Narrative Rationality and the Logic of Scientific

Discourse

WALTER R. FISHER

Communication Arts and Sciences

University of Southern California
University Park
Los Angeles, CA 90089-1694
U.S.A.

ABSTRACT: This essay argues that scientific discourse is amenable to interpretation and
assessment from the perspective of the narrative paradigm and its attendant logic,
narrative rationality. It also contends that this logic entails a revised conception of
knowledge, one that permits the possibility of wisdom. The text analyzed is James D.
Watson and Francis H. Crick's proposal of the double helix model of DNA.

KEY WORDS: Rhetoric, scientific discourse, logic, knowledge, reason, rationality.

In earlier writings, I have claimed that scientific discourse is as amenable to

interpretation and assessment from the perspective of the narrative paradigm 1 as
other forms of discourse (Fisher, 1989, 85-86, 143-144). So far, I have used the
paradigm to analyze public moral argument, epic, political communication, and
philosophical dialogue (Fisher, 1989, Chs. 3, 7, 8, 9). I have also related it to
historical writing (Fisher, 1988, 50-53). The present essay is meant to substan-
tiate my claim that the narrative paradigm can account for scientific discourse;
indeed, I shall argue that it can do so more satisfactorily than traditional
argumentation theory or positivist notions of reason. The text chosen for this
demonstration is James D. Watson and Francis H. Crick' s proposal of the double
helix model of DNA, "A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid" (Watson and
Crick, 1953, 737-738; a copy is appended). Additionally, I shall maintain that
narrative rationality, the logic that attends the narrative paradigm, entails a
reconceptualization of knowledge, one that permits the possibility of wisdom.
Three tasks are necessary to make my case: recounting the construct of narrative
rationality (with some emendations); reconsidering the conception of
knowledge; and analyzing Watson and Crick's proposal.
Before pursuing these tasks, two caveats are in order. First, there is no need to
establish the rhetorical nature of Watson and Crick's article. This has been done
admirably by Charles Bazerman (Bazerman, 1988, 27-34, 46-47), Alan G.
Gross (Gross, 1990, 28-29, 62-64), and Lawrence J. Prelli (Prelli, 1989,
236-256). As they show, the text is symbolically and strategically composed to
gain the adherence of a particular audience; its context is historical and situa-
tional; and its appeal is reasonable rather than rigorously empirical or strictly

Argumentation 8: 21-32, 1994.

© 1994KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printedin the Netherlands.
22 WALTER R. FISHER

logical according to positivist precepts. I, furthermore, agree with Prelli's

argument that rhetoric and science are compatible because scientific discourse
practices are governed by "rhetorical logic" (Prelli, 1990, 316). This is so, he
contends, because scientific discourse is shaped by adherence to a topical logic.
I have no quarrel with this view; it neatly captures the inventional aspect of
scientific discourse addressed to other scientists. However, analyzing the actual
reasoning employed by Watson and Crick convinces me that their logic accords
with narrative rationality, which is also a rhetorical logic (Fisher, 1987, 3-21;
Fisher, 1989, Ch. 2). 'The analysis was guided by the question: what are, o r
appear to be, the criteria by which one would assess and determine to believe or
not to believe Watson and Crick's message; in other words, what was the logic
of adherence underlying their proposal?
Second, I concur with those who make a distinction between doing rhetoric
and doing science. There is no question, at least in my mind, that scientific
discursive practices are rhetorical, whether involving the specialized audience of
scientists or the generalized audience of the public. In both instances, rhetorical
motives and rhetorical means are at work - the desire to gain adherence,
adaptation to audience constraints, and the use of strategic, persuasive symbols,
including charts, graphs, pictures, metaphors as well as empirical data and well-
formed arguments. Justification to convince a specialized audience and transla-
tion for a generalized audience are both rhetorical "doings," practices.
Doing science, on the other hand, is a particular form of problem solving,
having two interdependent (at times, concurrent) phases: discovery and verifica-
tion. The nature of the first phase is caught aptly by Albert Einstein's image of
the scientist who studied the face of a clock (nature) and tried to conceive of the
mechanisms behind the clock's face which accounted for the movement of the
clock's hands. Such was the search of Watson and Crick as they worked to
decipher the structure of DNA. The process of discovery is marked by insight,
but it is important to recognize that insight does not occur in a vacuum. Insight
combines knowledge, intellection, and imagination, and it is nurtured by
reflection, "doodling," speculation, "playing with ideas," trial and error, and -
often - luck. The second phase is represented by procedures of observation and
testing. Watson and Crick were guided by experimental data, obtained through
x-ray crystallography, and stereochemical laws when solving the problem of the
structure of DNA. This was, in my view, a matter of doing science. Watson and
Crick began to do rhetoric when they sought the most persuasive symbols to
justify their discovery, a key component of which was a drawing of the structure
they imagined to be the right one. Later, I shall detail the lines of argument they
employed. At this point, it is appropriate to turn to the tasks of reviewing
narrative rationality and the prevailing conception of knowledge.
 RATIONALITYAND THE LOGICOF SCIENTIFICDISCOURSE 23

NARRATIVE RATIONALITY REVISITED

Any system of logic - that is, any system for assessing reason - presupposes a
philosophical view of the material that it would account for. Formal logic, for
instance, presumes a world in which there are analytic structures° Without such
structures, rules of syllogistic inference and truth tables would make no sense.
Early argumentation theory in this century presupposed a world that ap-
proximated this strictly structured way of thinking - but ambiguously, because it
also wanted to retain much of the heritage of rhetorical logic. Later argumenta-
tion theory, following the lead of Stephen Toulmin (Toulmin, 1958) and Chai'm
Perelman (Perelman and Tyteca, 1969), presupposed a world that is analogous
to that of the legal arena. The logic that I am proposing, narrative rationality,
presupposes a narrative world (see components of the narrative paradigm,
footnote 1), a world constituted by the nature of human beings as homo narrans
and the stories riley tell in all sorts of discourse. Not all discourse necessarily
appeals to reason, such as some jokes, phatic expressions, and consummatory
communication, but all discourse is presented by a fallible human being and is
an interpretation of some aspect of the world occurring in time and shaped by
history, culture, and character. Discourse rarely, if ever, presents an uncontested
or uncontestable truth. It is to such discourse that the narrative paradigm and
narrative rationality are directed, to provide means by which reason can be
assessed. And reason is to be found in those elements that provide warrants for
accepting or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of communication that
can be considered rhetorical These elements appear not only in legal,
philosophical, political, and historical discourse, they are also common in
aesthetic, religious, and scientific texts as well. Most importantly, however they
are formed - as clear-cut inferential or aesthetic expressions - whether discur-
sive or nondiscursive - and whenever they arise, they will be value-laden. That
is why narrative rationality includes tests of values and "reasons." Humans are
valuing, reasoning beings.
The considerations involved in assessing narrative rationality have been
delineated elsewhere (Fisher, 1978, 376-384; Fisher, 1989, 47-49, 105-123),
including an essay in the inaugural issue of this journal (Fisher, 1987, 3-21). I
repeat them here, with some slight emendations, as they are essential to my
argument and, of course, there is a distinct possibility that some readers will not
be familiar with them.
The two major considerations in narrative rationality are coherence and
fidelity. Since this is a time when it is fashionable to celebrate discontinuity,
fragmentation, and conceptual incommensurability, it may seem odd to stress
coherence as a key aspect of rationality. But, then, it is even more strange that
this or any other project to reconstruct reason exists - given the contemporary
preoccupation with desire, ideology, uncertainty, power, and indeterminacy.
One can only observe that declarations of incoherence or inconsistency are made
coherently and consistently. Moreover, they are made seriously as interpreta-
tions of the way the world is, as truths that should be believed and acted upon.
24 WALTERR. FISHER

Besides, there is reason in them. To determine how much, one must assess the
degree of coherence (as detailed here) and fidelity in each declaration.
Coherence has three aspects. First, there is a concern for argumentative or
structural coherence. Second, there is a concern for material coherence, which
is determined by comparing and contrasting a present story with stories told in
other relevant discourses. By juxtaposing stories that purport to tell the "truth"
about a given matter, one is able to discern factual errors, omission of important
arguments, and other sorts of distortions. It is the case that any discourse is as
good as it stands with or against other stories. There is, in other words, no story
that is not embedded in other stories. Third, there is a concern for
characteriological coherence. Here there is regard for the intelligence, integrity,
and goodwill (ethos) of the author, the values she or he embodies and would
advance in the world (character). 2 The degree to which one adheres to the
message of any story is always related to the degree to which the narrator is
taken to be a character whose word warrants attendance, if not adherence. In
each of these features of coherence, values are manifest: consistency, complete-
ness, and character.
Testing for fidelity is not merely an assessment of formal or informal
soundness in thinking. Since values inform "reasons," it is necessary, indispen-
sable, to weigh values in discourse to determine their worthiness as a basis of
belief and action. Testing for fidelity, for the truth qualities not revealed by
considering matters of coherence, then, entails two lines of assessment: weigh-
ing the elements of a message usually regarded as its reasons and weighing the
values it explicitly or implicitly conveys. In the first instance, one does what one
has always been taught to do: one determines whether the statements in a
message that purport to be fact are indeed facts, that is, confirmed by empirical
tests, consensus, or reliable, competent witnesses; one determines whether
relevant facts or arguments have been omitted or misrepresented (which can be
determined through consideration of the text's material coherence); one
determines whether the individuated forms of reasoning in it are sound, using
standards from formal and/or informal logics; and one determines whether the
key issues have been addressed, the questions on which decision and action
should turn.
In the second instance, one tries to answer the following questions related to
values: what are the implicit and explicit values in the story? Are the values
appropriate to the nature of the decision or beliefs that the story concerns? What
would be the effects of adhering to the values in regard to one's concept of self,
to one's behavior, to one's relationship with others and in society? Are the
values confirmed or validated in one's experience, in the lives and statements of
others whom one admires and respects? And even if a primafacie case has been
made or a burden of proof has been established, are the values fostered by the
story those that would constitute a humane basis for human conduct? This final
question most clearly concerns the paramount issue that confronts those
responsible for decisions that impinge on the nature, quality, and continued
existence of human life, especially in the fields of medicine and weapons
 RATIONALITYAND THE LOGICOF SCIENTIFICDISCOURSE 25

technology. This last consideration also raises the matter of knowledge, the kind
of knowledge produced by scientists and other technicians, and the kind of
knowledge encouraged and measured by narrative rationality.

RE-VISIONING KNOWLEDGE

What is knowledge? Answers to this question vary over time - from Plato's
noumenal view to the strict phenomenal position of the logical positivists - but a
review of this history is unnecessary here. There is only one conception that
need concern us. It is the notion that true knowledge is objective: the result of
observation, description, explanation, prediction, and control. This conception
informs the mind-set of researchers and consultants for virtually all levels of
decision making in every social, political, educational, legislative, and business
institution in society (Fischer, 1990, 13-55). The "tacit knowledge" of this
mind-set is that all problems are fundamentally "logical puzzles" that are to be
solved by empirical investigations tied to such systems as "cost-benefit" analysis
(Polanyi, 1962, 132-203); Polanyi, 1967, t-25). Method, techniques, and
technology are its means; efficiency, productivity, power, and effectiveness are
its values (Barrett, 1979). Knowledge from this perspective combines what
Gilbert Ryle called "knowledge of that" and "knowledge Of how" (Ryle, !949,
25-61). The limitation of this knowledge is indicated by Heinz Pagels' observa-
tion that "Science shows us what exists, but not what to do about it" (Pagels,
1988, 325). What is left out is knowledge of whether, whether or not some things
are desirable to do beyond what is instrumentally feasible and profitable. The
dominant notion of knowledge, which is the legacy 0f positivism, ill serves
questions of justice, happiness, and humanity. It is for this reason, and others,
that a number of writers have risen to radically revise or to reject traditional
notions of knowledge and reason: Richard Rorty (Rorty, 1979), Paul Feyerabend
(Feyerabend, 1988), Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1988), Jacques Derrida
(Derrida, 1981), and Jean-Francois Lyotard (Lyotard, 1988).
Knowledge of whether, as I am calling it, has its origins in Aristotle's concept
of practical wisdom. It includes knowledge of that and knowledge of how, and
adds to them a praxial consciousness. The construct may be clarified by these
examples: Medical doctors know that by using certain technological devices
they can keep one alive even when the brain is "dead." They know how to do
this. The question of whether they should do this is beyond their science.
Nuclear scientists obviously know that by combining certain materials they can
build weapons of incredible destructive power. They also know how to deploy
them for maximum effect. The question of whether nuclear weapons should be
deployed involves another sort of knowledge. Doctors and scientists, as
technicians, may dismiss, ignore, or relegate this sort of knowledge to others - it
is not their business - but they cannot do so without denying their humanity. (It
is needless to say, many doctors and scientists are keenly aware of this fact.)
They may also deny this sort of knowledge by insisting that it is a matter of
26 WALTERR. FISHER

values, as though their enterprises do not entail values, as though nonaction does
not imply values as clearly as action. What is at stake in the dominant objectivist
conception of knowledge is a notion that gives one power but not discretion.
Shortly before he died, physicist Heinz Pagels made this relevant observation:
Some intellectual prophets have declared the end of the age of knowledge and the
beginning of the age of information. Information tends to drive out knowledge.
Information is just signs and numbers, while knowledge has semantic value. What we
want is knowledge, but what we often get is information. It is a sign of the times that
many people cannot tell the difference between information and knowledge, not to
mention wisdom, which even knowledge tends to drive out (Pagels, 1988, 149).
The sort of knowledge that has tended to drive out wisdom, I have been
maintaining, is objectivist knowledge. The sort of knowledge that is in need of
reconstruction is praxial knowledge, and this is the sort of knowledge that
narrative rationality is aimed to foster and assess.

RHETORICAL REASON IN WATSON AND CRICK'S PROPOSAL

The analysis of Watson and Crick's proposal of the doubie helix model of DNA
shall proceed not only in light of the discussions of narrative rationality and
knowledge, but also in terms of what I call the rational world paradigm. Their
article was written, I believe, with this conception tacitly in mind: (1) Humans
are essentially rational beings. (2) The appropriate mode of human decision
making and communication is argument - discourse that features clear-cut
inferential or implicative structures. (3) The conduct of argument is ruled by the
dictates of situations - legal, scientific, legislative, public, and so on. (4)
Rationality is determined by subject-matter knowledge, argumentative ability,
and skill in employing the rules of advocacy in given fields. And (5) the world is
a set of logical puzzles that can be solved through appropriate analysis and
application of reason conceived as an argumentative construct. The principal
differences between the rational world paradigm and the narrative paradigm (see
endnote one), at least for present purposes, concern the conception of reason.
The narrative paradigm incorporates the ideas that reason is expressed through
clear-cut inferential and implicative structures and retains, in its attendant logic
(narrative rationality), the formal and informal tests of arguments. But it
broadens the conception of reason to encompass any symbolic form that
provides a warrant for belief and action and it offers tests of values, which may
be, as I have said, good reasons in and of themselves. Thus, narrative rationality
directs attention to features of discourse seen and unseen by traditional logics. In
addition to the enlarged view of reason and the tests of values, narrative
rationality includes explicit consideration of the coherence of the discourse:
argumentative-structural, material, and characteriological. To put the matter.
succinctly in regard to Watson and Crick's article, there is more reason in it than
can be accounted for by only looking at its statements of fact and argument.
The accuracy of this observation should become evident as I proceed. I shall
 RATIONALITYAND THE LOGICOF SCIENTIFICDISCOURSE 27

focus on how Watson and Crick's article satisfies the tests of coherence and
fidelity. I shall begin with fidelity, because it is the measure of discourse
reflecting the rational world paradigm. Watson and Crick's basic claim is that
they have discovered a valid structure for the DNA molecule. Actually, there are
two claims here: one, that they have discovered the model; and, two, that it is a
valid model. My concern is the second claim, and the initial question is: what
facts do the authors offer to justify the validity of the double helix model? The
most direct answer to this question is contained in the penultimate paragraph:
The previously published X-ray data 5,6 on deoxyribose nucleic acid are insufficient for
a rigorous test of our structure. So far as we can tell, it is roughly compatible with the
experimental data, but it must be regarded as unproven until it has been checked
against more exact results.
Their model, they go on to say, "rests mainly though not entirely on published
experimental data and stereochemical arguments" (Watson and Crick, 1953,
737). If this is the case, if the model was not secured by facts, it was not so
much valid as it was veracious, not so much true as truthful. Being truthful
rather than true, of course, is not a detriment in the advancement of scientific
theory (or any other kind of theory); it is as much as the working of nature (and
human experience) will allow. The fidelity of Watson and Crick's model with
known data and relevant "laws" of chemistry had to be the initial most compell-
ing reason for belief in their proposal. Truthfulness is a value. It provides a good
reason to entertain or accept any theory.
The question with which this analysis began - what facts do the authors offer
to support the validity of the double helix model - must now be revised: what
arguments do the authors offer to support the truthfulness of the double helix
model? Their first argument was that the structure proposed by Linus Pauling
and R.B. Corey was "unsatisfactory." The underlying reason for their rejection
was that the Pauling-Corey model was not truthful; it violated chemical "laws"
and prior research. Their second argument was that the structure put forward by
Fraser was too "ill-defined" to warrant comment. Clearly, precision is a value
and lack of it is sufficient reason, a good reason, for rejecting ideas that are
supposed to be scientifically sound. After describing their model - verbally and
in diagram - Watson and Crick present an interlined argument to establish its
conformity with "laws" of chemistry and current research data. Here again, there
is an implication of a good reason: sound theory is in accord with prior
knowledge. Each of these lines of argument, it should be noted, is not a strict
logical demonstration, either inductive or deductive. Each is, however, a proper
deduction if one grants the premises on which it is grounded: good theory is
truthful (that of Pauling-Corey is not truthful, it should be rejected); good theory
is precise (Fraser's theory is not precise, it should be rejected); good theory is
confirmed by the best available theory and evidence (ours is, therefore, it should
be accepted). The "reasons" for believing, accepting Watson and Crick's
proposal, then, are good reasons, reasons informed by values: truthfulness°
precision, conformity with the best that is known, and the promise of useful
28 WALTERR. FISHER

results in further theory and research.

So far, the analysis of Watson and Crick's claim that they have produced a
truthful model of DNA has focused on facts and arguments, the usual concerns
of the logic associated with the rational world paradigm. The analysis, however,
differs from the traditional approach in that it has brought to the surface the role
of values in giving force to these facts and arguments. The stage is now set to
consider whether or not these values provide good reasons to support Watson
and Crick's basic contention. This consideration is not part of the assessment
process dictated by traditional logics, but it is integral to the system of evalua-
tion in the construct of narrative rationality. It is, moreover, I believe, impossible
to adhere to Watson and Crick's position without endorsing the values their
discourse (re)affirms. Particularly pertinent are questions of the appropriateness
(given the subject-matter) of the explicit and implicit values in the message; the
consequences of endorsing these values for the constitution of agents involved
in the enterprise (of science) and the vitality of the enterprise itself; and if the
values are those that are esteemed by significant actors in the enterprise.
Without reservation, truthfulness, precision, conformity to the best that is
known, and usefulness are values appropriate to the matter at hand; they are
conducive to the make-up of good scientists and the conduct of science; and
they are heralded by leaders throughout the discipline. They are, in fact, the
bedrock values that inform knowing and communicating in all of the sciences -
natural, social, and human. They are the stuff not only of good reasons but the
best of reasons - in scholarship.
It is worthy of note, however, that truthfulness, precision, conformity with
past knowledge, and usefulness are not sufficient values to constitute a praxial
consciousness. Even as they are definitive of the scholarly/scientific
mind/enterprise, they do not go beyond what exists, or what is thought to exist.
Even when tied to the traditional values of pragmatism - efficiency, workability,
and success - they do not fully inform the mind to the knowledge of whether.
The values that are necessary to this state of awareness are those that look not
only to the past and present, but also to the future, the future beyond the
immediate moment. These values include, as suggested earlier, justice, happi-
ness, and humanity. The bedrock value of praxial consciousness, I believe, is
love, that is, an abiding concern for the welfare and well-being of others. 3
An example of the difference between a mind oriented to the here and now, to
the technical means and values by which problems are to be solved in
laboratories and in society, and a mind that incorporates this sort of knowledge
with a compassion for the consequences of using this knowledge should help to
clarify my point. An engineer is commissioned to build a bridge; he or she is
thereby confronted with a technical problem which she or he is well equipped to
solve. The engineer knows the how and the that of the matter. The result is a
structurally sound bridge. The engineer imbued with a feeling for those who
would use the bridge, not only their safety but also their sense of the ecological
and aesthetic qualities of the bridge, would design it differently from the one
whose only concern was technical proficiency. The bridge would be built with
 RATIONALITYAND THE LOGICOF SCIENTIFICDISCOURSE 29

compassionate competence; put another way, it would be built with a concern

for the welfare and well-being of its users. The difference between the techni-
cally minded engineer and the technically proficient, praxially conscious
engineer comes down to a difference in their perceptions of audience; the former
has in mind a technical audience; the latter has in mind the same audience, but
sees it as part of a larger one - potentially all of humanity.
The final component in this analysis concerns the coherence of Watson and
Crick's presentation, another consideration left out in traditional logical
assessment. There is good reason to accept the presentation because it is
argumentatively-structurally sound. There is good reason to accept it because it
is also materially coherent, that is, it is consonant with other relevant stories that
relate to the matter, even as it supersedes them, becoming the story by which
those that follow it will be read and evaluated. And there is good reason to
accept it because it is characterologically credible. The voices of Watson and
Crick achieve authenticity through the good reasons they provide in content and
form. "A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid" is, in short, not only a
touchstone within its field, it is also a classic representation of scientific
discourse. It is so because it is coherent and has fidelity to the matter at hand.
The point of this analysis has been to show that the construct of narrative
rationality provides a more complete, adequate account of reason in discourse
than traditional logic. If successful, it has demonstrated that the logical appeal of
Watson and Crick's claim to have come up with a truthful model of DNA
involved much more than the facts and arguments they presented. The principal
revelation has been that values were the compelling force in their message,
determining even the persuasive power of their facts and arguments. One further
observation is suggested, if not warranted entirely, by this analysis: certainty
about factual or theoretical matters plays the same role in the natural sciences as
it does in the social and human sciences. 4 Each of these enterprises is sustained
by ongoing rhetorical transactions. When a particular discovery in any one of
them is confirmed by a relevant community of scholars, that particular line of
inquiry and the specific rhetorical transactions that produced it wither and die -
occasioning birth of new lines of inquiry and other specific rhetorical transac-
tions, some of which may eventually disconfirm the certainties of the past or
revive the original controversy in the language of the present. In any case,
certainty is hardly the culmination of intellectual curiosity; it is the commence-
ment or recommencement of a continuing desire to know and to understand.

CONCLUSION

In 1978, I concluded an essay with the following words: "Since the time of
Francis Bacon, knowledge has been conceived largely as power over people and
things. In my judgment, we have lost a sense of wisdom. To regain it, I think,
we need to reaffirm the place of value as a component of knowledge" (Fisher,
1978, 384). The present paper was written in this spirit. The narrative paradigm
30 WALTERR. FISHER

and narrative rationality are designed to reveal the role of values in reason and
action in order to restore a consciousness of whether in our conceptions of
knowledge, which inevitably imply a praxis (Toulmin, 1990, 68ff). Without a
sense of whether, knowledge of how and knowledge of that will continue to
dominate, stifling the humane concerns of happiness, justice, and humanity. We
know that the structure of D N A is a double helix. We know how it can be
altered. This knowledge is essential, but the question of whether D N A should be
manipulated persists - and the answer is beyond the province of what merely
exists.

NOTES

i The essential components of the narrative paradigm are: (1) Humans are essentially
storytellers. (2) The paradigmatic mode of human decision making and communication is
"good reasons," which vary in form among situations, genres, and media of communica-
tion. (3) The production and practice of good reasons are ruled by matters of history,
biography, culture, and character. (4) Rationality is determined by the nature of persons
as narrative beings - their awareness of narrative coherence, whether a story "hangs
together," and their constant habit of testing narrative fidelity, whether or not the stories
they experience ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives. (5) The
world as we know it is a set of stories that must be chosen among in order for us to live
life in a process of continual re-creation.
2 I consider character as an organized set of actional tendencies which are motivated by
certain values. The significance of character in rhetorical transactions is demonstrated by
an analysis of President Ronald Reagan's rhetoric (Fisher, 1989, 145-148).
3 The relationships between knowledge and love are explored extensively by Martha C.
Nussbaum in Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Nussbaum,
1990). One of her claims is that "certain truths about human life can only be fittingly and
accurately stated in the language and forms characteristic of the narrative artist"
(Nussbaum, 1990, 5). I agree with this claim but have gone beyond it to argue that a full
appreciation of all sorts of knowledge requires a narrative frame, the essential com-
ponents of which are delineated in endnote 1 and whose application and usefulness are,
hopefully, demonstrated in the present essay (and others previously published).
4 One may be troubled by the suggestion here that certainty is a feature of the social and
human sciences. What I am saying is this: conviction about verified "facts" and
conviction about the truthfulness of a given theory or paradigm affects the progress of all
sorts of scholarly inquiry. Beyond this, I would also note that the pursuit of certainty has
been persistent throughout the history of philosophy, religion, and science. As John
Dewey observed in The Quest for Certainty: "perfect certainty is what man wants"
(Dewey, 1988, 17). That the achievement has been less than this justifies the inquiry of
all who want to know, regardless of discipline.

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