Bulletin for the Council for British Research in the Levant

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Memories from Beersheba: The Bedouin Palestine

Police and the Frontiers of the Empire

Mansour Nasasra

To cite this article: Mansour Nasasra (2014) Memories from Beersheba: The Bedouin Palestine
Police and the Frontiers of the Empire, Bulletin for the Council for British Research in the Levant,
9:1, 32-38, DOI: 10.1179/1752726014Z.00000000023

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1179/1752726014Z.00000000023

Published online: 13 Nov 2014.

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Memories from Beersheba: The Bedouin Palestine Police and the Frontiers
of the Empire
Mansour Nasasra (Kenyon Institute); email: m.nsasra@kenyon-institute.org.uk

This article examines British-Southern Palestine Bedouin relations through the lens of collective
memory and oral history interviews. It argues that British Mandatory authorities achieved a greater
degree of control and stability in southern Palestine by incorporating Bedouin tribesmen into the
Palestine Police and strengthening the frontier of their empire. Without the Bedouin being employed
as mobile police forces, it would have been impossible to govern southern Palestine. However, there
were occasions when Bedouin police supported the actions of rebels, particularly during the Great
Revolt (1936–39). Nevertheless, the forces were rebuilt after the Revolt and they continued to be
crucial for maintaining control during the British Mandate.

Keywords: Naqab/Negev, Bedouin Palestine Police, Great Revolt 1936–39, Bedouin Camelry, Lord
Oxford

Introduction 95 tribes. A British census in 1922 put the number of

Over the past few years (as part of my PhD project
at the University of Exeter), I have conducted many
interviews with Bedouin from the Naqab who served
in the Bedouin Palestine Police during the British
Mandate. I also interviewed a number of British offi-
cials who served in Beersheba during the 1940s,
including the late Julian Asquith, who was known by
the Naqab Bedouin as Lord Oxford, and served as
the assistant district commissioner of Beersheba in
1943. These interviews, which tapped into their mem-
ories, tell us a lot about the experience of serving in
the Palestine Police in southern Palestine during the
British Mandate. As part of the research project, I
also investigated archives in England (including the
Military and the National Archives in London), and
consulted the personal diaries and papers of Lord
Oxford. This research provides new insights and
dimenstions to previous research on the Palestine
Police (e.g. Rogan 2007).
I argue that despite the fact that Bedouin police resis-
tance to British governance peaked during the Great
Revolt (1936–39), they played an important adminis-
trative role in managing Palestine’s southern district.
Without their influence in securing the borders of the
state, the Mandate could not have governed a region
dominated by a powerful Bedouin tribal society.
Bedouin at 71,115 individuals, and Muhsam and Al
Aref reckoned that by 1946 there were between 65,000
and 90,000 (Al Aref 1999; Musham 1996). The obser-
vation report of the Assistant Commissioner on
Special Duty, Jerusalem, noted in 1937, ‘the Bedu of
Beersheba are semi-pastoral and semi-agricultural.
These Beersheba Bedu, like other tent-dwellers of Pal-
estine, are regarded with contempt by the great tribes
of Arabia’ (PRO, CO 733/344/4).
The Beersheba Bedouin (‘urban al-saba’) dominated
one of the most strategic regions in the Middle East,
including its historical and archaeological sites. In
writing about the region in the 1930s, Major C. S.
Jarvis, the governor of Sinai, noted: ‘the principal
importance of the Negeb in Byzantine times was its
value as a trade route. Situated . . . between the Med-
iterranean and the Red Sea, and by land between
Palestine, Egypt and Syria, it was the key to three or
four of the most important trade routes of the Middle
East’ (PRO, FO 371/20885). He also spoke of six Byz-
antine towns that confirmed the Naqab’s historical
past, Khalasa, Reheibe, Auja, Sbeite, Abda and
Qurnub (PRO, FO371/61868). The Naqab and Beer-
sheba continued to be an important strategic region
under both the British Mandate and for Israel.

Establishing the Palestine Police for Securing the

The Indigenous Bedouin Tribes of Beersheba and
the Negev/Naqab
The Negev/Naqab region extends from Beersheba to
Aqaba, covers 12,577 sq km, and comprises half of
Mandatory Palestine. The indigenous Bedouin, who
populated the region for generations as pastoral semi-
nomads, belonged to nine leading tribal confedera-
tions: Tiyaha, Zullam, Tarabin, ‘Azazme, Hanajreh,
Jbarat, Sa’idiyeen, Aheiwat, and Jahalin. In 1914,
under Ottoman rule, Bedouin tribes included around
55,000 people.
During the British Mandate, Bedouin numbers were
estimated at around 65,000–100,000, divided into
© Council for British Research in the Levant 2014
Frontiers of the Empire
When Allenby occupied Palestine in 1917, there was
a security vacuum in some regions, including Beer-
sheba. Since the Ottomans had abandoned their mil-
itary and administrative centre, a system of order and
policing was needed immediately for the stability of
southern Palestine. The key method adopted by the
British mandate authorities was through the Palestine
Bedouin camelry police, or Hajjaneh. Britain’s policies
of establishing a police force and wireless posts was
not unique to Palestine. During the 1920s, the British
worked a lot with Bedouin tribes, for example in Iraq
and Transjordan, and wireless points were extended
as part of their control system. The Ottomans also
DOI: 10.1179/1752726014Z.00000000023
 CBRL Bulletin 2014 vol 9
had adopted a similar policy of building police posts
in Transjordan, based on mounted gendarmes, mainly
for securing towns and patrolling countryside and
trade routes.
The Palestine Police force was created in July 1921,
with the overall aim of stabilizing the region, and
meeting security requirements. A full secret report
from Jerusalem in 1939 entitled ‘Memorandum
regarding a gendarmerie of a semi-military force for
Palestine’ attributed the foundation of the Palestine
Police to British efforts to settle riots and disorder:
‘in 1921 serious racial riots took place in Palestine,
and in consequence it was decided to raise both a
police force, for normal police work, and a gendar-
merie, for the presentation of the frontiers and main-
tenance of internal security’ (PRO, WO106/5720).
Through my research, I found that the police played
a central role in creating order in different areas of
Palestine, including the Beersheba region.
Once established, the gendarmerie included 63 offi-
cers and 1247 others ranks, of which two-thirds were
British. Later on, in 1926, the Arab portion of the
police was increased (PRO, WO 106/5720). Colonel
Alan Saunders was the Inspector General of the Pal-
estine Police Force, and was succeeded by Captain
Rymer Jones of the Metropolitan Police. The Palestine
Police included former members of the British gen-
darmerie, Jewish officers who were responsible for
securing settlements in remote places, as well as a
Bedouin camel corps section, wireless operators and
mounted police—all of them important components
of the police force. British archival reports include
details of proposals for recruiting Sudanese and other
minorities such as Circassians for the Palestine Police,
but these were not followed up (PRO, WO 106/5720).
The missions of the Palestine Police included patrol-
ling Arab villages and providing defence garrisons
for Jewish settlements, as well as maintaining public
security. Protecting tax collectors and distributing
government notices were also key missions, and the
Turkish gendarmes in Transjordan were given similar
missions. Following the recommendations of Sir
Charles Tegart, a police chief, Palestine Police posts
were distributed in central towns and villages almost
everywhere in Palestine, with around 90 posts in
remote desert areas in southern Palestine (Horne
1982, 37). In some locations, the Palestine Police
occupied and used former Ottoman buildings.
The Palestine Police/Bedouin Camelry in the
Beersheba Region
In the Naqab and Beersheba specifically, the Bedouin
were mainly recruited to the Palestine Police in
camel corps and mobile police positions. Malcolm
MacDonald, then Colonial Secretary, maintained that
southern Palestine was entirely policed by Bedouin
camelry PRO, CO 733/390/1). The Mandate employed
88 Bedouin police from the Beersheba region and
33
Fig. 1: Kurnub police post. Lord Oxford papers, Somerset,
reproduced with permission ©
Gaza in various police posts (Lord Oxford personal
papers, Somerset, UK), distributed throughout the
Naqab region, including ‘Asluj and Auja Al Hafir,
Kurnub, Khalasa, ‘Ayn Husb, ‘Ayn Ghadhyan, Tal el
Malah and Beersheba. Wireless telephones were
maintained to connect the posts with Beersheba
(interview with Suleiman Sbayeh Abu Rabia, Kseifa,
2009). In 1921, a very experienced former military
officer, Hassan Faiz al-Idrissi, was appointed to the
Camel Corps in Beersheba as the first Sub-Inspector.
For recruiting Bedouin to the Palestine Police in the
Beersheba region, the British relied on the tribal chiefs
(sheikhs) as their main contacts with the tribes. The
most striking form of collaboration between the Bed-
ouin and the British could be found in the Palestine
Police as part of the Hajjaneh, the Bedouin camelry.
Leading Bedouin sheikhs were encouraged to send
their boys to join the mobile police forces (interview
with Suleiman Sbayeh Abu Rabia and Hajj Salih Al
Nasasrah, Kseifa, June 2010).
Most of the Bedouin who enrolled in the police
underwent intensive training courses for working as
policemen or wireless operators in the service of the
Mandate. According to elderly Bedouin, some had
been sent to Jerusalem to continue their wireless
studies for several months, while the police members
were sent to a special training school (Palestine Police
Depot Training School) that was established in Jeru-
salem in 1921. Suleiman Sbayeh Abu Rabia explained,
‘after we finished the course with the other Bedouin
boys, we were sent back to the Naqab to be employed
by the British as wireless operators and border police
in multiple police centres distributed in the Naqab.
I was employed in Umm Rashrash, now Eilat, until
the 1948 war’ (interview with Suleiman Sbayeh Abu
Rabia, Kseifa, 2009).
The main mission of the Bedouin police was to carry
out special assignments in the desert and to patrol
the borders. The Hajjaneh Bedouins were employed
in various ways—to police remote sites, reduce
34 CBRL Bulletin 2014 vol 9
Fig. 2: One of the remaining Palestine Police Camelry, Hajjaneh, points east of the Bedouin town of Rahat ‘Wadi Al Zballah’ in the
Naqab. Photo: M. Nasasra, summer 2008
Fig 3: Atiya Ibn Rabia, a member of the Bedouin Palestine
Police from eastern Beersheba. Lord Oxford papers, Somerset,
reproduced with permission ©
cross-border economic activities, act as trackers,
and serve as wireless operators. Enforcing law and
maintaining order, including overseeing the frontiers
of Palestine, were significant duties for the Bedouin
police. As Lord Oxford said:
My main mission was to maintain security and
order, trying to put an end to tribal disputes
over land, honour and blood feuds. I worked
very closely with the Bedouin Palestine Police;
one of them was my personal guard. Without
the Bedouin being employed as mobile police
forces and for security issues, it would be
impossible to govern the Bedouin and maintain
order. The British Mandate laws did not work
sometimes for the Bedouin, so we preferred to
use the Bedouin for security missions in order
to keep them happy. Bedouin saw that to be
employed by the British gave them high status
among the tribes. This policy encouraged more
Bedouin sheikhs to send their boys to join the
mobile police forces.
This was an effective tactic in helping to secure Brit-
ish power in the Naqab desert, since only the Bedouin
were familiar with the desert, its valleys and routes.
This was the indigenous Bedouin’s advantage which
the imperial power lacked.
The Bedouin Police and Their Role in Beersheba
Region during the Great Revolt, 1936–1939
In securing frontier areas under their rule, the British
also maintained the relationship between Transjor-
dan, Sinai and Beersheba Bedouin by recruiting them
to the Palestine Bedouin Police. As Gawain Bell wrote,
‘The camel corps co-operated magnificently with their
counterparts in the Sinai police to the west and the
Arab Legion desert patrols commanded by Major J.
B. Glubb in the east’ (Horne 1982, 408). In his opinion,
 CBRL Bulletin 2014 vol 9
Fig 4: The Bedouin Police Corp of Glubb Pasha. Lord Oxford papers, Somerset, reproduced with permission ©
‘We needed to re-establish a working liaison with
the neighbouring Trans-Jordanian tribes and the Arab
Legion which had a post at Aqaba and another at
Gharandal half way up the Wadi Araba (Bell 1983,
104). Cooperation between the Palestine Police and
Glubb Pasha of the Arab Legion was essential to
keep tribes on both sides of the borders under control
(Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings
College—London, O’Connor 3/4/31). In fact, British
officials reckoned that Glubb Pasha had recruited
Bedouin from Beersheba for the Legion (interview
with Lord Oxford, June 2009).
The highest level of cooperation between mandate
officials in Palestine and Transjordan occurred during
the Palestinian revolt (1936–1939). According to
British reports from July 1936 (Treasury Chambers,
London), local officials were paying subsidies and
monthly allowances to a significant number of lead-
ing Bedouin tribal sheikhs in Transjordan to prevent
the revolt spreading to the tribal population in Tran-
sjordan. The amounts paid reached £10,000 (PRO, CO
831/39/14). As a Bedouin interviewee put it:
The Bedouin rebels made real problems for the
British Mandate in Beersheba region. Some Bed-
ouin joined Palestinian rebels in the 1936–1939
Arab revolt, attacking the British bases in Beer-
sheba. Eid Al Sane, one of the most famous
and well-remembered of Bedouin rebel leaders
in the Naqab, was one dominant figure. A group
of Bedouin fighters gathered around him during
the Arab Revolt, and their main military activi-
ties included attacking British troops, exploding
British military bases, and recruiting Bedouin
rebels for other actions (interview with Sheikh
Abu Srihan, Tel al Saba’, 2009).
35
As a result, creating order during the great revolt was
one of the main challenges faced by the mandate
authorities in different districts, including southern
Palestine. In this regard, both the military and the
police played an important part in imposing curfews
and targeting rebels. Large British forces, including
army, navy and police, were deployed to Palestine
for suppressing the revolt, during which brutal tor-
ture methods were used against the Palestinian rebels
by both the army and the Palestine Police. I found
plenty of archival evidence on the use of the Palestine
Police, including the Bedouin camelry, for restoring
order in Palestine.
According to British archival reports, however, the
fact that the Palestine Police included both Palestin-
ians and Jews made it difficult to trust them with
normal duties against rebels. As a 1939 report stated,
‘neither the Arab nor Jewish personnel could be com-
pletely trusted where certain action against their own
compatriots was involved. Thus, incidents occurred
of Arab police betrayal details of future operations to
the rebels, while a number of Jewish police were
found to be active members of illegal organizations,
some of them of a revolutionary character’ (PRO,
WO 106/5720). Palestinian police were perceived as
somewhat unreliable in completing their missions for
imposing order (Kolinsky 1993, 93), and as a result,
were not very effective during the revolt. However,
Arab policemen were also often targeted and accused
of participating in crushing the rebels and cooperat-
ing with the mandate authorities. For example, the
British deployed Bedouin camelry for settling riots
and restoring order, for example in the 1933 riots in
Jaffa when around 20 police camel corps were brought
specially from the Beersheba region.
36 CBRL Bulletin 2014 vol 9
Police posts everywhere in Palestine were targeted
by the rebels. In southern Palestine, most of the
Palestine Bedouin Police left their posts during the
revolt after being targeted by rebels, while other
Bedouin police stayed in their region and helped the
rebels to seize the posts. In other parts of Palestine,
police posts were destroyed by rebel leaders such as
Eissa al-Battat, a regional Palestinian commander
(interview with Sheikh Hassan, Beersheba, 2012). As
a result of being unable to secure their posts or defeat
the rebels attacking Beersheba, most of the camelry
left their posts and went back to their tribes (interview
with ‘Awad Blal, Beersheba, 2010).
Despite being an effective force in maintaining order
and security in southern Palestine, the Palestine Police
failed to defend Beersheba, and in September 1938
the main city of the Naqab fell into rebel hands and
the main police headquarter station in Beersheba
was taken from the British. Palestinian rebels, joined
by Bedouin tribes, managed to occupy Beersheba in
1938, a significant step towards the temporary defeat
of the colonial power.
Re-establishing the Bedouin Police in the
Beersheba Region
During the Great Revolt, police posts and Palestin-
ian/Bedouin camelry policemen in the Beersheba
region and elsewhere were targeted by angry Pales-
tinian rebels. British officials made significant efforts
to re-establish the Bedouin police and camelry and
restore order, and immediately after the revolt they
set about repairing the damage. Police chief Tegart
also recommended overhauling and reforming the
police system. Although the Bedouin police had not
been very effective in maintaining security and order,
the mandate authorities put significant amounts of
money into re-establishing them, and straight away
began recruiting Bedouin for a reconstructed police
force.
According to proposals submitted by the High
Commissioner of Palestine, the aim after the revolt
was to re-create ‘a former force of camelry which [had
been] withdrawn and reduced when resistance to
the forces of the government became so intense that
camelry in isolated posts were no longer secure’
(PRO, CO 733/390/1).
As noted by Lord Oxford, re-establishment of the
Bedouin gendarmerie involved close cooperation
with Glubb Pasha and other British officers in the
Legion. The task of overseeing the reconstitution of
the Bedouin camel gendarmerie police in the Beer-
sheba region and the re-opening of the destroyed
police posts was given to Sir Gawain Bell (Bell 1983,
104). Bell was an Assistant District Commissioner
with an excellent knowledge of Arabic, and was
transferred to Beersheba in June 1938 (PRO, CO
733/390/1. According to his post-revolt assessment,
a number of camelry posts needed attention, includ-
ing Ain Hosb, commanding the road from Beersheba
to Wadi Araba, which had had been destroyed and
abandoned, as had the gendarmerie posts of Asluj,
Auja al-Hafir and Um Rash-Rash on the Sinai frontier
(Bell 1983, 105–106).
The High Commissioner recommended strengthen-
ing the existing camelry to include 13 non-
commissioned officers and 72 constables, and
attaching another nine wireless operators to the
camelry. Four outposts would be re-established: Ain
Hosb, Um Rash Rash, Auja al Hafir and Asluj, and a
small patrol post set up in Tal el-Milh. The two posts
in Imara and Jammama would be re-opened, despite
a possible increase in overall costs, and four desert
vehicles would be attached to the force to support the
camelry.
The rebuilding work took four months and was com-
pleted in March 1940 at a total cost of 4,183 Palestin-
ian Pounds (£P or LP (livres)) (PRO, CO 733/390/1).
Once the posts were secure, Alan Saunders, Inspector
General of Police, supplied the gendarmerie with
arms. Some of the police who had served before the
revolt were re-recruited, and the camelry were care-
fully selected for fitness and tribal connections.
Training for the gendarmerie took place in Beersheba,
and the police headquarters, as in pre-revolt days,
would remain in Beersheba.
In 1946, the Government of Palestine’s Forestry
Department undertook a fact-finding survey of the
southern region, involving census-taking and obser-
vations of historical sites. From Jerusalem the officers
reported that various posts, including Ain Husb and
Kurnub, were operating normally, as previously.
They also passed on the names of experienced Bed-
ouin frontier police who had returned to serve in Ain
Husb and Kurnub and whose views they had heard
about the history of the region. As Lord Oxford noted,
some of those working in Ain Husb had previously
been enrolled in the Arab Legion with Glubb Pasha
(Lord Oxford Personal Diaries of Camelry inspection,
Somerset, UK), indicating another form of coopera-
tion between the Bedouin camelry in Beersheba and
the Arab Legion. Following reorganization, including
methods of discipline, the camelry were subject to
close scrutiny, and by reporting about them, and
referring to their outstanding intelligence, energy
and abilities, Lord Oxford confirmed their efficiency
and competence (Lord Oxford Personal Diaries of
Cemelry Inspection, Somerset, UK).
Despite the end of the mandatory era in Palestine in
1948, Lord Oxford confirmed that the Bedouin who
had served in the camelry remained in close contact
with their British officers after 1948. Letters from
Atiya Eid Ben Rabia, who lived in Hebron, stated that
some of the Bedouin camelry had moved to different
regions including Aqaba, Amman, Gaza, and Rafah
 CBRL Bulletin 2014 vol 9
Fig 5: After the re-establishment of the Bedouin police, touring the frontier area, in Wadi Murra, 1943. Lord Oxford papers,
Somerset, reproduced with permission ©
and that only a few of them remained in the Beer-
sheba area. Atiya even provided a list of camelry
names and reported about them to Lord Oxford (in
a letter from Atiya Ben Rabia to Lord Oxford, Hebron,
March 1955, Lord Oxford papers, Somerset, UK).
Other letters were sent from Bedouin camelry who
had moved to Jordan, recalling the ‘old good days’
of serving under British officials (Farid Saad Jumaa’
letter to Lord Oxford, Amman, 1950, Lord Oxford
papers, Somerset, UK).
Conclusion
In reviewing the Bedouin-British relationship as
illuminated by these interviews and archives together,
it seems that the British policies of incorporating the
Bedouin into different governmental positions, and
avoiding any clashes with their tribal structures,
contributed significantly to the contemporary stabil-
ity of the region. By integrating the Bedouin in the
Palestine Police (the Bedouin Hajjaneh, or camel-
mounted border patrol), the British authorities
managed to stabilize the frontier of their empire. The
Bedouin mobile forces became essential to securing
the southern district of Palestine. However, despite
the stable relationship with the British authorities, the
participation of the Bedouin police in the Great Revolt
(1936–1939) is one of the dominant forms of resistance
used by the Bedouin against the British Mandate in
Beersheba region.
Acknowledgements
I would especially like to thank the late Lord Oxford
(Julian Asquith) and his family for allowing me to
consult and present here insights and images from
their private archives, papers and albums.
37
References
Al Aref, Aref (1999) Tarikh‘ Bir Al- Saba’ wa Qabailuha [History
of Beersheba and Its Tribes]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbouli.
Bell, Gawain (1983) Shadows on the Sand: The Memoirs of Sir
Gawain Bell. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
Horne, E.B.E.M. (1982) A Job Well Done (Being a History of the
Palestine Police Force 1920–1948). Essex: Palestine Police Old
Comrades Benevolent Association.
Kolinsky, Martin (1993) Law, Order and Riots in Mandatory
Palestine, 1928–35. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
Musham, H.V. (1966) Beduin of the Negev. Jerusalem: Jerusalem
Academic Press Ltd.
Rogan, E. (2007) The Palestine Police Oral History Project. The
Middle East Centre, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford.
Bulletin of the Council for British Research in the Levant 2, 35–40.
Diaries and Archives
Lord Oxford Personal Diaries of Camelry inspection, Somerset,
UK
Public Records Office at Kew GARDENS-PRO (London,
England)
CO - Colonial Office Papers
FO - Foreign Office Papers
WO - War Office Papers
Military Archives, Kings College, London
Notes on Contributor
Mansour Nasasra is a scholar of International Relations and
Middle East Politics. Before joining the Kenyon Institute in
38 CBRL Bulletin 2014 vol 9
Jerusalem, Mansour was a Lecturer in Middle East Politics
and Conflict Resolution at the Department of Politics,
University of Exeter, where he also completed a PhD in Politics
in 2011. His research focuses on how the dynamics of power
and state-building influence the ways minorities in the
Middle East interact with the state. His doctoral research
examined the Naqab Bedouin history, particularly under the
British Mandate and Israeli military rule. His book (to be
published by Columbia University Press) produces a narrative
of Bedouin history 1900–1967 through the use of Bedouin oral
history, alongside Israeli and British archives. He is also a co-
editor, with Sophie Richter-Devroe, Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder
and Richard Ratcliffe, of The Naqab Bedouin and Colonialism:
New Perspectives (Routledge, 2014). The forthcoming journal
paper, ‘Ruling the Desert: Ottoman and British Policies
towards the Bedouin of the Naqab and Transjordan Region,
1900–1948’ will be published in the British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies.