1

FIRST LISTING IN D.B. II ITEM 10 ON 15.02.2021

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
(EXTRAORDINARY WRIT JURISDICTION)
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1851 OF 2021
IN THE MATTER OF:
   

    
     
   
    
    
     
MASTER INDEX 
  
VOLUME I 
 
 
  

  
  
  
  
  

   
   
   

 5422  
  
  5423   
  
 
          
 
 UNDER CHALLENGE
  /1 UNDER CHALLENGE
       
     
 2

         
        
 
 /2 
         
        
     

 
 /3     
    
      
       

   /4       
  /5      
        
 
VOLUME II 
    

   

   /1     

/2         
  /3      
  /4      
    /5   

  /6  
 /7  
 
       
      
       

       
 
 3

    

  
VOLUME III 
      
 
  
  
      
 
   /1     

      

        /2  
   /3  
  /4      
         
 /5   
/6  
  

  

      

 


   /1     

        
       
 due non appointment of Section 31 prosecutor)
 /2  
/3  
/4   
 
 
           
  
 4

 
       
        
 

        
     

       
     
 
   /1     
 
 
 /2   
   /1     
  
 
 /2   
 (definitely not a PIL) 
        

no public prosecutor
at the criminal trial 
     
 
       
    
  
 
   
        

        
  
  
non appointment
of Section 31 prosecutor
VOLUME IV 
 5

  /1  

  

    
   /2 

 

        
 
 /3  


    


         

  
    
      /4  

        
        
      
 
      /5    

        
 /6  
         
      
  /7       
          

/8   
        
       


 6

 /9  

 


 /10  



 /11  
      
      
  
        
   
 
 

 

          /12 


         

 /13  

    
       
      
        



 /14      
 

          
 
   

 7

     

     
 
 
          
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     /15  

         
        
       /16 
    
 
   
         
     /17    
 
        /18 


        
      


 /19   
         
      
      
        
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 /20   

     
 


 
 
       /21 
          
       
  /22  
 







         
         
 /23 

 /24 
       
   



         
   
      

       
/25  

        

    
         
 9


      
    
        

        


    
       
 
 

        
 /26     


       
   
          
    
  
      
       
        

  /27 
        
  

        

  

       
         
          

 
    /28    
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      

        /29 
 
  
  /30 
 
  /31  
 
    /32 

        
 Note: /24  /32

         
         
   
        



       
 
        
 
       
        
       
          



 

  
 
 

     
  
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 

  
         


 /33  
         
 
   
       
  /34      
         
   
       
        
       
  
 
       

  
        
/35 /1  
  

  /35 /2  
  

 /35 /3  
  

 /36  


       /37   

         
         
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  /38  

  
        
         
   /39  
 
        

  /40     
        
  /41  


 
 




 
/42 017  
      /43    
147  
         
     /44  
        /45 
       
      
        

        
 

         

          
 /46  
10.2015 in W.P. (Crl.) 588/
   
 13


 /47 /1    
 



 /47 /2  
  

 /48  
  
  
   
/49   
  
/50   
VOLUME V 
   
 

       
  
  
  
 

       




    
   
      

VOLUME VI 
   
  
 14



    /1   
      
     
      
       

  

       
 /2   
     
   /3  

    

 /4  
 /5  
   /6      
   /7      
     /8  
         
   /9     
      
  /10      
 
 /1  
        
/2  



 /3  
 

VOLUME VII 
 15

  /1 /1   

    
         
 
  
        
      
        

     


      
          
       


      
  /1/2   
         

 /1/3  
   

  /1/4    
   

  /1/5    
   

      
        
          
       

As per 21 year
Rule he should have got
on 21.12.1989 but given only on 15.09.1992. 
of Lt Col Selection Grade was given on  only after a
 16


         
/1/6   /1/7  
   
         
  /1/8   
   
  
 
   
 


       
 
 
 
          
  
/2  
 
     
        
       
       
        

  /3     
/4        
      
  
 /5      
      
        
  /6 
 /7 
    
  
        
 17

      

     
     


  /8   
         
  /9     

/10     
        
 /11  
    

  /12  
        
 
     
         


          

       
      /13    
         
      
        
  
 /14    
 

      
 
         

      
 
         
          
 18

        

  
        /15 
       
       

 /16  
    
    


          
 
      
 
 /17  
    /18  
  
   
       

 
 
 

  
       

 

VOLUME VIII 
   /19    
    
        
 (Court of Record has misplaced its Record)
VOLUME IX 
   /1     
       
    
 19

  /2  

 /3   
  
        
       
    
   /4  
       
   /5  
  
  
   /1     
       
    
    
      
/2  
/3  
/4   
/5         
    /6    
  
  
 
   /1     
       
/2  
        
 
  
/3   
      
   
  

     
  
   
    
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      

  Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young
Lawyers Association, 2020 (2) SCC 1 
 


        

      
 
   

VOLUME X 
 /1  

 
        
 /2    
   Tamil Nadu 
Pazhankudi Makkal Sangam v. Government of Tamil
Nadu 1997 [Vol.XLI] MLJ (Crl.) 655 
VOLUME XI 

  
        

          
         

 

 

         

   
      

         

   
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          


         

  


    

         

         
 
  
         

  


 
        

        
      
 
         
 
         
         

          
  
  
 
  
 
  

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  

 
  

          
     
  
         
       
      
       
 
       

   
      


   
 

        
 
         

         

          

  
 
         

  
 
   
     

 23

   

      
        

    
 
           


VOLUME XII 
         

         

         

        
   
 
   
       

          
 
  
 
         
         

  
         

VOLUME XIII 
   
       

   
   
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   

 
         
 
        
   
          
  
 
VOLUME XIV 
         

  
 
         
 
        
       

  /1  
 
  /2    
        
 
  
 
       
 
   
         

VOLUME XV 
    
 

         
 
       
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        


         
       


  
 
         
       



      

   
 
     

          
      

   
        
    

VOLUME XVI 
   
        
  
          
 
        
 

         
        

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  
        

        
        



         
 
     

          
      

         
       

       

          
 
VOLUME XVII 
          
 

         
       
      
   

         
       
      

   
 
      
 27

ISSN:2578-6873 [Funding by: Bloomberg Philanthropies

and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.]
.5. ANNEXURE P-34 PART VII/ 5: Climate Change 4055-
lnformation dated 31.10.2020 to Recipient No.9 97
6. ANNEXURE P-34 PART VII/ 6: Carbon dioxide toxicity
and climate change: a major unapprehended risk for human 4098-
health, 01.11.2020 [Research Gate DOl: 10.13140/ 12
RG .2.2.16787.48168]
7. ANNEXURE P-34 PART VII/ 7: EXTRACTS from The 4137-
Russian Conquest of Central Asia, A Study in Imperial 179
Expansion, 1814-1914, Alexander Morrison, 2020, ISBN:
978-1-107-03030-5
8. ANNEXURE P-35: /1 Judgement and Order dt. 23.06.1997 4180-
passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.S. Janardhanam ofHon 'ble 231
High Court of Madras in Crl.. R.C. No. 868/1996 titled
Tamil Nadu Pazhankudi Makkal Sangam represented by
V.P. Gunasekaran, General Secretary v. Government of
Tamil Nadu represented by the Home Secretary, and others
[EXTRACTS ONLY] Directions only to State Government
and not Union oflndia** to make Sections 30 & 31 workable
in Tamil Nadu as the unamended 1993 Act then existed [**
For the reason given at para 156 "156 ... We may, however,
point out that it is not legally permissible for this Court to
issue a mandamus to the Union Government to bring in
amendments to the enactments, as we have indicated. We
answer this point Accordingly. "] Citation: 1997 [Voi.XLI)
MLJ (Crl.) 655 /2 CM No. 56326 of 2018 in W.P. (Civil) 4232-80
No. 699 of 1990, 07.12.2018 /3 City of Oakland v. BP PLC 4281-
Transcript of Judge Alsup Tutorial on Climate Change, 4469
21.03.2018 District Court, California (N) No. C 17-06011
WHA (139 pp.)
9. ANNEXURE P-36: Table ofjudgcmcnts 4470-513

-::;1.~
Place: New Delhi
Dated: 26.01.2021 Petitioner-in-person
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi
1102, Tower 1, Uniworld Garden I, Sector 47 Gurugram-122018,
Mob.No.9818768349
Email: manioberoi@gmail.com
 28

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

(EXTRAORDINARY WRIT JURISDICTION)
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1851 OF 2021
IN THE MATTER OF:
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi … .Petitioner-in-person
Versus
Govt of NCT of Delhi & Ors. ….Respondents
(Not before Hon’ble the Chief Justice [Annx P 1 & P 2/1] Hon’ble
Mr Justice Siddharth Mridul [Annx P 23/32] Hon’ble Ms Justice
Mukta Gupta [Crl.M.C. 282/2013] Hon’ble Ms Justice Anu
Malhotra [Annx P 23/18] Hon’ble Ms Justice Rekha Palli [Annx
P 23/29/1/7] Hon’ble Ms Justice Jyoti Singh [Annx P 29/4])
INDEX-VOLUME I
S.NO. PARTICULARS PAGES
1. Urgent Application 30
2. Notice of Motion and POD 31-35
3. Court Fee 36-38
4. Memo of Parties 39-40
5. Synopsis and List of Dates 41-129
6. Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 130-
laying challenge (with ex-parte stay) to the Delhi Gazette. Pt. 197
IV No. 259 dt. 24.11.2020, Govt. of the NCT of Delhi,
N.C.T.D. No. 209 (SG-DL-E-25112020-223298) publishing
Notification F.6/13/ 2011-Judl./Suptlaw/1132-1137 dt.
24.11.2020 and other consequential reliefs under the
International Rule of Law with affidavit
7. C.M. NO. 5422 OF 2021 Application for ex-parte stay of 198-
the impugned notification dated 24.11.2020 with affidavit 201
8. C.M.NO. 5423 OF 2021 Application for exemption from 202-
filing certified copy of the originals of Annexures P-1 to P- 205
31(COLLY) with affidavit
9. ANNEXURE P-1: Delhi Gazette. Pt. IV No. 259 dt. 206-
24.11.2020, Govt. of the NCT of Delhi, N.C.T.D. No. 209 207
(SG-DL-E-25112020-223298) [UNDER CHALLENGE]
10. ANNEXURE P-2(COLLY): /1 [UNDER CHALLENGE]
Govt. of the NCT of Delhi Notification F.6/13/2011-
Judl./Suptlaw/721-725 dt. 14.06.2011 Special Courts of
Sessions in NCT of Delhi appointed on the date under
 29

“powers conferred by Section-30 of the Protection of 208

Human Rights Act, 1993...with the concurrence of the Chief
Justice of the High Court of Delhi..” (1pp.) /2 Gazette. of
India Extra Pt. II No. 1893 dt. 27.07.2016, S.0.2554(E), 209-10
27.07.206— Special Court of Sessions in NCT of Delhi
appointed on the date under“...powers conferred by sub-
section (1) of section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of
2013)]..with the concurrence ofthe ChiefJustice of the High
Court of Delhi..” (2pp.) /3 Haryana Govt. Gaz. Extra 211
07.07.2015 p.334, No. S.O. 137/C.A.10/1994/S.30/2015,
03.07.2015 “...powers conferred by section 30 of the
Protection ofHumanRights Act, 1993... with the concurrence
ofthe ChiefJustice ofthe Punjab and Haryana High Court...”
([pp.) /4 Regina v. Puddick, 176 ER 622 (1865) (3pp.) /5 212-4
EXTRACTHRCourts Not Functional- Human Rights 15th 215-7
Ed, 2014 Dr HO Agarwal Foreword Hon'ble Justice PN
Bhagwati (3pp.)

Continued in VolumeII
Place: New Delhi
Dated: 26.01.2021 = wh.
Petitioner-in-person
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi
1102, Tower 1, Uniworld Garden I, Sector 47 Gurugram-122018,
Mob.No. 9818768349
Email: manioberoi@gmail.com
 30

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

(EXTRAORDINARYWRIT JURISDICTION)
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NOO1F 2021
IN THE MATTEROF:
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi ... Petitioner-in-person
Versus
Govt of NCT of Delhi & Ors. .-.-Respondents
To,
The Registrar, High Court of Delhi,
URGENT APPLICATION
(Not before Hon’ble the Chief Justice, Hon’ble Mr Justice Siddharth Mridul
Hon’ble MsJustice Mukta Gupta, Hon’ble MsJustice Anu Malhotra, Hon’ble
Ms Justice Rekha Palli Hon’ble Ms Justice Jyoti Singh)
Sir,
Will you kindly treat this accompanying application as an urgent one
in accordance with High Court Rules and Orders on following grounds:
(1) challenge to Constitutional validity of impugned notifications published
in exercise of administrative powers by Hon’ble ChiefJustice of the High
Court of Delhi on authority of Articles 50, 233 & 236 ofthe Constitution of
India on 24.11.2020 & 14.06.2011 by signature of Lieutenant Governor NCT
of Delhi in writ of quo warranto.
(2) writ ofmandamus impacting “Constitutional Legitimate Expectations”in
humanrights offences of omission qua Section 31, Protection of Human
Rights Act 1993 in many matters [Constitution Bench in Government ofNCT
of Delhi v. Union of India and Ors., (2018) 8 SCC 501,
MANU/SC/0680/2018., (majority view) at SCC p.559, para 12,
“12...Constitutional Legitimate Expectations...”
(3) Constitution Bench having held in Kantaru Rajeevaru (5 judges) 2020(2)
SCC 1 at SCC para 4““4....It is essential to adhere to judicial discipline and
propriety when more than one petition is pending on the same, similar or
overlapping issues in the same court for which all cases must proceed
together”, Petitioner, therefore, requests listing of this matter on date as
convenientin petitions pending before Hon’ble Single Judge on same, similar
or overlapping issues in Hon’ble Court copyofpetition forwarded to learned
counsels in 340 CrPC Mr. Anil Bakshi Mob:9667300533 Ms. SuruchiMittal
Mob:9354323601 Mr. Jaideep Singh Sandhu Mob:9818188475, Ld. Counsel
in W.P.(Crl.) 588/2013 and Mr. B. Badrinath Mob: 9810320384, Ld. amicus
curiae in Cri. M.C. 3915/2019
Place: New Delhi Se Y
Dated: 26.01.2021 Petitioner-in-person
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi
1102, Tower 1, Uniworld Garden I, Sector 47 Gurugram-122018, Mob. No.
9818768349
Email: manioberoi@gmail.com
 31

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

(EXTRAORDINARY WRIT JURISDICTION)
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1851 OF 2021
IN THE MATTER OF:
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi … .Petitioner
Versus
Govt of NCT of Delhi & Ors. ….Respondents
NOTICE OF MOTION (CD BY SPEEDPOST)
To
1. Govt of NCT of Delhi, through its Chief Secretary Delhi
Secretariat, IP Estate, New Delhi 110054, Delhi Fax: 91-11-
23392102, Email:csdelhi@nic.in standingcounselgnctd@gmail.com
Mob: 9810071712 RESPONDENT NO. 1
2. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs
Government of India, North Block, New Delhi 110001 Fax: 91-
11-23093003, Email: hshso@nic.in Mob: 9811704188
maninderkaur_adv@yahoo.co.in RESPONDENT NO. 2
3.The Cabinet Secretary of India, Government of India Rashtrapati
Bhawan, New Delhi 110004, Fax: +91-11-230122874 Email:
cabinetsy@nic.in maninderkaur_adv@yahoo.co.in Mob:
9811704188 RESPONDENT NO. 3
4. Law Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of
India, 4th Floor ‘A’ Wing, Shastri Bhawan New Delhi 110001
Fax:91-11-23384403 Email:secylaw-dla@nic.in
Mob:9810015886 bansal_subhash@yahoo.com
RESPONDENT NO. 4
5. The High Court of Delhi, Sher Shah Road New Delhi 110003,
through its Registrar General Fax:+91-11-23073485 Email:
rg.dhc@nic.in saud@ahmadsyed.com Mob:9910013800
RESPONDENT NO. 5
6. The Secretary, Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs,
Government of India, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi 110011, Fax:
+91-11-23061459 secyurban@nic.in Mob:9811704188
Email:maninderkaur_adv@yahoo.co.in RESPONDENT NO.6
7.The Vice-Chairman, Delhi Development Authority Vikas Sadan
INA Colony, New Delhi 110023, Fax:+91-11-230122874 Email:
vcdda@dda.org.in avermadelhi@gmail.com Mob: 9811032001
ajverma@ndf.vsnl.net.in RESPONDENT NO. 7
 32

8. Armed Forces Tribunal(Principal Bench) throughits Principal

Registrar, West Block VIII, Opp. Mohan Singh Market, Sector I,
R. K. Puram, New Delhi 110066, Fax: +91-11- 26105361 Email:
aftdelhi@yahoo.in chetansharmamailbox@yahoo.com
RESPONDENTNO. 8
9. Sh. Dinesh KumarS.H.O,Police Station, Sadar, Sector 38,
Gurugram, 122018, Mob:9999981825, Email: shoggnsdr-
hry@nic.in groveradvocate@gmail.com Mob: 9811089646
baldevmahajan@rediff.com RESPONDENTNO.9
10. The National Human Rights Commission, through its
Secretary General, National Human Rights Commission, Manav
Adhikar Bhawan Block-C, GPO Complex, INA, New Delhi
110023 Fax: +91-11-24651329 Email:
sgnhre@nic.in chetansharmamailbox@yahoo.com
RESPONDENTNO. 10

Sir,
Pleasefind enclosed herewith the copy of Writ Petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for ex-parte stay
and the issue of a Writ of mandamus, quo warranto or any other
Writ, orderor direction to Respondents concerned. Thesaid matter
is likely to comeup on 09.02.2021 or such other date as convenient
to the Registry of the Hon’ble High Court.

Place: New Delhi

Dated: 26.01.2021 bu
Petitioner-in-person
SarvadamanSingh Oberoi
1102, Tower 1, Uniworld GardenI, Sector 47 Gurugram-122018,
Mob. No. 9818768349
Email: manioberoi@gmail.com
COPY ON CD BY SPEEDPOSTASPERLIST:-

[AB] Mr. Anil Kumar Bakshi (Advocate) 243, RPS,Flats, Sheikh Sarai
I, New Delhi 110017 Mob:9667300533 Email:
anilbakshilegal@gmail.com [W.P. (Civil) No. 7438 of 2000]
 33

[AG] Mr. Anil Grover (Sr. Addl. Advocate General, Haryana) A-174,
2nd Floor, Defence Colony, New Delhi 110024 Mob: 9811089646
Email: groveradvocate@gmail.com [R-9]

[AV] Mr Ajay Verma (Advocate) B-32.Sector-14, NOIDA 201301

Mob: 9811032001 Email: avermadelhi@gmail.com [R-7]

[BB] Mr B. Badrinath (Advocate) 41A, Pkt-A, SFS Flats Mayur Vihar-

III, Delhi 110096 Mob: 9810320384 Email: badrinath.adv@gmail.com
[Ld. Amicus Curiae in Crl. M.C. 3915/2019]

[BRM] Mr Baldev Raj Mahajan, Advocate General Haryana, H. No.

78, Sector-7, Chandigarh 160007 Email: baldevmahajan@rediff.com

[CS] Mr. Chetan Sharma, Additional Solicitor General of India, K-8,

Jangpura Extension, New Delhi 110014 Mob: 9810010757 Email:
chetansharmamailbox@yahoo.com

[JSS] Mr. J.S. Sandhu (Advocate) L-253, Vijay Rattan Vihar, Sector 15
Part-II, Gurugram 122001 Mob: 9818188475 Email:
ltcoljssandhu@gmail.com [Ld. Counsel in W.P. (Crl.) 588/2013]

[KKV] Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Attorney General for India, A-144, Neeti
Bagh, New Delhi, 110049 Email: kkvenu@outlook.in

[MK] Ms Maninder Kaur, :A-105, Priyadarshni Apartments, I.P.

Extension, New Delhi 110092 Mob: 9811704188 Email:
groveradvocate@gmail.com [R-2, R-3, R-6]

[SAS] Mr Syed Ahmad Saud (Advocate) 98, Azad Apartments,, Plot

No.111, I.P. Extension, New Delhi 110092 Mob: 9910013800 Email:
saud@ahmadsyed.com [R-5]

[SB] Mr Subhash Bansal (SCGC) 287, Ground Floor, Tower No. 3

Supreme Enclave, Mayur Vihar-I, Delhi 110091 Mob: 9810015886
Email: bansal_subhash@yahoo.com [R-4]

[SM] Ms Suruchi Mittal (Advocate) N-1/B, Ground Floor, Janjpura

Extension, New Delhi 110014 Mob: 9354323601 Email:
suruchi.m14@gmail.com [Ld. Counsel in CM No. 56326 of 2018 in
W.P. (Civil) No. 699 of 1990]

[RM] Mr Rahul Mehra Sr. Standing Counsel, 422, Lawyers Chambers, Delhi High
Court, New Delhi110001 Mob: 9810083100 Email: mehraandco@gmail.com [R-1]
34
35
36
37
38
 39

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

(EXTRAORDINARY WRIT JURISDICTION)
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1851 OF 2021

IN THE MATTER OF:

Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi … .Petitioner--in-person
Versus
Govt of NCT of Delhi & Ors. ….Respondents
MEMO OF PARTIES
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi, aged 72 yrs, s/o late Capt H.S. Oberoi,
r/o 1102, Tower 1, Uniworld Garden I, Sector 47 Gurugram-
122018, Mob: 9818768349 Email:manioberoi@gmail.com
PETITIONER

VERSUS

1. Govt of NCT of Delhi, through its Chief Secretary Delhi

Secretariat, IP Estate, New Delhi 110054, Delhi Fax: 91-11-
23392102, Email:csdelhi@nic.in standingcounselgnctd@gmail.com
Mob: 9810071712 RESPONDENT NO. 1
2. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs
Government of India, North Block, New Delhi 110001 Fax: 91-
11-23093003, Email: hshso@nic.in Mob: 9811704188
maninderkaur_adv@yahoo.co.in RESPONDENT NO. 2
3.The Cabinet Secretary of India, Government of India Rashtrapati
Bhawan, New Delhi 110004, Fax: +91-11-230122874 Email:
cabinetsy@nic.in maninderkaur_adv@yahoo.co.in Mob:
9811704188 RESPONDENT NO. 3
4. Law Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of
India, 4th Floor ‘A’ Wing, Shastri Bhawan New Delhi 110001
Fax:91-11-23384403 Email:secylaw-dla@nic.in
Mob:9810015886 bansal_subhash@yahoo.com
RESPONDENT NO. 4
 40

5. The High Court of Delhi, Sher Shah Road New Delhi 110003,
through its Registrar General Fax:+91-11-23073485 Email:
rg.dhc@nic.in saud@ahmadsyed.com Mob:9910013800
RESPONDENTNO.5
6. The Secretary, Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs,
Governmentof India, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi 110011, Fax:
+91-11-23061459 secyurban@nic.in Mob:9811704188
Email:maninderkaur_adv@yahoo.co.in RESPONDENT NO.6
7.The Vice-Chairman, Delhi Development Authority Vikas Sadan
INA Colony, New Delhi 110023, Fax:+91-11-230122874 Email:
vedda@dda.org.in avermadelhi@gmail.com Mob: 9811032001
ajverma@ndf.vsnl.net.in RESPONDENTNO. 7
8. Armed Forces Tribunal (Principal Bench) throughits Principal
Registrar, West Block VIII, Opp. Mohan Singh Market, Sector I,
R. K. Puram, New Delhi 110066, Fax: +91-11- 26105361 Email:
aftdelhi@yahoo.in chetansharmamailbox@yahoo.com
RESPONDENTNO. 8
9. Sh. Dinesh Kumar S.H.O, Police Station, Sadar, Sector 38,
Gurugram, 122018, Mob:9999981825, Email: shoggnsdr-
hry@nic.in groveradvocate@gmail.com Mob: 9811089646
baldevmahajan@rediff.com RESPONDENTNO.9
10. The National Human Rights Commission, through its
Secretary General, National Human Rights Commission, Manav
Adhikar Bhawan Block-C, GPO Complex, INA, New Delhi
110023 Fax: +91-11-24651329 Email:
sgnhre@nic.in chetansharmamailbox@yahoo.com
RESPONDENTNO. 10

Place: New Delhi <<

Dated: 21.12.2020 lot,
Petitioner-in-person
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi
1102, Tower 1, Uniworld Garden I, Sector 47 Gurugram-122018,
Mob. No. 9818768349
Email: manioberoi@gmail.com
 41

SYNOPSIS

1. The Petitioner, in this writ petition raises challenge, by way of

a writ of quo warranto, to the validity of Delhi Gazette. Pt. IV No.

259 dt. 24.11.2020, Govt. of the NCT of Delhi, N.C.T.D. No. 209

(SG-DL-E-25112020-223298) published u/s 30 of The Protection

of Human Rights Act, 1993 (Central Act No. 10 of 1994, 1993 Act

hereinafter), Notification F.6/13/2011-Judl./ Suptlaw/1132-1137

dt. 24.11.2020 (ANNEXURE P-1), qua “constitutional legitimate

expectations.”

2. That petitioner also seeks, by way of a writ of mandamus,

ground level implementation of Section 31 thereby enabling

Section 30 of the 1993 Act, reason being, criminal courts of

session are non-functional sans Public Prosecutor, who is a must

for commencement of every criminal trial at Sessions.

3. That the Public Prosecutor enjoins a long legal tradition dating

back to 1865; Crompton J., in Regina v. Puddick, 176 ER 622 held:

“I hope that in the exercise of the privilege granted by the

new Act to counsel for the prosecution of summing up the evidence,

they will not cease to remember that counsel for the prosecution

in such cases are to regard themselves as ministers of justice, and

 42

not to struggle for a conviction as in a case at Nisi Prius nor be

betrayed by feelings of professional rivalry – to regard the

question at issue as one of professional superiority, and a contest

for skill and pre-eminence.”

4. That Section 30 mandates appointment of a “Court of Session”

in the following words:

“30. Human Rights Courts.- for the purpose of providing

speedy trial of offences arising out of violation of human rights,

the State Government may, with the concurrence of the Chief

Justice of the High Court, by notification, specify for each district

a Court of Session to be a Human Rights Court to try the said

offences:

Provided that nothing in this section shall apply if-

(a) a Court of Session is already specified as a special

court; or

(b) a special court is already constituted, for such offences

under any other law for the time being in force.”

5. That in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XVIII

Trial Before a Court of Session, Section 225 mandates

appointment of a “Public Prosecutor” in the following words:

 43

“ 225. Trial to be conducted by Public Prosecutor. In every

trial before a Court of Session, the prosecution shall be conducted

by a Public Prosecutor.”

6. This writ of quo warranto raises challenge to notification issued

by Lieutenant Governor of Union Territory of Delhi on 24.11.2020

because, the Respondent 1 (a Union Territory) is lacking in List I

jurisdiction to grant seal of approval for notification dated

24.11.2020 authorised under the powers to be exercised in

consultation with Respondent 5 under Article 233(1)/ 236(a) of the

Constitution of India. That it suffers fatal defect of not having the

seal of the President of India or a competent lawfully notified

authority, which the Constitution Bench, on 04.07.2018, held “it

is clear as noon day” it is not the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi..

7. That the Court of Session appointed under Section 30 of the

1993 Act, at New Delhi, is further-more not enabled to commence

trial because the mandate of Section 225 CrPC and Section 31 of

the 1993 Act disables the prosecutor in conducting a legitimate

trial.

8. That in Case CRN No. DLND01-000756-2018, CC 20/2018

titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Union of India and others, (the

 44

one and only case ever filed before any Human Rights Court of

Sessions at Delhi since 1993) the trial, if completed, is therefore

null and void absent the Public Prosecutor.

9. That, in fact, without a Public Prosecutor neither any statements

or evidence could be led, nor cognizance could have been taken. It

is well settled that criminal trials where allegations supported by

documents, which point towards cognizable offence, have

necessarily to proceed to trial for establishing the truth or

otherwise of the allegations/ documents. Criminal trial, if it were

to proceed may result in a finding of Proved, Not Proved or

Acquitted but certainly the term dismissal is reserved for matters

other than cognizable offences. That has always been the public

policy in the Indian Criminal Procedure from its inception in 1861

10. That there is no criminal law provision known to Indian Law

enabling any Court of Sessions to opt for ex-parte dismissal,

without examining the witnesses and documents that too in

complete absence of the Public Prosecutor.

11. That the short ground for quashing said notification is that it is

not authorised by the President of India or by such officer as is

validly authorised under Article 53(3)(b) in terms of Entry 13 List

 45

I which is fully controlled by Article 73(1)(b), contrary to the law

laid down by the Constitution Bench on 04.07.2018 in

Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India and Ors., (2018) 8

SCC 501, MANU/SC/0680/2018 holding at SCC p.647, para

284.12:

“In the light of the ruling of the nine judge bench in NDMC,

it is clear as noon day that by no stretch of imagination, NCT of

Delhi can be accorded the status of a State under our present

constitutional scheme. The status of NCT of Delhi is sui generis, a

class apart, and the status of the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi is

not that of a Governor of a State, rather he remains an

Administrator, in a limited sense, working with the designation of

Lieutenant Governor. ”

12. The petitioner has been diligently and honestly pursuing

cases, under the 1993 Act, in the statutory courts/ tribunals and the

courts of record, cases of human rights offences alleged to have

been committed or acquiesced in India by the State and/ or organs

of the State and Central Governments (term “organ” includes

related and unrelated organs which, due State inaction, collusion,

or otherwise, are enabled to commit human rights offences) at

 46

Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab and Haryana since last

about ten years. That the Petitioner has failed, not because of lack

of application, but because of the inchoate implementation of the

Statute by the State (“organs”) in accord with “constitutional

legitimate expectations”. This petition is restricted to legitimate

expectation (LE) of the petitioner from the Central Government

and its “organs” whether they be in States (List II) or in Union

Territories (List I), which include and encompasses NCT

Government of Delhi, being the Respondent No .1, Ministry of

Home Affairs, being the Respondent No .2, Cabinet Secretariat,

being the Respondent No .3 and other “organs” such as

Respondent No. 9 (SHO, P.S. Sadar, Sector 38, Gurugram) qua a

List I matter, (human rights offence of not registering FIR as per

mandate of the Constitution Bench and Article 2.3(a), ICCPR,

1966) it is for the Central Government to enforce international rule

of law upon a recalcitrant List II “Organ”; with the vast power to

do good that the Constitution has favoured upon it, this is a fit case

where it can eclipse the odd recalcitrant State Government and its

“organs”.
 47

13. That all respondents, except Respondent No. 9, are to sue and

be sued in the name of the “Central Government” under the

General Clauses Act, 1897.

14. That as regards the Ministry of Home Affairs, Respondent No.

2 and the Cabinet Secretariat, Respondent No. 3, it was held by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Government of NCT of

Delhi v. Union of India and Ors., (2018) 8 SCC 501, MANU/SC/

0680/2018, (majority view)(04.07.2018) at SCC p.646, para 284.6

“284.6. Ours is a parliamentary form of Government guided by

the principle of collective responsibility of the Cabinet. The

Cabinet owes a duty towards the legislature for every action taken

in any of the Ministries and every individual Minister is

responsible for every act of the Ministry. This principle of

collective responsibility is of immense significance in the context

of "aid and advice".”

15. That Respondent No. 9 needs must be included in array of

respondents, in an honest attempt to remedy and relieve the system

of burking SHOs, an “organ of State” sole responsibility of failure/

violation for last 27 year’s failure is only of Union of India for its

gross failure to ensure execution of List I power of notifying

 48

Section 31 Public Prosecutor, thus stymieing district court level

relief from burking in FIRs by State Police, hence sole

responsibility rests on Union of India which alone has List I

overriding rectification authority and power over States. With

authority and power go accountability and responsibility both – In

Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New

Delhi (1978) 1 SCC 405 at SCC p.413 para 3, Hon’ble Justice

Krishna Iyer speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench

held “3. The moral may be stated with telling terseness in the

words of William Pitt: 'Where laws end, tyranny begins'.

Embracing both these mandates and emphasizing their combined

effect is the elemental law and politics or Power best expressed by

Benjamin Disraeli:

I repeat...that all power is a trust-that we are accountable for its

exercise that, from the people and for the people, all springs, and

all must exist." (Vivien Grey, Bk. VI. Ch. 7)

Aside from these is yet another, bearing on the play of natural

justice, its nuances, non-applications, contours, colour and

content. Natural Justice is no mystic testament of judge made

juristics but the pragmatic, yet principled, requirement of fairplay

 49

in action as the norm of a civilised justice-system and minimum of

good government crystallised clearly in our jurisprudence by a

catena of cases here and elsewhere.”

16. That as held by the Constitution Bench in Government of NCT

of Delhi v. Union of India and Ors., (2018) 8 SCC 501, (majority

view) (04.07.2018) at SCC p.646, para 284.6, the Cabinet owes a

duty towards the legislature for every action taken in any of the

Ministries and every individual Minister is responsible for every

act of the Ministry. That the executive control under the 1993 Act,

is traceable under Article 73(1)(b) of the Constitution of India,

1949, to the control and power of the Cabinet headed by the

Hon’ble Prime Minister of the Union of India under Lists I, II &

III, (Entry 13 List I, Entry 16 List I, Article 73(1)(b) & Article

53(3)(b). That, therefore, in international criminal law, primary

responsibility for control of human rights offence of widespread

disease of police burking in registration of “FIRs” by an organ of

State, SHOs, is the collective responsibility of the Cabinet of the

Central Government. That this Hon’ble Court enjoys power

coupled with duty under Article 226 in actions (laxity qua

widespread disease of burking SHOs, a human rights violation) in

 50

matters of human rights falling under Article 21, concerning the

collective responsibility of the Cabinet of the Central Government.

17. That Petitioner, under Article 51-A, is duty bound to move this

Hon’ble Court under Article 226 upon a strict reliance on Articles

14, 19, 21, 51, 53, 73(1)(b), 141, 154, 162, 239-AA, 246 and 253

of the Constitution of India, 1949, particularly Article 73(1)(b)

That Article 73 states:

“73. Extent of executive power of the Union

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the

executive power of the Union shall extend

(a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament has

power to make laws; and

(b) to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction

as are exercisable by the government of India by virtue of any

treaty on agreement:

Provided that the executive power referred to in sub clause

(a) shall not, save as expressly provided in this constitution or in

any law made by Parliament, extend in any State to matters with

respect in which the Legislature of the State has also power to

make laws
 51

(2) Until otherwise provided by Parliament, a State and any

officer or authority of a State may, notwithstanding anything in

this article, continue to exercise in matters with respect to which

Parliament has power to make laws for that State such executive

power or functions as the State or officer or authority thereof

could exercise immediately before the commencement of this

Constitution Council of Ministers”

18. That purposive interpretation of Article 73(1)(b) makes it

crystal clear that disenabling Proviso qua List III (Concurrent),

only applies to Article 73(1)(a). That Article 73(1)(b) is a discrete,

universal and wholesome power encompassing List I (Union), List

II (State) and List III (Concurrent) enabling Parliament to legislate

the 1993 Act honouring “constitutional legitimate expectations”

That a minute examination of the 1993 Act reveals that Parliament

has made specific provisions enabling exercise of power under

Article 53(3)(b) by Governors where appropriate, under the

Constitution and existing law. That as regards exercise of power

under Article 73 it is the significant conclusion of the Petitioner

that, most wisely, Parliament has not specifically excluded the

executive power of the Union in any part of the said Act. That even
 52

where a power has been delegated under List II to State Human

Rights Commissions it has been specified that the powers of the

Authority shall exercise only those powers which are available

under Lists II & III. [Section 21(5), Sections 21(7)&21(8) -

preferential treatment to Union Territory of Delhi may or may not

violate Article 14, Section 36(1) - preferential treatment to Union

Territory of Delhi may or may not violate Article 14]

19. That as regards criminal special procedure in Human Rights

Courts, enjoying full powers under Lists I, II & III, Petitioner relies

from 01.09.1872 onwards upon (i) Clause 2, Section 2 of Act X of

1872(CrPC) “Saving of special procedure. – Wherever a special

form of procedure is prescribed by any law not expressly repealed

in the first schedule to this Act, it shall not be deemed to have been

impliedly repealed by reason of its being inconsistent with the

provisions of this Code.” (ii) Section 1 of Act X of 1882(CrPC),

saving of special procedure, (iii) Section 1(2) of Act V of

1898(CrPC), saving of special procedure, and (iv) Section 5 of Act

2 of 1974(CrPC), “5. Saving.- Nothing contained in this Code

shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect

any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special
 53

jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure

prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.”

20. It is well settled that the special shall overrule the general. That

placing reliance upon three Constitution bench judgements [The

South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. The Secretary, Board of

Revenue Trivandrum, AIR 1964 SC 207, P.S. Sathappan (Dead)

by Lrs. v. Andhra Bank Ltd. (2004) 11 SCC 672 & Pankajakshi

and Ors. v. Chandrika and Ors., (2016) 6 SCC 157], Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India in Managing Director Chhattisgarh State

Co-Operative Bank Maryadit v. Zila Sahkari Kendriya Bank

Maryadit and Ors. (2020) 6 SCC 411, MANU/SC/0274/2020 held

at MANU paras 31-33: 8

“31. It is a settled principle of law that where two provisions

of an enactment appear to conflict, courts must adopt an

interpretation which harmonises, to the best extent possible, both

provisions. Justice G P Singh in his seminal work Principles of

Statutory Interpretation states:

“To harmonize is not to destroy. A familiar approach in all

such cases is to find out which of the two apparently conflicting

provisions is more general and which is more specific and to

 54

construe the more general one as to exclude the more specific…

The principle is expressed in the maxims Generalia specialibus

non derogant and Generalibus specialia.”

Similarly, Craies in Statute Law states:

“The rule is, that whenever there is a particular enactment

and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken

in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the

particular enactment must be operative, and the general

enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute

to which it may properly apply.”

Where two provisions conflict, courts may enquire which of

the two provisions is specific in nature and whether it was intended

that the specific provision is carved out from the application of the

general provision. The general provision operates, save and

except in situations covered by the specific provision. The

rationale behind this principle of statutory construction is that

were there appears a conflict between two provisions, it must be

presumed that the legislature did not intend a conflict and a

subject-specific provision governs those situations in exclusion to

the operation of the general provision.

 55

32. In an early decision of this Court in JK Cotton Spinning

and Weaving Mills Co Ltd v State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1961 SC

1170], a three judge Bench of this Court considered whether the

principle applied to conflicts within the same enactment. Clause

5(a) of the Government Order dated 10 May 1948 conferred upon,

inter alia, any employee or a registered trade union of employers

the right to move the Board constituted under the Order to initiate

an enquiry into an industrial dispute. Clause 23 stipulated that

where an enquiry is pending before the Regional Conciliation

Officer, notwithstanding the pendency of a case before the Board

or Industrial Court, no employer shall discharge or dismiss any

workman. Under Clause 24, an order of the Board, unless

modified in appeal, was final and conclusive. The appellant,

representing the employer’s union, contended that once an order

is made under Clause 5(a), Clause 23 has no application and the

employer may proceed to dismiss the workmen. The Court rejected

the contention noting that any employer could defeat the

provisions of Clause 23 merely by an application under Clause

5(a). The Court held that Clause 23 was made with a definite

purpose. Consequently, where an enquiry was pending under

 56

Clause 23, an application under Clause 5(a) was barred. The

Court held:

“9. We reach the same result by applying another well-

known rule of construction that general provisions yield to special

provisions. The learned Attorney-General seemed to suggest that

while this rule of construction is applicable to resolve the conflict

between the general provision in one Act and the special provision

in another Act, the rule cannot apply in resolving a conflict

between general and special provisions in the same legislative

instrument. This suggestion does not find support in either

principle or authority. The rule that general provisions should

yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by

lawyers and Judges but springs from the common understanding

of men and women that when the same person gives two directions

one covering a large number of matters in general and another to

only some of them his intention is that these latter directions

should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the

earlier direction should have effect.

10. Applying this rule of construction that in cases of

conflict between a specific provision and a general provision the

 57

specific provision prevails over the general provision and the

general provision applies only to such cases which are not covered

by the special provision, we must hold that clause 5(a) has no

application in a case where the special provisions of clause 23 are

applicable.”

This Court affirmed that the principle that the general

excludes the specific is a tool of statutory interpretation even in

cases of conflict within the same enactment. Where one of the

conflicting provisions is general in nature and the other is specific,

common understanding dictates that the specific provision is given

effect, while the general provision continues to apply to all other

situations.

33. In Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v M/s Binani

Cements Ltd., [Civil Appeal No. 336 of 2003, decided on 19

February 2014.] the question concerned whether the respondent-

assessee was entitled for the grant of an eligibility certificate for

exemption from payment of Central Sales Tax and Rajasthan Sales

Tax under Entry 4 in Annexure ‘C’ of the Sales Tax New Incentive

Scheme for Industries, 1989. Annexure ‘C’ to the Scheme was

titled the ‘Quantum of Sales tax Exemption under the new

 58

Scheme’. Entry 4 of the Annexure stipulated that “Prestigious

Units’ would be entitled to a 75% exemption from tax liability with

100% in terms of Fixed Capital Investment. By an amendment,

Entry 1E was inserted which covered ‘new cement units’ and

stipulated that large-scale units would be entitled 25% tax

exemption. A two judge Bench of this Court held:

“27. Before we deal with the fact situation in the present

appeal, we reiterate the settled legal position in law, that is, if in

a Statutory Rule or Statutory Notification, there are two

expressions used, one in General Terms and the other in special

words, under the rules of interpretation, it has to be understood

that the special words were not meant to be included in the general

expression. Alternatively, it can be said that where a Statute

contains both a General Provision as well as specific provision,

the later must prevail.

29…. It is well established that when a general law and a

special law dealing with some aspect dealt with by the general law

are in question, the rule adopted and applied is one of harmonious

construction whereby the general law, to the extent dealt with by

the special law, is impliedly repealed. This principle finds its

 59

origins in the latin maxim of generalia specialibus non

derogant…”

The Court held that where two provisions are in question -

one of general application and the other specific in nature, a

harmonious interpretation would mean that the general law, to the

extent it is dealt with by the special law, is impliedly repealed. This

Court, relying on the principle generalia specialibus non derogant

held that Item 1E is a ‘subject specific provision.’ The Court noted

that the amendment removed ‘new cement industries’ from the

non-eligible Annexure ‘B’ and placed it into Annexure ‘C’

amongst the eligible industries. Consequently, the Court rejected

the contention of the respondent-assessee and held that as Item 1E

concerned the more specific unit, it was excluded in its application

from other general entries.

The principle that the general provision excludes the more

specific has been consistently applied by this Court in South Indian

Corporation (P) Ltd. v Secretary, Board of Revenue [AIR 1964 SC

207], Paradip Port Trust v Their Workmen [AIR 1977 SC 36],

Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Education v

Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth [(1984) 4 SCC 27], CCE v Jayant

 60

Oil Mills,[(1989) 3 SCC 343] P S Sathappan v Andhra Bank Ltd,

[(2004) 11 SCC 672] Sarabjit Rick Singh v Union of India [(2008)

2 SCC 417] and Pankajakshi v Chandrika[(2016) 6 SCC 157].”

21. That for 27 years the State (Article 12 definition) and its organs

in India have failed to ensure notification of the primary driver of

the 1993 Act, which is mandatory prior availability of human

rights prosecutor before commencement of trial by the Section 30

Court for “…trial of offences arising out of violation of human

rights…”

22. That it is well settled that a sessions trial concluded whether

“on the merits” or even otherwise, without the presence of a

prosecutor validly appointed, is null and void.

23. That u/s 31, thereof, provision of an independent human rights

prosecutor (compliant with U.N. G.A. Resolution 48/134 dt.

04.03.1994 Annx: Paris Principles 20.12.1993) to prosecute the

State (Article 12 definition) has been mandated by Parliament to

honour “International Covenants”; u/s 31, Protection of Human

Rights Act, 1993 r/w Sec 2 (d): “(d) “human rights” means the

rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual

 61

guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International

Covenants and enforceable by courts in India.”

24. That upon a proper construction of Article 246 of the

Constitution of India in the light of Articles 51, 53(3)(b), 73(1)(b),

141, 154, 162, 226, 239-AA and 253 of the Constitution of India

it is axiomatic that the words “State Government” in Sections

12(c), 14(1)*, 17(i)*, 20*, 21(1), 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, and

38* are inclusive in nature and do not conclusively exclude the

legislative and executive power of the “Central Government” and

it would strain the Constitutional dharma of Articles 51 and

73(1)(b) read with Article 253 of the Constitution of India, if

Sections 12(c), 21(1), 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, and 35 are excluded

from executive power of the “Central Government” in light of any

imagined “exclusion by implication” upon a strained interpretation

of Sections 14(1)*, 17(i)*, 20* and 38* which empower both the

“Central Government” and the “State Government” in the 1993

Act.

25. That it is clear as noon day that the words “State” in Sections

6(3), 13(6), Proviso to Section 21(6), Third proviso to Section

22(1) and Section 24(3) are relatable to Entry 45 List III and not
 62

to Entry 94 List I (Article 246) as clarified by Hon’ble Supreme

Court of India (14.02.2019) in Government of NCT of Delhi v.

Union of India and Ors., 258 (2019) DLT 449,

MANU/SC/0203/2019 at MANU Para 116. (discussed below)

26. That, therefore, qua the relief sought by petitioner it is

unnecessary to challenge either the statute or the Constitution of

India, 1949.

27. That a challenge simplicitor to the Notification published by

no more than an Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi,

even though designated as “Lieutenant Governor”, not being a

Constitutional Authority like the Governor of a State or the

President of India, if accepted, would satisfy the first part of the

reliefs sought by petitioner in this writ petition.

28. That, qua Legitimate Expectation (LE) it was held by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Government of NCT of Delhi

v. Union of India and Ors., (2018) 8 SCC 501, MANU/SC/

0680/2018., (majority view) at SCC p.559, paras 12-13:

“12. We have referred to the aforesaid precedents to state

that the spirit of the Constitution has its own signification. In the

context of the case at hand, the democratic nature of our

 63

Constitution and the paradigm of representative participation are

undoubtedly comprised in the "spirit of the Constitution". While

interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, the safe and most

sound approach is to read the words of the Constitution in the light

of the avowed purpose and spirit of the Constitution so that it does

not result in an illogical outcome which could have never been the

intention of the Constituent Assembly or of the Parliament while

exercising its constituent power. Therefore, a constitutional court,

while adhering to the language employed in the provision, should

not abandon the concept of the intention, spirit, the holistic

approach and the constitutional legitimate expectation which

combinedly project a magnificent facet of purposive

interpretation. The Court should pose a question to itself whether

a straight, literal and textual approach would annihilate the sense

of the great living document which is required to be the laser beam

to illumine. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the

constitutional courts should protect the sense and spirit of the

Constitution taking aid of purposive interpretation as that is the

solemn duty of the constitutional courts as the final arbiters of the

Constitution. It is a constitutional summon for performance of

 64

duty. The stress has to be on changing society, relevant political

values, absence of any constitutional prohibition and legitimacy of

the end to be achieved by appropriate means. We shall refer to the

aspect of purposive interpretation regard being had to the context

and other factors that gain primacy to be adverted to at a

subsequent stage.

13. Having prefaced thus, we shall now proceed to state the

controversy in brief since in this batch of appeals which has been

referred to the Constitution Bench, we are required to advert to

the issue that essentially pertains to the powers conferred on the

Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi

and the executive power exercised by the elected Government of

NCT of Delhi. The facts involved and the controversy raised in

each individual appeal need not be dwelled upon, for we only

intend to answer the constitutional issue.”

29. The Executive is in clear and prescient violation of Article 14,

19 & 21 rights of petitioner by not appointing human rights

prosecutor under Section 31 of the 1993 Act for 27 years at a

stretch, and causing him prejudice of standstill in two dozen and

 65

more court cases pending for 10 to 30 years, thus attracting the

mischief of Legitimate Expectation (LE).

30. That while referring to the above Constitution Bench

judgement (04.07.2018), it was noted by Hon’ble Supreme Court

of India (14.02.2019) in Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of

India and Ors., 258 (2019) DLT 449, MANU/SC/0203/2019 at

MANU Para 20:

“20. We would now like to reproduce, in entirety, the

conclusions which the majority judgment arrived at. These are as

under:

The conclusions in seriatim

284. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we record our

conclusions in seriatim:

284.1. While interpreting the provisions of the Constitution,

the safe and most sound approach for the constitutional courts to

adopt is to read the words of the Constitution in the light of the

spirit of the Constitution so that the quintessential democratic

nature of our Constitution and the paradigm of representative

participation by way of citizenry engagement are not annihilated.

 66

The courts must adopt such an interpretation which glorifies the

democratic spirit of the Constitution.

284.2. In a democratic republic, the collective who are the

sovereign elect their law-making representatives for enacting laws

and shaping policies which are reflective of the popular will. The

elected representatives being accountable to the public must be

accessible, approachable and act in a transparent manner. Thus,

the elected representatives must display constitutional objectivity

as a standard of representative governance which neither

tolerates ideological fragmentation nor encourages any utopian

fantasy, rather it lays stress on constitutional ideologies.

284.3. Constitutional morality, appositely understood,

means the morality that has inherent elements in the constitutional

norms and the conscience of the Constitution. Any act to garner

justification must possess the potentiality to be in harmony with

the constitutional impulse. In order to realise our constitutional

vision, it is indispensable that all citizens and high functionaries

in particular inculcate a spirit of constitutional morality which

negates the idea of concentration of power in the hands of a few.

 67

284.4. All the three organs of the State must remain true to

the Constitution by upholding the trust reposed by the Constitution

in them. The decisions taken by constitutional functionaries and

the process by which such decisions are taken must have normative

reasonability and acceptability. Such decisions, therefore, must be

in accord with the principles of constitutional objectivity and

symphonious with the spirit of the Constitution.

284.5. The Constitution being the supreme instrument

envisages the concept of constitutional governance which has, as

its twin limbs, the principles of fiduciary nature of public power

and the system of checks and balances. Constitutional governance,

in turn, gives birth to the requisite constitutional trust which must

be exhibited by all constitutional functionaries while performing

their official duties.

284.6. Ours is a parliamentary form of Government guided

by the principle of collective responsibility of the Cabinet. The

Cabinet owes a duty towards the legislature for every action taken

in any of the Ministries and every individual Minister is

responsible for every act of the Ministry. This principle of

collective responsibility is of immense significance in the context

 68

of "aid and advice". If a well-deliberated legitimate decision of the

Council of Ministers is not given effect to due to an attitude to

differ on the part of the Lieutenant Governor, then the concept of

collective responsibility would stand negated.

284.7. Our Constitution contemplates a meaningful

orchestration of federalism and democracy to put in place an

egalitarian social order, a classical unity in a contemporaneous

diversity and a pluralistic milieu in eventual cohesiveness without

losing identity. Sincere attempts should be made to give full-

fledged effect to both these concepts.

284.8. The constitutional vision beckons both the Central

and the State Governments alike with the aim to have a holistic

edifice. Thus, the Union and the State Governments must embrace

a collaborative federal architecture by displaying harmonious

coexistence and interdependence so as to avoid any possible

constitutional discord. Acceptance of pragmatic federalism and

achieving federal balance has become a necessity requiring

disciplined wisdom on the part of the Union and the State

Governments by demonstrating a pragmatic orientation.

 69

284.9. The Constitution has mandated a federal balance

wherein independence of a certain required degree is assured to

the State Governments. As opposed to centralism, a balanced

federal structure mandates that the Union does not usurp all

powers and the States enjoy freedom without any unsolicited

interference from the Central Government with respect to matters

which exclusively fall within their domain.

284.10. There is no dearth of authorities with regard to the

method and approach to be embraced by constitutional courts

while interpreting the constitutional provisions. Some lay more

emphasis on one approach over the other, while some emphasise

that a mixed balance resulting in a unique methodology shall serve

as the best tool. In spite of diverse views on the said concept, what

must be kept primarily in mind is that the Constitution is a dynamic

and heterogeneous instrument, the interpretation of which

requires consideration of several factors which must be given their

due weightage in order to come up with a solution harmonious

with the purpose with which the different provisions were

introduced by the Framers of the Constitution or Parliament.

 70

284.11. In the light of the contemporary issues, the

purposive method has gained importance over the literal

approach and the constitutional courts, with the vision to realise

the true and ultimate purpose of the Constitution not only in letter

but also in spirit and armed with the tools of ingenuity and

creativity, must not shy away from performing this foremost duty

to achieve constitutional functionalism by adopting a pragmatic

approach. It is, in a way, exposition of judicial sensibility to the

functionalism of the Constitution which we call constitutional

pragmatism. The spirit and conscience of the Constitution should

not be lost in grammar and the popular will of the people which

has its legitimacy in a democratic set-up cannot be allowed to lose

its purpose in simple semantics.

284.12. In the light of the ruling of the nine-Judge Bench in

NDMC [NDMC v. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/0760/1997 : (1997)

7 SCC 339], it is clear as noonday that by no stretch of

imagination, NCT of Delhi can be accorded the status of a State

under our present constitutional scheme. The status of NCT of

Delhi is sui generis, a class apart, and the status of the Lieutenant

Governor of Delhi is not that of a Governor of a State, rather he

 71

remains an Administrator, in a limited sense, working with the

designation of Lieutenant Governor.

284.13. With the insertion of Article 239-AA by virtue of the

Sixty-ninth Amendment, Parliament envisaged a representative

form of Government for NCT of Delhi. The said provision intends

to provide for the Capital a directly elected Legislative Assembly

which shall have legislative powers over matters falling within the

State List and the Concurrent List, barring those excepted, and a

mandate upon the Lieutenant Governor to act on the aid and

advice of the Council of Ministers except when he decides to refer

the matter to the President for final decision.

284.14. The interpretative dissection of Article 239-

AA(3)(a) reveals that Parliament has the power to make laws for

the National Capital Territory of Delhi with respect to any matters

enumerated in the State List and the Concurrent List. At the same

time, the Legislative Assembly of Delhi also has the power to make

laws over all those subjects which figure in the Concurrent List

and all, but three excluded subjects, in the State List.

284.15. A conjoint reading of Clauses (3)(a) and (4) of

Article 239-AA divulges that the executive power of the

 72

Government of NCTD is coextensive with the legislative power of

the Delhi Legislative Assembly and, accordingly, the executive

power of the Council of Ministers of Delhi spans over all subjects

in the Concurrent List and all, but three excluded subjects, in the

State List. However, if Parliament makes law in respect of certain

subjects falling in the State List or the Concurrent List, the

executive action of the State must conform to the law made by

Parliament.

284.16. As a natural corollary, the Union of India has

exclusive executive power with respect to NCT of Delhi relating to

the three matters in the State List in respect of which the power of

the Delhi Legislative Assembly has been excluded. In respect of

other matters, the executive power is to be exercised by the

Government of NCT of Delhi. This, however, is subject to the

proviso to Article 239-AA(4) of the Constitution. Such an

interpretation would be in consonance with the concepts of

pragmatic federalism and federal balance by giving the

Government of NCT of Delhi some required degree of

independence subject to the limitations imposed by the

Constitution.
 73

284.17. The meaning of "aid and advise" employed in

Article 239-AA(4) has to be construed to mean that the Lieutenant

Governor of NCT of Delhi is bound by the aid and advice of the

Council of Ministers and this position holds true so long as the

Lieutenant Governor does not exercise his power under the

proviso to Clause (4) of Article 239-AA. The Lieutenant Governor

has not been entrusted with any independent decision-making

power. He has to either act on the "aid and advice" of Council of

Ministers or he is bound to implement the decision taken by the

President on a reference being made by him.

284.18. The words "any matter" employed in the proviso to

Clause (4) of Article 239-AA cannot be inferred to mean "every

matter". The power of the Lieutenant Governor under the said

proviso represents the exception and not the general Rule which

has to be exercised in exceptional circumstances by the Lieutenant

Governor keeping in mind the standards of constitutional trust and

morality, the principle of collaborative federalism and

constitutional balance, the concept of constitutional governance

and objectivity and the nurtured and cultivated idea of respect for

a representative Government. The Lieutenant Governor should

 74

not act in a mechanical manner without due application of mind

so as to refer every decision of the Council of Ministers to the

President.

284.19. The difference of opinion between the Lieutenant

Governor and the Council of Ministers should have a sound

rationale and there should not be exposition of the phenomenon of

an obstructionist but reflection of the philosophy of affirmative

constructionism and profound sagacity and judiciousness.

284.20. The Transaction of Business Rules, 1993 stipulate

the procedure to be followed by the Lieutenant Governor in case

of difference between him and his Ministers. The Lieutenant

Governor and the Council of Ministers must attempt to settle any

point of difference by way of discussion and dialogue. By

contemplating such a procedure, the 1993 TBR suggest that the

Lieutenant Governor must work harmoniously with his Ministers

and must not seek to resist them at every step of the way. The need

for harmonious resolution by discussion is recognised especially

to sustain the representative form of governance as has been

contemplated by the insertion of Article 239-AA.

 75

284.21. The scheme that has been conceptualised by the

insertion of Articles 239-AA and 239-AB read with the provisions

of the GNCTD Act, 1991 and the corresponding the 1993 TBR

indicates that the Lieutenant Governor, being the administrative

head, shall be kept informed with respect to all the decisions taken

by the Council of Ministers. The terminology "send a copy thereof

to the Lieutenant Governor", "forwarded to the Lieutenant

Governor", "submitted to the Lieutenant Governor" and "cause to

be furnished to the Lieutenant Governor" employed in the said

Rules leads to the only possible conclusion that the decisions of

the Council of Ministers must be communicated to the Lieutenant

Governor but this does not mean that the concurrence of the

Lieutenant Governor is required. The said communication is

imperative so as to keep him apprised in order to enable him to

exercise the power conferred upon him Under Article 239-AA(4)

and the proviso thereof.

284.22. The authorities in power should constantly remind

themselves that they are constitutional functionaries and they have

the responsibility to ensure that the fundamental purpose of

administration is the welfare of the people in an ethical manner.

 76

There is requirement of discussion and deliberation. The fine

nuances are to be dwelled upon with mutual respect. Neither of the

authorities should feel that they have been lionised. They should

feel that they are serving the constitutional norms, values and

concepts.

284.23. Fulfilment of constitutional idealism ostracising

anything that is not permissible by the language of the provisions

of the Constitution and showing veneration to its sense, spirit and

silence is constitutional renaissance. It has to be remembered that

our Constitution is a constructive one. There is no room for

absolutism. There is no space for anarchy. Sometimes it is argued,

though in a different context, that one can be a "rational

anarchist", but the said term has no entry in the field of

constitutional governance and Rule of law. The constitutional

functionaries are expected to cultivate the understanding of

constitutional renaissance by realisation of their constitutional

responsibility and sincere acceptance of the summon to be

obeisant to the constitutional conscience with a sense of

reawakening to the vision of the great living document so as to

enable true blossoming of the constitutional ideals. The Lieutenant

 77

Governor and the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief

Minister are to constantly remain alive to this idealism.”

30.That it was most importantly noted by Hon’ble Supreme Court

of India (14.02.2019) in Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union

of India and Ors., 258 (2019) DLT 449, MANU/SC/0203/ 2019 at

MANU Paras 116, 129-132 and 135-136:

” Issue No. 3: Whether the GNCTD is an 'appropriate

Government' under the COI Act?

116. The relevant entries in the Seventh Schedule are Entry

94 of List I and Entry 45 of List III. These are as under:

Entry 94 List I

Inquiries, surveys and statistics for the purpose of any of the

matters in this List.

Entry 45 List III

Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters

specified in List II or List III.”

xxxx

“129. From the arguments noted above, it becomes

apparent that the outcome of this issue hinges upon the meaning

that is to be assigned to the expression 'State Government'

 78

occurring in Section 2(a) of the COI Act which defines

'Appropriate Government'. To put it otherwise, whether the term

State Government would include 'Union Territory'? For this

purpose, one will have to fall back on the GC Act. Section 3(8) of

the GC Act defines Central Government and relevant portion

thereof is as under:

(8) "Central Government" shall-

(a) ...

(b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the

commencement of the Constitution, means the President; and shall

include-

(i) ...

(ii) ...

(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory,

the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority

given to him Under Article 239 of the Constitution;

130. Section 3(60) of the GC Act, on the other hand, defines

State Government, relevant provision whereof is extracted below:

3(60) "State Government"-

(a) ...
 79

(b) ...

(c) as respects anything done or to be done after the

commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act,

1956, shall mean, in a State, the Governor, and in a Union

Territory, the Central Government; and shall, in relation to

functions entrusted Under Article 258A of the Constitution to the

Government of India, include the Central Government acting

within the scope of the authority given to it under that article;

131. The GC Act also defines 'Government', 'State' and

'Union Territory'. We would like to reproduce these definitions as

well:

3(23) "Government" or "the Government" shall include

both the Central Government and any State Government;

3(58) "State"-

(a) ...

(b) as respects any period after such commencement, shall

mean a State specified in Schedule I to the Constitution and shall

include a Union Territory;

3(62A) "Union Territory" shall mean any Union Territory

specified in Schedule I to the Constitution and shall include any

 80

other territory comprised within the territory of India but not

specified in that Schedule;

132. No doubt, definition of State as contained in Section

3(58) includes Union Territory. However, we are concerned with

the meaning of 'State Government' which is defined in Section

2(60) of the GC Act. Here, it is specifically provided that in respect

of Union Territory, the State Government would mean the Central

Government.”

xxxx

“135. We, therefore, are unable to accept the submission of

Mr. Naphade that the expression 'State Government' occurring in

Section 2(a) of the COI Act would mean GNCTD, a Union

Territory.

136. It is not for us to deal with the argument of Mr.

Naphade that Entry 45 of List III confers legislative and executive

competence on GNCTD and, therefore, GNCTD can pass an

appropriate order appointing a Commission of Inquiry in exercise

of its executive power. In the instant case, we are concerned with

notification dated August 11, 2015 which is passed under the COI
 81

Act. We, therefore, uphold the judgment of the High Court on this

aspect.”

31. That as regards Issue No. 3 which is most relevant for this case

Hon’ble Justice Ashok Bhushan concurred with the separate

judgement delivered, as reproduced above, by Hon’ble Justice

A.K. Sikri on five out of the six issues, differing only on issue No.

1 with which this writ petitioner is not concerned. This petitioner

is also not concerned with Issue No. 2 and Issues No. 4 to No.6.

32. That it is in the knowledge of the petitioner that there are two

matters (C. A. No. 7968/2019 & W.P. (Crl.) 819/2019) which are

pending/disposed, but not finally concluded, in the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India which have concentrated their focus on

the necessity to ensure proper constitutional working of Sections

30 & 31 of the Protection of Human Rights, Act, 1993

33. That, to demonstrate this fact, Petitioner would reproduce four

orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, concerning the

issue of Sections 30 & 31 of the Protection of Human Rights, Act,

1993. That the said orders are in SMW (Crl.) No. 1/2019,

(13.08.2019 & 17.01.2020), C. A. No. 7968/2019, (13.08.2019 &

13.01.2020) C.A. No. 5912/2012, (13.08.2019, 17.01.2020 &

 82

27.08.2020), W.P. (Crl.) 819/2019 (13.08.2019 & 17.01.2020), &

W.P. (Crl.) 539/1986 (27.08.2020) orders reproduced below, in

seriatim on 13.08.2009, 13.01.2020, 17.01.2020 & 27.08.2020:

13.08.2019

SMW (Crl.) No(s).1/2019, IN RE ALARMING RISE IN

THE NUMBER OF REPORTED CHILD RAPE INCIDENTS

xxxx

“SLP(C) No.34251/2017 (now C. A. No. 7968/2019)

On 04.01.2018, this Court had passed a detailed order,

relevant portion of which reads as follows:

"....According to us, it is the mandate of the statute to

establish Human Rights Courts and to appoint Special Public

Prosecutors. In that regard, we would like the responses of all the

States...."

Following States i.e. Odisha, Telangana, Meghalaya,

Mizoram, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand have not

filed their responses despite period of one year six months having

elapsed.

State of Rajasthan is not represented in Court.

 83

States of Odisha, Telangana, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Uttar

Pradesh and Uttarakhand are directed to file reply responses

within four weeks from today subject to payment of Rs.50,000/- as

costs which will be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Services

Committee for use of juvenile issues. As far as State of Rajasthan

is concerned it is not even represented in Court. Therefore, costs

of Rs.1 lakh are imposed on it and was also granted four weeks

time to file its response.

The High Court of Calcutta has not filed its reply. The reply

be filed in the meantime.

List on 04.10.2019.

For arguments on the dispute between the National

Commission for Protection of Child Rights and the West Bengal

State Commission for Protection of Child Rights, list on

03.09.2019.

W.P.(C) No.819/2019 (Bhavika v.Union of India)

Though notice has been issued, the States need not file

replies in this case and reply be filed only in SLP(C)

No.34251/2017*. List along with SLP(C) No.34251/2017”

(*now Civil Appeal No. 7968/2019- Disposed)

 84

13.01.2020

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7968 OF 2019 NATIONAL

COMMISSION FOR PROTECTION OF CHILD RIGHTS &

ORS. v. DR. RAJESH KUMAR & ORS.

“40. This appeal is partly disposed of in the aforesaid terms

in so far as the disputes inter se the NCPCR and WBCPCR are

concerned. We, however, make it clear that the issue of setting up

of human rights courts and appointment of special public

prosecutors for such human rights courts shall be dealt with in this

appeal as well as in the Writ Petition (C) No.819 of 2019. All

pending application(s) related to the dispute between the NCPCR

and the Dr. Rajesh Kumar, ADGP, CID, West Bengal (respondent

no.1) & WBCPCR, shall stand(s) disposed of accordingly.”

17.01.2020

SMW (Crl.) No(s). 1/2019, IN RE ALARMING RISE IN

THE NUMBER OF REPORTED CHILD RAPE INCIDENTS

“We make it clear that issue of setting up Human Rights

Courts will not be taken in this Suo Moto Writ Petition and this

petition will deal only with exclusive POCSO Courts. The issue of
 85

setting up of Human Rights Courts shall be dealt with C.A.

No.7968/2019 and W.P.(C) No.819/2019.

It is pointed out to us that there is another matter being C.A.

No.5912/2012 wherein the issue of setting up Human Rights

Courts is also been dealing with.

List all the three matters regarding setting up of Human

Rights Court before one Bench after obtaining orders from

Hon’ble Chief Justice of India.”

27.08.2020

Miscellaneous Application No(s).1259/2020 in

W.P.(Crl.) No. 539/1986 SHRI DILIP K. BASU v. STATE OF

WEST BENGAL & ORS. WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5912

OF 2012 Punjab State Human Rights Commission vs. Jat Ram

& Ors.

“Writ Petition (Crl.) No.539 of 1986 has been engaging the

attention of this Court for last few years and various orders have

been passed by this Court from time to time. The last effective

order was passed on 14.07.2015, reported in 2015 (8) SCC 744.

 86

Pursuant to the liberty granted in the concluding paragraph

of said order, M.A. No.1259 of 2020 has been preferred by learned

Amicus Curiae seeking various directions.

By order dated 05.08.2020, National Human Rights

Commission (NHRC, for short) was made party to the application

and NHRC was called upon to respond to paragraphs 8 and 9 of

the application.

Notice was also issued to Union of India to respond to para

10 of the application.

Responses have since then been filed on behalf of NHRC

and Union of India.

Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Amicus Curiae has

invited our attention to the proceedings dated 05.04.2010 before

NHRC in complaint referred by Senior Superintendent, District

Jail, Fatehgarh, U.P., when the issue of applicability of Section

176(1A) of the Criminal Procedure Code (‘the Code’, for short),

as inserted by Act 25 of 2005, was considered by NHRC and it was

observed:-

“In our opinion, the correct position of law is that an

enquiry by Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate is

 87

mandatory in only those cases of custodial death, where there is

reasonable suspicion of foul play or well founded allegation of

commission of offence. All other cases of custodial death where

the death is natural or caused by disease may be enquired into by

an Executive Magistrate.”

Copies of said proceedings were marked for information

and necessary action to all the concerned.

According to learned Amicus Curiae, the interpretation

accepted and placed by NHRC on Sub-Section (1-A) of Section 176

of the Code is not correct.

We have heard Dr. Singhvi, learned Amicus Curiae, Mr.

S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General for Union of India

and Ms. Anitha Shenoy, learned Senior Advocate for NHRC at

some length.

During the course of hearing, it is brought to our notice that

the issue regarding interpretation of Section 176(1-A) of the Code

and the question whether the provision is mandatory or not, are

pending consideration in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.354 of 2019

‘Suhas Chakma vs. Union of India & Ors.’; and that the matter is

to come up for hearing on 07.09.2020.

 88

Another issue highlighted by learned Amicus Curiae is

about the functioning of various State Human Rights

Commissions. It is submitted that i) no information is available

with regard to the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and

Nagaland; ii) in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,

Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka,

Maharashtra, Manipur, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttar

Pradesh and Uttarakhand there are substantial vacancies in the

State Human Rights Commissions; iii) the States of Andhra

Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Manipur,

Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu either do not have a Chairperson or

are functioning through an Acting Chairperson; iv) the States of

Jharkhand, Manipur and Meghalaya do not even have the

required strength to constitute the Commission as no member or

an investigative officer has been appointed.

It is submitted on behalf of NHRC that in Writ Petition

(C)No.349 of 2018 [Jammula Choudaraiah vs. UOI] and Civil

Appeal No.5912 of 2012 [Punjab State Human Rights Commission

vs. Jat Ram & Ors.], the issues regarding strength of members of

State Human Rights Commission as well as the appointments of

 89

Chairpersons and members in various State Human Rights

Commission are pending consideration before this Court.

Another development that needs to be adverted to is that

Writ Petition (C ) No.668 of 2020 has now been assigned to this

Bench by virtue of Order dated 21.08.2020.

Since some of the issues projected in the present Writ

Petitions are also arising in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.354 of 2019,

Writ Petition (Civil) No.349 of 2018 and Civil Appeal No.5912 of

2012, these matters are adjourned to 14.09.2020.

In the meantime, the Registry is directed to place the papers

of Writ Petition (Crl.)No.539/1986 as well as of Writ Petition

(C)No.668 of 2020 before the Hon’ble CJI so that multiplicity of

proceedings with regard to same issues is avoided and the matters

are placed before the appropriate Bench.”

34. That, the Petitioner gets a sinking feeling that only because of

the COVID-19 Lockdown and for no other reason, the momentum

on the issue of independent human rights prosecutors (and courts)

appears to have petered out.

35. That in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.539 of 1986 in Judgement/

Order dated 24.07.2015, Shri Dilip K. Basu v. State of West

 90

Bengal & Ors, (2015) 8 SCC 744, it was noted at para 23 at SCC

p.765.

“23. Reference in this connection may be made to the

recommendations of the NHRC published in its Annual Report for

the year 2004-2005 where the commission observed:

16.1 State Human Rights Commissions have been set up in

15, States viz., the States of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Chhattisgarh,

Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh,

Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu,

Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The Commission would like to

reiterate its view that the 'better protection of human rights' can

be ensured if all the States set up Human Rights Commission. The

Commission also emphasizes that the State Human Rights

Commission which have already been set up or are proposed to be

set up should be in compliance with the 'Paris Principles'.

16.2 The Commission, on its part, has endeavoured to assist

and guide the State Commissions in whatever manner possible,

whenever requests for such assistance or guidance has been

sought. The strengthening of the State Commissions, is an

important agenda in the Commission's activities. With this in view,

 91

the Commission has taken the initiative to have annual

interactions with all the State Human Rights Commissions, where

mutual discussions take place.

16.3 The first such annual meeting was held on the 30-01-

2004, where the agenda included coordination and sharing of

information between the SHRCs and the Commission; training,

awareness building and substantive human rights issues. Taking

forward the initiative, the second meeting was convened on the 13-

05-2005. Apart from the various issues of concern discussed in the

meeting, the meeting concluded with the adoption of the following

Resolution:

The National Human Rights Commission and the State

Human Rights Commissions present hereby unanimously resolve

to urge the State Governments to:

a) Setup, on priority, State Human Rights Commissions

where the same do not exist.

b) Where, there are State Human Rights Commissions or,

are in the process of being setup, it be ensured that they are

structurally and financially independent as envisaged in and, fully

confirming to, the principles relating to the status of national

 92

institutions (the "Paris Principles') which were endorsed by the

UN General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20-12-1993.

The National and State Commissions also reiterate and

remind the Governments, both, at the Centre and in the States, that

the primary obligation towards the protection of human rights is

that of the State and that the national human rights institutions are

for 'better protection of human rights.

16.4 The Commission places great importance to these

interactions especially keeping in view the social, cultural and

linguistic diversity that comprises our society. Institutionalizing

the mechanism of these annual interactions is one way the

Commission hopes to keep up the process of dialogue. It is thus,

all the more important that all the states expeditiously set up

human rights Commissions.”

36. Taking note in Shri Dilip K. Basu v. State of West Bengal &

Ors, (2015) 8 SCC 744 of the Joint Meeting of the Human Rights

Commissions dated 13-05.2005, in at para 23.16.3 (b) at SCC

p.766 “..the principles relating to the status of national institutions

(the "Paris Principles') which were endorsed by the UN General

Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20-12-1993.” Hon’ble Supreme

 93

Court, further down on the same page, also took a note of this 13-

05-2005 unanimous resolution at para 23.16.3 at SCC p.

766“…remind the Governments, both, at the Centre and in the

States, that the primary obligation towards the protection of

human rights is that of the State …”

37. That, once the Court noted favourably that “primary

obligation towards the protection of human rights is that of the

State” inclusive of “(the "Paris Principles') which were endorsed

by the UN General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20-12-1993”

reticence of the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para 30 at SCC p.769

(reproduced below) “Beyond that we do not propose to say

anything at this stage.” is understandable.

38. That in Shri Dilip K. Basu v. State of West Bengal & Ors,

(2015) 8 SCC 744 para 30 at SCC p.769 it was held:

”30. There is, in our opinion, no reason why the State

Governments should not seriously consider the question of

specifying human rights Court to try offences arising out of

violation of human rights. There is nothing on record to suggest

that the Governments have at all made any attempt in this

direction or taken steps to consult the Chief Justices of the

 94

respective High Courts. The least which the State Governments

can and ought to do is to take up the matter with the Chief Justices

of High Courts of their respective States and examine the

feasibility of specifying Human Rights Court in each district within

the contemplation of Section 30 of the Act. Beyond that we do not

propose to say anything at this stage.”

39. That the issue of human rights prosecutors was specifically

raised for the very first time in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

by a three Judge Bench on 04.01.2018 in National Commission for

Protection of Child Rights and Ors. vs. Rajesh Kumar and Ors.,

2018 (1) SCALE 418, MANU/SC/0092/2018 at MANU paras 13-

16:

“13. In this context, we may also look at certain aspects

pertaining to protection of human rights as envisaged under the

Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (for short, 'the 1993 Act').

Section 2(1)(d) defines "human rights", which is as follows:

2(1)(d) "human rights" means the rights relating to life,

liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the

Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and

enforceable by courts in India.

 95

14. The language employed in the aforesaid dictionary

clause, seems to us to include the dignity of the individual and in

that compartment dignity of a child deserves to be covered. A child

cannot be bartered away at the whim and fancy or selfishness of

the person In-charge of orphanages. The person concerned may

be liable for violation of human rights. It is worth noting here that

Section 30 of the 1993 Act deals with Human Rights Courts. The

said provision is as follows:

30. Human Rights Courts.- for the purpose of providing

speedy trial of offences arising out of violation of human rights,

the State Government may, with the concurrence of the Chief

Justice of the High Court, by notification, specify for each district

a Court of Session to be a Human Rights Court to try the said

offences:

Provided that nothing in this section shall apply if-

(a) a Court of Session is already specified as a special

court; or

(b) a special court is already constituted, for such offences

under any other law for the time being in force.

 96

15. Section 31 deals with special public prosecutor. It is as

under:

31. Special Public Prosecutor.- For every Human Rights

Court, the State Government shall, by notification, specify a

Public Prosecutor or appoint an advocate who has been in

practice as an advocate for not less than seven years, as a Special

Public Prosecutor for the purpose of conducting cases in that

Court.

16. According to us, it is the mandate of the statute to

establish Human Rights Courts and to appoint Special Public

Prosecutors. In that regard, we would like the responses of all the

States.”

40. Regrettably, that momentum appears to have petered out. The

reasons why the three cases noted in order dated 17.01.2020 in

SMW (Crl.) No(s).1/2019 are presently somnolent may be

because:

(1) The order dated 13.08.2019 in SMW (Crl.) No(s).1/2019

directed that as regards W.P.(C) No.819/2019 (Bhavika v. Union

of India) “Though notice has been issued, the States need not file

replies in this case and reply be filed only in SLP(C)

 97

No.34251/2017.” (now C.A. 7968/2019). Because no replies are to

be filed, and the case (C.A. 7968/2019) in which replies were to

be filed is “Disposed”, and the other case C.A. 5912/2012 is only

regarding powers and staffing of State Human Rights

Commissions and not human rights prosecutors or human rights

courts, W.P.(C) No.819/2019 where no responses are to be filed,

is otiose.

(2) That there are no affected parties remaining, hence

matter C.A. 7968/2019 is perforce shown by registry, as per Rules,

as “Disposed”, in view of there being no remaining interested

parties. In C.A. 7968/2019 para 40 of the last Order dated

13.01.2020 held“40. This appeal is partly disposed of in the

aforesaid terms in so far as the disputes inter se the NCPCR and

WBCPCR are concerned. We, however, make it clear that the issue

of setting up of human rights courts and appointment of special

public prosecutors for such human rights courts shall be dealt with

in this appeal as well as in the Writ Petition (C) No.819 of 2019.

All pending application(s) related to the dispute between the

NCPCR and the Dr. Rajesh Kumar, ADGP, CID, West Bengal
 98

(respondent no.1) & WBCPCR, shall stand(s) disposed of

accordingly.”

(3) The case C.A. 5912/2012 is listed with some other

matters clubbed with Writ Petition (Crl.) No.539 of 1986 (D.K.

Basu) but none of these matters appear to concern the vital issue

of human rights prosecutors, and therefore order dated 26.08.2020

in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.539 of 1986 (D.K. Basu) has discussed

a host of human rights issues but is entirely silent on human rights

prosecutors, as also human rights courts.

41. That in the next following Constitutional interpretation of

Sections 30 & 31, Petitioner would place reliance on G.P. Singh’s

“Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Ed., 2016, Chapter 4.3

(b) at p.289: “It cannot, however, be said that the rule of literal

construction or the golden rule of construction has no application

to interpretation of the Constitution (Note 70:(2004) 2 SCC 267 at SCC

pp.271-272). So when the language is plain and specific and the

literal construction produces no difficulty to the constitutional

scheme, the same has to be resorted to (Note 71:(2006) 7 SCC 1 paras

201-204). Similarly, where the Constitution has prescribed a

method for doing a thing and has left no ‘abeyance’ or gap, if the
 99

court by a strained construction prescribes another method for

doing that thing, the decision will become open to serious

objection and criticism (Note 72:AIR 1994 SC 268 at AIR p.383, p.421,

p.442, p.454, 1996 MPLJ (Jour) 24 at MPLJ p.29, (1998) 7 SCC 739, (2009)

1 SCC 657, (2005) 2 SCC 104 overruling AIR 1996 SC 1308, AIR 2005 SC

2356 at AIR pp.2360-2361, (2004) 4 SCC 714 at SCC pp.737-738).”

Section 30: That upon a proper interpretation of Article

73(1)(b) because the List III powers permissible to State

Governments vide proviso Article 73(1) extend only to Article

73(1)(a) and not Article 73(1)(b) State Governments are excluded

by rule of implication from exercising any powers, whether of rule

making, notification or legislation proper under Entry 13 List I,

Entry 16 List I, Entry 93 List I, Entry 94 List I, Entry 95 List I and

Entry 97 List I except only where Parliament makes provison in

the Statute as it has indeed done in Sections 30 & 31 under Article

53(3)(b). That this should not pose any insurmountable difficulty,

because the Legislature rightly did not use the term “State

Government alone may” and wisely used the term “State

Government may” and hence Central Government is not disabled

from notifying Human Rights Courts “with the concurrence of the

 100

Chief Justice of the High Court” in case a State Government falters

in appointing a Human Rights Court. In this connection it shall be

very instructive to refer to the Index details of ANNEXURE P-

8(COLLY): “ANNEXURE P-8(COLLY): Govt. of the NCT of

Delhi Notification F.6/13/2011-Judl./Suptlaw/721-725 dt.

14.06.2011 Special Courts of Sessions in NCT of Delhi appointed

on the date under “…powers conferred by Section-30 of the

Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993...with the concurrence of

the Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi..” /2 Gazette. of India

Extra Pt. II No. 1893 dt. 27.07.2016, S.O.2554(E), 27.07.206–

Special Court of Sessions in NCT of Delhi appointed on the date

under “…powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 435 of the

Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013)]..with the concurrence of the

Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi..”

Section 31: That upon a proper interpretation of Article

73(1)(b) because the List III powers permissible to State

Governments vide proviso Article 73(1) extend only to Article

73(1)(a) and not Article 73(1)(b) State Governments are excluded

by rule of implication from exercising any powers, whether of rule

making, notification or legislation proper under Entry 13 List I,

 101

Entry 16 List I, Entry 93 List I, Entry 94 List I, Entry 95 List I and

Entry 97 List I except if a provision has been made under Article

53(3)(b). That this should not pose any insurmountable difficulty,

because the Legislature rightly did not use the term “State

Government alone may” and wisely used the term “State

Government may” and hence Central Government is not disabled

from notifying Human Rights Prosecutors. That an

insurmountable difficulty arises here.

42. That the specific difficulty is that whereas oversight of the

Courts of Record over appointments under Section 30 ensures the

Paris Principles mandate of independence but independent (Paris

Principles compliant) prosecutor under Section 31 needs must be

appointed by the State (Central or State Government), but it must

at the same time, not be subservient to it. Therefore the Rule of

Law dictates that this task is best left to any independent Article

12 State Entity which should also an A-Status Institution enjoying

accreditation status by the Bureau of the International

Coordinating Committee of National Institutions (ICC Bureau)

referred to in ANNEXURE P-27(COLLY)/ 4. That one such entity

is the National Human Rights Commission (of India - NHRCI).

 102

However, since National Human Rights Commission is not a

Constitutional Authority, there also needs to be the ultimate

oversight of a Constitutional Authority. One such Constitutional

Authority is the Attorney-General for India who is best entrusted

with ultimate oversight of this task of management of

appointments of Human Rights Prosecutors (Paris Principles

compliant as per UN GA Res. 34/183 dt. 48/134 dt. 04.03.1994)

under the provisions of Article 76(2) of the Constitution of India.

That this difficulty needs to be resolved in terms of Mohinder

Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi (1978)

1 SCC 405 at SCC p.421 para 16, Hon’ble Justice Krishna Iyer

speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench held “16.

Secondly, the pregnant problem of power and its responsible

exercise is one of the perennial riddles of many a modern

constitutional order. ……….. The judicial branch has a sensitive

responsibility here to call to order lawless behavior. Forensic

non-action may boomerang, for the court and the law are

functionally the bodyguards of the People against bumptious

power, official or other.”

 103

43. That Section 31 not having been ensured timely by the

Government or the Courts of Record in India, it clearly attracts the

provisions of ICCPR as held in Remdeo Chauhan @ Rajnath

Chauhan v. Bani Kant Das, [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 957 at

S.C.R. p.983 para 52“52…….. Such action would include

inquiring into cases where a party has been denied the protection

of any law to which he is entitled, whether by a private party, a

public institution, the government or even the Courts of law. We

are of the opinion that if a person is entitled to benefit under a

particular law, and benefits under that law have been denied to

him, it will amount to a violation of his human rights.” Article 2.3

of ICCPR, 1996 holds “3.Each State Party to the present

Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights

or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an

effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been

committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b)To ensure

that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right

thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or

legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority

provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the
 104

possibilities of judicial remedy;(c) To ensure that the competent

authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.” This right

to effective legal determination has attained paramountcy by the

UN General Assembly in its Resolution 60/147 dt. 16.12.2005 in

the following words with special reference having been made in

Annex, Preamble about Article 2 of ICCPR, 1966 “The General

Assembly, Recalling the provisions providing a right to a remedy

for victims of violations of international human rights law found

in numerous international instruments, in particular …. article 2

of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

……Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines

contained herein do not entail new international or domestic legal

obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and

methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations under

international human rights law and international humanitarian

law which are complementary though different as to their norms,

Recalling that international law contains the obligation to

prosecute perpetrators of certain international crimes in

accordance with international obligations of States and the

requirements of national law or as provided for in the applicable

 105

statutes of international judicial organs, and that the duty to

prosecute reinforces the international legal obligations to be

carried out in accordance with national legal requirements and

procedures and supports the concept of complementarity,….

Recognizing that, in honouring the victims’ right to benefit from

remedies and reparation, the international community keeps faith

with the plight of victims, survivors and future human generations

and reaffirms the international legal principles of accountability,

justice and the rule of law, Convinced that, in adopting a victim-

oriented perspective….”

“Adopts the following Basic Principles and Guidelines:… VIII.

Access to justice…18. In accordance with domestic law and

international law, and taking account of individual circumstances,

victims of gross violations of international human rights law and

serious violations of international humanitarian law should, as

appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and

the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and effective

reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23, which include the

following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,

satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.”

 106

44. That it needs to be emphasised here that these prosecutors

would be independent and hence are not strictly bound by the rules

of previous sanction. That this is all the more reason that the

Government keeps a check on any abuse of process through an

independent Constitutional Authority such as the Attorney

General for India, in exercise of the Constitutional power under

Article 76(2). That if, in the opinion of the prosecutor there arises

interference with the independence of process or the Rule of Law

by delays in previous sanction cognizance and trial would not be

held up, merely by any delay because this Special Act speaks of

“Speedy Trial”. That there is no need for previous sanction under

the 1993 Act because of the exclusion clause of Entry 1 List III the

Code of Criminal Procedure, which includes Section 197. Entry 1

List III provides inter alia:

“1. Criminal law, including all matters included in the

Indian Penal Code at the commencement of this Constitution but

excluding offences against laws with respect to any of the matters

specified in List I or List II and excluding the use of naval, military

or air forces or any other armed forces of the Union in aid of the

civil power.”
 107

LIST OF DATES

821-822 Monument of Lassa, Inscription 821-822 AD (ANNEXURE

AD P-34 PART I/ 2)

24.10.1684 The Peace of Westphalia and it Affects on International

Relations, 24.10.1684 [Patton, Steven (2019) The Histories:

Vol. 10 : Iss. 1 , Article 5] (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 3)

Year 1684 Peace Treaty Between Ladakh and Tibet at Tingmosgang,

1684 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 4)

02.12.1815 Treaty of Saganli, 1815 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 5)

16.09.1842 Peace Treaty between the Ruler of Jammu, the Emperor of

China and The Lama Guru of Lhasa, 1842 (ANNEXURE P-34

PART I/ 6)

Year 1852 Agreement between Tibet and Kashmir, 1852 (ANNEXURE

P-34 PART I/ 7)

Year 1852 Map Central Asia before the Russian Conquest, 1852 at p.xxv

in “The Russian Conquest of Central Asia, A Study in Imperial

Expansion, 1814-1914” Alexander Morrison, ISBN: 978-1-

107-03030-5 First published 10.12.2020 (ANNEXURE P-34

PART I/ 8)
 108

Year 1865 Regina v. Puddick, 176 ER 622 (1865)ANNEXURE P-

2(COLLY) /4

11.11.1865 Treaty of Sinchula, 1865 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 9)

13.04.1874 Treaty between Great Britain and Eastern Turkistan, 1874

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 10)

17.03.1890 Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Tibet

and Sikkim signed at Calcutta, 1890 (ANNEXURE P-34

PART I/ 11)

1883-1893 Map of Kashmir-Sinkiang Boundary prepared by China prior

to 1890 and exchanged by the Chinese Minister to the Court of

St. Petersburg with Russia and later given by him to George

Macartney (1867-1945) British Indian Consul General at

Kashgar in 1893 [S.F. August 1893, No. 342; S.F. October

1893, No. 97] (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 12)

05.12.1893 Regulations regarding Trade Communication and Pasturage

Great Britain and China [Tibetan Present Did not sign] 1893

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 13)

01.03.1894 The Burmah Convention between Great Britain and China

with map, 1894 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 14)

 109

04.02.1897 The Burmah Convention between Great Britain and China

with a 1927 additional map, 1897 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART

I/ 15)

14.09.1897 Queen Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, ILR 1898 (22) Bom

112, (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 16)

05.09.1902 Supplementary Commercial Agreement between Great Britain

and China, 1902 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 17)

07.09.1904 Convention between Tibet and Great Britain, Lhasa 1904,

Simla, 11.11.1904 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 18)

27.04.1906 Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting

Tibet, 1906 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 19)

31.08.1907 Convention between Great Britain and Russia with translation

in re Tibet, 1907 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 20)

20.04.1908 Convention between Great Britain and China on Tibet, 1908

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 21)

11.01.1913 Treaty between Tibet & Mongolia, 1913, Chinese People's

23.05.1951 Political Consultative Conference, 1951, Forcible Agreement

24.04.1954 signed through a Tibetan prisoner of war held captive by

Chinese Communist Party as Head of Tibetan Delegation,

 110

repudiated by Dalai Lama; India-China Agreement 1954, all

agreements proof that Tibet is an independent nation from

1913-1954; [The Changing Face of Tibet, Pradyumna P.

Kumar, The University Press of Kentucky, 1976]

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 22)

11.01.1913 Tibet Chinese Communist Party Talks 1951, Conclusion

23.05.1951 Process and Analysis of the “17-Point Agreement” between

24.04.1954 China and Tibet, SUH Sangmun, Chungang University, 2009

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 23)

25.03.1914 Exchange of notes between the British and Tibetan

plenipotentiaries from Aitchison Vol. XIV, 1929 (with a Map

by Goldstein), 1914 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 24)

03.07.1914 Convention Great Britain China and Tibet with 2 maps, 1914

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 25)

03.07.1914 Anglo Tibetan Trade Regulations, 1914 (ANNEXURE P-34

PART I/ 26)

Year 1914 Tibet and Adjacent Countries, Survey of India Provisional

Map, 1914 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 27)

 111

1915-1919 Map No. 3 Chinese Proposals for a frontier settlement 1915-

1919 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 28)

28.06.1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919 (ANNEXURE P-34

PART I/ 29)

Year 1919 Tibet and Adjacent Countries, Survey of India Map, 1919

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 30)

13.12.1920 Statute of the Court PCIJ, 1920 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/

31)

25.11.1926 Belgium China Treaty Matter PCIJ, Belgium Application

25.11.1926 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART II/ 1)

08.01.1927 Belgium China Treaty Matter PCIJ Judgement 08.01.1927

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART II/ 2)

25.05.1929 Belgium China Treaty Matter PCIJ Judgement 25.05.1929

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART II/ 3)

11.03.1941 International Arbitral Awards Trail Smelter Case – US v.

Canada Vol III pp.1905-1982 (pp.1962-1966) 11.03.1941

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART II/ 4)

01.01.1942 UN Yearbook 1946-47 Pt 1 Sec 1 Atlantic Charter, (Important

01.01.1947 Chinese Contribution) (ANNEXURE P-34 PART II/ 5)

 112

26.06.1945 Charter of the United Nations, 1945 (ANNEXURE P-34

PART II/ 6)

26.06.1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART II/ 7)

1947-1967 October 1967 CIA Map No. 54935 10-67 showing Ethno-

Linguistic Groups in Communist China (ANNEXURE P-34

PART I/ 32)

15.08.1947 India gets independence. Pakistani infiltrators intrude into

princely State of Kashmir on 22.10.1947 which thereupon

accedes to India on 27.10.1947

26.10.1947 December 1990 CIA Map No. 720542 (B01163) 12-90

showing the territorial boundary of the erstwhile princely State

of Kashmir on 15.08.1947 before its Accession to India on

27.10.1947 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 33)

27.10.1947 Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to India,

26.10.1947/ 27.10.1947 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART I/ 34)

27.10.1947 June 1991 CIA Map No. 801746 (B01313) 6-91 showing the

territorial boundaries of Myanmar with India and China

 113

10.12.1948 UN General Assembly Resolution 217 (III) of the date

proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and

approved measures for implementation, publicity and

enforcement. (ANNEXURE P-2)

01.07.1953 Chinese troops commenced intrusions into areas (Hunza/

Aksai Chin) which were clearly within the territorial boundary

of the erstwhile princely State of Kashmir in the December

1990 CIA Map No. 720542 (B01163) 12-90 taking advantage

of total lack of any border patrolling in these very remote

thinly populated areas.

14.12.1966 Self Determination and Declaration on the Granting of

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1966

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART II/ 8)

16.12.1966 UN General Assembly Resolution 2200 (XXI) of the date

adopted and opened for signature the International Covenant

on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

(ANNEXURE P-3) (ANNEXURE P-34 PART II/ 9)

 114

Year 1968 The India-China Border A Reappraisal, Gondker Narayana

Rao, 1968 and Reprint 2009, ISBN: 9788120834545

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART III/ 1)

13.11.1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution,

1979 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART III/ 2)

22.03.1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,

1985 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART III/ 3)

01.02.1987 Petitioner blamed in an inquiry conducted behind his back in

abuse of process of Army Rule 180 which abuse effectively

put paid to his career in the Indian Army. That this blame

caused his rejection for promotion at the Board held in Dec

1988. That for this blame he was given the award of “Severe

Displeasure Recordable” on 26.02.1989. That his writ in this

Hon’ble Court resulted in a witch hunt such that he was forced

to seek early retirement. That his continuing efforts to restore

his honour and character only resulted in the Armed Forces

Tribunal (which has no jurisdiction in cause of action

arising from “Severe Displeasure Recordable”) passing

adverse character remarks behind his back in an illegitimate

 115

Order dated 08.08.2018, passed without hearing him, which

his best efforts have so far failed to resolve simply because the

Chairperson, Armed Forces Tribunal is not responding to

Epistle (COVID-19) dated 24.06.2020.

16.09.1987 Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer,

1987 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART III/ 4)

09.05.1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. New York,

1992 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART III/ 5)

28.09.1993 Statement of Objects and Reasons, Act No.10 of 1994 (The

Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993) w.e.f. 28.09.1993

(ANNEXURE P-4(COLLY))

20.12.1993 UN General Assembly Resolution 48/134 dt. 04.03.1994

04.03.1994 (National institutions for the promotion and protection of

human rights) Annx: Paris Principles 20.12.1993

(ANNEXURE P-5)

24.06.1998 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range

Transboundary Air Pollution on Persistent Organic Pollutants,

1998 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART III/ 6)

 116

08.03.1999 UN General Assembly Resolution 53/144 1999 [Declaration

on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and

Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally

Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms]

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART IV/ 1)

22.05.2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2001

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART IV/ 2)

12.12.2001 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,

2001 (ANNEXURE P-6) (ANNEXURE P-34 PART IV/ 3)

01.01.2003 Extracts from United Nations Human Rights Manual No. 9 for

Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, 2003 (ANNEXURE P-8)

17.08.2004 Corporate Obligations under International Law .2004 [See also

A/HRC/ 17/31, 21.03.2011] (ANNEXURE P-34 PART IV/ 4)

12.07.2005 Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, 2005 (5) SCC 665,

14.12.1974 (Definition of Aggression) (ANNEXURE P-34 PART IV/ 5/

1) General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December

1974, annex (Definition of Aggression) (ANNEXURE P-34

PART IV/ 5/ 2)
 117

08.12.2005 Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly

16.12.2005 during its sixtieth session 3364-416 Vol. I: UN General

Assembly Resolutions 60/110-120 dt. 08.12.2005 & 60/142-

150 dt. 16.12.2005 – Extract (ANNEXURE P-34 PART IV/ 6)

Year 2008 The fatal consequences of atmospheric CO2-e levels higher

than 450 ppm, 2008, Dr Andrew Glikson (ANNEXURE P-34

PART IV/ 7)

15.12.2009 US EPA Endangerment & Cause or Contribute Findings for

Greenhouse Gases, FR Vol 74, No. 239 at pp.66496-546, 2009

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART V/ 1)

11.06.2010 Elements of Crime, 11.06.2010 [Official Records of the

Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International

Criminal Court, Kampala, 31 May - 11 June 2010

(International Criminal Court publication, RC/11)]

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART V/ 2)

21.03.2011 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:

Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and

Remedy” Framework UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 2011

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART V/ 3)

 118

14.06.2011 Govt. of NCT of Delhi Notification F.6/13/2011-Judl./

Suptlaw/721-725 dt. 14.06.2011 (ANNEXURE P-8)

09.12.2011 UN General Assembly Resolution 66/100, 2011

[Responsibility of international organizations] (ANNEXURE

P-34 PART V/ 4)

Year 2014 Technical Summary in: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of

Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the

Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga et al

(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United

Kingdom and New York, NY, USA., 2014 (ANNEXURE P-

34 PART V/ 5)

13.12.2015 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first

session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015,

FCCC/CP/2015/10/ Add.1, 13.12.2015 (ANNEXURE P-34

PART V/ 6)

18.11.2016 GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation Report-

November 2016 (Extracts) (ANNEXURE P-9)

 119

06.03.2017 GANHRI General Observations of the Sub-Committee on

Accreditation (ANNEXURE P-10)

23.11.2016 Judgement & Order of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in

W.P.(C) 7035/2015 titled Tenzin Tselha v. Union of India,

2016 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART V/ 7)

17.11.2017 GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation Report-

November 2017 (Extracts) (ANNEXURE P-11)

06.12.2017 Order dt. 06.12.2017 passed by Hon’ble High Court of Punjab

& Haryana in CRM-M 44361/ 2017 titled Sarvadaman Singh

Oberoi v. Union of India (ANNEXURE P-12(COLLY))

30.01.2018 Hon’ble High Court of Delhi letter 293/DHC/ Gaz/G-2A/2018

dt. 30.01.2018 (ANNEXURE P-13)

09.02.2018 Letter No.15011/09/2018-HR-I&II dt. 09.02.2018 from MHA

(LS-1 Division) to Ministry of Law & Justice “as the subject

matter relates to Constitutional Criminal Law Matter being

handled by Law Commission of India” (ANNEXURE P-14)

22.03.2018 Human Rights Court of Sessions, Gurugram, Order dt.

22.03.2018 in CNR: HR-GR-01-005629 of 2015 CRR No.

179/2015 titled Lt Col Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. State of

 120

Haryana (adjourned sine die due non appointment of Section

31 prosecutor by State of Haryana after earlier court orders

(enclosed) elicited no timeframe pleading separation of

executive and legislature) (ANNEXURE P-15(COLLY))

07.05.2018 CRM 9241 of 2018 in Tr. P. (Crl.) 24/2018 titled Sarvadaman

Singh Oberoi v. Union of India and Ors. filed in Hon’ble High

Court of Delhi at 10 A.M. on 07.05.2018 for date time 10.30

A.M. 07.05.2018 fixed unilaterally at short notice by registry

upon one sided reference (not a transfer petition by petitioner)

by Sessions Court, New Delhi. (ANNEXURE P-16)

07.05.2018 Order dt. 07.05.2018 passed by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi

in Tr. P. (Crl.) 24/2018 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v.

Union of India and Ors. (ANNEXURE P-17)

15.05.2018 Order dt. 15.05.2018 passed by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi

in Tr. P. (Crl.) 24/2018 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v.

Union of India and Ors. (ANNEXURE P-18)

12.10.2018 Order dt. 12.10.2018 passed by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi

in L.P.A. No. 306/2018 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v.

Union of India and Ors. (ANNEXURE P-19(COLLY))

 121

29.10.2018 Summary. Air pollution and child health: prescribing clean air.

Geneva: World Health Organization; 2018

(WHO/CED/PHE/18.01). Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART V/ 8)

15.01.2019 Order dt. 15.01.2019 passed by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi

in Crl. Rev. P. 53/2019 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v.

Union of India and Ors. (ANNEXURE P-20(COLLY))

25.02.2019 Legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos

Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, 25.02.2019[Written

Statement of PRC, 01.03.2018] (ANNEXURE P-34 PART

VI/ 1)

06.04.2019 Human Rights Court of Sessions, Faridabad, Order dt.

06.04.2019 in CNR: HR-FB-01-010367 of 2018 CRM No.

132/2018 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Union of India

(adjourned sine die due non appointment of Section 31

prosecutor) (ANNEXURE P-21)

22.07.2019 PIB Press Note dt. 22.07.2019, Protection of Human Rights

(Amendment) Bill, 2019 (ANNEXURE P-22)

 122

27.07.2019 Protection of Human Rights (Amendment) Act, 2019 (No. 19

02.08.2019 of 2019) Gazette of India Extra Pt. II Sec 1 No. 38 dt.

27.07.2019 (ANNEXURE P-23)

-in force 02.08.2019, S.O.2756(E) dt. 01.08.2019

01.11.2019 Report of the Special Rapporteurs pursuant to Human Rights

Council resolutions 40/16, 42/22, 36/6, 26/17, 34/18, 41/12,

33/9, 34/5, 34/6, 37/2, 40/10 and 34/19 [REFERENCE OL

CHN 18/2019] (ANNEXURE P-34 PART VI/ 2)

World Uyghur Congress Submission, 3rd Universal Periodic

Review (UPR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),

March 2018 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART VI/ 3)

30.07.2020 Letter No. OTP-CR-141/20 dt. 13.07.2020 from the Office of

the Prosecutor, ICC, The Hague, Netherlands – “complement,

not replace national jurisdictions… consider raising it with

appropriate national or international authorities.”

(ANNEXURE P-24)

Year 2019 Sinkiang China in the India Office Records Three Case Studies

Jonathan Saha, 2019 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART VI/ 4)

 123

02.12.2019 Fossil fuel combustion is driving indoor CO2 toward levels

20.04.2020 harmful to human cognition, Kristopher B. Karnauskas, Shelly

L. Miller, Anna C. Schapiro, 02.12.2019 Published 20.04.2020

[GeoHealth 10.1029/2019GH000237] (ANNEXURE P-34

PART VI/ 5)

12.12.2019 Carbon Dioxide Human Gains A New Approach of the

Estimation, Antonio Rodero, Dorota Anna Krawczyk

Sustainability 2019 11 7128 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART VI/ 6)

30.12.2019 Right to a healthy environment: good practices, 30.12.2019

[UN Doc. A/HRC/43/53] (ANNEXURE P-34 PART VI/ 7)

13.02.2020 Particle and Carbon Dioxide Concentration Levels in a

Surgical Room Conditioned with a Window/Wall Air-

Conditioning System, Marcelo Pereira Int. J. Environ. Res.

Public Health 2020 17 1180 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART VI/ 8)

25.02.2020 Crime of aggression & Crimes against humanity: Notice,

25.02.2020 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART VI/ 9)

14.03.2020 Crime of aggression & Crimes against humanity: Submissions

in Domestic Court of International Criminal Law Jurisdiction,

14.03.2020 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART VII/ 1)

 124

The NOAA Annual Greenhouse Gas Index (AGGI), Updated

Spring 2020 3998-4005 [NOAA Earth System Research

Laboratory, R/GMD, 325 Broadway Boulder CO 80305-3328,

James.H.Butler@noaa.gov Stephen.A.Montzka@noaa.gov ]

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART VII/ 2)

30.03.2020 The Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court,

13.07.2020 The Hague, The Netherlands, Reference No. OTP-CR-141-20

23.09.2020 of the dates 30.03.2020, 13.07.2020 & 23.09.2020

(ANNEXURE P-34 PART VII/ 3(COLLY))

08.10.2020 Human Rights Court of Sessions, Gurugram, Order dt.

08.10.2020 in CNR No. HRGR01-001743-2020 App. No.

33/2020 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Union of India

(p.554), Order dt. 18.03.2020 (p.555), Application dt.

07.02.2020 (u/s 31 of 1993 Act: Continuing Failure Since Year

1993 of Union of India in the matter of Article 246/253/Paris

Principles Compliant Notification of Rules for a Lawful

Permanent Independent Human Rights Prosecutor Functioning

in the Courts of Human Rights) (pp.556-575) (ANNEXURE

P-27(COLLY))
 125

08.10.2020 Human Rights Court of Sessions, Gurugram, Order dt.

08.10.2020 in CNR No. HRGR01-013814-2019 CRMP No.

3/2019 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi (Informant/

Whistleblower/Petitioner-in-person) v. Union of India

(Necessary Party/ Sole Defendant) (p.576), Order dt.

18.03.2020 (p.577), Order dt. 12.09.2019 (p.578), Copy of

INFORMATION dt. 12.09.2019 (pp.579-632), Annexure P-28

of CRMP 3/20-19 (Draft Human Rights Courts Regulations,

2019) (pp.633-638), Annexure P-29 of CRMP 3/20-19 (Draft

Regulations for Office of the National Human Rights

Prosecutor under Section 40B of Protection of Human Rights

Act, 1993, 2019) (pp.639-653) (ANNEXURE P-28(COLLY))

12.10.2020 State of Global Air/ 2020, A Special Report on Global

Exposure to Air Pollution and its Health Impacts 12.10.2020,

Health Effects Institute ISSN:2578-6873 [Funding by:

Bloomberg Philanthropies and the William and Flora Hewlett

Foundation.] (ANNEXURE P-34 PART VII/ 4)

31.10.2020 Climate Change Information in First Information dated

31.10.2020 to Respondent No. 3 with proof of receipt (pp.669-

 126

670) of COPY No. 59 by the office of the Cabinet Secretary

of India at 13:42:36 on 06.11.2020 informing Climate

Emergency excess of 500 ppm. CO2-eq against safe level of

350 ppm. CO2-eq in National Capital Region. (pp.671-839)

[“same, similar or overlapping issues” as CNR No. HRGR01-

013814-2019 CRMP No. 3/2019 titled Sarvadaman Singh

Oberoi (Informant/ Whistleblower/ Petitioner-in-person) v.

Union of India (Necessary Party/ Sole Defendant)] [Kantaru

Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, 2020 (2)

SCC 1, MANU/SC/1565/ 2019 (5 judges) at MANU para 4:

“4…it is essential to adhere to judicial discipline and propriety when

more than one petition is pending on the same, similar or overlapping

issues in the same court for which all cases must proceed

together.…”][Climate Change Information in First Information dated

31.10.2020, COPY NO. 1, SPEEDPOST, ED672011083IN, has

accidentally escaped attention of Sh. Dinesh Kumar S.H.O, Police

Station, Sadar, Sector 38, Gurugram till filing of affidavit in this writ

petition] (ANNEXURE P-32(COLLY))

01.11.2020 Carbon dioxide toxicity and climate change: a major

unapprehended risk for human health Research Gate DOI:

 127

10.13140/RG.2.2.16787.48168 (ANNEXURE P-34 PART

VII/ 6)

18.11.2020 “FINAL NOTICE In Re Notice dated 03.11.2019 (Copy

Attached)-Unreplied By Due Date 03.02.2020) - Doctrine of

Incorporation, Definition of Human Rights Offences: The

Crime of Complicity in Genocide of Climate Change is now

Legally Enforceable in India and the World - No One Is Above

Law – All Are Equal Before Law & Epistles Dated 17.06.2019

and 05.01.2020 To Hon'ble Prime Minister of India (Both

Epistles Attached Have Gone Unreplied)” /2 Gmail from

<cpgrams-darpg@nic.in> to <manioberoi@gmail.com> on

18.11.2020 at 3.00 PM /3 Web screenshot on 19.11.2020 at

21:19 PM of https://pgportal.gov.in showing mere words

“Current Status Case closed” and “Date of Action 18/11/2020”

with printout of “Viewing details” but as to what is the action

taken, if any, is nowhere specified (ANNEXURE P-27

(COLLY))

20.11.2020 Human Rights Court of Sessions, New Delhi, Order dt.

20.11.2020 in CNR: DLND01-000756-2018 of 2018 M. No.

 128

24/2018 in CC No. 20/2018 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi

v. Union of India (ANNEXURE P-33(COLLY))

24.11.2020 Delhi Gazette. Pt. IV No. 259 dt. 24.11.2020, Govt. of the NCT

of Delhi, N.C.T.D. No. 209 (SG-DL-E-25112020-223298)

publishing Notification F.6/13/2011-Judl./ Suptlaw/1132-

1137 dt. 24.11.2020 issued by Lt Governor in excess of his

powers whereas Constitution Bench held on 04.07.2018 at para

277 (xii) “it is clear as noon day that by no stretch of

imagination, NCT of Delhi can be accorded the status of a

State under our present constitutional scheme”

(ANNEXURE P-1)

Hence this writ petition under Article 226 for quashing of

notification dated 24.11.2020 and restitution for violation of

petitioners fundamental rights protected by Articles 14, 19 & 21 of

the Constitution of India by denial of speedy provision of

independent human rights prosecutors under Section 31 of the

Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 in obedience to the

Legislative Command of speedy trial of human rights offences

legislated unanimously w.e.f. 28.09.1993 by both Houses of

Prliament on 08.01.1994 under Section 30 of said Act, which right

 129

of speedy trial is a fundamental right that has been continuously

denied to petitioner for last more than 27 years from 28.09.1993

onwards in many continuing causes of actions from 01.02.1987/

26.02.1989/ 08.08.2018/ 24.06.2020 onwards.

 130

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

(EXTRAORDINARY WRIT JURISDICTION)

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1851 OF 2021

IN THE MATTER OF:

Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi, aged 72 yrs, s/o late Capt H.S. Oberoi,

r/o 1102, Tower 1, Uniworld Garden I, Sector 47 Gurugram-

122018, Mob: 9818768349 Email:manioberoi@gmail.com

PETITIONER

VERSUS

1. Govt of NCT of Delhi, through its Chief Secretary Delhi

Secretariat, IP Estate, New Delhi 110054, Delhi Fax: 91-11-

23392102, Email:csdelhi@nic.in standingcounselgnctd@gmail.com

Mob: 9810071712 RESPONDENT NO. 1

2. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs

Government of India, North Block, New Delhi 110001 Fax: 91-

11-23093003, Email: hshso@nic.in Mob: 9811704188

maninderkaur_adv@yahoo.co.in RESPONDENT NO. 2

 131

3.The Cabinet Secretary of India, Government of India Rashtrapati

Bhawan, New Delhi 110004, Fax: +91-11-230122874 Email:

cabinetsy@nic.in maninderkaur_adv@yahoo.co.in Mob:

9811704188 RESPONDENT NO. 3

4. Law Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of

India, 4th Floor ‘A’ Wing, Shastri Bhawan New Delhi 110001

Fax:91-11-23384403 Email:secylaw-dla@nic.in

Mob:9810015886 bansal_subhash@yahoo.com

RESPONDENT NO. 4

5. The High Court of Delhi, Sher Shah Road New Delhi 110003,

through its Registrar General Fax:+91-11-23073485 Email:

rg.dhc@nic.in saud@ahmadsyed.com Mob:9910013800

RESPONDENT NO. 5

6. The Secretary, Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs,

Government of India, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi 110011, Fax:

+91-11-23061459 secyurban@nic.in Mob:9811704188

Email:maninderkaur_adv@yahoo.co.in RESPONDENT NO.6

7.The Vice-Chairman, Delhi Development Authority Vikas Sadan

INA Colony, New Delhi 110023, Fax:+91-11-230122874 Email:

 132

vcdda@dda.org.in avermadelhi@gmail.com Mob: 9811032001

ajverma@ndf.vsnl.net.in RESPONDENT NO. 7

8. Armed Forces Tribunal (Principal Bench) through its Principal

Registrar, West Block VIII, Opp. Mohan Singh Market, Sector I,

R. K. Puram, New Delhi 110066, Fax: +91-11- 26105361 Email:

aftdelhi@yahoo.in chetansharmamailbox@yahoo.com

RESPONDENT NO. 8

9. Sh. Dinesh Kumar S.H.O, Police Station, Sadar, Sector 38,

Gurugram, 122018, Mob:9999981825, Email: shoggnsdr-

hry@nic.in groveradvocate@gmail.com Mob: 9811089646

baldevmahajan@rediff.com RESPONDENT NO. 9

10. The National Human Rights Commission, through its

Secretary General, National Human Rights Commission, Manav

Adhikar Bhawan Block-C, GPO Complex, INA, New Delhi

110023 Fax: +91-11-24651329 Email:

sgnhrc@nic.in chetansharmamailbox@yahoo.com

RESPONDENT NO. 10

WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 FOR EX-PARTE

STAY OF AND FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF QUO

 133

WARRANTO, WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND/OR ANY

OTHER WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION:

(1) CHALLENGE TO VALIDITY OF DELHI GAZETTE PT.

IV NO. 259 GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI, N.C.T.D. NO. 209

(SG-DL-E-25112020-223298) 24.11.2020 NOTIFICATION

F.6/13/2011-JUDL./ SUPTLAW/1132-1137, 24.11.2020

(2) SEEKING SETTING UP OF HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS

IN DELHI SO AS TO EFFECTIVELY APPLY FOR

REPARATION AS A WAR VETERAN AND AN ARMY

OFFICER FOR MULTIPLE ATTACKS ON THE HONOUR,

CHARACTER AND REPUTATION OF ARMY OFFICER

BY ACT OF ORGANS OF STATE ON (1) 01.02.1987

(BLAME FIXED BEHIND THE BACK), 26.02.1989

(AWARD PASSED WITHOUT HEARING), (2) 13.11.2002

(COSTS IN MATTER AKIN TO 340 CrPC), (3) 15.01.2003

(ADVERSE REMARKS ON A 340 CrPC INFORMANT

BEHIND THE BACK - W. P. (Crl.) 588/2013 TITLED LT

COL (RETD) SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI V. THE

HIGH COURT OF DELHI THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR

GENERAL AND ORS, NDOH: 09.02.2021), (4) 05.04.2017

 134

(COSTS UPON POCSO INFORMANT – OTHER HIGH

COURT MATTER), (5) 19.05.2018 (COSTS UPON 340 CrPC

INFORMANT – OTHER HIGH COURT MATTER), (6)

08.08.2018 (ADVERSE CHARACTER REMARKS ON

APPLICANT BEHIND THE BACK – CHARACTER

ASSASSINATION; PER CONTRA 1959 CriLJ 644

APPROVED IN AIR 1964 SC 703), (7) 20.10.2018 (COSTS

ON ARTICLE 50/ 235 INFORMANT), (8) 01.02.2019 (COSTS

UPON 340 CrPC INFORMANT), (9) 10.07.2019 (COSTS

UPON 340 CrPC INFORMANT, PER CONTRA RUP

NARAIN V. MAHA DAYAL, AIR 1914 LAH 576, 18.12.1914

WHICH SET ASIDE AN ORDER OF SESSIONS JUDGE,

DELHI & THE CROWN V. PIR QADIR BAKHSH SHAH,

1925 ILR 6 LAH 34), (10) 05/07.08.2019 (COERCIVE

ACTION AGAINST 340 CrPC INFORMANT BY MM-02,

NEW DELHI - CRL. M.C. 3915/2019 TITLED LT COL

(VETERAN) SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI V. STATE

OF DELHI NCT, NDOH: 09.02.2021; FOLLOWED UP

LATER BY DELHI POLICE BREAKING INTO HIS

HOUSE ON 07.08.2019 IN ABSENCE OF ALL FAMILY

 135

MEMBERS AND CONFISCATING A TELEVISION

MONITOR;) & (11) 24.06.2020 (NO REPLY TO EPISTLE

DATED 24.06.2020 IN RE 08.08.2018 ISSUE OF

CHARACTER ASSASSINATION) VIDE SUB-SEC (d) & (f)

OF SEC 2 OF ACT 10 OF 1994 UNDER INTERNATIONAL

RULE OF LAW WHICH IS FULLY RECOGNIZED IN

INDIA AND CONSTITUTE CONTINUED VIOLATION OF

THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER

UNDER ARTICLES 14, 19 AND 21 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1949

TO,

THE HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE

AND HIS COMPANION JUDGES,

OF DELHI HIGH COURT, AT NEW DELHI

THE HUMBLE PETITION OF

THE PETITIONER ABOVE NAMED

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH: This writ petition,

raises no substantial question of law, since none arises, and seeks

two substantive reliefs besides quashing of offending notification,

and on separate application, stay of the current notification as

 136

petitioner is likely to succeed in the prayer for quashing. That the

two substantive reliefs are for operationalisation of the special

forum, Human Rights Courts (HRC hereinafter) mandated to be

set up on 28.09.1993 approved unanimously by both houses of

Parliament on 08.01.1994, in the Protection of Human Rights Act,

1993, Central Act 10 of 1994 (1993 Act hereinafter) after which

petitioner may properly and justly apply in said HRC for full and

effective relief and reparation as a war veteran and an army officer

for multiple attacks on his honour, character and reputation either

by act or by inaction of organs of state. [Judgement and Order of

Hon’ble High Court of Delhi dated 12.10.2018 in LPA 306/2018

titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Union of India and Ors.

(Whistleblower) ANNEXURE P-19(COLLY)/ 1, Tamil Nadu

Pazhankudi Makkal Sangam v. Government of Tamil Nadu 1997

[Vol.XLI] MLJ (Crl.) 655, ANNEXURE P-35(COLLY)/ 1]

2. The first relief seeks quashing (ex-parte stay on separate

application) of the Delhi Gazette. Pt. IV No. 259 dt. 24.11.2020,

Govt. of the NCT of Delhi, N.C.T.D. No. 209 (SG-DL-E-

25112020-223298) publishing Notification F.6/13/2011-

Judl./Suptlaw/1132-1137 dt. 24.11.2020 and its predecessor of

 137

14.06.2011 [ANNEXURE P-1, ANNEXURE P-2/1], mischief

the Constitution Bench Judgement in respect to Govt. of the NCT

of Delhi passed on 04.07.2018, (2018) 8 SCC 501, MANU/SC/

0680/2018. The said notification also concern criminal trial in

CRN No. DLND01-000756-2018, CC 20/2018 titled Sarvadaman

Singh Oberoi v. Union of India and others presently before an

HRC [ASJ-02, PHC, ND for 22.03.2021] ANNEXURE P-33

(COLLY) and all consequential reliefs to set up the above notified

HRCs with a Presidential stamp in this List I Matter in adherence

to the law laid down on 04.07.2018 by the Constitution Bench.

3. The second relief seeks appointment of Section 31 Paris

Principles compliant prosecutor in the HRCs [which is missing till

today in the State of Tamil Nadu even after 23.06.1997 landmark

judgement of Hon’ble High Court of Madras in Tamil Nadu

Pazhankudi Makkal Sangam v. Government of Tamil Nadu 1997

[Vol.XLI] MLJ (Crl.) 655, ANNEXURE P-35(COLLY)/ 1] so as

to operationalise the HRCs in accord with International Rule of

Law which is applicable herein vide sub-section (d) & (f) of

section 2 of the 1993 Act, Articles 51 & 253 of the Constitution of

India, 1949.
 138

4. That as regards remedies and reparation which include

restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and

guarantees of non-repetition, these can only be obtained with

assistance of Section 31 prosecutor. That the bare statement of

reparation incidents [detailing is only possible with assistance of

independent Section 31 prosecutor once appointed by concerning

respondents in compliance of this writ] are listed at paragraph

below.

5. In order to avoid further overloading this already more than

4500 pages long petition [basis more than 700 national and

international judgements duly indexed at ANNEXURE P-36], no

further detailing beyond this is presently necessary for the

purposes and scope of the substantive reliefs sought in this

petition, for which this Hon’ble Court granted liberty to petitioner

on 12.10.2018 in Judgement and Order of Hon’ble High Court of

Delhi dated 12.10.2018 in LPA 306/2018 titled Sarvadaman Singh

Oberoi v. Union of India and Ors. (Whistleblower). ANNEXURE

P-19(COLLY)/ 1. That a critique of this liberty in LPA 306/2018

is found to be necessary and is at para 24 below. That petitioner

undertakes to provide all voluminous records of underlying human

 139

rights offences, which would be produced in case Hon’ble Court

so desires at the hearing. Select list of continuing relief, reparation

and restitution causes of action are:

(a) 01.02.1987 (blame fixed by Court of Inquiry behind the back,

proceedings of Court of Inquiry which had been illegally withheld

from petitioner for 6 years and 6 months from 01.02.1987 onwards

in the face of the rule, till 52 page inquiry finally given to

petitioner’s previous unit at Amritsar on 05.08.1993 after

protracted correspondence; finally received by petitioner posted at

Calcutta soon thereafter. That Hon’ble High Court quashed the

illegal action of the Ministry of Defence in the case which

petitioner had earlier attacked in the 25.10.1989 and 07.11.1989

inter-connected Statutory Complaints. That, till today respondents

have failed to honour the assurance held out before this Hon’ble

Court on 06.05.1998 through Learned Counsel, Sh. P.N. Mishra,

to implement the “all the consequential benefits” due to petitioner

for loss of honour, dignity and financial hardship in loss of proper

promotion consideration and total loss of exercising in command

tenure during the period 1989 to 1995, essential for him to become

eligible for consideration of next higher rank of Brigadier, attained

 140

by his peers with lesser merit in the Year 1996. The stress and

tension caused to petitioner and his wife during the entire period

from 01.02.1987 to 07.11.1997 was a contributing cause for

petitioner’s wife’s cancer in 1990, heavy mental stress being a

well-recognised cancer stressor. That the Union of India, which

demonstrably has exhibited bias/ animus to this writ petitioner

who dared approach the writ courts repeatedly, went to the extent

of posting the petitioner out from Delhi in 1997 simply to ensure

that he could not personally pursue his writ matter in Delhi, and

even obtained a certificate from the Army Hospital Research &

Referral, Delhi that cancer is curable and petitioner’s wife has

been “cured” of cancer, hence, there is no need for her to stay in

Delhi and she should shift to a remote defence establishment at

Itarsi, nearest medical facility being 100 kms away at Bhopal. That

after the petitioner moved to Itarsi and obtained NOC since family

accommodation was currently not available at that station, her

staying on in government accommodation at Delhi for her

continuing treatment resulted in withholding of 80% of

petitioner’s salary, to pay so-called damages rent which were

reversed by this Hon’ble Court only after petitioner approached

 141

the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Petitioner’s wife who was

the Principal of the Vasant Valley School in Delhi for many years

passed away at Delhi on 25.02.2009 after fighting cancer for 19

long years, bravely continuing her professional work nearly till the

end. That, when petitioner forced by all this ill-treatment to seek

and obtain early retirement on 05.10.1999, finally retired, he was

forced to do so in the rank of Lt Col (Time Scale) Substantive

[reserved specially for non-promoted Majors and any acting Lt Col

(Selection Grade) specially rejected for the substantive rank of

acting Lt Col (Selection Grade)] which placed him in the pension

list and order of precedence of an officer holding the rank of

Major, hence lower in status to every serving Lt Col (Selection

Grade) whether acting or substantive, of the Indian Army. This

was the greatest shaming and dishonour ever suffered by an officer

of the Indian Army at the hands of the Union of India. That only

much after retirement the Union of India published a Gazette

Notification dt. 24.06.2000 that too only after a “continuing cause”

[Original Cause of Action remaining 01.02.1987] writ petition

CWP 2932/1998 titled Lt Col SS Oberoi v. Union of India &

Others was filed. [ANNEXURE P-29(COLLY) 29/1/9]. That by

 142

these malafide actions respondent Union of India maliciously,

vindictively and effectively reduced to the status of a scrap paper,

the Judgement and Order of this Hon’ble Court passed on

07.11.1997 in CWP 1475/1994 titled Lt Col (Acting) S.S. Oberoi

v. Union of India and others holding/ directing “According to

respondents, the Court of Enquiry had established that the cause

of accident was that the round which burst in the barrel was fired

in the plugged condition and this finding had been confirmed by

the Directorate of inspection. Petitioner refuted the charges vide

his letter dated 1st January, 1989. He refuted the allegations

levelled in the show cause notice and justified his stand. He

explained that no fire was shot due to his negligence. Thereafter,

no opportunity was given to him nor was he heard. The witnesses

relied were not allowed to be cross examined nor the statement of

the petitioner was recorded………Petitioner filed a statutory

complaint under section 27 of the Army Act. The same was rejected

by respondent No. 3 as also the request that the Selection Board

should consider his case for promotion only after finalisation of

the statutory complaint. The Selection Board No. 3 rejected the

case of the petitioner for promotion to the rank of Col. He again

 143

preferred another statutory complaint on 7th November, 1989

under Section 27 of the Army Act. The same was also rejected. His

apprehension was that the censure must have weighed with No. 3

Selection Board and that is why he was ignored for promotion.

Three successive Selection Boards were held between November

and December, 1988, January to July 1990. But petitioner was not

promoted. …… The impugned order thereby awarding the ”severe

displeasure” (recordable) therefore cannot be sustained. The

same is accordingly set aside. On the setting aside of the censure

the petitioner will be entitled to all the consequential benefits,

including reconsideration of his promotion of the relevant year

which the authorities will do de hors this censure.”),

[ANNEXURE P-29(COLLY)1/ 1]

NOTE: “Three successive Selection Boards were held between

November and December, 1988, January to July 1990” refers in

the Judgement dated 07.11.1997 of the Hon’ble Court in CWP

1475/1994 to (1) SB No. 3. Fresh 1968 Batch i.e. November and

December 1988 (2) SB No. 3 First Review 1968 Batch i.e. January

1990 & (3) SB No. 3 Second Review 1968 Batch i.e. July 1990.

Therefore respondents were to first take up (1) SB No. 3. Fresh

 144

1968 Batch i.e. November and December 1988. In fact till today

this Board (SB No. 3. Fresh 1968 Batch) has never been convened

by the respondents. Moreover fraud has been played upon the

Hon’ble Court by Union of India by furnishing a false assurance

on 06.05.1998. Hence the contempt petition could not survive and

petitioner could not get justice till today. The Union of India is

welcome to hold SB No. 3. Fresh 1968 Batch i.e. November and

December 1988 in respect of petitioner transparently and

petitioner would assure that he would easily come out higher in

merit to more than half the officers who were cleared from the

1968 Batch in November and December 1988. In fact while

dismissing the second writ petition the Hon’ble AFT Bench

conveniently omitted the portion “Three successive Selection

Boards were held between November and December, 1988,

January to July 1990” while considering at para 6, [ANNEXURE

P-29(COLLY)/ 4 at p.1499] the crucial portion of the Hon’ble

High Court’s judgement which entitled petitioner to

reconsideration of his SB No. 3. Fresh 1968 Batch i.e. November

and December 1988 and further introduced highly misleading

1988-89 ACR (June 1988-June 1989) at para 13 of its Judgement

 145

dated 18.01.2010 [ANNEXURE P-29(COLLY)/ 4 at p.1505] an

ACR which never pertain to SB No. 3. Fresh 1968 Batch i.e.

November and December 1988. That in any case the Tribunal was

barred by statute from looking into causes of action of the type

arisen on 01.02.1987/ 26.02.1989. Hence, sans jurisdiction, its

order shall forever remain a nullity open to challenge even in

collateral proceedings. [Explained in next para (b)]

(b) 26.02.1989 (Original cause of action being always of

01.02.1987 as held in Judgement and Order of Hon’ble High

Court of Delhi dated 07.12.2017 & 06.03.2018 in CWP

10892/2017 titled Murari Lal Sharma and Anr v. Union of India

granting, on 06.03.2018, the necessary permission to Petitioner

No. 2 to appear on behalf of the Petitioner No. 1, (permission was

earlier refused to Petitioner No. 2 on 07.12.2017) seeking

amendment to the earlier orders dated 07.12.2017 which was

thereupon duly amended to reflect the said ratio in light of the

correct provisions of law) ANNEXURE P-29(COLLY) /1 /7 &

8. Award of “Severe Displeasure Recordable” passed on

26.06.1989 without hearing, blamed by court of enquiry on

01.02.1987 behind the back, promotion denied in Nov-Dec 1988

 146

only because of blame illegally fixed on 01.02.1987, inter-

connected statutory complaints of 25.10.1989 & 07.11.1989 were

separately butchered, violating ratio laid down in Kantaru

Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, 2020 (2) SCC 1.

Thereafter respondents justifying before an incompetent (as in

jurisdiction) Armed Forces Tribunal, the illegal splitting of these

inter-connected complaints, during 28.03.1990 to 11.05.1992, per

contra assurance given on 11.06.1990 to Prime Minister Office by

the Ministry of Defence and also to this Hon’ble Court by Mr. P.N.

Mishra, Sr. Counsel appearing for the Union of India that officer’s

promotion board between “November and December, 1988”

would be re-considered as directed by this Hon’ble Court on

07.11.1997 at the hearing of CCP 77/1998 in CWP 1475/1994 on

06.05.1998. That, therefore, a solemn government assurance made

before Hon’ble High Court has also been dishonoured.

[ANNEXURE P-29(COLLY)1/5].

(c) 13.11.2002 (costs in matter akin to 340 CrPC matter – Order

dated 13.11.2002 in CM 12250/2020 in CWP 7438/2000 titled

Sher Singh v. Union of India & Others, causing property damage

also to petitioner herein; W. P. (Crl.) 588/2013 titled Lt Col (Retd)

 147

Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. The High Court of Delhi through its

Registrar General and Ors, NDOH: 09.02.2021),

(d) 15.01.2003 (adverse remarks on a 31.08.2000 340 CrPC

informant behind the back causing property damage also to

petitioner herein; W. P. (Crl.) 588/2013 titled Lt Col (Retd)

Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. The High Court of Delhi through its

Registrar General and Ors, NDOH: 09.02.2021) ANNEXURE P-

23(COLLY)/ 46,

(e) 20.05.2011 (Other High Court Matter: Cr. Misc. No. 200/2011

seeking Section 30 intervention of Sessions Court at Gurugram

dismissed by Sh. R.S. Virk Ld. District & Sessions Judge,

Gurugram with cost ₹ 1000 on victim of custodial death for not

going before Ilaqa Magistrate, costs paid by petitioner since he

filed the application; Matter filed by petitioner in CRM-M

5280/2015 titled 2017 titled SS Oberoi vs Unknown with State of

Haryana, adjourned sine die by Hon’ble High Court (Single Judge)

awaiting finalisation of a human rights offence matter of same

petitioner CRM-M 44361/2017 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi

vs Union of India and Ors, pending (after issue of notice only to

State of Haryana by Hon’ble Single Judge) before Hon’ble

 148

Division Bench at Chandigarh, in which even after application

dated 04.04.2018 [CRM No. 13084/2018 in CRM-M No.

44361/2017] matter never managed to reach the top of the board

even once, all requests in every case were denied on account of

more pressing business, hence notice has yet to issue to Union of

India. The fate of these cases is now in the hands of God and

COVID-19:

“In Coke Reports XII, 64, in the case of "The Question of

Prohibitions, 1607", Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice held

"Upon complaint made to him by Bancroft, archbishop of

Canterbury concerning prohibitions, the king was informed

that,... or in any other case in which there is not express

authority in law, the king himself may decide it in his royal

person; and that the judges are but the delegates of the king,

and that the king may take what causes he shall please to

determine from the determination of the judges and may

determine them himself ……… To which it was answered by

me that true it was that God had endowed his majesty with

excellent science and great endowments of nature; but his

majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England,

 149

and causes which concern the life or inheritance or goods

or fortunes of his subjects are not to be decided by natural

reason, but by the artificial reason and judgment of law -

which law is an act which requires long study and before

that a man can attain to the cognizance of it - and that the

law was the golden metwand and measure to try the causes

of the subjects... To whom I said that Bracton saith quod rex

non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege." (That the

king ought not to be under man, but under God and the

law.)”

(f) 15.05.2015 (Other High Court Matter: Matter of police

brutality on 15.05.2015 beating women and the area’s lady

municipal councillor, filed by petitioner on 16.05.2015 (dismissed

illegally under CrPC Section 210 on 16.05.2015 and its Revision

filed on 18.05.2015; Case and its Revision both transferred to

HRCs, after liberty granted by Hon’ble High Court; Since

adjourned sine die, 22.03.2018, reason no Section 31 prosecutor)

(g) 02.09.2015 (Other High Court Matter: Illegal arrest of

petitioner for lone silent protest outside the premises of P.S. Sadar,

Gurugram protesting failure to register F.I.R. in allegation of

 150

stealing the iPhone as also held by NHRC (with recording of

incident of police brutality on 15.05.2015) vide P.S. Sadar,

Gurgaon DDE No. 57/02.09.15, u/s CrPC 107/151; Liberty

granted by Hon’ble High Court however both cases in HRCs

adjourned sine die, 22.03.2018, reason no Section 31 prosecutor)

(h) 05.04.2017 (Other High Court matter: costs upon POCSO

informant, subsequently costs even on victim’s father, awaiting

lifting of COVID-19 restrictions),

(i) 19.05.2018 (Other High Court matter: costs upon 340 CrPC

informant, awaiting lifting of COVID-19 restrictions),

(j) 08.08.2018 (adverse character remarks on applicant behind the

back per contra Lal Singh Kang v. Union of India 1959 CriLJ 644

approved in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim, AIR

1964 SC 703), ANNEXURE P-29(COLLY) /7 at pp.1609-1620

(k) 20.10.2018 (costs on Article 50/ 235 informant), ANNEXURE

P-20(COLLY) /2 at pp.670-673

(l) 01.02.2019 (costs upon 340 CrPC informant), ANNEXURE P-

23(COLLY) /32 at pp.930-933

 151

(m) 10.07.2019 (costs upon 340 CrPC informant per contra The

Crown v. Pir Qadir Bakhsh Shah, (1925) ILR 6 Lah 34 & Rup

Narain v. Maha Dayal, AIR 1914 Lah 576, 18.12.1914 (from order

of Sessions Judge, Delhi) placing reliance on In Re Gopal

Siddeshwar Deshpande, ILR 1908 (32) Bom 203 & Marudappa

Gounden v. Bommanna Gounde, 1914 CriLJ 71 (Mad),

ANNEXURE P-23(COLLY) /34 at pp.937-941

(n) 07.08.2019 (coercive action against 340 CrPC informant by

MM-02, New Delhi; Delhi Police breaking into his house in

Gurugram District beyond its jurisdiction, in absence of all family

members and confiscating a television monitor during filing of Crl.

M.C. 3915/2019 titled Lt Col (Veteran) Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi

v. State of Delhi NCT, NDOH: 09.02.2021) &

(o) 24.06.2020 (no reply to epistle dated 24.06.2020 in re

08.08.2018 issue of adverse character remarks on applicant behind

the back per contra Lal Singh Kang v. Union of India 1959 CriLJ 644

approved in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim, AIR

1964 SC 703) ANNEXURE P-29(COLLY) /2 at pp.1490-1503

[Hon’ble Court may satisfy itself regarding full relief and

reparation for the above reparation causes of action, as grant of

 152

relief and reparation under International Rule of Law, are special

matters reserved only for the HRCs by Parliament and petitioner

is therefore clearly barred from directly seeking a Writ Remedy

under Article 226, and he is bound to seek full and effective relief

and reparation at a full trial under International Rule of Law]

6. That the Respondent 1 (a Union Territory) is lacking in List I

jurisdiction (writ of quo warranto) to grant seal of approval for

notification dated 24.11.2020 authorised under the powers to be

exercised in consultation with Respondent 5 under Article 233(1)/

236(a) of the Constitution of India and to direct Respondents 2 and

3 (writ of mandamus) to take appropriate steps in keeping with the

Legitimate Expectations (LE) in public interest matters to ensure

the immediate appointment of a “Paris Principles” compliant

human rights prosecutor not subservient to the “State”, so as to

enable citizens to seek for prosecution of offences under

international human rights law, at least for every district in Delhi,

maybe also, in India. That a copy of the impugned Notification

Delhi Gazette. Pt. IV No. 259 dt. 24.11.2020, Govt. of the NCT of

Delhi, N.C.T.D. No. 209 (SG-DL-E-25112020-223298) is placed

at ANNEXURE P-1.
 153

7. That this writ petition also seeks for direction to Respondents 1,

2, 3, 4, 5 & 10 for ensuring time bound appointment of human

rights prosecutors and matching HRCs/ Courts of Sessions, not

subservient to the “State” (wider meaning) in every such district,

as Constitution and Statute demand, both to be duly enabled to

exercise powers under Article 246, Entry 13 List I (Participation

in international conferences, associations and other bodies and

implementing of decisions made thereat), Entry 16 (Foreign

jurisdiction), Entry 93 (Offences against laws with respect to any

of the matters in this List), Entry 94 (Inquiries, surveys and

statistics for the purpose of any of the matters in this List) and

Entry 95 (Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts, except the

Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List) to

be implemented with honesty and transparency and thoroughly

harmonised with Articles 51, 73(1)(b) and 253.

9. That Respondents 6, 7, 8 are necessary parties as serious

allegations qua Indoor Management emerge from detailed

examination of law precepts and the documents produced in this

Writ Petition. However as these are only justiciable in an HRC

these allegations are revealed only so that these Respondents are

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not condemned unheard behind their backs, sad commentary on

the repeated human rights offences perpetrated on petitioner who

has been condemned unheard. That if Officers cannot protect their

honour how would the honour, safety and welfare of the men who

depend on their officers be protected? The Nation depends on our

soldiers to guard us in our darkest moments. Let the Cabinet

Secretary step up to the plate for once. Because the matter of

honour of Army Officer was raised to the level of PMO, it would

be in the fitness of things that the Respondent No. 3 takes care of

this sensitive matter on behalf of all the organs of State Power who

are facing allegations from petitioner on this gravest of all counts

in this writ petition. That the case of Respondent No. 9 has a twist

in the tale and requires much greater detailing (in paras 26-30

below) only after which the dire need to implead this otherwise

most unlikely respondent shall emerge crystal clear; but first, the

firm foundation on which this writ stands, needs must emerge.

10. The Petitioner has been diligently pursuing, in the regular

courts, the special courts and also tribunals as also the courts of

record, many cases of human rights offences alleged to have been

committed or acquiesced in by the “State” (wider meaning) which

 155

includes the State and Central Government in India, since last

about 25 years. That the Petitioner has failed, not because of lack

of application, but because of the obdurate stance of the Executive

not to faithfully implement the will of the Legislature as also by

turning a blind eye to the conscientious nudges of the Judiciary as

apparent from a bare examination of long continuing W.P.(Crl.)

No. 539/1986 Shri Dilip K. Basu v. State of West Bengal & Ors.,

in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. [(1997) 1 SCC 416, (2015)

8 SCC 744] . See also Tamil Nadu Pazhankudi Makkal Sangam

represented by V.P. Gunasekaran, General Secretary v.

Government of Tamil Nadu represented by the Home

Secretary, and others, 1997 [Vol.XLI] MLJ (Crl.) 655,

ANNEXURE P-35/1

11. That for 27 long years from 28.09.1993 the State has resolutely

failed to notify the independent human rights public prosecutor as

mandated by Parliament in Section 31 of the 1993 Act.

12. That on 23.06.1997 a landmark judgement directing removal

by the State of the nascent problems created by non-appointment

of Section 31 prosecutors and malfunctioning of Section 30 Courts

was delivered by the Hon’ble High Court of Madras, on the

 156

initiative of Honourable Mr. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer whose letter

dated 11.11.1996 resulted in directions of Honourable Mr. K.A.

Swamy, Chief Justice of High Court of Madras to take up the

matter on urgent basis. [1997 [Vol.XLI] MLJ (Crl.) 655].That the

163 paragraph judgement delivered by The Honourable Mr.

Justice M.S. Janardhanam discussed the detailed charter for such

independent human rights public prosecutor. ANNEXURE P-

35(COLLY)/ 1. The 163 para judgement held at paras 133, 156,

158 & 162: “133. Without a Special Public Prosecutor, as

contemplated under Sec. 31 of P.H.R.A, H.R.Cs. cannot at all

function. Such being the case, it behoves upon the State

Government to take immediate steps for the appointment of a

Special Public Prosecutor for conducting cases in H.R.Cs ….156.

Point No.24: Our findings so far do not at all disclose that

P.H.R.A. is materially defective in such a way as is not possible to

implement its provisions in "as is where is state" for achieving the

object, for which the same had been enacted……158. We are

emboldened to state that by the exercise undertaken in this action,

we have poured, by our hands some purposeful meaning in the

empty vessels of words, used in P.H.R.A, with the sole object of the
 157

same being implemented to the satisfaction of one and all…….

162. There is, to be sure, one condition that must exist in order to

assure the effectiveness of 'Human Rights', namely, an

independent judiciary and a courageous and independent Bar.

With these, 'Human Rights', can build the deepest aspirations of

the people into the structure of their common life.”

13. That the law of human rights offences is as laid out in

Annexures P-3 to P-11. Thus it becomes crystal clear [“it is clear

as noon day”] that every citizen of India has been denied access

for over 27 years to the statutory remedy provided unanimously

by both Houses of Parliament on 08.01.1994 effective 28.09.1993

for human rights offences committed by the State and/ or its

organs. This, then, is also a clear case of “corporeal theft of

property”.

14. That having exhausted all possible remedies in the courts

below and even under other jurisdictions in this Hon’ble Court,

thus being left entirely remediless, petitioner is now entitled to

seek, and in fact, demand the last remaining remedy in this

Hon’ble Court under Articles 226 & 227, for which request or

demand, the liberty granted to petitioner by this Hon’ble Court as

 158

far back as 12.10.2018 in LPA 306/2018 (Hon’ble D.B. I) is more

than sufficient authority. ANNEXURE P-19(COLLY) /1 [See

also para 24 below]

15. That having very diligently and carefully marshalled the

voluminous facts and law from across the Globe, the petitioner

could finally prepare this writ petition by 21.12.2020, however it

has taken more than a month of day and night work to proof read

and fact check this over four and a half thousand page writ which,

thankfully is finally ready to be filed.

16. That various international instruments laying out a detailed

charter are extracted and placed at ANNEXURES P-3 to P-11

being in seriatim, ANNEXURE P-3: UN General Assembly

Resolution 217 (III) dt. 10.12.1948, ANNEXURE P-4: UN

General Assembly Resolution 2200 (XXI) dt. 16.12.1966,

ANNEXURE P-5 (COLLY): Statement of Objects and Reasons,

Act No.10 of 1994 (pp.119-121), The Protection of Human Rights

Act, 1993 w.e.f. 28.09.1993 as enacted 08.01.1994 (pp.122-139),

The Protection of Human Rights (Amendment) Act, 2000,

11.12.2000 (p.140), The Protection of Human Rights

(Amendment) Act, 2006, 13.09.2006 w.e.f. 23.11.2006 (pp.141-

 159

149), The Protection of Human Rights (Amendment) Act, 2019

(No. 19 of 2019) 27.07.2019 w.e.f. 02.08.2019, Gazette of India

Extra Pt. II Sec 1 No. 38 dt. 27.07.2019 (pp.150-152), Act 34 of

2019 amending the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, (1993

Act hereinafter), 09.08.2019 w.e.f. 31.10.2019 (pp.153-207), The

Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 as amended upto

31.10.2019 (pp.208-224), ANNEXURE P-6: UN General

Assembly Resolution 48/134 dt. 04.03.1994 (National institutions

for the promotion and protection of human rights) Annx: Paris

Principles 20.12.1993, ANNEXURE P-7: Responsibility of

States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, ANNEXURE P-

8: Extracts from United Nations Human Rights Manual No. 9 for

Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, 2003, ANNEXURE P-9:

GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation Report- November

2016 (Extracts), ANNEXURE P-10: GANHRI General

Observations of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation 06.03.2017,

ANNEXURE P-11: GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation

Report- November 2017 (Extracts).

17. That the impugned notification dated 24.11.2020 appointing

ASJ-02 as Courts of Session under Section 30 of the 1993 Act in

 160

each District of Delhi presumes to supersede an earlier 14.06.2011

notification, the legality of which also depended on whether the

Lt. Governor is a mere administrator or is a full fledged

constitutional authority like a “Governor” or “President”. For

instant in matters pertaining to Entry 13 List I/ Entry 95 List I of

Article 246 of the Constitution of India, 1949, a Governor would

ordinarily be incompetent under the Constitution to issue a

notification empowering a court under Entry 95 List I in a statute

legislated under Entry 13 List I.

18. That a copy of earlier Govt. of the NCT of Delhi Notification

F.6/13/2011-Judl./Suptlaw/725-731 dt. 14.06.2011 presuming to

appoint ASJ-01 as Courts of Session under Section 30 of the 1993

Act in each District of Delhi is placed at ANNEXURE P-2/ 1. This

has now been superseded by Notification dt. 24.11.2020

ANNEXURE P-1. (Under Challenge & For Ex-parte Stay)

19. That the Constitution Benches have held on 19.12.1996 (9

judges) [New Delhi Municipal Committee (NDMC) v. State of

Punjab, (1997) 7 SCC 339, MANU/SC/0760/1997] and

04.07.2018 (5 judges) [Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of

India and Ors., (2018) 8 SCC 501, MANU/SC/ 0680/2018] that

 161

Lt. Governor is a mere administrator subject to the constitutional

authority of the President (Union of India). That a copy of Govt.

of the NCT of Delhi Notification F.6/13/2011-Judl./Suptlaw/ 721-

725 dt. 14.06.2011 presuming to appoint ASJ-01 as Courts of

Session under Section 30 of the 1993 Act in each District of Delhi

is placed at ANNEXURE P-2/ 1.

20. That it is the Rule of Law (which is well settled) that a Court

of Sessions tasked to prosecute the State and/or its organs for

human rights offences committed thereto cannot seek to do so

through the agency of the very same prosecutors who are

appointed by the Union Territories, State Governments or Central

Government since they themselves represent State power; are not

seen as independent of the authority of “State” hence barred under

Rule of Law, as also Paris Principles, from prosecuting cases by

victims against organs of the State. This is axiomatic since

prosecutors are appointed at the pleasure of the “State”, serve at

the pleasure of the “State” and draw salary at the pleasure of the

“State”. See Paris Principles B.2 & B.3 at ANNEXURE P-6 and

International Law and the Independence of Prosecutors at Chapter

4.5 in Extracts from “United Nations Human Rights Manual No.

 162

9 for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, 2003” in the Extracts

placed at ANNEXURE P-8. That the said sub-chapter provides

“an overview of the contents of the Guidelines on the Role of

Prosecutors, which were adopted by the Eighth United Nations

Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of

Offenders in 1990 “to assist Member States in their tasks of

securing and promoting the effectiveness, impartiality and

fairness of prosecutors in criminal proceedings” (final

preambular paragraph).”

21. That by not appointing Paris Principles compliant prosecutor

under Section 31 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 the

Court of Sessions tasked under Section 30 is locked and cannot

proceed to judgement in the trial, bereft of law officer/ prosecutor.

That the said Court cannot step into the arena as both a judge and

a prosecutor as that is beyond the pale of Law.

22. That, having regard for Legitimate Expectation in Government

of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India and Ors., (2018) 8 SCC 501

MANU/SC/0680/2018, the Constitution Bench held at Para 11

“Therefore, a constitutional court, while adhering to the language

employed in the provision, should not abandon the concept of the

 163

intention, spirit, the holistic approach and the constitutional

legitimate expectation which combinedly project a magnificent

facet of purposive interpretation. The Court should pose a

question to itself whether a straight, literal and textual approach

would annihilate the sense of the great living document which is

required to be the laser beam to illumine. If the answer is in the

affirmative, then the constitutional courts should protect the sense

and spirit of the Constitution taking aid of purposive interpretation

as that is the solemn duty of the constitutional courts as the final

arbiters of the Constitution. It is a constitutional summon for

performance of duty.”

23. That the Executive is in clear and prescient violation of Article

14, 19 and 21 rights of petitioner, thus attracting the mischief of

Legitimate Expectations. That in this very judgement ((2018) 8

SCC 501, MANU/SC/0680/2018) the Constitution Bench has also

held at MANU Para 277 (i) (iv) and (xii):

“(i) While interpreting the provisions of the Constitution,

the safe and most sound approach for the Constitutional

Courts to adopt is to read the words of the Constitution in

the light of the spirit of the Constitution so that the

 164

quintessential democratic nature of our Constitution and

the paradigm of representative participation by way of

citizenry engagement are not annihilated. The Courts must

adopt such an interpretation which glorifies the democratic

spirit of the Constitution.

(iv) All the three organs of the State must remain true to the

Constitution by upholding the trust reposed by the

Constitution in them. The decisions taken by constitutional

functionaries and the process by which such decisions are

taken must have normative reasonability and acceptability.

Such decisions, therefore, must be in accord with the

principles of constitutional objectivity and symphonious

with the spirit of the Constitution.

(xii) In the light of the ruling of the nine-Judge Bench in

New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC v. State of

Punjab, MANU/SC/0760/1997), it is clear as noon day that

by no stretch of imagination, NCT of Delhi can be accorded

the status of a State under our present constitutional

scheme. The status of NCT of Delhi is sui generis, a class

apart, and the status of the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi is

 165

not that of a Governor of a State, rather he remains an

Administrator, in a limited sense, working with the

designation of Lieutenant Governor.”

24. As regards critique of the liberty in LPA 306/2018 mentioned

at para 5 above, LPA (Whistleblower) 306/2018 titled Sarvadaman

Singh Oberoi v. Union of India and Ors. with Annexures A-1 to

A-17 running into 196 pages, was a whistleblower information

[Indirect Tax Practitioners Assn v. R.K.Jain 2010 (8) SCC 281,

Common Cause v. Union of India 2015 (6) SCC 332] about

administration of justice under Articles 50 & 235, in which there

is a compulsion on the Hon’ble Court to act one way or the other,

which required at the least that the matter not be brushed under the

carpet and documents be examined, and if found illegitimate the

whistleblower be punished but, on the other hand, if found genuine

then there could be no better mandate to act in aid of justice. Thus

mischief of Constitution Bench Judgement of 04.07.2018 as

reproduced in para 23 above, “(iv) All the three organs of the

State….” was required to be read harmoniously with The Crown

v. Pir Qadir Bakhsh Shah, ILR 1925 6 Lah 34 where in a matter of

administration of justice, Sir Shadi Lal, Chief Justice plaintively

 166

held at ILR pp.40-41, “…the Court has no alternative but to prefer

a complaint in writing and to forward it to a Magistrate of the first

class having jurisdiction to entertain it. This procedure in the High

Court is open to serious objection. It is hardly consistent with the

dignity of a Judge of the High Court that he should have to make

and sign a complaint which is to be inquired into by one of his

subordinates; and that he should be treated as complainant

throughout the proceedings, the only exception being that his

examination in support of the allegations in the complaint has

been dispensed with by proviso (aa) to section 200, Criminal

Procedure Code. Nor is it fair to the accused that he should be

arraigned in a case which has been instituted on a complaint by a

Judge of the highest tribunal and is to be tried by a judicial officer

who is subordinate to the complainant. It is to be hoped that no

Magistrate taking cognizance of a case of the this description

would be influenced by the circumstance that the complaint has

been preferred by a Judge of the High Court, but there can be little

doubt that the accused person is likely to entertain an

apprehension, not altogether without justification, that his

conviction is a foregone conclusion. I am, however, bound to

 167

administer the law as I find it, even if I consider it to be

objectionable, and I must leave it to the Legislature to make such

amendment as may be deemed expedient. I accordingly direct that

a complaint under section 193, Indian Penal code, in respect of

the statement quoted above, be drafted and placed before me for

signature. The complaint then shall be forwarded to the District

Magistrate of Lahore who shall then proceed in accordance with

law. Before concluding I desire to make it absolutely clear that

nothing contained in this judgement shall be construed as

implying, in the slightest degree, any expression of opinion on the

merits; and that the decision of the case shall depend entirely upon

the evidence which may be adduced by the parties. As I have

already explained, I am constrained to make a complaint in

writing because under the present law no other case is open to

me.” [With very minor changes, law of compulsion in

administration of justice matters is largely the same today; there is

compulsion to decide the matter one way or another – not leave it

to liberty of the petitioner as has been done on 12.10.2018 leading

to the disastrous consequences of further human rights offences

taking place on 20.10.2018, 01.02.2019, 10.07.2019 & 24.06.2020

 168

as detailed in para 4 above; further corroboration of petitioner’s

contention is the fact that at the first hearing of the matter, after

considering the prayer clause of LPA 306/2018 “That in

whistleblower information provided under Article 51-A (h) in this

Letters Patent Appeal it is not the lis of the whistleblower but the

precious case property of this Hon’ble Court to do equity, justice

and humanism qua the law of whistleblower, the doctrine of willful

blindness and the doctrine of indoor management in judicial

institutions and Articles 228, 246, 50, 141 & 235 of the

Constitution of India.” the Bench of Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.

Ravindra Bhat & Hon'ble Mr. Justice A. K. Chawla was pleased

to issue notice for which a Union of India counsel stood up in

acknowledgement, but immediately on petitioner’s pointing out

that notice shall not issue to Government upon unvetted sensitive

Article 50 & 235 information, the Bench was pleased to

immediately recall its order, merely ordering “List on 04th

September, 2018.”][For handling whistleblower cases of judicial

institutions such as LPA 306/2018 See Indirect Tax Practitioners

Assn v. R.K.Jain 2010 (8) SCC 281 & Common Cause v. Union

of India 2015 (6) SCC 332]

 169

25. That an examination of ANNEXURE P-9, GANHRI Sub-

Committee on Accreditation Report- November 2016 (Extracts) it

appears that the NHRC (NHRCI in the report) continues to enjoy

a high rating, however ratings are hampered since annual reports

of the NHRC are not placed before Parliament for 4 to 5 years after

submission to the Government of India by NHRC. That

ANNEXURE P-11, GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation

Report- November 2017 (Extracts) paints a similar bleak picture

of executive lethargy in timely response by the Respondent 2 to

the concerns raised by the NHRC in its statutory annual reports as

also special reports to the Central Government (and State

Governments as the case may be which Governments are required

to place every such report before each House of Parliament (and

State Legislature as the case may be) with memorandum of action/

reasons for non-acceptance of each recommendation accepted/

rejected respectively. That this is not only the mandate of Section

20 of 1993 Act but also concurrent international obligation

approved unanimously by both Houses of Parliament on

08.01.1994 in terms of Articles 51 & 253 of the Constitution of

India.
 170

26. That, apropos para 9 above, it is time now to find the necessity

of Respondent No. 9 as a Respondent before this Hon’ble Court

and not before any other High Court.

27. That on 07.08.2019 an incident took place which harks back to

the 05.10.2007 judgement of this Hon’ble Court in Rohit Kumar

alias Raju v. State of NCT Delhi, 2007 (98) DRJ 714,

MANU/DE/8784/2007 " It appears that the learned Addl.

Sessions Judge is not aware with the basics of Code of Criminal

Procedure, as it is apparent from record that process under

Sections 82/83 Cr.P.C. was never executed in accordance with

law..... The sine qua non for an action under Section 82 is the

prior issuance of warrant of arrest by the Court. There must be a

report before the Magistrate that the person against whom the

warrant was issued by him had absconded or had been concealing

himself so that such warrant can be issued. An attachment warrant

can be issued only after the issuance of proclamation..... When on

29th August, 2007, no valid proclamation under Section 82 and 83

Cr.P.C. has been effected, then where was the question for the trial

court for recording the statement of the process server so, that the

petitioner could have been declared as a proclaimed offender"

 171

28. That the facts relevant in this Hon’ble Court have already been

reproduced at para 5 (n) above: “(l) 07.08.2019 (coercive action

against 340 CrPC informant by MM-02, New Delhi; Delhi Police

breaking into his house in Gurugram District beyond its

jurisdiction, in absence of all family members and confiscating a

television monitor during filing of Crl. M.C. 3915/2019 titled Lt

Col (Veteran) Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. State of Delhi NCT,

NDOH: 09.02.2021)”

29. That the email to all high authorities including this Hon’ble

Court dated 10.08.2019 is poignant in its message, which

incidentally was met with stoic silence i.e., zilch response from

each of these August Authorities presumably responsible for the

freedoms man lives for, to every Indian Citizen who thinks he has

escaped from the tyranny of British Raj aka Queen Empress v. Bal

Gangadhar Tilak, ILR 1898 (22) Bom 112 ANNEXURE P-34

PART I/ 16, except a verbal abuse as detailed below by the SHO,

Sadar, Gurugram (since retired) who colluded with the Delhi

Police in a gross violation of human rights, “To, CHIEF

JUSTICE OF INDIA <supremecourt@nic.in>, Secretary Ministry

of Urban Development <secyurban@nic.in>, vcdda@dda.org.in,

 172

CVC of India <vigilance@nic.in>, cvc@nic.in,

delhihighcourt@nic.in, NHRC <sgnhrc@nic.in>,

lokpal.chairperson@gov.in, lokpal.pinakighose@gov.in,

nddistrict.dlsa@gmail.com, PH High Court

<highcourt@hry.nic.in>, Commissioner Police Gurgaon

<cp.ggn@hry.nic.in>, cp.amulyapatnaik@delhipolice.gov.in,

"SHO Sadar Gurgaon Police Department, Haryana" <shoggnsdr-

hry@nic.in>, jtcp.ser.dl@nic.in, District & Sessions Judge

Gurgaon <dsjgrg@hry.nic.in>, .. REQUEST FOR CrPC 197

SANCTION: VIOLATION OF IPC Sections 166 & 166 A (b), 441

IPC and violation of WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

Reference: Self Explanatory 5 page PDF FILE ENCLOSED.

1. That Warrants of Attachment being valid only within district in

which magistrate has jurisdiction (in this case New Delhi District)

[per Ganu Shakul v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Patna 347 ENCLOSED]

the illegal forcible entry of 4 male policemen/ASI (2 from Gurgaon

Police/ 2 from Delhi Police) into my residence at about 3 PM on

07.08.19 without lady constable / independent witness when no

family members were home only the one illiterate house maid

being present. She was threatened into putting her thumb

 173

impression on a paper which she could not read. No bond has been

executed and a TV is missing from my house, its whereabouts and

condition is not known.

2. That warrants of attachment are only and only against

proclaimed offenders and SHOs concerned are aware that I am no

proclaimed offender as I appear in one court or the other on a

daily basis in NCR and Punjab & Haryana.

3. That no court in Gurgaon would ever have done this to me in

view of whistleblower protection letters dt. 22.09.17 & 14.05.18.

(attached)

4. That this position was explained to SHO Dalbir Singh of P.S.

Sadar, Gurugram at 4.03 PM on 07.08.19 and he claimed to be

unaware of any such action by his police station, and yet at 5 PM

his 2 policemen and the 2 Delhi Police persons walked away with

the TV and were at P.S. Sadar Gurugram till 6.10 PM. No attempt

was made by SHO or Addl SHO to stop this gross illegal charade.

5. That the loss of honour is the greatest grief to an Army Officer.

For this loss of honour money can not recompense however a

claim of Rs 1 crore loss of reputation is made along with this

request for grant of sanction (within 90 days at the most) to

 174

prosecute the SHO/ Addl SHO/ IO and others concerned under the

offences committed under IPC Sections 166 & 441 IPC during 3

PM to 5 PM on 07.08.19 and by SHOs/ Addl SHOs/ IOs concerned

from 06.08.19 to date under Section 166A (b) IPC (continuing

offence)

6. That when I met the SHO Sadar Gurugram on 08.08.19

(evening) he refused to take any action or even read the 5 page

complaint (attached) which I had submitted in the morning at 9.30

AM on 08.08.19 and said "you do whatever you want to do, I have

taken the correct action." NOTE: Case law judgements enclosed.”

30. That the petitioner’s allegation against SHO, Sadar, Sector 38,

Gurugram that he acted jointly with Delhi Police violating thereby

the discipline of his own Ilaqa Magistrate, has support in numerous

judgements and international instruments. [Stewart Macpherson J.

in Ganu Shukul and Ors. v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 347, 123 Ind.

Cas. 397 MANU/BH/0010/1930] See also, UN Treaty Series Vol.

1465 No. 24841 dt. 16.12.1966 UN Res 2200 (XXI) ICESCR,

ICCPR, 1966 at ANNEXURE P-34 PART II/ 9 which have been

notified in the 1993 Act at sub-sections (d) & (f) of Section 2. That

this was the result of a patently illegal witch-hunting order of the

 175

MM-02, PHC, New Delhi not valid in Gurugam without the seal

of the local Ilaqa Magistrate. Hence SHO, Sadar, Sector 38 a

necessary party before this Hon’ble Court in order to defend if

there can ever be any defence to this collusion with Delhi Police

to subvert the Rule of Law, but the SHO, Sadar, Gurugram should

not be condemned unheard behind his back. That the case of

petitioner against the joint crime of human rights offence by SHO,

Sadar acting in collusion with Delhi Police and others, in breach

of Rule, Statute and Justice on 07.08.2019, is triable only with the

active aid and assistance of independent human rights prosecutor

under the special law passed unanimously by both Houses of

Parliament on 08.01.1994 wef 28.09.1993. That this argument is

supported on all fours by the following amongst other judgements:

(1) Ganu Shukul and Ors. v. Emperor , MANU/BH/0010/1930,

AIR 1930 Pat 347, 123 Ind. Cas. 397 "Stewart Macpherson , J.

Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), Section 88 - Attachment

in District other than that of issuing Magistrate without

endorsement of Magistrate of that District, legality of."

 176

(2) Alagammal v. Sadasiva Padayachi and Ors.,

MANU/TN/0087/1930, AIR 1930 Mad 1017, 129 Ind. Cas. 47,

1930-32-LW 843, (1931) 60 MLJ 72, 1930 MWN 1021

(3) VG Paterson v. OV Forbes and Ors, MANU/SC/0099/1962,

AIR 1963 SC 692, 1963 (2) AnWR 69, [1963] Supp (1) SC R 40,

1976 (1) SLJ 721(SC )

(4) Devi Singh v. State of Rajasthan, MANU/RH/0009/1964, 1963

RLW 642 "Criminal P.C., Secs. 79, 83 and 84—Police Officer

receiving warrant of arrest cannot endorse it to another police

officer outside the jurisdiction of court issuing warrant."

(5) Daya Nand v. The State of Haryana, MANU/PH/0028/1976,

(1975) ILR 1 P&H 291

(6) Dip Narain Singh and Ors. v. The State of Bihar,

MANU/BH/0158/1981, 1981 CriLJ 1672 "Attachment of

properties - Court was unable to find any material on which in

instant case in less than forty eight hours Court was satisfied that

all Petitioners were either absconding or concealing themselves

to avoid execution of such warrants"

(7) K.K. Patel and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and

Ors.,MANU/SC/0386/2000, 2000 (2) ACR 1658(SC ), AIR 2000

 177

SC 3346, 2000 (2) ALD(C ri) 115, 2000 CriLJ 4592, (2000) 4

GLR 823, JT 2000 (7) SC 246, 2000 (2) RCR(Criminal) 863, 2000

(4) SCALE 572, (2000) 6 SCC 195, [2000] Supp1 SC R 312

(8) Kura Rajaiah and Ors v. Government of Andhra Pradesh,

MANU/AP/ 0026/2007, 2007 (1) ALD (Cri) 845, 2007 (2) ALT

346, 2007 CriLJ 2031

(9) Rohit Kumar alias Raju v. State of NCT Delhi, 2007 (98) DRJ

714, MANU/DE/8784/2007 " It appears that the learned Addl.

Sessions Judge is not aware with the basics of Code of Criminal

Procedure, as it is apparent from record that process under

Sections 82/83 Cr.P.C. was never executed in accordance with

law..... The sine qua non for an action under Section 82 is the

prior issuance of warrant of arrest by the Court. There must be a

report before the Magistrate that the person against whom the

warrant was issued by him had absconded or had been concealing

himself so that such warrant can be issued. An attachment warrant

can be issued only after the issuance of proclamation..... When on

29th August, 2007, no valid proclamation under Section 82 and 83

Cr.P.C. has been effected, then where was the question for the trial
 178

court for recording the statement of the process server so, that the

petitioner could have been declared as a proclaimed offender"

(10) Randhir Sharma alias Rupesh v. State of Bihar,

MANU/BH/0326/2009 2009 CriLJ 3889, 2010 (1) PLJR 350

(11) L Vijayakumar and Ors v. State, MANU/TN/3572/2009,

2010 CriLJ 1309, 2010 (5) RCR(Criminal) 45

31. GROUNDS

A. THAT the Delhi Gazette. Pt. IV No. 259 dt. 24.11.2020, Govt.

of the NCT of Delhi, N.C.T.D. No. 209 (SG-DL-E-25112020-

223298) issuing under the powers to be exercised in consultation

with Respondent 5 under Article 233(1)/ 236(a) of the Constitution

of India suffers from fatal defect of not having the seal of the

President of India.

B. THAT the Govt. of the NCT of Delhi Notification F.6/13/2011-

Judl./Suptlaw/721-725 dt. 14.06.2011 issuing under the powers to

be exercised in consultation with Respondent 5 under Article

233(1)/ 236(a) of the Constitution of India suffers from fatal defect

of not having the seal of the President of India.

C. THAT the notifications dated 24.11.2020 and 14.06.2011 merit

quashing not having been authorised by the President of India or

 179

by such officer as is validly authorised under Article 53(3)(b) in

terms of Entry 13 List I which is fully controlled by Article

73(1)(b),

D. THAT the notifications dated 24.11.2020 and 14.06.2011 merit

quashing being contrary to the law laid down by the Constitution

Bench on 04.07.2018 in Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of

India and Ors., (2018) 8 SCC 501, MANU/SC/0680/2018.

E. THAT the notifications dated 24.11.2020 and 14.06.2011 merit

quashing being contrary to the law laid down by the Nine judges

Constitution Bench on 19.12.1996 in NDMC v. State of Punjab,

(1997) 7 SCC 33, MANU/SC/0760/1997.

F. THAT without a Special Public Prosecutor, as contemplated

under Section. 31 of the1993 Act HRC cannot at all function,

reason being, criminal courts of session are non-functional sans

Public Prosecutor, who is a must for commencement of every

criminal trial at Sessions.

G. THAT the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XVIII

Trial Before a Court of Session, Section 225 mandates

appointment of a “Public Prosecutor”

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H. THAT the Public Prosecutor enjoins a long legal tradition

dating back to 1865; Crompton J., in Regina v. Puddick, 176 ER

622 held: “I hope that in the exercise of the privilege granted by

the new Act to counsel for the prosecution of summing up the

evidence, they will not cease to remember that counsel for the

prosecution in such cases are to regard themselves as ministers of

justice, and not to struggle for a conviction as in a case at Nisi

Prius nor be betrayed by feelings of professional rivalry – to

regard the question at issue as one of professional superiority, and

a contest for skill and pre-eminence.”

I. THAT the inaction for last 27 years on the part of the

Respondents in not ensuring one functioning Human Rights Court

under Sections 30 & 31 of Act 10 of 1994 in each of the district

courts of Delhi in accord with the International Rule of Law which

is the mandate of Articles 51 and 253 of the Constitution of India,

1949 read with sub-section (d) & (f) of section 2 of Central Act

No. 10 of 1994 is illegal, and arbitrary, thus depriving the

Petitioner of a fair trial in Case CRN No. DLND01-000756-2018,

CC 20/2018 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Union of India and

others absent the Public Prosecutor, thus violating the

 181

fundamental rights of the Petitioner guaranteed under the

Constitution of India.

J. THAT the trial in Case CRN No. DLND01-000756-2018, CC

20/2018 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Union of India and

others absent the Public Prosecutor therefore merits a stay on the

further proceedings.

K. THAT the Stay of the Notification dated 24.11.2020 being

more than sufficient to stay the trial in Case CRN No. DLND01-

000756-2018, CC 20/2018 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v.

Union of India and others therefore merits a stay of the

Notification dated 24.11.2020.

L. THAT the Stay of the Notification dated 24.11.2020 shall avoid

any necessity for Stay of the criminal trial itself.

M. THAT as far back as 23.06.1997 it was held by the Hon’ble

High Court of Madras in Tamil Nadu Pazhankudi Makkal Sangam

v. Government of Tamil Nadu 1997 [Vol.XLI] MLJ (Crl.) 655 at

paragraph 156 of the Judgement that “156. Point No.24: Our

findings so far do not at all disclose that P.H.R.A. is materially

defective in such a way as is not possible to implement its

provisions in "as is where is state" for achieving the object, for

 182

which the same had been enacted. We, however, found that certain

deficiencies, numbering three or thereabouts were attributed in

this P.H.R.A and if those deficiencies stand rectified by way of

amendments by adding or creating a new offence of 'torture',

which affects the dignity of the individual in I.P.C. and introducing

a new provision, in the shape of Sec.114-B in I.E.A. revising the

burden of proof regarding Human Rights Offences, as indicated

by the Law Commission in its 113th report, besides investing

power of exclusive jurisdiction with H.R.Cs. to make award of

compensation to the victims of Human Rights offences, prescribing

no limits, ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Court and vesting public

law jurisdiction, inhering in Writ Courts - High Courts and

Supreme Court - relatable only to the award of compensation for

violation of fundamental rights of a citizen-with a discretion for

such courts to permit the Government Central, a State to recover

the whole or part of it form the officers), who are found guilty and

to award interim compensation befitting such relief, by making

suitable provision in P.H.R.A. by way of amendment, the

implementation of P.H.R.A will stand on a better pedestal. We

trust and hope that the Union Government will very soon bring
 183

necessary amendments to I.P.C., I.E.A. and P.H.R.A. as we have

indicated for giving succour and relief, in a better way, to the

citizens of this country, whose Human Rights, it is said, are being

violated day-in and day-out. We may, however, point out that it is

not legally permissible for this Court to issue a mandamus to the

Union Government to bring in amendments to the enactments, as

we have indicated. We answer this point Accordingly.”

N. THAT as far as Section 114-B mentioned in “L” above is

concerned in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar & another, AIR

1985 SC 416, [1985] 2 SCR 621, (1985) 1 SCC 552, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court held: “Before we close, we would like to impress

upon the Government the need to amend the law appropriately so

that policemen who commit atrocities on persons who are in their

custody are not allowed to escape by reason of paucity or absence

of evidence. Police Officers alone, and none else, can give

evidence as regards the circumstances in which a person in their

custody comes to receive injuries while in their custody. Bound by

ties of a kind of brotherhood, they often prefer to remain silent in

such situations and when they choose to speak, they put their own

gloss upon facts and pervert the truth. The result is that persons,
 184

on whom atrocities are perpetrated by the police in the sanctum

sanctorum of the police station, are left without any evidence to

prove who the offenders are. The law as to the burden of proof in

such cases may be re-examined by the legislature so that hand-

maids of law and order do not use their authority and

opportunities for oppressing the innocent citizens who look to

them for protection. It is ironical that, in the instant case, a person

who complained against a policeman for bribery, was done to

death by that policeman, his two companions and his superior

officer, the Station House Officer. The vigilant Magistrate, Shri

R.C. Nigam, deserves a word of praise for dutifully recording the

dying declaration of the victim, which has come to constitute the

sheet anchor of the case of the prosecution.”

O. THAT as far as Section 114-B mentioned in “N” above is

concerned on 29.07.1985, the Law Commission of India made its

113th Report; at para 5.2 it advised the Law Minister of India of its

suo moto recommendation in light of AIR 1985 SC 416

(18.01.1985), “5.2, In the circumstances, the Law Commission

recommends the insertion of a new section, say, as section 114B,

in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as under:— “114B. (1) In a

 185

prosecution (of a police officer) for an offence constituted by an

act alleged to have caused bodily injury to a person, if there is

evidence that the injury was caused during a period when that

person was in the custody of the police, the court may presume

that the injury was caused by the police officer having custody of

that person during that period. (2) The court, in deciding whether

or not it should draw a presumption under sub-section (1), shall

have regard to all the relevant circumstances, including, in

particular, (a) the period of custody, (b) any statement made by

the victim as to how the injuries were received, being a statement

admissible in evidence, (c) the evidence of any medical

practitioner who might have examined the victim, and (d) evidence

of any magistrate who might have recorded the victim’s statement

or attempted to record it”.”

P. THAT as far as Section 114-B mentioned in “O” above is

concerned, on 09.05.1995 in State Of Madhya Pradesh v.

Shyamsunder Trivedi and Ors, MANU / SC / 0722 / 1995, (1995)

4 SCC 262 it was recommended “In its 4th Report of June, 1980,

The National Police Commission noticed the prevalence of

custodial torture etc. and observed that nothing is so

 186

dehumanising as the conduct of police in practising torture of any

kind on a person in their custody. The commission noticed with

regret that the police image in the estimation of the public has

badly suffered on account of the prevalence of this practice in

varying degrees over the past several years and noted with

concern the inclination of even some of the supervisory ranks in

the police hierarchy to countenance this practice in a bid to

achieve quick results by short-cut methods. Though Sections 330

and 331 of the Indian Penal Code make punishable those persons

who cause hurt for the purpose of extorting the confession, by

making the offence punishable with sentence upto 10 years of

imprisonment, but the convictions, as experience shows us, have

been very few because the atrocities within the precincts of the

police station are often left without any ocular or other direct

evidence to prove who the offenders are. Disturbed by this

situation, the Law Commission in its 113th Report recommended

amendments to the Indian Evidence Act so as to provide that in the

prosecution of a police officer for an alleged offence of having

caused bodily injuries to a person while in police custody, if there

is evidence that the injury was caused during the period when the
 187

person was in the police custody, the Court may presume that the

injury was caused by the police officer having the custody of that

person during that period unless, the police officer proves to the

contrary. The onus to prove the contrary must be discharged by

the concerned police official. The recommendation, however, we

notice with concern, appears to have gone un-noticed and the

crime of custodial torture etc. flourishes unabated. Keeping in

view the dehumanising aspect of the crime, the flagrant violation

of the fundamental rights of the victim of the crime and the

growing rise in the crimes of this type, where only a few come to

light and others don't, we hope that the Government and

legislature would give serious thought to the recommendation of

the Law Commission (supra) and bring about appropriate

changes in the law not only to curb the custodial crime but also to

see that the custodial crime does not go unpunished.”

Q. THAT as far as Section 114-B mentioned in “P” above is

concerned on 18.12.1996 in Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West

Bengal, MANU/SC/0157/1997, AIR 1997 SC 610, (1997) 1 SCC

416 it was held “It needs no emphasis to say that when the crime

goes unpunished, the criminals are encouraged and the society

 188

suffers. The victim of crime or his kith and kin become frustrated

and contempt for law develops. It was considering these aspects

that the Law Commission in its 113th Report recommended the

insertion of Section 114B in the Indian Evidence Act. The Law

Commission recommend in its 113th Report that in prosecution of

a police officer for an alleged offence of having caused bodily

injury to a person, if there was evidence that the injury was caused

during the period when the person was in the custody of the police,

the Court may presume that the injury was caused by the police

officer having the custody of that person during that period. The

Commission further recommended that the Court, while

considering the question of presumption, should have regard to all

relevant circumstances including the period of custody, statement

made by the victim, medical evidence and the evidence which the

Magistrate may have recorded. Change of burden of proof was,

thus, advocated. In Shyam Sunder Trivedi's case (supra) this Court

also expressed the hope that the Government and the legislature

would give serious thought to the recommendation of the law

Commission. Unfortunately, the suggested amendment, has not

been incorporated in the statute so far. The need of amendment

 189

requires no emphasis - sharp rise in custodial violence, torture

and death in custody, justifies the urgency for the amendment and

we invite Parliament's attention to it.”.

R. THAT the time has come that people of India want to know

from their Government does the Government agree or disagree

with the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on the suggested

amendment (Section 114-B)?

S. THAT in case the Government does not agree with the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India on the suggested amendment (Section

114-B) it may disclose its reasons for the disagreement.

T. THAT in case the Government does agree with the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India on the suggested amendment (Section

114-B) it may disclose whether it is willing to pass an Ordinance

to ensure that such horrific crime by organs of State is immediately

checked.

U. THAT in case the Government is not willing to pass an

Ordinance to ensure that such horrific crime by organs of State is

immediately checked, is it willing to introduce a suitable Bill in

Parliament? If not, why not.

 190

V. THAT in case the Government does agree with the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India that such horrific crime by organs of State

should be immediately checked, Government may indicate the

time frame, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, 10 years or 50 years,

that it can commit to this Hon’ble High Court, in which this

wholesome recommendation of 29.07.1985, 35 years and more

ago, in which the law of evidence would be amended suitably to

grant the trial courts, the discretion, in an appropriate case, to shift

the burden of proof upon those organs of State, in whose custody

a person earlier healthy enough dies in custody as recommended

in 1985 by the Law Commission of India and re-iterated by

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on 09.05.1995 and 18.12.1996.

W. THAT the inaction for last 27 years on the part of the

Respondents in not ensuring one functioning Human Rights Court

under Sections 30 & 31 of Act 10 of 1994 in each of the district

courts of Delhi in accord with the International Rule of Law which

is the mandate of Articles 51 and 253 of the Constitution of India,

1949 read with sub-section (d) & (f) of section 2 of Central Act

No. 10 of 1994 and for 35 years not implementing a wholesome

provision of law on the lines suggested as “Section 114-B” on

 191

29.07.1985, which has, having not been objected to by the Central

Government attained Article 141 Status. That failure of 27/ 35

years respectively clearly attracts the mischief of Article 2.3 of

ICCPR, 1996 which holds “3.Each State Party to the present

Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights

or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an

effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been

committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b)To ensure

that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right

thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or

legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority

provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the

possibilities of judicial remedy;(c) To ensure that the competent

authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.”

X. THAT this right to effective legal determination has attained

paramountcy by the UN General Assembly in its Resolution

60/147 dt. 16.12.2005 in the following words with special

reference having been made in Annex, Preamble about Article 2

of ICCPR, 1966 “The General Assembly, Recalling the provisions

providing a right to a remedy for victims of violations of

 192

international human rights law found in numerous international

instruments, in particular …. article 2 of the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights … …Emphasizing that the

Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not entail

new international or domestic legal obligations but identify

mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the

implementation of existing legal obligations under international

human rights law and international humanitarian law which are

complementary though different as to their norms, Recalling that

international law contains the obligation to prosecute

perpetrators of certain international crimes in accordance with

international obligations of States and the requirements of

national law or as provided for in the applicable statutes of

international judicial organs, and that the duty to prosecute

reinforces the international legal obligations to be carried out in

accordance with national legal requirements and procedures and

supports the concept of complementarity,…. Recognizing that, in

honouring the victims’ right to benefit from remedies and

reparation, the international community keeps faith with the plight

of victims, survivors and future human generations and reaffirms

 193

the international legal principles of accountability, justice and the

rule of law, Convinced that, in adopting a victim-oriented

perspective…”… “Adopts the following Basic Principles and

Guidelines:… VIII. Access to justice…18. In accordance with

domestic law and international law, and taking account of

individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of

international human rights law and serious violations of

international humanitarian law should, as appropriate and

proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances

of each case, be provided with full and effective reparation, as laid

out in principles 19 to 23, which include the following forms:

restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and

guarantees of nonrepetition.” ANNEXURE P-34 PART IV/ 6

DECLARATION

32. That no other writ or other petition seeking the remedy herein

sought for NCT of Delhi has been filed in this Hon’ble Court or in

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India or any other High Court or other

Court in India or abroad.

 194

PRAYER

Thus, in the present facts and premise, it is most respectfully

prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to

I. Issue a writ/order/direction in the nature of quo

warranto, mandamus or any other appropriate writ / order

quashing Delhi Gazette. Pt. IV No. 259 dt. 24.11.2020, Govt. of

the NCT of Delhi, N.C.T.D. No. 209 (SG-DL-E-25112020-

223298) and/or;

II. Issue a writ/order/direction in the nature of quo

warranto, mandamus or any other appropriate writ / order

quashing Govt. of the NCT of Delhi Notification F.6/13/2011-

Judl./Suptlaw/721-725 dt. 14.06.2011 and/or;

III. Issue a writ/order/direction in the nature of mandamus

or any other appropriate writ / order directing Respondents to

ensure one Human Rights Court under Section 30 of Act 10 of

1994 in each of the eleven district courts of Delhi in accord with

the International Rule of Law which is the mandate of Articles 51

and 253 of the Constitution of India, 1949 read with sub-section

(d) & (f) of section 2 of Central Act No. 10 of 1994 within a period

of 240 days or lesser period, preferably in seisen of the Learned

 195

District & Sessions Judge, as may bein the wisdom ofthis Hon’ble

Court and/or;

IV. Issue a writ/order/direction in the nature of mandamus

or any other appropriate writ / order directing Respondents to

ensure one Independent Human Rights Prosecutor under Section

31 of Act 10 of 1994 exclusively appointed to examine and process

claims of human rights offences for prosecution of appropriate

case before the Human Rights Court in each of the eleven district

courts of Delhi in accord with the International Rule of Law which

is the mandate of Articles 51 and 253 of the Constitution of India,

1949 read with sub-section (d) & (f) of section 2 of Central Act

No. 10 of 1994 within a period of 240 days orlesser period, as may

be in the wisdom ofthis Hon’ble Court and/or;

V. Pass any other order as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and

properin the interest ofjustice.

Place: New Delhi

Dated: 21.12.2020
Petitioner-in-person
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi
1102, Tower 1, Uniworld Garden I, Sector 47 Gurugram-122018,
Mob.No. 9818768349
Email: manioberoi@gmail.com
196
197
 198

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

(EXTRAORDINARY WRIT JURISDICTION)
C.M. NO. 5422 OF 2021 IN W.P. (C) NO. 1851 OF 2021
IN THE MATTER OF:
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi … .Petitioner-in-person
Versus
Govt of NCT of Delhi & Ors. ….Respondents

APPLICATION FOR EX-PARTE STAY OF THE

IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION DATED 24.11.2020

TO,
THE HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND HIS COMPANION JUDGES,
OF DELHI HIGH COURT, AT NEW DELHI
THE HUMBLE PETITION OF
THE PETITIONER ABOVE NAMED
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:
1. The writ petition of this petitioner seeks stay on the
notification by way of writ of quo warranto, and raises challenge
to notification dt.24.11.2020 issued by Lieutenant Governor of
Union Territory of Delhi in exercise of powers of Hon’ble Chief
Justice of the High Court of Delhi under Article 233(1)/ 236(a) of
the Constitution of India.
2. That said notification suffers fatal defect of not having the
seal of the President of India or a competent lawfully notified
authority, which the Constitution Bench, on 04.07.2018, held
“clear as noon day is not the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi.
3. That the petitioner is likely to succeed in the writ petition
and hence Order of Stay of operation of the notification shall be in
the interests of Justice till suitable provision is made to appoint
 199

both the prosecutor under the Paris Principles and the properly
notified court having the seal of the President of India as held by
the Constitution Bench on 04.07.2018.
4. That the facts of the case have beenfully set out in the Writ
Petition. It is submitted that the facts stated in the Writ Petition
maybetreated as part of this Application and the same are not
reproduced herein for the sake ofbrevity.
5. That ex-parte stay of the notification dated 24.11.2020 may be
grantedas it would alsobein the interests ofjustice..
PRAYER
It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble
Court may bepleased to:
(a) grant ex-parte stay ofthe notification dated 24.11.2020 and
/or
(b) Pass any otherorder(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit
andproperin the interest ofjustice.
AND FORTHIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER AS
IN DUTY BOUND SHALLEVERPRAY.
Place: New Delhi <|
Dated: 21.12.2020 wh
Petitioner-in-person
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi
1102, Tower 1, Uniworld Garden I, Sector 47 Gurugram-122018,
Mob. No. 9818768349
Email: manioberoi@gmail.com
200
201
 202

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

(EXTRAORDINARY WRIT JURISDICTION)
C.M. NO. 5423 OF 2021 IN W.P. (C) NO. 1851 OF 2021
IN THE MATTER OF:
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi … .Petitioner-in-person
Versus
Govt of NCT of Delhi & Ors. ….Respondents

APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING

CERTIFIED COPY OF THE ORIGINALS OF
ANNEXURES

TO,
THE HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND HIS COMPANION JUDGES,
OF DELHI HIGH COURT, AT NEW DELHI
THE HUMBLE PETITION OF
THE PETITIONER ABOVE NAMED
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:
1. The writ petition of this petitioner seeks stay on the
notification by way of writ of quo warranto, and raises challenge
to notification dt.24.11.2020 issued by Lieutenant Governor of
Union Territory of Delhi in exercise of powers of Hon’ble Chief
Justice of the High Court of Delhi under Article 233(1)/ 236(a) of
the Constitution of India.
2 That the facts of the case have been fully set out in the Writ
Petition. It is submitted that the facts stated in the Writ Petition
may be treated as part of this Application and the same are not
reproduced herein for the sake of brevity.
 203

3. Thatthe Petitioner is filing true copy of the Annexure P-1 to

P-35 in the present petition, as the Petitioner does not have the
certified copy of the same.

PRAYER
It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble
Court may bepleasedto:
(a) Exempt the Petitioner from filing the Certified copy of
Annexure P-1 to P-35; and/or
(b) Pass any other order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit
and properin the interest ofjustice.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER AS
IN DUTY BOUNDSHALL EVERPRAY.
Place: New Delhi <a
Dated: 21.12.2020 wh
Petitioner-in-person
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi
1102, Tower 1, Uniworld Garden I, Sector 47 Gurugram-122018,
Mob. No. 9818768349
Email: manioberoi@gmail.com
204
205
 206
NOTIFICATION UNDER CHALLENGE

ANNEXURE P-1
207
NOTIFICATION UNDER CHALLENGE 208
ANNEXURE P-2(COLLY)/ 1
 209

ANNEXURE P-2(COLLY)/ 2
jftLVªh laö Mhö ,yö&33004@99 REGD. NO. D. L.-33004/99

vlk/kj.k
EXTRAORDINARY
Hkkx II—[k.M 3—mi&[k.M (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)
izkf/dkj ls izdkf'kr
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
la- 1893] ubZ fnYyh] cq/okj] tqykbZ 27] 2016@Jko.k 5] 1938
No. 1893] NEW DELHI, WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2016/SRAVANA 5 , 1938

कारपोरे ट काय मं ालय

अिधसूचना

नई द ली, 27 जुलाई, 2016

का.आ. 2554(अ).—के ीय सरकार, कं पनी अिधिनयम, 2013 (2013 का 18) क धारा 435 क उप-धारा
(1) ारा द शि य का योग करते ए, द ली उ च यायालय के मु य यायाधीश क सहमित से,
िन िलिखत यायालय को कं पनी अिधिनयम, 2013 के अधीन दो वष या उससे अिधक के कारावास से दंडनीय
अपराध के मामल के व रत िवचारण योजन के िलए कं पनी अिधिनयम, 2013 के अधीन िवशेष यायालय के
प म पदािभिहत करती है, अथात् -

.सं. िव मान यायालय िवशेष यायालय के प म अिधका रता

(1) (2) (3)

1. अपर सेशन यायाधीश – 03 का यायालय, रा ीय राजधानी े द ली

उ र-if'peh िजला, ारका

2. तंभ सं या (2) म उि लिखत उपयु यायालय तंभ सं या (3) म उि लिखत अिधका रता क बाबत िवशेष
यायालय के अिधका रता का योग करे ग।

[फा. सं. 01/12/2009-सीएल-I (खंड-IV)]

अमरदीप सह भा टया, संयु सिचव

3767 GI/2016 (1)

 210
2 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA : EXTRAORDINARY [PART II—SEC. 3(ii)]

MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS

NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 27th July, 2016
S.O. 2554(E).—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013
(18 of 2013), the Central Government hereby, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi,
designates the following Court as Special Court for the purposes of providing speedy trial of offences punishable under
the Companies Act, 2013 with imprisonment of two years or more under the Companies Act, 2013, namely:-
TABLE

Sl. No. Existing Court Jurisdiction as Special Court

(1) (2) (3)

1 Court of Additional Sessions Judge-03, South-West National Capital Territory of Delhi

District, Dwarka

2. The aforesaid Court mentioned in column number (2) shall exercise the jurisdiction as Special Court in respect
of jurisdiction mentioned in column number (3).
[F. No. 01/12/2009-CL-I (Vol.IV)]
AMARDEEP SINGH BHATIA, Jt. Secy.

Uploaded by Dte. of Printing at Government of India Press, Ring Road, Mayapuri, New Delhi-110064
and Published by the Controller of Publications, Delhi-110054.
 211

ANNEXURE P-2(COLLY)/ 3

334 HARYANA GOVT. GAZ. (EXTRA ), JULY 7, 2015 (ASAR. 16, 1937 SAKA) .

[Authorized English Translation]

HARYANA GOVERNMENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Notification
The 3rd July, 2015

No. S.O. 137/C.A.10/1994/S.30/2015.- In exercise of the powers conferred by section 30 of the Protection
of Human Rights Act, 1993 (Central Act 10 of 1994) the Governor of Haryana with the concurrence of the Chief
Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court hereby specifies the court of 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, and if
there is only one Court of Additional Sessions Judge, then 1st Additional Sessions Judge in each district in the State
of Haryana, to be a Human Rights Court to try offences under the aforesaid Act, within their respective territorial
jurisdiction.

P. K. MAHAPATRA,
Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Haryana
Administration of Justice Department
ANNEXURE P-2(COLLY)/ 4 212
213
214
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ANNEXURE P-2(COLLY)/ 5

EXTRACT HR Courts Not Functional- Human Rights 15th Ed, 2014 Dr HO Agarwal
Foreword by Hon'ble Justice PN Bhagwati
216
217