26

CHAPTER 2.
South Korea’s New
Southern Policy
and the US FOIP:
Convergence or
Competition?
Jaehyon Lee
 27

Introduction 27

Chapter 2
In November 2019, two high-level officials from the Republic of Korea Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and the United States Department of State released a
factsheet titled, The Republic of Korea and the United States Working Together
to Promote Cooperation between the New Southern Policy and the Indo-Pacific
Strategy.5 This was an announcement that the two countries had reached an
agreement on how to coordinate their respective regional policies: South
Korea’s New Southern Policy (NSP) and the United States’ Free and Open Indo-
Pacific (FOIP) strategy. It remains unclear how the two initiatives will interact in
the coming years, but it is nevertheless a meaningful start for cooperation given
their overlapping geographical scope.
With the announcement, many follow-up questions arise regarding the future
trajectory of South Korea’s NSP and the US FOIP, individually and jointly.
These include practical considerations, such as in what areas and through
what mechanisms the two initiatives can promote effective cooperation. But
there are also broader strategic questions. Is South Korea now onboard with
the US FOIP? What are the implications of closer cooperation between South
Korea and the US for the region? And, most importantly, are the two initiatives
ultimately converging or in competition?
Despite an earlier wary response to the US Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea
found a way to cooperate with the US Indo-Pacific strategy as South Korea’s
NSP and the US FOIP make an agreement. The two initiatives are more likely
to converge than compete, especially in the field of re-strengthening regional
rule-based order. One caveat is that the two initiatives may converge or
cooperate on a concrete agenda or specific projects, but more bilateral effort is
needed for a fundamental convergence. The strategies must be flexible enough
to accommodate each other’s imperatives.

South Korea’s New Southern Policy: Expanding Strategic Partners

Promoting a better partnership with ASEAN and India was one of Moon Jae-in’s
foreign policy pledges during the May 2017 presidential election6. The campaign
pledge was developed into a policy by his presidential transition team following
his election victory7. After some reviews and preparation, President Moon
Jae-in officially announced the New Southern Policy on his trip to Indonesia in
November 20178. The goal was to elevate South Korea’s relations with ASEAN
and India on par with its four traditional major partners (the United States,
China, Japan and Russia). It was thus an attempt to break the old mould
of South Korean diplomacy, which has been predominantly focused on two
issues: managing the Korean Peninsula situation and relations with its great
power neighbours.
28 // Chapter 2

Indonesian President Joko Widodo with South Korean President Moon Jae-In in Seoul,
11 September 2018, Source: Wikimedia Commons

The NSP, therefore, spearheaded the Moon administration’s effort to diversify

South Korean diplomacy9. First, it was an attempt to recognise the depth and
breadth of South Korea-ASEAN and South Korea-India relations10. There had
been no specifically named policy towards ASEAN or Southeast Asian countries
under past administrations. Nevertheless, economic and sociocultural relations
had rapidly grown over the past two decades, especially after the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis and the establishment of the ASEAN+3. Today, ASEAN is South
Korea’s second biggest trading partner and its second biggest investment
destination. Vietnam alone was the fourth biggest trading partner of South
Korea in 2018. The trade and investment nexus between South Korea and
ASEAN dwarfs that with the US, Japan and other regional partners. There
have therefore been good reasons for the Moon administration to give special
attention to ASEAN.
Second, the NSP was motivated by a desire to enhance South Korea’s
diplomatic leverage by building more intimate strategic networks in the region.
President Moon Jae-in assumed office in the middle of Chinese economic
retaliation for South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense) missile defence system. In addition, the strategic competition
between the US and China was growing, which posed a dilemma and difficult
choices for South Korea between the two superpowers. If South Korea had
more strategic partners and networks, it would enhance South Korea’s leverage
not only against Chinese pressure, but also against any potential threats to
 29

South Korea’s autonomy posed by superpowers including the US11. In this 29

Chapter 2
regard, close neighbours like ASEAN and India are the Moon administration’s
top priority in finding strategic partners.
Driven by these two underlying factors, the NSP set out a comprehensive
framework of activities and goals organised around three core themes known
as the ‘3Ps’: people, prosperity and peace. ‘People’ reflects President Moon’s
overarching slogan during the election campaign: ‘People First’. It prioritises
people’s interests as the ultimate goal of all cooperation and emphasises
people-to-people exchange in sociocultural cooperation. ‘Prosperity’ denotes
economic cooperation, but it further stresses mutual prosperity between South
Korea and ASEAN and implies that South Korea is moving away from what
we call a ‘sales diplomacy’ approach that it had towards ASEAN in the past12.
‘Peace’ is not simply about security cooperation, but it promotes South Korea-
ASEAN cooperation to bring about peace in the region through managing both
traditional and non-traditional security issues, including the Korean Peninsula.
Table 2 - Cooperation under the NSP’s People, Prosperity and Peace Pillars
Areas

   PEOPLE    PROSPERITY    PEACE

Greater mutual Building a base for Constructing a peaceful
understanding through an mutually beneficial, and safe environment in
Goal

expansion of exchanges future-oriented economic the region

cooperation
• Increasing the number • Strengthening • Invigorating exchanges
of mutual visitors institutional framework between Head-of-
• Expanding 2-way for greater trade and States and high-ranking
cultural exchanges investment officials
• Supporting human • Actively participating • Greater cooperation
resource capacity in the development of for building a peaceful
building infrastructure aimed at and prosperous Korean
greater connectivity Peninsula
Measures

• Helping improve
governance by • MSME cooperation and • Expanding cooperation
enhancing public improved market access  in national defense and
administration • Improving innovative the defense industry
competencies, etc. growth competencies • Collective responses to
• Promoting rights of through new industries anti-terrorism as well
Indian and ASEAN and smart cooperation  as cyber and maritime
people staying in South • Designing a cooperative security
Korea model tailored to each • Better resilience to
• Offering support to nation regional contingencies
improve quality of life

Source: Presidential Committee on New Southern Policy, “Directions for Promoting the New
Southern Policy” (http://www.nsp.go.kr/eng/policy/policy02Page.do).
30 // Chapter 2

The NSP Meets the Indo-Pacific: Engaging without Familiarisation

South Korea’s encounter with the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept came quite late. By the
early 2010s some regional countries including the US were starting to refer to
an Indo-Pacific region. But South Korea only engaged seriously with the concept
after November 2017 when President Trump visited Seoul and mentioned
the US FOIP. The South Korean government, and South Korean society more
broadly, was largely unaware of the US FOIP and of regional discussions of
the new concept. In his trip to South Korea, President Trump requested South
Korea support the US-led FOIP. The response from the South Korean side was
mixed13. The Blue House had reservations while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
mindful of the ROK-US alliance, was more receptive towards the Indo-Pacific.
Since then, the US has been demanding South Korea make its stance clear on
the FOIP14.
Two factors were working behind this reluctant and mixed response by South
Korea. First, the emergence of the concept caught South Korea by surprise.
The term Indo-Pacific first appeared not in the Trump administration, but in the
Obama administration when then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton used the
term in a speech in 2010 and in an article in 201115. Japan also argued that the
term was a Japanese invention and that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had coined
it in the late 2000s16. Australian scholars and government officials extensively
debated the term before officially adopting it in 2013 to replace the ‘Asia-Pacific’
as their primary geographic reference point 17.Of course, the concept was even
further developed with the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or
Quad, among the US, Japan, Australia and India in 2017.
During these years, the South Korean government was not able to properly
respond to the rapid development and spread of the concept across the region.
There were few South Korean government officials or security scholars who
seriously pondered upon the rise of the new concept and the regional debates
about the Indo-Pacific. Traditionally, the Korean Peninsula and ‘bilateral’
relations with the four major powers dominated the discourse and security
debate in South Korea. Very little room was spared for wider regional strategic
and security issues such as an emerging new regional order or the concept
of a new region. Consequently, South Korea was quite slow in staying updated
on what was discussed in the region. When the Indo-Pacific concept was
introduced to South Korea suddenly by President Trump in 2017, the South
Korean government and society alike was not prepared to make a response
either supporting or rejecting the idea.
 31

The second factor that added to this confusion and reluctance was the way 31

Chapter 2
and context in which the Indo-Pacific was introduced to South Korea. South
Korea had been caught in the midst of a strategic dilemma between the US and
China. Fundamentally, South Korea has been dependent on the US for security,
especially protecting itself from North Korean threats. Meanwhile, China has
been one of the biggest markets and investment destinations for South Korea
since the early 1990s. More recently, this dilemma was crystalised in the issue
of the THAAD deployment. With the decision to deploy THAAD, South Korea had
to face pressure and economic retaliation from China. The timing of the Indo-
Pacific introduction in the form of US demanding South Korea to support and
join the initiative was inopportune. Newly elected President Moon Jae-in and
his government had to juggle two tasks: accommodating the US demand while
fixing relations with China. The South Korean government’s hands were to a
certain degree tied by the dilemma.
The US government denies that the Indo-Pacific is a strategy to contain China,
although official documents on the Indo-Pacific mention China as a revisionist
power or threat to the existing international order. The strategy, the US argues,
is about a regional rules-based order, fair trade, rule of law, democracy,
good governance, regional prosperity and stability according to many official
explanations18. What really matters, nevertheless, are perceptions held by
audiences of the policy. While the US rejects the claim that the Indo-Pacific is
about containing China, President Trump’s frequent criticism of China and the
US-China trade war have suggested otherwise. For many, it has ingrained and
confirmed a deep suspicion that the strategy is in fact aimed at China in the
long term. This perception has also affected responses by regional countries to
the FOIP and shaped lukewarm or negative responses among some countries,
including South Korea.

Little Competition, Potential Convergence

With South Korea and the US reaching an agreement on cooperation between
the NSP and the FOIP in 2019, a clear mechanism has been established.
President Moon announced that the two presidents “agreed to put forth
harmonious cooperation between South Korea’s New Southern Policy and
the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy” in opening remarks at a joint press
conference following South Korea-US Summit in June 2019 19. In the end,
the two sides made a concrete agreement on how the two initiatives can
work together.
32 // Chapter 2

Table 3 - Agenda for Cooperation between the NSP and FOIP

Area

Agenda of Cooperation
• ENERGY
› Coordination through existing bilateral mechanisms
› Cooperation between NSP and US’ Asia EDGE initiative
• INFRASTRUCTURE AND FINANCE
Prosperity

› Infrastructure finance cooperation

› Promoting private sector investment in infrastructure development
› Working together in Smart City initiative
• DIGITAL ECONOMY
› Joint effort for digital economy related capacity building in the region
› Jointly helping ASEAN countries to build 5G network
› Building cyber capacity including cybersecurity, cyber defence
• MOFA-USAID MOU to collaborate in the field of development
People

• KOICA-USAID cooperation on democratic and responsive government

• Cooperation in resource management like plastic up-cycling alliance
• Working together for women empowerment
• Cooperation in NTS issues: transnational crimes, natural disaster, environment etc.
• Water management in Mekong
Peace

• Jointly working on maritime affairs, resiliency, climate issues in the Pacific Island
countries
• Working on maritime capacity building and aviation security of ASEAN countries
• Cooperation on health issues in ASEAN countries and Pacific Island countries

Source: Author’s summary of ROK MOFA and US DOS factsheets.20

It is interesting to note that the framework for cooperation is between the South
Korean NSP and the US FOIP, not about South Korea supporting or participating
in the US FOIP. The US requested South Korea’s support to join the US FOIP
in 2017 as widely reported. The wording in the joint press conference in 2019,
however, mentioned ‘cooperation’ between New Southern Policy and the Indo-
Pacific. In the two-year period between President Trump’s first mention of the
Indo-Pacific in South Korea and the agreement in 2019, the two sides’ different
ideas reached a compromise; rather than South Korea supporting and joining
the FOIP, there would be cooperation and coordination between the NSP and
the FOIP, if necessary, in the areas of common interests.
 33

33

Chapter 2
U.S. and Korea summit on 22 May 2018, Source: Wikimedia Commons

A few factors enabled this compromise. The Trump administration may have
recognised that it was difficult for South Korea to openly support the FOIP right
away, given all the dilemmas mentioned above. It was a second-best option
for the US to reach a consensus that the two governments would cooperate
closely with their own strategies, which share the same geographical targets:
Southeast Asia and India. In the meantime, South Korea’s NSP received wide
acceptance among Southeast Asian audiences. They increasingly recognised
the South Korean government’s sincerity in pursuing an initiative with ASEAN
countries21. For the South Korean government, the NSP was a way to reduce
US pressure to join the FOIP along with Trump’s other demands such as a
sharp increase in defence spending, South Korea-US trade issues etc. while
simultaneously using it as a vehicle for cooperating with it.22
Given the consensus between the NSP and the US FOIP, there are some points
on which the two parties can collaborate. The proposed fields and items
are also what South Korea is interested in implementing in Southeast Asia.
Although the two countries managed to identify some areas where they could
work together, it is not enough to say that the two strategies are converging.
Convergence denotes more fundamental cooperation in which the two
strategies can share common goals and visions. The two strategies both identify
economic growth and regional prosperity, and thus regional peace and stability
as their goal. They can thus find some areas of cooperation where they are both
interested in and have expertise. However, this does not necessarily mean that
34 // Chapter 2

the two strategies converge. Put simply, the two strategies have something
in common and have the potential to converge, but it is still too early to say
whether they actually will.
At the same time, it is safe to say that the two strategies are not in competition.
South Korea’s NSP is fundamentally an initiative for enhancing bilateral
relations with ASEAN and India. Meanwhile, the US FOIP is much more than
a bilateral framework. It is fundamentally a US strategy to expand its ties
in Asia. They are in different dimensions. In addition, South Korea is one of
the biggest beneficiaries of the existing regional order that supposedly has
been buttressed by the US since the end of World War II. The South Korean
government’s NSP does not digress from the existing order, but rather the
country, through its policy, tries to improve the order by being imaginative and
proactive23. The US FOIP – not the specific FOIP advocated by President Trump,
but the broader strategy of the US toward this region, does not indicate a
different direction from that of South Korea and the NSP as an initiative of South
Korean government.

Conclusion: Bending Arcs of NSP and FOIP

Both the NSP and FOIP will have to bend their ‘arcs of ambition’ so that they
can be meaningful initiatives in the region. The NSP needs to better harmonise
with other proposals for regional architecture, including the US FOIP. Likewise,
the FOIP has to bend its arc to find better common ground with the NSP and
to become a more acceptable policy in the eyes of regional countries. As the
Moon administration enters its fourth year and the second phase of the NSP,
it will need to deepen and widen bilateral relations with ASEAN countries and
India24. During this next phase of NSP 2.0, peace cooperation needs to expand
its scope. South Korea and ASEAN share few security issues in common. What
peace cooperation really needs to deal with is regional security issues, which
go beyond the scope of bilateral relations. The policy needs to look at the bigger
picture and set out its own vision on which ASEAN countries and South Korea
may work together.
South Korea has to engage in discussions about the Indo-Pacific concept
with regional countries. As mentioned, South Korea did not have a chance to
examine and analyse other Indo-Pacific concepts held by Japan, Australia,
India, New Zealand, ASEAN and others. Without recognising the existence of
different visions of the Indo-Pacific, South Korea was overwhelmed by the US
FOIP introduced in 2017. South Korea does not need to be bound by the US
FOIP when there are other options. If South Korea adjusts the NSP’s arc slightly
to include arguments for a regional rules-based order, and if South Korea
examines other Indo-Pacific arguments, it may find a better partner to work
together with under the banner of NSP-Indo-Pacific cooperation or the Indo-
Pacific more broadly.
 35

One element missing in the NSP’s peace cooperation is an emphasis on the 35

Chapter 2
rules-based order. There are signs that the South Korean government is
increasingly highlighting a regional free trade order. This was South Korea’s
response to the Japanese export ban and delisting of South Korea from its
export ‘white list’. The South Korean government stressed a regional free
trade order at the 2019 ASEAN Regional Forum and the third ASEAN-Korea
Commemorative Summit25. South Korea does not frequently and openly
champion regional free trade, although the country recognises the merits of
free trade order and thus quietly supports it. Put simply, the South Korean
government has been a follower, not a leader, when it comes to the regional
order including free trade. By extension, the NSP should address issues like the
promotion of regional multilateralism, a free trade order, democracy and good
governance and so on; all elements of a rules-based order. With that, the policy
would find more common ground with the FOIP and other regional countries
supporting Indo-Pacific concepts.
The US FOIP needs to bend its arc as well. There is a big perception gap
between the FOIP that the US ostensibly presents and the FOIP that is perceived
by the region. While the US claims that the FOIP is neither about containing
China nor strictly strategic and military aims, regional countries view it as an
instrument for US-China competition and for eventually containing China. If
this perception gap is left unaddressed, the US FOIP will not be able to extract
genuine support from regional countries. Two factors will be crucial to watch.
First, the low confidence in the Trump administration among regional countries
makes them suspicious of how seriously the US FOIP takes the pillars of
the rules-based order. Instead, it keeps countries wondering about a hidden
agenda. Second, when the US presents its strategy and vision to the region,
it needs a more sophisticated approach. What the US believes is right could
be called into question in another context. Even a small move by the US, a
superpower, could cause a big strategic shock for the rest of the region.
 105

Endnotes 105

Endnotes
Chapter 1
1  Presidential Committee on New Southern Policy (2020), ‘NSP brochure’, Available at http://www.nsp.
go.kr/eng/main.do
2  Net primary income includes receipts and payments of employee compensation paid to nonresident
workers too. The amount is relatively small for South Korea.
3  Business Korea (2019), ‘Samsung Electronics Accounts for 28% of Vietnam’s GDP’, 14 March.
4  Nikkei Asian Review (2020), ‘Patent Wars in Digital Era’, 12 February.
Chapter 2
5  For the factsheet, refer to a post on MOFA website at: http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/down.
do?brd_id=235&seq=369707&data_tp=A&file_seq=4
6  The Minjoo Party. 2018. The Minjoo Party’s Election Manifesto for the 19th Presidential Election (in
Korean). p. 235.
7  An unpublished report titled, “Northeast Asia Community of Responsibility” (originally in Korean) was
prepared by Moon’s presidential transition team in 2017. The idea of a New Southern Policy was included
in this report along with a New Northern Policy and a Northeast Asia Peace Platform which together
comprise the Moon administration’s regional foreign policy vision: a Northeast Asian Community of
Responsibility Plus.
8  Darren Whiteside. 2017. “South Korea’s Moon unveils new focus on Southeast Asia.” Reuters. 9
November. See also, Moon Jae-in. 2017. “Toward a People-Centred ASEAN Community.” Project Syndicate.
10 November.
9  Regarding diplomatic diversification, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2018. Diplomatic White Paper 2018.
Pp. 23-24.
10  Originally the NSP was a policy aimed at both ASEAN and India. But ASEAN has been given more
attention in the policy given the breadth and depth of practical cooperation between ASEAN and Korea. For
example, the trade volume between India and Korea is less than 50 billion USD a year while that between
ASEAN and Korea is over 200 billion USD a year.
11  Some examples of threats to South Korea’s autonomy from the US include re-negotiation of KORUS
FTA in 2017 and the pressure to increase South Korea’s contribution for the deployment of US troops. In
recent months, the Trump administration demanded five-fold increase of South Korea’s contribution to US 5
billion dollars. For KORUS FTA re-negotiation and the defense cost contribution, see Kyle Ferrier. 2019. “The
Double Standard for South Korea in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy” The Diplomat. Issue 51.
12  ‘Sales Diplomacy’ frequently used in the newspaper headlines reporting the purpose of Korean
president’s visit to Southeast Asia countries. It conveys a message to South Korean public that the president
tours Southeast Asia to promote Korea’s exports to the Southeast Asian countries and to increase Korea’s
trade surplus in ASEAN market which is already substantial.
13  Yeo Jun-suk. 2017. “Flip-flops over Seoul’s stance on Indo-Pacific initiative stir controversy.” The Korea
Herald. November 10.
14  Kim Jaechun. 2018. “South Korea’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Dilemma” The Diplomat. April 27, and
Lee Jung-ho. 2019. “South Korea’s US0-China dilemma deepens with support for America’s Indo-Pacific
strategy” South China Morning Herald. 7 July.
15  Hillary Clinton. 2010. Speech on America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii, 28
October; and Hillary Clinton. 2011. “America’s Pacific Century” Foreign Policy. October 11.
16  Shinzo Abe. 2007. “Confluence of the Two Seas” at the Parliament of the Republic of India” August 22.
17  For example, Rory Medcalf. 2012. “Indo-Pacific: What’s in a name?” The American Interest. 16 August;
Rory Medcalf. 2012. “A Term Whose Time Has Come: The Indo-Pacific” The Diplomat 04 December; Melissa
Conley Tyler and Samantha Shearman. 2013. “Australia’s new region: the Indo-Pacific” East Asia Forum. 21
May; Mark Beeson. 2014. “The rise of the Indo-Pacific” The Conversation. May 3; Andrew Carr & Baldino, D.
2015. “An Indo-Pacific norm entrepreneur? Australia and defence diplomacy” Journal of the Indian Ocean
Region. 11(1).
106 // Endnotes

18  For example, see, US Department of Defense. 2019. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness,
Partnership, and Promoting a Networked Region (https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-
1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF); and US Department of
State. 2019. A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision (https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf)
19  ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2019. “Opening Remarks by President Moon Jae-in at Joint Press
Conference Following Korea-U.S. Summit June 30, 2019 (http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/
view.do?seq=319902&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_
seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=) It is interesting
to note that the same remarks by President Moon posted by Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
White House are different. The remarks by President Moon are worded as follows on the White House
Website: “I believe this creates New Southern Policy, and the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy can find common
ground,” carrying a somewhat different meaning (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-president-moon-republic-korea-joint-press-conference/). Both are based on
simultaneous interpretation provided at the press conference. If we compare the two versions, the one by
ROK MOFA is more committed to cooperation between the NSP and the Indo-Pacific strategy than the one
by the White House, not the other way around.
20  See ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2019. “The Republic of Korea and the United
States Working Together to Promote Cooperation between the New Southern Policy
and the Indo-Pacific Strategy” (http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.
do?seq=369707&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_
seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=15).
21  Seksan Anantasirikiat. 2018. “South Korea’s New Southern Policy in Making and the Way Forward.” The
Geopolitics. 12 July (https://thegeopolitics.com/south-koreas-new-southern-policy-in-making-and-the-
way-forward/); Nurliana Kamaruddin and Aaron Denison Deivasagayam. 2019. “Great power rivalries push
South Korea and ASEAN closer.” East Asia Forum 26 October (https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/10/26/
great-power-rivalries-push-south-korea-and-asean-closer/); Chheang Vannarith. 2019. “Korea’s New
Southern Policy 2.0” Khmer Times. 26 November (https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50664000/koreas-
new-southern-policy-2-0/); and Lucio Blanco Pitlo III. 2020. “South Korea as a Middle Power For ASEAN.”
Eurasia Review. 22 January (https://www.eurasiareview.com/08122019-south-korea-as-a-middle-power-
for-asean-analysis/).
22  For defense burden and trade issue between South Korea and the US, see respectively Jeff Mason and
David Brunnstorm. 2017. “South Korea’s Moon to face Trump trade pressure at first summit” Reuters.
June 29 and Michael Flynn, Michael Allen and Carla Martinez Machain. 2019. “Trump wants South Korea
and Japan to pay more for defense” The Washington Post. November 26.
23  See, David Hundt. 2018. “What Australia Can Learn from South Korea.” Australian Outlook 27 June
(http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/what-australia-can-learn-from-south-korea/);
FRS-KF Korea Program on Security and Diplomacy. 2019. “President Moon promised he would visit all ten
ASEAN countries within his term: A Conversation with Lee Jaehyon.” April. (https://www.frstrategie.org/
sites/default/files/documents/programmes/programme-coree-securite-diplomatie/publications/2019/9.
pdf); and G. Ikenberry and Mo Jongryn. 2013. The Rise of Korean Leadership: Emerging Powers and
Liberal International Order. New York: Palgrave.
24  The 3rd ASEAN-Korea Commemorative Summit held in November 2019 was a turning point for the
NSP. The timing of the summit also marked two years since the announcement of the NSP while the Moon
government also enters its second half.
25  Song Sang-ho and Kim Seung-yeon. 2019. “FM Kang pursues brisk diplomacy in Thailand amid trade
row with Japan, N.K. tensions” Yonhap News. 31 July; and Lee Chi-dong and Kim Seung-yeon. 2019. “S.
Korea, ASEAN agree to promote free trade, regional peace” Yonhap News. 26 November.
Chapter 3
26  Pravakar Sahoo, Durgesh Kumar Rai and Rajiv Kumar, India-Korea Trade and Investment Relations,
Working Paper No. 242, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi,
December 2009 and Surendar Singh, “Potential Implications of Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership to India-South Korea Bilateral Trade Ties,” World Economic Brief, Vol. 10, No. 2, 22
January 2020.
 ISSUE: 2020 No. 7
ISSN 2335-6677

RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS

Singapore |30 January 2020

Assessing the ROK’s New Southern Policy towards ASEAN

Hoang Thi Ha and Glenn Ong*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The New Southern Policy (NSP) accords unprecedented prominence and priority to
ASEAN and its member states in the ROK’s external relations. It is characterised by
President Moon Jae-in’s strong personal commitment, his proactive summit
diplomacy towards ASEAN and an enhanced ROK institutional structure for the
NSP’s implementation.

• The NSP is primarily underpinned by a strong economic imperative rather than

guided by a strategic thrust. The ROK’s trade, investment, and development
assistance in Southeast Asia continue to grow. On the traditional security front,
Seoul is mainly focused on promoting its arms sales and securing ASEAN’s
contribution to its peace agenda on the Korean Peninsula.

• To advance the NSP, the ROK needs to develop more broad-based economic
engagement across ASEAN member states to overcome its over-concentration on
Vietnam, foster two-way exchanges that improve ASEAN’s market access and
cultural promotion in the ROK, and articulate a coherent idea of regional
cooperation that supports ASEAN-led mechanisms and the open, inclusive and
rules-based regional architecture.

* Hoang Thi Ha and Glenn Ong are respectively Lead Researcher (Political and Security
Affairs) and Research Officer at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
They wish to acknowledge Ms. Pham Thi Phuong Thao for her research assistance.

1
 ISSUE: 2020 No. 7
ISSN 2335-6677


INTRODUCTION

The New Southern Policy (NSP) introduced by ROK President Moon Jae-in during his state
visit to Indonesia in November 2017 has become a signature foreign policy of his
administration. The NSP’s objective is to “elevate Korea’s relationship with ASEAN to the
level of its relations with the four major powers around the Korean Peninsula”, namely the
US, China, Japan, and Russia.1

On the whole, the NSP represents a continuity from previous ROK policies vis-à-vis
Southeast Asia, which first took off under President Kim Dae-jung in the late 1990s.2 Then
in 2009, President Lee Myung-bak unveiled his New Asia Initiative as “South Korea’s bid
to diversify its diplomatic focus from the US and other regional powers… due to the
growing influence and importance of Asia”. 3 Despite this continuity, three elements
differentiate the NSP from its predecessors:

• The NSP has defined parameters and is specifically targeted at ASEAN member
states (AMS). Under Moon, AMS are accorded unprecedented priority in the ROK’s
foreign policy relative to the rest of Asia;

• President Moon has devoted significant time and resources to pursue diplomatic
activism in ASEAN, attesting to his strong personal commitment to NSP
implementation;

• President Moon’s commitment has translated into follow-up institutions with

enhanced manpower and inter-agency coordination. Chief among those is the NSP
Presidential Committee, formed to implement the NSP and coordinate various
initiatives by ministries and agencies under the NSP umbrella. The bureaus engaging
with ASEAN at the foreign and industry ministries and embassies in the region have
expanded, including the tripling of the staff at the ROK Mission to ASEAN in
Jakarta. 4 This “diplomatic infrastructure” is expected to help sustain the NSP’s
momentum beyond the Moon presidency.5

The ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit in Busan, ROK, held on 25-26 November

2019, and the two-year mark of the NSP, present a timely opportunity to review the NSP’s
progress and limitations, focusing on the two pillars of “Prosperity” and “Peace”. This
article argues that the “Prosperity” pillar has been moderately successful in meeting both
the ROK’s and ASEAN’s interests. However, concerning the “Peace” pillar – which
encompasses diplomatic engagement and defence cooperation, among others – the ROK’s
overriding interests to (i) expand its defence exports, and (ii) secure international support
for its Korean Peninsula peace agenda, have overshadowed ASEAN’s inherent strategic
importance. Against this backdrop, the Busan summit should not be seen as a culmination
of ASEAN-ROK relations, but a starting point for a more balanced and equitable
partnership.

PROACTIVE SUMMIT DIPLOMACY

President Moon has engaged in proactive summit diplomacy towards ASEAN and its
member states at all levels: bilaterally, sub-regionally, and through the ASEAN-ROK

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framework. His summit diplomacy is unprecedented compared to that of his predecessors,
and is among the NSP’s most prominent aspects. Under his watch, the ROK elevated its
relations with Indonesia to “special strategic partnership”, and to “strategic partnership”
with Malaysia and Thailand. He also proposed elevating the ROK’s relationship with
Cambodia6 and the Philippines7 to the level of strategic partnership.

With his strong commitment and diplomatic activism towards ASEAN, President Moon has
established many “firsts” in ASEAN-ROK relations. He is the first ROK President to: (i)
explicitly identify ASEAN as a foreign policy priority in his election manifesto; (ii) dispatch
a special presidential envoy to AMS upon taking office;8 (iii) visit all AMS within about
two years in office; (iv) visit Brunei Darussalam in 19 years; (v) visit Singapore since 2003;
(vi) make a state visit to Cambodia in 10 years; and (vii) initiate the inaugural Mekong-
ROK Summit.

The ROK is also the first Dialogue Partner to convene three commemorative summits with
ASEAN. The Busan summit set the stage for ten bilateral summits between President Moon
and his ASEAN counterparts to further cement their respective relationships in symbolic
and substantive ways. An estimated 80 agreements and memoranda of understanding
(MOU) were signed on the sidelines, focusing on trade and investment; Industry 4.0 (ICT,
start-ups, and innovation); infrastructure development; and development assistance,
especially for the Mekong countries (see Annex 1).

ROBUST ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT

That the NSP’s focus is tipped in favour of economics is no secret: the choice of the Korea-
Indonesia Business Forum in 2017 for the NSP’s unveiling, and the appointments of
business and technology veterans like Kim Hyun-chul and Joo Hyung-chul as the Chair of
the NSP Presidential Committee, suggest that economics is the key driver of the NSP. The
focus on economic cooperation is the result of a convergence between strong push factors
from the ROK and pull factors to ASEAN.

The impetus of the NSP came from the ROK’s imperative to diversify its economic relations
beyond that with China and the US, which together accounted for 38.1% of the ROK’s total
exports in 2015-2017.9 Seoul’s deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence
(THAAD) anti-missile system in early 2017 unleashed Beijing’s punitive economic
measures, which cost the ROK an estimated US$7.5 billion in economic losses that year.10
Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s trade war with China cost the ROK economy 21.3%
of its exports to China in August 2019 compared to August 2018.11 These experiences have
driven home the vulnerability of the ROK’s overdependence on these two countries, and
have beckoned Seoul to accelerate its search for new growth engines in Southeast Asia and
India.

These push factors away from China and the US intertwine with pull factors to ASEAN to
shape the character of the NSP. In recent decades, ASEAN economies have become
increasingly attractive both as a market for exports and a hub for manufacturing investment.
A telling example is Samsung’s southward relocation of its mobile phone production. The
company shuttered its last mobile phone factory in China in September 2019 due to rising
labour costs and the dramatic shrinking of its market share in China from 15% in 2013 to

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only 1% in 2019.12 Conversely, Samsung is entrenching its presence in Vietnam to turn the
country into its largest smartphone production base with a total investment of US$17.3
billion in eight factories and one R&D centre. 13 The ROK’s economic pivot towards
Southeast Asia is also driven by ASEAN’s alluring consumption market of over 650 million
people, the extensive architecture of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)
that helps sustain steady FDI inflows into the region, and ASEAN’s role as a key node in
the global supply chains of many Korean conglomerates.

The convergence of these push and pull factors has compelled Seoul to look south and
intensify its economic partnership with ASEAN. However, while ASEAN-ROK trade and
investment relations have been robust over the past three years, it would be too simplistic
and premature to attribute these strong economic linkages to the top-down interventions of
the NSP. Indeed, the longstanding footprint that Korean conglomerates have established in
Southeast Asia pre-dates the NSP. In any case, figures do indicate an uptick in bilateral
economic engagements since the NSP was launched. Between 2016 and 2018, ASEAN-
ROK trade grew by 30% from US$124.4 billion to US$161.5 billion. Between 2015 and
2018, the ROK’s investment in ASEAN grew by 17% to US$6.6 billion.14

However, the ROK’s economic engagement with ASEAN remains disproportionately

directed towards Vietnam in investment, trade, development assistance and people-to-
people exchanges. Vietnam accounted for 48% (or US$3.15 billion) of the ROK’s total FDI
to ASEAN in 2018, 40.7% (or US$65.8 billion) of the ROK’s total trade with ASEAN in
2018,15 and 37.8% (or US$187.73 million) of the ROK’s official development assistance
(ODA) to ASEAN in 2017. 16 Vietnam was also the top ASEAN destination for ROK
visitors, clocking in 3.4 million tourist arrivals in 2018. 17 Of the 500,000 people from
ASEAN who reside in the ROK, more than one-third (170,000) come from Vietnam; of
about 300,000 Koreans residing in ASEAN, half of them are in Vietnam. 18 President
Moon’s visits to all AMS signal the ROK’s recognition of this imbalance, and its
willingness to diversify Korea’s economic presence. However, the movements of capital
and people on the ground remain driven by practical business considerations and personal
decisions based on cultural affinity.

Furthermore, data from ASEAN Investment Reports indicate that the ROK’s share of
investments in ASEAN has remained modest when comparing the periods before and after
the NSP was unveiled in 2017. From 2010 to 2015, Korean FDI in the region was “relatively
small”, accounting for only 3.4% of total FDI flows into ASEAN.19 There was a modest
growth in Korean FDI to ASEAN from US$5.704 billion to US$5.89 billion between 2015
and 2016,20 which then decreased to US$5.3 billion in 2017.21 Between 2017 and 2018,
there was an uptick as the ROK’s share of total FDI into ASEAN grew from 3% to 4%.22
Despite this increase, the ROK merely retained its position as ASEAN’s seventh biggest
investor. From 2010 to 2018, the proportion of the ROK’s investments in ASEAN hovered
around 3-4% even with the roll-out of the NSP.23

Yet, there are good reasons to be optimistic from the ROK’s vantage point. Latest data
indicate that as of 2018, ASEAN is the ROK’s second largest trading partner, third largest
FDI destination, and the most popular travel destination for Koreans. 24 Infrastructure
investment between ASEAN and the ROK is also robust. As of 2018, the infrastructure
construction contracts signed between Korean companies and ASEAN countries amounted
to US$11.9 billion, which accounted for 37.1% of Korean companies’ overseas contracts.

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This makes ASEAN the largest source of overseas construction revenue for Korean
businesses.25 Such optimistic figures provide a solid basis for both sides to deepen their
economic engagement.

PRAGMATIC DEFENCE COOPERATION

Defence cooperation is an important component under the NSP’s “Peace” pillar. Since the
NSP’s launch, the ROK has stepped up bilateral defence partnerships with almost all AMS.
It signed a joint vision statement on defence cooperation with Vietnam,26 and an MOU on
defence cooperation with Brunei Darussalam in 2018. 27 Seoul also inked two bilateral
defence MOUs in 2019 to promote its defence exports to the Philippines,28 and military
intelligence cooperation with Thailand.29

At the heart of this defence cooperation is the ROK’s push for arms exports to AMS,
especially Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. For example, Indonesia purchased the
ROK’s Tarantula Panzer, Submarine Changbogo Class, and T-50i Golden Eagle.30 In April
2019, the ROK signed an agreement to sell three 1,400-ton submarines to Indonesia in a
US$1.02 billion deal, the second such contract in eight years between both countries.31
More recently, the ROK and Indonesia announced the release of a first full-size prototype
of their jointly developed KF-X fighter jet project in October 2019, worth US$6.33 billion.32
The ROK was also Vietnam’s fourth largest supplier of military hardware, accounting for
2.8% of the market.33 Meanwhile, the Philippine Navy acquired two missile frigates from
Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI).34 The Philippines also contracted South Korean company
Hanwha Systems for the upgrade of its three Del Pilar-class frigates.35

The ROK’s push for defence industry cooperation with AMS appears to be driven more by
commercial interests than by strategic calculations. There is little evidence to suggest that
Seoul has made sustained attempts to bring these bilateral arms sales within a strategically
coherent regional agenda. For example, the major clients of Korean defence exports are
Southeast Asian claimant states in the South China Sea (SCS), and these procurements could
help strengthen their maritime awareness and operational capabilities in the disputed waters.
Yet, the ROK has thus far remained ambivalent about the SCS disputes for fear of
displeasing China. The pragmatism of the ROK’s defence cooperation with AMS is also
illustrated by the lack of progress in its proposal for an annual ASEAN-ROK Defence
Ministers’ Meeting, even though it is listed as one of the 16 core policy tasks under the
NSP.36 It is unclear whether the ROK has tabled an official proposal on this matter to
ASEAN.

ASEAN’S ROLE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUE

Securing ASEAN’s support for President Moon’s Korean Peninsula peace agenda is one of
the NSP’s 16 policy tasks, and is a consistent talking point in his engagements with ASEAN
leaders. ASEAN’s role has been boosted by the hosting of the US-DPRK summits in
Singapore (June 2018) and Vietnam (February 2019). The ASEAN-ROK Joint Vision
Statement of the Commemorative Summit intertwines peace and stability in Southeast Asia
with that of Northeast Asia.37

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ASEAN possesses relevant assets that could enable it to promote peace on the Korean
Peninsula, especially from the liberal viewpoint of President Moon. These include
ASEAN’s peace-oriented values and ASEAN-led mechanisms, which provide avenues for
a reclusive DPRK to connect with the international community. Most AMS enjoy cordial
relations with both Koreas, and their development models could be a potential template for
the DPRK should it choose to open up. Yet, ASEAN’s leverage on the Korean Peninsula
should not be exaggerated. ASEAN is geographically and geopolitically a marginal player
in the Korean Peninsula complex, where deterrence and balance-of-power dynamics feature
overwhelmingly – if not decisively – in the strategic calculi of all parties. This sobering
acknowledgement is not meant to discourage ASEAN, but to caution against misplaced
expectations or unrealistic calculations.

A case in point is President Moon’s unilateral decision to invite DPRK leader Kim Jong-un
to attend the Busan summit,38 without prior consultation with and the consent of AMS. This
oversight, even if unintentional, is a breach of established procedures in ASEAN-ROK
dialogue relations, and conveys a lack of respect for ASEAN as an equal. On top of that,
ASEAN would have suffered from poor optics if Kim or a special envoy had actually visited
Busan, because the primary agenda of the summit to celebrate the 30th anniversary of
ASEAN-ROK relations “would fall off the radar of public attention” and be completely
overshadowed by Northeast Asian affairs.39

For perceptive observers of the NSP, its signature laser focus on ASEAN and Southeast
Asia has been unwarrantedly undercut by the ROK’s imperative to prioritise the “Korean
Peninsula” agenda in an unfitting context of the commemorative summit with ASEAN. This
unfortunate experience drives home the fact that the ROK remains a “constrained middle
power” due to its geopolitical conditions on the Korean Peninsula, despite its enthusiasm
and capacity to exercise “middle power activism”.40 For the NSP to succeed, the ROK’s
engagement with ASEAN should shine by its own light rather than be filtered through the
lens of Northeast Asian geopolitics.

CONCLUSION

The NSP has been primarily driven by a strong economic imperative rather than a strategic
thrust. ASEAN-ROK economic engagement has been robust, underpinned by the ROK’s
need to reduce its overdependence on American and Chinese markets, and the growing
attraction of ASEAN economies. Meanwhile, the NSP’s “Peace” pillar does not evince such
a synergy of push and pull factors. The ROK’s engagement with ASEAN on the traditional
security front has mainly focused on securing ASEAN’s contribution to the ROK’s Korean
Peninsula peace agenda and promoting its defence exports.

Despite the absence of a pronounced strategic imperative, the NSP carries considerable
geopolitical significance and potential. It provides new avenues for ASEAN and the ROK
to deepen their cooperation to hedge against vulnerabilities in their relations with major
powers, as well as against uncertainties arising from the US-China rivalry. It meets the
shared strategic imperative of both parties to diversify their external economic relations,
maintain an open and inclusive regional architecture, and mitigate the pressure to take sides
in major-power rivalries. A case in point is the ROK’s strong support for the ASEAN
Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which enables Seoul to participate in the Indo-Pacific

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discourse while avoiding entrapment in the US-China rivalry. The ROK’s support of the
AOIP, however, appears to be more pragmatic than strategic, given its longstanding
attachment to the idea of an East Asian Community (EAC). The NSP has not resolved
Seoul’s ambivalence towards the competing visions of regional integration espoused by the
broader Indo-Pacific concept on one hand, and the exclusive EAC on the other.41

Moving forward, it will be to the benefit of both sides that cooperation through the NSP be
pursued evenly and with recognition for ASEAN as an equal partner and on its own merits.
To do so, the NSP must (i) develop the ROK’s more broad-based economic engagement
that transcends Vietnam, (ii) foster two-way exchanges that help ASEAN’s market access
and cultural promotion in the ROK; and (iii) articulate a coherent idea of regional
cooperation that supports ASEAN-led mechanisms and the open, inclusive and rules-based
regional architecture.

Annex 1: ROK Summit Diplomacy and Deliverables (List is non-exhaustive)42

Summits Deliverables
ASEAN-ROK

ASEAN-Korea - MOU on Development Cooperation between the ROK and

Commemorative Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam
Summit (Nov 2019) - Formation of joint ASEAN-ROK startup funds and a startup
ecology to create more unicorn enterprises in Industry 4.0
- A “new southern” business cooperation centre to be created
to help Korean companies expand into ASEAN and
strengthen the competitiveness of ASEAN-based
enterprises
Mekong-ROK
1st Mekong-ROK - The Mekong-Han River Declaration for Establishing
Summit (Nov 2019) Partnership for People, Prosperity and Peace, focusing on:
(i) culture and tourism; (ii) agriculture; (iii) infrastructure,
(iv) IT; and (iv) sustainable development and security
- The Mekong-ROK Summit to be held annually
Brunei-ROK
Moon Jae-in’s official - Three MOUs on (i) cooperation in investment; (ii) science
visit to Brunei (March and technology in Industry 4.0; and (iii) intellectual
2019) property
Brunei-ROK summit - Three MOUs on (i) ICT; (ii) e-government; and (iii) smart
(Nov 2019) cities
Cambodia-ROK
Moon Jae-in’s official - Seven agreements/MOUs on (i) soft loan of Economic
visit to Cambodia Development Cooperation Fund for 2019-2023; (ii) soft
(March 2019) loan for the University of Health Sciences hospital project;
(iii) power supply project for micro-electricity grids and
battery charging station in Cambodia; (iv) Korean
investment facilitation; (v) education; (vi) soft loan for rural
road improvement project-phase 3; and (vii) construction
material and equipment
Indonesia-ROK

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Summits Deliverables
Moon Jae-in’s official - Upgrading relationship from strategic partnership to special
visit to Indonesia (Nov strategic partnership
2017) - Signing agreements on cooperation in, among others,
transportation; the 2nd phase of Jakarta’s Light Rail Transit
project; and Indonesia’s Low-Cost Housing program
Indonesia-ROK summit - Conclusion of Indonesia-ROK Comprehensive Economic
(Nov 2019) Partnership Agreement (CEPA)
Laos-ROK
Moon Jae-in’s official - MOUs on (i) agriculture; (ii) ICT; (iii) start-ups and
visit to Laos (Sep 2019) innovation; (iv) Economic Development Cooperation Fund
with Korea’s grant of US$500 million from 2020-2023
Malaysia-ROK
Moon Jae-in’s official - Four MOUs on (i) industrial cooperation relating to Industry
visit to Malaysia (March 4.0; (ii) cooperation in transportation; (iii) development of
2019) a Smart City in Malaysia; (iv) and halal industry
Malaysia-ROK summit - Elevating the relations to strategic partnership
(Nov 2019) - Four MOUs on (i) cooperation in IT; (ii) e-government; (iii)
health care; and (iv) water and sewage management
Myanmar-ROK
Moon Jae-in’s official - MOUs on (i) trade and industrial cooperation; (ii)
visit to Myanmar (Sep establishment of the Korea Desk in Myanmar to provide
2019) support for Korean investors; (iii) shipping logistics and
port; (iv) science and technology; and (v) start-ups and
innovation
- A framework agreement on 2018-2022 loans from the
Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF)
Myanmar-ROK summit - MOUs on cooperation on (i) fisheries; (ii) technical and
(Nov 2019) vocational training; (iii) the environment; and (iv)
development of digital economy, higher education, smart
cities and connectivity
The Philippines-ROK
Moon Jae-in’s official - Five agreements on (i) transportation; (ii) economy and
visit to the Philippines trade; (iii) renewable energy; (iv) science and technology;
(Nov 2017) and (v) infrastructure
Philippines-ROK - Five agreements in (i) tourism; (ii) fisheries; (iii) education;
summit (Nov 2019) (iv) social security; and (v) trade and investment
Singapore-ROK
Moon Jae-in’s state visit - Six MOUs on (i) environment; (ii) free trade; (iii) smart
to Singapore (July grids; (iv) Industry 4.0; (v) SMEs; and (vi) investments
2018)
Singapore-ROK summit - MOUs on (i) standards and conformance; (ii)
(Nov 2019) manufacturing of pharmaceuticals; (iii) smart cities
collaboration; and (iv) cybersecurity cooperation
Thailand-ROK
Moon Jae-in’s official - MOUs on (i) smart cities; (ii) Industry 4.0; (iii) Korean
visit to Thailand (Sep language studies; (iv) water development; (v) transport and
2019) infrastructure; and (vi) military intelligence

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Summits Deliverables
Thailand-ROK summit - MOUs on (i) scientific research and development; (ii)
(Nov 2019) business and industry development in Thailand’s Eastern
Economic Corridor; and (iii) information exchange on
illegal Thai workers in ROK
Vietnam-ROK
Moon Jae-in’s official - MOUs on the action programme towards US$100 billion
visit to Vietnam (March two-way trade by 2020; (ii) supporting industry
2018) cooperation; (iii) infrastructure and transport; (iv) urban
construction and development; (v) Industry 4.0; and (vi)
labour cooperation
Vietnam-ROK summit - MOUs on (i) prevention of double taxation; (ii) navigation
(Nov 2019) and crew training; (iii) trade promotion; (iv) capacity
building for Vietnam Development Bank

1
New Southern Policy Brochure, accessed from the website of the Presidential Committee on New Southern
Policy, http://www.nsp.go.kr/eng/main.do. The NSP target countries include not only ASEAN and its
member states but also India. This Perspective focuses only on the NSP vis-à-vis ASEAN.
2
Lee Jaehyon, “Korea’s New Southern Policy: Motivations of ‘Peace Cooperation’ and Implications for the
Korean Peninsula”, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 21 June 2019,
http://en.asaninst.org/contents/koreas-new-southern-policy-motivations-of-peace-cooperation-and-
implications-for-the-korean-peninsula/.
3
Byun Duk-kun, “Seoul declares ambitious diplomatic initiative for Asia,” Yonhap News Agency, 8 March
2009, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20090307003200315.
4
Lim Sungnam, “Korea’s New Southern Policy: Walk to the border, sail to the island”, The Jakarta Post, 15
November 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/11/15/koreas-new-southern-policy-walk-
to-the-border-sail-to-the-island.html.
5
Choe Wongi, “Why South Korea Wants to Tie In with ASEAN”, ASEANFocus Issue 6/2019, 23 December
2019, pp. 12-13, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ASEANFocus%20-%20December%202019.pdf.
6
Park Gil-ja and Lee Hana, “Korea, Cambodia agree to expand economic cooperation”, The Republic of
Korea Cheong Wa Dae, 15 March 2019, https://english1.president.go.kr/Media/News/554.
7
Pia Garcia, “PH and South Korea vow to strengthen bilateral ties, sign 5 deals”, CNN Philippines, 25
November 2019, https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/11/25/philippines-south-korea-bilateral-agreements-
asean-commemorative-summit.html?fbclid=IwAR2x-
fo_DLX9zY6biN1r9lPe4T5g5_Qx53rFLRkcVD1Ppyc_84NSqTATVJo.
8
Before that, special presidential envoys were only sent to China, Japan, Russia, and the US.
9
Sungil Kwak, “Korea’s New Southern Policy: Vision and Challenges”, KIEP Opinions, 12 November
2018, https://think-asia.org/bitstream/handle/11540/9407/KIEPopinions_no146.pdf?sequence=1.
10
Bonnie S. Glaser and Lisa Collins, “China's Rapprochement With South Korea: Who Won the THAAD
Dispute?”, Foreign Affairs, 7 November 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-
07/chinas-rapprochement-south-korea.
11
Megumi Fujikawa and Kwanwoo Jun, “U.S.-China Trade War Takes Toll on South Korea and Japan,”
The Wall Street Journal, 2 September 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-trade-war-takes-toll-on-
south-korea-and-japan-11567415192.
12
Ju-min Park, “Samsung ends mobile phone production in China,” Reuters, 2 October 2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-samsung-elec-china/samsung-ends-mobile-phone-production-in-china-
idUSKBN1WH0LR.


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13
Khanh Vu and Phuong Nguyen, “Samsung denies it plans new plant in northern Vietnam,” Reuters, 27
September 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-samsung-elec/samsung-denies-it-plans-new-
plant-in-northern-vietnam-idUSKBN1WC0LY.
14
Tabulations by the authors, based on the ASEAN Statistical Yearbooks 2015-2018,
ASEANStatsDataPortal, ASEAN Secretariat, https://www.aseanstats.org/ebooks/ebook-publication-by-
year/.
15
Ibid.
16
2018 ASEAN & Korea in Figures (Seoul: ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2018), p. 68.
17
See “ASEAN in Figures”, ASEANFocus Issue 6/2019, 23 December 2019, pp. 24-25,
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ASEANFocus%20-%20December%202019.pdf
18
“President Moon Jae-in wants to lift RoK-Vietnam partnership to next level,” Vietnam Investment Review,
22 March 2018, https://www.vir.com.vn/president-moon-jae-in-wants-to-lift-rok-vietnam-partnership-to-
next-level-57515.html
19
In the same period, ROK’s FDI was also disproportionately concentrated in ASEAN member states like
Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia, which together accounted for 63% of ROK FDI into ASEAN. See
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Investment Report 2016: Foreign Direct Investment and MSME Linkages
(Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2016), pp. xvii, 51, https://asean.org/storage/2016/09/ASEAN-Investment-
Report-2016.pdf.
20
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Investment Report 2017: Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Zones in
ASEAN (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2017), p. 4, https://asean.org/storage/2017/11/ASEAN-Investment-
Report-2017.pdf.
21
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Investment Report 2018: Foreign Direct Investment and the Digital Economy
in ASEAN (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2018), p. 7, https://asean.org/storage/2018/11/ASEAN-Investment-
Report-2018-for-Website.pdf.
22
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Investment Report 2019: FDI in Services: Focus on Healthcare (Jakarta:
ASEAN Secretariat, 2019), p. 22, https://asean.org/storage/2019/10/AIR-2019.pdf.
23
Furthermore, the disproportionate concentration of Korean FDI in some ASEAN member states has
endured during this period.
24
“Korea and ASEAN Relations,” 2019 ASEAN-Republic of Korea Commemorative Summit,
https://2019asean-roksummit.kr/?menuno=70.
25
Ibid.
26
“Vietnam, RoK sign joint vision statement on defence cooperation,” Nhân Dân, 24 April 2018,
https://en.nhandan.com.vn/politics/item/6080102-vietnam-rok-sign-joint-vision-statement-on-defence-
cooperation.html.
27
“What’s in the New Brunei-South Korea Defense Pact?”, The Diplomat, 18 September 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/whats-in-the-new-brunei-south-korea-defense-pact/.
28
DJ Yap, “PH signs ‘defense cooperation’ MOU with S. Korea,” Inquirer.net, 26 November 2019,
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/182276/ph-signs-defense-cooperation-mou-with-s-korea.
29
Hathai Techakitteranun, “Thailand, South Korea agree to deepen ties,” The Straits Times, 3 September
2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thailand-south-korea-agree-to-deepen-ties.
30
“Country Profile and Bilateral Relationship,” Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Seoul, Republic of
Korea, https://kemlu.go.id/seoul/en/pages/hubungan_bilateral/558/etc-menu.
31
Park Chan-kyong, “South Korea signs US$1 billion deal to supply submarines to Indonesia,” South China
Morning Post, 12 April 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/3005964/south-korea-signs-us1-
billion-deal-supply-submarines-indonesia.
32
Josh Smith and Ju-min Park, “South Korea unveils fighter jet mock-up amid program challenges,”
Reuters, 15 October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-jet/south-korea-unveils-fighter-jet-
mock-up-amid-program-challenges-idUSKBN1WU1H2.
33
“Future of the Vietnamese Defense Industry - Market Attractiveness, Competitive Landscape and
Forecasts to 2024,” Global Information, Inc., https://www.giiresearch.com/report/sdi654971-future-
vietnamese-defense-industry-market.html.
34
“Philippine Navy’s second 2,600-ton frigate launched in South Korea,” Naval Today, 8 November 2019,
https://navaltoday.com/2019/11/08/philippine-navys-second-2600-ton-frigate-launched-in-south-korea/.
35
“South Korea’s Hanwha Systems to upgrade Philippine frigates,” Naval Today, 23 August 2019,
https://navaltoday.com/2019/08/23/south-koreas-hanwha-systems-to-upgrade-philippine-frigates/.
36
New Southern Policy Brochure, op.cit.

10
 ISSUE: 2020 No. 7
ISSN 2335-6677



37
According to the statement, both sides would “promote and facilitate dialogue and cooperation, including
through ASEAN-led mechanisms, to support complete denuclearisation and the establishment of permanent
peace on the Korean Peninsula”. It also notes “ASEAN’s readiness to continue to play a constructive role in
contributing to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula”. See “ASEAN-Republic of Korea Joint Vision
Statement for Peace, Prosperity and Partnership,” ASEAN Secretariat, 26 November 2019,
https://asean.org/storage/2019/11/The-ASEAN-ROK-Joint-Vision-Statement-Final-formatted-4-November-
201....pdf.
38
Hyonhee Shin, “North Korea says 'pointless' for Kim to attend South Korea ASEAN summit,” Reuters, 21
November 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea/north-korea-says-not-right-time-
for-kim-to-attend-south-korea-asean-summit-idUSKBN1XV0KW.
39
Lee Je-hun, “Kim Jong-un declines to visit Busan for S. Korea-ASEAN summit,” The Hankyoreh, 22
November 2019, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/918116.html.
40
Andrew O’Neil (2015), “South Korea as a Middle Power: Global Ambitions and Looming Challenges”, in
Scott A. Snyder (Ed.), Middle-Power Korea Contributions to the Global Agenda, pp. 75-89, Council on
Foreign Relations Press, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-cjOl7BEZncaDRnc2hjUk5tbG8/view.
41
Hoang Thi Ha, “Korea Finds in ASEAN a Like-Minded Partner on the Indo-Pacific,” ISEAS Commentary
2019/103, 2 December 2019, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/medias/commentaries/item/10927-korea-finds-in-
asean-a-likeminded-partner-on-the-indopacific-by-hoang-thi-ha.
42
Compiled by the authors from publicly available sources.

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 March 30, 2020

ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-

Pacific (AOIP) and Korea’s
New Southern Policy

Ina CHOI
Ph.D., Associate Research Fellow, Southeast Asia and Oceania Team
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

As US-China rivalry intensifies, small and middle-sized states are under

increasing pressure to maintain their strategic autonomy. This applies to
the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
as well. Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has succeeded in expand-
ing its strategic space by positioning itself as an “honest broker” between
major powers. The ASEAN-based dialogue platforms such as the East
Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have provided
venues for major powers to engage with each other, contributing to confi-
dence-building and stability in the region. The ASEAN-led multilateral sys-
tem has enabled smaller states to have a say in regional affairs, and so-
called “ASEAN centrality” – placing ASEAN at the center of the Asia-Pa-
cific architecture – has strengthened ASEAN’s leverage vis-à-vis great
powers. The norm of ASEAN centrality presents a good example of how
weaker states can exercise collective power against great-power politics.
However, with tension escalating between the US and China, it is ques-
tioned whether ASEAN can continue to play a role in preserving the sta-
bility of the region.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3889166

 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and Korea’s New Southern Policy 2

ASEAN’s basic policy towards US-China relations has been to avoid choosing sides, hoping
for Washington and Beijing to settle differences based on their mutual strategic interests. This
strategy seemed to work during the presidency of Obama, who chose not to pursue an all-out
competition with China. While Obama’s Asia rebalancing strategy aimed to constrain China’s
power, it also sought a constructive engagement with China.1 This non-zero-sum approach to
China left some room for ASEAN to maintain its strategic autonomy, and President Obama’s
great attention to ASEAN-led mechanisms was well-received by ASEAN member states.2

However, a more confrontational posture towards China under the Trump administration is
narrowing strategic options that ASEAN countries have. Apart from waging a war on trade and
technological hegemony, the US seeks to counter Beijing’s regional influence, criticizing
China’s Belt and Road Initiatives as a debt diplomacy.3 Most notably, in its Indo-Pacific Stra-
tegic Report, the US bluntly labels China as a revisionist power seeking to “reorder the region
to its advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory eco-
nomics to coerce other nations.”4 Although the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy is in line with Presi-
dent Obama’s re-balancing strategy, this zero-sum approach to China is shrinking ASEAN’s
strategic choices in managing regional affairs. In particular, anti-China rhetoric embedded in
the Indo-Pacific discourse worries ASEAN nations in that they might be forced to choose be-
tween the two rival visions of regional cooperation.5 The revitalization of the Quad – a security
dialogue formed by the US, Japan, Australia and India – and President Trump’s relative lack
of interest in the ASEAN-led multilateralism have also raised concerns that ASEAN may lose
its centrality in the regional security architecture.

Against this backdrop, ASEAN leaders adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)
during the 34th ASEAN summit in Bangkok last year. Led by Indonesia, the AOIP was created
out of the need to reaffirm ASEAN’s centrality in addressing the evolving Indo-Pacific construct
and mitigate great-power frictions in the region. Key takeaways from the AOIP are as follows.
First, the AOIP ensures that ASEAN continues to remain at the center of Indo-Pacific cooper-
ation. Acknowledging the growing interdependence between the Asia-Pacific and Indian
Ocean regions, the AOIP emphasizes that no new regional architecture is required to promote

1
De Castro, Renato Cruz. 2018. “The Obama Administration’s Strategic Rebalancing to Asia: Quo Vadis in 2017?” Pacific Focus 33(2): 179-208, pp. 185-186.
2
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. 2016. “Obama’s legacy in South-east Asia” The Straits Times, 4 November 2016. https://www.straitstimes.com/opin-
ion/obamas-legacy-in-south-east-asia (accessed on 13 March, 2020)
3
Remarks by Vice President Pence at the 2018 APEC CEO Summit (16 November, 2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-
president-pence-2018-apec-ceo-summit-port-moresby-papua-new-guinea/ (accessed on 13 March, 2020)
4
US Department of Defense. 2019. ‘Message from the Secretary of Defense’, in “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a
Networked Region”.
5
Stromseth, Jonathan. 2019. “Don’t make us choose: Southeast Asia in the throes of US-China rivalry” The New Geopolitics, Brookings.

March 30, 2020 ㅣ

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3889166

 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and Korea’s New Southern Policy 3

Indo-Pacific cooperation. The AOIP suggests that the existing ASEAN-centered mechanisms
such as the EAS, ARF and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) are suf-
ficient platforms to address newly emerging needs of Indo-Pacific cooperation.6 This sends a
clear message to extra-regional powers that ASEAN-based multilateralism should be the ful-
crum in forging an Indo-Pacific architecture.

Second, with a great focus on development and prosperity, the AOIP restates that the Indo-
Pacific is a region for dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry.7 While embracing key con-
cepts of the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy – e.g. transparency, rules-based order, international
law and freedom of navigation and overflight – the AOIP emphasizes inclusiveness and pros-
perity for all, implying that ASEAN does not exclude China in its Indo-Pacific vision. This is the
continuation of ASEAN’s traditional hedging strategy to avoid choosing any one party over the
other. In an attempt to alleviate the strategic rivalry, the AOIP also proposes several priority
areas in need of cooperation that leads to peace and prosperity of the region: maritime coop-
eration, enhancing connectivity, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other
possible forms of economic cooperation.8 The emphasis on connectivity, sustainable develop-
ment and intra/extra-economic cooperation continues ASEAN’s previous efforts to lead
ASEAN-based regional development. In addressing maritime cooperation, the AOIP highlights
non-traditional security issues where mutual interests of regional states converge, creating
room for strategic cooperation among major powers.

It is difficult to see whether the AOIP, as a non-binding document, will play a meaningful role
in reconciling competing interests between the two great powers.9 Nevertheless, the AOIP
provides reference for how smaller states can be resilient to challenges posed by great power
politics. First, by adopting a unified perspective on how to deal with changing regional dynam-
ics, ASEAN reasserts the unity of its member states. Proving to speak with one voice, despite
different national interests, demonstrates ASEAN’s will to maintain its collective power against
the growing US-China rivalry. Second, ASEAN has taken a pre-emptive move to provide an
alternative version of the Indo-Pacific discourse. ASEAN’s vision of the Indo-Pacific, more de-
velopment-oriented and less security-driven, attempts to offset strategic elements of the Indo-
Pacific discourse forged by the quadrilateral group. The inclusive vision of the Indo-Pacific

6
The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), p. 2. https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf (ac-
cessed on 13 March 2020).
7
AOIP, p. 2.
8
AOIP, pp. 3-5.
9
Laksmana, Evan. 2019. “Flawed assumptions: Why the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is defective” Asia Global Online (19 September)
https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/flawed-assumptions-why-the-asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific-is-defective (accessed on 14 March, 2020)

March 30, 2020 ㅣ

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3889166

 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and Korea’s New Southern Policy 4

opens the door for China to participate in ASEAN-led Indo-Pacific cooperation, allowing re-
gional countries to have room for maneuver. Third, the AOIP reinstates the importance of mul-
tilateralism when unilateralism and minilateral alignments are gaining ground in the region.
With the AOIP, ASEAN endeavors to restore the primacy of the ASEAN-centered multilateral
system which has been a cornerstone in facilitating peace and prosperity throughout the Asia
Pacific region.

ASEAN’s efforts to overcome great power rivalry offer many implications for South Korea,
which faces a similar dilemma. Like Southeast Asian nations, Korea is striving to secure its
autonomy in the face of growing major power competition. Korea’s New Southern Policy (NSP),
aimed at reorienting its foreign policy towards ASEAN and India, is also derived from the need
to diversify its diplomatic options against the changing geopolitical dynamics. Building upon
the already well-developed relations with ASEAN, the NSP seeks to elevate the status of
ASEAN on a par with Korea’s four traditional major diplomatic partners: the US, China, Japan
and Russia. The three pillars of the NSP – People, Peace and Prosperity (3Ps) – manifest a
departure from Korea’s previous economic-oriented policy in its engagement with ASEAN.
President Moon’s visit to all ASEAN countries in the first half of his term also signifies Korea’s
commitment to enhance its strategic ties with ASEAN.10 The NSP has been received well by
ASEAN countries, leading to Korea’s hosting of the third ASEAN-ROK special summit and an
inaugural summit between the five Mekong countries and Korea last November. The special
summit reaffirmed that both sides would advance their strategic partnership towards a future-
oriented community that shares peace and co-prosperity.

The NSP indeed opened a new chapter in ASEAN-Korea relations, but there is still room for
Korea to upgrade its strategic partnership with ASEAN. Under the Peace pillar of the NSP,
Korea has garnered ASEAN’s support for establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. How-
ever, it has not articulated a vision of how to jointly address uncertainty in the strategic envi-
ronment of the region. The heavy focus on the Korean Peninsula issue is also likely to narrow
the scope of strategic cooperation between the two sides in managing US-China competition.
A recent survey of Southeast Asian elites released by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a Sin-
gaporean think tank, suggests that few ASEAN elites see Korea as a “preferred and trusted
strategic partner” in hedging against the uncertainties of the great power rivalry.11 While these
results represent the views of a minority of opinion leaders and would need further substanti-

10
President Moon Jae-in is the first Korean president to pay a visit to all ASEAN member states during their term in office.
11
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. 2020. “The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report”, p. 30.

March 30, 2020 ㅣ

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3889166

 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and Korea’s New Southern Policy 5

ation to be generalized, the clear indication is that Korea needs to make further efforts to ad-
dress ASEAN’s strategic needs. One possible way is to enhance cooperation where mutual
strategic interests converge, and in this sense the AOIP can be a good reference for forging
future partnership between the two.

In fact, the aim of the NSP, “creating a co-prospering, people-centered peace community,”
goes hand-in-hand with the regional vision proposed by the AOIP. Since the AOIP invites like-
minded countries to “promote an enabling environment for peace, stability and prosperity in
the region,”12 there are several areas where Korea can work with ASEAN to lead a peaceful
and prosperous Indo-Pacific partnership. First, as an active participant of the EAS, ARF and
ADMM-Plus, Korea can contribute to enhancing the role and functions of ASEAN-based mech-
anisms. Given that maintaining multilateralism is the most viable option for smaller states to
counterbalance great power politics, both ASEAN and Korea have mutual interests to
strengthen the multilateral architecture in the region. Second, Korea can invest more efforts to
shore up ASEAN-led development and connectivity projects. For instance, Korea can drive its
renewed emphasis on Korea-Mekong partnerships to support cooperation projects under the
Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) launched by
ASEAN member states. Supporting the development of ASEAN-led regional initiatives not only
serves to buttress ASEAN centrality – the cornerstone of regional multilateralism – but also
diversifies the scope of regional cooperation beyond the competing visions proposed by the
two major powers. Lastly, given that the AOIP highlights the importance of maritime coopera-
tion, Korea can expand its partnership with ASEAN in the following areas: promoting maritime
safety and sustainable management of marine resources; addressing transnational crimes at
sea; and addressing maritime pollution, sea-level rise and marine debris. Ensuring a stable
maritime environment is one of the vital interests of the region, and it is also a key area where
multilateral cooperation is mostly needed.

Gaining fresh momentum from the ASEAN-ROK special summit last year, the Korean govern-
ment announced its plans to push forward with the NSP 2.0, an updated version of the NSP.
13 There is a wealth of potential opportunities and overlapping areas between the NSP and
AOIP, and these are the areas that the Korean government could consider more closely when
formulating its NSP 2.0.

12
AOIP, p. 2.
13
Lee, Chi-dong. 2019. “S. Korea announces New Southern Policy 2.0 plan after Busan summit with ASEAN” Yonhap News
Agency (27 November) https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20191127004500315 (accessed on 17 March, 2020).

March 30, 2020 ㅣ

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3889166