AYLA KARAKAYA

COLLEGE OF EUROPE, BRUGES

02.04.2015

EU Reaction to the Gezi Protests in Turkey:

Rethinking EU’s ability to promote democracy and human rights

Gezi Park Protests of summer 2013 constitute an important point in the recent history of
Turkish democracy. Following the footages on the social media that showed the police violently
attacking the peaceful protestors in Gezi Park, whose only claim was to oppose the government
decision to construct yet another shopping mall into one of the last green places in Istanbul,
thousands of people poured into the Taksim square to show solidarity. As the numbers of protestors
grew in Taksim, so did the numbers of the riot police, the level of violence and the amount of tear
gas and water cannons used. “On 15 th of August 2013, the Turkish Medical Association reported that
police intervention had caused five deaths and thousands of injuries, among them one hundred and
six instances of severe head trauma and eleven cases that included the loss of an eye” 1.
As the demonstrations started to spread through the major cities of Turkey, the faces and the
demands of the protestors had shifted from protecting the Gezi Park.
“The protestors have broader demands: a more participatory decision-making system,
particularly regarding matters that directly affect people’s lives; a more pluralist system that
respects the demands of the minority as much as the majority; no imposition of religious and
cultural values or norms on society; improving fundamental rights and liberties, including but
not limited to freedom of assembly, free speech and free media; and a political system that
functions through dialogue and respect”2.
These demands became the merging point of the protestors as many Turkish people considered their
freedoms and their lifestyles being attacked by the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). “The government’s perceived intrusion into public life in the form of new
restrictions on the sale of alcohol and contraception” 3 and the government’s perceived aim of
creating a religious and ethical generation of youth were some of the reasons that led people to

1
“Gezi Resistance, Police Violence, and Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, Jadaliyya, 7 October 2013,
retrieved 28 March 2015 http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14469/gezi-resistance-police-violence-and-
turkey%E2%80%99s-acces
2
“Gezi Part one month on: what lies ahead?” European Policy Centre, 27 June 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3623_gezi_park_one_month_on_-_what_lies_ahead.pdf
3
“Turkey’s reaction to Gezi Park protests ‘brutal’, says Amnesty” The Irish Times, 2 October 2013, retrieved 28
March 2015 http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/turkey-s-reaction-to-gezi-park-protests-brutal-
says-amnesty-1.1546576
demonstrate on the streets. “Coming from all corners of Turkey, the majority of protestors were
young individuals including university students and well-educated professionals without any political
or NGO affiliation, who were supported by some 116 organisations from diverse backgrounds” 4. Even
though this generation was criticized as being part of the apolitical “Generation Y”, they showed their
strong support to democracy and fundamental rights and freedoms during protests.
“While violence continued against protestors, journalists reporting from the protests, doctors
treating the injured and lawyers defending their rights were also arrested and subjected to arbitrary
and abusive use of force”5. As the Turkish media refused to cover any news about these protests,
“CNN Türk’s decision to air two-hour documentary on penguins during the first weekend of mass
protest became a symbol in the eyes of many protestors and the wider public for self-censorship in
the national media”6. Social media networks, especially twitter became an essential tool among the
protestors to communicate, despite the government’s attempt to block mobile phone receptions in
the areas populated by the protestors and the eventual ban to the access to facebook and twitter.
This brief description of the Gezi protests depicts violations of the various fundamental rights
and freedoms, and the shortcomings of the Turkish democracy. These events as a whole had a major
impact on the accession talks between Turkey and the European Union (EU). “During the past
decades, the EU has developed into an agent of international democracy promotion” 7 and human
rights, and it has a strong leverage especially to those states which has a membership perspective.
Among the many demands of the EU Copenhagen Criteria, the respect for the rule of law,
democracy, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities 8 presents itself as the most
prominent one. However, the dialogue between the Turkish and EU officials during and after the Gezi
protests points out to a significant difference on the perception of democracy among these
authorities. While the EU’s effectiveness and it’s leverage capacity on Turkey is something that
should be taken into consideration, another important aspect of this debate is to figure out how
much the Turkish government values its ties and commitments to the EU. This paper will try to
investigate the dialogue between the EU and the Turkish authorities during the Gezi protests and will
try to understand whether there is a difference in the perceptions of democracy and human rights
between these actors.

4
European Policy Centre, Op. cit.
5
“Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey”, Amnesty International,
October 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015 http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/eur440222013en.pdf
6
Ibid
7
S. Lavenex and F. Schimmelfennig, “EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: from leverage to
governance?”, Democratization, vol. 18, no. 4, 2011, p.885
8
“Accession criteria”, EUROPA, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm
 EU Reaction to the Protests and the Response of the Turkish Government
First official statement to the Gezi protests was given by the spokesperson of High
Representative Catherine Ashton, on 2nd of June 2013, which expressed “deep concern at the
violence”9 and regretted “disproportionate use of force by members of the Turkish police” 10. On 7th
of June 2013, Štefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy,
who was in Istanbul for a conference organized by the Ministry of EU Affairs of Turkey, stated that
“democracy is a demanding discipline – not only during election campaigns, but every day. It requires
debates, consultation and compromise” 11 after saying events that are taking place in Istanbul at that
time was impossible to ignore. While for Erdoğan, winning the national elections three times in a row
is enough to count as democracy 12. Prime Minister Erdoğan has repeatedly used the argument of
“taking your chances in the ballot box” against any kind of criticism through the years of his rule 13.
Füle’s statement was quickly responded by Egemen Bağış, Turkey’s chief negotiator with the
EU, with a tweet writing that “Erdoğan welcomes democratic demands but won’t give in to terror
and vandalism14. At the same conference, Prime Minister Erdoğan “defended the violent suppression
of the Gezi protests by comparing them to government responses towards similar riots in France,
Germany, England, Greece, and the United States” 15. He also argued that “Union members were
discriminating against Turkey, and Turkish people within their borders, regarding the country’s
accession process to the EU”16.
For the opposition parties in Turkey, calling the ruling Justice and Development Party to
adopt higher EU standards has been a tactic to promote democratic changes in the society. However,
justifying a number of alarming policies by mentioning the European countries’ standards and
practices has become a method that the Prime Minister Erdoğan frequently adopts 17.
9
“Statement by the Spokesperson of the High Representative Catherine Ashton on violence in Turkey”, Council
of the European Union, 2 June 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137372.pdf
10
Ibid
11
“EU-Turkey bound together”, Stefan Füle, European Commission, 7 June 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-517_en.htm
12
“EU-Turkey Relations After Gezi: Another Halt or an Incentive to revive Turkey’s moribund accession
process”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, 15 July 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://politikaakademisi.org/eu-turkey-relations-after-gezi-another-halt-or-an-incentive-to-revive-turkeys-
moribund-accession-process/
13
“Erdoğan dismisses threat from opposition parties”, Al-Monitor, 12 May 2014, retrieved: 28 March 2015
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/contents/articles/originals/2014/05/erdogan-akp-presidency-divided-
opposition-parties-mhp-chp.html
14
“Turkey-EU relations may be a casualty of Gezi Park”, Al-Monitor, 14 June 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/wounded-relations-turkey-eu-
protests.html#ixzz3VxBLabaS
15
Jadaliyya, Op. cit.
16
“Turkish PM Erdoğan and EU Commissioner Füle in crossfire over Gezi Park protests” Hürriyet Daily News, 7
June 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-and-eu-
commissioner-fule-in-crossfire-over-gezi-park-protests.aspx?pageID=238&nid=48441
17
Jadaliyya, Op. cit.
 “In defending many of the recent policies that fueled the dissent of Gezi protesters—such as
urban renewal projects, tighter regulation of alcohol sales, and more conservative
reproductive policies attempting to limit abortion, reduce caesarean sections, and encourage
women to have at least three children—the government’s stated reference has been the
practices in advanced liberal democracies. Instead of “Turkey’s special circumstances,” which
until recently has informed governmental rationality, government representatives now
publicly justify their actions by referring to standards of democracy, development, and the
rule of law18”.
In order to rationalize the excessive use of tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons by the police
during Gezi events, EU Affairs Minister Egemen Bağış used the examples of Greek, Spanish and
Portuguese police suppressing the anti-austerity protestors, claiming that the method the Turkish
police adopted was in line with the best practices of the European states 19.
On 13th of June 2013, the European Parliament adopted a resolution which “harshly
condemned police violence against protesters recalling that freedom of assembly, freedom of
expression (including through social media both online and offline, the resolution stresses) and
freedom of press are fundamental principles of the European Union” 20 and it was the harshest
document that was adopted by the union so far. EU Affairs Minister Egemen Bağış was quick to
respond to this document with a press release saying that “some European parliamentarians and
officials are irresponsibly making very bold and irrational speeches” 21. He also stated that the
government was aware of “the national and international players in this plot” 22 and warned the
parliamentarians not to “be deceived by manipulation and slander” 23. “Some parliamentarians should
understand that there is a price to pay for talking this comfortably and daringly about Turkey's
internal matters”24, he stated in the press release, emphasizing that “Turkey is not a banana
republic”25. Bağış also emphasized the fact that suspending Turkey’s accession process is not a threat
for Turkey but for the EU26.
Prime Minister Erdoğan, who was also praised in the press release by Egemen Bağış by saying
that “Turkey has the most reformist and strongest government in Europe and the most charismatic

18
Jadaliyya, Op. cit.
19
Jadaliyya, Op. cit.
20
Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Op. cit.
21
“Message by Egemen Bağış, Minister For EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator on the Recent Developments”,
Ministry for EU Affairs, 17 June 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015 http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?
p=49004&l=2
22
Ibid
23
Ibid
24
Ibid
25
Ibid
26
Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Op. cit.
and strongest leader in the world” 27, also responded to the criticism of the European Parliament and
personally attacked Štefan Füle during a political rally of his party:
“How can you pass such a decision on Turkey, which isn't even an EU member but a
candidate? How dare you?” he said. “They have this guy (Füle) in charge of enlargement. He
couldn’t offer the slightest counterargument while he was with me, but then he tweets. Is this
ethical?” he asked, to wild applause of the  crowd28.
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu also took part in this debate by saying that “no country can teach
Turkey a democracy lesson, let alone on an issue what he called “one-sided” resolutions” 29. The EP
document was rejected and returned once it reached Ankara 30.

Democracy: Differences in Perception?

Ann-Kristin Jonasson who has recently published a book named “The EU’s Democracy
Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbours: Orientation, ownership and dialogue in Jordan and
Turkey”31 claims that EU democracy promotion is problematic because it “prescribes solutions
without understanding people’s needs” 32. The author says “that one of the main problems in Turkey's
EU accession negotiations is that the issue of what democracy is and how it is interpreted is not
addressed in an appropriate way in the accession negotiations”33. Indeed, the Deputy Prime Minister
Bülent Arınç said during a conference in Chatham House, UK, “If you discuss the topics about Turkey
with a perception that is based on the conditions in the UK, then you fail to solve issues” 34. However,
discussing the notion of democracy in Turkey requires a conscious efford of objectivity. While
government officials present Turkish democracy as “a source of inspiration to show how Islam and
democracy can go hand-in-hand and that the country had been able to demonstrate how Islam and

27
Ministry for EU Affairs, Op. Cit.
28
“Turkey-EU relations may be a casualty of Gezi Park”, Al-Monitor, Op. cit.
29
Ibid
30
“EU slams Ankara over protests, government furious”, Hürriyet Daily News, 14 June 2013, retrieved 28 March
2015 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-slams-ankara-over-protests-government-furious.aspx?
pageID=238&nID=48776&NewsCatID=338
31
S. Panebianco “The EU’s democracy promotion and the Mediterranean neighbours: orientation, ownership
and dialogue in Jordan and Turkey, by Ann Kristin Jonasson”, Democratization, vol.21, no.7, 2014, pp.1358-
1360
32
“Jonasson: EU questions overall democratic commitment of Turkish government”, Today’s Zaman, 20
October 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015 http://www.todayszaman.com/monday-talk_jonasson-eu-questions-
overall-democratic-commitment-of-turkish-govt_329279.html
33
Ibid
34
“The Future of Democracy in Turkey: Perceptions and Realities”, Chatham House, 20 February 2014, retrieved
28 March 2015 http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Meetings/Meeting
%20Transcripts/20140220Arinc.pdf
democracy can function together”35, Turkey is often portrayed by the international media as “the
world’s leading jailer of journalists”36 which presents an interesting contradiction.
The way the Turkish government perceived the Gezi Park demonstrations and the response
of the EU officials presents us the issue of what democracy is and how it is interpreted by different
actors. For the Turkish government, “the reliance on a majoritarian understanding of democracy,
focusing exclusively on the parliamentary majority, reveals a different perception of democracy” 37
than the EU’s. The democratization process is something needs to be anchored by the society. As
Jonasson suggests,
“A country needs to democratizee in line with its own values - on the basis of its own priorities
- for democracy to become sustainable. After all, it is the country itself that is to consolidate
its democracy, and that has to be done in accordance with local parameters, not the EU's”38.
Democratization of Turkey cannot simply be based on the pressure of the EU, which is directly linked
to how much Turkey values the membership to the EU. If the democratization is made for the sake of
joining the EU, “if political reforms are designed only to fulfill the EU's demands, irrespective of their
resonance with domestic values, democracy will be superficial and dependent on the EU's
position”39. Democratic reforms in Turkey should not be for the sake of pleasing the European
Commission but based on the preferences of the Turkish society, even if it means a significant drift
from the European understanding of democracy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 “Accession criteria”, EUROPA, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm
 “Erdoğan dismisses threat from opposition parties”, Al-Monitor, 12 May 2014, retrieved: 28
March 2015 http://www.al-

35
“Turkey’s unruly rule of law”, Open Democracy, 17 April 2013, retrieved 29 March 2015
https://www.opendemocracy.net/firdevs-robinson/turkey%E2%80%99s-unruly-rule-of-law
36
“Not so free”, The Economist, 4 April 2013, retrieved 29 March 2015
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21575823-government-finds-different-ways-intimidate-free-media-
not-so-free
37
Today’s Zaman, Op. cit.
38
Ibid
39
Ibid
 monitor.com/pulse/ru/contents/articles/originals/2014/05/erdogan-akp-presidency-divided-
opposition-parties-mhp-chp.html
 “EU slams Ankara over protests, government furious”, Hürriyet Daily News, 14 June 2013,
retrieved 28 March 2015 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-slams-ankara-over-protests-
government-furious.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48776&NewsCatID=338
 “EU-Turkey bound together”, Stefan Füle, European Commission, 7 June 2013, retrieved 28
March 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-517_en.htm
 “EU-Turkey Relations After Gezi: Another Halt or an Incentive to revive Turkey’s moribund
accession process”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, 15 July 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://politikaakademisi.org/eu-turkey-relations-after-gezi-another-halt-or-an-incentive-to-
revive-turkeys-moribund-accession-process/
 “Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey”, Amnesty
International, October 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/eur440222013en.pdf
 “Gezi Part one month on: what lies ahead?” European Policy Centre, 27 June 2013, retrieved
28 March 2015
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3623_gezi_park_one_month_on_-
_what_lies_ahead.pdf
 “Gezi Resistance, Police Violence, and Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, Jadaliyya,
7 October 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14469/gezi-resistance-police-violence-and-turkey
%E2%80%99s-acces
 “Jonasson: EU questions overall democratic commitment of Turkish government”, Today’s
Zaman, 20 October 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015 http://www.todayszaman.com/monday-
talk_jonasson-eu-questions-overall-democratic-commitment-of-turkish-govt_329279.html
 Lavenex, Sandra and Schimmelfennig, Frank. “EU democracy promotion in the
neighbourhood: from leverage to governance?”, Democratization, vol. 18, no. 4, 2011,
pp.885-909
 “Message by Egemen Bağış, Minister For EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator on the Recent
Developments”, Ministry for EU Affairs, 17 June 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=49004&l=2
 “Not so free”, The Economist, 4 April 2013, retrieved 29 March 2015
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21575823-government-finds-different-ways-
intimidate-free-media-not-so-free
  S. Panebianco “The EU’s democracy promotion and the Mediterranean neighbours:
orientation, ownership and dialogue in Jordan and Turkey, by Ann Kristin Jonasson”,
Democratization, vol.21, no.7, 2014, pp.1358-1360
 “Statement by the Spokesperson of the High Representative Catherine Ashton on violence in
Turkey”, Council of the European Union, 2 June 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137372.pdf
 “The Future of Democracy in Turkey: Perceptions and Realities”, Chatham House, 20
February 2014, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Meetings/Meeting
%20Transcripts/20140220Arinc.pdf
 “Turkey-EU relations may be a casualty of Gezi Park”, Al-Monitor, 14 June 2013, retrieved 28
March 2015 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/wounded-relations-
turkey-eu-protests.html#ixzz3VxBLabaS
 “Turkish PM Erdoğan and EU Commissioner Füle in crossfire over Gezi Park protests” Hürriyet
Daily News, 7 June 2013, retrieved 28 March 2015
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-and-eu-commissioner-fule-in-
crossfire-over-gezi-park-protests.aspx?pageID=238&nid=48441
 “Turkey’s reaction to Gezi Park protests ‘brutal’, says Amnesty” The Irish Times, 2 October
2013, retrieved 28 March 2015 http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/turkey-s-
reaction-to-gezi-park-protests-brutal-says-amnesty-1.1546576
Turkey’s unruly rule of law”, Open Democracy, 17 April 2013, retrieved 29 March 2015
https://www.opendemocracy.net/firdevs-robinson/turkey%E2%80%99s-unruly-rule-of-law