
information in order to adequately protect or safeguard the right to a healthful and balanced ecology. In Section 6 (l) of Rule
3 (Pre-Trial), when there is a failure to settle, the judge shall, among others, determine the necessity of engaging the
services of a qualified expert as a friend of the court (amicus curiae). While, in Section 12of Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), a
party may avail of discovery measures: (1) ocular inspection and (2) production or inspection of documents or things. The
liberality of the Rules in gathering and even compelling information, specifically with regard to the Writ of Kalikasan, is
explained in this wise: [T]he writ of kalikasan was refashioned as a tool to bridge the gap between allegation and proof by
providing a remedy for would-be environmental litigants to compel the production of information within the custody of the
government. The writ would effectively serve as a remedy for the enforcement of the right to information about the
environment. The scope of the fact-finding power could be: (1) anything related to the issuance, grant of a government
permit issued or information controlled by the government or private entity and (2) [i]nformation contained in documents
such as environmental compliance certificate (ECC) and other government records. In addition, the [w]rit may also be
employed to compel the production of information, subject to constitutional limitations. This function is analogous to a
discovery measure, and may be availed of upon application for the writ.
Clearly, in environmental cases, the power to appoint friends of the court in order to shed light on matters requiring special
technical expertise as well as the power to order ocular inspections and production of documents or things evince the main
thrust of, and the spirit behind, the Rules to allow the court sufficient leeway in acquiring the necessary information to rule
on the issues presented for its resolution, to the end that the right to a healthful and balanced ecology may be adequately
protected. To draw a parallel, in the protection of the constitutional rights of an accused, when life or liberty is at stake, the
testimonies of witnesses may be compelled as an attribute of the Due Process Clause. Here, where the right to a healthful
and balanced ecology of a substantial magnitude is at stake, should we not tread the path of caution and prudence by
compelling the testimonies of these alleged experts?
After due consideration, we find that, based on the statements in the Final Report, there is no sufficiently compelling reason
to compel the testimonies of these alleged expert witnesses for the following reasons.
First, the statements are not sufficiently specific to point to us a flaw (or flaws) in the study or design/implementation (or
some other aspect) of the project which provides a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the construction
and operation of the project vis-à-vis potential grave environmental damage. In particular, they do not explain why the
Environmental Management Plan (EMP) contained in the EIS of the project will not adequately address these concerns.
Second, some of the concerns raised in the alleged statements, like acid rain, warming and acidification of the seawater,
and discharge of pollutants were, as previously discussed, addressed by the evidence presented by RP Energy before the
appellate court. Again, these alleged statements do not explain why such concerns are not adequately covered by the EMP
of RP Energy.
Third, the key observations of Dr. Cruz, while concededly assailing certain aspects of the EIS, do not clearly and specifically
establish how these omissions have led to the issuance of an ECC that will pose significant negative environmental impacts
once the project is constructed and becomes operational. The recommendations stated therein would seem to suggest
points for improvement in the operation and monitoring of the project, but they do not clearly show why such
recommendations are indispensable for the project to comply with existing environmental laws and standards, or how non-
compliance with such recommendations will lead to an environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the
writ of kalikasan. Again, these statements do not state with sufficient particularity how the EMP in the EIS failed to adequately
address these concerns.
Fourth, because the reason for the non-presentation of the alleged expert witnesses does not appear on record, we cannot
assume that their testimonies are being unduly suppressed.
 Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015

Facts: The Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of Energy (DOE), entered into a Geophysical
Survey and Exploration Contract (GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX). This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and
reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys,
as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait. Subsequently, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into a Service
Contract (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately
2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. JAPEX then JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon
Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the area's
underwater composition. JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since
the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a
protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes.

The Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE)
commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC. Later, the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration
project in Tañon Strait. Months later, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.

This prompted petitioners [collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined
by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as
"the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species] to file a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from
implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution. Protesting the adverse ecological impact of
JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study
made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that
before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk
could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the ''payao,"
also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef." Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also
impute the incidences of "fish kill" observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the seismic survey. And they further allege
that the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions with the
affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.

On the other hand, public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals
and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the
various laws cited in the petitions; that the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations

Issue #1: Whether or not the petitioners Resident Marine Mammals have locus standi?

Held #1: The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the
legal standing to file this petition.

Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and
permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:

Sec. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an
action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an
order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties
to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the
order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.

Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental
rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws
and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The
terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet unborn.

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a
permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the Court allowed the suit to be brought
in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." Furthermore, the Court said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Issue #2: Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is unconstitutional?

Held #2: Yes. Service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The
grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion
of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to
the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms
to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.

In this case, SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are
governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. PD No. 87 is the general law
upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized. (However, the exploitation and
utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the
Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.) While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be
notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
Our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. In this case, the
public respondents have failed to show that the President had any participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts are
actually the acts of then President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the
President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself.
These service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural resources are of paramount
interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that the guidelines set by law
are meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments and agencies by
ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.

Issue #3: Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 contravenes other existing laws?

Held #3: Yes.

The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a protected area under the category of
Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of national significance characterized by
the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and
tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this areas; thus a management plan for each area must be
designed to protect and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent with this endeavor is the
requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity outside the scope
of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals of the
NIPAS Act shall be implemented. Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having
been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be
implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological
system.
Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:

SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the management
plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by law before they are adopted,
and the results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.

No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) under the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are allowed
to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse effects and the
preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution or
indiscretion.

SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2 hereof, protected areas,
except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering information
on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be
conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available
to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy
resources found within NIP AS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.

While an exploration done for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is allowed under Section 14 of the NIP AS Act,
this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to undergo an EIA under Section 12. Surveying for energy
resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement in Section 12; instead, Section
14 provides for additional requisites before any exploration for energy resources may be done in protected areas.

In this case, the public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the second
sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that when the seismic surveys were
done in the Tañon Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the
management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1586. The respondents' subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46
cannot and will not cure this violation.
 West Tower Condominium Corporation vs. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015

Facts: First Philippine Industrial Corporation (FPIC) operates two pipelines (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System,
which covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel, gasoline,
jet fuel and kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker
fuel from Batangas to a depot in Sucat, Parañaque. The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than
double the standard safety allowance against leakage, considering that they are made out of heavy duty steel that can
withstand more than twice the current operating pressure and are buried at a minimum depth of 1.5 meters, which is deeper
than the US Department of Transportation standard of 0.9 meters. In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the
pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower Condominium (West Tower) started to smell gas within the
condominium. What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump
pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into
the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of West Tower to abandon their
respective units and the condo's power was shut down. Subsequently, the University of the Philippines-National Institute of
Geological Sciences (UP-NIGS), which the City of Makati invited to determine the source of the fuel, found a leak in FPIC's
WOPL about 86 meters from West Tower.

This prompted West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.) to file a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay
Bangkal, Makati City (petitioners). West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and several people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit
because of the magnitude of the environmental issues involved. They impleaded as respondents FPIC, First Gen
Corporation (FGC), and their respective directors and officers. Petitioners argued that FPIC's omission or failure to timely
replace its pipelines and to observe extraordinary diligence caused the petroleum spill in the City of Makati. They, thus,
prayed that respondents to permanently cease and desist from committing acts of negligence and to open a special trust
fund to answer for similar and future contingencies in the future.

The Court issued a Writ of Kalikasan with a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). The TEPO enjoined
respondents to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders. In compliance with the Writ, respondents
submitted their Joint Return and prayed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that petitioners had no legal capacity to
institute the petition and there is no allegation that the environmental damage affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more
cities or provinces.

Since the Court’s issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and the
BOPL. However, the Court, answering a query of the DOE, clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the Writ of
Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can resume operation of its BOPL System. Because of
this, petitioners filed a Motion praying for the conduct of oral argument on the issue of reopening the BOPL System. They
invoked the precautionary principle and asserted that the possibility of a leak in the BOPL System leading to catastrophic
environmental damage is enough reason to order the closure of its operation. The Supreme Court then remanded the case
to the CA to conduct hearings and submit a report and recommendation thereafter. The CA submitted a report which
contained the following, among others:
(1) That the people's organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition be allowed to be formally impleaded
as petitioners;
(2) The CA directed respondent FPIC to submit the appropriate certification from the DOE as to the safe commercial
operation of the BOPL; otherwise, the operation of the BOPL must also be enjoined;
(3) That respondent FPIC be ordered to submit a certification from the DOE Secretary that the WOPL is already safe
for commercial operation. The certification should take into consideration the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate
leak detection system to be used in monitoring the entire pipeline's mass input versus mass output. The certification
must also consider the necessity of replacing the pipes with existing patches and sleeves;
(4) That petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund to answer for similar contingencies in the future be
denied for lack of sufficient basis;
(5) That respondent FGC be not held solidarily liable under the TEPO.
The Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the CA in its Report and Recommendation that FPIC be
ordered to secure a certification from the DOE Secretary before the WOPL may resume its operations. In compliance, the
DOE Secretary issued a Certification attesting that the WOPL is safe to resume commercial operations, subject to
monitoring or inspection requirements, and imposing several conditions that FPIC must comply with. Further, FPIC shall
submit itself to any test or inspection that the DOE and DOST may deem appropriate for purposes of monitoring the
operations of the WOPL facility.

Issue #1: Whether or not civil society and several people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and public
interest groups are proper parties in this Petition for Writ of Kalikasan?
Held #1: Yes. This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental
disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.
Issue #2: Whether or not the TEPO should be lifted in light of the DOE Certification?
Held. #2: No. The Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter to be complied with by FPIC as
conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed with the
implementation of the tests proposed in the said letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate
reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operation of the WOPL. On the other
hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition is
irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of the WOPL may be ordered.
Justice Leonen, in his dissent, is of the view that the petition should be denied and the TEPO immediately lifted in light of
the DOE's issuance of a certification attesting to the safety of the WOPL for continued commercial operations, thereby
rendering the instant petition moot and academic, seeking, as it does, the checking of the pipeline's structural integrity.
According to his dissent, the writ of kalikasan issued by the Court has already served its functions and, therefore, is functus
officio.
Moreover, he argues that directing the DOE and FPIC to repeat their previous procedures is tantamount to doubting the
agency's performance of its statutorily-mandated tasks, over which they have the necessary expertise, and implies that said
DOE certification is improper, a breach, allegedly, of the principle of separation of powers.
He also contends that the majority ordered the repetition of the procedures and tests already conducted on the WOPL
because of the fear and uncertainty on its safeness despite the finding of the DOE in favor of its reopening, taking into
consideration the occurrence of numerous pipeline incidents worldwide. The dissent argues that the precautionary principle
should not be so strictly applied as to unjustifiably deprive the public of the benefits of the activity to be inhibited, and to
unduly create other risks.
The dissent's contentions that the case is already moot and academic, that the writ of kalikasan has already served its
function, and that the delay in the lifting of the TEPO may do more harm than good are anchored on the mistaken premise
that the precautionary principle was applied in order to justify the order to the DOE and the FPIC for the conduct of the
various tests anew. The following reasons easily debunk these arguments:
1. The precautionary principle is not applicable to the instant case;
2. The DOE certification is not an absolute attestation as to the WOPL's structural integrity and in fact imposes several
conditions for FPIC's compliance;
3. The DOE itself, in consultation with FPIC and the other concerned agencies, proposed the activities to be conducted
preparatory to the reopening of the pipeline; and
4 . There are no conclusive findings yet on the WOPL's structural integrity.
Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary
Principle, provides that "[ w ]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity
and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it."
According to the dissent, the directive for the repetition of the tests is based on speculations, justified by the application of
said principle. This, however, is not the case. Nowhere did the Court apply the precautionary principle in deciding the issue
on the WOPL's structural integrity.
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human activity sought to be inhibited,
and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with full scientific certainty. Here, however,
such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the WOPL, which is
the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the surroundings
will cause environmental damage or will harm human health or that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum
leak and the harm that it caused to the environment and to the residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by
FPIC.
It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL's compliance with pipeline structure standards
so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the evidence presented by the
parties on the WOPL's actual state. Hence,the Court’s consideration of the numerous findings and recommendations of the
CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL' s present structure, and not the cited pipeline incidents as the dissent
propounds.
Issue #3: Whether or not a Special Trust Fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies?
Held #3: No. Under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the
purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment. Said proviso pertinently provides:
Sec. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other
litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment,
the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control
of the court.
Furthermore, Sec. 15( e ), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the grant of
damages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust
fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already
suffered.
Hence, the prayer is but a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As
such, the Court is of the considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced.

Issue #4: Whether or not FGC and the respective directors of FPIC and FGC should be solidarily liable?

Held #4: The Court will refrain from ruling on this issue due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
cases that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan, the Court cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under
Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. The civil case and criminal complaint filed by
petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual liability of respondents,
if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the
dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Regina N. Cayanan and SPOl Rolando V. Pascua
G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017

BERSAMIN, J.:

DOCTRINE: Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving petitions for the writ of amparo. The respondent
must show in the return on the writ of amparo the observance of extraordinary diligence. Once an enforced disappearance
is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies should be tasked to assiduously investigate and
determine the disappearance, and, if warranted, to bring to the bar of justice whoever may be responsible for the
disappearance.

Facts:

Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC alleging that Pablo, her husband, was being illegally detained by the
Director/Head of the CIDG; that on July 9, 2007 a group of armed men identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG,
led by Pascua, had forcibly arrested Pablo on Magalang Street, East A venue, Diliman, Quezon City without any warrant of
arrest, and had then detained him at the office of the CIDG in Camp Crame, Quezon City; that Pablo had not been found
or heard from since then; and that despite repeated demands by her and her relatives, the CIDG operatives had not
produced the body of Pablo.

The CIDG filed its return on the writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or having detained him. It prayed for the
dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.

Regina, albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas corpus, amended her petition to now seek instead the
issuance of a writ of amparo. The RTC issued the writ of amparo.

Regina moved ex parte for the issuance of a temporary protection order and witness protection order. The RTC granted her
motion

The CIDG forthwith moved for reconsideration; however, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the CIDG has directly appealed to the Court.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo by the RTC; and
(2) Whether the CIDG already discharged its duty as required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

RULING:
The appeal lacks merit.

I. Substantial evidence existed to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo

Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence to establish the allegations of the petition for the
writ of amparo and to warrant granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, to wit:

Section 18. Judgment. - x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, a case involving the propriety of the trial court's issuance of the writ of amparo, the Court expounded
on the need for substantial evidence to support the petition for the writ of amparo, viz.:

We see no merit in the petitioners' submitted position that no sufficient evidence exists to support the conclusion that the
Kasim evidence unequivocally points to some government complicity in the disappearance x x x. We painstakingly ruled:

To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a
close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence - even of those usually
considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence - taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the
test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement x x x.

The CIDG contends that Regina did not discharge her burden of proof because she did not present substantial evidence to
support her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

The contention of the CIDG is without merit. We declare that Regina fully discharged her duty to present substantial evidence
in support of her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

II. The CIDG did not observe the required extraordinary diligence

Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the diligence required of a public official or employee who is named
as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo, to wit:

Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules
and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to
evade the responsibility or liability.

The CIDG posits that it was only required to observe ordinary diligence in conducting its investigation of the disappearance
of Pablo and in determining Pablo's whereabouts.

The CIDG's position is incorrect. The diligence required of the CIDG was extraordinary.

Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo expressly states what a public official or employee impleaded as a respondent
in the petition for the writ of amparo should submit with the verified written return, to wit:

Section 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified
written return together with supporting affidavits xxx.

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the investigations conducted by the CIDG
and the NBI in a manner that would enable the RTC to judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo's
whereabouts had been sincere and adequate. The return by the CIDG was non-compliant in that regard. To be noted at
this juncture is that the CIDG should have exerted greater effort at complying with both the letter and spirit of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo in light of Perez's sinumpaang salaysay having fully placed the responsibility for the abduction and
disappearance of Pablo right at the very doorsteps of the CIDG in Camp Crame. It is disheartening for us to see the CIDG's
investigation having been limited to Pascua despite the circumstances justifying a broader inquiry. There was also no
affirmative showing of any investigation of the area of the abduction itself despite Regina having presented witnesses from
the area. Indeed, the CIDG did not seem to have itself investigated Perez on the abduction.