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207-214

Power and Knowledge:

The Case of the New Epistemology
Carmel Flaskas*

This paper is in part a critique of the new epistemology. However, its focus is not the content of the new epistemology, but rather the process
of the generation and legitimisation of knowledge which is represented by the new epistemology. It is argued that the new epistemology
has been embedded in foundationalism, or a framework that poses epistemology as the (legitimate) base of thinking, knowledge and practice.
This is a very conservative process of knowledge, as it allows the censorship of other ideas and knowledges in family therapy. My critique
is part of a wider project of exploring the relationship of knowledge and power. To this extent, the new epistemology can be used as a
case to illustrate the powerful effects of knowledge, and to remind us of the importance of allowing the space for differences in knowledge
to enrich the field of family therapy.

INTRODUCTION exploring the new epistemology is that it foreshadows

I want to present a set of ideas on the use of knowledge in
family therapy, taking as a case-study the new epistemology.
The heart of the discussion concerns the relationship of
knowledge and power, and a core theme is that knowledge
is always and necessarily enmeshed in power relations. This
enmeshed connection of knowledge and power was the subject
of study of French philosopher Michel Foucault, and has come
to be one of the delineating features of post-structuralist
thought. This paper is in part inspired by a curiosity to see
where some of these ideas might lead us in examining
knowledge in family therapy.
A distinction needs to be drawn here between the process
of knowledge and the content of knowledge. The content of
a particular knowledgeis just the ideas it expresses; the process
of knowledge describes the way in which those ideas come to
be expressed, and the momentum that is generated by those
ideas being expressed. For family therapists, this distinction
of content and process is a familiar one, and indeed is often
used in our work with families.
The invitation, then, is to examine the process of knowledge
by spotlightingthe new epistemology as an example of a recent
and influential form of knowledge in the field of family
therapy. Sufficient time has elapsed since the first articulation
of the new epistemology to allow such an examination; it is
also attractive as a case-study because the new epistemology
has been both creative and controversial. However, despite
its creative content, it is argued that the new epistemology is
embedded in a very orthodox process of knowledge, and on
this level it has been very conservative. It is preciselythe possi-
bility of this kind of contradiction between process and content
which brings to light the relationship of power and knowledge
in family therapy. The recent trend in family therapy
knowledge has been towards the broader but related
philosophy of constructivism, and thus an added bonus in
constructivism.
The plan of the discussion here is to begin by exploring the
concept of epistemology as it has been used in family therapy.
This will be achieved by first looking at the difference in the
way in which epistemology came to be used in family therapy
and its more common use in philosophy (and indeed, across
most other disciplines); secondly, I'll explore the similarity
between its use in the new epistemology and in philosophy.
I then want to examine the choice of biology as a base for
family therapy knowledge, and finally consider the power the
new epistemology came to have in censoring ideas in the field
of family therapy. Though this theoretical tour givesa critique
of the new epistemology, it is a critique which can be used
to underline the importance of the space for differences in
knowledgeto enrich the theory and practice of family therapy.
"EPISTEMOLOGY": THE QUESTION OF DIFFERENCE
Attention has already been paid to delineating the difference
between family therapy's use of "epistemology" and its
mainstream use in intellectual discourse. Barbara Held and
Edward Pols have given some distinctions which are very
useful. They defined epistemology (in its mainstream use) as
the discipline or study that concerns itself with the nature of
knowledge (Held and Pols, 1985, page 510). The common idea
that is associated with epistemology is that of the theory of
knowledge, or how we conceptualise and understand
knowledge. In philosophy, epistemology has involved itself in
defining the criteria for what counts as knowledge, say as
opposed to beliefs, opinions, values, metaphysics. The
philosophy of science, in particular, has played a major role
*Carmel Flaskas has a small private practice, and teaches social work at the
University of New South Wales (P.O. Box I, Kensington, NSW 2033).

208

in advancing the study of epistemology, and the issues that
have been addressed include questions about what counts
as valid knowledge, and what foundations ensure better
forms of knowledge. In this framework, we could talk of
some theories having an inadequate epistemological base,
or of one theory being on sounder epistemological ground
than another.
I'll come in a little while to a discussion of the particular
history of this mainstream use of epistemology. In family
therapy, "epistemology" has been used in a rather different
sense. Again, the nutshell definition offered by Held and
Pols is that epistemology in family therapy is more
concerned with what we know, or what we think we know
(Held and Pols, 1985, page 510). The emphasis here is on
the way we conceptualise the world, or in words closer to
the lingo, the way we "punctuate" our experience. The
issues of distinction, then, have not been so much to do with
competing theorisations of knowledge itself, but rather
competing ways of understanding the world. The most
common contrast within this meaning of epistemology has
been between a linear epistemology and a circular episte-
mology - a linear epistemology being where the way of
conceptualising the world is founded on a relationship of
cause and effect (A leads to B, A and B being entities
definable by themselves and the "leads to" having some
autonomy as a process); on the other hand, in a circular
epistemology, though A may appear to lead to B, neither
A nor B can be defined except in relation to each other, and
indeed the very notion of "leads to" cannot stand by itself.
The definitional words to look for here are reflexivity, recur-
siveness, circularity, and sometimes systemic and cybernetic.
So the distinction, of epistemology in its mainstream sense
and epistemology as it has been used in the "new episte-
mology" , is between the theory of knowledge versus the way
of knowing.
The meaning of epistemology used in family therapy is
attributed to Gregory Bateson's work. Though this is an
accurate claim, Bateson's work is not an uncomplicated
heritage with respect to the concept of epistemology. Paul
Dell identifies five ways in which Bateson uses epistemology
(Dell, 1985). The first two meanings have already been
covered. As well, Dell identifies Bateson's use of episte-
mology in the sense of biological cosmology which seems
to be a very original use. The fourth meaning Bateson gives
to epistemology is epistemology as a science, indeed a
premier or meta-science. Finally he uses epistemology as
character structure, where character structure is one's own
personal epistemology or way of knowing the world (see
Dell, 1985, pages 2-3).
It's probably not surprising that given these multi-levelled
notions of epistemology in Bateson's work, a good deal of
confusion has come to reign in family therapy's use of
Bateson's use of it. Dell has given an illuminating list of the
variety of ways in which "epistemology" has been used in
family therapy literature:
Thus we hear of linear epistemology... conventional episte-
mology ... thingish epistemology... dualistic epistemology...
circular epistemology... cybernetic epistemology... systemic episte-
mology ... ecological epistemology... ecosystemic epistemology
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A.N.Z. J. Fam. Ther., 1990, Vol. 11, No.4
...evolutionary epistemology Artistotelian epistemology
... Newtonian epistemology post-Einsteinian episte-
mology ... modern epistemology ... power epistemology ...
epistemology of pattern...epistemology of behavioural form
... epistemology of emotions... epistemology of traits ... event-
centred epistemology... people-centred epistemology.. .individual-
oriented epistemology... family epistemology... open system
epistemology ... medical epistemology ... body-mind epistemology
... psychoanalytic epistemology... and even British epistemology...
(Dell, 1985, page 2).
Dell concludes from this:
Whatever the appropriate definition of "an epistemology" may
be, it seems likely that the term "epistemology" has often been
used when the word "theory" would be more modest and,
perhaps, more accurate (Dell, 1985, page 2).
A question can be raised as to whether Dell was not being
rather generous here in extending (and generalising) the
conventional use of "theory" to make it mean something
more like theoretical assumptions. In some of the quoted
uses in the literature of family therapy, and in much of
common parlance, epistemology came to mean little more
than assumptions. In many instances of its use, not much
meaning is lost by substituting "assumptions" for "episte-
mology" - "well it all depends on your epistemology (read:
assumptions)". However, in some cases, such a substitution
would result in a very impoverished concept. This has led
to a practical difficulty in identifying when "epistemology"
means something more precise than theory or assumptions
- as Jeffrey Bogdan has commented:
Real epistemology, so to speak, does occasionally turn up in
the family therapy literature, and it would be useful to have a
generally understood word for it when it does (Bogdan, 1987,
page 29).
Cleveland Shields gave another critique of the new episte-
mology from the standpoint of orthodox empiricist
philosophy, and it is interesting to note his thoughts on the
mis-use of "epistemology":
When the term "epistemology" is used loosely by family
therapists, confusion results. When theoretical ideas are called
"epistemology", it obscures the fact that theoretical ideas are
merely human constructs. A theory packaged as "epistemology"
sounds more like a revelation of some hidden reality than a
humanly constructed, empirically testable theory (Shields, 1986,
page 360).
Now, I think there has to be a querying about the kind
of confusion which both Bogdan and Shields are identifying.
Specifically, we could question whether we are looking at
an example of the process of mystification operating in
family therapy knowledge. Why indeed use a word with six
syllables when often we could use "assumption", which
would save three syllables and which we could all spell with
a lot more confidence? When I talk about the process of
mystification, I am not referring just to concepts being hard
to grasp by most of us - this would be little more than an
anti-theoretical position, and although Bryan Lask's critique
was refreshing in identifying theoretical elitism, he bordered
on this position when he characterised ideas from the new
Flaskas
epistemology as "cybernetico-epistobabble" (Lask, 1987).
Clearly there are many very useful ideas which are hard to
grasp and sometimes require a specialist body of knowledge.
Theories or concepts are mystifying, not because they are
hard to understand, but because they are riddled with cross-
cuts of meanings and contradictions which obscure the lack
of any real content.
I do not think that Bateson's uses of epistemology fall
into the category of mystification, although this is a question
we should ask despite (or perhaps, precisely because of) his
status in family therapy. My judgement of Bateson's work
in this respect is that we are looking at multi-levelled
meanings and shifting theoretical priorities in his use of
"epistemology". However, it may be that family therapy's
use of Bateson's use of epistemology has allowed a place
for some empty concepts which serve little purpose other
than seeming to lend status and legitimacy to particular ways
of thinking. Mystification is not a conscious process, and
it is particularly hard to recognise in the new epistemology
because it has gone alongside a creative struggle toward a
new form of knowledge.
"EPISTEMOLOGY": THE QUESTION OF
SIMILARITY
At this point, I'd like to turn to the issue of the similarity
of the mainstream use of epistemology (theory of
knowledge) andjamily therapy's use of epistemology (way
ojknowing). This issue has received less attention in the liter-
ature than the question of the differences in meanings
around epistemology.
Although one can be critical of the use of "epistemology"
where "assumptions" would serve just as well, this slippage
gives a pointer to one important aspect of family therapy's
use (following Bateson) of epistemology - epistemology is
used in the sense of being underlying or foundational to
thinking, knowledge and practice. This notion is absolutely
in line with the way in which epistemology appears in its
mainstream usage. Beyond this is the particular history of
the rise of "epistemology" as an organising and founda-
tional concept in philosophy. It is important to identify the
foundationalism of the new epistemology, because there is
a momentum for censorship created by treating episte-
mology as underlying knowledge and practice. I will be
examining this momentum from several angles, but would
like to note here that a momentum for censorship is, of
course, very problematic for family therapy, which as a field
requires a breadth of knowledge and practice, rather than
the restriction of foundationalism.
But let us turn first to the history of epistemology as a
foundational concept in philosophy, and I'd like to refer
here to Richard Rorty's (1980) work in Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature. There have already been some signs of
interest in Rorty's work in family therapy. Paul Falzer has
used his historical analysis in his argument against
ecosystemic epistemology as a foundation of family therapy
(Falzer, 1986), while Graham Tuson has used Rorty's
distinction of systemising versus edifying paradigms in
philosophy to discuss theory and technology in family
therapy (Tuson, 1988). For my purposes, I am interested
210
both in his history and in his analysis of the effects of this
history on contemporary intellectual discourse.
Rorty gives a fascinating account of the rise of episte-
mology in the history of philosophy. His claim is that
epistemology appeared at a point where the status of
philosophy as the study of metaphysics had come under
threat from the developing sciences. He argues that episte-
mology emerged as a pivotal concept in philosophy and
achieved a transfer of philosophy as the study of metaphysics
to philosophy as the foundation of sciences. It was truly a
spectacular turn around - no longer was philosophy the
study of metaphysics, or what was the least material; it
became a study of what was the most basic, the foundation
of knowledge. This picture of philosophy as centred in
epistemology began with Kant, but became generally
accepted only after Hegel. Rorty writes of this change:
Philosophy became "primary" no longer in the sense of
"highest" but in the sense of "underlying" (Rorty, 1980, page
132).
Rorty offers a slice of the history of intellectual discourse,
but he also offers some thoughts on the momentum set up
by this history, and this is where he uses the distinction of
systemising and edifying paradigms in philosophy. Episte-
mology stands at the centre of a systemising frame of
philosophy, and reflects:
...a desire for constraint - a desire to find "foundations" to
which one mightcling, frameworks beyond which one must not
stray, objects which impose themselves, representations which
cannot be gainsaid (Rorty, 1980, page 315).
He also considers the way in which this momentum shows
itself in current intellectual discourse and interactions, and
the way in which "epistemology" bestows a privilege on
those who claim to have the corner on it:
To drop the notion of the philosopher as knowing something
about knowing which nobody knows so well would be to drop
the notion that his voice always has an overriding claim on the
attention of the other participants in the conversation (Rorty,
1980, page 392).
Of course, this quote can be transposed so that it's a little
closer to home:
To drop the notion of the Batesonian epistemologist as knowing
something about knowing which nobody knows so well would
be to drop the notion that her or his voice always has an
overriding claim on the attention of other participants in the
conversation of family therapy.
Switching this quote to the new epistemology works well
precisely because Bateson places his meaning of episte-
mology in exactly the same privileged location that
epistemology has come to assume in its mainstream usage.
Perhaps barring his idea of character structure or personal
epistemology, all Bateson's meanings show a strong
commitment to foundationalism, and he makes a clear
distinction between what is epistemologically "right" and
what is epistemologically "wrong" (Bateson, 1972, page
336). Bateson also counter-poses (correct) circular episte-
mology with epistemological errors, mistakes, pathologies

and even "epistemological lunacy" (Bateson, 1972, page
487)". These are terms which automatically invalidate the
positions they describe. Similar disqualifiers frequently
appeared in the literature of the new epistemology (see for
example: Dell, 1985, pages 28,30,31; Keeney and Sprenkle,
1982, page 4).
The irony is that this process is often occurring while
Bateson's position on the impossibility of objectivity and
the relativism of experience and knowledge is being elabo-
rated within the new epistemology. This is exactly an
example of a contradiction between the content (or ideas)
in a particular knowledge, and the process (or, if you like,
interactional frame) of that knowledge. One could argue that
constructivism as a whole is tied up in a similar paradox.
Up to now, I've been wanting to make two points about
the similarity of family therapy's use of epistemology and
its mainstream use. First, the mainstream use of episte-
mology has a very particular history in philosophy, it has
evolved as a foundational concept, and this rescued
philosophy from a rather sticky historical impasse. Episte-
mology as a study has claimed the privilege of underlying
knowledge, and has been caught up in a momentum to
impose constraints on what can be counted as knowledge.
The second point is that Bateson's epistemology and family
therapy's new epistemology are also foundational concepts,
and have been located in exactly the same position of
privilege, even though at another level they are significantly
different from the mainstream concept of epistemology.
Moreover, the similarity in the privileged location of the
concept exists despite ideas in Bateson's work and the new
epistemology which seem to run counter to the notion of
foundationalism. We could think of looking at two pictures,
which are none the less each bordered by the same kind of
frame.
AND WHY BIOLOGY?
I will take a different angle now in this exploration of the
new epistemology, and query the alignment of family
therapy with biology as a discipline. Again, this has occurred
via Bateson, and more recently via Maturana and Varela.
A descriptive answer to the question "Why biology?" could
lead to a discussion of Bateson's background, how he came
to work with family therapists and how his study of living
things came to have such an impact on the milieu of family
therapy. It is interesting to use a different lens, and question
the momentum of family therapy to use biology in the
process of generating its own knowledges.
At the risk of being thought of as irrevocably lineal in
my thinking, I want to say that of course biology has more
status as a discipline than for example sociology, let alone
family therapy. No matter what we make of it, we are all
aware of a hierarchy of legitimacy in the map of knowledge
- physical ("natural") sciences are privileged over social
sciences, which are privileged over practice disciplines such
as family therapy. The reason for this is very much tied up
with the history of epistemology as foundational, and it has
been the philosophy of science which has organised the finer
gradations of the scale, epistemological purity being one of
the major criteria in this enterprise. Of course, there is
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A.N.Z. J. Fam. Ther., 1990, Vol 11, No.4
nothing unusual about a newer and more precarious
discipline attempting to secure status by aligning itself with
a more legitimate field of knowledge, or even just "great
thinkers". Bateson made an important contribution to the
history of family therapy partly because his work made it
possible for family therapy to align itself with the theoretical
status of biology.
However, there is a less obvious but possibly more
important aspect to family therapy's alliance with Bateson's
biology. In terms of the traditional hierarchy of knowledge,
physics is the field of enquiry which occupies the highest
position. Indeed, in the development of the empiricist
paradigm within the philosophy of science, physics has been
used as the prototype of knowledge. Empiricism privileges
direct experience (observation) in "grounding" knowledge,
and holds out for an ideal of knowledge being to approx-
imate the real world as closely as possible, and hence the
emphasis on testing and verification. Empiricism as a
paradigm was hegemonic in Anglo-American philosophy
from the 1920s through to the 1960s, and is still the
dominant paradigm in contemporary philosophy of science.
This view of knowledge is less easily applied to the social
sciences than the physical sciences, and so the social sciences
have had an uneasy status within the philosophy of science.
It is in this context that biology occupies a strategic position,
because it has the potential as a field of enquiry to bridge
the natural and social sciences. Bateson achieved a major
synthesis in his work when he created a biology which more
fully realised this potential. In doing this, he generated an
epistemology (theory of knowledge) and philosophy of
science based on biology as opposed to physics, and bridged
the natural and social sciences.
Small wonder that his work has been very influential.
Without wishing to detract from this creativity, I simply
want to note the boundaries of the shift - a philosophy
of science based on physics has been shifted to a philosophy
of science based on biology. However, the attendant
commitments to foundationalism, and the possibility of a
hierarchy in the legitimacy of know ledges, remain
unchanged.
Paul Falzer (1986) gives an extended critical consideration
of ecosystemic epistemology as a foundation of family
therapy. Others such as Deborah Leupnitz argue that cyber-
netic explanation lacks complexity in describing and
accounting for human relationships (Leupnitz, 1988, page
163). I am also sceptical of the limits of the biological cyber-
netic metaphor as a theoretical base for family therapy. In
addition, though, I am deeply sceptical of the momentum
of any search for a base, biological or otherwise, because
an investment in the idea of a foundational set of propo-
sitions inevitably leads to censorship.
THE POWER OF THE NEW EPISTEMOLOGY
So what of the power of the new epistemology? I will tackle
it directly and argue that the foundationalism of the new
epistemology (by assuming a frame of privilege) has affected
the way in which discussion can happen in family therapy.
There has been a circling around the word "power" in this
paper, and it is time for me to say something more about
the idea of power that is being used here.
Earlier the question was raised as to the potential
Flaskas
helpfulness of the work of French philosopher Michel
Foucault, and post-structuralist theory in general - in
particular, its helpfulness for an understanding of the
relationship of knowledge and power. * Foucault attends to
two aspects of power - power shows itself in its negative
or constraining effects, and it also shows itself in its positive
or creative effects, "positive" and "negative" being used
as neutral descriptions here. To apply this to the new episte-
mology: to the extent that the new epistemology achieved
a mainstream position in recent family therapy knowledge,
it both channelled creativity with a particular kind of
momentum, and censored the development of alternate
kinds of know ledges and ideas which did not fall within its
parameters. Foucault's studies in the second period of his
work (1979, 1981) focus directly on the creative effects of
power, and he does this by precise historical analysis of the
effects of concrete social practices on the development of
particular types of knowledges and social discourses. It
would be fascinating to think about family therapy in this
way, but this is not my project in this paper. I am more
interested right now in giving closer attention to the
constraining effects of the new epistemology in family
therapy.
It is always hard to show evidence of censorship, because
the more effective the censorship, the less evidence there is
available of that censorship. However, the difficulty in
thinking about power itself within the frame of the new
epistemology has by now received sustained consideration
in the literature and conversation of family therapy (Taggart,
1985; Imber-Black, 1986; MacKinnon and Miller, 1987;
Leupnitz, 1988). There is no question that power as a
concept has been under-theorised in much of the writing of
the new epistemology, and indeed has been actively censored
in the foundational theorising of Bateson and Maturana.
Bateson, for example, writes polemically:
... the myth of power is, of course, a very powerful myth, and
probably most people in this world more or less believe in it.
It is a myth which, if everybody believes in it, becomes to that
extent self-validating. But it is still epistemological lunacy and
leads inevitably to various sorts of disaster (Bateson, 1972, pages
486-487).
As for Maturana, his biological study of the system of
perception in frogs' eyes led to his hypothesis of the
organisational closure of all living systems, which has then
been extrapolated to the impossibility of "instructive inter-
action" or lineal causality, which has then become translated
in terms of a philosophy which denies the possibility of a
direct, determining power. (For discussions in the family
therapy literature of these aspects of Maturana's work, see
Colapinto, 1985; Dell, 1985b; Efran and Lukens, 1985;
Simon, 1985).
I will not attempt to replicate the detailed critiques of the
new epistemology which have opposed the censorship of
power that has flowed from theoretical premises of these
kinds. However, it is striking that all the above-listed
critiques (and to name them again: Taggart, 1985; Imber-
Black, 1986; MacKinnon and Miller, 1987; Leupnitz, 1988)
emerged in the context of the author's theoretical (and often
212
explicitly political) alliance with feminism. The point here
is that it has been possible for this particular censorship to
be challenged precisely because some people had a clear and
separate commitment to a counter-acting form of knowledge
(and politics).
Other areas of censorship are thus less easy to identify,
and I am left to offer you examples of things I have wanted
to think about because I too have a separate commitment
to doing so. I am for instance very interested in thinking
about emotionality, and this has been extremely difficult to
conceptualise within the frame of the new epistemology
(Flaskas, 1989). My clinical experience in family therapy (not
to mention experience in my own life) has led me to be
interested in emotionality, yet if I were whole-heartedly
attached to the new epistemology as the foundation of my
theory and practice in family therapy, emotional issues
would scarcely rate a mention. This particular censorship
has been compounded by the association of emotionality
with a psychoanalytic paradigm, which has traditionally
been seen to be in conflict with the theory and practices of
systemic family therapy.
The final example is quite immediate. It would not have
been possible to develop the thoughts in this paper had I
been constrained by the parameters of the new epistemology.
There is a clear "problem" about a core interest in power,
but beyond this, the method of putting ideas together falls
outside the frame of the new epistemology. I am more
interested in layering ideas one on top of the other in an
attempt to create some space for different ways of thinking,
and this in itself is different from the new epistemology's
endeavour to ground the knowledge of an entire discipline
to one particular epistemological base. Of course, many
lineal connections and concepts have been used in this paper.
This is not necessarily a problem, as long as it leads to ideas
which open out some thinking about the effects of
knowledge in the field of family therapy.
The task of identifying the constraints and censorship of
the new epistemology is frustrating - it feels like to trying
to dance with shadows. However, as part of this discussion,
I want to tell a story, which could very easily be true:
I am at a workshop, given by a man who is something of a
star. I find him Iikeably enthusiastic about the ideas he is putting
forward. In the afternoon, he explains the ideas his work is based
on, and which he thinks have major implications for the entire
field of family therapy. Quite a few years ago, Maturana disco-
vered the way frogs' eyes work, and this is why we should all
think about and practise therapy in a particular way. The stance
he is proposing neither thrills nor offends me, yet I find myself
becoming enraged. My anger is directed toward the structuring
of the interaction. When someone ties what is essentially a
*It is the middle period of Foucault's work, during which time he
produced the studies Discipline and Punish (1979) and The History of
Sexuality Vol. I. (1981), which is most useful for an analysis of power,
power relationships and knowledge, The writings in Gordon's collection
(1980) provide a good overview of his thinking in this period, and his
article in Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) stands as an important milestone
in the development of his ideas on power. Chris Weedon (1987) locates
Foucault's work within the context of post-structuralism.

political or ethical or strategic position to "facts" about frogs'
eyes, what arena is there for an open and equal discussion of
differing ideas? Precious little, and there's the rub.....
A postscript: However, though there is no space for an open
and equaldiscussion, there is a precious littlespacefor resistance.
I could walk out of this workshop, or evendecideneverto come
to this kind of workshop again. I can continue to come to
workshops likethis, but also continue developing clinical practice
which does not need to be based on the study of frogs' eyes.
I can talk about this experience at other family therapy events.
I can write a passionate paper about the power of knowledge
in family therapy.
A theoretical postscript to this story is irresistible, and
it concerns again the issue of power. The insistence of the
new epistemology on the impossibility of unilateral power
has been useful as an attempt to focus family therapists on
the leeway for change in any relationship. However, this
would not want to be the new epistemology's main claim
to fame, as there are many other theoretical roads (for
example, post-structuralism) which also lead in this
direction. We could abandon theoretical roads for the
moment, though, and just think of the history of political
struggle and of the everyday subversions of power we witness
in families. Both provide compelling evidence for the
argument that resistance can occur in even the most horren-
dously oppressive conditions.
Simply to make this point in all its generalised abstraction
is, I think, problematic unless we also show an interest in
two areas:
(a) exactly what kind of power/s mightbe operating in any given
relationship or situation, and how does this power operate? It
seems self-evident, yet maybeweneedto underline the difference
between institutional practices of censorship, the use in some
countries of abduction, torture and murder as routine practices
of political control, and the power of a father to terrorise and
sexually abuse his daughter....
and
(b) exactly what kind of resistance is possible in any given
situation where there is an oppressive powerdifferential, the costs
of these resistances and their effects. We can think of the hunger
strike, for example, as a resistance of absolute desperation,
whether it occurs in the contextof near-totalpolitical repression,
or in the context of grossly restricted emotional choices in a
family. We also need to remember who actually dies in this
resistance, and the effects on the power relationships. These
power relationships are far more complex than the description
of "not unilateral".
The new epistemology has been both silent on and
silencing of considerations of these kinds. Some writers have
been trying to create space in the new epistemology for
power to be thought of in a more fruitful and politically
relevant way (for example, Dell, 1986; MacKinnon and
Miller, 1987), and it remains to be seen if this is possible.
I have pointed to the work of Foucault and post-
structuralism here because I believe there are other
frameworks which offer more potential for thinking about
power and power relationships. However, this is not a call
for one theoretical base to be substituted for another. The
danger of the new epistemology with respect to its censorship
213
A.N.Z. J. Fam. Ther., 1990, Vol. 11, No.4
of power has not been just in what the new epistemology
has said or hasn't said about power. This aspect only became
dangerous because the new epistemology has been
committed to foundationalism, and the danger only became
realised because family therapy as a field has been vulnerable
to searching for the legitimacy of a knowledge base. Of
course, though knowledges have the capacity for particular
kinds of powerful effects, these effects can only become a
reality by the way in which we use them. It has been the
three ingredients of the actual ideas of the new epistemology,
the foundationalism of the new epistemology, and family
therapy's vulnerability to wanting a legitimate "base",
which have together formed the power of the new
epistemology.
CONCLUSION
I don't intend to use this conclusion to give a full summary
of the ideas already presented. The structure of the paper
began with an examination of epistemology as it has
appeared in family therapy, then moved to an identification
of the commitment to foundationalism, then to the
alignment of family therapy with biology as a base discipline,
and finally through to spotlighting the censoring effects of
the new epistemology. All this has been clearly signposted
along the way, and so I am more interested in spelling out
some final thoughts on the new epistemology and the power
of knowledge in family therapy.
With respect to the new epistemology, I have not been
leading up to a call to abandon it retrospectively in its
entirety. However, at the very least, we can afford to
cultivate and maintain a scepticism in relation to its premises.
Looking back, I would suggest that some of us have been
too respectful of the premises of the new epistemology which
cut across our experiences and our politics. From this we
can feel encouraged to explore ideas and know ledges which
fall outside the parameters of the new epistemology. It is
important to resist taking on board the foundationalism of
the new epistemology, which can bring some relief from its
power of censorship. Hopefully this would release us from
the dreaded possibility that our ideas may forever dwell in
the darkness of epistemological error.
But though I have been wanting to use this paper to offer
a further critique specifically of the new epistemology, I have
been juggling this with a wider project of commenting on
the relationship of power and knowledge in the field of
family therapy. To some extent, the new epistemology can
be taken as a case-study for this wider project, and indeed
most of the concluding remarks I have just made about the
new epistemology can be applied equally to any form of
knowledge which is put forward as a base for family therapy,
and which begins to achieve dominant legitimacy in the field
as a whole. With respect to the new epistemology, its
popularity as the sole basis for family therapy knowledge
has already been waning, and judging by recent interest, it
seems that constructivism as a closely related philosophy is
*See for example the September/October 1988 issue of The Family Therapy
Networker.
Flaskas
moving more centre-stage. * The study given here of the new
epistemology can be used to give an alert to the difference
between the process and content of knowledge, and to the
concrete effects of the process of knowledge on the kind of
theoretical, political and practice discussions which can take
place within the field of family therapy. I have chosen to
identify these effects as part and parcel of the relationships
of power within the discipline of family therapy as a whole.
In looking forward, it will be important to scrutinise
constructivism, or more precisely, the kind of powerful
effects that might accompany its popularity.
I am tempted to go one step further and argue not only
against the search for a (legitimised) base for family therapy
knowledge, but also against the search for theoretical
congruence in family therapy. Some of you will probably
disagree with me about this. This isn't necessarily a problem,
and it would be good to talk about it some more. In the
meantime, I would support a strictly strategic position in
relation to knowledge, and the struggle to allow the space
for differences in knowledge to enrich the field of family
therapy.
Acknowledgements
Some of the ideas in this paper were originally presented at the
1987 Women and Family Therapy Meeting held in Leura, N.S.W.
The support 1 received there encouraged me to continue work on
the project. 1 would also like to thank Coli Osman, Gill Burrell,
Laurie MacKinnon and the members of my women and writing
group for the generosity of their encouragement and ideas.
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