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Teaching logic and teaching critical

thinking: revisiting McPeck
a
Susan Rebecca Robinson
a
Centre for Regional Engagement , University of South Australia ,
Whyalla, Australia
Published online: 03 May 2011.

To cite this article: Susan Rebecca Robinson (2011) Teaching logic and teaching critical
thinking: revisiting McPeck, Higher Education Research & Development, 30:3, 275-287, DOI:
10.1080/07294360.2010.500656

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 Higher Education Research & Development
Vol. 30, No. 3, June 2011, 275–287

Teaching logic and teaching critical thinking: revisiting McPeck

Susan Rebecca Robinson*

Centre for Regional Engagement, University of South Australia, Whyalla, Australia

(Received 3 January 2010; final version received 1 June 2010)
Taylor and Francis
CHER_A_500656.sgm

Higher
10.1080/07294360.2010.500656
0729-4360
Taylor
2011
30Article
30
Dr
susan.robinson@unisa.edu.au
000002011
SusanRobinson
&
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Development

This paper reappraises the view of John McPeck that critical thinking can only be
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taught within rather than across the disciplines. In particular the paper explores
one aspect of McPeck’s position: his resistance to teaching informal logic as a
means of teaching critical thinking. The paper draws upon the author’s experience
of teaching critical thinking in the USA, Britain and Australia to outline some of
the challenges and issues arising in devising and teaching courses in reasoning
and informal logic and seeks to show that McPeck’s misgivings are not entirely
well-founded.
Keywords: John McPeck; teaching critical thinking; teaching informal logic

Introduction
Defining critical thinking
The three decades that have elapsed since the publication of John McPeck’s (1981)
Critical thinking and education have seen a growing consensus regarding the
definition of critical thinking, plus the qualities and skills-set typifying the mature
critical thinker.
Discussions of critical thinking owe much to definitions devised by philosophers
such as John McPeck, John Ennis, John Chaffee and Richard Paul, who have moved
sideways into the area of critical thinking research. According to McPeck (1981),
‘critical thinking is the propensity and skill to engage in an activity with reflective
scepticism’ (pp. 7, 9, 152). Writers agree that critical thinking is not a narrow form of
criticality or ‘nay-saying’ to the views of other people. Ideas are accepted or rejected
based on the evidence used to back those claims and this is done with a view to help-
ing make better decisions and arriving at the truth (Halpern, 1998, p. 449; Verlinden,
2005, pp. 17, 3, 19). For this reason, the critical thinker finds fault with her own ideas
as much as she does with those of other people.
Some writers emphasize the dispositional nature of critical thinking. Dispositions
associated with critical thinking include ‘a passion for accurate, timely information’
and an openness to having one’s mind changed in the light of new evidence (Bassham,
Irwin, Nardone, & Wallace, 2005, p. 3; Cederblom & Paulsen, 2001). One of the key
dispositions of the critical thinker is a willingness to suspend judgment when the
circumstances call for this (Verlinden, 2005, p. 24). Ennis (1996, p. 9) identifies three
key critical thinking dispositions: caring that one’s beliefs are true and one’s decisions
justified, representing honestly the intellectual positions adopted by oneself and others

*Email: susan.robinson@unisa.edu.au

ISSN 0729-4360 print/ISSN 1469-8366 online

© 2011 HERDSA
DOI: 10.1080/07294360.2010.500656
http://www.informaworld.com
 276 S.R. Robinson

and caring about the dignity and worth of every person. Whereas we might identify
the first two as enabling dispositions or tendencies that must be present within the
thinker if critical thinking is to take place, the third is merely a facilitating disposition:
a tendency of mind that leads to critical thinking being conducted well wherever it
happens to take place.
David Perkins, who treats ‘good thinking’ and ‘critical thinking’ as more or less
synonymous (Perkins, Jay, & Tishman, 1994, p. 66) identifies seven thinking disposi-
tions underlying good (critical and creative) thinking. These are the dispositions to:
think in a broad and adventurous way, sustain intellectual curiosity, think across
multiple contexts and perspectives, build knowledge and understandings, be intellec-
tually careful and clear, seek truth through reasons and evidence and be metacognitive
and strategic in one’s thinking (Perkins, Jay, & Tishman, 1993a, p. 6, 1994, p. 73;
Tishman, Jay, & Perkins, 1993, p. 148). Perkins, Jay and Tishman, identify three
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components to each disposition: cognitive abilities, but also inclinations and sensitiv-
ities that trigger the use of those abilities (Perkins et al., 1993a, p. 4; Perkins, Tishman,
Ritchhart, Donis, & Andrade, 2000, p. 274; Tishman et al., 1993, p. 148).
Many commentators would see a link between critical thinking skills and reflec-
tive thinking. ‘Critical thinking is thinking about your thinking while you’re thinking
in order to make your thinking better’ (Paul, 1992, p. 7). Critical thinking involves
evaluating the thinking process itself and, as such, has important links with higher
order cognitive skills – thinking skills that are relatively complex, require judgment,
analysis, and synthesis and are not applied in a rote or mechanical manner (Halpern,
1998, p. 451).
The proliferation of information technologies has raised awareness of the impor-
tance of critical thinking for contemporary higher education. As early as 1989 the half-
life of information, or the time it takes for one half of the knowledge in a given field
to become obsolete, was being estimated at anything between five and ten years
(Crow, 1989, p. 9; Nelson, 1989, p. 20). In a situation where half the information
acquired in pursuing a degree will be obsolete within a decade, the ‘what’ a student
knows becomes less significant than the life-long skills in evaluating sources of infor-
mation that graduates bring to the workplace. Where students lack critical thinking
abilities, they run the risk of ‘having all of the answers but still not knowing what the
answers mean’ (Halpern, 1998, p. 450).
The perceived significance of critical thinking skills is reflected in the requirement
of many North American Liberal Arts Colleges and universities that students complete
at least one course in critical thinking prior to graduation (McPeck, 1981, p. 23; Moore,
2004, p. 5; Verlinden, 2005, p.16). In the Australian context, the educational impor-
tance of critical thinking is enshrined in the list of graduate attributes or qualities
promoted to their students by Australian universities. There are also signs that some
Australian universities may be following the North American trend of offering generic
critical thinking courses to all undergraduates.1

The generalist-specificist critical thinking debate

Since McPeck (1981) there has been a debate whether critical thinking is generic or
discipline-specific (Moore, 2004, p. 4). This debate reflects a disagreement between
‘generalists’ such as Ennis, who treat critical thinking as a universal, general skill and
a subject of study in itself, and ‘specifists’ like McPeck, who treat critical thinking as
a ‘loose category taking in diverse modes of thought’ (Moore, 2004, p. 4) and best
 Higher Education Research & Development 277

cultivated through prolonged immersion in the concerns and skills of a particular

discipline. The high and low point of this debate was reached in a series of acrimoni-
ous exchanges in the mid-1980s and early-1990s (Ennis, 1990; McPeck, 1985, 1990a;
Paul, 1984). Tim Moore (2004) differentiates between extreme specifist and ‘weaker
relativist’ positions (p. 14). The latter acknowledge students’ ability to carry critical
thinking skills across the disciplinary divide, but only after these skills have been
acquired within a home discipline. Common to both specifist and weak relativist posi-
tions is the belief that critical thinking can only be developed within specific contexts
of knowledge.
Davies (2006) argues that presenting the choice between generalist and specifist
approaches to teaching critical thinking as an ‘either-or’ option, as Moore (2004) does,
involves a ‘fallacy of the false alternative’ (Davies, 2006, p. 180). Davies recommends
viewing the two species of critical thinking as complementary contributors to
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students’ academic success. Students require generic reasoning skills, because ‘unless
students are capable of “deconstructing” … slabs of discourse into a series of premises
leading to a conclusion, it is not clear that they have learned anything substantial about
their subject’ (p. 190). At the same time, students require particular critical thinking
skills to outline ‘how the general principles are used and deployed in the service of
“academic tribes”’ (p. 191). Davies recommends an ‘infusion’ approach whereby
critical thinking is taught as a generic skill in the context of the disciplines. In later
articles, Davies (2008, 2009) describes one way of operationalising an ‘infusion’
approach: teaching computer-assisted argument mapping (CAAM) as part of the
subject curriculum within disciplines such as Accounting and encouraging students to
generate maps of the structure of arguments as part of essay-writing assignments. A
later section of this paper gives further thought to the benefits of CAAM in developing
critical thinking.
The US educational agenda for critical thinking apparently operationalises a
Generalist approach by treating critical thinking as a stand-alone course in informal
logic. The remainder of this paper assesses McPeck’s arguments against teaching
critical thinking in this way.

Can critical thinking be taught across the disciplines?

Anyone with a half-hour to spare and access to the catalogue of an average university
library will discover a plethora of texts with the terms ‘reasoning’, ‘argument’ or ‘crit-
ical thinking’, or some combination of these, appearing in the title. These texts appear
in many shapes and sizes. Some are rather brief (Haynes, 1987; Holt, 1987; van den
Brink-Budgen, 1996) and others substantial tomes (Dauer, 1989; Ennis, 1996;
Groarke & Tindale, 2004). The tone of many books is conversational and directed
towards the student (Epstein & Kernberger, 2006; van den Brink-Budgen, 1996;
Verlinden, 2005). Some offer a format which renders the student a self-instructor in
the art of thinking, working her way through the exercises and discussions contained
in the text, with the lecturer functioning as classroom facilitator to help students
confirm that they are developing thinking skills appropriately (Ennis, 1996; Epstein &
Kernberger, 2006). Some texts are interspersed with entertaining quotations related to
the topic of critical thinking (Bassham et al., 2005) and some with humorous cartoons
gleaned from the popular press or specially commissioned for that volume (Epstein &
Kernberger, 2006; Verlinden, 2005). Many texts illustrate good and poor forms of
reasoning using examples from advertising, the Internet (Epstein & Kernberger, 2006;
 278 S.R. Robinson

Groarke & Tindale, 2004) and editorials in the popular press, apparently oblivious to
McPeck’s (1981) complaint that ‘analysing readily accessible newspaper editorials
and advertisements’ is not ‘sufficient to create a critical thinker’ (p. 8). Some texts are
supported by instructors’ manuals and/or websites (Dauer, 1989; Groarke & Tindale,
2004). Some approach the subject of ‘reasoning’ wholly from the perspective of infor-
mal logic, whilst others place at least some stress on developing reading and writing
skills as aspects of critical thinking competency. Of the latter, some are intended to
accompany college courses on composition and writing (Chaffee, 2008; Wright,
2001), whilst others merely offer supplemental advice to students on writing argumen-
tative essays (Hughes & Lavery, 2008, p. 13). Some focus on rhetoric as they present
critical thinking from the perspective of the discipline of Communication (Verlinden,
2005). Some offer such detailed attention to logical techniques that it seems unlikely
they can function as textbook for a single-semester, stand-alone course (Dauer, 1989;
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Ennis, 1996), which might explain why these volumes in particular have not gone to
multiple editions.
Almost without exception, these textbooks are marketed as doing something that
McPeck and his advocates argue to be impossible: teaching critical thinking as a
generic skill of thinking and reasoning, as opposed to a competency that arises through
immersion in a discipline. The fact that the majority of texts consulted here have gone
to multiple editions provides presumptive evidence that these textbooks have proved
useful in the classroom. The question arises, are all of these texts, their authors and
publishers seriously deluded in what they are attempting to achieve? In order to
answer this question, it will be necessary to re-examine McPeck’s arguments. As well
as having introduced, constructed and lectured a critical thinking course for a philos-
ophy program in the UK, the author of this paper has acted as Teaching Assistant for
critical thinking courses in North America. She has attempted to instil and confirm
critical thinking skills in Higher Degree by Research students and in young academic
staff whilst working briefly as an academic developer at an Australian university. The
cumulative experience of teaching critical thinking across a range of academic
contexts informs many of the points developed below.
In the following it will be argued that:

(1) The proliferation of generic textbooks devoted to the topic of informal logic as
a form of critical thinking may provide evidence that generic courses in critical
thinking pitched at the level of informal logic are serving some useful intellec-
tual function, even if (as seems more than likely) these courses are not output-
ting fully-fledged critical thinkers.
(2) McPeck’s (1981, p. 21 and chap. 4) dismay that anyone might offer a course
in informal logic as a method of teaching critical thinking reflects the informal
logic textbooks available to McPeck in 1981. Here I briefly outline some
recent developments in the fields of informal logic and their implications for
teaching critical thinking skills.

What is taught in a generic critical thinking course?

Before considering McPeck’s arguments, it will be useful to understand the subject
matter typically taught in a stand-alone critical thinking course. Broadly speaking,
such courses tend to take one of three formats. Many courses in critical thinking or
reasoning blend elements of all three.
 Higher Education Research & Development 279

Text-based courses in reading and writing

Texts such as Chaffee (2008) are designed to service stand-alone college writing
courses. To some extent, these are courses and texts in critical writing and only inci-
dentally given over to the topic of critical thinking. Among other things, such courses
encourage students to answer comprehension questions based on textual excerpts and
promote the development of creative writing methods.

Generic reasoning courses

Generic reasoning courses might be serviced by texts such as Thomson (2002), Fisher
(2004), Groarke and Tindale (2004) or van den Brink-Budgen (1996). Typical subject
matter for such courses includes, but is not confined to, teaching students to differen-
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tiate between argumentative and non-argumentative forms of prose (Groarke &

Tindale, 2004, pp. 1–25) and using contextual clues plus premise-indicator and
conclusion-indicator words to distinguish reasons (premises) from claims (conclu-
sions) (Govier, 2005, pp. 4–6). Additional topics include: teaching students to identify
hidden assumptions required to complete the arguments that appear on the page, iden-
tifying intermediate conclusions drawn within extended pieces of reasoning and using
tree diagrams to demonstrate whether the reasons supporting a conclusions are linked,
convergent or divergent (Ennis, 1996, pp. 161–171; Fisher, 2004, pp. 10, 20; Groarke
& Tindale, 2004, pp. 33–50; Thomson, 2002).

Courses in informal logic and critical thinking

Courses in informal logic and critical thinking add a number of topics in informal
logic to the mix described for generic reasoning courses. These courses introduce
students to the language of argument appraisal, testing arguments for validity, sound-
ness and cogency (Bassham et al., 2005, p. 83; Rudinow & Barry, 1994, p. 202;
Verlinden, 2005, p. 59). Students learn to distinguish between inductive and deductive
forms of reasoning and a less rigorous form of argumentation known as ‘defeasible’
or ‘plausible’ (Walton, 2006, pp. 69–75). Students are introduced to notions such as
adopting a burden of proof in reasoning (Groarke & Tindale, 2004, pp. 138–139) and
applying the principle of charity when interpreting the positions adopted by opponents
(Bassham et al., 2005, pp. 46, 62; Ennis, 1996, p. 170; Govier, 2005, pp. 56–57).
Students may encounter some simple forms of valid argumentation (e.g. the forms
known as modus ponens and modus tollens) and be provided with a set of fallacy
labels to help them diagnose ways in which reasoning can go wrong.
The precise mix of topics from traditional logic courses finding their way into this
third type of course will reflect the judgment of the individual instructor, who must
weigh the needs of logical instruction against those of pedagogical simplification.
Where critical thinking courses are intended for a non-philosophical audience, the
instructor must compromise between introducing sufficient complexity to enable
students to handle real-world examples of argumentation and demoralising students
by demanding they master too many complex logical techniques. For instance, invit-
ing students to map the premises of a syllogism onto a Venn diagram offers a simple
and effective visual test for deductive validity – i.e. a glance at the diagram shows
whether the argument is valid or not – with obvious benefits for those students favour-
ing visual learning styles. Introducing syllogisms in this way requires instruction in
the logic of categorical statements (statements qualified by the terms ‘all’ ‘some’ and
 280 S.R. Robinson

‘none’). A student who understands categorical propositions learns how to challenge

a generalisation and will not make the elementary logical mistake of suggesting that
the denial of ‘all animals possess rights’ is the formula ‘no animals possess rights’.2
However, these benefits must be weighed against the real class time consumed in
introducing the topics of categorical statements, syllogisms and Venn diagrams.
Whatever else they do, courses in informal logic and reasoning tend to develop
skills in:

● identifying arguments by distinguishing between claims we are invited to accept

and reasons for accepting those claims;
● critiquing arguments by interrogating the relationship of support between
reasons or premises and claims or conclusions; and
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● constructing arguments by offering reasons to support positions.

All of these are key critical thinking skills. To the extent that these courses encourage
students to adopt critical responses to arguments, there is an apparent case for saying
that these courses set students on the path to becoming active critical thinkers. I will
now consider whether McPeck succeeds in showing that this is not the case.

Why McPeck believes that teaching informal logic is no way to teach

critical thinking
In Chapter 4, McPeck (1981) seeks to detach the two concepts when he argues that
there is no conceptual, logical or even contingent connection between informal logic
and critical thinking (p. 66). In particular, McPeck argues that: (1) informal logic is
not so much as necessary for critical thinking, since ‘there are (and have been) critical
thinkers in this world who have never heard of informal logic’ (p. 67). McPeck also
argues that (2) knowledge of informal logic is not sufficient for critical thinking
because ‘there are students who have mastered the required exercises in informal logic
texts yet in many other contexts would not qualify as critical thinkers’ (p. 23). McPeck
further wishes to show (3) that there is no useful connection to be made between infor-
mal logic and critical thinking that would justify proposing courses in informal logic
as a means of improving the critical thinking abilities of students. I shall address each
of these three claims in turn.
Claim 1. There are many people persuaded that they are doing good critical think-
ing within their subject areas who would be dismayed to be told they need to learn
something of the apparatus of informal logic in order to claim the title of critical
thinker. Within many disciplines becoming a critical thinker means becoming a knowl-
edgeable practitioner of the discipline. This is true of nursing, where the terms ‘clinical
judgment’, ‘clinical reasoning’ and ‘critical thinking’ are often used interchangeably
(Alfaro-LeFevre, 1995, p. 45) and a critical thinker is simply an experienced
practitioner who reliably displays good clinical judgement. The requirement that a
knowledgeable practitioner understand logic seems either redundant or discriminatory
or needlessly onerous, or all three.
Making some knowledge of the basic tools of logical analysis a precondition for
mastery of critical thinking would certainly seem onerous. This is because adopting
an informal logic approach to critical thinking risks forcing upon the student some of
the intellectual constraints of the philosophical discipline: using such terms as ‘argu-
ment’, ‘valid’ and ‘sound’ in a specially marked, narrow sense. Students must cease
 Higher Education Research & Development 281

thinking of an ‘argument’ as a verbal ‘fight’ and embrace the notion of an argument

as evidence (premises) offered in support of a claim (conclusion) (Bassham et al.,
2005, 30; Ennis, 1996, p. 2; Govier, 2005, p. 2; Verlinden, 2005, pp. 4–5). Likewise,
the notion of an ‘assumption’ is given a special role in a logical context (Ennis, 1996,
p. 161). For the individual already convinced of her higher-level thinking credentials
within her home discipline, this systematic re-scoping of terms seems misplaced and
redundant. In the eyes of some, pressing knowledge of informal logic upon the skilled
practitioner seems discriminatory because this implies that the logician is doing what-
ever the rest of us are doing when we argue critically – only somehow the logician is
doing it better.
In short, those who have developed deep expertise within their chosen discipline
are operating with many of the basic skills and dispositions of the critical thinker and
they happily do so without employing a series of philosophical labels. However, this
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is not to say that possessing a slightly more formalised understanding of the notions
of argument and evidencing a case would not assist many expert practitioners in artic-
ulating and reflect upon the nature of their existing practice. Increasing the ability to
describe one’s thinking processes improves the ability to engage in higher level thinking
about one’s thinking – identified above as a key component of critical thinking ability.
The notion that understanding the terminology of informal logic is not necessary
for critical thinking might not apply in the case of the critical thinking novice. Van
Gelder (2005, p. 44) notes that without some shared language, students will not under-
stand what instructors are saying about critical thinking and will fail to understand
how to correct their mistakes. Students looking to improve their critical thinking
performance acquire this common language by acquiring some theory of the nature of
argumentation. Historically, this shared language and theory of argumentation have
been provided by the discipline of (informal) logic. If he is serious in rejecting the use
of informal logic in critical thinking instruction, McPeck must locate some alternative
source for this language.
Statement 2 makes the point that the semester-long experience of manipulating the
tools of informal logic will not, taken alone, develop fully-fledged critical thinking
skills. This part of McPeck’s case against using informal logic to teach critical think-
ing reflects the dispositional nature of critical thinking competency. Developing as a
critical thinker involves developing thinking dispositions and, as Perkins et al. (1993b)
note, developing the values and belief structures upon which these dispositions rest (p.
78). Many teachers of stand-alone critical thinking courses would concede that
students might not succeed in internalising values by the end of a semester’s study.
However, this fact does not demonstrate that informal logic has no place in developing
critical thinking. At most this shows that a course in informal logic provides a first
step in the mastery of critical thinking and that early training in logical thinking skills
must be confirmed, scaffolded and supported by subsequent studies in her home disci-
pline if it is to provide lasting benefit to the student. Perkins et al. describe the process
of teaching good thinking as a matter of enculturation, whereby instructors create a
culture of thinking in the classroom in three mutually reinforcing ways: by providing
cultural exemplars, cultural interactions between students and direct instruction in the
thinking competencies they wish to instil in students (Perkins et al., 1993b, pp. 79–80;
Tishman et al., 1993, p. 150). All of this may be modelled within the disciplines so
that students, previously taught the notions of criticality and reason-finding in the
context of a generic thinking course, learn to identify matters worth expending their
critical skills upon within their home discipline. Alternatively, knowledge of the appa-
 282 S.R. Robinson

ratus of argument assessment might be taught directly in the home discipline, under
the infusion approach recommended by Davies.
Is McPeck correct in arguing that a stand-alone course devoted to informal logic
and critical thinking cannot a critical thinker make (Point 3, p. 280)? In the past
decade, the generalist cause has received encouragement from the results of introduc-
ing CAAM as a pedagogic device in stand-alone critical thinking courses. Teams
utilizing argument mapping softwares such as Reason!Able and its Austhink succes-
sor, Rationale, have recorded impressive gains in students’ critical thinking ability
across a single semester of study, gains in some cases exceeding those across three
years of undergraduate study (Davies, 2009; Twardy, 2004; van Gelder, 2001; van
Gelder, Bissett, & Cumming, 2004). Harrell (2007) points to significant student gains
in critical thinking in courses teaching old-fashioned pencil-and-paper argument
mapping. This suggests that the success of recent CAAM-led courses is not solely
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attributable to the computer platform. Some of these impressive gains may reflect the
benefits offered by graphic forms of argument representation. An argument map is a
diagram that uses easily recognizable visual cues (shape, line, colour and position on
a page) to convey information, with arrows indicating the direction of support from
premise-claim to conclusion-claim. Provided the mapping conventions are clear and
appropriate, inferential relations can be ‘read off’ the presentation in a more or less
mechanical way, allowing students to master the concept of evidential support after
minutes rather than weeks of instruction (van Gelder, 2001, p. 541, 2002, p. 100).
Argument maps generated by students allow instructors to ‘see’ what the student is
thinking (van Gelder, 2005, p. 45), allowing effective, prompt feedback.
The University of Melbourne Reason! Project, in particular, would attribute a large
part of its success not simply to argument mapping, but also to the adoption of a ‘quality
practice’ approach to training. Students were introduced to a regime of ‘deliberate prac-
tice’: practice that is motivated, scaffolded, guided and graduated in difficulty, allowing
good and frequent expert feedback to improve performance (van Gelder, 2001, p. 540,
van Gelder et al., 2004, p. 143). In short, in encouraging students to construct and eval-
uate arguments, the Reason! project was aiming to develop dispositional reasoning
tendencies in students within a relatively short period of time.
Recent successes with CAAM suggest that it may indeed be possible to set
students on the path to becoming critical thinkers after just a single semester of study.
This will only happen where study is structured on pedagogically sound principles and
students are encouraged to practice in an environment of scaffolded, structured
learning. Whilst McPeck might be right in saying that simple knowledge of informal
logic is not sufficient for critical thinking, deliberate practice in informal logic might,
in the words of van Gelder et al. (2004) ‘allow individuals to go beyond ordinary
competence’ (p. 143).

Fallacies and informal logic

McPeck devotes much of Chapter 4 to uncovering the perceived deficiencies of the
sub-discipline of philosophy known as informal logic (McPeck’s point 3, above).
McPeck complains that informal logic textbooks betray a fascination with naming and
describing fallacies that serves to obscure the theoretically thin nature of the underly-
ing subject matter. In particular, the focus upon fallacies serves to disguise the fact
that logicians possess no underlying theory of the nature of informal logic and no
decent theory of fallacies (McPeck, 1981, pp. 67, 72–78).
 Higher Education Research & Development 283

The books surveyed here apparently bear out McPeck’s contention that textbooks
in informal logic demonstrate more fascination with fallacies than understanding of
their nature, function and meaning for the field of informal logic. Most writers agree
that informal fallacies involve a ‘mistake’ (Hamblin, 1970, p. 12) in reasoning, but
apparently disagree in locating the source of error. Fallacies are variously described
as arguments that seem to be valid but are not so; ‘unreliable inferences’ (Rudinow &
Barry, 1994, p. 207); ‘bad arguments of a type agreed to be unrepairable’ (Tindale,
2007, p. 1); ‘erroneous but frequently persuasive ways of being led from a reason to
a conclusion’ (Dauer, 1989, p. 72); poor arguments that seem more cogent than they
really are (Govier, 2005, p. 128); a particular kind of egregious error that seriously
undermines the power of reason in an argument (Epstein & Kernberger, 2006, p. 199).
Writers also disagree over the number of fallacies to discuss, offering anything from
15 distinct fallacy labels (Chaffee, 2008) to 70 (Verlinden, 2005).
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The manner in which writers scatter discussions of fallacies across their texts
confirms the impression that, for these writers at least, there exists no agreed theory
of the way fallacies relate to everyday arguments. Their interest in fallacies is such
that few writers bother to offer the reader a rationale for their study. Exceptions
include Epstein, who describes knowledge of the fallacies as a ‘prophylactic against
being taken in’ (Epstein & Kernberger, 2006, p. 203), and Verlinden, who expresses
a belief that knowledge of the fallacies provides knowledge of the various common
ways that arguments go wrong and this improves the student’s skill in making and
analysing arguments. In his more defensive moments Verlinden offers the throwaway
remark that knowledge of the fallacies is ‘appropriate for someone with a college
education’ (Verlinden, 2005, pp. 43, xviii). Many writers recommend caution in using
these fault-finding tools (Ennis, 1996, p. xxii; Rudinow & Barry, 1994, p. 289; Verlin-
den, 2005, p. 44) – and for a variety of reasons: because these labels are intimidating
to those who don’t know them; because a single argument can exemplify more than
one fallacy or error in reasoning and because accusing an arguer of fallacy involves
making a charge we must be able to back up with reasons.
Research conducted by informal logicians over the last three decades serves to
undermine many of McPeck’s observations. This research stresses the ‘new dialectic’,
a new framework of rationality for thinking and arguing (Tindale, 2007; Walton,
1998, 2006). Under this conception an argument is not something static on a page, but
the real words of real people looking to persuade others. The basic dialectical situation
takes the form of a dialogue between a proponent and a challenger who is also a ratio-
nal judge. The proponent of the argument propounds and defends a thesis in response
to the challenger’s questions. The challenger proposes her questions with a view to
probing the logical weaknesses of the proponent’s argument (Freeman, 1991, p. 91;
Pinto, 2001).
Traditional discussions of fallacies generally stumbled over the fact that many
seemingly fallacious ways of arguing represent acceptable argumentative strategies
in some but not all contexts. It therefore proved impossible to use the fallacies to
anticipate and explain the ways in which everyday argumentation could go wrong.
Used in the midst of a quarrel, an ad hominem move is both acceptable and appro-
priate. It only becomes inappropriate where discussants are engaged in a critical
discussion. Walton (1998) uses this fact to craft an account of informal fallacies as
breaches of the rules of reasonable dialogue. The ad hominem move becomes
fallacious when one speech partner to the dialogic exchange makes a move that is
not appropriate to the form of exchange taking place. Argumentum ad hominem
 284 S.R. Robinson

involves a dialectical shift that turns what was a critical discussion into a quarrel
(pp. 260–261).
In summary, exploring the dialectical dimension of argument promises real
progress in our understanding of the nature of informal argumentation. A dialogic
approach to fallacies could contribute to the text-based, specificist agenda outlined by
Moore (2004). This is because the dialogic model pays attention to what Moore (2004)
calls the register of evaluation or the manner in which a critique is made in a text (p.
11) and thus normalizes methods of textual analysis adopted in informal logic courses
against methods used in other disciplines. This in turn would improve the transferabil-
ity of learning from the generic to the discipline-specific context. If nothing else, the
dialogic model of argumentation should make informal logic courses more attractive
to non-philosophy students.
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Conclusion
The bibliography indicates that a very large number of texts in reasoning have gone
to multiple editions, some to five and beyond (Cederblom & Paulsen, 2001; Govier,
2005; Hughes & Lavery, 2008; Moore & Parker, 1998). To judge by the evidence of
publication, the ‘generalist’ opinion that some generic skills of critical thinking can be
taught is deep-seated and persistent. This paper has argued that the proliferation of
texts and courses in informal logic and critical thinking suggests that something is
going on here, something that deserves as much respect – but no more – than that
afforded the work undertaken in any academic sub-area.
The instincts of a ‘generalist’ have driven me to re-examine McPeck’s case against
entrusting the teaching of critical thinking to the informal logic classroom. This paper
has sought to throw doubt upon McPeck’s claim that knowledge of informal logic is
neither necessary nor sufficient for critical thinking. For reasons outlined in the previ-
ous section – the need for a language to describe and reflect upon the nature of our
practice, the need for a language of instruction in critical thinking – we would be ill-
advised to rule out the use of informal logic in the critical thinking classroom until such
time that the McPeckites can offer an alternative language and theory of argument
appraisal.
This paper has examined a relatively small portion of McPeck’s case against the
generalist position. In rejecting the strong specifist agenda implicit in McPeck’s
hostility to the informal logic approach to critical thinking, I am aware that other and
stronger arguments might be needed to persuade other theorists to abandon the
specifist camp. Recent successes of courses utilizing CAAM, whilst encouraging for
the generalist position, cannot decisively settle the issue either way in the generalist-
specifist debate.
Much of what was said in this paper is compatible with an ‘infusion’ approach to
critical thinking of the kind outlined by Davies (2006). An infusion approach should
be attractive to educators who believe that critical thinking skills are too important to
entrust their development to a single, stand-alone course in a topic bearing no relation-
ship to the main disciplinary studies undertaken in reading for a degree. An infusion
approach should also be attractive to those who believe that tackling a brief course in
informal logic or reasoning cannot on its own create in students the complete skills-
set and dispositions associated with the fully-fledged critical thinker.
For those students who enjoy learning about informal logic, exposure to the terms
and concepts used in appraising arguments can be a useful first step on the road to
 Higher Education Research & Development 285

becoming a critical and self-reflective thinker. For this reason alone generic critical
thinking courses can be of value to students.

Acknowledgements
This article has benefited from the suggestions of anonymous referees.

Notes
1. A recent job advert for a lectureship in philosophy announced, as one of the key responsi-
bilities of that position, the production of a critical thinking course to be offered to all
undergraduates of that university.
2. The correct answer here would be ‘some animals do not possess rights’.
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