The approach MADS/MOSAR to manage

the triptych
“technology/normative/management”

F. Muñoz, L. Perrin, J.P. Josien,

O. Chery & M. Sardin

Laboratoire des Sciences du Génie Chimique

UPR 6811 - Groupe SISyPHe

CNRS - LSGC - INPL – ENSIC

BP 20451 1 rue Grandville F-54001 NANCY Cedex
 Agenda
I. Introduction
II. The MADS/MOSAR methodology
I. The origin of MADS/MOSAR
II. The MADS model
III. The MOSAR methodology
III. Application in the miner underground sector
I. Systemic Construction
II. Dangers assessment
III. Model of danger
IV. Reduction of the variety & finding relations
V. Scenarios & FTA (fault tree analysis)
VI. Risk analysis
VII. Definition of prevention-protection goals, location of barriers and
their rating
IV. Summary
CNRS/LSGC-ENSIC Presentation

The Laboratoire des Sciences du Génie Chimique (LSGC), is property of the Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS).

• Objective:
The scientific design and complex systems control, through a conception of
processes engineering.

• 7 Research groups
• Industrial Security and Heterogeneous Particular Systems (SISyPHe)

The base methods... … the applications

‰ Reactions y reactors
‰ Separation
‰ Transportation phenomena
‰ Processes scale up and scale down
‰ Modeling
‰ Optimization, control y command
‰ Acquisition and data treatment
‰ Unitary operations
‰ Materials
‰ Quality and security control
‰ Equipments design
‰ Optimization and control Software
‰ Environmental Protection
‰ Rational use of energy
‰ Granule solids and media
‰ Formulation
 Introduction
2000 — Mars,
2006 — January 2, 80 miners died. Explosion in Barakova.
12 miners dead . Explosion in the (Ukraine)
International Coal Group . (USA)

1942 — April 26, 1,572 miners died.

explosion in Honkeiko. Coal mine (China)

2006 — February 19, 65 miners died.

Explosion in Pasta de Conchos mine.
(Mexico)

1990 — August ,
180 miners died. Explosion in Dobrnja mine.
(Bosnia Herzegovina)

• The context: Law & major industrial’s risk

• Keys words: technology, territory, hazard, risk assessment & management
The Complexity

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), Guiding Principles for Chemical
Accident Prevention, Preparedness and Response, 2003
The MADS/MOSAR methodology

Analysis Method of Dysfunctional Systems

(MADS)

Organized and Systemically Method of Risk

Analysis (MOSAR)
The origin of MADS/MOSAR
1970-1980
• A necessity to integrate the risk
analysis in scale-up process.
• Formalization of the methodology
by the educational structure
– Atomic Energy Commission (CEA,
France)
– French's Schools of Mining
Engineering
– Technological University Institute
(UIT Bordeaux, France)
1980-1990
• Technological University Institute
(Bordeaux)
– Reflection about the problematic
of safety and the methodological
relation with the pedagogy
1991
• Found the MADS group
– Objective: Conceptualize a
methodology of risk analysis,
particularly in an European project
COMMETT (Education and
Training for Technology )
 The MADS model
• Principle: One systemic
approach (cybernetic origin) to
unfolding complex systems
and evaluate the potential
damage in specific targets.

• Objective: Identify and

modeling the mechanism of
danger between Field of
Danger-Source-Target

• Structure: Pictograms and

fundamental conception in risk
science (definitions: flux of
danger, targets, sources,
barriers, etc.)
 The MOSAR methodology
• Principle: One systemic and systematic approach, to assess, evaluate,
create hierarchies, negotiate, and manage the risk, from one described
system in a complex context.

• Objective: To highlight the major scenario and to define the barriers of

prevention and protection that we have, to set up, to neutralize, or to
reduce the occurrence of the undesirable event.

• Structure: 2 modules (A & B)

•Module A.
• 3 listings (hazards, position of barriers and complementary analysis)
• 3 tables (modeling, barriers identification and barriers position)

The methodology was made with a toolbox conception, and its application
depends on each user context (goals, resources, finality, time, etc.)
 MOSAR: structure
Systems Identify the Module A
identification & sources of Macroscopic vison
modeling hazards Identify the
scenarios of
hazards Assess the
scenarios of Negotiate the
risks objetives and Define the
ranking of the means of
scenarios prevention and
qualify the
barriers

Identify the
risks of
functioning Assess the
Negotiate the
risks
precise
objetives of Polish the
prevention prevention
means Manage the
Module B risks
Microscopic vison
 Axioms and Hypothesis
• Axioms
– The MADS reference model allows the identification of unwanted
events, in complex systems
– An economic sector, inscribed within a national territory is a
complex system
– A risks analysis (MADS/MOSAR) allows the identification of a-
priori legislative opportunities

• Hypothesis
– The MADS/MOSAR methodology supports the scale up in the
complex levels
– A technological risks analysis by activity, permits the evaluation
of a national normative system, generates recommendations for
its evolution, and it is transferable to other sectors.
 Application in the miner
underground sector
• Capital: Bogotá

• Area: 1’138.914 Km²(26th)

Colombian exports (1994-2006*)

25.000

• Population: 45’600.000 (est. 2005)

20.000

US$ Million
• Economy: 15.000

Total of exports
10.000 Mining sector

– Colombia has the largest coal 5.000

reserves in Latin America and it is
the world’s fifth largest thermal coal 0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006*

exporter. Year

– Colombia offers interesting

investment opportunities in mining
extracts, such as nickel, emeralds,
iron and gold.
Systemic Construction

« le système est une entité The Key

– TYPOLOGIES
constituée d’éléments
Common base…
humains, logiciels,
• …to transfer!
organisationnel et
• …to compare!
matériels en interaction et • …to evaluate!
combinés pour remplir une
mission détermine et
• Typology of Economical
répondant a cinq critères Sector
de structure, fonction,
– ISIC Rev. 3: International
finalité, environnement et Standard Classification of
évolution. All Economic Activities

(Lemoigne, 1990) »
 Systemic Construction RE PRESEN
PRE SEN TER
ET MO DE LISER
L’IN STALLA TIO N
ID ENTIFIER LES
SO URCES DE
D AN GERS

IDEN TIFIER LES

LE S
SC ENAR IOS DE
DAN GERS

EV ALU ER LES
SCEN ARIO S DE
R ISQ UE S
MOSAR A

NEGO CIER D ES
OBJECTIFS ET
H IERARCH IER
LES SCENAR IO S

D EFIN IR LE S
M OYENS DE
PREV ENTIO N ET
LES QU ALIFIER

• Mega-system
– Colombia
• Supra-system Colombia
– Economical miner sector
• Systems
– Process in the sector
• Underground mine (UG)
• Aboveground mine (AG) Mining
• Benefit plat (BF) Sector

• Sub-systems
– Available technology by activity
• Breaking
• Mucking
Underground
• Haul Mine
• Annexed operations
• Man
• Environment
• Basic entities for analysis (ex. breaking)
Annexed
Breaking Mucking Haul Man Environment
– Breaking : Operations

• Manual systems
• Mechanical pick systems
• Bossing systems (disks, chains, etc)
• Haulages systems (rails, wheels, tracked, Complexity Unfolding
etc)
• Drilling systems ex. Sub-system Breaking (UG)
• Explosives
• Others techniques
 Dangers assessment (I) RE PRE SEN TER ID ENT IFIE R LES
MOSAR A
ET MO DELISE R SO URCE S DE
L’IN STALLA TIO N D AN GERS

IDEN TIFIER LES

SC ENAR IOS DE
DAN GERS

EV ALU ER LES
SCEN ARIO S DE
R ISQ UE S

NEGO CIER D ES
OBJECTIFS ET
H IERARCH IER
LES SCENAR IO S

D EFIN IR LE S
M OYE NS DE
PREV ENTIO N ET
LES QU ALIFIER

Basic entities for analysis (ex. Code Hazard

breaking) A Mechanical
– Breaking : B Chemical

« Grid 1 »
• Manual systems C Electrical
• Mechanical pick systems
D Fire & explosion
• Bossing systems (disks,
chains, etc) E Radiation
• Haulages systems (rails,
wheels, tracked, etc) F Biohazard
• Drilling systems G Men
• Explosives H Environment
• Others techniques
I Social & economical

Crossing the basic entities with the typology of hazards (grid 1), we
obtain the sources of danger in the MADS model.
 Dangers assessment (II) RE PRE SEN TER ID ENT IFIE R LES
MOSAR A
ET MO DELISE R SO URCE S DE
L’IN STALLA TIO N D AN GERS

IDEN TIFIER LES

SC ENAR IOS DE
DAN GERS

EV ALU ER LES
SCEN ARIO S DE
R ISQ UE S

NEGO CIER D ES
OBJECTIFS ET
H IERARCH IER
LES SCENAR IO S

D EFIN IR LE S
M OYE NS DE
PREV ENTIO N ET
LES QU ALIFIER

Process of danger
• We have the sources
& their hazards
• We set the targets:
• People
• Infrastructure
• Environment
• We can make the
relation to find the Q) But, what is the tool
danger flux to to establish that?
complete the models A) The table A
 Model of danger (I)
TABLE A Initial event: event which characterizes the change of one system
Establishment of process of danger which passes from a state or normal situation
SOUS-SYSTEME SOURCE towards a state or situation failing.
SS1:
Initiating event: disturbing event which is at the origin of change of
Underground working - Breaking
state or situation of one system.
Main event: event which expresses the matter flow, of energy and
information emitted by a system in a failing state or
situation.

SOURCE OF Phase of Process Initiatory event

Main event
N° DANGER Initial event
E MNT Post Internal External (flow of danger)
(grille 1)
Mechanicals

By individual tools • Problem of the • Ignorance of • Bad operation of the • Projection of the tools
(spade - pickaxe and utilities (air, the personnel tools •Material projection (dust
etc) •Artificial • Dysfunction of the and rocks)
1 the power pick) X
•Problem of environment tools • Noise + vibration
handling of •Artificial
tools environment

Cutting them (coal • Problem of the • Ignorance of • Bad operation of the •Fragmentation of the
cutters "shortwall“, utilities (air, the personnel tools machine
etc) •Artificial • Dysfunction of the •Material projection (dust
2 "longwall ", towing) X
•Problem of environment tools and rocks)
handling of • Artificial • Noise + vibration
tools environment
Reduction of the variety RE PRESEN TER
ET MO DELISER
DELISE R
L’IN STALLA TIO N
ID ENTIFIER LES
SO URCE S DE
D AN GERS

IDEN TIFIER LES

DAN GERS
LE S
SC ENAR IOS DE

EV ALU ER LES
MOSAR A

& finding relations

SCEN ARIO S DE
R ISQ UES

NEGO CIER D ES
OBJECTIFS E T
H IERARCH IER
LES SCENAR IO S

D EFIN IR LE S
M OYENS DE
PREV ENTIO N ET
LES QU ALIFIER

Mechanics
By individual tools (spade - pickaxe and the
power pick)
Cutting (coal cutters "shortwall " -
"longwall" , towing)
The crest gate of gummings (integrated - not
integrated)
Movements (on rails, caterpillars or tires) • We have the models
The perforation (drilling machines with · Projection of the tools
hand, drilling machines on support)
Shooting without explosive (hydraulics,
carbon dioxides, proceeded chemical and
compressed air)
• Material projection (dust and rocks)
of danger by entity
Chemical • Noise + vibration
Explosives • Fragmentation of the machine
Gasolines
Hydraulic fluids
Firedamp (~CH4)
Dust
• Fall of lime pit foot
• Thermal load
• Fall
• Noise + vibration
• We know the unfolding
Other substances
Toxicity of the fume and the gases
(explosives, combustion gases, etc)
Specific characteristic of the material (ex:
• Explosion without shooting

• Explosive after shooting

of entities by
asbestos, uranium, etc)
Electric
Electricity for the machines (ex: the electric
station, electric sets of the machine, etc)
• Exposure to a dangerous substance
• Emission of the substance
subsystems
Electricity for the machines of the utilities • Confined firedamp dispersion
(ex: compressors, etc)
Electrical supply networks of demolition • Dispersion confinéede dust

Charge not wished shotfiring cables

Static generation of energy by material O
handling activities of exploitation
• Dispersion
• Confined dispersion
• We can make the
• Electric shock

reduction of the variety

Of fire and explosion
Firing data • Power failure
Lubricants or substances with characteristics • Charge - electric discharge
fuels
Specific characteristic of material • Detonation
Radiations

Specific characteristic of the material (ex:

uranium)
• Dispersion of the fume and pollutant gases

• Deflagration using the black-box

Ionizing sources on demolition • Exposure to the radioactivity
The man
Operators
Personales with responsibility (ex: the
engineer)
• Exposure
• Failling material (dust, rocks)
• Flood
concept by subsystem
• Fall of machines and tools

(ex. Breaking –UG-)

Environment
Dangerous geological conformation • Stop of pumping
Disturbance of geological stability for • Stop of ventilation
demolition (ex: fall of material)
Sources of flood • Electric stop
Seisms • Emission of the substance
The geothermic one
Supports of the gallery
Supports of operation (ventilation, pumping,
etc)
Pickling, rolling, transport
Economic and social
Migration
Conflicts
Criminality
Demonstrations
Strikes

Figure 4. Black box S.S. breaking

Reduction of the variety & RE PRESEN TER
ET MO DELISER
DELISE R
L’IN STALLA TIO N
ID ENTIFIER LES
SO URCE S DE
D AN GERS

IDEN TIFIER LES

DAN GERS
LE S
SC ENAR IOS DE

EV ALU ER LES
SCEN ARIO S DE
R ISQ UES
MOSAR A

finding relations
NEGO CIER D ES
OBJECTIFS E T
H IERARCH IER
LES SCENAR IO S

D EFIN IR LE S
M OYENS DE
PREV ENTIO N ET
LES QU ALIFIER

•We have the main

events by sub-
system (auto
destruction loops &
open events)
•We know the sub-
systems by system
•We can make the
relations for the main Main events:
events in tree Explosion
Collapsing (total & partial)
…the
analysis
Fire undesirable
Pulmonary disease
etc…
events!!!
Scenarios & FTA (fault tree analysis)

…the events!!!
RE PRE SEN TER ID ENT IFIE R LES
MOSAR A
ET MO DELISER SO URCE S DE
L’IN STALLA TIO N D AN GERS

IDEN TIFIER LES

LE S
SC ENAR IOS DE
DAN GERS

EV ALU ER LES
SCEN ARIO S DE
R ISQ UE S

NEGO CIER D ES
OBJECTIFS ET
H IERARCH IER
LES
LE S SCENAR IO S

D EFIN IR LES
LE S
M OYE NS DE
PREV ENTIO N ET
LES QU ALIFIER
 MOSAR A

Risk analysis
RE PRE SEN TER ID ENT IFIE R LES
ET MO DELISE R SO URCE S DE
L’IN STALLA TIO N D AN GERS

IDEN TIFIER LES

SC ENAR IOS DE
DAN GERS

EV ALU ER LES
SCEN ARIO S DE
R ISQ UE S

NEGO CIER D ES
OBJECTIFS E T
H IERARCH IER
LES
LE S SCENAR IO S

D EFIN IR LE S
M OYE NS DE
PREV ENTIO N ET
LES QU ALIFIER

Impacts of the event Likelihood

People Goods Environment Compa- < 1/50 1/30 1/10 1/5 1/Year
ny Years Years Years Years
• We choose the (public
imagen)

scenarios 10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2

+ 1 death Total Irreversible Interna-

destruction important tional
• We use the return of effects impact
S1 S3

1 death Damages Reversible Important

experiences with stop important
effects
impact
(national)
S2

– NIOSH-CDC.(1983- Insulated
serious wounds
Damage
with partial
Irreversible
localized effects
Limited
impact
stop (regional)

2004) Light wounds Minor

damage
Minor effects Minor
impact

– Experts Not wounded No damage No effects No impact

– Definition of risk
acceptability line for • Explosion: Probable (1/10 year), severity (more
Colombia than 1 death) “S1”
• We select and conform • Collapsing (post-operation): Probable (1/30 years),
the group of experts severity (national impact) “S2”
• Silicosis: High Probability (between 10-2 y 10-3),
• We can make the
severity (more than one death) “S3”
scenario’s hierarchy &
evaluate the risk Conservatory estimation
Definition of prevention-protection goals, RE PRE SEN TER
ET MO DELISE R
L’IN STALLA TIO N
ID ENT IFIE R LES
SO URCE S DE
D AN GERS

IDEN TIFIER LES

SC ENAR IOS DE
DAN GERS
MOSAR A

location of barriers and their rating.

EV ALU ER LES
SCEN ARIO S DE
R ISQ UES

NEGO CIER D ES
OBJECTIFS E T
H IERARCH IER
LES SCENAR IO S

D EFIN IR LE S
M OYENS DE
PREV ENTIO N ET
LES
LE S QU ALIFIER

Impacts of the event Likelihood

People Goods Environment Compa- < 1/50 1/30 1/10 1/5 1/Year
ny Years Years Years Years
• We know scenarios (public
imagen)
10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2
• We know the flux of danger
+ 1 death Total Irreversible Interna-
destruction important tional
• We know the risk effects impact

1 death Damages Reversible Important

• We know the return of with stop important

effects
impact
(national)

experiences Insulated
serious wounds
Damage
with partial
Irreversible
localized effects
Limited
impact S1 S2 S3
stop (regional)
– International mining Light wounds Minor Minor effects Minor
strategies in normative damage impact

Not wounded No damage No effects No impact

barriers
– Colombian normative
barriers
– Experts
• We can make suggestions in
relation with the barriers
(inclusion or elimination) &
recalculate the risk to transfer
to an acceptable area
Barriers suggestions
• Development of an ATEX legislation
• Development of an integral plan of mining activities training
• Development of an integrated system of mining information
• Development of national programs in training and investigation
of mining risk
• Construction of a general frame for post-exploitation systems
• Development of a silicosis prevention program
• Implementation of APELL for the mining sector (United
Nations Environment Programme -UNEP-. 2001)
• Others
 MOSAR A

Summary
RE PRE SEN TER ID ENT IFIE R LES
ET MO DELISER
DELISE R SO URCE S DE
L’IN STALLA TIO N D AN GERS

IDEN TIFIER LE S
SC ENAR IOS DE
DAN GERS

EV ALU ER LES
SCEN ARIO S DE
R ISQ UE S

NEGO CIER D ES
OBJECTIFS E T
H IERARCH IER
LES SCENAR IO S

D EFIN IR LES
LE S
M OYE NS DE
PREV ENTIO N ET
LES
LE S QU ALIFIER

• We have seen in this study that the MADS model's simplicity allows risk analysis based on local
knowledge. Such a model makes it possible to incorporate common concepts related to the
danger mechanisms. That makes it possible to start the discussion and to create the outlines of a
common language to facilitate regional risk evaluation coming from many sources.
• It is obvious that it is essential to integrate the local knowledge with miner expert knowledge
(positive and negative feedback) to create a clear spectrum of the way the local exploration and
global aspects are. Having the above-mentioned information, specific strategies can be created,
according to the regional miner sector needs. But a prospective exercise for developing countries
implies a parallel with the first world. This generates a framework and expert knowledge.
• Using systematic methodologies and their complex unfolding, facilitates identification of logical
levels of analysis, and it defines the owner of the imposed barrier on a specific danger flow. The
main factors implemented by local authorities for regional risk administration are usually based on
prevention. Some of them can be derived from the European ATEX Directives; that makes it
possible to have a combined reduction of the risks (barriers of prevention and protection). The
products of analysis, such as FTA (Fault Trees Analysis) or risk valuation, create a framework to
facilitate similar exercises in other regions. It is of course obvious that a framework construction
will improve the miner economic sector, by defining some strategies to administrate residual risks.
• And we should never forget to check the barriers effectiveness; the obligatory stage is the training
of the personnel. Not all accidents can be avoided but the risks can however be reduced if proper
attention is given to the mining environment with the standards for construction, maintenance,
inspection and security. The importance of the human factor in the mine security cannot be
underestimated. This is essential to be aware of the dangers, aware of the risks and aware of the
procedures for limiting damages when an accident does occur, in order to be sure that the
barriers would be completely operational if necessary.
 Felipe MUÑOZ

Laboratoire des Sciences du Génie Chimique

UPR 6811 - Groupe SISyPHe

CNRS - LSGC - INPL – ENSIC

BP 20451 1 rue Grandville F-54001 NANCY Cedex