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research-article2017
WFRXXX10.1177/1946756717708913World Futures ReviewEditorial
Editorial
Four Essays and One Book
In this issue, we feature works by seven authors
on a variety of theoretical, methodological,
and pedagogical matters of concern to anyone
interested in understanding and using futures
studies. One of the goals of the World Futures
Review (WFR) is to highlight the work of peo-
ple and places that have been at the very fore-
front of futures studies from the beginning—as
well as to spotlight the activities of scholars
and practitioners new to the field.
“Futures Studies in Hungary,” by Erzsébet
Nováky, Éva Hideg, and Klára Szita Tóthné,
traces the outstanding pioneering futures work
done in Hungary from the earliest days to the
present. Reading it brings back very fond memo-
ries of when I first had a chance to engage with so
many outstanding Hungarian futurists on their
home turf during a conference on “Technology of
the Future and its Social Implications” in
Budapest, Hungary, September 1987. I then vis-
ited Hungary several times in preparation for and
attendance during the outstanding XIth World
Conference of the World Futures Studies
Federation, in Budapest, May 1990. My paper
for the 1987 conference had been titled, “Hanging
on the Hinge of History.” By 1990, that title was
a bit more prophetic than even I imagined at the
time I presented it.
“Baseline Analysis: The Epistemology of
Scenario Support” is by the founder of one of
the major academic programs in the United
States devoted to futures studies—Peter Bishop
of the Foresight Graduate Program of the
University of Houston, Texas. Dr. Bishop’s
essay is focused entirely on one of the central
issues in futures studies—the utility—indeed,
validity—of predictions of single, most-likely
futures versus the forecast of an array of alterna-
tive futures. As a strong advocate of the neces-
sity of evaluating many alternative images of
futures before attempting to envision and create
preferred futures, this is a piece that I read with
World Futures Review
2017, Vol. 9(2) 65­–71
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great interest from a person I have loved and
admired for many years. I strongly disagree
with many of the statements Dr. Bishop makes
here when characterizing the field. I think he
overstates the convictions and differences too
starkly.
Bishop’s main point, that he repeats fre-
quently, is that each of the alternative futures is
based on “assumptions” and not on “evidence.”
As he says, “Anyone’s GBN matrix is just about
as good as anyone else’s. Anyone’s fixed sce-
nario archetypes (e.g., best case, worst case,
muddling through, transformation) are about as
useful as the next one.” While Bishop does not
specifically say he is referring to the four alterna-
tive generic images of the futures of the so-called
“Manoa School,” and because only one of the
four types he lists, “transformation,” is also one
of the Manoa School’s four generic images, per-
haps he has something else in mind. But as the
four Manoa images are, indeed, thought to be
“fixed archetypes”—generic—perhaps he does.
If so, he is mistaken. Bishop seems to fail to
notice that the Manoa School’s four generic
futures are images of the future, beliefs people
hold and express about “the future.” They are
four alternative images of the future, not four
different futures. Moreover, these four images
are empirically based on “evidence”: they
resulted from the longtime, continuing collec-
tion and analysis of actually existing images of
the future. They are the result of an attempt to
reduce to a manageable, essential few, the huge
number of images of the futures that actually
exist in the thoughts, statements, and images of
the futures that different people hold (often
holding contradictory images of the futures
about themselves personally, for example, and
their community). I continually go to great
lengths to make it clear that the four generic
images we use are empirically based. I did not
make up the four categories. Moreover, I
66 World Futures Review 9(2)
typically include empirical evidence for each
of them in anything I publish based on the four
generic images. For example, see the refer-
ences supporting each of the four images of the
futures here (Bengston et al. 2016). While the
specific form of each image is our creation, the
“facts” contained in each form, and the under-
lying logic of each, are based on that of each
archetype and/or the specific references cited.
We insist that people we work with consider
the four images because real, serious, scholarly
(and/or practical) humans believe one or the
other of the four images correctly captures “the
future,” as they understand it, and that we, as
futurists, cannot chose one as being correct,
while instructing our students or clients to
ignore the other three. We feel we have an ethi-
cal, professional obligation to require people
to consider all four images seriously by exam-
ining one version of the “evidence” presented
by advocates of each of the four, and then
either concluding for themselves which is cor-
rect, if they wish to play God, or, preferably,
devising preferred futures that seek to be
robust over all four futures, and not just one.
Bishop makes a strong case for considering
only “the most probable” future, but I, like
Herman Kahn (whom he quotes), insist that past
history makes clear that “the most likely future
isn’t” and so most likely “won’t” be either. So, to
be safe, we should consider futures that other
people feel are “most probable,” too.
Continuing the theme of “facts” and “evi-
dence,” “Report on a Study of Counterfacts as a
Futures Research Technique for Forecasting
Future Global Developments” is written by a
relative (but not absolute) newcomer to futures
studies, Mariana Todorova, a futurist in Bulgaria
and a member of the National Assembly, together
with another pioneer in the field, Ted Gordon, a
member of RAND in the early 1960s, founder of
The Futures Group in 1971, and a key affiliate of
Jerry Glenn’s Millennium Project now.
In the current environment of contested
facts and “alternative facts,” their data, relying
on a survey-based exploratory study of “coun-
terfacts,” raise some very important questions
about where evidence for matters of great
importance for the future—but of little or no
importance in the present—might be found.
For example, how many futurists a decade ago
“predicted” that Donald Trump (or someone
very much like him) would be elected presi-
dent of the United States as a Republican?
Indeed, how many are willing even now to
accept that such an election did, in fact, hap-
pen—that it is not a dark dream from which we
soon will awaken?
The report by Todorova and Gordon can be
read as a counterbalance to that of Peter Bishop.
It is also a treatise on what I call “emerging
issues” (or that they and others call “Black
Swans”)—and certainly it exemplifies part of the
rationale behind “Dator’s Second Law of the
Futures,” which is that “any useful idea about the
futures should appear to be ridiculous.”
Finally, Dennis Morgan’s “Conducting an
Innovations/Issues Change Tracking and
Forecasting Term Project in an Undergraduate
Futures Studies Course” describes the experi-
ence of an absolute newcomer to futures stud-
ies who introduced a futures course into his
teaching at Hankuk University of Foreign
Studies, in Korea. Morgan shows that he relied
heavily and well on pedagogical examples
from scholars teaching futures courses at many
universities around the world. His example
should provide guidance and courage to others
who wish to enter the field without prior for-
mal academic training in futures studies.
In addition, for the first time, I will use this
editorial as an opportunity to review a book
that deserves special attention from futurists
old and new, and the general public alike.
The book is The Future: A Very Short
Introduction by Jennifer M. Gidley (Gidley
2017), president of the World Futures Studies
Federation (WFSF), and an absolutely splen-
did book it is. As it is part of the Oxford
University Press’s vast Very Short Introduction
series, it is physically quite small in size. The
font size is tiny as well—not quite small
enough to have published the book on the head
of a pin, but pretty close to it. The page count
is small as well—138 pages of text and 164
overall. But its contents are huge—there is a
lot of information packed into this small, valu-
able book.
In the very front of the book, there are seven
pages of titles that are published in the Oxford
Editorial 67
Very Short Introduction series on every possi-
ble subject—except futures. Dr. Gidley’s book
is the only one on futures. Indeed, I could not
find even one other that was clearly devoted to
some kind of a futures-oriented theme.
My son, Mack, caught a glimpse of me
reading the book and exclaimed, “Dad! The
title is The Future!! Wha . . . ?” He was
speechless.
I do not know what the reaction of Peter
Bishop was on seeing the title, but as many
futurists (and their families) know, “The
Future” does not exist. Rather, many images of
alternative futures do. I knew that Dr. Gidley
most certainly was aware of this, and so I was
puzzled by how she could possibly have
allowed the title of such an important book to
imply a singular future. One of the very first
things I did before committing to becoming
editor of the World Future Review was to get
the managing editor of Sage to agree to change
the title to World Futures Review. The editor
not only immediately agreed with no resis-
tance whatsoever, but also the title was, indeed,
changed as promised at the first opportunity.
The mystery of the title of Gidley’s book is
not solved until page 44, where, under the sub-
tle subtitle, “The Urge to Predict the Future,”
she explains why the title is singular:
It was initially a challenge for me to accept the
publisher’s suggestion [sic?] to use the singular
form: future. On reflection, I took the challenge
as it enables me to clarify how the concept of a
singular future is inherently power-laden,
and she does, indeed, spend a great deal of
space making clear that the futures are plural,
open, and possible, and not singular, predeter-
mined, and inevitable.
Indeed, Dr. Gidley makes this clear at the
very beginning of the book when she mentions
the WFSF (pp. 7–8). Unfortunately, she did not
have the space, I assume, to give my favorite
example of how the matter is truly “inherently
power-laden.”
One of the original reasons for the creation
of the WFSF in the late 1960s–early 1970s was
to provide a place where people from all sides
of the Iron Curtain could meet and talk safely
about futures that were better than the present
for everyone. After several preliminary confer-
ences in Oslo, Kyoto, and Paris, a world con-
ference was held in Bucharest, Romania (a
socialist country), where a committee drafted
the constitution for WFSF. I was on the draft-
ing committee. In the room where we worked
were not our usual fellow futurists from the
Soviet Union (such as Igor Bestuzhev-Lada),
but rather a person we did not know who
looked like he was a stereotypical “secret
agent” from Hollywood Central Casting, com-
plete with overcoat and hat, chain-smoking
foul-smelling cigarettes.
He said never a word while the rest of us pas-
sionately discussed the words and paragraphs of
the constitution for what we agreed (with no dis-
cussion there that I recall) would be named The
World Futures Studies Federation—a federation
of groups and people around the world engaged
in futures studies.
Somehow, I was asked to present the draft
constitution to the members of the Conference as
a whole for their debate, modification, and ulti-
mate approval. I had gotten only a few para-
graphs into that task when the person from the
Soviet Union raced down the center aisle of the
auditorium, leapt to the stage, brushed me aside,
and (stopping short of doing an imitation of
Khrushchev banging his shoe on the podium)
began shouting—“Future, future! There is only
one future—that of Communism! There are no
futures! Change the name or no person from any
socialist country can become part of this
organization!”
Because one of the main goals of the WFSF
was to be a place where all peoples of the
world could meet and discuss the futures with-
out regard for their ideology, religion, culture,
ethnicity, or gender, we dutifully agreed to
erase the “s” wherever it appeared in the docu-
ment, and so WFSF began as the World Future
Studies Federation.
As I happened to be president of the WFSF
when the Berlin Wall fell, I quietly and without
consulting anyone put the “s” back in, and we
have been the World Futures Studies Federation
ever since.
Gidley’s book proceeds in a straightforward
manner, in six cleverly titled chapters, a short
68 World Futures Review 9(2)
conclusion, a helpful appendix, which is a
“global futures timeline,” references, and fur-
ther readings and websites.
Chapter 1 is exactly what the title states: a
summary of “Three Thousand Years of Futures.”
Chapter 2, titled “The Future Multiplied,” dis-
cusses the title of the book, why there is this
“urge to predict the future,” and the emergence
among those who devote themselves largely to
the study of ideas and actions about things to
come that, while “prediction” of a single future is
impossible, “forecasting” of many alternative
futures and “envisioning and designing” of pre-
ferred futures is possible and necessary.
In chapter 2, Gidley captures the essence of
the origins and evolution of the social sciences
and of futures studies very well, including
many of the variations of alternative futures
theories and methods within the futures field.
Chapter 3, “The Evolving Scholarship of
Futures Studies,” extends and deepens our
understanding of the academic and applied
aspects of the field.
Gidley correctly notes that while futurists and
“the future” seem to be everywhere now, enjoy-
ing a new spurt of popularity, our social, political,
economic, and cultural structures still force
almost everyone to think and act narrowly in the
very short term, often meaning today and not
even tomorrow, much less next year or twenty
years hence. Perhaps, as a consequence, many
things still seem to move from worse to still
worse because of our lack of consistently applied
broad and long-range foresight.
In these three chapters, her summary of the
long history of ideas about time, the future,
preferred futures, utopias and dystopias, prog-
ress and chaos, to planning, she skillfully
weaves many resources into a fluid, coherent
narrative. She offers an excellent summary of a
long and complicated story, endeavoring with
considerable success to be global and multicul-
tural, not just western-centric in the telling as
so many tellings of the tale often are.
In my editorial for Vol. 9, No. 1 of WFR, an
issue entirely devoted to essays about “Time
and Futures Studies,” I criticized many futur-
ists for failing to make a critical analysis of the
most basic concepts in the field: “time” and
“future.” I certainly cannot make this criticism
of Gidley. To the contrary, she provides excel-
lent if necessarily brief discussions of time
(pp. 10–22, 77–80, and 108). I hope that she
will expand on these ideas in a contribution for
the next issue of WFR on “Time and Futures
Studies.”
Chapter 4, “Crystal Balls, Flying Cars, and
Robots,” discusses some of the common tropes
in the media about futures studies that most
infuriate its serious scholars and practitioners.
Even after having been briefed by futurists on
what futures studies is and is not, many stories
about the field in the popular media persist in
repeating the same old stereotypes over and
over: where are your crystal balls? Where are
the flying cars? Would you allow your daugh-
ter to marry a robot? All designed to make the
field seem misguided and frivolous.
I am looking forward to reading other
reviews of Gidley’s book to see if and how
they exhibit these tendencies, as some almost
certainly will.
This is bad enough in the popular media, but
when futurists read the work of otherwise serious
scholars who have somehow decided to turn their
attention to “the future,” we discover they also
often write in complete ignorance of the field, in
spite of its seventy-five-year-old history as a seri-
ous academic discipline and applied field, with
its conferences, journals, academic programs,
consulting firms, blogs, and websites. Not only
am I editor of WFR, but I have served for many
years as a reviewer of manuscripts for almost all
of the major academic journals in the futures
field. As such, I constantly am obliged to read
papers written by people who wish to publish in
these journals but who have not read a single
scholarly paper on the subject—even in the jour-
nal in which they wish to publish! At best, they
refer to only one or two very well-known popular
futurists, but typically they cite no one but them-
selves. I cannot imagine this happening to
reviewers for history, philosophy, psychology,
biology, or physics journals, but willful refusal to
engage in futures research before writing about
“the future” is rampant in the halls of academe.
Gidley suggests that part of the problem
might, indeed, be that the existence of journals
specializing in futures isolates discussions of
the futures in our own little silo (p. 82). I
Editorial 69
wonder if that matters anymore. Do not people
search the Internet by subject matter, and so
find material wherever it is? Does anyone read
specific subject-matter journals only? Does
anyone read journals at all? These are issues
that I discussed with the Sage editors before I
took over this job.
In chapter 5, “Technotopian or Human-
Centered Futures,” Gidley addresses one of the
many differences of values and opinion within
the futures field—the role of technology vis-à-
vis humanity.
First of all, in so doing, Gidley makes it
clear that, unlike many academic areas, the
discussion of ethical, moral, cultural, and other
values is not only permitted, but also encour-
aged in futures studies. While some scholars
under the broad umbrella of futures studies
may choose to attempt to be “value free” in
their work, many—I would say most—under-
stand that this is probably not only impossible,
but also not desirable. One of the major points
of futures studies is to envision and create
“preferred futures,” and what is one person’s
preference may be another person’s worst
nightmare. Many futurists acknowledge and
embrace this fact as important features of the
field.
Near the end of the book, Gidley provoca-
tively defines futures studies as “the art and
science of taking responsibility for the long-
term consequences of our decisions and actions
today” (p. 136).
This definition makes clear that futures stud-
ies typically are profoundly values-based. While
most futurists attempt to be fair, they do not and
should not shrink from being, and urging the
people they work with to be, “aspirational”—to
use the word guiding the futures work of the
Institute for Alternative Futures. Different futur-
ists and futures groups work from and toward dif-
ferent values, and often take potshots at other
futurists with differing values—as perhaps I have
done above with Peter Bishop. This is absolutely
acceptable. It has characterized the field from the
beginning from Johan Galtung, Robert Jungk,
and Eleonora Masini (and many others) through
Alvin Toffler and John Naisbitt (and many oth-
ers) to Herman Kahn and the Heritage Foundation
(and many others who often have been far more
influential in actually impacting policies toward
their preferred futures than were any in the first
two groups I mentioned).
Gidley’s view of the relationship between
technology and humanity is starkly revealed in
chapter 5, “Techno Dehumanization,” she calls
it. In this regard, she shows that she is more on
what might be called the “spiritual” end of the
futures spectrum than I am. She sees much
technology as dehumanizing.
I see all technology as rehumanizing; as
mutating; that, as Buckminster Fuller put it, we
are not human beings but human becomings. As
I have tried to make clear in many places, most
recently in Mutative Media (Dator et al. 2014), I
have concluded that human values are derived in
part from biology, culture, and technology, and in
part from the behavior that our biology, culture,
and technology enables or thwarts. However,
new technologies typically allow new behavior
that challenges old values based on the behavior
enabled by the old technologies. New technol-
ogy, thus, redefines what it means to be human,
upsetting some people while pleasing others (and
totally ignored by most people).
Gidley’s “anti-technology” position is
widely shared within and without the futures
community. It is absolutely proper that her per-
spective shows through brilliantly in her Very
Short Introduction, especially as uncritical,
commercialized, culture- and environment-
destroying pro-technology views dominate the
media and public consciousness. But there are
other views on the relationship than just these
two, pro and con.
Indeed, the more I become involved within
the space community, the less “humanistic” I
have become. Life as it emerged on Earth is
marvelous, but it is not suitable in its present
biological form for survival in any other part of
space we know of so far. I learned initially
from John and Magda McHale (McHale 1969)
and their other publications that life and con-
sciousness are worth saving by evolving and
transforming, and not only by preserving in
their current earthly biological forms alone.
Nonetheless, at the same time, Gidley
seems to avoid discussion of the biological
basis of human’s values and actions, saying,
for example, that “social, political and
70 World Futures Review 9(2)
economic structures limit some [choices] more
than others.” That is true, but so also human
biology both enables us in some ways and
restrains us in others, and how we deal with
that fact is also a value issue. Some say humans
are naturally selfish killers and that we must
design futures on that basis. Others insist we
have the capability to hoard and kill or to share
and love, and which we do and how we do it is
significantly a cultural matter subject to val-
ues-based social system design.
So also, whether we can or should tinker
with our biology to enhance some features and
suppress others is another technology about
which futurists differ. Gidley seems to oppose
any tinkering as dehumanizing. Again, I see it
as rehumanizing in ways that are neither good
nor bad nor neutral, but are just what evolution
does to all life all the time—mutate. In the
mean time, it is perfectly OK for futurists and
other humans to fret and struggle about it.
The final chapter, chapter 6, is titled “Grand
Global Futures Challenges” and is both about
that subject and about various futures-oriented
organizations that are trying to address the chal-
lenges. Gidley focuses on “Environmental
Trends and Surprises,” “Trends and Twists in
Global Power,” “Socio-Cultural Trends and
Counter Trends,” “The Grand Urbanization
Challenge,” “The Grand Educational Challenge,”
and “The Grand Climate Challenge.” I agree
these are major issues of global concern (and
vastly appreciate the fact that she implies that
“surprises,” “twists,” and “counter trends” are
equal in importance with the “trends” of the
“most likely future”). While climate change
might well have been folded into the environ-
mental section, I agree that it deserves consider-
ation in and of itself as one of the greatest novel
challenges for recent humanity, especially given
America’s grossly irresponsible refusal to even
think about the new Anthropocene Epoch, much
less to address its consequences—which also add
another “twist” to America’s rapidly vanishing
role as a positive force in creating preferred
global futures.
While Gidley cannot reasonably be faulted for
not including everything about all aspects of the
vast futures field, especially given the restraints
on word count she was laboring under, there are
two omissions that I do regret. While discussing
“participatory futures” (p. 70), she failed to men-
tion the many “Anticipatory Democracy” (AD)
activities, spurred by Alvin Toffler and advanced
by Clem Bezold and others (although Bezold’s
Institute for Alternative Futures is listed on p.
144). Those AD activities were extraordinary
events carried out in the very early days whose
depth and breadth of futures-oriented popular
participation has never been duplicated, much
less exceeded, to my knowledge (Bezold 1978,
2010).
In addition, although “future generations”
are mentioned several times, the considerable
literature and global activities of the Future
Generations Alliance and other groups, carried
on currently by J. C. Tremmel and the
Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations
and the Intergenerational Justice Review and
others, are not mentioned.
One tiny but (to me) important correction. I
did not found Hawaii Research Center for
Futures Studies. As an outgrowth of the exten-
sive “Hawaii 2000” AD activities of 1970 and
beyond, the Center was created by law of the
Hawaii State Legislature and placed in the
University of Hawaii for administrative pur-
poses. I knew absolutely nothing about its cre-
ation, and would have chosen a less cumbersome
title if I had been asked. It is true that I was named
its first director, and served as such until I retired
from the University in 2014. But the credit goes
to the citizens of Hawaii who sponsored the
“Hawaii 2000” activities and supported the many
resulting projects. So, the chart (p. 144) needs to
be changed in any revision of the book. I thank
Dr. Gidley for her good summary of the four
generic images of the futures of the Manoa
School (p. 74).
We all should give Jennifer Gidley a standing
ovation. This is an absolutely wonderful source,
as a basic textbook about the field, and as a very
good short introduction about the futureS for
everyone.
Jim Dator
Editor, WFR
References
Bengston, David N., Jim Dator, Michael J. Dockry,
and Aubrey Yee. 2016. “Alternative Futures for
Editorial 71
Forest-Based Nanomaterials: An Application of
the Manoa School’s Alternative Futures Method.”
World Futures Review 8 (4): 197–221.
Bezold, Clement. 1978. Anticipatory Democracy:
People in the Politics of the Future. New York:
Vintage Books.
Bezold, Clement. 2010. “Anticipatory Democracy
and Aspirational Futures.” Journal of Futures
Studies 15 (2): 167–70.
Dator, Jim, John Sweeney, and Aubrey Yee. 2014.
Mutative Media: Communication Technologies
and Power Relations in the Past, Present, and
Futures. New York: Springer Press.
Gidley, Jennifer M. 2017. The Future: A Very Short
Introduction. Cambridge: Oxford University
Press.
McHale, John. 1969. The Future of the Future. New
York: George Braziller.