Risk Assessment in Magnetic Particle Inspection (MPI) of critical ferromagnetic parts via Bayesian

Belief Networks and Analytic Hierarchy Process and the use of Goal Tree to Improve the on quality
and sustainability of organizations.
J. C. Pereira
Center for Systems and Control, National Laboratory for Scientific Computing (LNCC), Petropolis, Brazil, jpereira@lncc.br and
Petropolis Catholic University, Petropolis, Brazil, josecristiano.pereira@ucp.br

F. Almeida
Petropolis Catholic University, Petropolis, Brazil. E-mail: flavio.42040103@ucp.br

Abstract: This paper proposes a method for identifying the high-level risks in the Magnetic Particle Inspection (MPI) of ferromagnetic
material parts, based on Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). The combination of probability and the
impact identified the most significant risks, which needed to be addressed to improve quality management system and ensure organization
sustainability. As a methodological approach, the estimated risk probabilities for the risk factors obtained from a case study and a survey
with experts were loaded into Bayesian Belief Networks software to assess the probability of occurrence of undesirable events and AHP
was utilized to rank the relative importance (effect) of risks. The combination of probabilities and the effects identified the most significant
risks. The novelty of the paper is the combination of Bayesian Belief Networks with AHP and the use of Goal Tree dashboard to improve
quality and sustainability in the inspection of critical parts. The application of the method revealed that the most significant risks in the
inspection of critical hardware are related to operator failure, unfavorable control and environment, negative organizational factors. The
paper proposes responses to these risks aiming at preventing the occurrence of failure in the MPI inspection of critical hardware. This
paper contributes to the literature in the field non-destructive inspection of critical parts. The proposed model has also practical implications
and is an invaluable source for non-destructive inspection professionals, safety engineers, quality managers and decision makers in
companies.

Keywords: Risk assessment, Bayesian Belief Network, Analytic Hierarchy Process, Critical Ferromagnetic Parts, Magnetic Particle, Goal
Tree, Quality Management System, Organizational Sustainability.

1. Introduction According to Mishra, K. (2012), decision makers need to

understand these risks through probabilistic risk analysis, so
This work aims to present a method to identify risks of
that decisions are not made in real time without considering
unwanted events during the inspection of magnetic particles
the likelihood and severity of adverse consequences on
(MPI) of critical ferromagnetic parts. Firstly, we intend to
reliability, safety and quality of the inspection performed.
increase knowledge about the relationship between the risk
Risks can be avoided, shared, transferred, minimized or
factor and failure in the MPI of critical ferromagnetic parts.
mitigated with appropriate strategies.
Second, provide a method to identify and evaluate the risk
factors related to the failure of the MPI, based on an in- For KNEMEYER (2008), every company is subject to
depth analysis of the current literature on the process and numerous risks. In general terms, the measurement of risks
the experience of experts. The MPI requires several involves the probability of the occurrence of a certain risk,
operations that must be closely monitored and, in most its impact and consequences in the chain. KNEMEYER
cases, the inspection depends a lot on the inspector's (2008) presents the classification defended by Giunipero
attention to details in critical applications, and, as he cites and Eltantaway, where factors such as product technology,
(Glatz, 1985) the factors that affect the sensitivity of the safety, supplies and experience must be considered in risk
inspection need be known and treated. analysis and decision making. In a complementary way,
CHOPRA AND SODHI (2004) identify as risk factors in
This method was originated by Bell Telephone Laboratories
the supply chain events such as delays, interruptions in
in 1962 as a technique to perform the safety assessment of
supply, provisions, stock depletion, physical capacity
the Minutemen Launch Control System for intercontinental
limitation, among others. For each risk factor, it is possible
ballistic missiles. According to MOSS (1993), the fault tree
to identify an agent and, from them, develop a failure tree
is a logical diagram that shows the relationship between the
pointing out the main causes of threats to the chain.
system failure, a certain undesirable event in the system and
Similarly to MPI, the risks inherent in the process go beyond
system component failures. An undesirable event is defined
the company's technological capacity, involving logistics,
first and the causal relationships of the leadership failures to
training, management, investment, quality, among others.
the event are then identified. It is a technique based on
deductive logic.

Proceedings of the 31st European Safety and Reliability Conference

Edited by Bruno Castanier, Marko Cepin, David Bigaud, and Christophe Berenguer
Copyright  c ESREL 2021.Published by Research Publishing, Singapore.
ISBN: 978-981-18-2016-8; doi:10.3850/978-981-18-2016-8 279-cd 2909
 Proceedings of the 31st European Safety and Reliability Conference
The intention is to help managers and decision makers,
providing answers to the main risks of failure of the MPI.
The probability of the occurrence of a certain risk, its impact
and consequences in the chain, as described by
KNEMEYER (2008) and, thus, adapting to improve the
quality and safety of MPI. The manufacture and
maintenance of critical ferromagnetic parts are usually very
complex and depend on human performance, software and
technology. As mentioned by (Detmer, 2007), identifying
risks through a qualitative and quantitative risk analysis is
essential. The application of the Goal Tree methodology, by
Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1962, creating the concept
of failure analysis tree what, and the ability to keep the
analysis focused on what is important for the success of the
system as well as the respective iterations between the
different departments, procedures and technologies. The
application of the method revealed that the most significant risks
in the inspection of critical hardware are related to operator failure,
unfavorable control and environment, negative organizational
factors. The innovative paper open a new boundary of proposes
and must identify responses to these risks aiming at preventing the
occurrence of failure in the MPI inspection of critical
hardwareThis research is of great value for industrial managers
who have the need to anticipate possible difficulties in the
application of MPI and, consequently, increased reliability
and safety.
Risk assessment in MPI allows decision makers to allocate
funds for critical activities that can impact quality and
safety. The research questions are:
RQ 1. What are the main risk factors related to the MPI of
critical ferromagnetic parts?
RQ 2. What are the risk responses needed to improve the
process and prevent MPI failure?
RQ 3. Can the responses to risks identified with the
proposed method improve product quality and ensure
organizational sustainability?
The article is organized as follows: section 1 provides an
introduction, section 2 is dedicated to the description of the
inspection of magnetic particles of critical ferromagnetic
parts, section 3 addresses the assessment of quality and
operational risk, section 4 covers sustainability
organization, section 5 covers the assessment of BBN's
section 6 covers risk assessment with AHP, section 7
describes the process methodology
2. Description of Magnetic Particle Inspection of
critical ferromagnetic parts.
The non-destructive magnetic particle test consists of
subjecting a part to appropriate magnetization. It is one of
the oldest known tests and today there is a wide variety of
applications in different sectors. In aviation it is used for its
advantages such as: simple methodology, easy
interpretation, economy, and portability, allowing the use of
the technique in components such as landing gears, engine
assemblies, assembly fixing of primary structures and
screws used in the different systems of the structure. It is
necessary, to consider that the physical principle on which
the inspection of magnetic particles is based is Magnetism,
a phenomenon that has been extensively addressed.
According to Obtesol (2007), Isotec (2010) and UNLP
(2012) the ferromagnetic and paramagnetic aeronautical
metallic components, which present some imperfect surface
(up to 6 mm), be they cracks, pores, non-magnetic
inclusions in metallic material, are susceptible of being
inspected by the technique of magnetic particles. With this
test, discontinuities can be detected generated in the
production of aeronautical parts and in cracks generated
during service, as consequence of overloads and load
cycles, such as fatigue (Log, 2010; UNLP, 2012) typical of
aircraft operations or main components, such as engines,
propellers, power trains, landing gear, retaining plates,
wheels, engine supports, screw design and control surfaces.
As a non-destructive test, END, the risks of its application
in aeronautical elements must be carefully identified,
analysed, and mitigated, therefore, one of the processes of
control and identification of responsibilities is the use of the
Goal Tree.
3. Quality and Operational Risk Assessment
Organizations strive to satisfy, or preferably exceed, the
wants and expectations of the customer’s subject to meeting
the demands of the other stakeholders, to fulfil the aim of
the organization. Quality of product can only be achieved
by organizations that are in control of their processes and
functions, and that try to continually improve themselves.
Company and/or local image, however, can affect the
perception of these quality dimensions, and work as a filter.
If a provider is good in the eyes of the customer, minor
mistakes will be forgiven. If the image is negative, the
impact of any mistake will often be considerably greater
than it otherwise would have been (Dyllick and Hockerts,
2002)
Quality is a broad, multi-interpretable, relative, and
dynamic concept. As stated by quality standards, the most
important focus point in the quality management approach
is the customer. Above all, quality is delivering an output
meeting or exceeding customers’ expectations. Hence
quality is measured by, for instance, by customer
satisfaction rates or complaints. Economic reasoning
explains the strength of this perspective.
The goals of manufacturing and services excellence efforts
include maintaining market share, improving profitability
and the firm's ability to compete in a global marketplace
(Suketu and Desai, 2016). This author describes the
concept, approaches and identification of critical success
factors, performance measures for lean manufacturing and
services practices. Quality and innovation are two key
competitive strategies that many organizations pursue to
win customers in their business (Pak Tee Ng., 2014).
International quality standard such as ISO 9001-2015,
AS9100 and ISO 31000/2018 requires the implementation
of operational risk management process to improve safety.
Islama et al. (2017) stated that work overload and stress
increased the likelihood of human error as well as potential
accidents and developed an application in human factor risk
assessment that can assist in improving the safety and
reliability in operations.
 Proceedings of the 31st European Safety and Reliability Conference
4. Organizational Sustainability
Corporate sustainability means meeting the needs of a
firm’s direct and indirect stakeholders (such as
shareholders, employees, clients, pressure groups,
communities etc.), without compromising its ability to meet
the needs for future stakeholders as well. Sustainability has
been developed also towards a more relative concept as the
level of sustainability is related to the needs of stakeholders
and the extent to which these needs are fulfilled (Dyllick
and Hockerts, 2002). Furthermore, the relative importance
of the different stakeholders can change as well as the needs
of the stakeholders, which implies that the meaning of
sustainability also has become a dynamic.
The need to specify the responsibility is also relevant when
an organization applies sustainability to its supporting
activities. In literature, the nature of the responsibility is
established by means of the stakeholder concept (Dyllick
and Hockerts, 2002). Yet, since there is more than one
stakeholder, the ambiguity with respect to the sustainability
approach has not really been decreased. An organization
must specify the boundaries of the chosen responsibility
system.
According to Freeman Freeman et al. (2004), the
Stakeholder Theory postulates that corporations have duties
to multiple stakeholders. Stakeholders can be internal, such
as employees, including management; or external, such as
customers, suppliers, banks, environmentalists,
governments, and other groups. Some stakeholders may be
considered both internal and external, such as stockholders.
Stakeholders can also be divided into primary and
secondary groupings, where primary one has a more direct
influence or are influenced by the company to a greater
degree than secondary ones (Castka and Prajogo, 2013).
5. Risk Assessment with Bayesian Belief Networks
(BBNs)
Bayesian Networks (BNs, also called Bayesian Belief
Networks (BBNs) provide a causal structure that allows
probability risk analysis practitioners to gain deeper insight
into risk drivers and into specific interventions that reduce
risk (Rechenthin, 2004), (Mosleh, 1992). Bayesian was
used in the Estimation of Failure Probability in Mechanical
Systems Using Monte Carlo Simulation (Guérin et al.,
2016). Efficient Bayesian Network was used in Learning for
System Optimization in Reliability Engineering (Gruber
and Ben-Gal, 2016). Objective Bayesian Analysis was used
for Recurrent Events in Presence of Competing Risks (Fu et
al. 2016). Exact Bayesian was used to predict Exponential
Lifetime Based on Fixed and Random Sample Sizes (Fu et
al. 2016).
There has been an increasing trend in the application of
Bayesian networks in fields related to reliability, safety and
maintenance (Mahadevan et al. 2001). Bayesian approaches
to aggregate expert judgments on probabilities have been
extensively investigated in risk and reliability analysis
(Podofillini and Dang, 2013), Droguett et al. 2004). BBNs
provide a framework for addressing many of the
shortcomings of human reliability analysis from a
researcher perspective and from a practitioner perspective
(Groth and Swiler, 2013). Barua et al. (2016) proposed a
risk assessment methodology for dynamic systems based on
Bayesian network, which represents the dependencies
among variables graphically and captures the changes of
variables over time by the dynamic Bayesian network.
Kanesa et al. (2017), presented a case study of the
quantitative risk assessment of a process unit using BN. The
different steps of the development of the BN were detailed,
including translation of a Bowtie into a skeletal BN,
modification of the skeletal BN to incorporate reliability
data, and insertion of equipment failure evidence into the
BN for dynamic modelling.
6. Risk Assessment with Analytic Hierarchy Process
(AHP)
Saaty (1980) first introduced the Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP) to provide a relative weight of criteria
according to a hierarchical structure. The method depends
on a pairwise comparison of alternatives, which is
quantified in a matrix. The technique has been used in
numerous disciplines to solve complex decision problems.
It divides a complicated problem into smaller parts that can
be ranked hierarchically. The first stage of AHP is to
construct a pairwise comparison matrix (Saaty, 1986). Each
element aij (i, j = 1, 2, ..., n) represents the relative
importance of elements i and j. A higher value denotes a
stronger preference of element i over element j (Karel,
Otcenaskova, 2013, Iberraken, 2013). The values can be
specified according to a relative importance scale provided
by Saaty (1980).
7. Methodology
This section describes the methodology used to obtain
responses to the research questions. Figure 1 presents the
methodology steps.
To have a realistic Goal Tree, its necessary mapping all
process. Each step, resources, standard and activity must be
organized by hierarch level so, the first step in developing a
goal tree model, involves definition of goal or objective.
This top goal must be explicitly defined in terms which
make it a single unambiguous statement. It is from this
definition that the analyst will identify and relate all the
different plant goals and subgoals which must be achieved
to attain the overall objective.
Fig. 1. Methodology steps.
 Proceedings of the 31st European Safety and Reliability Conference

To construct GT model after identifying all tasks, steps, Man9 Operator Fatigue 1
sources, events and their relationship, we might write each Man10 Poor visual acuity, color vision 1
one in a box and, connect all then by arrows to understand Man11 Inspectors not motivated 2
all connections since main goal box until low line box level. Man2 Eyewear 3
Mat1 Unsuitable particle 1
You can use many levels you need to find all relation that Mat2 Unsuitable carrier 1
could impact on main goal. Mat3 Unsuitable cleaning solvent 2
Tropos (2019) introduces primitives for modeling actors of Mat4 Solution not tested for concentration 1
Mat5 Surface condition of part improper 2
the system (agentive entities), and goals that actors intend
Mat6 Part complex 2
to achieve. A task represents an abstract way to do Mat7 Defect type 1
something, and its execution can be a means for satisfying Met1 Parameters not correctly documented 1
a goal. When goals/tasks are at high abstraction levels, they Met2 Particle application method not defined 1
can be refined through and/or-decomposition into finer sub- Met3 Particle application method wrongly defined 1
goals/sub-tasks. A resource represents a physical or an Met4 Part magnetization sequence not defined 1
informational entity. Finally, a dependency allows actors to Met5 Part magnetization sequence wrongly defined 1
depend on one another for the fulfillment of goals, Met6 Magnetization 1
execution of tasks, and provision of resources. The risk factors from Table 2 were classified into the
8. Results following categories: operator failure, improper material,
uncorrected method, deficient equipment, unfavourable
The risk factors gathered by the authors from the most environment, and negative organization factors. The risk
current literature on MPI of critical ferromagnetic parts and factors were classified into pertinent risk sublevels so that
from the case study were classified into six categories the causes and consequences of each risk could be defined.
named: Manpower, Material, Method, Machine, Table 3 shows the risk levels, sublevels, and the associated
Environment and Organization. The authors raised 12 risk factors. As an example, this table shows that operator
factors related to Manpower (Man1-Man12), 7 related to failure (L1) may be caused by inadequate training (SL1),
Material (Mat1-Mat7), 9 related to Method (Met1-Met9), 8 negative attitude (SL2) and lack of skills (SL3). Inadequate
related to Machine (Mac1-Mac8), 12 related to Environment training may be caused by Operators lack of knowledge
(Env1-Env12) and 12 related to Organization (Org1-Org12). defects (Man1); on-the-job training not received (Man4),
The experts were asked to estimate the probability level Training material poor (Man5), Preventive Maintenance
(very likely, likely, possible, unlikely or very unlikely) for operator error (Man7) and Operator skill and experience
each risk factor contributing to MPI failure when processing (Man8). A negative attitude may be caused by Operator lack
critical ferromagnetic parts. The scores 1 to 5 were assigned of attention (Man2), Operator distraction (Man3),
to each risk factor by different experts based on Table 1. Horizontal communication poor (Man6) and inspectors lack
Table 1 Probability Level Scores 8 motivation (Man11). Lack of skills may be caused by
Operator Fatigue (Man9), Visual acuity, and color vision
Probability Score Probability Level Probability (Man10), and Eyewear (Man12).
5 Very Likely More than 0.8
4 Likely 0.5 – 0.8 Table 3 Risk Levels, Sub-Levels and Associated Risk Factor
3 Possible 0.31 – 0.50
2 Unlikely 0.11 – 0.30 Risk Level Risk Sub-Level Associated Risk Factor
1 Very Unlikely Bellow 0.10 SL1 Inadequate training Man1, Man4, Man5, Man7, Man8
Manpower
L1 SL2 Negative attitude Man2, Man3, Man6, Man11
Table 1 only guided experts on the probability elicitation poor prepared
process. Probability Elicitation was used to encode the SL3 Lack of skills Man9, Man10, Man12
subjective judgments of experts into probabilities. Such SL4 Wrong choice of Mat1, Mat2, Mat3
probabilistic judgments were used to obtain information that materials
Improper
L2 Material & Ineffective material Mat4, Mat5
could not be obtained directly from data or observation. The SL5
monitoring
Hardware
process was useful in the evaluation of risks. Experts were SL6 Improper hardware Mat6, Mat7
condition
able to classify the risks using the table with no
Operational
difficulties.The probability scores obtained from experts SL7
procedure not
Met2, Met4, Met6, Met8

were aggregated and presented in Table 2. L3

Uncorrected
SL8 Operational Met1
Method procedure not used
Table 2 Risk factors and probabilities SL9 Wrong operational Met3, Met5, Met7, Met9
procedure
Prob. Processing
Event Risk Factors SL10 Mac2, Mac4, Mac7, Mac8
Level Equipment/
equipment failure

Man1 Lack of knowledges 2 L4 Instrument SL11 Inspection Mac1, Mac3

equipment failure
Man2 Operator lack of attention 2 Failure
SL12 Process control Mac5, Mac6
Man3 Operator distraction 1 equipment failure
Man4 Lack of practical training 1 SL13 Material control Env1, Env2, Env11
failure
Man5 Training material poor 1 Unfavourable
Equip./instr.
Man6 Horizontal communication poor 1 L5 Control & SL14
control failure
Env9, Env10
Environment
Man7 Preventive Maintenance operator error 1 Environment
SL15 Env3, Env4, Env5, Env6, Env7, Env8
Man8 Operator lack skill and experience 2 control failure
 Proceedings of the 31st European Safety and Reliability Conference

SL16 Monitoring & Org3 Org5, Org6 Table 4. Relative Importance Matrix.
control ineffective
Negative

Manpower poorly
L6 Organization SL17 Quality &safe Org1, Org2, Org4, Org8, Org9
management
Factor

Unfavourable

Environment

Organization
Material and

Incorrected
Lack of adequate

Equipment
Instrument
SL18 Org7, Org 10, Org11, Org12
Risks

Hardware

control &
Improper

Negative
resources

prepared

Method

Weight
Factors
Failure
The risk factors and risk sublevels were combined in BBN‟s
Manpower poorly
for each risk level. The primary nodes are represented by the 1,00 3,00 3,00 5,00 0,14 1,00 3,00
prepared
risk factors. BBN‟s combined all Risk Levels, Sub-levels Improper Material
0,33 1,00 1,00 3,00 0,14 1,00 3,00
and Hardware
and associated risk factors. BBN´s were built for Risk Incorrected
0,33 1,00 1,00 3,00 0,41 3,00 3,00
Method
Levels L1, L2, L3, L4, L5 and L6 and are shown in Figure Equipment
1,00 0,33 0,33 1,00 0,05 0,33 3,00
2. Instrument Failure
Unfavourable control
1,00 1,00 0,33 0,33 0,14 1,00 1,00
& Environment
Negative
0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,14 1,00 1,00
Organization Factors

The normalized matrix and the risk impact (weighted

values) is shown in Table 5. The CI and CR were calculated,
as required. The pairwise comparative matrices on the
corresponding impact from the interview are logically
consistent since the CR was smaller or equal to 0.10.
Table 5. Normalized Matrix and Weights.

Manpower poorly

Unfavourable

Environment

Organization
Material and

Incorrected

Equipment
Instrument
Risks

Hardware

control &
Improper

Negative
prepared

Method

Weight
Factors
Failure
Manpower poorly
0,25 0,45 0,50 0,39 0,14 0,21 0,32
prepared
Improper Material
0,08 0,15 0,17 0,24 0,14 0,21 0,16
and Hardware
Incorrected
0,08 0,15 0,17 0,24 0,41 0,21 0,21
Method
Equipment
0,25 0,05 0,06 0,08 0,05 0,21 0,12
Instrument Failure
Unfavourable control
0,25 0,15 0,06 0,03 0,14 0,07 0,11
& Environment
Negative
0,08 0,05 0,06 0,03 0,14 0,07 0,07
Organization Factors

The risks impact ratings for the Weights obtained in Table

5 were established by using Table 6.
Table 6. Risk Impact Rating
Impact Score Impact Level Impact
5 Very Likely More than 0.16
4 Likely 0.12 – 0.16
3 Possible 0.08 – 0.12
2 Unlikely 0.04 – 0.08
1 Very Unlikely Bellow 0.04

A Risk evaluation of MPI on critical ferromagnetic parts

based on the results from the Risk assessment with BBN and
AHP was conducted by the authors. The risk score and risk
class were determined by sing the risk scoring matrix shown
in Table 7.
Figure 2. Bayesian Belief Networks. Table 7. Risk Scoring Matrix
Impact
To analyse the risk impact, pairwise comparisons matrices,
Very Mode- Very
as recommended by Saaty (1980) were developed by the Low High
Low rate High
authors based on the 6 risk levels. The relative importance 1 2 3 4 5 Risk Class
matrix evaluation prepared by the authors and considering Very unlikely 1 1 2 3 4 5 1-5 Negligeble
Probability

Unlikely 2 2 4 6 8 10 6-9 Tolerable

the failure of MPI of critical ferromagnetic parts is shown in
Possible 3 3 6 9 12 15 10-16 Undesireble
Table 4. Likely 4 4 8 12 16 20 17-25 Intolerable
Very likely 5 5 10 15 20 25
 Proceedings of the 31st European Safety and Reliability Conference
The Risk Scoring Matrix for the 6 risks showing the
probabilities, impacts and respective risk scorings for each
risk are presented in Table 8.
Table 8. Risk Scoring Matrix
Probab.
Risk Probab. Impact Scoring
Operator Failure 0,15 0,324231032
Improper Material 0,07 0,164581909
Uncorrected Method 0,08 0,210036455
Equipment/Instrument Failure 0,08 0,115707197
Unfavourable Control & Environment 0,13 0,114943925
Negative Organization Factors 0,14 0,070499481
The risks associated operator failure, unfavourable control
and environment and negative organizational factors were
evaluated to be particularly at “Intolerable” risk level.
A Goal Tree was constructed vertically downward from the
objective in levels, wherein each identified goal was divided
into a necessary and sufficient set of dependent subgoals.
The Goal Tree in Figure 2 presents a logical model of a MPI
successful process from which success paths can be
determined, including the relationship between them. A
success path shows various components that can impact
positively or negatively on proper of the successful
operation of the system.
Figure 3 - Application of Risk Assessment using Goal Tree in the
Magnetic Particle inspection of critical parts
9. Conclusion
The proposed method is important for several reasons. First,
risk assessment using AHP is gaining importance in the
industry and the adoption of multi criteria decision-making
in the MPI inspection of critical ferromagnetic parts has not
been reported yet. The application of the methodology has
been simulated successfully in this study and identified the
critical risk factors in the MPI of critical ferromagnetic
parts. Second, this study combines two approaches, the
BBN and AHP and considers the risk of MPI failure as
decision-making criteria. Third, the paper shows that risk
factors identified with the method should be considered
critical and be controlled to avoid critical ferromagnetic
parts failure. The probability and impact of risks associated
with MPI were predicted quantitatively showing that
Impact Risk
Scoring Scoring preventive actions can be planned to minimize the
4 5 20 downtime of the manufacturing and services process and
2 4 8
2 4 8 delay in production and part failure.
2 5 8
4 5 20 Hardware operators are responsible to make sure the
4 5 20 management of critical ferromagnetic parts is effective to
ensure parts are inspected periodically and removed from
service, as per requirements defined in manufacturer
approved technical data. They are also responsible for risk
assessment in MPI inspection to ensure full compliance to
manufacturer requirements to avoid accidents and loss of
lives.
In response to the first research question, the proposed
method identified the most critical risks in the MPI
inspection of critical ferromagnetic parts and can be used to
plan risk responses to make the inspection more effective
and safer.
It is noteworthy here that it is not possible to infer these
significant risks from a specialist opinion only. The
Bayesian Belief Network and Analytic Hierarchy Process
(AHP) tools are especially important in this process. As a
by-product of the results, it is suggested that these methods
should be used by companies to identify the critical risks in
MPI of critical hardware.
In response to the second research question, the result of the
simulation shows that actions to the significant risks should
be taken, as shown by the goal tree. Important actions are:
definition of the criteria for training the operator
theoretically and hands on (on the job training), the issuance
of a detailed user-friendly instructions for the operators and
for the control of all variables of the MPI process.
Awareness training of the production leadership and the
people involved with production planning would also be
especially important. Focus on the organizational factors
would also prevent the failure of the MPI inspection.
In response to the third research question, the results show
that by implementing responses to the identified risks,
quality of operation can be maximizing, and organizational
sustainability can be maintained, once all stakeholders‟
needs and expectations are met, as described in Section 4.
In conclusion, this paper presents a method for risk
assessment of MPI on critical parts. It also proposes actions
to improve quality and sustainability of organization. This
study opened some new research avenges for future and can
be applied similarity in other non-destructive inspections.
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