Salazar vs.

Felias

Doctrine: Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on
which it is situated. It confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such
properties. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.

Case Title: FELICITAS L. SALAZAR, Petitioner vs. REMEDIOS FELIAS, on her

own behalf andrepresentation of the other HEIRS OF CATALINO NIVERA,
Respondents G.R. No. 213972, February 5, 2018, REYES, J.:

Facts:
Private respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino Nivera
(Heirs of Nivera) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and
Damages against the Spouses Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo) and Felisa
Lastimosa (Fe1isa). The former sought to recover from the latter four parcels of
land located in Baruan, Agno, Pangasinan (subject property).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC Branch 55 rendered a Decision,[5] declaring the
Heirs of Nivera as the absolute owners of the parcels of land in question, and
thereby ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and to surrender
possession thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not Felicitas claims that the execution cannot proceed, as the subject
property is her family home and is therefore exempt from execution.
Held:
The movant's claim that his/her property is exempt from execution for being the
family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the
execution of a final and executory ruling. It is imperative that the claim for
exemption must be set up and proven.
Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated. It confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties.[34]
It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases
However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the
movant's family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and
forestall the execution of a final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is
not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that such property is a family
home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family
Code, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved.
In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly
mandates that the occupancy of the family home, either by the owner thereof, or
by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. This occupancy must be real, or
actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or that which is
merely presumptive or constructive.
it becomes all too apparent that Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the
subject property is her family home, sans sufficient evidence proving her
allegation. It bears emphasis that it is imperative that her claim must be backed

1slf
with evidence showing that the home was indeed (i) duly constituted as a family
home, (ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of
a family, (iii) resided in by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries),
(iv) forms part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's
consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family, and (v) has an actual
value of Php 300,000.00 in urban areas, and Php 200,000.00 in rural areas.
Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the property sought to
be executed is indeed her family home.
Interestingly, Felicitas admitted in her Motion for Reconsideration dated
December 23, 2013, and her Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated June 22,
2006, that she is, and has always been a resident of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.[41]
Similarly, the address indicated in Felicitas' petition for review on certiorari is
Muñoz, Nueva Ecija... the Court takes judicial notice of the final ruling of the RTC
Branch 55 in the case for recovery of ownership, that the subject property has
belonged to the Heirs of Nivera since the 1950s.
This automatically negates Felicitas' claim that the property is her family home.
Felicitas' argument that the property subject of the writ of execution is a family
home, is an unsubstantiated allegation that cannot defeat the binding nature of a
final and executory judgment. Thus, the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued
by the RTC Branch 55 must perforce be given effect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated December 6, 2013 and Resolution dated
August 7, 2014, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97309
are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Ining vs. Vega

Doctrine: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit
from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent's property.
Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate
that was formed among the... decedent's heirs. Time and again, it has been held
that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may
prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the...
co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster
of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing.
Case Title: ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL
VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO, CAMILO FRANCISCO,
ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS
FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO;
RAMON TRESVALLES, ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA
(DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA
IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO

2slf
RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED
BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA RIMON GONZALES AND REMEDIOS RIMON
CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN
INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS, vs. LEONARDO R.
VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO
M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD
VEGA, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013, DEL
CASTILLO, J.:

Facts:
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a...
parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. (24071) RO-630[5] (OCT RO-630).
Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria
Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein
respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in
turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M.
Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the... substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners
Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and
Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea,
Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo
Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus
Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is
survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco
(Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo),... Lucimo
Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and
Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan
Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear
from the records if he was made... party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and
Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria's grandchildren or spouses thereof
(Gregoria's heirs).
acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as
Romana's surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kalibo, Aklan... recovery of ownership and possession, with... damages, against
Gregoria's heirs.
Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he demanded the partition of the
property but Gregoria's heirs refused to heed his demands... that portions of the
property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be collated
and included as part of the... portion to be awarded to Gregoria's heirs
Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject
property;... that the same be partitioned after collation and determination of the
portion to which he is entitled; that Gregoria's heirs be ordered to execute the
necessary documents or agreements

3slf
Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had
no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the
subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in... good faith by
sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon,
and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual,
adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that
they have been paying the... taxes on the property; that Leonardo's claim is
barred by estoppel and laches
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer
Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the property. The trial
court rendered a Decision Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs'
right of action has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;
Declaring Lot 1786... to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan
Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to issue a transfer
certificate... of title to the heirs of Natividad Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of
Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4)
share; and Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share. Trial court found... deeds
of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to
Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the
subject property remained part of Leon's estate at the... time of his death in 1962.
Leon's siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in
equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to Romana's share as
the latter's successors. The trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from
Leon's death in 1962 or up to 1992 within which to file the partition case. Since
Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already barred
by prescription
In addition, the trial court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo was... guilty of
laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to Gregoria's heirs
exclusively.
Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA... the appeal questioned the
propriety of the trial court's dismissal of Civil Case No. 5275, its application of
Article 1141, and the award of the property to Gregoria's heirs exclusively this
appeal is GRANTED
CA held that the trial court's declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and
November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr.,
respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners' failure to appeal the
same. Proceeding from the premise that no... valid prior disposition of the
property was made by its owner Leon and that the property which remained part
of his estate at the time of his death passed on by succession to his two siblings,
Romana and Gregoria, which thus makes the parties herein who are Romana's
and
Gregoria's heirs co-owners of the property in equal shares, the appellate court
held that only the issues of prescription and laches were needed to be resolved.
CA declared that prescription began to run not from Leon's death in 1962, but
from Lucimo Sr.'s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979,...
which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with
Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against

4slf
his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he... expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership," the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over
the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his co-ownership
with
Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the
30-year prescriptive period under Article 1141.
The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.'s sole possession of the property for more
than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the respondents as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership either, stating that his exclusive possession of
the property and appropriation of its fruits... even his continuous payment of the
taxes thereon while adverse as against strangers, may not be deemed so as
against Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect
that the latter was ousted or deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention
of... assuming exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a showing that
this was effectively made known to Leonardo.
CA granted respondents' prayer for partition, directing that the manner of
partitioning the property shall be governed by the Commissioner's Report and
Sketch and the Supplementary Commissioner's Report which the parties did
not... contest.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the decision of the Trial Court on the ground that Francisco repudiated
the co-ownership only on February 9, 1979 and upholding the decision
dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription and laches.
Held:
The Court denies the Petition.
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been
settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the
property remained part of Leon's estate.
The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez
and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then concluded that no such sale
from
Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not
appeal. Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should be considered
settled. Thus, petitioners' insistence on Lucimo Sr.'s 1943 purchase of the
property to reinforce their claim over the... property must be ignored. Since no
transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly
remained part of Leon's estate upon his passing in 1962.
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria,
who thus inherited the property in equal shares.
Gregoria's and Romana's heirs are co-owners of the subject property.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana,
petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may

5slf
use the property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as... not to injure the interest
of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to
their rights.
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription
the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the... co-owner has performed unequivocal
acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within
which Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141
and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall begin to run in...
favor of a co-owner and against the other co-owners only from the time he
positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the
other co-owners.
What escaped the trial and appellate courts' notice, however, is that while it may
be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a
repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property.
Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria;... he is merely Antipolo's son-in-law, being
married to Antipolo's daughter Teodora.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora
is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership,
which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely
against Leonardo, and his right to seek... a partition of the property has not been
lost.
Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this... very
well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More
significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens system and
covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon's name. Leon's ownership ceased only in
1962, upon his death when the property passed... on to his heirs by operation of
law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006 Decision
and the September 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74687are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Romero vs. Singson

Doctrine: True, no suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made. However, the failure of a party to comply
with this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. If the opposing party
fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived.

6slf
Case Title: CONSOLACION D. ROMERO AND ROSARIO S.D.
DOMINGO, Petitioners, v. ENGRACIA D. SINGSON, Respondent. G.R. No.
200969, August 03, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts:
Petitioners Consolacion Domingo Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo and
respondent Engracia Domingo Singson - are siblings. Their parents, Macario and
Felicidad Domingo, own a 223-square meter piece of property (the subject
property) located at 127 F. Sevilla Street, San Juan City, Metro Manila... which
was issued in 1953. It appears that petitioners and other siblings, Rafael and
Ramon Domingo, are the actual occupants of the subject... property, having
stayed there with their parents since birth. On the other hand, respondent took up
residence in Mandaluyong City after getting married.
On February 22, 1981, Macario passed away, while Felicidad died on September
14, 1997. On June 7, 2006,... a new certificate of title... was issued in
respondent's name, by virtue of a notarized "Absolute Deed of Sale"... ostensibly
executed on June 6, 2006 by and between Macario and Felicidad - as sellers,
and respondent - as buyer. And this despite the fact that Macario and Felicidad
were then already deceased. Soon thereafter, respondent sent letters to her
siblings demanding that they vacate the subject property, under pain of litigation.
Petitioners and their other siblings just as soon filed a Complaint... against
respondent and the Register of Deeds of San Juan City for annulment and
cancellation of TCT 12575 and the June 6, 2006 deed of sale, reconveyance,
and damages, on the claim that... the deed of sale is a forgery and that as heirs
of Macario and Felicidad, the true owners of the subject property, they were
entitled to a reconveyance of the same.
Petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming that the June 6, 2006 deed of sale was
a forgery, and no certificate of title in her name could be issued; that they thus
remained co-owners of the subject property, and respondent had no right... to
evict them; and that the pendency of Civil Case No. 70898-SJ bars the ejectment
suit against them.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners essentially petition should be dismissed for failure to
comply with Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation
to Article 151 of the Family Code.
Held:
The Court grants the Petition.
The procedural issue of lack of attempts at compromise should be resolved in
respondent's favor. True, no suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been... made. However, the failure of
a party to comply with this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. If the
opposing party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is
deemed waived... the fact that respondent has in her favor a certificate of title is
of no moment; her title cannot be used to validate the forgery or cure the void
sale.

7slf
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the
registration of the property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest
in him or her the title to the property. A certificate of title merely confirms or
records title already... existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title
should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of
real property.
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same remained
in the name of the original registered owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs
of the owners, petitioners and respondent thus became, and remain co-owners -
by succession - of the subject... property. As such, petitioners may exercise all
attributes of ownership over the same, including possession - whether de facto or
de jure; respondent thus has no right to exclude them from this right through an
action for ejectment.
This Court has always recognized the general rule that in appellate proceedings,
the reversal of the judgment on appeal is binding only on the parties in the
appealed case and does not affect or inure to the benefit of those who did not
join or were not made... parties to the appeal. An exception to the rule exists,
however, where a judgment cannot be reversed as to the party appealing without
affecting the rights of his co-debtor, or where the rights and liabilities of the
parties are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be... inseparable, in
which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all. This exception,
which is based on a communality of interest of said parties, is recognized in this
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 29, 2012 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114363 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The December 11, 2009 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
160 in SCA No. 3144 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Moreno vs. Kahn

Doctrine: Non-compliance with the earnest effort requirement under Article 151
of the Family Code is not a jurisdictional defect which would authorize the courts
to dismiss suits filed before them motu proprio. Rather, it merely partakes of a
condition precedent such that the non- compliance therewith constitutes a
ground for dismissal of a suit should the same be invoked by the opposing party
at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Otherwise,
such ground is deemed waived.

Case Title: OSE Z. MORENO, PETITIONER, V. RENE M. KAHN, CONSUELO

MORENO KAHN-HAIRE, RENE LUIS PIERRE KAHN, PHILIPPE KAHN, MA.
CLAUDINE KAHN MCMAHON, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MUNTINLUPA CITY, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 217744, JULY 30, 2018 ,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts:

8slf
Jose alleged that since May 1998 and in their capacity as lessees, he and his
family have been occupying two (2) parcels of land co-owned by his full-blooded
sister, respondent Consuelo et al. Around April or May 2003, respondents offered
to sell to Jose the subject lands which Jose accepted. Over the next few years,
Jose made partial payments to respondents

However, in July 2010, Consuelo decided to "cancel" their agreement, and

thereafter, informed Jose of her intent to convert the earlier partial payment as
rental payments instead. In response, Jose expressed his disapproval to
Consuelo's plan and demanded that respondents proceed with the sale, which
the latter ignored. He then claimed without his consent, Consuelo et al sold their
shares over the subject lands to Rene. Upon learning of such sale, Jose sent a
demand letter to Rene asserting his right to the subject lands. As his demands
went unheeded, Jose brought the matter to the barangay upon for conciliation
proceedings between him and Rene. As no settlement was agreed upon, Jose
was constrained to file the subject complaint for specific performance and
cancellation of titles with damages.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the RTC's motu proprio dismissal of
Jose's complaint and if Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable to this case.

Held:

NO, Article 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

Non-compliance with the earnest effort requirement under Article 151 of the
Family Code is not a jurisdictional defect which would authorize the courts to
dismiss suits filed before them motu proprio. Rather, it merely partakes of a
condition precedent such that the non-compliance therewith constitutes a ground
for dismissal of a suit should the same be invoked by the opposing party at the
earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Otherwise, such
ground is deemed waived

The base issue is whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of
dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards
a compromise have been made. In the case at hand, no motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in
the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that
respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.

Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or

objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-
defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer-to-petitioner’s
complainant, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on
earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have
any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint

9slf
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 24,
2014 and the Resolution dated March 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 129232 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil
Case No. 12-004 is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa City, Branch 205 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug vs. Abuda

Doctrine: For a mortgage contract to be valid, the absolute owner of a property

must have free disposal of the property. That property must be used to secure
the fulfillment of an obligation.

Case Title: FLORANTE VITUG, Petitioner,vs. EVANGELINE A.

ABUDA, Respondent. G.R. No. 201264 January 11, 201, LEONEN, J.:

Facts:

Abuda loaned P250,000.00 to Vitug and his wife, NarcisaVitug. As security for
the loan, Vitug mortgaged to Abuda his property. The property was then subject
of a conditional Contract to Sell between the National Housing Authority and
Vitug. That, upon consummation and completion of the sale by the NHA of said
property, the title-award thereof, shall be received by the Mortgagee by virtue of
a Special Power of Attorney, executed by Mortgagor in her favor. The parties
executed a "restructured" mortgage contract on the property to secure the
amount of P600,000.00 representing the original P250,000.00 loan, additional
loans, and subsequent credit accommodations given by Abuda to Vitug with an
interest of five (5) percent per month. By then, the property was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title under Vitug's name. Spouses Vitug failed to pay their
loans despite Abuda's demands.

Abuda filed a Complaint for Foreclosure of Property before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. On December 19, 2008, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a
Decision in favor of Abuda.On appeal, the RTC ruled in favor of Abuda and
ordered Vitug to pay the principal sum with interest and upon default of the
defendant to fully pay the aforesaid sums, the subject mortgaged property shall
be sold at public auction to pay off the mortgage debt. The judgement was
affirmed with the modification as to the payment of interest. Petitioner argues that
not all the requisites of a valid mortgage are present. He contends that a
mortgagor must have free disposal of the mortgaged property. That the existence
of a restriction clause in his title means that he does not have free disposal of his
property.

Issue:

Whether the restriction clause in petitioner's title rendered invalid the real estate
mortgage he and respondent Evangeline Abuda executed.

Held:

10slf
No. Petitioner may dispose or encumber his property. The restrictions are mere
burden or limitations on petitioner’s jus disponendi.

All the elements of a valid mortgage contract were present. For a mortgage
contract to be valid, the absolute owner of a property must have free disposal of
the property. That property must be used to secure the fulfillment of an
obligation. Article 2085 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to contracts of pledge and
mortgage:

(1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation; (2)
That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or
mortgaged; (3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the
free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally
authorized for the purpose.

Petitioner's undisputed title to and ownership of the property is sufficient to give

him free disposal of it. As owner of the property, he has the right to enjoy all
attributes of ownership including jusdisponendi or the right to encumber, alienate,
or dispose his property "without other limitations than those established by law."
Petitioner's claim that he lacks free disposal of the property stems from the
existence of the restrictions imposed on his title by the National Housing
Authority. These restrictions do not divest petitioner of his ownership rights. They
are mere burdens or limitations on petitioner'sjus disponendi.Thus, petitioner may
dispose or encumber his property. However, the disposition or encumbrance of
his property is subject to the limitations and to the rights that may accrue to the
National Housing Authority. When annotated to the title, these restrictions serve
as notice to the whole world that the National Housing Authority has claims over
the property, which it may enforce against others. Contracts entered into in
violation of restrictions on a property owner's rights do not always have the effect
of making them void ab initio. Contracts that contain provisions in favor of one
party may be void ab initio or voidable. Contracts that lack consideration, those
that are against public order or public policy, and those that are attended by
illegality or immorality are void ab initio.

Contracts that only subject a property owner's property rights to conditions or

limitations but otherwise contain all the elements of a valid contract are merely
voidable by the person in whose favor the conditions or limitations are made. The
mortgage contract entered into by petitioner and respondent contains all the
elements of a valid contract of mortgage. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
found no irregularity in its execution. There was no showing that it was attended
by fraud, illegality, immorality, force or intimidation, and lack of consideration. At
most, therefore, the restrictions made the contract entered into by the parties
voidable by the person in whose favor they were made—in this case, by the
National Housing Authority. Petitioner has no actionable right or cause of action
based on those restrictions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated

October 26, 2011 and its Resolution dated March 8, 2012 are AFFIRMED. The
interest rate for the loan of P600,000.00 is further reduced to 6% per annum from
July 1, 2013 until fully paid.

11slf
SO ORDERED.

De Santos vs. Angeles

Doctrine: Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been
decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now
recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural
children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.

Case Title: MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS v HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES,

JUDGE, RTC OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE
SANTOS, respondents. G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995 Romero, J.

Facts:

This case is a petition for certiorari. Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, a
marriage that gave them a daughter, the herein petitioner Maria Rosario de
Santos. The marriage turns sour and they got separated. Thereafter, Antonio had
a relationship with the herein private reapondent, Conchita Talag. Antonio sought
a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a
Nevada court in 1949.

Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with

whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This
union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala.
Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent
contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On
March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value
of P15,000,000.00.

On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late
husband’s estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was
survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children,
and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was granted.

On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent’s account of her

administration, the court a quo passed upon petitioner’s motion. The court, citing
the case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99
[1983]), declared private respondent’s ten children legitimated and thereupon
instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the
heirs of Antonio de Santos.

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the
court’s order dated January 9, 1992. Hence this petition.

12slf
Issue:

Whether or not the natural children by legal fiction be legitimized

Held:

No, since only natural children can be legitimated under the Family Code.  Article
269 of the Civil Code (Now Article 177 of the Family Code) provides that Children
born outside of wedlock of parents who at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified to marry each other are natural.

In the case at hand, the herein private respondent did not deny that all her
children were born prior to the death of Sofia and while the marriage between Dr
De Santos and Sofia Bona was still subsisting.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of

the court a quo dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby declared the
SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent Antonio de Santos and, as such,
entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.

SO ORDERED.

SSS vs. Aguas

Doctrine: CHILDREN BORN IN WEDLOCK ARE LEGITIMATE

Case Title: SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS,

JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her Legal
Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, Respondents. G.R. No. 165546, February 27,
2006, CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:

This is a Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA

declaring that the petitioners are entitled to the SSS benefits accruing from the
death of Pablo Aguas. Pablo Aguas is a member and pensioner of the SSS. After
his death, the surviving spouse, Rosanna Aguas, filed a claim with SSS for death
benefits, which also indicates that his minor child, Jeylnn, survives him. Her claim
for monthly pension was settled. However, SSS received a sworn letter from
Pablo’s sister, Leticia, alleging Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna but the
latter had several children with Romeo Dela Pena with whom she is living with
and dependent for support. As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of the
monthly pension. The respondents Rosanna and Jeylnn, joined by Janet Aguas
who also claimed to be the child of deceased filed a claim for the
Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC).
The SSC ruled that they are not entitled to the claims. As for Jeylnn, even if
Pablo as her father signed her birth certificate, she is not a legitimate child based
on her baptismal certificate in the name of Jenelyn that she was the daughter of

13slf
Rosanna and Romeo. As for Janet, SSC relied on Leticia’s testimony that Pablo
and Rosanna only adopted her.

Petitioner maintains that Janet and Jeylnn are not entitled to the pension
because based on the evidence on record, particularly the testimonies of the
witnesses, they are not the legitimate children of Pablo and Janet. On the other
hand, respondents contend that Janet and Jeylnn’s legitimacy may be impugned
only on the grounds stated in Article 166 of the Family Code, none of which were
proven.

Issue:

Whether or not JeyInn entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death
of Pablo.

HELD:

Yes, Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS Benefits.

Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate. In the case of De Jesus v. Estate of
Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon it was held that there is perhaps no presumption
of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right
of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.

In the present case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of
Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn's status as a legitimate child of Pablo
can no longer be contested. The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is
buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablo's signature, which was verified
from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by
the father is a competent evidence of paternity. The presumption of legitimacy
under Article 164, however, cannot extend to Janet because her date of birth was
not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing
proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child's parents were legally
married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of
that marriage. It should be noted that respondents likewise submitted a
photocopy of Janet's alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give
said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnn's because it was not
verified in any way by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without
probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by the civil register of
the fact of Janet's birth on the date stated in the certificate. In any case, a record
of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. Here, the
witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but merely
adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. As for Rosanna, while she is the legitimate wife
of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to
present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent
on him for support even if they were already living separately. Therefore, only
Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as
it was established that she is his legitimate child.

14slf
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared entitled to the SSS death
benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.

SO ORDERED.

Miller vs. Miller

Doctrine: Citing Braza v City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros

Occidental: “legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.”

Case Title: GLENN M. MILLER, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SURVIVING LEGAL

HEIRS, NAMELY: [1] EVELYN L. MILLER; [2] JENNIFER ANN L. MILLER; [3]
LESLIE ANN L. MILLER; [4] RACHEL ANN L. MILLER; AND [5] VALERIE ANN
L. MILLER, PETITIONERS, v. JOAN MILLER Y ESPENIDA A.K.A. JOHNLYN
MILLER Y ESPENIDA AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GUBAT,
SORSOGON,RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 200344, August 28, 2019, LEONEN, J.:

Facts:

Respondent filed a partition of the Miller estate claiming to be the illegitimate

child of the deceased. Petitioner filed a petition to cancel Respondent’s certificate
of live birth and to remove the entry that stated the deceased to be her father.
RTC and CA found for the Respondent due to the documents showing that the
deceased acknowledged her as an illegitimate child and that the petitioner failed
to discharge the burden of proving that said documents were false.

Petitioner’s initiatory pleading is a Petition for Correction of Entries in the

Certificate of Live Birth. Citing In re: Barreto v The Local Registrar of Manila, the
Court explained that: the summary procedure for correction of entries under Art.
412, CC and Rule 108, ROC is confirmed to “innocuous or clerical errors, such
as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding”

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court
Judgment allowing private respondent Joan Miller y Espenida to continue using
the surname Miller.

Held:

The Court held that what Petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change but a
substantial affecting Respondent’s rights. This Court stresses that Glenn's
initiatory pleading before the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City is a Petition for
Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller y Espenida.[58]
This type of petition is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
Here, petitioners sought the correction of private respondent's surname in her
birth certificate registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 825. They want her to use

15slf
her mother's surname, Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an
acknowledged illegitimate child of John
What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of
correcting a single letter in private respondent's surname due to a misspelling.
Rather, private respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her
surname from Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not
only her identity, but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is
substantial.In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental,[61] this Court emphasized that "legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attack[.]"[62] Moreover, impugning the legitimacy of a child is
governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Court of Appeals' June 30, 2011 Decision and February 3, 2012 Resolution
in CA-G.R. CV No. 84826 are AFFIRMED insofar as they affirm the November
26, 2004 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 48 in
Spec. Proc. No. 4703, which dismissed the Petition for Correction of Entries in
the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller y Espenida.

However, the declarations of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court
as to the legitimacy and filiation of private respondent Joan Miller y Espenida
are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court's other
pronouncements in its November 26, 2004 Judgment are
also NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

This Decision is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the refiling of the appropriate action

before the proper court.

Finally, this Court resolves to treat the Memorandum of petitioners Evelyn L.

Miller, Jennifer Ann L. Miller, Leslie Ann L. Miller, Rachel Ann L. Miller, and
Valerie Ann L. Miller, who substituted Glenn M. Miller as his surviving legal heirs,
as a formal administrative complaint against Judge Jacinta B. Tambago of
Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Masbate City. The administrative complaint is
referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for proper investigation, report,
and recommendation.

SO ORDERED.

Braza vs. City Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental

Doctrine: A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which
all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.

Facts:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo),
also known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married
16slf
The union bore Ma. Cristina's co-petitioners Paolo Josef[2]... and Janelle Ann...
and Gian Carlo Pablo died. During the wake... respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille)
began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick)
as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of
which... she obtained Patrick's birth certificate[6] from the Local Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy[7] of a marriage contract showing that
Pablo and Lucille were married... drawing her and her co-petitioners to file...
before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental a petition[8] to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the
Local Civil Register.
Petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the... entries in Patrick's birth record
with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment,
and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille,
all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick... to DNA
testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of
the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose,
the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
Trial court dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special
proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family...
court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick
to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an
ordinary adversarial action.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and
questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.
Held:
In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct
clerical,... spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry.
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction... of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which
all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the
court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

17slf
Ara vs. Pizarro

Doctrine: If filiation is sought to be proved under the second paragraph of Article

172 of the Family Code, the action must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.

Case Title: ROMEO F. ARA AND WILLIAM A. GARCIA vs. DRA. FELY S.
PIZARRO AND HENRY ROSSI, GR. No. 187273, February 15, 2017,
LEONEN, J.:

Facts:

Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners), and Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and
Henry A. Rossi (respondents) all claimed to be children of the late Josefa A. Ara,
who died on November 18, 2002. Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro was born
to Josefa and her then husband, Vicente Salgado, who died during World War II.
At some point toward the end of the war, Josefa met and lived with an American
soldier by the name of Darwin Gray. Romeo F. Ara was born from this
relationship. Josefa later met a ertain Alfredo Garcia, and, from this relationship,
gave birth to sons Ramon Garcia and William A. Garcia. Josefa and Alfredo
married on January 24, 1952.8 After Alfredo passed away, Josefa met an Italian
missionary named Frank Rossi, who allegedly fathered Henry Rossi.

Respondent Pizarro claims that, to her knowledge, she is the only child of Josefa.
Further, petitioner Garcia is recorded as a son of a certain Carmen Bucarin and
Pedro Garcia, as evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth dated July 19, 1950;
and petitioner Ara is recorded as a son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores,
evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth.

Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Rossi, verbally sought
partition of the properties left by the deceased Josefa, which were in the
possession of respondent Pizarr. Plaintiffs a quo filed a Complaint for judicial
partition of properties left by the deceased Josefa, before the Regional Trial
Court. In her Answer, respondent Pizarro averred that, to her knowledge, she
was the only legitimate and only child of Josefa. She denied that any of the
plaintiffs a quo were her siblings, for lack of knowledge or information to form a
belief on that matter. Further, the late Josefa left other properties mostly in the
possession of plaintiffs a quo, which were omitted in the properties to be
partitioned by the trial court in Special Civil Action No. 337-03, enumerated in her
counterclaim.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents can be considered legitimate children of Josefa

A. Ara and are entitled of partition of the properties left by the deceased Josefa.

Held:

No. A person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation after the death of a
putative parent must do so via a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a

18slf
final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation. In Uyguangco v. Court of
Appeals:

The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in

proving his illegitimate filiation: Article. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

5. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

6. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his
claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which
his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove
his filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his
action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second
paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows:

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to
introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed
by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario
Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his
alleged son's illegitimate filiation. True, birth certificates offer prima facie
evidence of filiation. To overthrow the presumption of truth contained in a birth
certificate, a high degree of proof is needed. However, the circumstances
surrounding the delayed registration prevent us from according it the same
weight as any other birth certificate. Even without a record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment, filiation may still be established after the
death of a putative parent through an admission of filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument, signed by the parent concerned. evidence
any admissions of filiation.

However, petitioners did not present in evidence any admission of filiation. An

admission is an act, declaration, or omission of a party on a relevant fact, which
may be used in evidence against him. The evidence presented by petitioners
such as group pictures with Josefa and petitioners' relatives, and testimonies do
not show that Josefa is their mother. They do not contain any acts, declarations,
or omissions attributable directly to Josefa, much less ones pertaining to her
filiation with petitioners. Although petitioner Garcia's Baptismal Certificate,
Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate of Live Birth obtained via late registration
all state that Josefa is his mother, they do not show any act, declaration, or

19slf
omission on the part of Josefa. Josefa did not participate in making any of them.
The same may be said of the testimonies presented. Although Josefa may have
been in the photographs, the photographs do not show any filiation. By definition,
none of the evidence presented constitutes an admission of filiation under Article
172 of the Family Code.

An alleged parent is the best person to affirm or deny a putative descendant's

filiation. Absent a record of birth appearing in a civil register or a final judgment,
an express admission of filiation in a public document, or a handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned, a deceased person will have no
opportunity to contest a claim of filiation.

In truth, it is the mother and in some cases, the father, who witnesses the actual
birth of their children. Descendants normally only come to know of their parents
through nurture and family lore. When they are born, they do not have the
consciousness required to be able to claim personal knowledge of their parents.
It thus makes sense for the parents to be present when evidence under the
second paragraph of Article 172 is presented.

The limitation that an action to prove filiation as an illegitimate child be brought

within the lifetime of an alleged parent acknowledges that there may be other
persons whose rights should be protected fromspurious claims. This includes
other children, legitimate and illegitimate, whose statuses are supported by
strong evidence of a categorical nature.

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of
the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that
duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the
publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as
might have occurred.

Therefore, this Court upholds the birth certificates of William Garcia and Romeo
F. Ara, as issued by the Civil Registry, in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals,
where the High Court ruled that the evidentiary nature of public documents must
be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity
or nullity. Consequently, appellants Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia are
deemed not to be the illegitimate sons of the late Josefa Ara.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The August 1,

2008 Decision and the March 16, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 00729 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Tinitigan vs. Republic

Doctrine: It is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth
certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes
the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by
the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the
blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that individuals are not falsely
named as parents.

20slf
Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF
CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH FO YUHARES JAN BARCELOTE TINITIGAN
AND AVEE KYNNA NOELLE BARCELOTE TINITIGAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ET AL. G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017, Carpio, J.

Facts:

On 24 June 2008, Barcelote bore a child out of wedlock with a married man
named Tinitigan in her relative's residence. She was not able to register the birth
of their child, whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not
give birth in a hospital. To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in
Davao del Sur while Tinitigan lived with his legitimate family in Davao City and
would only visit her. On 24 August 2011, she bore another child with Tinitigan,
whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not register his
birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal charges. Thereafter, she
lost contact with Tinitigan and she returned to Davao City.

When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission,
Barcelote finally decided to register the births of both children. She returned to
Davao del Sur to register their births. The Local Civil Registrar approved the late
registration of the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote,
with Registry Nos. 2012-1344 and 2012-1335 after submitting proof that the NSO
has no record of both births on file.

However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to
the NSO, Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live birth with
the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in their office.
The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City
state the following:

1. Birth Certificate with Registry No. 2. Birth Certificate with Registry No.
2008- 21709: 2011- 28329:
a. Name: Avee Kyna Noelle Barcelote a. Name: Yuhares Jan Barcelote
Tinitigan; Tinitigan; b. Date of Birth: August 14,
2011
b. Date of Birth: June 4, 2008;
c. Place of Birth: EUP Family Care c. Place of Birth: EUP Family Care
Clinic, Holy Cross Agdao Davao City; Clinic, Holy Cross Agdao Davao City;
d. Informant: Ricky O. Tinitigan. d. Informant: Ricky O. Tinitigan.

Thus, Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject
birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation,
and for containing erroneous entries.

The RTC ruled in favour of Barcelote and ordered the cancellation of the two
birth certificates as the subject birth certificates are legally infirm, because they
were registered unilaterally by Tinitigan without the knowledge and signature of
Barcelote in violation of Section 5, Act No. 3753. The RTC also held that the
subject birth certificates contain void and illegal entries, because the children use
the surname of Tinitigan, contrary to the mandate of Article 176 of the Family
Code stating that illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother.
However, upon appeal to the CA, it reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC.
21slf
Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the CA in reversing the decision of the RTC was
correct.

Held:

No. Prior to its amendment, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that an
“Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support”. Subsequently, upon
the effectivity of RA 9255,the provision that “illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother” was retained,
with an added provision that they “may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father”.

The use of the word “may” readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child
is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word
“may” is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate
children.

The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother. The use of the word "shall"
underscores its mandatory character. The discretion on the part of the
illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional upon proof of
compliance with RA 9255.

Since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside a valid
marriage, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The
children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the
subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore incorrect;
their surname should have been "Barcelote" and not "Tinitigan."

Further, the argument that the subject birth certificates are the express
recognition of the children's filiation by Tinitigan is incorrect because they were
not duly registered in accordance with the law. Act No. 3753, otherwise known as
the Civil Registry Law, states that “In case of an illegitimate child, the birth
certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant
or only the mother if the father refuses.”

Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth
certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes
the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by
the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the
blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that individuals are not falsely
named as parents.

Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did
not sign the documents, the local civil registrar had no authority to register the
subject birth certificates. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the 5

March 2015 Decision and the 3 December 2015 Resolution of the Court of

22slf
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03223-MIN. We REINSTATE the 28 February 2013
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, in SPC. PROC.
No. 12,007-12. The Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registry of
Davao City is ordered to CANCEL: (1) the Certificate of Live Birth of Avee Kynna
Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan under Registry No. 2008-21709 and (2) the Certificate
of Live Birth of Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan under Registry No. 2011-28329.

SO ORDERED.

Aguilar vs. Siasat

Doctrine: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is

established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child
in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that
does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

It must be concluded that Rodolfo– who was born during the marriage of Alfredo
Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths – has
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. He
correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS satisfies the requirement for proof of
filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family
Code; by itself, said document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.”

Case Title: RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT G.R. No. 200169,
January 28, 2015,
J. Mariano C. Del Castillo

Facts:

Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses)

died, intestate and without debts. Included in their estate are two parcels of land
(herein subject properties).

Petitioner, Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a civil case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Sias at alleging
that Rodolfo is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. Edna
claimed that Rodolfo is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar
spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of
generosity and kindness of heart; that he is not a natural or adopted child of the
Aguilar spouses.

RTC issued its Decision rendering that Rodolfo is not deemed vested with
sufficient interest in this action to be considered qualified or entitled to the

23slf
issuance of the writ of mandatory injunction and Damages prayed for, this was
affirmed by CA.

Rodolfo argues in this petition that Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS satisfies the
requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under
Article 172 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not Rodolfo satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses

Held:

Yes, Rodolfo satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the
Aguilar spouses.

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)

the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required.

In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated
on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish
the
child’s acknowledgment.

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded
on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are
living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.

Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and
in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred
by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

24slf
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be
concluded that Rodolfo– who was born during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar
and Candelaria Siasat- Aguilar and before their respective deaths – has
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. He
correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS satisfies the requirement for proof of
filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family
Code; by itself, said document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. “

Rodolfo has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all
the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod
City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary
evidence – particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS to prove filiation. It was erroneous
for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph
thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence

submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant

and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to
have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.

In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social

welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006 Decision and
December 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No.
64229, as well as the August 17, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to SURRENDER to the
petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070.

SO ORDERED.

Fabilar vs. Paller

Doctrine: In the absence of the record of birth and admission of legitimate

filiation, Article 172of the Family Code (Code) provides that filiation shall be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. Such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a

25slf
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court (Rules). Article 175 of the same Code also allows illegitimate children to
establish their filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as that of
legitimate children.

Case Title: HEIRS OF PAULA C. FABILLAR, AS REPRESENTED BY

AUREO[[*]] FABILLAR, Petitioners vs. MIGUEL M. PALLER, FLORENTINA P.
ABAYAN, AND DEMETRIA P. SAGALES, Respondents, G.R. No. 231459,
January 21, 2019, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts:

The instant case stemmed from an Amended Complaint[5] for Recovery of

Ownership, Possession, and Damages filed by respondents against Spouses
Custodio and Paula (collectively, the Custodios), before Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Eastern Samar involving a 3.1003-hectare parcel of agricultural coconut
land... with an assessed value of P950.00 Respondents claimed that the subject
land was a portion of a bigger parcel of land originally owned by their
grandfather, Marcelino Paller. After the latter's death, or sometime in 1929 or
1932, his children, Ambrosio Paller Isidra Paller and Ignacia Paller along several
others, orally partitioned his properties and took possession of their respective
shares.
From Marcelino's estate, respondents' father, Ambrosio, was given about one (1)
hectare of the subject land, in addition to a smaller property situated in Sitio
Dungon, Brgy. 07... while Isidra was given two (2) hectares as her rightful share.
After Isidra's death, her son, Juan Duevo... sold the two (2)-hectare land to
Ambrosio's wife and respondents' mother, Sabina Macawile Through succession
upon their parents' death, respondents alleged that the subject land was passed
on to them. On the other hand, the Custodios' predecessor-in-interest and
petitioners' grandmother, Ignacia, was assigned two (2) parcels of land situated
in Sitio Dungon, Brgy. 07 and Sitio Bangalog, Brgy. Parina as her share
In 1995, respondent Demetria, daughter of Ambrosio, mortgaged the subject land
to Felix R. Aide with right to repurchase. Upon her return from Manila in 2000,
she redeemed the same but discovered that the Custodios took possession of
the land and refused to vacate therefrom despite demands; hence, the complaint.
In their Answer,[13] the Custodios claimed to be legitimate and compulsory heirs
of Marcelino who can validly and legally possess the subject land which has not
been partitioned, and thus, commonly owned by his heirs. They further averred
that Ambrosio is not a child of Marcelino and, as such, has no right to claim the
subject land.[14] To support respondents' claim that Ambrosio is a child of
Marcelino and Susana Paller, they presented before the MCTC a copy of
Ambrosio's baptismal certificate[15] indicating that his father was Marcelino;... to
establish their acquisition of the two (2)-hectare portion, they adduced a copy of
the unnotarized deed of sale dated May 3, 1959 in waray dialect denominated as
"Documento Hin Pag Guibotongan Hin Cadayunan"... purportedly covering the
sale of the said portion by Juan to respondents' mother,... abina, who, however,
was described therein as married to "Marcos Paller" (Marcos),... not to Ambrosio.

26slf
To explain the discrepancies in the names reflected in the above documents,
Miguel explained that "Ambrosio" and "Talampona" are the real names, and that
"Marcos" and "Susana" were mere aliases. Custodios filed a Demurrer to
Evidence... averring that respondents failed to establish their claim that Ambrosio
is a son of Marcelino. Thus, they contended that respondents cannot claim to
have lawfully and validly acquired the subject land by right of representation from
Ambrosio. Respondents evidence failed to prove not only their ownership of the
subject land, but likewise the identity of the land they seek to recover,
considering the different boundaries... reflected in the unnotarized deed of sale
and the tax declarations (TD) they presented Demurrer to Evidence was denied
in an Order... and the Custodios were allowed to present their evidence. MCTC
declared respondents as the lawful owners of the subject land, and ordered the
Custodios to surrender the ownership and physical possession of the subject
land, and to pay actual damages, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit
Aggrieved, the Custodios appealed to the RTC.vRTC affirmed the MCTC ruling.
Diissatisfied, Spouses Custodio and herein petitioners, heirs of Paula,[32]
elevated the matter to the CA,... CA affirmed the RTC Decision, finding Marcelino
to be the father of Ambrosio, thereby declaring that respondents, as children of
Ambrosio, have a right over the subject land. It rejected the Custodios' claim of
lack of cause of action for failure to declare heirship prior to the institution of the
complaint for having been raised only for the first time on appeal, and
considering further the parties' active participation in presenting evidence to
establish or negate respondents' filial relationship to Marcelino.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that respondents' predecessor, Ambrosio,
is a child of Marcelino and is entitled to inherit the subject land.

Held:

By virtue of the evidence presented by respondents, the lower courts could not
have justly concluded that the two (2)-hectare parcel of land subject of the
unnotarized deed of sale is indeed a portion of the subject land. Accordingly, the
Court finds that a reversal of the assailed Decision is warranted.WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 2016 and the
Resolution dated March 10, 2017 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City in CA-G.R.
CEB-S.P. No. 08293 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment
is entered DISMISSING the Amended Complaint for Recovery of Ownership,
Possession, and Damages filed by respondents Miguel M. Paller, Florentina P.
Abayan, and Demetria P. Sagales before the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Giporlos-Quinapondan, Eastern Samar, docketed as Civil Case No. 273.
while the Court, in Yaptinchay, ruled that a declaration of heirship can only be
made in a special proceeding inasmuch as what is sought is the establishment of
a status or right,[43] by way of exception, the Court, in Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte,
[44] declared that "the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship,"[45]
and "the [trial court] had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it
defined during the pre-trial,"[46] as in this case.

27slf
the case falls under the exception, and there is no need to institute a separate
special proceeding for the declaration of Ambrosio's heirship.
In this case, the MCTC, the RTC, and the CA did not appreciate any other
material proof related to the baptismal certificate of Ambrosio that would
establish his filiation with Marcelino, whether as a legitimate or an illegitimate
son. Contrary to the ruling of the said courts, the burden of proof is on
respondents to establish their affirmative allegation that Marcelino is Ambrosio's
father,[57] and not for petitioners to disprove the same, because a baptismal
certificate is neither conclusive proof of filiation[58]/parentage nor of the status of
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person baptized.[59] Consequently, while
petitioners have admitted that Marcelino's heirs had partitioned Marcelino's
properties among them,[60] the Court finds respondents' evidence to be
inadequate to prove the claimed filiation with the property owner, Marcelino, as to
entitle Ambrosio and his successors-in-interest, herein respondents, to share in
the properties left by Marcelino. However, it is well to point out that the portion of
the property supposedly inherited by Ambrosio from Marcelino involved only a
one (1)-hectare portion of the subject land.
The Court finds that respondents failed to establish the identity of the land they
were seeking to recover,... respondents' evidence are insufficient to warrant a
conclusion that the two (2)-hectare parcel of land subject of the unnotarized deed
of sale is indeed a portion of the subject land.
By virtue of the evidence presented by respondents, the lower courts could not
have justly concluded that the two (2)-hectare parcel of land subject of the
unnotarized deed of sale is indeed a portion of the subject land. Accordingly, the
Court finds that a reversal of the assailed Decision is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 2016
and the Resolution dated March 10, 2017 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City in
CA-G.R. CEB-S.P. No. 08293 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is entered DISMISSING the Amended Complaint for Recovery of
Ownership, Possession, and Damages filed by respondents Miguel M. Paller,
Florentina P. Abayan, and Demetria P. Sagales before the 9th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Giporlos-Quinapondan, Eastern Samar, docketed as Civil Case No.
273.

SO ORDERED.

Conti vs. CA
Doctrine: Under Art. 172 of the Family Code,  the filiation of ligitimate children
shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent's admission of such
legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such
other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting
his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds
of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.  By analogy, this
method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.

Case Title: Heirs of Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 118464; Decemebr 21, 1998 BELLOSILLO, J.

28slf
Facts:
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-
owners of a lot in Lucena City. Lourdes died intestate without issue. Private
respondents, claiming to be the collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes, filed
an action for partition and damages. Conti refused the partition on the ground
that private respondents failed to produce any document to prove that they were
the rightful heirs of Lourdes. Ignacio died and was substituted as party-defendant
by his children. During the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo
Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo to prove that they were the collateral heirs of the
deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as co-owner of
the subject lot. Private respondent, Lydia Sampayo presented an original copy of
her certificate of live birth to prove that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes and
daughter of Josefina Sampayo. Josefina, is the only living sibling of Lourdes.
Lydia also testified that the other siblings of Lourdes were Remedios, Luis and
Manuel and are deceased. She presented their baptismal certificates together
with the birth certificate of Manuel. The baptismal certificates were presented in
lieu of the birth certificates because the Office of the Civil Registry was burned
and all records were totally burned. Adelaida Sampayo testified that she was the
spouse of Manuel, the brother of deceased Lourdes. Rosario claimed that the
late Ignacio Conti paid for real property taxes of the property and spend for
necessary repairs and improvements because of their agreement that Lourdes
would leave her share of the property to them. No will was presented by
petitioners to substantiate this claim. Petitioners argue that a complaint for
partition to claim a supposed share of the deceased co-owner cannot prosper
without prior settlement of the latter’s estate.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner correct in stating that settlement of the estate is a
condition precedent before the commencement of any action pertaining to the
deceased.

Held:

No. Prior settlement of estate is not a condition precedent before the

commencement of any action pertaining to the deceased. Article 494. No co-
owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for
a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be
extended by a new agreement. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a
period which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall there be any partition
when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or
co-heir against his co-owners or coheirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership Article 777. The rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent Conformably with Arts.
777 and 494 of the Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as
a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at any time or to
terminate the coownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In demanding
partition private respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to

29slf
the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners' theory as to the
requirement of publication would have been correct had the action been for the
partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with
extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary settlement
of estates of small value . But what private respondents are pursuing is the mere
segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from her through
intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-
owners. The title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at
once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the
claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the
purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate
passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs.
Therefore, prior settlement of estate is not a condition precedent before the
commencement of any action pertaining to the deceased.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 30 March

1994 and Resolution dated 21 December 1994 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Abella vs. Cabañero

Doctrine: Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely appropriate"

to the action for support filed by petitioner Richelle for her child. An action for
support may very well resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it involves the
same parties, is brought before a court with the proper jurisdiction, prays to impel
recognition of paternal relations, and invokes judicial intervention to do so. Thus,
it was improper to rule here, as the Court of Appeals did, that it was impossible
to entertain petitioner's child's plea for support without her and petitioner first
surmounting the encumbrance of an entirely different judicial proceeding.

Case Title: RICHELLE P. ABELLA, for and in behalf of her minor daughter,
MARL JHORYLLE ABELLA, Petitioner, -versus – POLICARPIO CABAÑERO,
Respondent. G.R. No. 206647, SECOND DIVISION, August 9, 2017, LEONEN,
J.

Facts:

Petitioner Richelle alleged that while she was still a minor in the years 2000 to
2002, she was repeatedly sexually abused by respondent Cabañero inside his
rest house at Barangay Masayo, Tobias Fornier, Antique. 9 As a result, she
allegedly gave birth to a child on August 21, 2002. Richelle added that on
February 27, 2002, she initiated a criminal case for rape against Cabañero, This,
however, was dismissed. Later, she initiated another criminal case, this time for
child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. This, too, was dismissed.
Richelle prayed for the child's monthly allowance in the amount of P3,000.00.

RTC dismissed Richelle’s Complaint without prejudice, on account of her failure

to implead her minor child, Jhorylle, as plaintiff. CA sustained. It ruled that filiation
proceedings should have first been separately instituted to ascertain the minor

30slf
child’s paternity and that without these proceedings having first resolved in favour
of the child’s paternity claim, petitioner’s action for support could not prosper.

Issue:

Whether or not CA erred in ruling that filiation proceedings should have first been
separately instituted to ascertain the minor child’s paternity and that without
these proceedings having first resolved in favour of the child’s paternity claim,
petitioner’s action for support could not prosper.

Held:

Yes.

While it is true that the grant of support was contingent on ascertaining paternal
relations between respondent and petitioner's daughter, Jhorylle, it was
unnecessary for petitioner's action for support to have been dismissed and
terminated by the Court of Appeals in the manner that it did. Instead of
dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the
Regional Trial Court. There, petitioner and her daughter should have been
enabled to present evidence to establish their cause of action — inclusive of their
underlying claim of paternal relations — against respondent.

Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely appropriate" to

the action for support filed by petitioner Richelle for her child. An action for
support may very well resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it involves the
same parties, is brought before a court with the proper jurisdiction, prays to impel
recognition of paternal relations, and invokes judicial intervention to do so. This
does not run afoul of any rule. To the contrary, and consistent with Briz v. Briz,
this is in keeping with the rules on proper joinder of causes of action. This also
serves the interest of judicial economy — avoiding multiplicity of suits and
cushioning litigants from the vexation and costs of a protracted pleading of their
cause.

Thus, it was improper to rule here, as the Court of Appeals did, that it was
impossible to entertain petitioner's child's plea for support without her and
petitioner first surmounting the encumbrance of an entirely different judicial
proceeding. Without meaning to lend credence to the minutiae of petitioner's
claims, it is quite apparent that the rigors of judicial proceedings have been
taxing enough for a mother and her daughter whose claim for support amounts to
a modest P3,000.00 every month. When petitioner initiated her action, her
daughter was a toddler; she is, by now, well into her adolescence. The primordial
interest of justice and the basic dictum that procedural rules are to be "liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding"impel us to grant the
present Petition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed

August 25, 2011 Decision and January 15, 2013 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02687 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Antique for it to
settle in Civil Case No. 2005-4-3496 the matter of Marl Jhorylle Abella's

31slf
purported paternal relation with respondent Policarpio Cabañero and, in the
event of a favorable determination on this, to later rule on the matter of support.
SO ORDERED.

Alanis vs. CA

Doctrine: Reading Article 364 of the Civil Code together with the State's
declared policy to ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the
law,1 a legitimate child is entitled to use the surname of either parent as a last
name.

Case Title: ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS HI, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF

APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND HON. GREGORIO Y. DE LA PENA
III, PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. 12, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ZAMBOANGA
CITY, RESPONDENTS, G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020, LEONEN, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner alleged that he was born to Mario Alanis y Cimafranca and Jarmila

Imelda Ballaho y Al-Raschid, and that the name on his birth certificate was
"Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III."

Petitioner wished to remove his father's surname "Alanis III," and instead use his
mother's maiden name "Ballaho," and change his first name from "Anacleto" to
"Abdulhamid"as this was what he has been using since childhood and indicated
in his school records.

Petitioner's parents have separated when he was 5 years old, and have been
living separately, and the petitioner's mother has single-handedly raised him and
his siblings.

Petitioner has presented pieces of evidence, such as photographs of his

yearbooks, school diploma and school paper editorial staff.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioner failed to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA;

2. Whether or not legitimate children have the right to use their mothers'
surnames as their surnames;

3. Whether or not petitioner has established a recognized ground for changing

his (first) name.

Held:

Petition is granted.

1. The Petition was filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but petitioner did
not even attempt to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court
of Appeals. On this ground alone, the Petition may be dismissed.

32slf
Nonetheless, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court may choose to
apply procedural rules more liberally to promote substantial justice. 

2. Contrary to the State policy, the trial court treated the surnames of petitioner's
mother and father unequally.

The Regional Trial Court's application of Article 364 of the Civil Code is incorrect.

"ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the

surname of the father."

 Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall "principally" use the
surname of the father, but "principally" does not mean "exclusively." This gives
ample room to incorporate into Article 364 the State policy of ensuring the
fundamental equality of women and men before the law, and no discernible
reason to ignore it. 

Reading Article 364 of the Civil Code together with the State's declared policy to
 
ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law, a legitimate
child is entitled to use the surname of either parent as a last name.

3. That confusion could arise is evident.

The petition to change name was filed to avoid confusion, as petitioner has been
using the name Abdulhamid Ballaho in all his records and transactions. 

The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the
best evidence available.

Regardless of which name petitioner uses, his father's identity still appears in his
birth certificate, where it will always be written, and which can be referred to in
cases where paternity is relevant.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The May 26, 2014 Decision and

December 15, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No.
02619-MIN, as well as the April 9, 2008 and June 2, 2008 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 12 in Special Proceeding No. 5528,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  

As prayed for in his Petition for Change of Name, petitioner's name is declared to
be ABDULHAMID BALLAHO. Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Cebu City is
DIRECTED to make the corresponding corrections to petitioner's name, from
ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS III to ABDULHAMID BALLAHO.

SO ORDERED.

33slf
34slf