2021 BAR REVIEW REMEDIAL LAW

Handout No. 6
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

DECLARATORY RELIEF

A Petition for Declaratory Relief is an Action Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation

The court with jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief is the Regional Trial Court, the
subject matter of litigation in an action for declaratory relief being incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Section 19 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction
in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil
actions in which the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation[.] Consistent with
the law, the Rules state that a petition for declaratory relief is filed “in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court.” A special civil action for declaratory relief is filed for a judicial determination of any
question of construction or validity arising from, and for a declaration of rights and duties, under
any of the following subject matters: a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation. However, a
declaratory judgment may issue only if there has been “no breach of the documents in question.”
If the contract or statute subject matter of the action has already been breached, the appropriate
ordinary civil action must be filed. If adequate relief is available through another form of action
or proceeding, the other action must be preferred over an action for declaratory relief. City of
Lapu-Lapu vs. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, 742 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 187583 November
26, 2014, J. Leonen

REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS OF THE COMELEC AND THE COA

Rule 64 Allows Only 30 Days to File Petition with No Fresh-Period Upon Denial of MR

Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has a reglementary period
of 60 days from receipt of denial of the motion for reconsideration. The Constitution, however,
specifies that the reglementary period for assailing the decisions, orders, or rulings of the
constitutional commissions is thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision, order, or ruling. For
this reason, a separate rule was enacted in the Rules of Court. Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides the guidelines for filing a petition for certiorari under this rule. Section 2 of
the rule specifies that “[a] judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.” The phrase, “except as hereinafter
provided,” specifies that any petition for certiorari filed under this rule follows the same
requisites as those of Rule 65 except for certain provisions found only in Rule 64. One of these
provisions concerns the time given to file the petition. Section 3 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure states: SEC. 3. Time to file petition. — The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a

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motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed
under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed.
If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. Under this
rule, a party may file a petition for review on certiorari within 30 days from notice of the judgment
being assailed. The reglementary period includes the time taken to file the motion for
reconsideration and is only interrupted once the motion is filed. If the motion is denied, the party
may file the petition only within the period remaining from the notice of judgment. The Law Firm
of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 269, G.R. No.
185544 January 13, 2015, J. Leonen

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, AND MANDAMUS

A Motion for Reconsideration is a Plain, Speedy, and Adequate Remedy

A motion for reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law alluded to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for
reconsideration is required before a petition for certiorari is filed “to grant [the court which
rendered the assailed judgment or order] an opportunity . . . to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.”
Madarang vs. Morales, 725 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 199283 June 9, 2014, J. Leonen

Rule 45 Petition May Be Treated as Rule 65 Petition if the Subject is One of Jurisdiction

There have been instances when a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was treated by
this court as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. As explained in China Banking Corporation v.
Asian Construction and Development Corporation, 550 SCRA 585 (2008): [I]n many instances, the
Court has treated a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 as a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, such as in cases where the subject of the recourse was one
of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. vs. Chiongbian, 729
SCRA 580, G.R. No. 197530 July 9, 2014, J. Leonen

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Rule 65 Petition Does Not Stay the Principal Case Unless a TRO or WPI Has Been Issued

As basic as the principle of finality of judgments is the rule that filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure “shall not interrupt the course of the principal case
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against
the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.” Unlike an appeal, a pending petition
for certiorari shall not stay the judgment or order that it assails. The 2005 Rules of Procedure of
the National Labor Relations Commission, which were in effect when the material incidents of
this case occurred, explicitly and specifically makes this principle applicable to decisions of labor
arbiters and of the National Labor Relations Commission. De Ocampo vs. RPN-9/Radio
Philippines, Inc., 777 SCRA 183, G.R. No. 192947 December 9, 2015, J. Leonen

Non-Compliance with the Rules of Court Constitutes Grave Abuse of Discretion

Non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not, as the Office of the Solicitor General asserts, a
mere error of judgment. It constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In Crisologo v. JEWM Agro-
Industrial Corporation, 717 SCRA 644 (2014): This manifest disregard of the basic rules and
procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman
v. Judge Medel Belen, 674 SCRA 477 (2012), the Court held as inexcusable abuse of authority the
trial judge’s “obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure.” Such level of
ignorance is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to “evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,” or in essence,
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Needless to say, judges are expected
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must
know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence requires no less.
Cruz vs. People, 828 SCRA 685, G.R. No. 224974 July 3, 2017, J. Leonen

An Administrative Agency Does Not Have the Power to Rule on Petitions for Certiorari

DARAB’s exercise of the innately judicial certiorari power is an executive encroachment into the
judiciary. It violates the separation of powers; it is unconstitutional. With or without a law
enabling it, DARAB has no power to rule on jurisdictional controversies via petitions for certiorari.
DARAB’s self-serving grant to itself of the power to issue writs of certiorari in the 1994 DARAB
New Rules of Procedure is itself a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It must be annulled for running afoul of the Constitution. Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta vs.
Land Bank of the Philippines, 836 SCRA 367, G.R. No. 205128 August 9, 2017, J. Leonen

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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Entitlement to an Informer’s Reward is Not Ministerial Which May Be the Subject of Mandamus

Petitioner’s entitlement to an informer’s reward is not a ministerial matter. Quite the contrary,
its determination requires a review of evidentiary matters and an application of statutory
principles and administrative guidelines. Its determination is a discretionary, quasi-judicial
function, demanding an exercise of independent judgment on the part of certain public officers.
Whether from Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338, Presidential Decree No. 707, Section 331 of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, Section 35 of Presidential Decree No. 1773, or
Section 282 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, it is clear that the grant
of an informer’s reward is not a readily demandable entitlement. It is not a legally mandated duty
in which every incident is prescribed with a preordained outcome. The mere consideration of a
claim is contingent on several factual findings. Making these findings demands proof the
appraisal of which is to be done by certain public officers. Hence, it demands the exercise of
discretion. Lihaylihay vs. Tan, 872 SCRA 277, G.R. No. 192223 July 23, 2018, J. Leonen

QUO WARRANTO

A De Facto Officer’s Title to his Office May Only be Attacked Through a Quo Warranto Petition

In any case, we cannot order the invalidation of respondent’s appointment in the present
proceedings. To do so would necessarily result in his removal from an office he has physically
possessed for almost nine (9) years. Respondent has been discharging the duties of the City
Assessor, at the very least, under a color of title to the position especially since he possesses the
qualifications for it. Analogous to a de facto officer, respondent’s title to his office may only be
attacked through a petition for quo warranto filed by the Government or by the person claiming
title to the office. Abad vs. Dela Cruz, 753 SCRA 680, G.R. No. 207422 March 18, 2015, J. Leonen

EXPROPRIATION

RA 8974 Requires Immediate Payment of Zonal Value Before Government Can Take Possession

As stated in Republic v. Judge Gingoyon, 478 SCRA 474 (2005), Republic Act No. 8974 “provides
for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67” since it requires
the immediate payment of the zonal value and the value of the improvements on the land to the
property owner before the trial court can allow the government to take possession. In contrast,
Rule 67 only requires the government to deposit the assessed value of the property for it to enter

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and take possession. National Power Corporation vs. Posada, 752 SCRA 550, G.R. No. 191945
March 11, 2015, J. Leonen

Expropriation Case is Not Automatically Dismissed When Property Ceases to be for Public Use

The rule, therefore, is that expropriation proceedings must be dismissed when it is determined
that it is not for a public purpose, except when: First, the trial court’s order already became final
and executory; Second, the government already took possession of the property; and Lastly, the
expropriation case already caused prejudice to the landowner. The expropriation case is not
automatically dismissed when the property ceases to be for public use. The state must first file
the appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the trial court having jurisdiction over the
proceedings. The grant or denial of any Motion to Withdraw in an expropriation proceeding is
always subject to judicial discretion. National Power Corporation vs. Posada, 752 SCRA 550, G.R.
No. 191945 March 11, 2015, J. Leonen

FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE

Pendency of Action to Annul Foreclosure Sale Does Not Toll the Running of Redemption Period

Here, the Certificate of Sale in favor of Dura Tire was registered on February 20, 1995. Mahinay,
as the successor-in-interest of previous owner A&A Swiss, had one (1) year from February 20,
1995, or on February 20, 1996, to exercise his right of redemption and buy back the property
from Dura Tire at the bid price of P950,000.00. With Mahinay failing to redeem the property
within the one (1)-year period of redemption, his right to redeem had already lapsed. As
discussed, the pendency of an action to annul the foreclosure sale or to enforce the right to
redeem does not toll the running of the period of redemption. The trial court correctly dismissed
the Complaint for judicial declaration of right to redeem. Mahinay vs. Dura Tire & Rubber
Industries, Inc., 825 SCRA 383, G.R. No. 194152 June 5, 2017, J. Leonen

Registration of Certificate of Sale is Mandatory to Start the Running of Redemption Period

The registration of the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff after an extrajudicial sale is a
mandatory requirement; thus, if the certificate of sale is not registered with the Registry of
Deeds, the property sold at auction is not conveyed to the new owner and the period of
redemption does not begin to run. In the case at bar, the Ex Officio Sheriff of the City of Malolos,

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Bulacan was restrained from registering the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan and the certificate of sale was only issued to respondent after the Complaint for
annulment of real estate mortgage was filed. Therefore, even if the properties had already been
foreclosed when the Complaint was filed, their ownership and possession remained with
petitioner since the certificate of sale was not registered with the Registry of Deeds. This supports
petitioner’s claim that it never asked for the reconveyance of or asserted its ownership over the
mortgaged properties when it filed its Complaint since it still enjoyed ownership and possession
over them. First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. vs. Philippine Bank of Communications, 866
SCRA 438, G.R. No. 202836 June 19, 2018, J. Leonen

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

As a General Rule, Prior Demand to Pay is a Jurisdictional Requirement under Rule 70

Possession of a property belonging to another may be tolerated or permitted, even without a

prior contract between the parties, as long as there is an implied promise that the occupant will
vacate upon demand. Refusal to vacate despite demand will give rise to an action for summary
ejectment. Thus, prior demand is a jurisdictional requirement before an action for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer may be instituted. Under Rule 70, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
an action for unlawful detainer may be brought against a possessor of a property who unlawfully
withholds possession after the termination or expiration of the right to hold possession. Rule 70,
Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that there must first be a prior demand to pay
or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate before an action can be filed. Cruz vs.
Christensen, 842 SCRA 65, G.R. No. 205539 October 4, 2017, J. Leonen

Prior Demand is Unnecessary when the Complaint is Premised on the Expiration of Lease

The property in this case is owned by petitioner. Respondents had a month-to-month lease with
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. Petitioner contends that no prior demand was necessary in
this case since her Complaint was premised on the expiration of respondents’ lease, not on the
failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of the lease. The jurisdictional
requirement of prior demand is unnecessary if the action is premised on the termination of lease
due to expiration of the terms of contract. The complaint must be brought on the allegation that
the lease has expired and the lessor demanded the lessee to vacate, not on the allegation that
the lessee failed to pay rents. The cause of action which would give rise to an ejectment case
would be the expiration of the lease. Thus, the requirement under Rule 70, Section 2 of a prior

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“demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate” would be unnecessary.
Cruz vs. Christensen, 842 SCRA 65, G.R. No. 205539 October 4, 2017, J. Leonen

The Only Issue in an Ejectment Proceeding is Physical Possession of the Property Involved

Specifically, action for unlawful detainer is brought against a possessor who unlawfully withholds
possession after the termination and expiration of the right to hold possession. To determine the
nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the complaint must be
examined. The jurisdictional facts must be evident on the face of the complaint. There is a case
for unlawful detainer if the complaint states the following: (1) initially, possession of property by
the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such
possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s
right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction Development Company, 857 SCRA 549,
G.R. No. 196795 March 7, 2018, J. Leonen

The Issue of Ownership Can Be Resolved Provisionally in an Ejectment Proceeding

In ejectment cases, courts will only resolve the issue of ownership provisionally if the issue of
possession cannot be resolved without passing upon it. In Co v. Militar, 421 SCRA 455 (2004): We
have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership
by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not
susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the
undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of possession. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. Eversely Childs Sanitarium vs.
Barbarona, 860 SCRA 283, G.R. No. 195814 April 4, 2018, J. Leonen

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The MTC has Jurisdiction Over an Ejectment Proceeding Regardless of the Defenses Raised

Not even the claim that there is an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will remove the
Metropolitan Trial Court’s jurisdiction over the complaint. To emphasize, physical possession, or
de facto possession, is the sole issue to be resolved in ejectment proceedings. Regardless of the
claims or defenses raised by a defendant, a Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over an
ejectment complaint once it has been shown that the requisite jurisdictional facts have been
alleged, such as in this case. Courts are reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the
issue of physical possession, as there is a public need to prevent a breach of the peace by
requiring parties to resort to legal means to recover possession of real property. Intramuros
Administration vs. Offshore Construction Development Company, 857 SCRA 549, G.R. No.
196795 March 7, 2018, J. Leonen

Judgment of Eviction in an Ejectment Proceeding Will Affect Sublessees

A sublessee cannot invoke a superior right over that of the sublessor. A judgment of eviction
against respondent will affect its sublessees since the latter’s right of possession depends entirely
on that of the former. A complaint for interpleader by sublessees cannot bar the recovery by the
rightful possessor of physical possession of the leased premises. Since neither the specific
performance case nor the interpleader case constituted forum shopping by petitioner, the
Metropolitan Trial Court erred in dismissing its Complaint for Ejectment. Intramuros
Administration vs. Offshore Construction Development Company, 857 SCRA 549, G.R. No.
196795 March 7, 2018, J. Leonen

CONTEMPT

Willful and Deliberate Forum Shopping Shall Constitute Direct Contempt

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, apart from being a ground
for summary dismissal, “willful and deliberate forum shopping . . . shall constitute direct
contempt, [and is] a cause for administrative sanctions.” Thus, it would be inadequate to stop
with a mere declaration that respondent City of Makati, which acted through its counsels,
engaged in forum shopping. It was among the matters prayed for by petitioner City of Taguig that
appropriate sanctions be imposed for respondent City of Makati’s wilful and deliberate forum
shopping. So too, respondent City of Makati’s defenses have been duly pleaded and considered
in this case. Under Rule 71, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, direct contempt
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by

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imprisonment not exceeding 10 days and/or a fine not exceeding P2,000.00. Accordingly, a fine
of P2,000.00 is imposed on each of respondent City of Makati’s counsels who filed the Petition
for Annulment of Judgment before the Court of Appeals: Atty. Pio Kenneth I. Dasal, Atty. Glenda
Isabel L. Biason, and Atty. Gwyn Gareth T. Mariano. City of Taguig vs. City of Makati, 793 SCRA
527, G.R. No. 208393 June 15, 2016, J. Leonen

Difference Between Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt

Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge “for
the benefit of the other party.” A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the
court’s authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.
Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey a court order, judgment, or
decree which he or she refuses to do for the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement
and the preservation of a right of a private party, who is the real party-in-interest in the
proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor’s punishment is to compel obedience to the order.
Thus, civil contempt is not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt
is not necessary to prove it. Oca vs. Custodio, 832 SCRA 615, G.R. No. 199825 July 26, 2017, J.
Leonen

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