Steven Mueller's Litigation With Burr Ridge Mayor Gary Grasso

2-21-0594
APPEAL TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
DUPAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS
GARY GRASSO
Plaintiff/Petitioner Reviewing Court No: 2-21-0594
Circuit Court/Agency No: 2021MR000158
Trial Judge/Hearing Officer: PAUL M FULLERTON
v. 10
E-FILED
Transaction ID: 2-21-0594
File Date: 12/9/2021 1:03 PM
STEVEN N MUELLER Jeffrey H. Kaplan, Clerk of the Court
Defendant/Respondent APPELLATE COURT 2ND DISTRICT
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD
The record has been prepared and certified in the form required for transmission to the
reviewing court. It consists of:
1 Volume(s) of the Common Law Record, containing 185 pages

1 Volume(s) of the Report of Proceedings, containing 47 pages
0 Volume(s) of the Exhibits, containing 0 pages
I hereby certify this record pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 324, this 30 DAY OF NOVEMBER,
2021
(Clerk of the Circuit Court or Administrative Agency)
CANDICE ADAMS, CLERK OF THE 18th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT ©

WHEATON, ILLINOIS 60187
C1
Table of Contents
APPEAL TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
GARY GRASSO
Plaintiff/Petitioner Reviewing Court No: 2-21-0594
Circuit Court/Agency No: 2021MR000158
Trial Judge/Hearing Officer: PAUL M FULLERTON
v.
STEVEN N MUELLER
Defendant/Respondent
COMMON LAW RECORD - TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 1 of 2
Date Filed Title/Description Page No.

RECORD SHEET C 4-C 10 (Volume 1)
02/17/2021 NEW CASE COMPLAINT PETITION C 11-C 13 (Volume 1)
03/08/2021 NOTICE OF MOTION C 14-C 15 (Volume 1)
04/19/2021 ORIGINAL STATUS DATE NOTICE C 16 (Volume 1)
05/25/2021 WEB ACTION ORDER C 19 (Volume 1)
06/11/2021 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND CAPTION C 22-C 24 (Volume 1)
06/11/2021 EXHIBIT A C 25-C 28 (Volume 1)
06/11/2021 EXHIBIT B C 29-C 31 (Volume 1)
06/11/2021 EXHIBIT C C 32-C 34 (Volume 1)
06/11/2021 NOTICE OF FILING C 35-C 36 (Volume 1)
06/11/2021 APPEARANCE C 37 (Volume 1)
06/14/2021 MOTION TO DISMISS C 40-C 44 (Volume 1)
06/14/2021 WEB BLANK ORDER C 45 (Volume 1)
07/12/2021 PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT 'S C 49-C 54 (Volume 1)
MOTION TO DISMISS
07/12/2021 EXHIBIT A C 55-C 61 (Volume 1)
07/12/2021 EXHIBIT B C 62-C 76 (Volume 1)
This document is generated by eappeal.net

WHEATON, ILLINOIS 60187 C 2
Table of Contents
COMMON LAW RECORD - TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 2 of 2
Date Filed Title/Description Page No.

07/26/2021 DEFENDANT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THE C 79-C 83 (Volume 1)
MOTION TO DISMISS
09/03/2021 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS C 87-C 145 (Volume 1)
AGAINST PLAINTIFF
09/07/2021 PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR C 148-C 150 (Volume 1)
RECONSIDERATION OF 8-9-21 ORDER
09/17/2021 DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO GARY GRASSO'S C 154-C 157 (Volume 1)
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 8-9-21
ORDER
09/17/2021 GRASSO'S RESPONSE TO MULLER'S RULE 137 C 160-C 169 (Volume 1)
MOTION AND GRASSO'S COUNTER MOTION TO
DISMISS
09/24/2021 DEFENDANT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION C 172-C 175 (Volume 1)
FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF
09/24/2021 PETITIONER'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF C 176-C 181 (Volume 1)
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 8-9-21
ORDER
10/08/2021 NOTICE OF APPEAL C 184-C 185 (Volume 1)

WHEATON, ILLINOIS 60187 C 3
Court File History Page 1
18th Judicial Circuit Court
Docket of CourtFile 2021MR000158
Case Title: GARY GRASSO -VS- STEVEN N MUELLER
Assigned Location: 2005 Legal Status: ACTIVE Initiating Agency: CLERKS OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Parties-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name: STEVEN N MUELLER
Role: FIRST-NAMED DEFENDANT
Address: 8070 GARFIELD AVENUE
UNIT 10-4
BURR RIDGE IL 60527
Name: GARY GRASSO
Role: FIRST-NAMED PLAINTIFF
Address: 38 BLAINE STREET
STE. 100
HINSDALE IL 60521
Name: GARY GRASS
Role: PLAINTIFF
Name: DONALD P HUGHES
Role: Attorney Of RecordDONALD P HUGHES
Address: 1814 GRANDSTAND PLACE
ELGIN IL 60123
Name: GRASSO LAW PC
Role: Attorney Of RecordGRASSO LAW PC
Address: 38 S BLAINE STREET
STE 100
HINSDALE IL 60521
Name: ROBBINS, SCHWARTZ, NICHOLAS, LIFTON & TAYLOR, LTD.
Role: Attorney Of RecordROBBINS, SCHWARTZ, NICHOLAS, LIFTON & TAYLOR, LTD.
Address: 55 W MONROE STREET
SUITE 800
CHICAGO IL 60603
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Count Number: 0001--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of Case: MR0081 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A DECISION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OTHER THAN A TAX COMMISSION
Issuing Agency: CLERKS OFFICE Status: ACTIVE
02/17/2021 10200 FIRST-NAMED PLAINTIFF

First Name: GARY Last Name: GRASSO
02/17/2021 10010 ADDRESS
C 4
First Name: GARY Last Name: GRASSO Address Type: HOME Address Line 1: 38 BLAINE STREET Address Line 2: STE. 100 City: HINSDALE State: IL Zip Code: 60521
Country Code: USA
02/17/2021 10030 COMMUNICATIONS
02/17/2021 10100 FIRST-NAMED DEFENDANT
First Name: STEVEN Middle Name: N Last Name: MUELLER
02/17/2021 10010 ADDRESS
First Name: STEVEN Middle Name: N Last Name: MUELLER Address Type: HOME Address Line 1: 8070 GARFIELD AVENUE Address Line 2: UNIT 10-4 City: BURR RIDGE
State: IL Zip Code: 60527 Country Code: USA
02/17/2021 700210 CIVIL COUNT
02/17/2021 2140 ORIGINAL LOCATION ASSIGNMENT
New Location: 2005
02/17/2021 5350 COMPLAINT
02/17/2021 4181 CIVIL CASE FILING ASSESSMENT
02/17/2021 110 STATUS DATE
Court Date: 05/17/2021 Court Location: 2005 Court Time: 09:00 AM Purpose Code: STATUS
02/17/2021 10320 ATTORNEY OF RECORD
Attorney: DONALD P HUGHES
02/17/2021 10350 EFILEIL ATTY LEAD
First Name: ADAM Last Name: BOWERS ARDC #: 6277163
02/17/2021 5195 APPEARANCE
For: GARY GRASSO
Attorney ID: 31780
02/18/2021 9601 CIVIL FUND RECEIVED -TYLER
Allocated Amount: $343.00
02/18/2021 9700 APPLICATION OF FUND
03/08/2021 5890 NOTICE OF MOTION
Court Date: 05/17/2021 Court Location: 2005 Court Time: 09:00 AM Purpose Code: PETITION
04/19/2021 20700 ORIGINAL STATUS DATE NOTICE
Notice Type: ORIGINAL STATUS DATE
Court Date: 05/17/2021 Court Location: 2005 Court Time: 09:00 AM Purpose Code: PETITION
04/29/2021 10350 EFILEIL ATTY FILINGATTY
First Name: GARY Middle Name: A Last Name: GRASSO ARDC #: 3121760
05/17/2021 2310 COURT HELD REMOTELY
Judge: FULLERTON PX
C 5
Attorney ID: 71875
05/20/2021 9300 PAYMENT RECEIVED
Actual Amount Received: $6.50 Payor Name: Nicole Clark Type of Payment: CREDIT CARD WEB PAYMENT Credit Card Type: MASTERCARD Amount returned: $0.00
05/20/2021 9601 CIVIL FUND RECEIVED
05/20/2021 4177 CREDIT CARD FEE ASSESSMENT
05/20/2021 9300 PAYMENT RECEIVED
Actual Amount Received: $7.00 Payor Name: Nicole Clark Type of Payment: CREDIT CARD WEB PAYMENT Credit Card Type: MASTERCARD Amount returned: $0.00
05/20/2021 9601 CIVIL FUND RECEIVED
05/20/2021 4177 CREDIT CARD FEE ASSESSMENT
05/25/2021 1640 CONTINUE FOR VIDEO CALL
Type: FOR VIDEO CALL Court Date: 06/14/2021 Court Location: 2005 Court Time: 09:00 AM Purpose Code: STATUS Judge: FULLERTON PX
06/11/2021 5190 APPEARANCE
Total Assessment Amount: $218.00 For: STEVEN N MUELLER
06/11/2021 8000 NOTICE OF FILING
Type: OF FILING
06/11/2021 10350 EFILEIL ATTY FILINGATTY
First Name: MARSHALL Middle Name: NEAL Last Name: SMITH ARDC #: 6284023
06/11/2021 7900 MOTION - LEAVE TO FILE
Type: - LEAVE TO FILE
Court Date: 06/14/2021 Court Location: 2005 Court Time: 09:00 AM Purpose Code: MOTION
06/11/2021 6440 EXHIBIT
06/11/2021 6440 EXHIBIT
06/11/2021 6440 EXHIBIT
06/14/2021 30278 ORDER
Judge: FULLERTON PX
06/14/2021 2250 ORDER
Judge: FULLERTON PX
C 6
Type: FOR VIDEO CALL Court Date: 06/21/2021 Court Location: 2005 Court Time: 09:00 AM Purpose Code: STATUS Judge: FULLERTON PX
06/14/2021 10210 PLAINTIFF
First Name: GARY Last Name: GRASS
06/14/2021 7900 MOTION - DISMISS
Type: - DISMISS
Type: OF FILING
06/14/2021 9601 CIVIL FUND RECEIVED -TYLER
Judge: FULLERTON PX
06/21/2021 30278 ORDER
06/21/2021 2180 LEAVE TO FILE GRANTED
Type: GRANTED Judge: FULLERTON PX
Type: FOR VIDEO CALL Court Date: 08/09/2021 Court Location: 2005 Court Time: 10:00 AM Purpose Code: HEARING Judge: FULLERTON PX
07/12/2021 8270 RESPONSE
Type: OF FILING
07/12/2021 6440 EXHIBIT
07/12/2021 6440 EXHIBIT
07/26/2021 8230 REPLY
Type: OF FILING
08/09/2021 2300 NO ACTION TAKEN
Judge: FULLERTON PX
08/10/2021 30278 ORDER
08/10/2021 1700 DISMISSAL AS TO CERTAIN COUNTS
Type: AS TO CERTAIN COUNTS Judge: FULLERTON PX
08/10/2021 2270 MOTION OR PETITION DENIED
Judge: FULLERTON PX
09/03/2021 8260 PLACED ON CALL BY JUDGES SECRETARY
Court Date: 09/13/2021 Court Location: 2005 Court Time: 09:00 AM
09/03/2021 7900 MOTION - OTHER
C 7
Type: - OTHER
09/07/2021 8260 PLACED ON CALL BY JUDGES SECRETARY
Court Date: 09/13/2021 Court Location: 2005 Court Time: 09:00 AM
09/07/2021 7900 MOTION - OTHER
Type: - OTHER
09/13/2021 30278 ORDER
Judge: FULLERTON PX
09/13/2021 2180 LEAVE TO FILE GRANTED
Type: GRANTED Judge: FULLERTON PX
09/13/2021 1640 CONTINUE FOR HEARING
Type: FOR HEARING Court Date: 10/08/2021 Court Location: 2005 Court Time: 10:00 AM Purpose Code: HEARING Judge: FULLERTON PX
09/17/2021 8270 RESPONSE
Type: OF FILING
09/17/2021 8270 RESPONSE
Type: OF FILING
09/24/2021 8230 REPLY
09/24/2021 8230 REPLY
Type: OF FILING
10/08/2021 7280 NOTICE OF APPEAL
Type: OF FILING
10/08/2021 4164 APPEAL ASSESSMENT
Amount: $50.00
10/12/2021 30278 ORDER
C 8
Bill Of Costs
Date Code Service Rendered Obligor Assessed Applied Due

02/17/2021 4181 CIVIL CASE FILING ASSESSMENT DONALD P HUGHES $343.00 $0.00 $343.00
02/18/2021 9700 APPLICATION OF FUND $0.00 $343.00 $0.00
05/20/2021 9700 APPLICATION OF FUND $0.00 $2.50 -$2.50
05/20/2021 4172 COPIES ASSESSMENT ROBBINS, SCHWARTZ, NICHOLAS, LIFTON & $3.00 $0.00 -$10.50
TAYLOR, LTD.
05/20/2021 4177 CREDIT CARD FEE ASSESSMENT ROBBINS, SCHWARTZ, NICHOLAS, LIFTON & $4.00 $0.00 -$6.50
TAYLOR, LTD.
05/20/2021 4177 CREDIT CARD FEE ASSESSMENT ROBBINS, SCHWARTZ, NICHOLAS, LIFTON & $4.00 $0.00 -$2.50
TAYLOR, LTD.
05/20/2021 4172 COPIES ASSESSMENT ROBBINS, SCHWARTZ, NICHOLAS, LIFTON & $2.50 $0.00 $0.00
TAYLOR, LTD.
06/11/2021 5190 APPEARANCE ROBBINS, SCHWARTZ, NICHOLAS, LIFTON & $218.00 $0.00 $218.00
TAYLOR, LTD.
06/14/2021 9700 APPLICATION OF FUND $0.00 $218.00 $0.00
10/08/2021 4164 APPEAL ASSESSMENT ROBBINS, SCHWARTZ, NICHOLAS, LIFTON & $50.00 $0.00 $50.00
TAYLOR, LTD.
------------ ------------ ------------
Case Total: $624.50 $574.50 $50.00
This bill of costs reflects amounts filed after January 1, 2002. If you need a bill of costs for prior years, please contact our office.
C 9
Bill Of Costs
Obligor Assessed Applied Due

DONALD P HUGHES $343.00 $343.00 $0.00
ROBBINS, SCHWARTZ, NICHOLAS, LIFTON & TAYLOR, LTD. $281.50 $231.50 $50.00
------------ ------------ ------------
Case Total: $624.50 $574.50 $50.00
This bill of costs reflects amounts filed after January 1, 2002. If you need a bill of costs for prior years, please contact our office.
C 10
2021MR000158
Candice Adams
e-filed in the 18th Judicial Circuit Court
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 12243700
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 2/17/2021 2:11 PM
Date Submitted: 2/17/2021 2:11 PM
Date Accepted: 2/17/2021 4:14 PM
KS
C 11
6. Grasso had to retain counsel and the Village of Burr Ridge had to convene an
elections board of three Village officials (two Village Trustees and the Village Clerk) which had
to meet on two sessions. The Village also had to retain its counsel for the election board sessions,
read the filings and law and prepare recommendations to the election board.
7. Grasso' s counsel filed a motion to dismiss containing citations to case law and
precedent directly contrary to Mueller's challenge on both issues.
8. Mueller conceded there was no basis for his challenge to the use of Village
President/Mayor on the Petitions and withdrew that challenge before the election board convened
a second time.
9. Mueller had no support to continue the challenge based now solely on the Notary
writing 2021 instead of 2020 on the Statement of Candidacy. He and his counsel did so anyway.
10. On January 12, 2021, the election board met in the Village Board room. Argument
was had and Mueller's counsel demonstrated no basis in law to assert that the notary's use of2021
instead of 2020 could invalidate the Statement of Candidacy.
11. Mueller never attended either session of the election board. Nor did not access it
via Zoom nor did he call in on the provided call-in number.
12. Mueller - and his counsel - had no basis in law to file the challenged, or continue
it.
13. The election board unanimously granted Grasso's motion to dismiss the challenge
and set forth its bases in writing.
14. Mueller did not appeal to the 18th Judicial Circuit Court.
15. Grasso reserves his rights to add Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution
causes of action against Respondent and any others who assisted Respondent in his challenge.
C 12
WHEREFORE, Grasso asks this Court to find the Mueller challenge lacked any legal basis
in law or fact to be filed or continued thereafter, and under Rule 137, and other causes of action
that may still be filed, sanction Mueller, and his attorney, if warranted and for any other relief the
Court deems equitable.
Adam.Bowers
Adam.Bowers
GRASSO LAW, PC
38 Blaine Street
Hinsdale, IL 60521
abowers@grassolaw.com
DuPage #: 31780
C 13
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
DUPAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS
STEVEN N. MUELLER, ) Candice Adams

) e-filed in the 18th Judicial Circuit Court
Petitioner-Objector, ) DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 12490187
) 2021MR000158
v. ) 2021 MR 000158 FILEDATE: 3/8/2021 2:52 PM
) Date Submitted: 3/8/2021 2:52 PM
GARY GRASSO, ) BC
)
Respondent-Candidate. )
------------------------------------------------------)
GARY GRASS, )
)
Counter-Petitioner, )
)
v. )
)
STEVEN N. MUELLER, )
)
Counter-Respondent. )
NOTICE OF MOTION
To: Robert Windon, Esq.

Windon Strategies, LLC
3421 W. Elm Street
McHenry, IL 60050
robert@windonstrategies.com
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 17, 2021, at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as
counsel may be heard, we shall appear before the Honorable Judge Paul Fullerton or any judge
sitting in his stead, in Courtroom 2005, via Zoom, as provided by the Court and then and there
present RULE 137 PETITION FOR SANCTIONS, a copy of which is hereby served upon you.
Dated: March 8, 2021
GRASSO LAW, PC Respectfully submitted,

38 Blaine Street
Hinsdale, IL 60521 Adam Bowers____________________
abowers@grassolaw.com Adam Bowers
DuPage #: 31780
C 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Christen L. Korzyniewski, a non-attorney, certify that a true and correct copy of this
Notice and Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions, has been served via electronic email upon counsel of
record on this 8th day of March 2021, at the following address:
Robert Windon, Esq.

Windon Strategies, LLC
3421 W. Elm Street
McHenry, IL 60050
/s/Christen L. Korzyniewski
Adam Bowers
GRASSO LAW, P.C.
38 S. Blaine Street, Ste. 100
Hinsdale, IL 60521
(630) 654-4500
Attorney No. 31780
C 15
CLERK OF 1HE 18th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT
OFFICIAL NOTICE
STATUS DAlE NOTICE
DATE OF NOTICE 0411912021
''''"""''''''
GRASSOLAWPC
38 S BLAINE STREET
STE 100
llINSDALE IL 60521
CASENUMBER 2021MR000158
CASE TITLE GARY GRASS -VS- STEVEN N MUELLER
You are hereby notrlied that tlus case IS set for a status review
Tlus case IS set for heanng on 0511712021
Atthehourof 09 00 AM
This matter will proceed remotely via 1.oom teleconference unless this case is scheduled in
Courtoom 2002, an order of protection hearing, or otheiwise ordered by the Court
For further information please visit the Circuit Court website atwww.dupageco.org!courtsl.
The locat10n IS
COURTROOM 2005
505 N COUNTY FARM RD
WHEATON
Failure to comply with tlus notice may result m the disrrussal for want ofprosecut10n or other sanct10ns
nnposed by the court
CANDICE ADAMS
CIRCUIT COURT CLERK
Nolli• Thuqu< &)" 2021MR15800002021-04-193211
C 16
GARY GRASS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2021 MR 000158
) Candice Adams
STEVEN N. MUELLER, ) e-filed in the 18th Judicial Circuit Court
DuPage County
) ENVELOPE: 13138910
Counter-Respondent. ) 2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 4/29/2021 12:02 PM
REVISED NOTICE OF MOTION Date Accepted: 4/29/2021 2:29 PM
LG
To: Robert Windon, Esq. Steven Mueller
Windon Strategies, LLC 8070 Garfield Avenue, Unit #10-4
3421 W. Elm Street Burr Ridge, IL 60527
McHenry, IL 60050
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 17, 2021, at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as
counsel may be heard, we shall appear before the Honorable Judge Paul Fullerton or any
judge sitting in his stead, in Courtroom 2005, via Zoom, as provided by the Court and then
and there present RULE 137 PETITION FOR SANCTIONS, a copy of which is hereby
served upon you.
Dated: April 29, 2021
Respectfully submitted,
Adam Bowers____________________
Adam Bowers
GRASSO LAW, PC
38 Blaine Street
Hinsdale, IL 60521
DuPage #: 31780
C 17
Notice and Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions, has been served via electronic email upon counsel of
record on this 29th day of April 2021, at the following address:
Robert Windon, Esq. Steven Mueller

Windon Strategies, LLC 8070 Garfield Avenue, Unit #10-4
3421 W. Elm Street Burr Ridge, IL 60527
McHenry, IL 60050
Adam Bowers
GRASSO LAW, P.C.
38 S. Blaine Street, Ste. 100
Hinsdale, IL 60521
(630) 654-4500
Attorney No. 31780
C 18
ACTION ORDER 2021MR000158-59
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
STATE OF ILLINOIS COUNTY OF DU PAGE
GARY GRASS
Plaintiff
-VS- 2021MR000158
FILED
CASE NUMBER 21 May 25 AM 08: 11
STEVEN N MUELLER
Defendant
CLERK OF THE
18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
ACTION ORDER
This matter having come before the Court, the Court having jurisdiction and being fully advised in the premises:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
The case is continued to 06/14/2021 in 2005 at 09:00 AM for STATUS - FOR VIDEO CALL.
Description: pleadings/service
Submitted by: GARY GRASSO

Attorney Firm: GRASSO LAW PC
DuPage Attorney Number: 31780 PRO SE
Attorney for:
JUDGE PAUL FULLERTON
38 S BLAINE STREET, STE 100
Validation ID : DP-05252021-0811-23773
HINSDALE, IL, 60521
630-654-4500
Date: 05/25/2021
Email: ggrasso@grassolaw.com
CANDICE ADAMS, CLERK OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT © Page 1 of 1

WHEATON, ILLINOIS 60187-0707 C 19
Visit http://www.i2file.net/dv to validate this document. Validation ID: DP-05252021-0811-23773
Candice Adams
GARY GRASS, 1 ) e-filed in the 18th Judicial Circuit Court
DuPage County
Counter-Petitioner, ) 2021MR000158
) FILEDATE: 6/11/2021 3:24 PM
v. ) Date Accepted: 6/11/2021 3:40 PM
) AP
)
Counter-Respondent. ) 2021MR000158
NOTICE OF MOTION
To: Robert Windon, Esq. M. Neal Smith

Windon Strategies, LLC Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, Ltd.
3421 W. Elm Street 550 Warrenville Road, Suite 460
McHenry, IL 60050 Lisle, IL 60532
robert@windonstrategies.com nsmith@robbins-schwartz.com
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 14, 2021, at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as
counsel may be heard, we shall appear before the Honorable Judge Paul Fullerton or any
judge sitting in his stead, in Courtroom 2005, via Zoom, as provided by the Court and then
and there present Petitioner, Gary Grasso’s Motion for Leave to Amend Caption, a copy of
which is hereby served upon you.
Dated: June 11, 2021
/s/ Gary Grasso
GRASSO LAW, PC
38 Blaine Street, Suite 100
Hinsdale, IL 60521
630-654-4500
ggrasso@grassolaw.com
DuPage County: 31780
1
Original caption misspelled name – should be Grasso
C 20
Notice and Motion for Leave to Amend Caption, has been served via electronic email upon counsel
of record on this 11th day of June 2021, at the following address:
Robert Windon, Esq. M. Neal Smith

GRASSO LAW, PC
Hinsdale, IL 60521
630-654-4500
C 21
GARY GRASS, 1 )
) Candice Adams
Counter-Petitioner, ) e-filed in the 18th Judicial Circuit Court
) DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 13660665
v. ) 2021 MR 000158 2021MR000158
) FILEDATE: 6/11/2021 3:24 PM
STEVEN N. MUELLER, ) Date Submitted: 6/11/2021 3:24 PM
) AP
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND CAPTION
NOW COMES GARY GRASSO, by Grasso Law, PC, asking this Court for an order
allowing the caption to be amended and in support thereof, states:
1. Petitioner filed a Rule 137 Petition For Sanctions arises from and within an election
board challenge styled Mueller v Grasso, 2021 MOEB 001, Village of Burr Ridge, DuPage
County, IL.
2. After the local election board dismissed the challenge, Mueller did not appeal.
3. (Had he appealed, upon information and belief, the matter would have been
assigned a “new” case number by the DuPage Court Clerk because the system does not recognize
“MOEB” filings.)
4. On February 11, 2021, Petitioner’s office styled the initial filing as Mueller v.
Grasso/Grasso v. Mueller and filed under the category “law – tort damages”; a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit A.
5. The DuPage County Court rejected the filing, stating: “Please submit in existing
case with case number or submit as new case filing and remove the counter party names”; a copy
of that communication is attached as Exhibit B.
1
Original caption misspelled name – should be Grasso
C 22
6. Counsel’s office contacted the DuPage County Clerk and understood from that
contact that the Court’s filing system could not take the case with that MOEB file number because
there was no caption in the court system.
7. Petitioner’s office thus removed the counter party names and refiled on February
11, 2021 as noted.
8. The DuPage County Court rejected the second filing on February 16, 2021, stating:
“If this is a review of administrative proceedings case type then you will need to
include the mailing fees and addresses to send mailings. If this is another case type
you will need to let us know which case type you would like us to file it under”.
A copy of that communication is attached as Exhibit C.
9. Counsel’s office contacted the Court and was instructed to file it as a petition under
the petitioner’s name, and it would assign a case number. Counsel’s office did so and captioned
the Petition as it understood was required by the Clerk’s office for filing. 2
10. The petition was submitted, accepted and assigned a “miscellaneous remedy”
number.
11. Mr. Mueller has appeared through counsel (apparently to contest service).
12. The petition was timely filed and styled in the matter as originally styled before the
election board in the court that would hear the petition or appeal.
13. The petition should continue to be styled Mueller v. Grasso as was attempted
initially, with the case number the DuPage Clerk has assigned.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner Grasso asks this court to enter an order amending the caption as
Mueller v. Grasso as initially attempted, or Grasso v. Mueller as the Clerk’s filing system required,
2
Unfortunately, there was a spelling error in the name.
C 23
with the court number that the Clerk assigned because it does not recognize “MOEB”, as the Court
deems best to address the merits of the Petition.
/s/ Gary Grasso
GRASSO LAW, PC
Hinsdale, IL 60521
630-654-4500
Section 1-109
Sworn Statement of Christen Korzyniewski
1. I am a paralegal at Grasso Law, PC, Hinsdale, IL 60521.
2. I prepared the caption and filing of the Rule 137 Petition For Sanctions and communicated
with the DuPage County Court Clerk’s office on this matter.
3. Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and
correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief, and as to such matters
the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he/she verily believes the same to be true.
___________________________________________
Christen Korzyniewski
C 24
2021MR000158
EXHIBIT A
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 13660665
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 6/11/2021 3:24 PM
AP
C 25
)
Petitioner-Objector, )
)
v. ) 21 L __________
)
GARY GRASSO, )
)
------------------------------------------------------)
GARY GRASS, )
)
Counter-Petitioner, )
)
v. )
)
)
RULE 137 PETITION FOR SANCTIONS
NOW COMES GARY GRASSO, by Grasso Law, PC pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 137, and in support thereof states:
1. Gary Grasso is the Mayor of Burr Ridge, DuPage County, IL.
2. On December 14, 2020, Grasso timely filed his Petitions and Statement of
Candidacy and related documents needed to run for re-election as Mayor of Burr Ridge in the April
2021 municipal elections.
3. Steven R. Mueller, a resident of Burr Ridge filed a challenge to Grasso’s petition
under Mueller v. Grasso, 2021 MOEB 001, Burr Ridge. Mueller and his counsel contended
Petitions and Statement of Candidacy were invalid because (1) Grasso’s petitions used the titles
of Village President/Mayor and Village President and (2) the Notary had signed the Grasso’s
Statement of Candidacy on December 3, 2020 but had written “2021” instead of 2020.
C 26
4. Mueller conceded that both the law of Illinois and Burr Ridge’s ordinances allowed
for the use of Village President or Mayor for that position, and that Grasso had properly appeared
before the Notary, taken the oath and signed his named to the Statement of Candidacy as required
by Illinois law.
5. There was neither fact nor law that supported the validity of Mueller’ challenge.
6. Grasso had to retain counsel and the Village of Burr Ridge had to convene an
elections board of three Village officials (two Village Trustees and the Village Clerk) which had
to meet on two sessions. The Village also had to retain its counsel for the election board sessions,
read the filings and law and prepare recommendations to the election board.
7. Grasso’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss containing citations to case law and
precedent directly contrary to Mueller’s challenge on both issues.
8. Mueller conceded there was no basis for his challenge to the use of Village
President/Mayor on the Petitions and withdrew that challenge before the election board convened
a second time.
9. Mueller had no support to continue the challenge based now solely on the Notary
writing 2021 instead of 2020 on the Statement of Candidacy. He and his counsel did so anyway.
10. On January 12, 2021, the election board met in the Village Board room. Argument
was had and Mueller’s counsel demonstrated no basis in law to assert that the notary’s use of 2021
instead of 2020 could invalidate the Statement of Candidacy.
11. Mueller never attended either session of the election board. Nor did not access it
via Zoom nor did he call in on the provided call-in number.
12. Mueller – and his counsel – had no basis in law to file the challenged, or continue
it.
C 27
13. The election board unanimously granted Grasso’s motion to dismiss the challenge
and set forth its bases in writing.
14. Mueller did not appeal to the 18th Judicial Circuit Court.
15. Grasso reserves his rights to add Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution
causes of action against Respondent and any others who assisted Respondent in his challenge.
WHEREFORE, Grasso asks this Court to find the Mueller challenge lacked any legal basis
in law or fact to be filed or continued thereafter, and under Rule 137, and other causes of action
that may still be filed, sanction Mueller, and his attorney, if warranted and for any other relief the
Court deems equitable.
Adam Bowers____________________
Adam Bowers
GRASSO LAW, PC
38 Blaine Street
Hinsdale, IL 60521
DuPage #: 31780
C 28
2021MR000158
EXHIBIT B
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 13660665
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 6/11/2021 3:24 PM
AP
C 29
Using a screen reader? Press Enter Now.
Envelope # 12188078
Envelope Information
Envelope Id Submitted Date Submitted User Name

12188078 2/11/2021 2:14 PM CST ckorzyniewski@grassolaw.com
Case Information
Location Category Case Type

DuPage County Law Magistrate: Damages over Tort - Money Damages ($10,000.01 to
$10,000 up to $50,000 $15K)
Case Cross Reference Number
Case Cross Reference Number Case Cross Reference Type
38825 DuPage Attorney/Firm Number/Self-Represented Litigant Number
Party Information
Party Type Party Name Lead Attorney
Plaintiff/Petitioner Gary Grasso
Defendant/Respondent Steven N Mueller
Party Details
Party Type
Plaintiff/Petitioner
First Name Last Name

Gary Grasso
Help
C 30
Filings
Filing Code Client Ref # Filing Description
Petition Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions
Filing Details
Filing Type Filing Code
EFile Petition
Filing Description
Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions
Filing Status
Rejected
Lead Document
File Name Description Security Download
Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions.pdf Rule 137 Petition for Non-Confidential Original File
112.60 kB Sanctions.pdf
Rejection Information 
Rejection Reason
Date / Time
Comment
Rejected 2/11/2021 4:09 PM Please submit in existing case with case

number or submit as new case filing and
remove the counter party names
Fees
© 2021 Tyler Technologies
Version: 2020.0.1.9148
C 31
2021MR000158
EXHIBIT C
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 13660665
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 6/11/2021 3:24 PM
AP
C 32
Using a screen reader? Press Enter Now.
Envelope # 12193531
Envelope Information
Envelope Id Submitted Date Submitted User Name

12193531 2/11/2021 4:55 PM CST ckorzyniewski@grassolaw.com
Case Information
Location Category Case Type

DuPage County Law Magistrate: Damages over Tort - Money Damages ($10,000.01 to
$10,000 up to $50,000 $15K)
Case Cross Reference Number
Party Information
Filings
Filing Code Client Ref # Filing Description
Petition Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions
Filing Details
Filing Type Filing Code
EFile Petition
Filing Description
Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions
Filing Status
Rejected
Lead Document
File Name Description Security Download
Rule 137 Motion for Sanctions.pdf Rule 137 Motion for Non-Confidential
Original FileHelp
111.76 kB Sanctions.pdf
C 33
Rejection Information 
Rejection Reason
Date / Time
Comment
Rejected 2/16/2021 8:45 AM If this is a review of administrative

proceedings case type then you will need
to include the mailing fees and addresses
to send mailings. If this is another case
type you will need to let us know which
case type you would like us to file it under.

Fees

Petition
Description Amount
Filing Fee $0.00
Filing Total: $0.00
Total Filing Fee $0.00

Court Case Fee $293.00
Payment Service Fee $8.47
Envelope Total: $301.47
Party Responsible for Gary Grasso Transaction Amount $301.47

Fees
Payment Account Grasso Law PC Transaction Id 19403093
Filing Attorney Adam Bowers Order Id 012193531-0
Transaction Authorized
Response
© 2021 Tyler Technologies
Version: 2020.0.1.9148
C 34
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 13651560
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 6/11/2021 9:59 AM
Date Submitted: 6/11/2021 9:59 AM
Date Accepted: 6/11/2021 11:57 AM
DUPAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS EP
GARY GRASSO )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No.: 2021 MR 158
)
STEVEN MUELLER, )
)
Defendant. )
NOTICE OF FILING
TO: Adam Bowers

Gary Grasso
Grasso Law, PC
38 Blaine Street
Hinsdale, IL 60521
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 11, 2021, the undersigned caused to be filed via
electronic filing with the Clerk of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, Illinois, Steven
Mueller’s APPEARANCE, a copy of which is served upon you herewith.
By:__/s/ M. Neal Smith_________ _______

M. NEAL SMITH
Firm No. 71875

M. Neal Smith
ROBBINS, SCHWARTZ, NICHOLAS,
LIFTON & TAYLOR, LTD.
550 Warrenville Road, Suite 460
Lisle, IL 6532
630.929.3639
630.783.3231 - FAX
nsmith@robbins-schwartz.com
4845-6297-7207v.1
C 35
Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/1-109, the undersigned
certifies that the statements set forth herein are true and correct.
The undersigned states that he caused a copy of this NOTICE OF FILING and a copy of
the referenced APPEARANCE to be served by electronic mail to the email address listed above.
/s/ M. Neal Smith _
4845-6297-7207v.1
C 36
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 13651560
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 6/11/2021 9:59 AM

EP
C 37
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 13665967
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 6/14/2021 8:53 AM
DUPAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS Date Accepted: 6/14/2021 10:39 AM
EP
GARY GRASSO )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No.: 2021 MR 158
)
STEVEN MUELLER, )
)
Defendant. )
NOTICE OF FILING
TO: Adam Bowers

Gary Grasso
Grasso Law, PC
38 Blaine Street
Hinsdale, IL 60521
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 14, 2021, the undersigned caused to be filed via
electronic filing with the Clerk of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, Illinois, Defendant
Steven Mueller’s MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 735 ILCS 5/2-301 AND 735 ILCS 5/2-
615, a copy of which is served upon you herewith.
By:__/s/ M. Neal Smith_________ _______

M. NEAL SMITH
Firm No. 71875

M. Neal Smith
Lisle, IL 6532
630.929.3639
630.783.3231 - FAX
4845-6297-7207v.1
C 38
the referenced MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 735 ILCS 5/2-301 AND 735 ILCS 5/2-615
to be served by electronic mail to the email address listed above.
/s/ M. Neal Smith _
4845-6297-7207v.1
C 39
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 13665967
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 6/14/2021 8:53 AM

EP
C 40
obligations under the Code of Civil Procedure should be rejected . The Code of Civil Procedure
applies to cases filed by Grasso in the same manner it applies to everyone else .
II. This matter should be dismissed pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-615 because a
"Petition for Rule 137 Sanctions" cannot be filed as a stand alone cause
of action.
This case was initiated when Grasso filed a complaint styled a "Petition for Rule 137
Sanctions" on February 17, 2021 . Setting aside the Petition's lack of substantive merit, in filing
the case Grasso did precisely what Supreme Court Rule 137 does not allow. That is, he has
attempted to assert a violation of Rule 137 as a separate stand-alone civil cause of action .
Supreme Court Rule 137(b), provides in pertinent part as follows :
All proceedings under this rule shall be brought within the civil action in which the
pleading , motion or other document referred to has been filed , and no violation or
alleged violation of this rule shall give rise to a separate civil suit, but shall be
considered a claim within the same civil action .
There is no legal basis to assert a stand-alone violation of Rule 137. Before filing this
Motion to Dismiss, the undersigned asked Grasso to provide his reasoning if Grasso believes that
that there was a good faith basis in law for the filing of the "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions" as a
separate civil suit. See Exhibit A. Grasso's nonsensical answer shows that he either does not
understand Rule 137 or, alternatively, that Grasso is attempting to obfuscate because he
understands well that what he has done is a blatant abuse of Rule 137. Id. Whatever the reason ,
Grasso has caused Mueller to incur court costs and attorney fees to defend an action that has no
good faith basis in law.
WHEREFORE , Defendant Mueller requests that this Court dismiss this matter for lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-301 and for failure to state a claim , order Grasso
to pay the court costs and attorney fees of Mueller following prove up of same, and for such further
relief as appropriate.
C 41
Respectfully submitted ,
STEVEN MUELLER
By:_ _
.{/
__ <:
_______
M. Neal Smith , one of his attorneys
Firm No. 71875

M. Neal Smith
ROBBINS SCHWARTZ NICHOLAS
Lisle , Illinois 60532
630 .929.3639
630-783-3231 - FAX
C 42
EXHIBIT
Neal Smith A
From: Gary Grasso <ggrasso@grassolaw.com>
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2021 1:15 PM
To: Neal Smith
Cc: Adam R. Bowers
Subject: RE: Grasso v. Mueller, Case No. 2021 MR 158
Follow Up Flag: Follow up

Flag Status: Completed
Mr. Smith: I appreciate you confirming that Mr. Mueller was a pawn and who really instigated a meritless challenge that
was materially withdrawn after the motion to dismiss was filed. The Rule 137 was filed in the same action against the
nominal litigant and attorney and the attorney was served - which is all that was required . He even agreed it was filed
within the 30 day requirement. Notice was also mailed as a courtesy - and received by Mueller. DuPage County
assigned it another number, but it's still within the same action . I also have abuse of process and malicious prosecutions
actions that can be separately filed against those two and your clients that were actually involved . If you will not file an
appearance, please do not communicate further w me on this case./ GARY
Ga ry Grasso
Grasso Law, PC
Hinsdale, Illinois 60521 CONSIDER GETTING VACCINATED
630 .654 .4500 (o)
312.498 .3202 (c)
This message, including attachments, is covered by the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C., sections 2510-
2521, is CONFIDENTIAL and also may be protected by ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE. If you believe you received this e-
mail in error, do not read it. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any retention,
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If the reader of this message is not
the intended recipient, I did not intend to waive and do not waive any privileges or confidentiality of this message or the
attachments. Please reply to the sender that you have received the message in error, then delete it. Thank you for
considering the environmental impact of printing emails.
From: Neal Smith <nsmith@robbins-schwartz.com>

Sent: Thursday, June 10, 202111 :34 AM
To: ggrasso@burr-ridge .gov; Adam R. Bowers <abowers@grassolaw.com>; Gary Grasso <ggrasso@grassolaw.com>
Subject: Grasso v. Mueller, Case No. 2021MR158
Gary and Adam,
I have been retained to represent Steven Mueller in the above referenced matter, where you have attempted to assert a
cause of action by filing a "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions ." Setting aside the Petition's lack of merit, I want to bring to
your attention the language of subsection (b) of Supreme Court Rule 137, which provides as follows : All proceedings
under this rule shall be brought within the civil action in which the pleading, motion or other document referred to has
been filed, and no violation or alleged violation of this rule shall give rise to a separate civil suit, but shall be considered a
claim within the same civil action.
In filing the above referenced case, you have done precisely what Rule 137 does not allow. That is, you have attempted
to assert a violation of Rule 137 as a separate stand-alone civil suit. Therefore, by this email, I am formally notifying you
that you must dismiss the above action without further delay. Dismissal should be accomplished on or before June 14 at
1
C 43
9 a.m . when this matter is next before Judge Fullerton. If you believe that that there is a good faith basis in law for the
filing of the "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions" as a separate civil suit, I would appreciate if you could provide your
reasoning, citing applicable law.
Lastly, as you know, this matter was filed nearly four months ago and you still have not served Steven Mueller. I want to
be clear that Mr. Mueller has not waived service and does not agree to waive service.
Please let me know if you have any questions.
M. Neal Smith
Attorney
Robbins Schwartz
Lisle, Illinois 60532-4311
p: 630.929.3639 f : 630.783 .3231
cell: 312-217-2450
nsmith@robbins-schwartz .co m
Robbins Schwartz
This message is confidential. Thi s message may also be privil ege d or protected by work produ ct immunity or other laws and regulations. If you have received it by
mistake, plea se re-se nd this communication to the sen der and del ete it from your system without copying it or disclosing its contents to anyone.
C 44
ORDER 2021MR000158-76
GARY GRASS
Plaintiff
2021MR000158
FILED
-VS-
CASE NUMBER 21 Jun 14 AM 09: 58
STEVEN N MUELLER
Defendant
CLERK OF THE
ORDER
This matter having come before the Court on status and Petitioner, Gary Grasso's Motion for Leave to Amend Caption, the Court having
jurisdiction and being fully advised in the premises:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. The Court is directed to correct the spelling of Petitioner/Plaintiff's last name in the caption from "Grass" to "Grasso".
2. This case is continued to 6/21/2021 in 2005 at 09:00 AM for STATUS via Zoom conferencing.
Submitted by: GARY A GRASSO

Attorney Firm: GRASSO LAW PC
DuPage Attorney Number: 31780
Entered:
Attorney for: PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER
Address: 38 BLAINE STREET, STE. 100 Validation ID : DP-06142021-0958-56873
City/State/Zip: HINSDALE, IL, 60521
Phone number: 630-654-4500 Date: 06/14/2021
Email : ckorzyniewski@grassolaw.com

ORDER 2021MR000158-94
GARY GRASSO
Plaintiff
2021MR000158
FILED
-VS-
CASE NUMBER 21 Jun 21 PM 12: 22
STEVEN N MUELLER
Defendant
CLERK OF THE
ORDER
This matter coming to be heard for status on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Mueller, the Court being fully advised, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff Grasso shall have 21 days, to July 12, 2021, to file a Response to the Motion to Dismiss.
2. Defendant Mueller shall have 14 days thereafter, to July 26, 2021, to file a Reply in support of the Motion to Dismiss.
3. Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss is scheduled for August 9, 2021 at 10:00 a.m. via Zoom video conferencing.
Submitted by: M. NEAL SMITH

Attorney Firm: ROBBINS, SCHWARTZ, NICHOLAS, LIFTON & TAYLOR, LTD.
Entered:
Attorney for: DEFENDANT
Address: 550 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 460 Validation ID : DP-06212021-1222-19865
City/State/Zip: LISLE, IL, 60532
Email : nsmith@robbins-schwartz.com

Candice Adams
GARY GRASSO, ) e-filed in the 18th Judicial Circuit Court
DuPage County
Petitioner, ) 2021MR000158
) FILEDATE: 7/12/2021 4:45 PM
v. ) Case No. 2021 MR 158 1 Date Accepted: 7/13/2021 9:59 AM
) AP
)
NOTICE OF FILING
To: Robert Windon, Esq. M. Neal Smith

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 12th of July 2021, I caused to be filed with the Clerk
of the Circuit Court of DuPage County, Illinois, PETITIONER GRASSO’S RESPONSE TO
RESPONDENT MUELLER’S SECTIONS 2-301 AND 2-615 (COMBINED) MOTION TO
DISMISS.
Dated: July 12, 2021
/s/ Gary Grasso
GRASSO LAW, PC
Hinsdale, IL 60521
630-654-4500
1
The original Rule 137 action was captioned Mueller v Grasso, 2021 MOEB 001. This petition arose from a Village
of Burr Ridge election commission. Mueller, through other counsel filed and placed summons through the Sheriff of
DuPage County, a purported legal challenge to the petitions and related statement of candidacy of Gary Grasso in the
2021 municipal election for Mayor of Burr Ridge. When Grasso filed the Rule 137 Petition under this case name and
number, the Clerk of the 18th Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, rejected it and later instructed petitioner to file it in his
name first and it would be assigned a “MR” miscellaneous remedy case number. Hence the current caption and case
number.
C 47
Notice and Response to Respondent Mueller’s Sections 2-301 and 2-615 (Combined) Motion to
Dismiss, has been served via electronic email upon counsel of record on this 12th day of July 2021,
at the following address:
Robert Windon, Esq. M. Neal Smith

GRASSO LAW, PC
Hinsdale, IL 60521
630-654-4500
C 48
Candice Adams
GARY GRASSO, ) DuPage County
FILEDATE: 7/12/2021 4:45 PM
v. ) Case No. 2021 MR 158 1 Date Accepted: 7/13/2021 9:59 AM
) AP
)
PETITIONER GRASSO’S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT MUELLER’S

SECTIONS 2-301 AND 2-615 (COMBINED)
MOTION TO DISMISS
NOW COMES Petitioner Gary Grasso, by Grasso Law, PC, and for his Response to
Respondent Steven Mueller’s combined motion to dismiss, states:
Summary Statement
Mueller, through additional new counsel of record, argues circularly that: (1) Mueller was
not served, and (2) this petition cannot proceed because it is a separate action not permitted by
Rule 137. These arguments presume this a new action. It is not.
This petition for Rule 137 sanctions arose directly from Mueller v Grasso, 2021 MOEB
001, Village of Burr Ridge. The DuPage County Court Clerk required the petition caption to be
reversed and then assigned it an “MR” (miscellaneous remedy) number. This court administrative
issue arose because the DuPage court system does not recognize MOEB filings. The court record
shows that the petition was served on Mueller’s then counsel, Robert Windon, Esq. as required
1
number.
C 49
under Rule 137. That service counts for serving Mueller under the Rule. Thus, there is no lack of
service here.
While the caption now reads Grasso v. Mueller and has a miscellaneous remedy number
given by the Court Clerk, that is zero fault of Grasso, but rather arises only to conform with court
administrative requirements. 2 Thus, Mueller, through new counsel, argues form over substance
in claiming this is a new action.
Also, in filing a substantive 2-615 motion seeking relief from the Court, Mueller has
appeared herein for all purposes.
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137
Rule 137 “authorizes a court to impose sanctions on lawyers and parties who
violate its terms.” Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 486 (1998). “[U]nder
Rule 137, sanctions may be granted under two different circumstances: (1) when a
pleading, motion, or other paper is not ‘well-grounded in fact’ or is not ‘warranted by
existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law,’ or (2) when it is interposed for purposes such as to ‘harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.’” People v. Stefanski,
337 Ill. App. 3d 548, 551 (2007) (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 137 (eff. Aug. 1, 1989)). “The
purpose of Rule 137 is to ‘prevent abuse of the judicial process by penalizing claimants
who bring vexatious and harassing actions based upon unsupported allegations of fact
and law.’” Burrows v. Pick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1050 (1999) (citing Senese v.
2
Grasso incorporates by reference his recently filed Motion to Amend Caption that sets forth the filing facts and
includes a 1-109 certification of the facts.
C 50
Climatemp, Inc., 289 Ill. App.3d 570, 581 (1997)). “[A]n objective determination of
reasonableness under the circumstances applies when determining whether a filed paper
is grounded in fact and warranted by existing law; it is not sufficient that the party
honestly believed that the allegations raised were grounded in fact and law.” Stefanski,
377 Ill. App. 3d at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 137 begins with this broad statement: “Every pleading, motion and other paper of a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual
name, whose address shall be stated.” Mueller was certainly a party as the petitioner in Mueller v.
Grasso. Mueller’s attorney Windon signed the petitions and Mueller verified them.
The Rule also provides:
“The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has

read the pleading, motion or other document; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.”
As set forth in Grasso’s motion for sanctions, counsel or Mueller appeared to have done
zero investigation into the applicable law because as soon as Grasso filed a motion to
dismiss the challenges, Mueller (and Windon) withdrew the first challenge they raised
as to Grasso’s petitions having the title Village President / Mayor. Indeed, a simple
check of state law allows the use of both titles, and a check of Burr Ridge’s code would
have disclosed that Burr Ridge expressly allows both titles also. The challenge was
baseless.
C 51
Mueller and Windon’s other challenge (that the notary wrote “2022” instead of
2021), also lacked any support in law as a basis to disqualify a candidate. Mueller and
Windon conceded that Grasso took all the required actions and presented himself in
person to sign the Statement of Candidacy – and thus had not violated any part of the
election code to seek the office of Mayor/Village President of Burr Ridge. At the
hearing on the notary-date issue, Mueller offered nothing to rebut Grasso’s position. In
a well written decision, the Election Board summarily dismissed the notary-date
challenge. See Decision attached hereto as Exhibit A.
Rule 137 further provides: “If a pleading, motion, or other document is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other document,
including a reasonable attorney fee.” “Other document” is a broad term, as is
“pleading” or “motion”. Mueller and Windon were seeking a decision – was appealable
to this Court and beyond – that Grasso’s name should be stricken from the ballot and
thereby be prevented from running for Mayor. As Grasso was running unopposed,
Mueller and Windon were seeking to create a vacancy of the office. Certainly, Rule
137 seems to cover an election challenge that can have severe consequences to a
candidate and municipality.
C 52
Grasso has never disputed that Rule 137 requires “all proceedings” to be brought in the
civil action in which the pleading, motion or other document referred to has been filed. Grasso’s
position is that the sanctions motion comports with this requirement. Grasso timely filed
this proceeding in the only forum available – the circuit court of DuPage County that directly hears
election board matters. Indeed, Mueller or Windon caused summons to be placed with the DuPage
Sheriff who sent a deputy to Grasso’s home and served Grasso after hours, in the evening, at his
residence. Mueller used the civil process of DuPage County to pursue his baseless challenge.
Upon information and belief, an election board matter would be assigned a MR or similar
new case number because the Court Clerk does not recognize MOEB filings. Grasso’s motion is
no different. As the record shows, when Grasso filed this petition for sanctions, he did so as it was
captioned under the MOEB filing, to wit: Mueller v Grasso, 2021 MOEB 001, Village of Burr
Ridge. It was the DuPage Court Clerk that understandably insisted the filing conform to its
capabilities – and directed Grasso to file it in his name first and Mueller as respondent - and then
assigned it an MR number. This Rule 137 action nonetheless is brought in the action and venue
in which the pleading, motion or other document had to be filed per Rule 137. Mueller’s motion
is based upon the Court Clerk’s form requirements, not substance.
Rule 137 applies broadly – and is applicable even against and to state agencies.
There are no stated limitations and certainly the Supreme Court could have excluded
certain actions such as election challenges but did not do so.
The Court may note from Avila v Village of Lisle, 2021 IL App (3d) 180389-U
(Rule 23) that the trial court case number in this case was 17-MR-049 where the court
awarded sanctions. This was a ballot access case in which the court awarded Rule 137
C 53
sanctions and legal fees of approximately $6,000 - very similar to the relief sought in
the case at bar. Avila is a nonprecedential order entered under subpart (b) of Rule 23
on or after January 1, 2021 and cited here for persuasive purposes – here, that Rule 137
applies to election / ballot access challenges with MR case numbers. A copy of Avila is
attached as Exhibit B for the Court and provided to opposing counsel also.
WHEREFORE, Grasso asks the Court to deny the motions of Mueller.
/s/ Gary Grasso
GRASSO LAW, PC
Hinsdale, IL 60521
630-654-4500
DuPage County #: 31780
C 54
2021MR000158 Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 14007005
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 7/12/2021 4:45 PM
AP
EXHIBIT A
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STATE OF ILLINOIS )
) SS
COUNTY OF DUPAGE )
BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD

OF THE VILLAGE OF BURR RIDGE, ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS FOR THE
HEARING AND PASSING UPON OBJECTIONS TO THE
NOMINATION PAPERS OF GARY GRASSO, CANDIDATE FOR
VILLAGE PRESIDENT/MAYOR OF THE VILLAGE OF BURR RIDGE, ILLINOIS
STEVEN MUELLER, )
)
vs. ) No. 2021-MOEB-001
)
GARY GRASSO, )
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned, being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes and states that she
served a copy of the Findings, Decision and Order entered by the Electoral Board on
January 12, 2021 in the above-captioned matter by regular U.S. Mail, to the following :
Mr. Robert Windon Ms. Tiffany Nelson-Jaworski

Attorney and Counselor DelGaldo Law Group
3421 West Elm Street 1441 South Harlem
McHenry, Illinois 60050 Berwyn, Illinois 60402
on Tuesday, January 12, 2021, by depositing same in the U.S. mail depository at 9501
West Devon Avenue, Rosemont, Illinois 60018, before 5:00 p.m.
Subscribed and sworn to before me

this 121h day of January, 2021 .
KatMtm a. ~~
NOTARY PUBLIC
"OFFICIAL SEAL"
KATHLEEN A KESTLER
NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF IWNOIS
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 12/1112023
963609.I
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BEFORE THE DULY CONSTITUTED MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD
OF THE VILLAGE OF BURR RIDGE TO HEAR AND PASS UPON OBJECTIONS TO
THE NOMINATION PAPERS OF CANDIDATES FILED FOR ELECTION TO OFFICE
AT THE APRIL 6, 2021 CONSOLIDATED ELECTION
STEVEN MUELLER, )
)
)
vs. ) Case No. 2021-MOEB-001
)
GARY GRASSO, )
)
Respondent-Candidate )
FINDINGS, DECISION AND ORDER
The duly constituted Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the Village of Burr
Ridge, consisting of Guy Franzese, sworn Trustee, sitting as substitute Chairperson 1;
Village Clerk Susan Schaus, Member; and sworn Trustee Al Paveza, Member,
organized by law following the issuance of a call by the Chairperson, Guy Franzese, for
the purpose of hearing and passing upon objections ("Objections") of Steven Mueller
("Objector") to the nomination papers ("Nomination Papers") of Gary Grasso
("Candidate"), candidate for election to the office of Village President/Mayor of the
Village of Burr Ridge at the April 6, 2021 Consolidated election, having convened on
January 7, 2021 and January 12, 2021 in the Village Hall Board Room of the Village of
Burr Ridge, 7660 County Line Road, Burr Ridge, Illinois and having heard and
determined the Objections to the Nomination Papers in the above-titled matter, finds
and orders as follows:
1. The Electoral Board was legally constituted according to the laws of the
State of Illinois to hear and pass upon Objections to the Nomination Papers filed in this
matter.
2. Objections to the Nomination Papers of the Candidate were duly and

timely filed with the Village Clerk on behalf of the Objector.
3. A Call to the hearing on the Objections was duly issued by the Chairman
of the Electoral Board and was caused to be served upon the members of the Electoral
Board, the Objector and the Candidate by mail and/or personal service, as required by
law.
4. Public hearings on the Objections were held on January 7, 2021 and

January 12, 2021 .
1
Guy Franzese was sitting as a substitution for Village President/Mayor Gary Grasso, the Respondent-
Candidate in the instant case.
963471_1
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5. There were present at such hearings the following persons, among others:
A The members of the Electoral Board, and the Electoral Board's

counsel, Michael K. Durkin, all attending in person.
B. The Objector, by his counsel, Robert L. Windon, attending remotely

via Zoom Video Conferencing ("Zoom").
C. The Candidate, in person, and by his counsel, Tiffany Nelson-

Jaworski, attending via Zoom.
6. Rules of Procedure were made available prior to the adoption by the

Electoral Board, and no objections to the Rules by the parties being made, the Electoral
Board adopted such Rules of Procedure.
7. The Electoral Board introduced and received into evidence the following
Electoral Board Exhibits into the record, as follows:
Exhibit 1 Call, Notice and Agenda

Exhibit 2 Rules of Procedure
Exhibit 3 Proofs of Service and Appearances filed by, or on behalf of, the
Parties (Group Exhibit)
Exhibit 4 Objector's Petition
Exhibit 5 Candidate's Nomination Papers
8. The Electoral Board takes notice of the following motions, filings and
responses thereto filed by the parties:
A Candidate's Motion to Strike and Dismiss Objector's Petition;
B. Petitioner/Objector's Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss;

and
C. Reply to Objector's Response to Candidate's Motion to
Strike and Dismiss Objector's Petition.
9. On January 11, 2021, as part of ·Petitioner/Objector's Response to Motion

to Dismiss, the Objector withdrew "the objections related to the Candidate's use of
multiple office names in the petitions," which the Electoral Board finds included
paragraphs 10 through 13, inclusive, appearing under the heading "Signature Sheet
Deficiencies" of the Verified Objector's Petition. . (Electoral Board Exhibit 4). On
January 12, 2021, the Electoral Board entered an Order striking paragraphs 1O through
13 of the Objections.
10. On January 12, 2021, in accordance with Rule 5 of the Rules of

Procedure, the Electoral Board reserved ruling on the Candidate's Motion to Strike and
Dismiss Objector's Objection Petition, pending further hearing on the remaining
Objections.
963471_1
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,,
'
11. On January 12, 2021, the Electoral Board heard all testimony offered by
the parties and arguments by the parties were made for consideration by the Electoral
Board. All evidence tendered and .received into evidence, any offers of proof, and all
arguments made by those appear~As at the public hearing on January 7, 2021 and
January 12, 2021 were heard, considered and publicly debated by the Electoral Board
in open session.
12. The Electoral Board finds that the notary jurat on the Statement of
Candidacy is incorrect, in that the wrong year, 2021, rather than the year 2020, appears
on the jurat as the date that the Candidate signed and swore to before an officer
authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds in the State, as required by 10 ILCS
5/10-5.
13. The Electoral Board finds that having the incorrect year of the subscribing
and swearing before a proper officer in the notary jurat of the Statement of Candidacy
IS/l-i9 T a technical violation of Section 10-5 of the Illinois Election Code which DOES
NOT/mo:l'i invalidate the Statement of Candidacy, and that the requirements of 10
ILCS 5/10-5 HAVE/l:S"i , Wt1" been met.
14. The Electoral Board finds that the nomination papers of the Candidate,
including the Statement of Candidacy, ARE//cJ ti _ 1 I in proper form and the
nomination papers on file ARE/A ?Z l& f valid.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Objections to the Nomination Papers of

Candidate Gary Grasso for election to the office of Village President/Mayor of the
Village of Burr Ridge are OVERRULED/ , in conformity with the findings
hereinabove described, and therefore, the Nomination Papers are hereby declared
VALID/llMSll!t, in conformity with the findingf above, and the Can_ didate's name
SHALUSiii' J T appear as a candidate for election to the office of Village
President/Mayor of the Village of Burr Ridge on the ballot for the April 6, 2021
Consolidated Election.
Dated: January 12, 2021
~t;;;2
Membe~
Al Paveza,
963471_1
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STEVEN MUELLER, )
)
)
)
GARY GRASSO, )
)
ORDER
On January 7, 2021, the duly constituted Municipal Officers Electoral Board for
the Village of Burr Ridge ("Electoral Board"), comprised of Guy Franzese,
Trustee/Chairman; Susan Schaus, Clerk/Member; and Al Paveza, Trustee/Member,
convened to hear and pass upon the objections to nomination papers filed in this
matter. Also appearing was the Objector, through counsel, and the Candidate, in
person and through counsel. At said hearing, the Electoral Board adopted the Rules of ·
Procedure. This matter was recessed and continued to January 12, 2021 at 3:30 p.m.
On January 12, 2021, the Electoral Board entered into the record the following
Electoral Board exhibits, numbered 1 through 5, to wit:
Exhibit 1 Call, Notice and Agenda

Exhibit 2 Rules of Procedure
Exhibit 3 Proofs of Service and Appearances filed by, or on behalf of, the
Parties (Group Exhibit)
Exhibit 4 Objector's Petition
Exhibit 5 Candidate's Nomination Papers
NOW, THEREFORE, the Electoral Board hereby issues this Order, entering into
the record the Electoral Board exhibits, numbered 1 through 5, as described above.
Entered: January 12, 2021

(/))___
Micha . Durkin, Attorney for the
Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the
Village of Burr Ridge
963215_1
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STEVEN MUELLER, )
)
)
)
GARY GRASSO, )
)
ORDER
On January 12, 2021 , the duly constituted Municipal Officers Electoral Board for
the Village of Burr Ridge ("Electoral Board"), comprised of Guy Franzese,
Trustee/Chairman; Susan Schaus, Clerk/Member; and Al Paveza, Trustee/Member,
reconvened to hear and pass upon the objections to nomination papers filed in this
matter.
The Electoral Board finds that on January 11 , 2021 , Petitioner-Objector Steven

Mueller ("Objector") and his attorney, Robert L. Windon, filed his Petitioner/Objector's
Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss ("Response"). As part of his response,
Objector withdrew the "objections related to the Candidate's use of multiple office
names in the petitions."
NOW, THEREFORE, the Electoral Board hereby orders that paragraphs 10

through 13, inclusive, appearing under the heading "Signature Sheet Deficiencies" of
the Verified Objector's Petition (Electoral Board Exhibit No. 4) are withdrawn and
stricken.
Entered: January 12, 2021
Michael K. Durkin , Attorney for the

Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the
Village of Burr Ridge
963479_ 1
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2021MR000158 Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 14007005
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 7/12/2021 4:45 PM
AP
EXHIBIT B
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NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2021 IL App (3d) 180389-U
Order filed March 4, 2021

____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2021
FRANK AVILA and ANDREW FINKO ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) Will County, Illinois.
)
v. ) Appeal No. 3-18-0389
) Circuit No. 17-MR-049
THE VILLAGE OF LISLE, )
) The Honorable
Defendant-Appellant. ) John C. Anderson,
) Judge, presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices DAUGHERITY and SCHMIDT concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
Held: Plaintiffs are not immune from Rule 137 liability under section 15 of the Citizen
Participation Act because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Lisle’s petition for
attorney fees “is based on, relates to, or is in response to any act or acts of the
moving party in furtherance of the moving party’s rights of petition, speech,
association, or to otherwise participate in government” in accordance with 735
ILCS 110/15. The circuit court’s ruling is affirmed.
The circuit court entered an order holding the plaintiffs—attorneys Avila and Finko—
responsible for Rule 137 sanctions totaling $6,765 in attorney fees because, inter alia, plaintiffs’
petition to place a question regarding annexation of the Village of Woodridge, the city of
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Warrenville, and Village of Lisle “had no reasonable basis in fact or law.” On appeal, the
appellants argue that they are immune from liability under section 15 of the Citizen Participation
Act (735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2016)) because (1) plaintiffs’ activities were in furtherance of their
clients’ first amendment right of ballot access and (2) Lisle’s petition for attorney fees was solely
based on plaintiffs’ acts in furtherance of their first amendment rights.
We affirm.
FACTS
On January 3, 2017, plaintiffs Frank Avila and Andrew Finko, on behalf of the electors of
the Village of Woodridge, the City of Warrenville, and Village of Lisle, filed a “Petition to Place
a Question of Annexation of Lisle, Warrenville, and Woodridge into the City of Naperville upon
the Consolidated Election Ballots.” The petition requested that a question of whether the
municipalities of Woodridge, Warrenville, and Lisle should be annexed into Naperville be placed
on the April 4, 2017, election ballot and submitted to electors of Naperville located within Will
County, Illinois, pursuant to section 7-1-16 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-1-16
(West 2016)). Plaintiffs stated that they had submitted an identical petition to the Eighteenth
Judicial Circuit in DuPage County. On April 20, 2017, Keri-Lyn Krafthefer, attorney for the
Village of Lisle, e-mailed Avila to inquire about the status of the case and Avila responded, “We
are dismissing it.”
An initial case management conference was held, at which Krafthefer, on behalf of Lisle,
was the only party present. Krafthefer informed the court that plaintiffs intended to dismiss the
petition and that the DuPage County Circuit Court had dismissed a similar petition finding it was
filed in bad faith. Krafthefer orally moved the court to dismiss the petition because (1) plaintiffs
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submitted a smaller number of signatures than required to bring the petition; (2) the petition was
moot as the April 4 election date had passed; and (3) plaintiffs had failed to prosecute the claim.
The court stated that it considered whether sanctions were appropriate and whether the
case should be forwarded to the ARDC because the plaintiffs seemed to have filed a
“breathtakingly meritless complaint.” Krafthefer informed the court that the DuPage County
court was also considering “that action” based on the court’s determination that the petition was
filed in bad faith. In its written order, the court set the case for status on May 22, ordered Lisle to
file a motion to dismiss, and required plaintiffs to appear at the scheduled status hearing to
explain why the court should not order sanctions under Rule 137 and should not forward a copy
of the complaint to the ARDC.
,r 8 On May 3, in advance of the status hearing, plaintiffs filed a motion to voluntarily
dismiss their petition with prejudice. In the motion, plaintiffs explained that citizens of Lisle,
Warrenville, Woodridge, and Naperville had sought to use their first amendment ballot access
rights to place the question of annexation on the April 4 election ballot to “eliminat[e]
duplicative branches of government, provid[e] efficiency in municipal services, and yield[]
considerable financial savings to taxpayers.” Avila and Finko also stated that they had been
unavailable in February and March 2017 because Avila suffered from severe health issues and
Finko had sustained a head injury and that the unexpected occurrences delayed the filing of the
motion to voluntarily dismiss. Lisle and Woodridge filed a joint motion to dismiss the petition.
On May 17, 2017, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary dismissal, allowed
defendants to file a petition for attorney fees, and reserved the issue of Rule 137 sanctions.
,r 9 On June 6, 2017, Lisle filed a petition for attorney fees, requesting fees in the amount of
$14,868.75 for legal services rendered during the pendency of this case. Plaintiffs filed a
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response to the petition, arguing that Lisle’s petition for fees should be denied because counsel
did not act on behalf of Lisle in this case, but on behalf of then-Lisle mayor, Joseph Broda. The
petition shows Lisle only incurred $6,765 in attorney fees. On July 26, 2017, a hearing was held
on the court’s motion for sanctions and petition for attorney fees. The court clarified its order
allowing Lisle to file a petition for attorney’s fees:
“THE COURT: Again, the question of sanctions is on the Court’s motion, it’s
not on Lisle’s motion. And to the extent I wanted Lisle to do anything, it was
to provide me some indication as to what their fees were so that if sanctions
were indeed appropriate, then I might have some good signposts as to what
sanctions might be appropriate.”
,r1o Lisle acknowledged that the $14,868.75 in attorney fees was a mathematical error and
clarified that the village was seeking $6,765 in attorney fees. Lisle also argued that plaintiffs
acted in bad faith and, thus, sanctions against plaintiffs were proper because (1) plaintiffs
provided an insufficient number of signatures in violation of the Municipal Code; (2) plaintiffs
failed to cause notice of a hearing on the petition to be published under the Election Code; (3)
plaintiffs improperly filed their petition in Will County; and (4) plaintiffs failed to exercise
professional courtesy.
Plaintiffs asserted that (1) during the winter months, the petition circulators rushed to
obtain signatures for the petition and that plaintiffs did not receive the list of signatures until the
day before they filed the petition, leaving them no time to review the petitions and authenticate
the signatures; (2) plaintiffs communicated with legal counsel of the Illinois State Board of
Elections who informed them that the Municipal Code, not the Election Act, governed in this
case; (3) although only a small portion of Naperville and Woodridge were in Will County,
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plaintiffs also filed the petition in the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court to ensure that the Will
County Election Authority would have an order from a court within its jurisdiction with which to
comply; and (4) Lisle lacked standing to defend against the petition.
,112 On September 8, 2017, the court found that the petition was not filed in good faith and,
therefore, did not comply with Rule 137 because (1) the petition “had no reasonable basis in fact
or law”; (2) it was unnecessary to file the petition in Will County to acquire jurisdiction over the
Will County Clerk because Illinois circuit courts have jurisdiction over all justiciable matters; (3)
the petition did not have the requisite signatures and “some of the signature pages are presented
as individual pages with unique pagination but they are, in fact, photocopies”; (4) plaintiffs were
not making good-faith attempts to “test the legal and interpretive bounds of the statute” as their
arguments lack[ed] credibility and were “complete nonsense.”
,r13 The court noted that Lisle’s standing was irrelevant to the issue of whether plaintiffs
violated Rule 137 and that plaintiffs’ failure to advance the case supported the court’s conclusion
that plaintiffs were not acting in good faith. The court ordered that plaintiffs “provide letters of
apology to the mayors and trustees/councilmen of Naperville, Lisle, Warrenville, and
Woodridge. Said letters must reflect a conciliatory tone for wasting the time and resources of
those municipalities and the taxpayers that live there.” Plaintiffs were also instructed to file a
copy of the letters with the clerk of the court in this case. The court also ordered that the
plaintiffs “comply with the [letter requirement] with sufficient remorse and zeal, [and if so,]
there exists a real possibility that the court may ultimately decline to award fees as a sanction.”
The court declined to submit the matter to the ARDC.
The case was set for a status hearing on October 9, 2017; however, October 9 was a
designated court holiday, and the status hearing occurred the next day. The court noted plaintiffs’
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failure to appear but held the absence harmless given the court’s scheduling error. The court
stated, however, that “it goes without saying that the case would be called the next business day.
Any suggestion that they believed otherwise would be absurd. In fact, the Court is in receipt of a
phone message Mr. Avila left with the clerk stating that he would be unable to appear today.”
The court awarded Lisle sanctions in the amount of $6,765 “for the reasons stated in the
September 8 order” and ordered plaintiffs to comply with its September 8 order that they send
apology letters. The court stated that it would reevaluate whether to submit the matter to the
ARDC at the next status hearing.
On November 21, 2017, plaintiffs moved to vacate the court’s October 10 order, asserting
that they had received no notice of the September 8 order. The plaintiffs attached three unsigned
letters from Finko dated October 31, 2017, addressed to the mayors of Warrenville, Woodridge,
and Lisle. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for sanctions against Lisle’s attorneys. In its response to
the motion to vacate order and motion for sanctions, Lisle noted that only the Mayor of Lisle
received an apology letter, the letter was from Finko only, and it was affixed with Wonder
Woman stamps.
,r16 On March 5, 2018, a hearing on the motions was held. Plaintiffs argued against sanctions
as follows:
“MR. FINKO: Thank you, your Honor. Just to summarize, the initial
complaint was filed based on an interpretation of statutes that have never been
interpreted before by the Appellate Court. It was filed in Will County for the
reason that the clerk is here and the [sic] for the Court to have jurisdiction over
the clerk. Filing in the wrong venue under 2 – Section 2-104 of the Code of
Civil Procedure –
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THE COURT: The clerk is not even a party in the case.
MR FINKO: No, I understand that. But your Honor’s order –
THE COURT: How do you get jurisdiction over someone who is not a party?
MR FINKO: The statute doesn’t require the – that person to be named. That’s
the way that – this was a statute that had never been applied and never been
interpreted, so we were doing the best we could on interpreting it at the point.
We just thought that the order would be able – would be directed because the
clerk is a government official, so if it was in error, obviously then maybe in the
future we would do things obviously very differently. But we did not – we did
our best good faith effort to interpret the statute under a very short time frame.
I think we had less than a week, perhaps days, to prepare and file this
complaint. And to the extent that it was filed in the wrong venue, the venue
statute says that no action will be dismissed – or that it can be just transferred.
So to the extent that it was filed here erroneously, I apologize to the Court, to
the taxpayers of Will County. The procedure would have been – and we could
have simply transferred it. However, we did voluntarily dismiss the complaint,
agreed with [sic] that with Counsel before anything really got going or under
way here.
To the extent that there was a – an issue, I thought – the Court had mentioned
about the number of signatures that were attached. We did the best we could.
We thought we could supplement. But the other option we thought always was
we could challenge this through the Appellate Court to say well, this statute is
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not appropriate because it imposes a higher burden during winter months to
collect signatures than perhaps a different statute or different sections of the
election or different sections of the municipal code. So, you know, filing a
complaint with some signatures that aren’t perhaps in the Court’s
determination were not sufficient.”
On April 5, 2018, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the October 10 order
imposing fees and reinstated the September 8 order requiring letters of apology. The court
reconsidered its motion for sanctions and again awarded Lisle sanctions in the amount of $6,765
because plaintiffs failed to comply with the apology letter sanctions in the September 8 order.
The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions against Lisle. Plaintiffs filed a motion to
reconsider and vacate the court’s April 5 and September 8 orders, which the court denied.
Plaintiffs appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. Immunity
Plaintiffs argue that they are immune from liability under section 15 of the Citizen
Participation Act (735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2016)) because (1) plaintiffs’ activities were in
furtherance of their clients’ first amendment right of ballot access and (2) Lisle’s petition for
attorney fees was solely based on plaintiffs’ acts in furtherance of their first amendment rights as
(a) Lisle intentionally requested unrelated fees for services rendered after plaintiffs filed their
motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice, (b) Lisle admitted that it sought disclosure of the
plaintiffs’ clients to hold the “citizens responsible for this attempt to use the court system to
advance an unclear political agenda at significant expense to taxpayers,” and (c) the village filed
the petition on behalf of the Mayor of Lisle, not the Village of Lisle.
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• 21 Lisle claims that plaintiffs have forfeited this issue because they had failed to bring it
before the trial court in violation of sections 15 and 20 of the Citizen Participation Act (735
ILCS 110/15 (West 2016)). Moreover, Lisle asserts that a petition for attorney fees does not
constitute a “motion” under the Citizen Participation Act and, thus, the Act is not applicable to
this case. Lisle also alleges that the petition for attorney fees was not based solely on plaintiffs’
first amendment activity because the trial court’s sanctions ruling was “independent of and had
no relation to” plaintiffs’ acts in furtherance of their rights.
~ 22 The parties’ dispute—whether or not Lisle’s petition for attorney fees constitutes a
Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”) under the Citizen Participation Act
and, therefore, should be dismissed—presents a question of statutory interpretation. “The
fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
legislature.” Benzakry v. Patel, 2017 IL App (3d) 160162, ¶ 74 (citing Ryan v. Board of Trustees
of the General Assembly Retirement System, 236 Ill. 2d 315, 319 (2010). “The most reliable
indicator of that intent is the language of the statute itself.” Id. “In determining the plain meaning
of statutory language, a court will consider the statute in its entirety, the subject the statute
addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.” Id. (citing Blum v.
Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 29 (2009)). “If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be
applied as written, without resorting to further aids of statutory interpretation.” Id. (citing
Hendricks v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 2015 IL App (3d) 140858, ¶ 14).
The issue of statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. Id. ¶ 73.
23 In August 2007, Illinois enacted anti-SLAPP legislation under the Citizen Participation
Act (735 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2008)). Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 33.
“SLAPPs are lawsuits aimed at preventing citizens from exercising their political rights or
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punishing those who have done so.” Id. (citing Wright Development Group, LLC v. Walsh, 238
Ill. 2d 620, 630 (2010)). “SLAPPs use the threat of money damages or the prospect of the cost of
defending against the suits to silence citizen participation.” Id. (citing Walsh, 238 Ill. 2d at 630).
“SLAPPs are, by definition, meritless.” Id. ¶ 34 (citing John C. Barker, Common-Law and
Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 395, 396 (1993). “Because
winning is not a SLAPP plaintiff’s primary motivation, the existing safeguards to prevent
meritless claims from prevailing were seen as inadequate, prompting many states to enact anti-
SLAPP legislation.” Id. ¶ 35 (citing Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A
Summary of and Commentary on Its Operation and Scope, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 801, 804-05
(2000)). “[T]he purpose of the Act is to give relief, including monetary relief, to citizens who
have been victimized by meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits because of their act or acts made
in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in
government.” Id. ¶ 44 (citing Walsh, 238 Ill. 2d at 633) (internal quotation marks omitted).
~ 24 Section 15 requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that Lisle’s petition for attorney fees “is
based on, relates to, or is in response to any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the
moving party’s rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government.”
Id. ¶ 56 (citing 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008)). If plaintiffs have met their burden of proof, the
burden shifts to the responding party to prove by “clear and convincing evidence that the acts of
the moving party are not immunized from, or are not in furtherance of acts immunized from,
liability [under the] Act.” Id. (citing 735 ILCS 110/20(c) (West 2008)).
25 Here, plaintiffs failed to prove that the petition for attorney fees was “based on, relates to,
or is in response to” any acts by plaintiffs in furtherance of their petition to place the question of
annexation on the April 4 ballot. Prior to the trial court’s injection of the issue of sanctions, the
10
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only relief sought by Lisle was dismissal of a complaint based on (1) real and significant
departures from fundamental statutory requirements and (2) mootness due to the election date
having passed. The evidence shows that the fee petition was filed in direct response to the trial
court’s order instructing the village to file the petition. The court later clarified that the intent of
the petition it had sought was “to provide [the court] some indication as to what their fees were
so that if sanctions are indeed appropriate, then [the court] might have some good signposts as to
what sanctions might be appropriate.”
126 The evidence also shows that the fee petition ordered by the court addressed plaintiffs’
failure to sufficiently bring a petition that was based in law and fact. Throughout this case, Lisle
asserted that plaintiffs’ petition failed to comply with various statutory provisions and that
plaintiffs caused a substantial delay in proceedings by continuing a moot case for two months
before they ultimately filed a motion to dismiss. Because plaintiffs have failed to meet their
burden, it is irrelevant whether plaintiffs’ actions were genuinely aimed at procuring favorable
government action, result, or outcome and, thus, are immune from liability under section 15. See
Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 53. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling and
find that plaintiffs are not immune from liability under section 15 of the Citizen Participation
Act.
II. Sanctions
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it ordered sanctions on April 24, 2017, and
again on May 17, 2017, without conducting a court hearing on the matter. Plaintiffs also claim
that the trial court’s factual findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence because (1)
the petition they had filed was not seeking forcible annexation but was merely seeking to submit
a question on the April 4, 2017, ballot pursuant to the Municipal Code; (2) the Will County Clerk
11
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does not have to be a named party to the suit; (3) because there is no established precedent
interpreting the Municipal Code, plaintiffs did not assert arguments contrary to authority and
made reasonable inquiry concerning the code’s interpretation; and (4) plaintiffs took reasonable
steps to dismiss the case when they informed Lisle’s attorney that they intended to dismiss the
case and subsequently filed a motion for voluntary dismissal.
129 Lisle alleges that plaintiffs had multiple opportunities, and used those opportunities, to
defend themselves against sanctions. Furthermore, Lisle claims that an evidentiary hearing was
unnecessary because the petition’s deficiency made it clear on its face that plaintiffs filed a
frivolous pleading. Thus, Lisle argues that the trial court’s findings support an award of
monetary sanctions under Rule 137.
~J30 Rule 137 “authorizes a court to impose sanctions on lawyers and parties who violate its
terms.” Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 486 (1998). “[U]nder Rule 137,
sanctions may be granted under two different circumstances: (1) when a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not ‘well-grounded in fact’ or is not ‘warranted by existing law or a good-faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,’ or (2) when it is interposed
for purposes such as to ‘harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.’” People v. Stefanski, 337 Ill. App. 3d 548, 551 (2007) (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 137 (eff.
Aug. 1, 1989)). “The purpose of Rule 137 is to ‘prevent abuse of the judicial process by
penalizing claimants who bring vexatious and harassing actions based upon unsupported
allegations of fact and law.’” Burrows v. Pick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1050 (1999) (citing Senese
v. Climatemp, Inc., 289 Ill. App.3d 570, 581 (1997)). “The purpose is not to punish litigants and
their attorneys simply because they have been unsuccessful in the litigation.” Id. (citing Espevik
12
C 74
v. Kaye, 277 Ill. App.3d 689, 697 (1996)). Rule 137 is penal in nature and must be strictly
construed. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d at 487.
“[A]n objective determination of reasonableness under the circumstances applies when
determining whether a filed paper is grounded in fact and warranted by existing law; it is not
sufficient that the party honestly believed that the allegations raised were grounded in fact and
law.” Stefanski, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted). A trial court’s order
granting or denying a petition for sanctions is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Munizzo, 2013 IL App (3d) 120153, ¶ 33. “A trial court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Id. (citing Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 36
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). When addressing sanctions, the reviewing court’s
“primary consideration is whether the trial court’s decision was informed, based on valid
reasoning, and follows logically from the facts.” Id.
As to whether plaintiffs are entitled to an evidentiary hearing, “parties faced with Rule
137 sanctions should be granted a hearing to determine if sanctions are warranted.” Koch v.
Carmona, 268 Ill. App. 3d 48, 54 (1994). In this case, the record shows that plaintiffs were given
opportunities to be heard at hearings on July 26, 2017, and March 5, 2018.
,r33 As to the trial court’s award of sanctions, the evidence shows that plaintiffs’ actions were
not objectively reasonable. Plaintiffs stated that they relied on citizens of Lisle, Warrenville, and
Woodridge to obtain signatures for the petition. The signatures were submitted to plaintiffs the
day before they planned to file the petition. In order to meet the January 3 deadline, plaintiffs
hastily submitted the petition without the requisite number of signatures in accordance with the
13
C 75
plain language of section 7-1-16. Plaintiffs admitted that they did not verify the authenticity of
the signatures before they filed the petition.
,r34 Notwithstanding their failure to obtain the appropriate number of signatures, Plaintiffs
argued that they intended to challenge the constitutionality of section 7-1-16’s signature
requirement; however, they failed to do so before the April 4 election. In fact, had plaintiffs
conducted even a rudimentary inspection of their petition, they would have found that some of
the pages were merely photo-copied duplicates. Plaintiffs became aware that their petition was
not meritorious on February 28 when the DuPage County circuit court dismissed the petition.
However, plaintiffs waited until four days before the conference, and 16 days after the election,
to inform Lisle’s attorney that they were dismissing the claim. Eventually, plaintiffs filed a
motion to dismiss a month after the conference. Furthermore, there are concerns as to whether
plaintiffs chose the proper venue to file the petition, especially when Lisle and Warrenville are
not located in Will County. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
14
C 76
GARY GRASSO )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No.: 2021 MR 158
)
STEVEN MUELLER, ) Candice Adams
) DuPage County
Defendant. ) ENVELOPE: 14176474
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 7/26/2021 8:58 AM
NOTICE OF FILING Date Accepted: 7/26/2021 10:34 AM
AP
TO: Adam Bowers
Gary Grasso
Grasso Law, PC
38 Blaine Street
Hinsdale, IL 60521
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 26, 2021, the undersigned caused to be filed via
electronic filing with the Clerk of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, Illinois, Defendant
Steven Mueller’s REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 735 ILCS
5/2-301 AND 735 ILCS 5/2-615, a copy of which is served upon you herewith.
By:__/s/ M. Neal Smith_________ _______

M. NEAL SMITH
Firm No. 71875

M. Neal Smith
Lisle, IL 6532
630.929.3639
630.783.3231 - FAX
4839-7676-8243 v.1
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the referenced REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 735 ILCS
5/2-301 AND 735 ILCS 5/2-615 to be served by electronic mail to the email address listed above.
/s/ M. Neal Smith _
4839-7676-8243 v.1
C 78
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 14176474
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 7/26/2021 8:58 AM
AP
C 79
and the complaint. Grasso attempts to be clever and call his complaint a "petition ," as if it was
something other than the initial pleading that initiated this case. Grasso can call it a "petition," but
ultimately it is still a complaint for purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure, and complaints must
be served for the court to have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
II. This matter should be dismissed pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-615 because a
"Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions" cannot be filed as a stand-alone cause
of action.
Supreme Court Rule 137 concerns the signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers in
the circuit courts . Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 486 (1998). The purpose of
the rule is to prevent abuse of the judicial process. Senese v. Climatemp, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d
570, 581 (1st Dist. 1997). The rule provides, in part, as follows :
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has

read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension,
modification , or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
If a pleading, motion, or other document is signed in violation of this Rule 137 requirement,
the court may impose a sanction upon the attorney or the attorney's client. S. Ct. Rule 137. But
Rule 137 does not allow a stand-alone complaint to be filed for violation of the Rule . Grasso fails
to specifically address the clear language of Rule 137(b ), though the language has been pointed
out to him on multiple occasions, including in the motion to dismiss. Rule 137(b) provides in
pertinent part as follows :
pleading, motion or other document referred to has been filed, and no violation or
considered a claim within the same civil action.
Instead of reading this language to say that violations of Rule 137 cannot give rise to a
separate civil suit, somehow Grasso reads the rule to provide that violations can give rise to a
separate civil suit. But as this plain language of Rule 137 indicates, the predicate acts for
C 80
sanctions to be imposed must happen in the context of already existing litigation in the circuit
court. That is not the case here. The actions that Grasso claims are sanctionable (which lack
substantive merit but are not relevant for purposes of this motion) happened before the Municipal
Officers Electoral Board of the Village of Burr Ridge, and the January 12, 2021 final decision of
the Electoral Board was not appealed to the circuit court. To the extent Grasso is claiming that
the proceedings before this court are an appeal of the Electoral Board 's decision or otherwise an
extension of the Electoral Board's proceedings, his attempt is untimely many times over. The
deadline to appeal the decision of the Electoral Board was five days following its entry. 1O ILCS
5/10-10.1 . Grasso waited 36 days-from January 12 to February 17-to file this case.
Because Grasso did what subsection (b) explicitly says he cannot do, and because he
has no good faith response to the plain language of subsection (b ), Grasso simply makes the
conclusory assertion that his complaint in this matter "comports" with subsection (b). (Response,
p. 5). Grasso even misleads the Court when he states that "Mueller used the civil process of
DuPage County to pursue his baseless challenge," which is a statement presumably in reference
to the fact that an objector in an electoral board proceeding is required to serve notice using the
DuPage County Sheriff. 1O ILCS 5/10-10. But in Grasso's response brief (footnote 1 and p.5), the
impression is that Mueller used litigation in the circuit court to pursue his objection challenge,
which is of course not true .
The drafters of Rule 137 were also mindful that some actions in circuit court do involve
review of administrative decisions, and that in some instances it may be appropriate to award
sanctions for costs incurred by a party at the administrative level. Rule 137(c) provides:
where the litigation involves review of a determination of an administrative agency,

the court may include in its award for expenses an amount to compensate a party
for costs actually incurred by that party in contesting on the administrative level an
allegation or denial made by the State without reasonable cause and found to be
untrue.
Rule 137( c) is not applicable here because this case is not a review of an administrative agency
determination, and it does not involve the State.
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Grasso cites Avila v. Village of Lisle, 2021 IL App (3d) 180389-U, claiming that the case
is similar to the current matter. It is not similar. Avitia involved sanctions against a party that filed
a petition in circuit court pursuant to section 7-1-16 of the Illinois Municipal Code asking for an
order to place a referendum question on the ballot. Id. at~ 5. In other words , in Avitia there was
an underlying case in existence in circuit court and the sanctioned party was the plaintiff who had
brought about that underlying litigation by filing the initial pleading. In contrast, there was no
underlying cause of action here, as Mueller never filed or initiated any complaint in circuit court.
All that exists is Grasso as plaintifffiling a stand-alone complaint for Rule 137 sanctions in violation
of the plain language of the Rule itself. Perhaps the take away from Avitia is that Grasso as the
petitioner should be sanctioned .
CONCLUSION
Before filing the motion to dismiss, the undersigned attorney asked Grasso to provide his
reasoning if Grasso believes that that there was a good faith basis in law for the filing of the "Rule
137 Petition for Sanctions" as a separate civil suit. Grasso did not do so. Grasso has now filed
a response brief that is a violation of Rule 137 and Grasso shows no indication that he intends to
stop his Rule 137 violation spree. Id. Grasso continues to cause Mueller to incur court costs and
attorney fees to defend an action that has no good faith basis in law. Grasso is violating the very
same rule that he claims Mueller violated. But unlike Mueller, Grasso initiated a complaint in
circuit court and is doggedly insisting that he has the procedural right to continue to use the courts
of this State to bludgeon his opponents by fil ing stand-alone Rule 137 petitions. The obstinate
maneuvering of Grasso has no basis in law and the "Rule 137 Petition fo r Sanctions" should be
dismissed .
WHEREFORE , Defendant Mueller requests that this Court dismiss this matter for lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-301 , and for failure to state a claim , order Grasso
C 82
to pay the court costs and attorney fees of Mueller following motion and prove up of same, and
for such further relief as appropriate.
STEVEN MUELLER
By:_ _/_ (/ _ ~~
--_-:___ __
M. Neal Smith, one of his attorneys
Firm No. 71875

M. Neal Smith
Lisle, Illinois 60532
630.929.3639 (ph)
630-783-3231 (fax)
nsmith@robbins-schwartz. com
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ORDER 2021MR000158-110
GARY GRASSO
Plaintiff
2021MR000158
FILED
-VS-
CASE NUMBER 21 Aug 10 AM 08: 50
STEVEN N MUELLER
Defendant
CLERK OF THE
ORDER
This matter coming on to be heard for hearing on the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-301 and 735 ILCS 5/2-615 filed by
Defendant Mueller, the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The Motion to Dismiss the Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-301 is denied for the reasons stated on the
record.
2. The Motion to Dismiss the Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-615 is granted for the reasons stated on the
record.
Submitted by: MARSHALL NEAL SMITH, JR.

Entered:
Attorney for: STEVEN N MUELLER
Address: 550 WARRENVILLE RD, SUITE 460 Validation ID : DP-08102021-0850-59873
Email : nsmith@robbins-schwartz.com

Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 14700553
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 9/3/2021 12:51 PM
LG
C 85
I, M. NEAL SMITH, an attorney, certify that I caused a copy of this Notice and the
document referenced above to be served upon the above-named individuals via e-mail
this 3rd day of September, 2021.
Isl M. Neal Smith

M. NEAL SMITH
4847-0450-636lv.l
C 86
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 14700553
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 9/3/2021 12:51 PM
KB
C 87
See Exhibit 1, attached hereto. His vexatious and harassing action against Mueller is intolerable.
This motion seeks to hold Grasso accountable.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 13 7 concerns the signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers in the circuit courts.
Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 486 (1998). As noted above, the purpose of the
rule is to prevent abuse of the judicial process by penalizing those who bring vexatious and
harassing actions. See Sundance Homes, 195 Ill. 2d at 285-86; and Senese v. Climatemp, Inc., 289
Ill. App. 3d 570, 581 (1st Dist. 1997). The rule provides, in pari, as follows:
The signature of an attorney or pariy constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief fanned after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warrnnted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
In determining whether to impose sanctions for filing an improper or frivolous pleading,
courts are instructed to use an objective standard in evaluating what was reasonable under the
circumstances as they existed at the time. Whitmer v. Munson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 501, 514 (1st Dist.
2002). It is not a sufficient defense that the signing party had an honest belief that his or her case
was well grounded in fact or law. Id.
If a pleading, motion, or other document is signed in violation of Rule 137, the court should
impose an appropriate sanction that both deters violative behavior and compensates a party for
having to defend against the frivolous action. Law Office of Brendan R. Appel, LLC v. Georgia's
Restaurant and Pancake House, Inc., 2021 IL App (1st) 192523 at iii! 54, 57 ("[ w ]e have
consistently rejected the denial of attorney fees when it is incompatible with the purpose of the
statute").
C 88
ARGUMENT
I. Grasso's stand-alone civil suit entitled "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions"
was not warranted by law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.
Grasso's "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions" was frivolous and baseless because Rule 137(b)
provides in part as follows:
pleading, motion or other document refen-ed to has been filed, and no violation or
considered a claim within the same civil action.
Instead of reading this language to say that violations of Rule 137 cannot give rise to a
separate civil suit, Grasso inexplicably reads the rule to provide that violations can give rise to a
separate civil suit. But as the plain language of Rule 13 7 indicates, the predicate acts for sanctions
to be imposed must happen in the context of already existing litigation in the circuit court. The
actions of Mueller that Grasso claimed are sanctionable (they are not) happened before the
Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the Village of BulT Ridge (the "Electoral Board"), and the
January 12, 2021 final decision of the Electoral Board was not appealed to the circuit court.
Thus, Grasso did precisely what subsection (b) of Rule 137 explicitly says he cannot do,
and on August 9, 2021, this court agreed stating that "[Rule] 137(b) cannot be more clear as far as
the language that [Rule 137] does not create or rise to a separate cause of action ." See August 9,
2021 transcript, p. 10, lines 20-22. A copy of the transc1ipt is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
Even if the comt assumes, arguendo, that the filing of the "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions"
was some honest oversight by Grasso or confusion on the meaning of Rule 137(b)-as if Grasso
was a new and overzealous attorney just out of law school instead of a 43 year veteran attorney
and fonner Attorney General candidate-there is still no excuse for Grasso ' s pursuit ofthis case
after he was firmly disabused by the undersigned of any en-oneous beliefs Grasso may have had
C 89
about Rule 137. A copy of the email exchange between Grasso and Neal Smith on June 10, 2021
is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 3. The undersigned requested Grasso to
dismiss the case by June 14, 2021 and to provide the basis for any argument that a Rule 13 7 petition
can be filed as a stand-alone civil suit. Grasso did neither.
On June 11 , 2021 , the undersigned filed his appearance for Mueller and again emailed
Grasso to tell him that filing the "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions" as a stand-alone cause of action
is not allowed by the plain language of Rule 137(b). Grasso was again urged to dismiss the matter,
which he did not do . A copy of the June 11 , 2021 correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
Given Grasso's refusal to voluntaiily dismiss the matter, Mueller filed a motion to dismiss
on June 14, 2021 formally asking the court to dismiss Grasso ' s "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions"
because Rule 13 7 does not allow for stand-alone causes of action. Mueller also moved to dismiss
pursuant to 735 ILCS ILCS 5/2-301 because Grasso never even served Mueller. Grasso's response
brief to the motion to dismiss was another doubling down on the baseless assertion that Rule 13 7
can be a stand-alone cause of action. Bizanely, Grasso also seems to blame the DuPage County
Circuit Court Clerk for not allowing him to devise his own case number docketing system in the
DuPage County courts and initiate a new case with a caption that makes it look like be is the
defendant and Mueller is the plaintiff. See Grasso's Motion for Leave to Amend Caption filed
June 11, 2021. Stated Grasso: "[t]he petition should continue to be styled Mueller v. Grasso as
was attempted initially .. " See Motion for Leave to Amend Caption, p. 2 at if 13.
At the August 9, 2021 hearing on Mueller's motion to dismiss, Grasso doubled down to
the very end on his baseless position stating that he continues to disagree that his "Rule 13 7 Petition
for Sanctions" is a separate civil action. See Exhibit 2, p. 6, lines 2-4 and p . 14, lines 5-8 . On
C 90
August 9 this court put an end to Grasso's frivolous maneuve1ing by dismissing the "Rule 137
Petition for Sanctions."
Rule 137(b) is clear. Looking at this matter objectively, there was no reasonable basis for
Grasso to think that his "Rule 13 7 Petition for Sanctions" was watTanted by existing law or a good-
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. But Grasso's
underlying motive was not to win a legal argument. Rather, he was using the court system to
leverage infonnation out of Mueller thinking that Mueller was "frngal" and would fold when faced
with the cost of defending a court case. More on this topic in the next section.
II. Grasso should be sanctioned because his "Rule 137 Petition for
Sanctions" was filed for the improper purpose of wringing information
out of Mueller.
Its bad enough the Grasso ignored the clear language of Rule l 37(b) in filing his "Rule 137
Petition for Sanctions" and then doubled down on his frivolous legal arguments until the very end
when his action was dismissed by the court. But this situation involves a heightened need for
sanctions to punish Grasso and deter Grasso (and others) from using the legal system as leverage
to obtain political infonnation that he is not entitled to receive.
Sho1tly after he filed the instant case, Grasso explained to the news media that: "I can only
assume someone asked Mueller to be a front and paid Mueller's fees .. .I've asked Mueller through
his attorney to confinn that fact, so the real culprit can be pursued .. .I'm seeking sanctions (the
fees) under a rnle that allows recoupment of fees for meritless pleadings." See Burr Ridge Mayor
Sues Petition Objector, Seeks 'Real Culprit', Patch, March 26, 2021, a copy of which is attached
as Exhibit 5.
On June 14, 2021, and after the undersigned had appeared for Mueller and filed the motion
to dismiss, Grasso sent an email to the undersigned. In that email, Grasso again brazenly admitted
C 91
that his purpose in filing the "Rule 13 7 Petition for Sanctions" against Mueller in DuPage County
Circuit Court was not actually to pursue Mueller, but, rather, to pursue "the person or
persons . . .who put Mueller up to this metitless challenge." 1 A copy of the email ofJune 14, 2021
is attached hereto as Exhibit 6. In other words, Grasso freely admitted that he had filed the action
for the purpose of accomplishing an outcome that Grasso had no legal recourse to accomplish
directly. Before he sent the June 14 email to the undersigned, Grasso apparently also made the
same extortionate demand to attorney Robert Windon who was Mueller's attorney in the
proceedings before the Electoral Board. Id; see also Exhibit 5.
In the June 14 email, Grasso went on to explain that he has concluded Mueller was
essentially a straw man challenger in the Electoral Board matter because Grasso believes Mueller's
"acquaintances include the person or person[s] who convinced Mr. Mueller to file the challenge."
Id. Also, according to the thinking of Grasso, Mueller would not spend the money to pay an
attorney to challenge Grasso's nominating papers, or to defend the instant action, as Grasso
understands Mueller to be "quite frugal." Id. This insolent "frugal" comment aside, there is
nothing wrong with a third-party footing the costs and attorney fees of another litigant, a point
Grasso even acknowledges before going in for his attempted power play on Mueller, stating: "All
I asked Mr. Windon-and now you-is to obtain pe1mission from Mueller to tell me who asked
him to do this ... " See Exhibit 5. 2 If Mueller divulges the information sought, says Grasso "I will
not pursue the matter fmiher with him or Mr. Windon." Id. In other words, by his June 14 email,
1
The "meritless challenge" description is in reference to Mueller's challenge to Grasso's nominating papers, which
challenge was heard by the Burr Ridge Municipal Officers Electoral Board and is the same challenge that is the subject
ofGrasso 's "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions.
2In the subject line of his June 14, 2021 email, Grasso writes, in all caps, "FOR RESOLUTION PURPOSES ONLY."
Grasso may assert that the email cannot be used for evidentiary purposes under Rule 408 of the Illinois Rules of
Evidence. Such assertion, if made, will be incorrect. Settlement communications are permitted to be used in evidence
for certain purposes, including establishing bad faith. See Ill. R. Evid. 408(b).
C 92
Grasso was trying to strike the following bargain: tell me who paid Mueller's fees and put Mueller
up to challenging my nominating papers and I will dismiss my legally unsound case and thereby
obviate the need for Mueller, a frugal person, to have to spend money to defend against the case.
One June 18, 2021, the undersigned attorney again urged Grasso to dismiss the "Rule 13 7
Petition for Sanctions" so that further costs and attorney fees could be avoided. See email
correspondence of June 18, 2021, attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 7. Instead of
reconsidering his harassing tactics, Grasso responded that "my position is that it is a proper Rule
137'' and that "the offer to resolve the matter as outlined in my [June 14] email to you remains."
Id. The undersigned then told Grasso that his "offer" was not really an offer at all, but, rather, an
expression of bad faith and a use of the court system for an improper purpose. Id. Grasso responded
that "your characterization is neither the issue not needed" and then, under threat of futther
litigation, demanded Mueller spill the beans on who was behind the challenge to Grasso's
nominating papers: "[t]ell me who asked him to file the challenge-that's it-Mueller's done after
that." Id.
At every key interval where Grasso could have dismissed the "Rule 13 7 Petition for
Sanctions" and let Mueller walk away without having to incur more costs, attorney fees and
harassment, Grasso chose to press on in order to find out who supposedly put Mueller up to
challenging Grasso's nominating papers. Grasso's purposes were demonstrably and objectively
improper and he should be sanctioned for it.
Moreover, Grasso has not learned his lesson and continues to threaten frivolous legal action
against Mueller. In case his frivolous "Rule 13 7 Petition for Sanctions" was not enough leverage
to squeeze information out of Mueller, Grasso has from beginning to end of this litigation stated
or implied he could file a lawsuit against Mueller for "Abuse of Process" or "Malicious
C 93
Prosecution." He has not been shy about communicating this threat, stating as much in his
pleadings, in open comi, and in emails among counsel. See "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions," ,-r
15; see also, Exhibit 2, p. 12, lines 16-20; see also Exhibit 6. Actions for malicious prosecution
and abuse of process, if filed, would also be frivolous, not grounded in fact or law, and
sanctionable. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2019 IL 122654 at ,-r 26 (to state a cause of action for
malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove five elements, including the commencement or
continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant); and Kumar v.
Bornstein, 354 Ill. App. 3d 159, 165 (2d Dist. 2004) (element of abuse of process are the existence
of an ulterior purpose or motive and some act in the use of legal process not proper in the regular
prosecution of the proceedings).
III. Appropriate sanctions should be imposed on Grasso for his violations

of Rule 137.
As a result of Grasso bringing this action, Grasso should be ordered to pay the reasonable
costs and attorney fees of Mueller to defend this action and the costs and attorney fees for bringing
this sanctions motion. An affidavit of attorney Neal Smith establishing the costs and attorney fees
incurred and their reasonableness is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 8.
A patiy may recover fees under Rule 13 7 that were incun-ed because of the sanctionable
paper or pleading. S. Ct. Rule 137. Recoverable fees under Rule 137 include those incun-ed in
pursuit of unsuccessful motions. In this case, the entirety of the costs and attorney time should be
charged to Grasso as a sanction because, but for his frivolous "Rule 13 7 Petition for Sanctions,"
there would have been no case in DuPage County Circuit Court and Mueller would not have been
involved in litigation. See Ashley v. Scott, 266 Ill. App. 3d 302, 307 (1st Dist. 1994) (all of the
father's legal expenses were actually incurred as a result of the untrue pleading, because but for
C 94
that pleading, the father would not have been involved in the lawsuit, and although certain motions
did not benefit him, they were filed as a result of the false pleading).
In addition to the costs and attorney fees incurred by Mueller up to and including the
August 9, 2021 hearing where the matter was dismissed, Mueller has also incurred costs and
attorney fees in preparing this motion for sanctions against Grasso, which costs and fees are also
recoverable. See Robertson v. Calcagno, 333 111. App. 3d 1022, 1028 (1st Dist. 2002). The
attached affidavit of Neal Smith establishes the costs and attorney fees of Mueller through
September 2, 2021 , and attaches a description of the attorney time and services through July 31 ,
2021. Mueller also seeks leave to add additional statements of attorney time and services after
July 31 , 2021 and leave to prove-up the additional costs and fees associated with this sanctions
motion, including reviewing and replying to anything Grasso may fi le and costs and attorney fees
for the hearing on the motion. See Law Office of Brendan R. Appel, LLC, 2021 IL App (1st)
192523 at iii! 58-59 (approaching Rule 137 sanctions as a twofold process where the comt first
detennines whether conduct was violative of Rule 137 and then grants leave to file petition for
attorney fees assists the comt in dete1mining reasonableness and gives the attorney an opportunity
to provide itemized billing including actual time spent in connection with the motion for
sanctions).
Beyond the monetary sanctions sought, Mueller also seeks a public apology from Grasso
apologizing for the pejorative "frugal" comments and also apologizing for bringing this action and
for attempting to wring info1mation out of Mueller in the manner described above. Lastly, Mueller
requests that the court consider whether anything shown by the record requires referral to the
Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) for further proceedings.
C 95
CONCLUSION
Rule 13 7 is not intended to penalize litigants merely because they were not successful in
litigation, but Rule 13 7 is a critical tool in preventing abuse of the judicial process and it is a critical
tool to make sure there are no unjust consequences. Here, it would be unjust if Grasso's actions
meant the incun-ence of unrecoverable court costs and attorney fees for Mueller, and it would be
unjust letting Grasso off without sanction, especially since doing so would invite similar conduct
in the future. And Grasso has already told the undersigned attorney and this court that further
frivolous pleadings are in the offing.
WHEREFORE, Steven Mueller seeks an order (i) determining that Grasso's filing of the
"Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions" is violative of Rule 137; (ii) awarding reasonable costs and
attorney fees following prove-up of same, (iii) requiring a public apology from Grasso, and (iv)
for such other and further relief as appropriate.
STEVEN MUELLER
By:_ _1_A, <""a1......--

v _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Finn No. 71875
M. Neal Smith
550 WaJTenville Road, Suite 460
630.929.3639 (ph)
10
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.
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8/31/2021 Gary Grasso
LLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL (GOP)
Gary Grasso
POSTED February 15, 2018 12:07 PM
UPDATED March 19, 2018 11 :28 AM
Gary Grasso
Name: Gary Grasso
Age: 66
Party: Republican
Current residence: Burr Ridge
Current position: Founding partner of Grasso Bass P.C. in Hinsdale
Past legal experience: 39 years as a litigation attorney; partner, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, 10
years ; partner, Cole Grasso , five years; partner, Johnson & Bell Ltd. , three years ; Ungaretti & Harris
LLP, two years; founding partner, Grasso Bass P.C., 14 years
Campaign funds available, July 1 to Dec. 31: $141 ,969.53
Campaign funds spent, July 1 to Dec. 31: $117 ,025
Law school: Fordham University School of Law, New York, 1978
Campaign website: garygrasso.com
https:l/www.chicagolawbulletin .com/archives/2018/02/15/00004-r_ attorney-general_grasso 1/4

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Family: Married to Janet Ryan Grasso, 39 years; six children, three grandchildren
Hobbies/interests: History, public service (former mayor of Burr Ridge 2005-12; chairman,
Emergency Telephone System Board of DuPage, 2014-present; member, DuPage County Board,
2012-present)
What would you consider your greatest career accomplishment?
I'm especially proud of my marriage to Janet and our large family. As a lawyer, I was part of building
the legal-ma lpractice department at Hinshaw & Culbertson under my mentor, and have contributed to
the development of significant legal concepts in that field ever since. I have been recognized as a
"Leading Lawyer" by my peers, a designation of less than 5 percent of Illinois attorneys, and also have
been recognized as a "Preeminent Attorney" with the highest rating in legal ability and ethics. As a
public servant, I am extremely proud of my accomplishments as mayor of Burr Ridge, helping to
create its village center, police center and the approval for the branded bridge over 1-55 - the first in
the IDOT system. As chairman of DuPage's 911 Board , I am proud of the consolidation of the number
of call centers from 22 PSAPs (public-safety answering points) down to three PSAPs and adding more
technology which has increased public safety while annua lly saving taxpayers millions of dollars each
year.
Why should voters support your candidacy?
As a Republican with extensive litigation knowledge and experience and an elected official with an
accomplished track record , I have the right experience at the right time to investigate and take down
the political corruption that has become the status quo in Illinois, but which will not be tolerated when I
am AG. I also will pursue the opioid/heroin crisis in Illinois and make sure that Illinois is part of the
national opioid litigation to win for Illinois the money needed to provide education and treatment
centers to help rebuild the lives and families of so many who have suffered from this scourge. Finally, I
will fight to stabilize the public pension system, reform the public pension system and restore the
credit rating of Illinois so we can make Illinois a better place to do business.
What would be your top priority as attorney general?
Foremost, we must use the power of the attorney general to investigate, pursue and refer for
prosecution the perpetrators of the clout epidemic at the root of Illinois' political corruption -
especially in the property tax assessment system that exists only for the few connected elected
officials and lobbyists. I will follow the clout and the money tentacles to the body of corruption we all
know is far too bold and prevalent. I will use the bully-pulpit of the office, its power of subpoena, the
AG investigators, and lawsuits to bring Illinois' corruption to the forefront to change the culture of
politics in our state - and save Illinois from financial destruction.
Regarding the ongoing consent decree talks with the Chicago Police Department, what
policies or measures do you view as being necessary for the department to adopt?
It starts with policies on accountabi lity and transparency, especially when the use of force is at issue.
The CPD and DOJ have agreed to work together as part of the decree talks. The Illinois attorney
general should offer additional support for this cooperative effort. One of the three tenets of the AG 's
office duties is advocacy. As such, I would push for CPD to promote transparent, and timely
investigations in use of force situations - and prompt disclosure of findings. As attorney general , I
would dedicate the open and honest government division to working with CPD and DOJ to build a
https ://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/arch ives/2018/02/15/00004-r_ attorney-general_grasso 214

C 99
culture of trust. It's important that we support good, sound police work and training for what is often a
stressful and demanding duty.
How do you view the attorney general's role in conjunction with the federal government?
We live in a republic where a state should cooperate with the federal government when it comes to
enforcement of state and federal law. For example, if a person is arrested for committing a crime, all
aspects of that person's residency and citizenship may be reviewed and reported where required by
federal law. That said , profiling and using ordinance and traffic violations as a pretext for wanting to
investigate a person's residency or citizenship should not be tolerated.
Do you believe state employees should be paid absent an appropriation? Under the current
laws of the state, would you go to court to block their pay if they continued receiving checks
absent a budget?
I do not believe it is the job of the AG to litigate to hold hostage the paychecks of state employees
because the legislature cannot pass a balanced budget. It may be the AG 's place to litigate for the
people against those legislators or their leaders who place politics above their duty to pass a balanced
budget.
LAWYER-TO-LAWYER REFERRAL
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1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
. DUPAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS
2
GARY GRASSO, )
3 )
Plaintiff, )
4 )
-vs- ) No. 21 MR 158
5 ) Motion
STEVEN MUELLER, )
6 )
Defendant. )
7
8 REPORT OF VIDEOCONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

9 had at the hearing of the above-entitled cause, before
10 the HONORABLE PAUL M. FULLERTON, judge of said court,
11 DuPage County, Illinois, recorded via Zoom and
12 transcribed by MARCIA MESSINA, Certified Shorthand
13 Official Court Reporter, commencing on the 9th day of
14 August, 2021.
15
16 PRESENT:
17 MR. GARY GRASSO,
appeared pro se;
18
19 ROBBINS SCHWARTZ NICHOLAS LIFTON & TAYLOR, LTD., by
MR. M. NEAL SMITH,
20 appeared on behalf of Steven Mueller,
Defendant;
21
22 THE LAW OFFICE OF HIERA & DENNISON, LLC, by
MR. WILLIAM J. DENNISON, II,
23 appeared on behalf of Robert Windon.
24
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1 THE COURT: The case I have before me is 21 MR 158,

2 Grasso vs. Mueller. If I could have the attorneys state
3 their names for the record.
4 MR. GRASSO: Gary Grasso.
5 MR. SMITH : Good morning , Judge. Neal Smith for
6 Mueller.
7 THE COURT: All right.
8 MR. DENNISON: Good morning, Judge. William
9 Denni son. I'm stepping up for Robert Windon who is not
10 a party to the case but is named in it as an interested
11 party.
12 THE COURT: Say that again. He's named as an
13 interested party?
14 MR. GRASSO: He's in the case, Judge. He's in the
15 case.
16 MR. SMITH: He's not in the case. I think he's
17 just appearing to probably let Mr . Windon know, although
18 I don't want to speak for Mr. Windon.
19 MR. GRASSO: Your Honor, Mr. Windon is part of the
20 case. 137 includes attorneys
21 THE COURT: Okay.
22 MR. GRASSO: - - and the client.
23 THE COURT : I guess I ' ll deal with that because
24 what I have up today is the Mueller Section 2 - 301 and
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1 2-615 combined motion to dismiss, and the document that

2 is the operative document is titled Rule 137 Petition
3 For Sanctions. So the motion to dismiss attacks
4 basically saying the Court doesn't have jurisdiction
5 over Mr. Mueller because he's never been served, and
6 that's under Section 301. So while it's correct he's
7 never been served, the problem is Mr. Smith has filed an
8 appearance for him. And I know the appearance was
9 contesting jurisdiction; but with the motion, it's also
10 a substantive motion under 615.
11 So I took a look at some case law because
12 it's a substantive motion, and it is well-settled that
13 any action taken by the litigant which recognizes the
14 case as in court will amount to a general appearance
15 unless such action was for the sole purpose of objecting
16 to the jurisdiction over his or her person. So an
17 appearance raising any defense other than personal
18 jurisdiction is a general appearance regardless of
19 whether it's designated as a, quote, special appearance;
20 so because you're arguing also pursuant to 615 there's a
21 general appearance.
22 So with respect to your motion to dismiss
23 under 2 - 301, that would be denied; however, your Section
24 615 motion deals with Section 137(b) specifically, which
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1 states that all proceedings under this rule shall be
2 brought within the civil action in which the pleading,
3 motion or other document referred to has been filed, and
4 no violation or alleged violation of this rule shall
5 give rise to a separate civil suit but shall be
6 considered a claim within the same civil action. I
7 don't have a civil action filed in front of me. The
8 only thing I have is this Rule 137 -- it's Rule 137
9 Petition For Sanctions. It doesn't create a separate
10 civil suit. 137 needs to be brought -- If there's a
11 petition for 137, it needs to be brought within a civil
12 action.
13 And I know from the history of this it seems
14 that the Municipal Officers Electoral Board basically
15 dismissed the claims that were against Mr. Grasso; but
16 that, to me, is an administrative hearing. And there's
17 been no administrative review of that hearing, to my
18 knowledge, at least not in this particular case . So
19 there's no underlying cause of action in which I could
20 even award 137 sanctions, and 137 is not a separate
21 cause of action. So I'm granting the motion under - -
22 MR. GRASSO: Your Honor, can I be heard before you
23 grant - - And I understand
24 THE COURT: Sure, go ahead.
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1 (Simultaneous speaking; compromised

2 audio feed.)
3 MR. GRASSO: Thank you. I appreciate having the
4 hearing. So that is the conundrum which you've just
5 well-defined. So is Your Honor's ruling -- As you're
6 giving your ruling, is Your Honor's ruling going to be
7 the issue that I brought up from the beginning, is that
8 effectively then there is no Rule 137; that is, an
9 attorney and a claimant could put forth meritless
10 allegations not based either in law in fact and the
11 Respondent in this case, me, would have no remedy under
12 137 because the Court is effectively saying there is no
13 137 ability even though the rule itself says the
14 signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
15 certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion
16 or other document?
17 And so all that's required, Your Honor,
18 respectfully is that there be a pleading, a motion or
19 other document -- which is, here , the claim, you know,
20 contesting the election petitions -- that to the best of
21 his or her knowledge, information and belief after
22 reasonable inquiry it is well-grounded in fact and is
23 warranted by existing law , et cetera -- Of course, the
24 Court can read this; but my point is this: 137 makes no
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1 exception for election matters, and all 137 requires is

2 the signing of a pleading, motion or other document. It
3 doesn't say it's got to be a separate civil action, with
4 all due respect; and it does not eliminate election
5 contests. So I would argue that Rule 137 includes
6 election contests, and they have to be brought as
7 another document and be well-grounded in fact and is
8 warranted by existing law; otherwise, they are improper
9 and there should be -- as the constitution requires,
10 there should be a remedy for every wrong.
11 So since the only way to go on this -- And
12 certainly an election board doesn't have the authority
13 this Court would. The path to --
14 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you there. Does the
15 election board have that authority?
16 MR. GRASSO: Well, I did look for that, Your Honor;
17 and I saw nothing that would give me any indication that
18 that is possible. I filed my -- I filed my motion
19 here my petition here within 30 days. It was under
20 the MOE- -- M-0-E-D -- whatever it is -- number. As I
21 laid out, the Court changed the caption and the
22 numbering. So, you know, if that's what the Court -- I
23 don't know. I'm not saying the Court is ruling one way
24 or the other, but certainly I think I've met everything
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1 under 137; and there's no exception in 137 to election
2 proceedings. I couldn't find law that said an election
3 board can issue sanctions. Under what? Under 137? I
4 don't know that 137, an Illinois Supreme Court rule,
5 applies. And so by default, if you will, the body that
6 would handle this issue, a 137 to an election petition,
7 would be this Court and Your Honor. So I tried to
8 follow the rules. I believe I did follow the rules
9 and otherwise, I have no other recourse.
10 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Smith, I don't know if you
11 want to weigh in on that; but I'd give you the
12 opportunity.
13 MR. SMITH: I will comment on a couple things. I
14 think Rule 137(b) is abundantly clear about this not
15 being something you can file as a separate civil action.
16 And what Mr. Grasso's essentially saying is that any
17 time an attorney signs any document, he can then file a
18 new case in circuit court saying that document was
19 frivolous. That would mean, for instance, if -- you
20 know, if I sent Mr. Grasso a letter he did not like --
21 we had no case between us but I sent him a letter he
22 doesn't like, he can file a new case in circuit court
23 saying that that letter was frivolous or not in good
24 faith. There's -- And that's not the case. There's got
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1 to be an underlying court action.

2 And beyond Rule 137(b) -- The very first
3 sentence of Rule 137, there's some language Mr. Grasso
4 admitted, Every pleading, motion and other document
5 he relies on that "other document" 1 anguage - - of a
6 party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at
7 least one attorney of record. That "of record" wording
8 in the first sentence is critical because to be of
9 record an attorney has to have an appearance in an
10 existing case, which Section B confirms. If Mr. Grasso
11 doesn't like the -- If he thinks that an electoral board
12 should be able to rule on sanctions, he should have made
13 the motion before the electoral board, received his
14 ruling from the electoral board, and then appealed from
15 that; but he didn't do that . He filed a separate,
16 stand-alone cause of action, which Rule 137 does not
17 a 11 ow.
18 MR. GRASSO: Your Honor , briefly in response. I'm

19 not quite sure where Mr. Smith was going circularly , but
20 this is a pleading And Mr. Windon did, in fact, show
21 up -- he appeared, in fact. Mr. Mueller -- And I will
22 say, as an officer of the court , I was present for both
23 the hearings. Mr. Windon did show up at the first one ,
24 asked for time to brief the issues, decided not even to
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1 brief the issue about the mayor-versus-village-president

2 petition, and put in hardly a brief on the other issue
3 on the notary certification. And then he did show up at
4 the next hearing and didn't -- hardly even and did
5 not even argue , is my recollection. So he was of
6 counsel. He was of record in that proceeding .
7 As I admitted from the beginning, I don't
8 know where the remedy lies; but it would seem that this
9 Court would be the only place where you could bring a
10 137 . And I believe 137 would encompass a pleading , a
11 motion or other document signed, you know, and presented
12 by an attorney of record. If you want further briefing
13 on whether or not the issue could have been brought as a
14 motion for sanctions in front of the electoral board
15 which I believe we're going to find is no because it has
16 no -- it has no this Court sits both in equity and in
17 law -- The obvious remedy in 137 is sanctions, which
18 here would likely be monetary. I don't believe an
19 electoral board has that authority; and, of course, I'm
20 entitled to have a remedy as the constitution allows.
21 So it is a bit of conundrum. I said that
22 from Day 1 when I appeared on this, but And I'm more
23 than willing to do -- I couldn't find any further
24 research, but maybe Mr . Smith will be better at it . But
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1 I would like -- I would come back to Your Honor, then,

2 and say there is no ability to bring a sanctions motion
3 in front of an electoral board; therefore, my only path
4 is to this Court.
5 MR. SMITH: There's no conundrum. There's no
6 conundrum. If the legislature had wanted to sanction
7 people for bringing actions before an electoral board,
8 the legislature would have done that because the
9 electoral board, we all have to recall, is a creature of
10 statutory construction.
11 THE COURT: Right.
12 MR. SMITH: And any jurisdiction the electoral
13 board has has to be specifically given to it by the
14 legislature. So if the legislature had wanted to
15 sanction frivolous conduct before an electoral board, it
16 would have specifically said so.
17 THE COURT: Well , let me --
18 MR. SMITH : So there's no conundrum.
19 THE COURT: I'm not going to -- I don't need any
20 more briefing. I believe that 137(b) cannot be more
21 clear as far as the language that it does not create or
22 rise to a separate cause of action. It needs to be
23 brought within an underlying cause of action, so it's
24 not -- Your petition, as it stands, is invalid under
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1 137(b); so that's why I'm granting the motion under 615.

2 An administrative agency -- And I don't know much about
3 the Municipal Officers Electoral Board. They either
4 have their own rules and regulations -- and if they
5 don't , they would fall under the administrative code and
6 follow those rules and regulations. And whether their
7 own rules and regulations has an ability to sanction, I
8 don't know. And under the administrative code, as I sit
9 here right now, I don't know if there's a provision
10 under that code for an administrative board to issue
11 sanctions . But I do agree with Mr. Smith on the point
12 that administrative agencies are a creation of the
13 legislature, and they're obligated to follow whatever
14 those rules and regulations are. They could have their
15 own rules and regulations, but they'd also be under the
16 administrative code .
17 MR. GRASSO: (Zoom distortion.)
18 THE COURT: So if -- I mean, if you wanted to
19 pursue sanctions under the Municipal Officers Electoral
20 Board, they would probably either tel 1 you, yes, I could
21 issue them; or , no, I can't issue them . But then that
22 would be an administrative review to bring here and then
23 you could argue the 137, I believe. But as a separate
24 cause of action
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12
1 MR. GRASSO: It's -- I think Your Honor said right

2 from the beginning it's not a separate cause of action.
3 So here's what I'd like to request -- I understand
4 Your Honor is granting the motion under 615 that
5 Mr. Mu el 1 er al so has fi 1 ed an appearance here ; and I'd
6 like to come back in 30 days to see if , in fact, there
7 is any ability under the administrative code to do so .
8 I believe the Court has said "I believe , " and I believe
9 Mr . Smith has said "I believe ," and there's really no
10 clarity here. The burden would be on me since it was my
11 petition , so I'm willing to take that burden and come
12 back and report to the Court. And if I conclude that
13 And I will present my position to the Court based on
14 what I find. And if there's anything that I can put in
15 writing, I will put in writing if I find it ; if not , I
16 wi 11 then agree to dismiss this matter. And then I
17 guess I have to pursue whatever other civil remedies in
18 terms of abuse of process and malicious prosecution
19 might give me here . So I would respectfully request
20 30 days to see if I can find what administrative avenues
21 there may have been or not have been and whether or not
22 I do have a remedy under 137 in front of Your Honor.
23 THE COURT: Well , I'm not going to grant that time.
24 I've made my ruling today . I'm granting the motion, the
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1 615. You now have a time period to bring a motion to

2 reconsider if you believe that I'm wrong. So as of
3 today, I'm granting the 615 motion to dismiss under the
4 language of 137(b). When I say "I believe" -- I think
5 when you're referencing my "I believe" I was talking
6 about the administrative agency and administrative code,
7 which I haven't reviewed. But I will say this: The
8 Court's belief in 137(b) is that you can't bring the
9 petition that you brought.
10 MR. GRASSO: But are you saying, Judge -- I get
11 that that's what you're saying. Are you saying --
12 Because I may have taken a poor note. I thought you
13 said it wasn't a separate action, and now are you saying
14 it is a separate action?
15 THE COURT: No. Your supreme court Your
16 petition for 137 is not a separate cause of action.
17 MR. GRASSO: Right.
18 THE COURT: You can't bring -- You filed a
19 petition. It's called Rule 137 Petition For Sanctions.
20 In this Court's view, this is in violation of 137(b).
21 MR. GRASSO: Because it's not part of an action in
22 front of you?
23 THE COURT: No violation or alleged violation of
24 this rule sh al 1 give rise to a separate ci vi 1 suit.
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1 MR. GRASSO: Okay. That's what you' re saying. So
2 it's a separate civil suit.
3 THE COURT: It is. That's all I have in front of
4 me.
5 MR. GRASSO: Okay. All right. Well, I, again,
6 respectfully disagree because I had no avenue
7 Election petitions go to the circuit court, so the only
8 avenue was from the election board to the circuit court.
9 THE COURT: It's an administrative review process.
10 MR. GRASSO: Well, that -- Precisely, which I will
11 then 1 ook at and respect your ruling; and then if
12 there's a basis for reconsideration as a new evidence or
13 wrong on the law or others, I will bring it.
14 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. All right. I'll
15 look for the court order.
16 MR. SMITH: I'll prepare that. Thank you, Judge.
17 MR. DENNISON: Thank you, Judge.
18 (Which were all of the proceedings had
19 in the above-entitled matter.)
20
21
22
23
24
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1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

2 DUPAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS
3
5 I, MARCIA MESSINA, hereby certify that I am a

6 Certified Shorthand Official Court Reporter assigned to
7 transcribe the Zoom videoconference recording of
8 proceedings had of the above-entitled cause.
9 I further certify that the foregoing,
10 consisting of Pages 1 to 15, inclusive, is a true and
11 accurate transcript completed to the best of my ability,
12 based upon the quality of the audio recording.
13
14
15
16 Official Court Reporter
Eighteenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois
17 DuPage County
CSR License No. 84-003955
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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C 118
From: Neal Smith
To: ggrasso@burr-ridq e.gov
Cc: abowers@grassolaw.com
Subject: RE: Grasso v . Mueller, Case No. 2021 MR 158
Date: Thursday, June 10, 2021 2:09:00 PM
Gary,
I'm not going to justify the many non sequiturs in your email below with a response, so you should
not make any presumptions from my si lence.
Please be advised that I will be filing an appearance in the above referenced matter, and among
other things Mr. Mueller will be contesting personal jurisdiction pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-301.
Your " Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions" was the initial pleading in Case No. 2021 MR 158, and by filing
it you represented that the pleading con stitutes a stand-alone cause of action . Again, that is not
al lowed by Supreme Court Rule 137 for the reasons I described . If you have filed another case in
DuPage County against Steven Mueller-as you seem to suggest -pl ease forward the case number.
Again, I urge you to abide by Supreme Court Rule 137 and dismiss case 2021MR158. Please let me
know if you have any questions.
M. Neal Smith
Attorney
Robbins Schwartz
p : 630.929.3639 f: 630.783.3231
cell : 312-217-2450
nsmith@robbin s-schwartz.com
Robbins Schwartz
Thi s message is confidential. Thi s message may also be privi leged or protected by work product immunity or ot her laws and regu lations.
If you have received it by mistake, please re-se nd this communication to the sender and delete it from your system wit hout copyi ng it or
disclosi ng its contents to anyone.

Sent: Thursday, June 10, 20211:15 PM
To: Neal Smith <nsmith@robbins-schwartz.com>
Cc: Adam R. Bowers <abowers@grassolaw.com>
Subject: RE: Grasso v. Mueller, Case No. 2021MR158
Mr. Smith: I appreciate you confirming that Mr. Mueller was a pawn and who really instigated a
meritless challenge that was materially withdrawn after the motion to dismiss was filed. The Rule
137 was filed in the same action against the nominal litigant and attorney and the attorney was
served - which is all that was required. He even agreed it was filed within the 30 day requirement.
C 119
Notice was also mailed as a courtesy - and received by Mueller. DuPage County assigned it another
number, but it's still within the same action . I also have abuse of process and malicious prosecutions
actions that can be separately filed against those two and your clients that were actually involved. If
you will not file an appearance, please do not communicate further w me on this case./ GARY
Ga ry Grasso
Grasso Law, PC
630 .654.4500 (o)
312.498.3202 (c)
This message, including attachments, is covered by the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18
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recipient, you are hereby notified that any retention, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this
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attachments. Please reply to the sender that you have received the message in error, then delete
it. Thank you for considering the environmental impact of printing emails.
From: Neal Smith <nsm ith@robb ins-schwart z.com >

Sent: Thursday, June 10, 202111:34 AM
To: ggra sso@burr-ridge.gov; Adam R. Bowers <abowers@ grassolaw. com >; Gary Grasso
<ggrasso@ grasso law.co m>
Subject: Grasso v. Mueller, Case No. 2021MR158
Gary and Adam ,
I have been retained to represent Steven Mueller in the above referenced matter, where you have
attempted to assert a cause of action by filing a "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions ." Setting aside the
Petition's lack of merit, I want to bring to your attention the language of subsection (b) of Supreme
Court Rule 137, which provides as follows : All proceedings under this rule shall be brought within the
civil action in which the pleading, motion or other document referred to has been filed, and no
violation or alleged violation of this rule shall give rise to a separate civil suit, but shall be considered
a claim within the same civil action.
In filing the above referenced case, you have done precisely what Rule 137 does not allow. That is,
you have attempted to assert a violation of Rule 137 as a separate stand -alone civil suit. Therefore,
by this email, I am formally notifying you that you must dismiss the above action without further
delay. Dismissal should be accomplished on or before June 14 at 9 a.m. when this matter is next
before Judge Fullerton. If you believe that that there is a good faith basis in law for the filing of the
"Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions" as a separate civil suit, I would appreciate if you could provide your
reasoning, citing applicable law.
Lastly, as you know, this matter was filed nearly four months ago and you still have not served
C 120
Steven Mueller. I want to be clear that Mr. Mueller has not waived service and does not agree to
waive service.
Please let me know if you have any questions .
M. Neal Smith
Attorney
Robbins Schwartz
p: 630.929 .3639 f: 630.783.3231
cell : 312-217-2450
nsmit h@robbin s-schwartz.com
Robbins Schwartz
This message is confidential. Thi s me ssage may also be privileged or protected by work produ ct immuni ty or other laws and regulations.
If you have received it by mistake, please re-send this communication to the sender and del ete it from your syste m without copying it or
disclosing its contents to anyone.
C 121
C 122
From: Neal Smith
To: ggrasso@grassolaw.com; abowers@g rassolaw.com
Subject: Grasso v. Mueller, Case No. 2021 MR 158
Date: Friday, June 11, 20211:04:00 PM
Attachments: Aopearance.odf
NOF Appea ra nce.pdf
Gary and Adam,
Please see attached appearance and notice of filing, which are hereby served upon you . Again, as I
stated yesterday, your "Ru le 137 Petition for Sanctions" was the initial pleading in Case No. 2021 MR
158, and by filing it you represented that the pleading constitutes a stand-alone cause of action.
However, doing this is not al lowed by the plain language of Supreme Court Rule 137 itself. I urge
you to dismiss the matter. Please advise . Thanks .
M. Neal Smith
Attorney
Robbin s Schwartz
Lisle, Illinoi s 60532-4311
p: 630 .929.3639 f: 630.783.3231
cell: 312-217-2450
nsm ith@robbins-schwart z. com
Robbins Schwartz
Thi s message is confidential. Thi s message may also be privileged or protected by work product immunity or other laws and regu latio ns.
If you have received it by mista ke, please re-se nd this communication to the sender and delete it from you r system without copying it or
C 123
C 124
9/3/2021 Burr Ridge Mayor Sues Petition Objector, Seeks 'Real Culprit' I Burr Ridge, IL Patch
Burr Ridge Mayor Sues Petition Objector, Seeks 'Real

Culprit'
Grasso beat back the challenge, but wants resident sanctioned by court.
David Giuliani, Patch StaffO
Posted Fri , Mar 26, 202 1 at 3: 17 pm CTUpdated Fri , Mar 26, 2021 at 3:33 pm CT
Replies (10)
• n''.'' :. ~: ,.=. nl"
·.' ..... _.
"1.1
Burr Ridge Mayor Gary Grasso is suing res ident Steven Mueller, who filed an objection to Grasso's petition as a candidate
for mayor. (David Giuliani/Patch)
BURR RIDGE, IL- Burr Ridge Mayor Gary Grasso beat back a legal challenge to his
petition as a candidate for mayor. But he is apparently not forgetting about it.
https://patch.com/illinois/burrridge/burr-ridge-mayor-sues-petitlon-objector-seeks-real-culprit 1/4
C 125
Last month, Grasso, a lawyer, filed fl.P-etition for sanctions against Burr Ridge resident
Steven Mueller, who submitted the objection to Grasso's petition.
"Mueller's baseless petition cost the Village $6,ooo in attorneys fees and wasted two
afternoons of three Village officials," Grasso said in a text to Patch. "I can only assume
someone asked Mueller to be a front and paid Mueller's fees just to cost the Village and
me time and money. I've asked Mueller through his attorney to confirm that fact, so the
real culprit can be pursued, but Mueller's attorney has yet to respond. I'm seeking
sanctions (the fees) under a rule that allows recoupment of fees for meritless pleadings
for these very reasons."
Find out what's happening in Burr Ridge with free, real-time updates from Patch.
Your email address Let's go!
In January, the village's electoral board unanimously_granted Grasso's request to

dismiss Mueller's challenge, which was based on procedural issues.
Now, in his lawsuit in DuPage County Court, Grasso asserts Mueller had no basis in law
to file the challenge or continue it.
https://patch .com/illinois/burrridge/burr-ridge-mayor-sues-petition-objector-seeks-real-culprit 2/4

C 126
Grasso said he reserves his rights to add abuse of process and malicious prosecution
causes of action against Mueller and any others who assisted him with his challenge.
In his lawsuit, Grasso asked the court to sanction Mueller and his attorney, if
warranted, for any other relief the court deems equitable.
"His objection that my petitions listed Village President and Mayor was not
objectionable and is allowed under state law AND our Village ordinance," Grasso said in
the text. "His attorney withdrew that 'objection' and did not even try to argue it after we
filed a motion to dismiss based on statutory and case law that was easy to find. As for
the notary error placing 2021 instead of 2020, there was no law supporting Mueller. His
attorney admitted I had properly appeared before the notary and signed under oath on
the month and day stated. A notary's clerical year error does not nullify a petition."
Grasso is represented by Adam Bowers, who has long been associated with the Grasso
Law Firm In Hinsdale.
Mueller's lawyer, Robert Windon, could not be reached for immediate comment Friday.
https://patch .com/illinois/burrridge/burr-ridge-mayor-sues-petition-objector-seeks-real-culprit 3/4

C 127
9/3/2021 Burr Ridge Mayor Sues Petition Objector, Seeks 'Real Culprit' I Burr Ridge , IL Patch
A hearing in DuPage County Court is set for May 17.
Under Illinois law, candidates are required to follow an exacting process with their
paperwork. Seemingly small errors can get them removed as candidates.
Mueller filed to run for Village Board two years ago, but the village's electoral board
barred him from the ballot.
One of the problems with Grasso's petition, Mueller said, was that it was not validly
notarized because the notarization was dated "December 3, 2021," nearly a year into the
future at the time.
The village's electoral board unanimously rejected that argument.
"Everyone on the electoral board said that was a clerical error by the notary and not the
responsibility of the person turning in the petition," Al Paveza, a village trustee who
serves on the electoral board, said in an interview in January.
Mueller also pointed to a law that says the "heading of each sheet shall be the same" in
the petition. Grasso's petition alternated between "Village President" and
"Mayor/Village President."
When the town formed, Paveza said, the top elected official was called village president.
"Then we saw that so many towns around us had mayors, instead of presidents," Paveza
said. "It was decided we wouldn't eliminate 'president,' but if the person wanted to be
called 'mayor,' he would be called 'mayor."'
Paveza said Mueller took that part of his challenge off the table.
The electoral board was made up of Paveza, Trustee Guy Franzese and Clerk Sue
Schaus.
The election is April 6. Grasso is running unopposed.
https://patch.com/illinois/burrridge/burr-ridge-mayor-sues-petition-objector-seeks-real-culprit 4/4
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C 129
From: Garv Grasso
To: Neal Smit h
Cc: Ada m R. Bowers
Subject: RE : Mueller v Grasso: 21 MR 158 / FOR RESOLUTION PURPOSES ONLY
Date: Monday, June 14, 2021 9:54 :58 AM
Mr. Smith : 1. Understood - it happens. I consider the motion served. It will be my position that
once a party requests substantive relief from a court by a filing, such as a motion to dismiss, counsel
has appeared for that party for all purposes. I think that is clearly the law and saw the judge nod
when I made that point . Thus, it will be my position that your motion to contest service now is
moot. You might consider speaking with some of your very capable litigation partners and possibly
withdrawing it next week.
2. As I stated, the Rule 137 is procedurally awkward when the court system does not allow a filing
consistent with Rule 137 from an election challenge . If it procedurally cannot be done from an
election challenge (which may well be the law), then I will pursue Malicious Prosecution and Abuse
of Process remedies in the Law Division as to Mr. Mueller and Mr. Windon . As Mr. Windon may be
able to confirm, I told him that my goal was not to pursue Mr. Mueller (or him) but the person or
persons I am confident who put Mueller up to this meritless challenge. My informal discussions w
others about Mr. Mueller (whom I asked a couple of years ago to get involved with the Village after
he tried unsuccessfully to run for Trustee - but he never responded) led me to the conclusion that
he would not spend the money for an election cha llenge - even a valid one. I understand he is quite
frugal. I also understand his acquaintances include the person or person who convinced Mr. Mueller
to file the challenge. I also am confident that someone else for example retained you on Mr.
Mueller's behalf. That is generally permissible, of course. All I asked Mr. Windon - and now you - is
to obtain permission from Mueller to tell me who asked him to do this - and pay his fees . I will not
pursue the matter further with him or Mr. Windon . If you have other ideas, I am open to a
dialogue.
/Gary Grasso
Gary Grasso
Grasso Law, PC
630 .654.4500 (o)
312.498.3202 (c)
U.S.C., sections 2510-2521 is CONFIDENTIAL and also may be protected by ATTORNEY/CL/ENT
C 130
Sent: Monday, June 14, 2021 9:24 AM
To: Gary Grasso <ggrasso@grassolaw.com>
Cc: Adam R. Bowers <abowers@grassolaw.com >
Subject: RE : Mueller v Grasso : 21MR158
Gary,
It was not my intent to send this to your Village address. My Outlook keeps populating the "To" lin e
with the Village email address over the law firm address. However, the initial email did go to Adam
at the law firm email address.
M. Neal Smith
Attorney
Robbins Schwartz
SSO Warrenville Road, Suite 460
p: 630.929.3639 f: 630.783.3231
cell: 312-217-2450
nsmith@robbi ns-schwartz co m
Robbins Schwartz
This message is confidential. This message may also be privileged or protected by work product immunity or other laws and regulations.
If you have received it by mistake, please re-send this comm uni cation to the sen der and delete it from your system witho ut copying it or
From: Gary Grasso <ggrasso@g rassolaw.com >

Sent: Monday, June 14, 2021 9:19 AM
To: Neal Smith <nsmit h@ro bb in s-schwa rt z.com>
Cc: Adam R. Bowers <abowe rs@ grasso law.com>
Subject: Mueller v Grasso : 21MR158
Mr. Smith - this email is in response to yours to me at my village email address- again. Even though I
have asked twice, you nonetheless continue to send your communications on this case to my village
email and not my law firm - and not to Mr. Bowers either. I do not consider this motion served
because you have used the wrong email address. Adam and I will accept it at either of our respective
law firm email addresses./ GARY
Ga ry Grasso
Grasso Law, PC
630 .654.4500 (o)
312.498.3202 (c)
C 131
U.S.C., sections 2510-2521 . is CONFIDENTIAL and also may be protected by ATTORNEY/CLIENT
C 132
C 133
Neal Smith

Sent: Friday, June 18, 2021 3:49 PM
To: Neal Smith
Cc: Adam R. Bowers
Subject: RE: Mueller v Grasso: 21 MR 158 I FOR RESOLUTION PURPOSES ONLY
Mr. Smith: No briefing is needed. Windon or you - or the court sua sponte I suppose - can seek a ruling that there
cannot be a Rule 137 from an election challenge. Service is a red-herring - no service is needed if it's a Rule
137. Windon was served. As for my offer to resolve, your characterization is neither the issue nor needed. Tell me who
asked him to file the challenge- that's it - Mueller's done after that that./ GARY
Gary Grasso
Grasso Law, PC
630.654.4500 (o)
312.498.3202 (c)
2521, is CONFIDENTIAL and also may be protected by ATTORNEY/CL/ENT PRIVILEGE. If you believe you received this e-

To: Gary Grasso <ggrasso@grassolaw.com>
Subject: RE: Mueller v Grasso: 21MR158 /FOR RESOLUTION PURPOSES ONLY
Gary,
What are your thoughts as far as a briefing schedule? We are not agreeable to your offer to resolve this, as it is not
really an offer at all but rather an expression of bad faith and use of the court system for an improper purpose.
M. Neal Smith
Attorney
Robbins Schwartz
p: 630.929.3639 f: 630.783.3231
cell : 312-217-2450
Robbins Schwartz
This message is confidential. This message may also be privileged or protected by work product immunity or other laws and regulations. If you have received it by
mistake, please re-send this communication to the sender and delete it from your system without copying it or disclosing its contents to anyone.
C 134
Sent: Friday, June 18, 20213:11 PM
To: Neal Smith <nsmith@robbins-schwartz.com>
Subject: RE: Mueller v Grasso: 21MR158 /FOR RESOLUTION PURPOSES ONLY
Mr. Smith: my position is that it is a proper Rule 137 - if it is, no separate service is needed beyond sending notice of the
motion (as we did) to Mr. Windon . If the court decides there cannot be a Rule 137 from an election board hearing
(because it has to get a new case number), then I will pursue a new action for malicious prosecution and abuse of
process and meet the service rules appliable to such actions. My offer to resolve the matter as outlined in my email to
you remains./ GARY GRASSO
Gary Grasso
Grasso Law, PC
630.654.4500 (o)
312.498.3202 (c)
2521, is CONFIDENTIAL and also may be protected by ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE. If you believe you received this e~

To: Gary Grasso <ggrasso@grassolaw .com>
Subject: RE: Mueller v Grasso : 21MR158 /FOR RESOLUTION PURPOSES ONLY
Gary,
Will you be dismissing the "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions" on Monday? I urge you to do so to avoid further costs and
attorney fees . The issue of personal jurisdiction has not been waived. As I said in my email Monday, we do not agree
that the court has personal jurisdiction over Mueller and we are not waiving the issue and the issue is not moot. At this
point, the only thing the court has jurisdiction to do is hear Mueller's 2-301 motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, and it is not a problem that we have combined the 2-301 motion with other grounds for dismissal. See
Ryburn v. People, 349 Ill. App . 3d 990 (4th Dist. 2004).
M. Neal Smith
Attorney
Robbins Schwartz
p: 630.929.3639 f : 630.783.3231
cell: 312-217-2450
C 135
C 136
GARY GRASSO )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
V. ) Case No.: 2021 MR 158
)
STEVEN MUELLER, )
)
Defendant. )
AFFIDAVIT OF M. NEAL SMITH
M. NEAL SMITH, having first been duly sworn upon oath, does hereby depose and state that
if called as a witness, he would competently testify to the facts stated herein as truthful and within his
own personal lmowledge.
l. I am an attorney and partner with the law firm of Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas,
Lifton & Taylor, Ltd., and I practice out of the finn ' s Lisle, Illinois office. I have
been licensed to practice in the State of Illinois since November 2004.
2. At all relevant times I have acted as legal counsel fer defendant Steven Mueller
(hereinafter "Mueller") in the above captioned case.
3. In order to defend this matter, and through July 31 , 2021 , Mueller has incun-ed
attorney fees in this matter in the total amount of $5,775 .00 for 17.25 hours oflegal
work, at the hourly rates of $350 per hour. Copies of the billing statements through
July 31, 2021, are attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4. Five billing entties totaling two hours ($700) have been deducted and are not part of
the petition for attorney fees, and one entry of .75 hours was listed as "No Charge"
on the billing statements attached as Exhibit A. Thus, the total amount sought for
attorney fees through July 31 , 2021 is $5,075.
5. The fees incurred by Mueller in this matter through July 31 , 2021 are reasonable for
an attorney practicing in DuPage County given the nature of the case and the skill
necessary to handle this matter.
6. Following July 31, 2021 and through September 2, 2021, and in order to defend this
matter and also to prosecute his motion for sanctions against Gary Grasso, Mueller
has incun-ed attorney fees in the amount of$6,125.00 for 17.5 hours oflegal work at
the hourly rate of $350 per hour. Statements for the time and charges from August 1,
2021 forward have not yet been prepared or sent. The undersigned will submit them
to this court with an additional affidavit when prepared.
7. The fees incmTed by Mueller from August 1, 2021 forward in this matter are
1
C 137
reasonable for an attorney practicing in DuPage County given the nature of the case
and the skill necessary to prosecute this matter.
8. Additionally, Mueller has incurred costs in the amount of $239 for the appearance
filing in this matter and costs in the amount of $62.33 for transcript preparation. See
invoice of Marcia Messina attached hereto as Exhibit B.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT
M. Neal Smith
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me

this 3rd day of September, 2021.
N~~~~NtlN~~~~~~
JB AR) OFFICIAL SEAL
JACQUELINE J MCLERRAN
NOTARY PUBLIC· STATE OF ILLINOIS
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:08129/23
C 138
Robbins Schwartz55 West Monroe Street, Suite 800
Chicago, IL 60603-5144
Telephone: (312) 332-7760
www.robbins-schwartz.com
Federal Tax l.D. No.: 36-2850001
July 30, 2021

Steven Mueller Client: 009173
Matter: 021003
Invoice#: 897390
Resp . Atty: MNS
Page: 1
RE: Grasso v. Mueller
For Professional Services Rendered Through June 30, 2021
Total Services $2,712 .50

Total Current Charges $2,712 .50
PAY THIS AMOUNT $i,112.so
Remittance Advice
For billing inquiries contact us at billingaccounting@robbins-schwartz.com
Check Payable To: ACH Payment Information :

Robbins Schwartz Receiving Bank: Fifth Third Bank
Attn.: Accounts Receivable ABA Routing Number: 071923909
55 West Monroe Street, Suite 800 Account Number: 1910001368
Please return this remittance page with your payment. Thank you. EXHIBIT
A C 139
Robbins Schwartz
55 West Monroe Street, Suite 800
Telephone: (312) 332-7760
Federal Tax l.D. No. : 36-2850001
July 30, 2021

Steven Mueller
Client: 009173
Matter: 021003
Invoice#: 897390
Resp . Atty: MNS
Page: 1
RE : Grasso v. Mueller
For Professional Services Rendered Through.lune 30, 2021
SERVICES
Date Person Description of Services Hours Rate Amount

06/09/2021 MNS 0.75 $0.00 $0.00
06/10/2021 MNS Perform legal research and analyze research 2.00 $350.00 $700.00
results re : Supreme Court Rule 137 and email
correspondences to Grasso re: Rule 137 and
related case law; review replies of Grasso.
06/10/2021 MNS Telephone conference with client re : Monday 0.50 $350.00 $175.00
appearance before Judge Fullerton .
06/11/2021 MNS Prepare and file appearance for Steven Mueller. 0.25 $350.00 $87.50
06/11/2021 MNS Email correspondence to Grasso re: appearance 0.25 $350.00 $87.50
and whether he will voluntarily dismiss the Rule
137 petition.
06/11/2021 MNS Review and analysis of Grasso motion to change 0.25 $350.00 $87.50
caption.
06/13/2021 MNS Draft motion to dismiss the Rule 137 petition . 0.50 $350.00 $175.00
06/16/2021 MNS 0.25 $350.00 $87.50
06/16/2021 MNS Telephone conference with client re: next steps 0.50 $350 .00 $175.00
in litigation.
06/18/2021 MNS Email correspondences to Grasso re: Rule 137 0.75 $350.00 $262 .50
petition for sanctions and whether it will be
dismissed; review Illinois Rule 408 re: evidence
issues.
06/21/2021 MNS Prepare for and attend court before Judge 1.25 $350.00 $437.50
Fullerton and prepare and submit court order;
email correspondence to client re: court order.
C 140
July 30 , 2021
Robbins Schwartz Client:
Matter:
009173
021003
Invoice#: 897390
Resp. Atty: MNS
Page: 2
SERVICES ); .: ~· \,?< 1
...:-...· - - -, f ~'. - , ... - .,

06/21/2021 MNS 0.25 $350 .00 $87.50
06/23/2021 MNS 0.75 $350.00 $262 .50
06/23/2021 MNS Review information from electoral board hearing 0.25 $350.00 $87.50
in determining how to respond to Grasso.
Total Professional Services 8.50 $2 ,712 .50
PERSON RECAP
Person Hours Rate Amount

MNS M. Neal Smith 0.75 $0.00 $0.00
MNS M. Neal Smith 7.75 $350.00 $2,712 .50
Total Services $2,712.50

Total Current Charges $2 ,712.50
PAY THIS AMOUNt' .$2,712.50
C 141
Robbins Schwartz55 West Monroe Street, Suite 800
Telephone: (312) 332-7760
August 17, 2021

Steven Mueller Client: 009173
Matter: 021003
Invoice#: 897741
Resp . Atty: MNS
Page: 1
For Professional Services Rendered Through July 31 , 2021
Total Services $3,062 .50

Total Current Charges $3,062 .50
Past Due Balance as of Bill Date $2,712 .50
PAY THIS AMOUNT $5,775.00
Remittance Advice
For billing inquiries contact us at billingaccounting@robbins-schwartz.com
Check Payable To: ACH Payment Information:

Robbins Schwartz Receiving Bank: Fifth Third Bank
Attn.: Accounts Receivable ABA Routing Number: 071923909
55 West Monroe Street, Suite 800 Account Number: 1910001368
Please return this remittance page with your payment. Thank you.
C 142
Robbins Schwartz
55 West Monroe Street, Suite 800
Telephone: (312) 332-7760
August 17, 2021

Steven Mueller
Client: 009173
Matter: 021003
Invoice#: 897741
Resp. Atty: MNS
Page: 1
For Professional Services Rendered Througtl.luly 31 , 2021
SERVICES

07/12/2021 MNS Review and analysis of Grasso response in 1.00 $350.00 $350 .00
opposition to the motion to dismiss and analysis
of next steps.
07/13/2021 MNS Review and analysis regarding legal authority for 0.50 $350.00 $175.00
filing a Rule 137 sanctions petition against
Grasso.
07/16/2021 MNS 0.50 $350.00 $175.00
07/20/2021 MNS Draft reply brief in support of motion to dismiss. 4.25 $350.00 $1,487 .50
07/23/2021 MNS Draft additional language to reply brief in support 2.00 $350.00 $700.00
of motion to dismiss.
07/23/2021 MNS 0.25 $350.00 $87.50
07/30/2021 MNS Correspondence by UPS to Judge Fullerton 0.25 $350.00 $87 .50
regard ing motion to dismiss courtesy copies.
Total Professional Services 8.75 $3,062.50
PERSON RECAP
Person Hours Rate Amount

MNS M. Neal Smith 8.75 $350.00 $3,062.50
C 143
August 17, 2021
Robbins Schwartz Client:
Matter:
009173
021003
Invoice#: 897741
Resp. Atty: MNS
Page: 2
Total Services $3 ,062.50

Total Current Charges $3,062.50
Previous Balance $2,712.50
PAY THlS.AMblJNt :
. • • J - -~ •• ~
'$5;f775.b0
~.. -· ...
C 144
Marcia Messina, CSR INVOICE
505 North County Farm Road , Room 366
Wheaton, IL 60187
630-407-8926 DATE: August 24, 2021
INVOICE# 458
Bill to:
Mr. M. Neal Smith

Robbins Schwartz Nicholas Lifton & Taylor, Ltd .
550 Warrenville Road
DESCRIPTION AMOUNT
Court Reporting Services Rendered For:
Transcript: 15 pages - Original - Regular delivery $60.00

Square Inc. credit card processing fee $2 .33
Case: Grasso vs Mueller (21 MR 158)
Date: 08/09/2021
Judge: Paul M. Fullerton
TOTAL $ 62.33
PAYMENTS/CREDITS $ 62.33
BALANCED OWED $
Make all checks payable to MARCIA MESSINA PAID IN FULL

marcia.messina@18thjudicial.org
Telphone: 630-407-8926
Fax: 630-407-8932
EXHIBIT
t _B-~-----
C 145
Candice Adams
FILEDATE: 9/7/2021 1:31 PM
v. ) Case No. 2021 MR 158 1 Date Accepted: 9/7/2021 4:22 PM
) BC
)
NOTICE OF FILING
To: M. Neal Smith

Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, Ltd.
Lisle, IL 60532
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 13, 2021, at 9:00 a.m. or as soon
thereafter as counsel may be heard, we shall appear before the Honorable Judge Paul M.
Fullerton or any judge sitting in his stead, in Courtroom 2005, via Zoom or by other means, as
directed by the Court and then and there present PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF AUGUST 9, 2021 ORDER.
/s/ Gary Grasso
GRASSO LAW, PC
Hinsdale, IL 60521
630-654-4500
1
number.
C 146
Notice and Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of August 9, 2021, Order, have been served
via electronic email upon counsel of record on this 7th day of September 2021, at the following
address:
M. Neal Smith
Lisle, IL 60532
GRASSO LAW, PC
Hinsdale, IL 60521
630-654-4500
C 147
Candice Adams
FILEDATE: 9/7/2021 1:31 PM
v. ) Case No. 2021 MR 158 1Date Accepted: 9/7/2021 4:22 PM
) BC
)
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

OF AUGUST 9, 2021 ORDER
NOW COMES PETITIONER Gary Grasso asking this court to reconsider and vacate its
order dated August 9, 2021 dismissing the petition for Rule 137 sanctions under Rule 137(b) as a
separate action, and in support thereof states:
One basis for reconsideration is that the Court did not properly apply to law applicable to
the issue. Gardner v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 213 Ill.App.3d 242, 248, 571
N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (1st Dist. 1987). Petitioner informed the court from inception of this cause that
there was no procedural path from the election commission to seek sanctions for frivolous
challenges – including as here where Mueller hired counsel, stated proceedings caused two
sessions to convene then withdrawing his principal objection and offering no law to support either
of his two objections. This resulted in unnecessary expenditures of times and funds for Petitioner
and the Village of Burr Ridge. There should be a remedy for such tactics.
1
2021 municipal election for Mayor of Burr Ridge. When Grasso filed the Rule 137 Petition with this case name and
name first and it would be assigned a Miscellaneous Remedy “MR”) number. Hence the basis for the current caption
and case number even though it was filed as captioned and numbered before the local election commission.
C 148
Petitioner is entitled to be heard on the merits and seek a remedy for the establishment of
frivolous actions taken by Mr. Mueller in an election petition challenge. The only forum available
is the circuit court. Petitioner sought sanctions timely and, in a form, to apply Rule 137 – using
the same action. The Clerk of the Court of DuPage County converted the caption and assigned a
case # consistent with its procedures – having no filing mechanics to accept an election
commission action under the caption or case number here.
The Election Commissions do not exist or function under the Illinois Administrative
Review Law. 735 ILCS 5/3101 et. seq. This law governs such agencies are liquor commission,
boards of education, public health, law enforcement, Department of Agriculture, and the
Commerce Commission – but not elections. There, there is no mechanism for sanctions – and
appeals are first directed to the circuit courts. see, e.g. 235 ILCS 5/7-11 (Liquor Commissions).
Thus, the only path from administrative law decisions is to the circuit court.
Elections in Illinois are governed by the Illinois Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq.
commonly cited as the Election Code. The State Board of Elections (Sec. 1A-1) has general
supervision over the administration of the registration and election laws throughout the State and
shall perform only such duties as are or may hereafter be prescribed by law. Under Article 29:
Prohibitions and Penalties there is a listing of prohibited acts (e.g. vote buying) but no procedure
to challenge frivolous challenges such as the one Mueller filed. One could conclude that there is
no right of a local election board or candidate to contest a frivolous challenge – or that other rules
can be used for that purpose – such as Rule 137. That rule as noted provides for a remedy based
upon “… a pleading, motion, or other paper…” (emphasis added) violates the rule. A frivolous
election challenge is either a pleading or certainly is “other paper” signed in violation of the rule.
C 149
Section 12 of the Illinois Constitution states “RIGHT TO REMEDY AND JUSTICE:
Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives
to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He (she) shall obtain justice by law, freely,
completely, and promptly.
The court’s ruling under 2-615 effectively abrogates a municipality or candidate’s right to
seek a remedy for frivolous challenges – and thereby arguably encourages the filing of them or
certainly does not discourage them.
Separately, the court determined that the motion for Rule 137 sanctions was not brought
within the civil action, pleading or other paper was filed as required by section (b) of the rule. This
court is the only path from election matters, including challenges – thus it is within the civil action
where the frivolous challenged was filed. Petitioner used the same caption and number
substantively – clerically that could not happen but that does not alter the fact it is in the same
action. It is and should be “… considered a claim within the same civil action” under these
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner asks the Court to reconsider and vacate its ruling and allow this
motion for sanctions to proceed on its merits.
/s/ Gary Grasso

Gary Grasso
GRASSO LAW PC
38 Blaine Street
Hinsdale, IL 60521
630-654-4500
C 150
ORDER 2021MR000158-131
GARY GRASSO
Plaintiff
2021MR000158
FILED
-VS-
CASE NUMBER 21 Sep 13 PM 12: 24
STEVEN N MUELLER
Defendant
CLERK OF THE
ORDER
This matter coming on to be heard for presentment of Mueller’s Motion for Sanctions Against Plaintiff Gary Grasso Pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 137 (the “Motion for Sanctions”), and for Gary Grasso’s Motion for Reconsideration of August 9, 2021 Order (the “Motion
for
Reconsideration”), the Court being fully advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Grasso shall have to September 17, 2021, to file a Response to the Motion for Sanctions; Mueller shall have to September 17, 2021, to
file a Response to the Motion for Reconsideration.
2. Grasso shall have 7 days thereafter, to September 24, 2021, to file a Reply in support of the Motion for Reconsideration; Mueller shall
have 7 days thereafter, to September 24, 2021, to file a Reply in support of the Motion for Sanctions.
3. The Motion for Sanctions and the Motion for Reconsideration are scheduled for hearing on October 8, 2021 at 10:00 a.m. via Zoom
video conferencing.
Submitted by: M. NEAL SMITH

Entered:
Attorney for:
Address: 550 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 460 Validation ID : DP-09132021-1224-18187
Email : smonroe@robbins-schwartz.com

Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 14866886
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 9/17/2021 2:42 PM
MK
C 152
Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/1-109, the undersigned certifies
that the statements set forth herein are true and correct.
the referenced DEFENDANT MUELLER'S RESPONSE TO GARY GRASSO'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AUGUST 9, 2021 ORDER to be served by electronic mail to
the email address listed above.
Isl M. Neal Smith
4849-7649-159v .1
C 153
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 14866886
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 9/17/2021 2:42 PM
MK
C 154
easily discarded. See Holzer v. Motorola Lighting, Inc. , 295 Ill. App. 3d 963, 978 (1st Dist. 1998)
("it is well-settled that one may not raise a legal theory for the first time in a motion to reconsider") .
ARGUMENT
Grasso's new argument-though hardly clear or well-articulated- is that he has a
constitutional iight under Article I, Section 12 of the Illinois Constitution to a remedy for what
Grasso claims was a frivolous objection to his nominating papers. To be clear, Mueller' s objection
to Grasso's nominating papers was not frivolous and the Electoral Board that heard the matter even
agreed with Mueller that there were defects in Grasso's nominating papers. But even assuming,
arguendo, that Mueller' s objection was frivolous, the law is clear that Grasso had no grounds
whatsoever to file his "Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions."
According to Grasso's logic, Rule 137 must be the legal vehicle for his "claim" against
Mueller because Section 12 of the Illinois Constitution guarantees a remedy. The argument is
baseless. Section 12 of the Illinois Constitution provides:
Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs
which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain
justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 12.
The Illinois Supreme Comi has repeatedly stated that this provision is merely an expression
of philosophy and does not mandate that a certain remedy be provided in any particular form for
any alleged or particular wrong. See McAlister v. Schick, 147 Ill.2d 84, 98 (1992); and Sullivan v.
Midlothian Park District, 51 lll.2d 274, 277 (1972). Moreover, the Illinois legislature has the
inherent power to repeal or change the state's common law and may do away with all or part of
the common law. People v. Gersch, 135 Ill.2d 384, 395 (1990). And the legislature has broad
discretion to determine whether a statute that restricts or alters an existing remedy is reasonably
necessary to promote the general welfare. Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 125 Ill.2d 230, 245
C 155
(1988) . Especially concerning elections "[ s ]tates may, and inevitably must" enact laws and
regulations to regulate elections to prevent disorder, and they have broad discretion in doing so.
Jackson-Hicks v. East St. Louis Bd. ofElec. Com 'rs, 2015 IL 118929 at if 32 quoting Clingman v.
Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 , 593 (2005).
What this means in the present context is that the winning party in a matter before an
electoral board must look to state statute for authorization to pursue a damages claim against the
losing party on the grounds that the objection was frivolous. Illinois has no provision authorizing
such a claim, and Grasso acknowledges as much. (Seep. 2 of Motion for Reconsideration) . But
instead of coming to terms with the fact that there is no basis in law to pursue Mueller, Grasso
went to Rule 13 7 and made up a cause of action out of whole cloth. As evidenced by his request
for reconsideration, Grasso continues to doggedly pursue his baseless theory. And Grasso does so
even though Rule 13 7 clearly and specifically prohibits what he is doing.
CONCLUSION
Grasso has given no valid reason for this Court to reconsider its August 9, 2021 Order. But
what Grasso has done with his Motion for Reconsideration is further demonstrate that he is
unrepentant in his shameless attempted powerplay against Mueller. The August 9, 2021 Order
should stand, and Grasso should be sanctioned in accordance with Mueller's Motion for Sanctions.
WHEREFORE, Steven Mueller seeks an order (i) denying Grasso's Motion for
Reconsideration; (ii) sanctioning Grasso under Rule 137 for advancing meritless arguments in the
Motion for Reconsideration; (iii) sanctioning Grasso in accordance with Mueller's Motion for
Sanctions; and (iv) for such other and further relief as appropriate.
C 156
STEVEN MUELLER

Finn No. 71875
M. Neal Smith
550 Wan-enville Road, Suite 460
630.929.3639 (ph)
C 157
Candice Adams
DUPAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 14870701
GARY GRASSO, ) 2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 9/17/2021 5:07 PM
Petitioner, ) Date Accepted: 9/20/2021 8:24 AM
) KB
v. ) Case No. 2021 MR 158 1

)
)
NOTICE OF FILING
To: M. Neal Smith

Lisle, IL 60532
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the17th of September 2021, I caused to be filed with the
Clerk of the Circuit Court of DuPage County, Illinois, PETITIONER GRASSO’S RESPONSE TO
RESPONDENT MUELLER’S RULE 137 MOTION AND GRASSO’S 2-615 COUNTER-
MOTION TO DISMISS.
Dated: September 17, 2021
/s/ Adam R. Bowers
Adam R. Bowers
Gary Grasso
GRASSO LAW, PC
Hinsdale, IL 60521
630-654-4500
1
number.
C 158
I, Christen L. Korzyniewski, a non-attorney, certify that a true and correct copy

of this Notice and PETITIONER GRASSO’S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT MUELLER’S
RULE 137 MOTION AND GRASSO’S 2-615 COUNTER-MOTION TO DISMISS, has been
served via electronic email upon counsel of record on this 17th day of September 2021, at the
following address:
M. Neal Smith
Lisle, IL 60532
Adam R. Bowers
Gary Grasso
GRASSO LAW, PC
Hinsdale, IL 60521
630-654-4500
C 159
Candice Adams
DUPAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 14870701
2021MR000158
GARY GRASSO, ) FILEDATE: 9/17/2021 5:07 PM
Petitioner, ) KB
)
v. ) Case No. 2021 MR 158
)
)
GRASSO’S RESPONSE TO MUELLER’S RULE 137 MOTION

AND
GRASSO’S 2-615 COUNTER-MOTION TO DISMISS
NOW COMES Petitioner-Movant Gary Grasso by Grasso Law, P.C. for his Response to
Mueller’s Rule 137 Motion and 2-615 Counter-Motion to Dismiss, and in support thereof states as
follows:
INTRODUCTION
Mueller’s Rule 137 Motion (the “Mueller 137 Motion”) fails to meet the pleading
requirements for Rule 137 and should be dismissed pursuant to Section 2-615 because it is not
premised on a pleading that is claimed to have been filed without a basis in law or fact – or the
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Mueller makes no effort to make such a
showing. To the contrary, Mueller avoids the merit of Grasso’s Rule 137 Petition (the “Grasso 137
Petition”) that it was Mueller who filed a baseless election challenge – on behalf of unnamed
others. Throughout Mueller’s wandering Motion, there is no attempt on Mueller’s part to
demonstrate that the Grasso 137 Petition misstates the law or the facts as required to bring a Rule
137 motion.
Second, Mueller anchors his Motion on the erroneous contention that Grasso’s 137 Petition
was a separate case filed to discover who was the driving force behind Mueller filing the
C 160
underlying election challenge. (Mueller Motion, p. 3). However, even if true these assertions do
not fall within the prohibitions of Rule 137 nor are they sanctionable. Rule 137 requires a movant
seeking sanctions to identify sanctionable statements in Grasso’s 137 Petition. There are none and
Mueller attempts no such showing. Procedure, particularly where the complained of “violation”
was required by the Circuit Clerk, is not the basis for sanctions; a plain reading of the rule provides
the definition for what is sanctionable, and the failure to meet this burden is fatal to any sanctions
motion including Mueller’s at issue here.
Mueller also ignores and does not refute the allegations that Mueller filed a baseless
election challenge at the behest of an undisclosed other person, and Mueller then withdrew the
first claim when confronted with the law in a motion to dismiss. Having withdrawn one of the two
claims, Mueller proceeded on a notary’s scrivener error while admitting that Grasso had performed
all the required obligations for a statement of candidacy. Thus, Mueller’s challenge to Grasso’s
candidacy was untenable and unsupported by existing law, yet Mueller persisted which caused
Grasso and the Village of Burr Ridge to needlessly expend time and legal fees in defense of
Mueller’s improper claims.
BRIEF FACTS
The instant dispute arises out of an election challenge to Grasso’s candidacy as Village
President / Mayor of the Village of Burr Ridge. The record shows that Grasso tried to file his Rule
137 Sanctions Petition in the same civil action in the only forum available. Grasso’s Rule 137
Petition was originally captioned Mueller v Grasso, 2021 MOEB 001. It timely arose within a
Village of Burr Ridge election commission challenge which Mueller, through other counsel.
Mueller filed the challenge and placed summons through the Sheriff of DuPage County,
C 161
challenging the petitions and related statement of candidacy of Grasso in the 2021 municipal
election for Mayor of Burr Ridge.
Mueller asserted that there were two “flaws” in the petitions that Grasso filed in support of
his candidacy. The first “flaw” concerned a scrivener’s error with the notary’s certification of the
petitions; instead of indicating the correct year (2020), the notary incorrectly indicated that the
year the signatures were certified was 2021. The second “flaw” related to the fact that on some of
the petition pages, Grasso’s office alternated between “Mayor” and/or “Village President”.
In the face of a motion to dismiss demonstrating that neither challenge had merit (state law
and Burr Ridge’s ordinance allow for the use of Village President and Mayor interchangeably),
Mueller withdrew the petition challenge and then offered no substantive response to the notary’s
scrivener’s error – conceding that Grasso had done everything required by a candidate in signing
the statement of candidacy.
Grasso had sufficient reason to believe that Mueller raised the election challenges as a
“straw man” for another individual (or individuals) who used Mueller’s name and paid his legal
fees to harass Grasso, also costing Grasso and the Village unnecessary time and expense. Grasso
made an overture to Mueller’s counsel in the form of a settlement proposal. That Mueller would
reveal the substance of a settlement communication protected by Illinois Rule of Evidence 408 in
support of his sanctions motion is further evidence of Mueller and counsel’s bad faith.
When the notary challenge was dismissed as lacking in merit, Grasso proceeded by seeking
Rule 137 sanctions in the only available venue – this Court. The election commission is not a court
of law and lacks authority to use Rule 137 nor does it have other power to sanction. Yet Rule 137
governs all civil actions or other proceedings, and this Court is the forum for proceedings related
C 162
to election challenges. Such a review must be undertaken by the Circuit Court, as a plenary court
of review for any action taken by an election commission or board within its jurisdiction.
As noted, when Grasso attempted to file the Rule 137 Petition under the original village
case caption and number, the Clerk of the 18th Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, rejected it and
instructed Grasso to file it in his name as plaintiff, so that the Clerk could assign a “MR”
miscellaneous remedy case number. Hence, the current form of caption and case number is a
product of the Court Clerk’s instructions and requirements for filing, and it cannot be concluded
here that Grasso intended a separate civil action, nor does he agree that the instant matter
constitutes such a separate civil action.
It was not Grasso who sought to file a separate civil suit, and while the matter was assigned
a new case number and the caption was rearranged because the Circuit Clerk insisted and would
not accept the Petition otherwise, the case remains for all intents and purposes a claim within “the
same civil action.” Consistent with this procedure, Grasso purposefully did not cause new
summons to issue. He served former counsel for Mueller with a Notice who attended the initial
hearing, consistent with Grasso’s position here.
Grasso also has separately filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court’s dismissal of the Grasso
137 Petition on the basis that Rule 137 by its terms applies to election challenges and Grasso is
entitled to a remedy which cannot be deprived pursuant to the Illinois Constitution. Unless the
Circuit Court accepts a sanctions petition from “within the same civil action” (i.e. from a tribunal
under its governance), not only is Grasso deprived a remedy for this particular violation, but a
fortiori frivolous election challenges are rendered inexplicably immune and not subject to the same
pleading rules and requirements as other civil claims in Illinois, which at least facially would run
counter to established public policy.
C 163
ARGUMENT
A. Section 2-615 Governs Rule 137 Motions, and Mueller’s Motion is Substantially
Insufficient in Law.
Muller’s motion is substantially insufficient in law because it does not address a
sanctionable statement in Grasso’s motion. Section 2-615 allows for motions to dismiss
“pleadings”. The Illinois Supreme Court has determined that Section 2-615 applies to Rule 137,
which treats sanctions motions as an added count to a complaint, superseding conflicting decisions
in the lower courts. Krautsack v Anderson, 223 Il.2d 54 (2006); John G. Phillips & Assoc. v.
Brown, 197 Ill.2d 337 (2001).
A proper Rule 137 sanctions claim must identify (a) each pleading, motion or other paper
filed by the opposing party which contains a sanctionable statement and identify (b) the allegedly
sanctions statement(s) contained in each document. Rule 137; see, e.g., Marriage of Adler, 271
Ill.App.3d 469 (1st Dist. 1995); Whitmer v. Munson, 335 Ill.App.3d 501 (1st Dist. 2002); Marriage
of Naylor, 220 Ill.App.3d 366 (1st Dist. 1991). Rule 137 is penal in nature and must be strictly
construed. Dismuke v RandCook Auto Sales, Inc., 378 Ill.App.3d 214, 217 (1st Dist. 2007) (“The
party seeking to have sanctions imposed by the court must demonstrate that the opposing litigant
made untrue and false allegations without reasonable cause.”) Id. (emphasis added).
Fundamentally, Mueller must first identify the “pleading, motion and other document”
signed by the attorney of record or the party himself which would constitute a violation. Mueller
does not and cannot meet the standard of the rule and thus cannot ask the Court for relief here. For
the simple reason that the Mueller 137 Motion is insufficiently pled, his motion should be
dismissed under 2-615.
C 164
B. Responding to Mueller’s 137 Motion, it fails because it does not identify any sanctionable
pleading in Grasso’s Rule 137 Petition.
Mueller cannot establish any entitlement to sanctions because Mueller fails to show the
substance of a pleading that Grasso filed which violated Rule 137. The sole allegation and claim
made by Mueller is not that Grasso’s pleading was in any way false or unwarranted by existing
law or good-faith argument for the extension, etc., of existing law. Rather, Mueller’s only essential
claim is that the Grasso 137 Petition was filed in a wrong forum (this Court) or constitutes a
separate suit under Rule 137(b), neither of which in itself constitutes an established violation of
Rule 137. 1 Grasso attempted to seek sanctions “within the same civil action” but in order for the
Circuit Clerk to accept the Petition, the Circuit Clerk insisted that it be refiled to receive a new
case number because there was no other way for the Circuit Clerk to process the “miscellaneous
remedy” it assigned to characterize the proceeding.
Mueller would have this Court address the merits of the Grasso 137 Petition without any
reference to the fact that it proceeded from Mueller’s filing a frivolous and vexatious election
challenge that was summarily dismissed by the Burr Ridge elections commission. 2 Here, Mueller
anchors his motion to a filing procedure that cannot support the motion. Without being able to
point to a sanctionable statement in the Grasso 137 Petition, Mueller fails to designate a
sanctionable statement in Grasso’s motion and as such Mueller’s motion should be denied. In re
Estate of Hanley, 2013 IL App (3d) 110264.
1
For Grasso to have a remedy against a false election challenge he maintains that his Sanctions Petition was and is
“within the civil action” as the only available venue where a court has power under Rule 137, and thus is the same
“civil action” - not “a separate civil suit.”
2
Mueller through counsel has demonstrated a failure to understand that filing a section 2-615 motion subjected
Mueller to this Court’s jurisdiction and now has filed a fundamentally flawed Rule 137 motion that does not address
the elements of such a motion and compounds its deficiencies by violating Illinois Rule of Evidence 408. This
constitutes a repeated lack of fundamental knowledge – or basic disregard – for the essential procedure that must be
followed in these proceedings.
C 165
C. Mueller Cannot “Have it Both Ways” by Seeking Dismissal as a “Separate Civil Suit”
while Simultaneously Seeking Sanctions in the “Same Civil Action”.
Mueller presents the Court with conflicting positions and seeks to avail himself of both
positions in turn: that Grasso is subject to sanctions because he brought a “separate civil suit” while
contemporaneously seeking to proceed against Grasso for sanctions in the “same civil action”. In
this case, Mueller’s dual positions underscore that the distinctions he draws between “separate
civil suit” and “same civil action” are mere semantics rather than substantial. Based upon the
Court’s ruling, it only has jurisdiction over Mueller because he fumbled the jurisdiction motion by
filing a substantive 2-615 motion. The record demonstrates this was not an intentional waiver of
service. Mistaking the procedural rules should not be grounds to be heard now under Rule 137.
The record supports that Grasso did not cause summons to issue in connection with the
Grasso 137 Petition because he filed in form and timing in the same civil action. Prior counsel for
Mueller in the election challenge was previously served (or appeared). Thus, Mueller was never
served with process here because it would not be necessary. Current counsel for Mueller
voluntarily filed the motions without Mueller being served and procedurally waived an opportunity
to properly argue what he now argues here.
The Court expressly noted that the latter motion for dismissal waived the former about the
lack of service, thus waiving Muller’s rights and subjecting Mueller to the Court’s jurisdiction
here. The Court then granted the 2-615 motion, finding that Grasso’s 137 Petition was “a separate
civil suit” that was prohibited by Rule 137(b). While Grasso disagrees with the 2-615 ruling, based
upon that ruling, a fortiori the Court would have granted the service / jurisdiction motion on the
same basis and thus Mueller would never be under the court’s jurisdiction. Where it was Mueller’s
C 166
own missteps that bring him to the instant moment, he should not now be permitted to be heard to
invoke Rule 137.
D. Mueller’s Impermissible Attempts to Inject a Settlement Communication as a Basis for his
Motion Should be Admonished and Rejected.
Mueller can couch his representations in whatever sort of euphemism he prefers, but it does
nothing to change his impermissible attempt to utilize a settlement communication protected by
Illinois Rule of Evidence 408. Knowing Grasso is an elected official, Mueller has gone so far as
to cause the settlement communication to be published in the media as a means to threaten and
harass Grasso as though Mueller’s couching of it constitutes it as fact. Mueller utterly fails to
establish how the substance of the communication is in any way untoward, impermissible or a
credible basis for sanctions. Mueller has never denied that someone else was behind the challenge
and paid his legal bills to bring the challenge. Mueller’s attempt to feign outrage or appear
indignant should be regarded as further posturing and deflection from his frivolous election
challenge. Indeed, in various factual contexts courts do look to discover who is behind
sanctionable proceedings.
For example, in Rankin v Heidlebaugh, 321 Ill.App.3d 255 (5th Dist. 2001), the appellate
court examined a case in which a mentally disabled adult “Joe” with the functioning of a 4- or 5-
year-old child was taken from his adoptive parents and placed in a group home for alleged abuse
by his adoptive parents which was later determined to be factually without merit. The appellate
court noted that the group home began receiving $2,000 a month from the state to care for Joe.
With the group home’s lawyer having purported to represent Joe but “funded by others”, they
caused Joe’s parents “to expend thousands of dollars to defend a position the parents had held for
years without benefit of the Courts: that of Joe’s guardian.” Id. at 265-66.
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Regarding the group home, the trial court indicated that it would not have hesitated to
sanction it “assuming the Court had the authority”, but that “Rule 137 is for lawyers and does not
apply to them [i.e., the group home]”. Id. at 266. The appellate court reversed the trial court,
holding that the underlying group home “client” could be subject to sanctions under Rule 137
because of its “position” as the attorney’s employer. Id. It held that a principal is liable for the acts
of its agent committed within the scope of her authority. Id. at 266-67, citing Brubakken v.
Morrison, 240 Ill.App.3d 680 (1st Dist. 1992). The court was not amused that another was the
driving force behind the sanctionable filing and did what it could to uncover the actual party. That
may ultimately not be possible in our case here, but courts do not want frivolous filings and will
do their best to exact sanctions against the true responsible party where that can occur. It is the
reason Rule 137 exists. Thus, it was perfectly reasonable to seek the true person(s) behind Mueller.
At this stage, the allegations in the Grasso 137 Petition should be taken as true. Therein, he
noted and reserved rights to add Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution causes of action
against anyone who assisted Mueller in his bogus challenge. Mueller has not attempted to deny
that Grasso’s suspicions are correct. Indeed, the election commission opinion shows that Mueller
withdrew one challenge after the motion to dismiss and weakly argued the notary scrivener error.
Mueller utterly fails to establish how Grasso’s seeking to learn the identity of the individual(s)
behind the election challenge is in any way a sanctionable violation against Grasso. Arguably, the
only impropriety regarding the settlement discussions concerned Mueller’s attempt to use those
settlement communications here, which is clearly barred by Illinois Rule of Evidence 408 and
should not be permitted.
C 168
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Petitioner-Movant Gary Grasso asks the Court to: (1) dismiss Mueller’s
Rule 137 Motion under 2-615 for failing to state facts supporting such a motion, and also (2) deny
it for similar and additional reasons set forth herein and (3) expressly admonish Mueller for
violating Illinois Rule of Evidence 408 and (4) for such other and further relief this Court deems
just and equitable.
GARY GRASSO
/s/ Adam R. Bowers

By: Adam R. Bowers, Esq.
one of his attorneys
GRASSO LAW, P.C.

Hinsdale, IL 60521
(630) 654-4500
DuPage #: 31780
10
C 169
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 14962835
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 9/24/2021 9:31 PM
CK
C 170
Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/1-109, the undersigned certifies
that the statements set forth herein are true and correct.
the referenced DEFENDANT MUELLER'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF IDS MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF GARY GRASSO PURSUANT TO SUPREME
COURT RULE 137 to be served by on the parties listed above by electronic mail.
Isl M. Neal Smith

M. NEAL SMITH
4845-8796-6460v.1 2
C 171
Candice Adams
DUPAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS e-filed in the 18th Judicial Circuit Court
DuPage County
GARY GRASSO ) ENVELOPE: 14962835
2021MR000158
) FILEDATE: 9/24/2021 9:31 PM
Plaintiff, ) Date Submitted: 9/24/2021 9:31 PM
) Date Accepted: 9/27/2021 8:41 AM
CK
v. ) Case No.: 2021 MR 158
)
STEVEN MUELLER, )
)
Defendant. )
DEFENDANT MUELLER’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

AGAINST PLAINTIFF GARY GRASSO PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RULE 137
NOW COMES defendant Steven Mueller (“Mueller”), by and through his attorneys, and
for his Reply in support of his Motion for Sanctions states as follows:
INTRODUCTION
In his Response and “2-615 Counter-Motion to Dismiss” Gary Grasso (“Grasso”) attempts
to extricate himself from the legal hole he is in, but Grasso only ends up digging it deeper. With
each filing in this case, Grasso doubles down on the same baseless positions he first took in his
“Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions.” If this Court does not meaningfully sanction Grasso, it will
have emboldened a legal bully who has no qualms with brazenly abusing the legal process in full
view of everyone.
ARGUMENT
I. Muller’s motion for sanctions against Grasso is clear and precise and
in compliance with Rule 137.
Where a pleading, motion or other document in a civil action is violative of Rule 137,
parties are directed by the plain language of Rule 137 to raise the claim by motion. Muller did
exactly that in filing his “Motion for Sanctions Against Plaintiff Gary Grasso Pursuant to Supreme
C 172
Court Rule 137.” Section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure is for attacking defects in
pleadings. 735 ILCS 5/2-615. While Mueller’s motion seeking sanctions against Grasso is
deemed a new claim in this matter—Rule 137 provides that such motions are considered a claim
within the same civil action—the motion is not a pleading that can be attacked using 2-615.
That procedural note aside, Mueller’s motion is clear and specific about why sanctions are
sought against Grasso, and Mueller satisfies the requirements for a Rule 137 motion. “It is well
settled that ‘[a] motion for sanctions must meet minimum requirements of specificity so that a
responding party has an opportunity to challenge and defend against the allegations made and so
that fees and costs may be fairly apportioned.’” Whitmer v. Munson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 501, 512
(1st Dist. 2002). Mueller’s motion specifies that the “Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions” filed by
Grasso was not well grounded in law or a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and Mueller sets forth the reasons why. Grasso does not claim—nor can
he—that Grasso has been insufficiently informed about why Rule 137 sanctions are sought against
him.
If not for the “Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions” that Grasso filed there would have been no
Case No. 2021 MR 158 in DuPage County and Mueller would not have been a defendant in a civil
court action where money damages are sought against Mueller. In this case, all the ink spilled by
Grasso after the “Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions” has also been frivolous and violative of Rule
137 because the purpose of each of his subsequent filings has been to support, in some way, the
“Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions” or the arguments made therein. Mueller was not required to
identify specific factually untrue paragraphs in the “Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions” because the
grounds for Mueller’s motion was that Grasso’s pleading was legally baseless and infirm. Again,
the entirety of Grasso’s “Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions” was not warranted by law, or by a good
C 173
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. In Ashley v. Scott, 266
Ill. App. 3d 302, 307 (1st Dist. 1994), a defendant was awarded all or nearly all of his legal
expenses because, but for the original frivolous pleading that brought the defendant into the
litigation, the defendant would not have been involved in the lawsuit at all. Where a defendant
would not have been in a lawsuit but for a frivolous pleading in violation of Rule 137, the fact that
the defendant had unsuccessful motions during the litigation does not mean he cannot recover for
the entirety of his legal fees. See Ashley, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 307.
Grasso also make a nonsensical argument that Mueller should not be allowed to invoke
Rule 137 because Mueller’s motion to dismiss based on 735 ILCS 5/2-301 was not granted. Even
if the argument was correct (it is flat wrong), the Court still has the power on its own initiative to
sanction Grasso under the plain language of Rule 137.
II. As anticipated, Grasso argues that he should be able to strong-arm his

opponents with impunity by threatening to prolong meritless litigation
as long as Grasso labels his communications “FOR RESOLUTION
PURPOSES ONLY.”
Grasso though he could get away with making strong-arm demands that Mueller divulge
certain information by labeling correspondences “FOR RESOLUTION PURPOSES ONLY” and
then arguing that Supreme Court Rule 408 prohibits the use in evidence of settlement
communications. In his motion for sanctions against Grasso, Mueller anticipated that Grasso
would make this very argument and Mueller noted there as he does here that settlement
communications are permitted to be used in evidence for certain purposes, including establishing
bad faith. See Ill. R. Evid. 408(b). Establishing bad faith is precisely why Grasso’s “settlement
communications” were attached as exhibits.
In his “settlement communication” Grasso brazenly acknowledges that his purpose in filing
the “Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions” against Mueller in DuPage County Circuit Court was not
C 174
actually to pursue Mueller, but, rather, to pursue “the person or persons…who put Mueller up to
this meritless challenge.” See Exhibit 6 to Mueller’s motion for sanctions. In other words, Grasso
freely acknowledged that he had filed the action for the purpose of accomplishing an outcome that
Grasso had no legal recourse to accomplish directly. This is precisely the type of bad faith that
settlement communications can be used as evidence to show.
CONCLUSION
Grasso’s abuse of the judicial system should not be tolerated, and this Court has an
opportunity to show that egregious abuses of the legal system will not evade punishment, no matter
how politically powerful the offending party may be. It is especially important here for another
reason: Grasso remains unrepentant and continues to state or imply that further frivolous pleadings
may be in the offing. For the most recent example, see p. 9 of Grasso’s Response where he again
mentions his supposed “Abuse of Process” and “Malicious Prosecution” causes of action.
WHEREFORE, Steven Mueller seeks an order (i) determining that Grasso’s filing of the
“Rule 137 Petition for Sanctions” and arguments in support of the filing are violative of Rule 137;
(ii) awarding reasonable costs and attorney fees following prove-up of same, (iii) requiring a public
apology from Grasso, and (iv) for such other and further relief as appropriate.
STEVEN MUELLER
By:___/s/ M. Neal Smith_______________

Firm No. 71875
M. Neal Smith
630.929.3639 (ph)
C 175
Candice Adams
GARY GRASSO, ) e-filed in the 18th Judicial Circuit Court
DuPage County
) FILEDATE: 9/24/2021 6:05 PM
v. ) Case No. 2021 MR 158
)
STEVEN N. MUELLER, ) JF
)
PETITIONER’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AUGUST 9, 2021 ORDER
NOW COMES Petitioner Gary Grasso, by Grasso Law PC, and for his Reply in Support
of his Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s August 9, 2021 Order, states as follows:
INTRODUCTION
Mueller effectively concedes that Grasso’s Motion to Reconsider is well taken by asserting
that Grasso has no remedy for a frivolous election challenge. (“What this means in the present
context is that the winning party (Grasso) in a matter before an electoral board must look to statute
for authorization to pursue a damages claim against the losing party (Mueller) on the grounds that
the objection was frivolous. Illinois has no provision authorizing such a claim…” Response. p. 3.)
As Grasso asserted in the Motion, it was error for the trial court to dismiss Grasso’s Petition as a
separate case when there was and is no other way to obtain a remedy, which is contrary to the
Constitution, and why Rule 137 exists. Grasso followed exactly what Rule 137 requires.
The Court mistakenly characterized the Petition as a “separate suit” under Rule 137(b)
which refers to filing within the “same civil action” versus filing a separate “suit”. The plain
meaning of this rule is that a Rule 137 motion arises and is confined to the same civil action. It
seeks a sanctions remedy and is not a damages case. The mechanism by which this is achieved
C 176
might require, as it did here (because the Circuit Clerk insisted upon it), the assignment of a new
case number and a rearrangement of the caption. As noted, Grasso used the same caption and
election commission number and only sought sanctions. A new case number is sometimes assigned
when, inter alia, a case is transferred to a different division or remanded on appeal. However, in
those instances and the one here, the definition of the case as the “same civil action” is unchanged,
notwithstanding a procedural change in case number or caption.
ARGUMENT
Mueller argues that Article 12 of the Illinois Constitution is not a “right” but rather an
“expression of philosophy”, citing McAlister v Schick, 147 Ill.2d 84, 98 (1992) and the 1972 case
of Sullivan v Midlothian Park Dist., 51 Ill. 2d 274, 277 without even generally explaining either
case. However, when the cases are read “right” vs. “philosophy”, such is a distinction without a
difference because both cases are premised on the existence of a remedy, just not the limitless ones
each plaintiff was seeking. Each case implicitly if not explicitly recognized there must a remedy
for wrongs.
McAlister is the well-known case that upheld the constitutionality of requiring an attorney
(or pro se plaintiff) affidavit that he/she has consulted with a health professional who has deemed
there to be a meritorious medical malpractice case - better known as Section 2-622 of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure. There, the case did not rise or fall on Article I, Section 12 of the Illinois
Constitution; indeed, the plaintiff argued that Section 2-622 violated the separation of powers
provision of the Illinois Constitution, that the affidavit usurped the court’s province to hear and
determine medical malpractice cases. So, Mueller missed the actual issue.
C 177
Outside of that primary argument, the plaintiff in McAlister also argued that he was
guaranteed a “certain remedy” without bounds based on Article I, Section 12. In explaining that
section (and the meaning behind “certain remedy”) the Supreme Court wrote:
“This court has stated that the “certain remedy” provision is merely an expression
of philosophy, and does not mandate that a certain remedy be provided in any form
for any alleged wrong. (Mega v. Holy Cross Hospital (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 416, 424.)
In Mega the court found that the constitutional right to a remedy was not violated
by application of a four-year medical malpractice limitations period, even though
its effect was to bar injuries discovered after that time. Mega, 111 Ill. 2d at 423-24.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second District on the question of requiring adherence to
Section 2-622, which it held was not unconstitutional and did not deprive the plaintiff there of a
remedy. Indeed, the existence of a remedy was fundamental to the McAlister holding. In effect,
the Supreme Court in no way dismissed the constitutional right to a remedy as “mere philosophy”
but upheld it on the basis that the plaintiff there had a remedy (i.e., there was no unconstitutional
violation of the remedy clause). The McAlister court found that the benefit of requiring adherence
to Section 2-622 outweighed any burden on the plaintiff to comply.
McAlister holds that the Legislature can limit or burden a remedy when there is a legitimate
state interest in doing so. Additional examples include statutes of limitations and repose and other
affidavits of merit. McAlister recognizes that the philosophy of our state is that there must be
remedies for wrongs – but noted that philosophy did not mean a plaintiff had a right to a remedy
that is certain in the sense that it is particular. Limitation yes; deprivation no.
McAlister actually assists Grasso’s argument because the effect of the trial court’s
dismissal here is that there is no remedy at all for a frivolous election challenge. Grasso’s remedy
is not merely limited or burdened in some way, rather there is no “key” to opening the door to a
remedy as the Supreme Court indicated was present in McAlister. Mueller brazenly argues in his
Response that the Court should leave it that way. That is unjust and inconsistent with Rule 137.
C 178
Grasso did not file a law division case, or a damages case. No Complaint was filed. The
Circuit Clerk recognized Grasso’s Petition for what it seeks – sanctions – and assigned it a “MR”
number. Grasso’s point, finally admitted by Mueller, is that it is open season in Illinois to file
frivolous election challenges because there is no remedy against them. Mueller now seeks this
Court’s imprimatur on that contention. Rule 137 is a rule for all proceedings, including Mueller’s.
It is a gate-keeper promulgated by our Supreme Court to be administered by the Court here.
Mueller’s other cornerstone case, Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 51 Ill.2d 274 (1972),
when read, again assists Grasso’s argument that there has to be a remedy. That case involved an
action seeking damages for injuries suffered by a minor while riding a merry-go-round operated
by the defendant. Id. at 275. The issue there concerned the application of the Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act. The Supreme Court stated as to the certain remedy clause:
Provisions similar to section 19 of article II, of the constitution of 1870 were

contained in the constitutions of 1818 (art. VIII, sec. 12) and 1848 (art. XIII, sec.
12). An examination of the opinions in which these provisions have been
considered demonstrates that section 19 of article II and its predecessors are an
expression of a philosophy and not a mandate that a “certain remedy” be provided
in any specific form or that the nature of the proof necessary to the award of a
judgment or decree continue without modification. Thus in Heck, a “Heart Balm”
statute was held invalid because its effect was to leave one who suffered injury
with no remedy, and in Smith v. Hill (1958), 12 Ill.2d 588, a statute which did not
abolish the common-law remedy but severely limited the damages recoverable, was
held to be valid. 51 Ill. 2d at 277-78 (emphasis added).
Once again, Mueller misstates the holding. Sullivan too stands for the proposition that the
philosophy of the Constitution is to provide a remedy within the sound discretion of the Legislature
– not that there be a “certain [or particular] remedy” that a plaintiff may want to exist, or
conversely, that there be no limitations or burdens placed upon obtaining such a remedy. Sullivan
assists Grasso because it bolsters the necessity of adherence to the “philosophy”: the Supreme
Court signaled its intention that there be remedies for wrongs, which is the “philosophy” of this
C 179
state. Consistent with that philosophy, the Supreme Court also does not want frivolous civil
actions. That’s why Rule 137 exists.
More to the point, and the very reason that Mueller’s Rule 137 slap motion is ill conceived
and without merit is that Grasso is seeking to advance a principle for which there may not be an
available statute (or more precisely, procedural mechanism) but for which Rule 137 is precisely
applicable. There is no dispute that Rule 137 is intended to thwart frivolous lawsuits. This
objective is so strong that a court exercised all its power under Rule 137 to sanction a party based
upon the actual driving force behind the false pleading. Rankin v Heidlebaugh, 321 Ill.App.3d 255
(5th Dist. 2001) (cited and explained in Grasso’s Response to Mueller’s Rule 137 motion). This
Court is well within its authority to take up such a petition and hear it on the merits.
Grasso stated at the outset that he could not find a defined procedural path from the election
board in which to apply Rule 137, but it followed that since this Court was the procedural path for
appeals, it was the appropriate court to which a Rule 137 petition should be presented. Grasso
explained and the record shows that he filed the petition with the same caption and number, but
that it was the Circuit Clerk who insisted Grasso invert the caption, drop the election board number,
and a “MR” number would be assigned. In essence, Grasso contends in this motion to reconsider
that the court applied form over substance and should have given credence to the applicablity of
Rule 137 to a frivolous election challenge – especially when it appears to be the product of an
undisclosed driving force.
CONCLUSION
Mueller’s Rule 137 Motion fails and Grasso’s 137 Petition should be reinstated because
Grasso is advocating for the application of a remedy that exists at law but potentially lacks a
mechanism within the context of election challenges. In contrast to other forms of litigation,
C 180
election challenges are used as political foils meant to deplete the resources of candidates and
hinder their candidacy to elected office. Oftentimes, candidates (especially those seeking to hold
regional or municipal elected offices) largely fund their own campaigns and have high aspirations
for public service but are far more vulnerable to election challenges, for the simple reason that they
are not usually as well funded or staffed as those seeking higher elected offices who are backed
with funding from their political parties and action committees.
The trial court should not countenance Mueller thumbing his nose in the face of this Court
and gloating at having brought a frivolous election challenge (at considerable time and expense to
Grasso and the Village of Burr Ridge) for which – according to Mueller – there is no remedy. One
need not speculate whether this will encourage future impunity for the likes of Mueller (and in
particular those who lurk in the shadows paying the bills of the likes of Mueller) in the future.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner asks the Court to reconsider and vacate its ruling and allow this
motion for sanctions to proceed on its merits.
GARY GRASSO
/s/ Adam R. Bowers

By: Adam R. Bowers, Esq.
one of his attorneys
GRASSO LAW, P.C.

Hinsdale, IL 60521
(630) 654-4500
DuPage #: 31780
C 181
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 15142027
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 10/8/2021 3:16 PM
JC
C 182
Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to 735 ILCS 511-109, the undersigned
The undersigned states that he caused a copy of this NOTICE OF FILING and a
copy of the referenced DEFENDANT-APPELLANT GARY MUELLER'S NOTICE OF
APPEAL to be served on the parties listed above by electronic mail and by first class
mail, proper postage paid, this 81h day of October, 2021.
Isl M. Neal Smith, Esq

Attorney for Steven Mueller
M. Neal Smith
Lisle, IL 6532
Ph: 630.929.3639
DuPage County No. 71875
4845-8 796-6460v .1 2
C 183
Candice Adams
DuPage County
ENVELOPE: 15142027
2021MR000158
FILEDATE: 10/8/2021 3:16 PM
JC
C 184
Respectfully Submitted ,
Isl M. Neal Smith, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant Steven
Mueller
M. Neal Smith
550 Warrenville Road , Suite 460
Lisle, IL 6532
Ph : 630 .929 .3639
Fax: 630-783-3231
DuPage No . 71875
ARDC No. 6284023
C 185

Steven Mueller&#39;s Litigation With Burr Ridge Mayor Gary Grasso

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2-21-0594

APPEAL TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

1 Volume(s) of the Common Law Record, containing 185 pages

(Clerk of the Circuit Court or Administrative Agency)

CANDICE ADAMS, CLERK OF THE 18th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT ©

COMMON LAW RECORD - TABLE OF CONTENTS

Date Filed Title/Description Page No.

This document is generated by eappeal.net

CANDICE ADAMS, CLERK OF THE 18th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT ©

COMMON LAW RECORD - TABLE OF CONTENTS

Date Filed Title/Description Page No.

CANDICE ADAMS, CLERK OF THE 18th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT ©

02/17/2021 10200 FIRST-NAMED PLAINTIFF

Date Code Service Rendered Obligor Assessed Applied Due

Obligor Assessed Applied Due

precedent directly contrary to Mueller's challenge on both issues.

instead of 2020 could invalidate the Statement of Candidacy.

via Zoom nor did he call in on the provided call-in number.

and set forth its bases in writing.

Court deems equitable.

STEVEN N. MUELLER, ) Candice Adams

To: Robert Windon, Esq.

Dated: March 8, 2021

GRASSO LAW, PC Respectfully submitted,

Robert Windon, Esq.

CASE TITLE GARY GRASS -VS- STEVEN N MUELLER

Tlus case IS set for heanng on 0511712021

served upon you.

Dated: April 29, 2021

Robert Windon, Esq. Steven Mueller

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

Submitted by: GARY GRASSO

CANDICE ADAMS, CLERK OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT © Page 1 of 1

To: Robert Windon, Esq. M. Neal Smith

which is hereby served upon you.

Dated: June 11, 2021

/s/ Gary Grasso

Robert Windon, Esq. M. Neal Smith

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND CAPTION

allowing the caption to be amended and in support thereof, states:

of that communication is attached as Exhibit B.

there was no caption in the court system.

11, 2021 as noted.

A copy of that communication is attached as Exhibit C.

deems best to address the merits of the Petition.

/s/ Gary Grasso

1. I am a paralegal at Grasso Law, PC, Hinsdale, IL 60521.

RULE 137 PETITION FOR SANCTIONS

Rule 137, and in support thereof states:

1. Gary Grasso is the Mayor of Burr Ridge, DuPage County, IL.

2021 municipal elections.

3. Steven R. Mueller, a resident of Burr Ridge filed a challenge to Grasso’s petition

precedent directly contrary to Mueller’s challenge on both issues.

instead of 2020 could invalidate the Statement of Candidacy.

via Zoom nor did he call in on the provided call-in number.

and set forth its bases in writing.

Court deems equitable.

Envelope Id Submitted Date Submitted User Name

Location Category Case Type

Case Cross Reference Number

Case Cross Reference Number Case Cross Reference Type

38825 DuPage Attorney/Firm Number/Self-Represented Litigant Number

Party Type Party Name Lead Attorney

Plaintiff/Petitioner Gary Grasso

Steven Mueller's Litigation With Burr Ridge Mayor Gary Grasso

Steven Mueller's Litigation With Burr Ridge Mayor Gary Grasso

By:/s/ M. Neal Smith_ _

By:/s/ M. Neal Smith_ _