Cleaner Environmental Systems 2 (2021) 100021

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Cleaner Environmental Systems

journal homepage: www.journals.elsevier.com/cleaner-environmental-systems

Engineering risk assessment of photovoltaic-thermal-fuel cell system using

classical failure modes, effects and criticality analyses
C. Ogbonnaya a, c, *, C. Abeykoon b, A. Nasser a, C.S. Ume c, U.M. Damo d, A. Turan e
a
Department of Mechanical, Aerospace and Civil Engineering, The University of Manchester, M60 1QD, UK
b
Aerospace Research Institute, Department of Materials, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M13 9PL, UK
c
Faculty of Engineering and Technology, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike Ikwo, P.M.B, 1010, Nigeria
d
Department of Mechanical, Aerospace and Civil Engineering, The University of Manchester, M13 9PL, UK
e
Independent Researcher, Manchester, M22 4ES, Lancashire, UK

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: As renewable energy technologies (RETs) replace fossil fuel-based energy systems, the need to address the risks
Renewable energy technology and reliability of emerging RETs suitable for integration into energy infrastructures becomes urgent. The inter-
Integrated photovoltaic-thermal-fuel cell sys- mittency of renewable energy sources and individual characteristics of the components of RETs are potential
tem
causes of power curtailment, system failure, techno-economic costs, and the inertia to transit to renewable energy
Solar energy
Failure mode and effect analysis
utilisation. Here, we applied the classical failure modes, effects, and criticality analyses to assess the effects of
Criticality analysis failure modes of the components of an integrated photovoltaic-thermal-fuel cell system. Risk items were identified
Reliability with their possible failure modes, mechanisms, and effects to generate risk priority numbers and Criticality values.
Results showed that the risk of no solar radiation, hydrogen leakage, failure of photovoltaic module, leakage of
oxygen had risk priority number of 450, 270, 240, 240 whilst their corresponding Criticality values were 90, 54,
80, 48, respectively. Generating power with both battery and fuel cell may improve the overall reliability of the
system. Eventually, some recommendations were made to improve the system for off-grid and grid-connected
applications to supply electrical energy and hot water. Therefore, addressing the identified risk items could
significantly improve the reliability and operational efficiency the system.

because of the decreasing cost of PV modules and promising conversion

1. Introduction
Solar energy technologies are probably the most sustainable renew-
able energy technologies (RETs) because of the ubiquity of solar radia-
tion across the globe and the capability of solar energy technologies to
operate with zero or minimal amount of greenhouse gases emissions
(Ogbonnaya et al., 2019a; Schram et al., 2019). Nevertheless, the inter-
mittent nature of solar radiation appears to pose prima facie risk and
reliability concerns (Ogbonnaya et al., 2020a,b,c) given that reliability is
a key component of users’ requirements (Kececioglu et al., 2020). Over
the last four decades, there have been research efforts to model, design,
develop and optimise integrated photovoltaic-fuel cell systems for both
grid (Lajnef et al., 2013) and off-grid applications (Dash and Bajpai,
2015; Rekioua et al., 2014) because of their environmental friendliness
and relevance in the upcoming hydrogen economy. Photovoltaic-led
energy systems will continue to dominate the composition of RETs for
transition into 100% renewable energy infrastructure across the globe
efficiencies of PV cells (IEA, 2020; Ogbonnaya et al., 2019a,b,c,d). An
energy and exergy analysis of photovoltaic-led energy systems including
photovoltaic-battery, photovoltaic-thermal-battery, photovoltaic-
battery-fuel cell and photovoltaic-thermal-battery-fuel cell system
showed that combining photovoltaic-thermal modules, batteries and fuel
cell components could provide a robust energy storage system (Ogbon-
naya et al., 2019a,b,c,d).
Although the risk and reliability aspects of an integrated
photovoltaic-fuel cell (IPVFC) systems are often mentioned or implied as
an important factor in their commercialisation and uptake (Ghosh et al.,
2003; Volken et al., 2019), there are scarce studies that have systemati-
cally investigated their risks and reliability. An engineering risk analysis
of RETs may focus on detailed analysis of the parts of a key component as
exemplified by an engineering risk analysis of wind turbine (Colli, 2015;
Kahrobaee and Asgarpoor, 2011) and PV module (Arabian-Hoseynabadi
et al., 2010). Another approach, which is not common so far, is to
consider all the active components of the system and their parts,

* Corresponding author. Department of Mechanical, Aerospace and Civil Engineering, The University of Manchester, M60 1QD, UK.
E-mail address: chukwuma.ogbonnaya@manchester.ac.uk (C. Ogbonnaya).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cesys.2021.100021
Received 13 January 2021; Received in revised form 29 January 2021; Accepted 26 February 2021
2666-7894/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
C. Ogbonnaya et al.
Nomenclatures
AC alternating current
C criticality
CIL critical item lists
D detectability of a failure
Di detectability of the ith risk item
DC direct current
FMEA failure mode and effect analysis
FMECA failure mode, effect, and criticality analysis
IPVFC integrated photovoltaic-fuel cell
IPVTFC integrated photovoltaic-thermal-fuel cell
O probability of occurrence of a failure
Oi probability of occurrence of the ith risk item
PEME proton exchange membrane electrolyser
PEMFC proton exchange membrane fuel cell
PV photovoltaic
PV/T photovoltaic-thermal
S severity of a failure
Si severity of the failure of the ith risk item
RETs renewable energy technologies
RPN risk priority number
including environmental factors to generate a more comprehensive
assessment of the risks and reliability issues a RET may face during its life
cycle.
This study considered the components and parts of an integrated
photovoltaic-thermal-fuel cell (IPVTFC) system that facilitate mass and
energy transfer in the system during operation. The preconception
underlining this approach is that any interception of mass and energy
flow through the components would lead to a system failure or at least
make the system partially inoperable. The theoretical framework and
methodology in support of the approach in this study are system theory,
system thinking and system analysis (Ponte et al., 2016; White, 2015).
Within each component of the system, the parts that are involved in mass
and energy transfer are focussed on.
Recovering the waste heat from a photovoltaic module appeared to
increase the overall energy efficiency of the resultant photovoltaic-
thermal (PV/T) systems (Ogbonnaya et al., 2019a,b,c,d ). It is antici-
pated that researchers may soon start considering an integration of PV/T
instead of PV to supply both electricity and hot air/water/other fluids
instead of the current configuration of IPVFC systems (Cetin et al., 2009;
Shaygan et al., 2019) whereas more energy can be harnessed by replacing
a PV module with a PV/T module (Ogbonnaya et al., 2020a). An inte-
gration of a PV/T module with batteries/supercapacitors, electrolyser,
and fuel cell can provide electricity and hot water for grid-connected and
off-grid applications. Nonetheless, the addition of electrolyser and fuel
cell may reduce the overall exergy efficiency, increase the cost of the
integrated system and the complexity of the system. The potential risks
and reliability challenges of an IPVTFC system may differ under the
grid-connected and off-grid modes. However, the major benefit of an
IPVTFC system is in its capability to be used in an off-grid mode as a
distributed renewable energy system and it has prospects as a
self-sustaining energy source in developing countries in Africa, Middle
East and Asia where the energy infrastructures are hugely
under-developed (Ogbonnaya et al., 2019a). By using an IPVTFC system
in distributed applications, it will not depend on the transmission
segment of power infrastructure since it generates energy closest to
where it will be consumed by the end-users. As of it, this study will
consider the risk profiles of an IPVTFC system for both grid-connected
and off-grid applications. This will ensure that the risk management of
an IPVTFC system would reduce or eliminate the operational risks whilst
enhancing the safety and reliability of the system.
2
Cleaner Environmental Systems 2 (2021) 100021
Performing engineering risk assessment using Failure mode and effect
analysis (FMEA) and Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis
(FMECA) are essential parts of risk management strategies for engi-
neering systems, processes and operations (Stavrou and Ventikos, 2016).
FMEA focuses on identifying failure modes for a product as well as
assessing the risks such failures might pose to the safety and reliability of
the system and personnel. FMECA focuses on ranking the identified risk
items in order of significance and importance to guide preventive and
corrective actions. FMEA and FMECA were first proposed by The Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1963 for military
systems and fully implemented by Ford Motors in 1977 (Gilchrist, 1993).
FMEA is an inductive process for eliminating possible failures at the
design phase of a product during new development process before they
get to the customers. Capturing potential risks and eliminating them at
the conceptual design phase is essential because it ensures that end-users
of an engineering product (in this case an IPVTFC) have a pleasurable
experience with the product. As such, FMEA and FMECA promote
customer-centricity by eliminating any potential design defects or oper-
ational inefficiency in a product so that customers would not experience
such defects. In other words, FMEA systematically establishes the po-
tential causes of failures before they materialise during the lifetime of a
system. Moreover, original equipment manufacturers apply FMEA and
FMECA to save costs associated with recalls and warranties for
dysfunctional products, which may constitute a huge economic loss for
the companies and inconveniences to the customers. As such, FMEA
provides an objective, proactive and cost-effective inductive evaluation
of systems/processes so that the possible requirements by the users and
plausible design alternatives can be contemplated at the design phase.
Furthermore, FMEA and FMECA are useful for developing new designs,
technologies, processes; making modifications to existing designs or
processes; or for evaluating new designs or processes when they are to be
used in a new environment (Agarwala, 1990; Bowles, 1998; Department
of Defense of United States of America, 2000).
Explicitly, the design intent of an IPVTFC system is to continuously
supply electricity and hot water to the users for both grid-connected and
off-grid applications. Rationally, failures of the components will increase
the risk of unavailability of the system. Unavailability could cause the
user to resort to fossil fuel-based energy systems which will continue to
increase greenhouse gases emission and global warming. Besides, un-
availability of an IPVTFC system could cause the user to spend more on
purchasing power from the grid. Thus, the overarching research question
is how an IPVTFC system can be designed and operated to ensure that
electricity and hot water can be supplied in the right quantity and quality
whenever demand for them are made by the user. Our preoccupation in
this study is therefore to identify the risk items associated with an IPVTFC
system and provide insights on how designers can avoid risks that would
undermine its operational efficiency and general technological sustain-
ability outlook. This is a crucial question that end-users, energy policy-
makers and investors would want engineers to address before massive
uptake and deployments. Essentially, RETs are not only expected to meet
environmental sustainability but also economic, social and technological
sustainability before it can replace conventional energy systems. There-
fore, the overall aim of this study is to critically assess the risks of
different failure modes of the components of an IPVTFC system for grid
and off-grid applications. The specific objectives are to:
1. Generate risk priority numbers and criticality values for the compo-
nents/parts of an IPVTFC system.
2. Analyse the design and operational implications the risk rankings
within the framework of system FMEA/FMECA.
3. Suggest strategies to mitigate the identified risks in order to improve
the reliability of an IPVTFC system.
This study contributes to generate useful information for the risk
management profiling and documentation for an IPVTFC system and
other photovoltaic-based energy systems. This can be used to improve the
C. Ogbonnaya et al. Cleaner Environmental Systems 2 (2021) 100021

design for maintainability of the system; and provide a basis for testing,
troubleshooting and fault-detection in the system. The results from this
study can facilitate the creation of critical item lists (CIL) at the design
and development phase of an IPVTFC system. The CIL carefully considers
failure mode, failure effects, causes, detectability, corrective or preven-
tive actions and rationale for acceptance (Pillay and Wang, 2003). This
could inspire design innovation since changes in the design of the system
could make a high impact failure less critical. Henceforth, the IPVTFC
system is described in section 2. FMEA and FMECA methodologies
adopted for this research are presented in section 3. Critical analyses of
the results generated from the risk assessment and recommendations
therefrom are presented in section 4. Section 5 presents the limitations of
the study and future work plan while Section 6 presents the conclusions
that can be drawn from the study.
characterise the components based on their normal operating behaviour
or function so that alternative components can be considered for
high-risk components. For instance, supercapacitors perform the same
function of energy storage as batteries, and they can be interchangeable
depending on the extent to which their characteristics meet the design
specifications and use cases. A hierarchical approach to system analysis
(Papalambros and Wilde, 1992) was implied in this study to consider
how failures at the part level could cause the component, subsystem and
ultimately the entire system to fail (Kim and Zuo, 2018; Papalambros and
Wilde, 1992).
Table 1 shows the grouping of the components into the three sections
based on their inherent effect on mass and energy flow through the
system. These components may convert/transform, store or transport
mass or energy subject to the applicable physical or chemical laws.

2. Description of an IPVTFC system Table 1

Mass and energy-active components of the IPVTFC system and their functions.
An IPVTFC system in Fig. 1 is made up of a photovoltaic-thermal (PV/
Description of Components Functional analysis Energy conversion
T) module, a cold-water source and hot-water storage tank; a DC/DC section processes and interfacial
converter, a DC/AC inverter, a proton exchange membrane electrolyser energy transfer
(PEME), a hydrogen and oxygen storage tanks, a proton exchange
Energy The sun Source of solar Energy transfer by
membrane fuel cell (PEMFC), a DC bus bar and a battery bank and generation energy radiation
ancillary components such as pumps, compressors, reheater, tanks, etc. (G) PV/T Produces Solar-to-electrical
Under a normal operating condition, the PV module generates electricity electricity
whenever there is solar radiation. The DC produced by the PV module Produces hot water Solar-to-thermal
Electrolyser Produces hydrogen Electrochemical
charges the battery as a priority because the primary source of power is gas
the battery. Any excess electricity is used to generate hydrogen using Produces oxygen Electrochemical
PEME. The hydrogen and oxygen generated from the PEME are stored in gas
tanks using compressors. The gases are used to generate electricity using Fuel cell Produces Electrochemical
electricity
PEMFC at night or when there is an unfavourable weather condition (e.g.
Energy Hydrogen/ Stores reactants No reaction; Requires
cloudy, snowy or rainy weather). The output from the battery and the storage (S) Oxygen tank pressure.
PEMFC are DC type and they can be collected using bus bar so that the DC Hot water tank Stores hot water Heat retention
can be converted into AC using an inverter when an AC load is to be Battery Stores electricity Electrochemical
powered. In this configuration, for grid-tied applications, the system can Energy DC/DC Converts DC DC-to-DC electrical
utilisation converter current
be connected to the grid to purchase power when there is no solar ra- (U) Inverter Transforms DC DC -to-AC electrical
diation and the energy stored were exhausted. The PV/T component uses current to AC
thermal energy generated from the PV and direct solar radiation on the current
thermal absorber to produce hot water which can be used for domestic Pumps/ Increase pressure Mass transportation
compressors of flow
applications.
Bus bar Collect and DC-to-DC electrical
The IPVTFC system is further grouped into three sections including distributes DC
energy generation (G), energy storage (S) and energy utilisation (U) current in the
(Ogbonnaya et al., 2020a,b,c). The aim of the categorisation is to system

Fig. 1. A schematic diagram of an integrated photovoltaic-thermal-fuel cell system.

3
C. Ogbonnaya et al.
Conversely, components that do not convert/transform, store or trans-
port mass and energy inputs from one form to another; but rather provide
other functions, say aesthetic value to the system are not considered in
this study.
3. Methods
There are three types of FMEA: System, Design and Process. System
FMEA helps to establish the design requirements that would inform the
design FMEA. Within the methodological framework of an FMEA and
FMECA, the design FMEA is fed into a process FMEA to inform how a
product can be manufactured. The current study is limited to a System
FMEA and FMECA whilst system theory, system thinking, and system
analysis are applied to conceptualise and interrogate the interactions
between the components of the system as well as the system and its
environment.
Traditionally, risk priority number (RPN) is used for quantifying the
significance of failure modes and their impacts. It is calculated as the
product of the probability of the failure occurring, the severity of the
failure if it crystalises and detectability of the failure (Gilchrist, 1993;
Pillay and Wang, 2003). The criticality of a failure (C) is calculated as the
product of the severity and the probability of a failure and it is used to
rank the risk items in order of importance. Although FMEA/FMECA de-
pends on expert judgement (Liu et al., 2013) due to the nature of risks
and uncertainties (Finucane and Holup, 2006), the usefulness of an
FMEA/FMECA in improving risk management of systems is widely
acknowledged. Different approaches have been adopted by researchers
to generate the RPN and the criticality numbers. For instance, the fuzzy
method has been proposed to quantify the linguistic ambiguity of FMEA
(Ahn et al., 2017). Fuzzy-based FMEA was used for a system that has not
been experienced before and it was proposed by L. A. Zadeh for
expressing an uncertain state in mathematics (Mamdani, 1988). The
fuzzy method has been applied in the FMEA study of a nuclear design
(Guimar~ aes et al., 2011). Total efficient risk priority number (TERPN) (Di
Bona et al., 2018) has also been proposed as a means of classifying risks
to identify corrective actions.
FMEA and FMECA are forward-looking risk management techniques
for improving the reliability and safety of products, processes, structures,
systems (Lo and Liou, 2018). Thus, in this study, the FMEA focuses on the
likely failure modes of the components involved in mass and energy
conversion, transformation, storage, or transportation in the system. The
methodological framework is based on MIL-STD-882D, MIL-STD-1629A
standards and SAE J1739 and AIAG FMEA guidelines for performing
FMEA/FMECA. Overall, the steps adopted to generate the RPN and
Criticality values were based on the proposed steps by Pillay and Wang
(2003). The steps are summarised as follows:
1. Develop a good understanding of how the system operates under
normal condition.
2. Divide the system into subsystems and components.
3. Use system flow charts and block-diagram to identify the com-
ponents and their relationships.
4. List the components of the system.
5. Identify operational and environmental stresses.
6. Determine the failure modes of each of the components and their
potential effects on the component, assembly, sub-system or
system.
7. Determine and categorise the severity of the failure modes.
8. Estimate the probability of failure of the components.
9. Calculate the risk priority number (RPN) for each of the
components.
10. Develop design improvements to achieve preventive or compen-
satory actions.
11. Summarise the analysis
Based on insights from the literature on the characteristics of the
4
Cleaner Environmental Systems 2 (2021) 100021
components and our understanding of the system and its components, a
total of twenty risk items were identified for analysis. The items are listed
later in Table 6 to avoid repetition. Tables for severity (S) of failures,
probability of occurrence (O) and detectability (D) were created based on
our risk perception and risk appetite (Finucane and Holup, 2006). To
develop the criteria for judging the severity of failure of the identified
items, a ranking of 1–10 was used. Ranking 1 indicates that there is no
discernible effect of the failure on the performance of the system while
ranking 10 indicates that the failure is so severe that a regulatory
requirement of safety may be breached if the failure crystalises. In
assigning the effects of the failure modes of the items, the linguistic de-
scriptions of the ranking are presented in Table 2. To decide whether any
of the items fall under any of the severity ranking, some design consid-
erations were made including modularity, fault detection, fault isolation,
warnings, redundancy, design safety (Department of Defense of United
States of America, 2000; Ogbonnaya et al., 2020a,b,c). Table 2 is based
on suggested procedure for performing FMECA in SAE J1739 and AIAG
FMEA procedure (AIAG, 1995).
The criteria for the probability of failures were estimated based on the
possible number of occurrences of the failures of the items in every 365
days. The ranking of 1 indicates that there is no possible failure occur-
rence in 365 days while the ranking of 10 indicates that the occurrence of
failures is
200 times in 365 days. The detailed criteria for the linguistic
implications of the occurrence of failures are presented in Table 3. The
table is based on the suggested mishap probability levels in MIL-STD-
882D.
The last component required to calculate a risk priority number is
detectability. Like the other two components, the criteria for detectability
of the failures of the items are developed based on a ranking of 1–10.
From the linguistic description of the criteria presented in Table 4, a
ranking of 1 indicates that it is almost certain that a failure would be
detected by a design control if it occurs while a ranking of 10 indicates
that it is uncertain that a failure would be detected by design control if it
occurs. Risk impacts decreases as detectability increases. Table 4 is cus-
tomised for IPVTFC system based on the suggested procedure for per-
forming FMECA in MIL-STD-1629A.
Table 5 presents a linguistic classification of the risk criteria, colour
codes and the Criticality values. The classification would facilitate the
Table 2
Linguistic implications and ranking of the severity (S) of failures.
Effect Criteria: Severity (S) of effect Ranking
Hazardous without Very high severity ranking when a potential 10
warning failure mode affects the safe operation of the
system; and/or involves a breach of regulations/
laws without warning.
Hazardous with Very high severity ranking when a potential 9
warning failure mode affects the safe operation of the
system; and/or involves a breach of regulations/
laws with a warning.
Very High System inoperable (e.g. no hot water and 8
electricity output)
High System operable (poor quality of hot water and 7
electricity output). System users very dissatisfied.
Moderate System operable but with low reliability 6
(particularly energy availability). System users
dissatisfied.
Low System operable, but energy availability 5
fluctuates. System users are somewhat dissatisfied.
Very Low Energy availability balanced before critical points 4
where there is a system-level failure. Defect
noticed by more than 75% of users.
Minor Design coupling and finishing do not conform to 3
users' specification at the system level. Defect
noticed by 50% of the users.
Very Minor Design coupling and finishing do not conform at 2
components level. Defect noticed by 25% of the
users.
None No discernible effect on the system. 1
C. Ogbonnaya et al. Cleaner Environmental Systems 2 (2021) 100021

Table 3
Linguistic implications and ranking of the occurrence (O) of failures.
Probability of Failure Possible failure rates
Very High: Persistence failure
200 times in 365 days
150 times in 365 days
High: Frequent failures 100 times in 365 days
50 times in 365 days
Moderate: Occasional failure 20 times in 365 days
10 times in 365 days
5 time in 365 days
Low: Relatively few failures 2 times in 365 days
1 time in 365 days
No failures 0 time in 365 days
Table 4
Linguistic implications and ranking of the detectability (D) of failures.
Detection Criteria: Likelihood of Detection by Design Control
Absolute Design control cannot detect a potential failure
Uncertainty mechanism, its causes and subsequent failure mode.
Very Remote Very remote chance that the design control will
detect a potential failure mechanism, its causes and
subsequent failure mode. Defects remain until no
energy is being produced.
Remote Remote chance that the design control will detect a
potential causes or failure mode mechanism and
subsequent failure mode. Defects remain until energy
production is interrupted.
Very Low Very low chance that the design control will detect a
potential failure mechanism, its causes and
subsequent failure mode. Detection becomes possible
when the system is severely affected to be able to
produce energy.
Low Low chance that the design control will detect a
potential energy failure mechanism, its causes and
subsequent failure mode. Detection becomes possible
when the system is no longer producing energy.
Moderate Moderate chance that the design control will detect a
potential failure mechanism, its causes and
subsequent failure mode. System users will not know
until the whole system is affected.
Moderately High Moderately high chance that the design control will
detect a potential failure mechanism, its causes and
subsequent failure mode.
High High chance that the design control will detect a
potential failure mechanism, its causes and
subsequent failure mode. Detection can only be done
through inspection/testing.
Very High Very high chance that the design control will detect a
potential failure mechanism, its causes and
subsequent failure mode.
Almost Certain Design control will certainly detect a potential
energy failure mechanism, its causes and subsequent
failure mode.
Table 5
Linguistic description of risk criteria, colour codes and criticality ranking.
Risk assessment Description of risk criteria
colour codes
Red Persistent, frequent or occasional energy failures
that may be hazardous or render the system
completely or partially inoperable.
Orange Failure, either frequent or rare, that may be
hazardous or simply leave the user of the system
very dissatisfied and complaining.
Yellow Unacceptable performance of the system due to
potential risk if it fails or involves persistent/
frequent failures that render the system
uncompetitive. This will leave the customer very
dissatisfied
Green Relatively few failures which may not be noticed
by more than 50% of the users when it occurs.
FMECA aspect of this study. There are situations where it might be more
effective to communicate the criticality of the risks using colour coding.
Ranking Thus, the risk level in “red” colour requires high priority attention to
effect design changes so that the regulatory requirements and customer
10
9 experiences can be satisfied. At the end of the other spectrum, the Crit-
8 icality values coded “green” between 1 and 4 represent relatively few
7 failures and may not be given as much attention in comparison with the
6 items that fall within the criticality values between 40 and 100. Table 5 is
5
4
based on the suggested procedure for performing FMECA in MIL-STD-
3 1629A.
2 The risk priority number for each item (RPNi ) expressed in Equation
1 (1) is calculated by multiplying the values of S, O and D for each of the
items based on the criteria presented in Tables 2–4. The criticality of the
failure of each of the item (Ci ) expressed in Equation (2) is calculated by
multiplying the values of O and S based on the criteria presented in Ta-
bles 2 and 3
Ranking
RPNi ¼ Si  Oi  Di (1)
10
9 Ci ¼ Oi  Si (2)
Fig. 2 shows the flowchart summarising the steps taken in developing
the methods for generating the RPN and Criticality values for each of the
8 twenty items identified to pose risks to the reliability of an IPVTFC sys-
tem. The steps are further explained as follows:
7 Step 1 System description: This involves the design of the system so
that the configuration of the components can be established (see
Fig. 1). The normal operating condition and the inputs and
outputs of each of the components were critically considered.
Table 1 shows a critical consideration of the functional analysis
6
of the components of the system.
Step 2 Information gathering: A systematic literature review was per-
formed to understand the possible use cases for an IPVTFC sys-
5
tem and the characterisation of the components. Information
gathering were limited to publicly available peer-reviewed
materials. The information gathered at this stage was useful in
4 selecting the twenty items that were focused on in this study.
Also, insights were drawn from studies on IPVFC systems (Cas-
ta~neda et al., 2013; Jayalakshmi, 2018; Lajnef et al., 2013) since
3
it is closely related to IPVTFC systems.
Step 3 Analysis of operating conditions: The ideal operating conditions
of the system was defined to be a reliable supply of electrical
2
energy and hot water whenever demands are made. Any con-
dition or event that would cause the system not to meet this
1 definition constitutes a risk item.
Step 4 Generation of a list of risk items: The list of items selected for
study are based on the items that their failure would affect the
flow of mass and energy in the system. The number of items
depends on the size, number of parts and characteristics of the
components. This means that the number of risk items generated
on a component of the system varies from one component to
Range another.
Step 5 Description of failure modes: Different scenarios that could lead
40–100 to the failure of the parts, components and the system were
contemplated using system analysis. The state of the parts or
components that imply a failure were described. The de-
20–39 scriptions will be presented in Table 6.
Step 6 Estimation of effects and impacts of a failure: Risk, safety, reli-
5–19 ability analysis and decision-making are often done with some
degree of uncertainties where statistical data cannot facilitate a
probabilistic assessment (Groso et al., 2012; Iheukwumer-
e-esotu, 2020). When operational data are not available, prob-
1–4 ably because the system is at a conceptual phase of development,
as in the instant case, engineering judgements and assessments
by experts become crucial to reduce the epistemic uncertainties

5
C. Ogbonnaya et al. Cleaner Environmental Systems 2 (2021) 100021

Fig. 2. Flowchart of the research methods used to implement the FMEA and FMECA.

associated with the performance prediction of the system.
Evaluating the engineering risks of an IPVTFC system using the
FMEA and FMECA methodologies depends on the risk appetite,
feelings or analysis approach of the expert (Finucane and Holup,
2006). Thus, we were consistent in the application of the
described criteria in Tables 2–4.
Step 7 Estimation of the severity, occurrence, and detectability: This
step involves a translation of the linguistic implications of the
effects and impacts of a failure of a part or a component

6
C. Ogbonnaya et al. Cleaner Environmental Systems 2 (2021) 100021

considered in step 6 into numerical values. At this point, values
were assigned to the S, O and D based on the criteria described
in Tables 2–4.
Step 8 Calculation of RPN and Criticality values for each item: The RPN
and Criticality values for each of the item was calculated based
on Equations (1) and (2), respectively. This step was facilitated
using Excel.
Step 9 Risk and Criticality ranking: The values realised from step 8
were used for the failure mode and criticality analysis to gain
insight into the failures with a potentially high impact. The
items were rearranged based on the criteria for criticality as
described in Table 5.
Step 10 Critical analysis of the significance of the rankings: MATLAB
was used for data analysis to plot bar charts for the RPN and
Criticality values. The numbers generated were critically ana-
lysed for two major purposes. The first purpose was to examine
if the result calculated made sense with respect to the insights
gained from the literature review. This was necessary to ensure
that the risk ranking is rationalizable. The second purpose for a
critical analysis of the ranking was to consider new design
controls and modification in the system design and operational
procedures that could reduce or eliminate the risks so that the
reliability of the system can be improved.
Step 11 Recommendation of preventive and corrective actions: There
were recommendations on how to reduce the risks associated
with the use of IPVTFC system for providing the right quantity
and quality of electrical energy and hot water whenever they are
demanded. Attention was focussed on the design or operational

Table 6
Risk priority number and Criticality values of risk items for an integrated photovoltaic-thermal-fuel cell system.
ID Components Function Failure modes Failure Failure Effect Severity Occurrence Detectability RPN Criticality
mechanism (S) (O) (D) (SxOxD) (C)
(SxO)

1 Sun Solar energy No solar Night/cloudy No energy 9 10 5 450 90

source radiation weather generation in PV/T
2 PV/T cold Supplies cold No cold water Cold water supply No water in the PV/ 6 2 3 36 12
water pump water to PV/T in the PV/T pump fails T; and no hot water
supply
3 Hot water Supplies hot No hot water Hot water No hot water 6 2 3 36 12
pump water to the output from pump(s) fails supplied to the
house PV/T or tank house
4 PV module Produces No electricity No solar radiation; No power for 8 10 3 240 80
electricity output strings fails; battery and
electrolyser
5 Electrolyser Supplies water Electrolyser Pump fails; water No hydrogen 7 3 4 84 21
water pump for hydrogen not receiving finished in tank produced
production water
6 Electrolyser Stores Hydrogen tank H2 compressor No hydrogen for a 8 5 3 120 40
hydrogen hydrogen empty fails; no hydrogen fuel cell to utilise for
pump produced power generation
7 Electrolyser Stores oxygen Oxygen tank O2 compressor No oxygen for a fuel 7 5 3 105 35
oxygen pump empty fails; no oxygen cell to utilise for
produced power generation
8 Electrolyser Provides energy No electricity PV/battery/bus No hydrogen 8 6 3 144 48
power source for dissociating input bar fails. produced
water
9 Fuel cell Supplies FC not H2 compressor No electrochemical 7 2 4 56 14
hydrogen hydrogen to receiving fails; no hydrogen reaction to produce
pump fuel cell hydrogen in the tank power.
(fuel)
10 Fuel cell Supplies FC not O2 compressor No electrochemical 7 2 4 56 14
oxygen pump oxidant receiving fails; no oxygen in reaction to produce
oxygen the tank power.
11 Fuel cell Collects and No electricity Disconnection, no No power supply in 8 1 2 16 8
power transmit power output reaction in the cell house
collector produced in
fuel cell
12 Fuel cell Enhance Membrane dry Humidification Low power quality 7 7 6 294 49
humidifier membrane system fails
ionic
transports.
13 Hydrogen Stores H2 leak. Puncture No H2 supply to FC; 9 6 5 270 54
tank hydrogen endangers users
14 Oxygen tank Stores oxygen O2 leak Puncture No O2 supply to FC 8 6 5 240 48
15 Insulated hot Conserves heat Heat lost to Thermal Low thermal quality 6 4 3 72 24
water tank surrounding insulation fails of hot water
supplied to house
16 Charge Stores No electricity Charge controller Battery not charging 8 5 3 120 40
controller electricity fails
17 Battery Stores No power Leakage, No power supply to 5 6 2 60 30
electricity output discharge bus bar
18 DC/DC Connects PV to No electricity No current flow. No DC supply to DC 5 2 2 20 10
converter bus bar bus bar
19 Inverter DC-AC No electricity DC- AC inversion No AC output 5 2 2 20 10
inversion fails
20 Bus bar Distributes DC No electricity Wire cuts/ No power supply 8 4 2 64 32
in the system disconnects

7
C. Ogbonnaya et al.
modifications that could prevent the crystallisation of the
identified risk items. Where the risks cannot be eliminated,
recommendations on how to reduce their impacts were made.
Step 12 Continuous improvement: The essence of this study is to
perform a proactive engineering risk assessment of an IPVTFC
system which is relevant for IPVFC systems (Brocke et al., 2002;
Devrim and Pehlivanolu, 2015; Ganguly et al., 2010). Every
FMEA report is a living document which can be updated as new
information on risks that were not initially envisaged emerge.
New information may emerge during operation of the system
and such information can be included in system definition so
that the design of the next generation of the system can be
improved. Further recommendations on how to use the results
generated from this study are made. Also, suggestions on an
alternative methodology for generating the RPN and Criticality
values under real-world environment were made.
4. Results and discussions
This section discussed the relevance of the RPN and Criticality values
of the risk items for an IPVTFC system within the framework of FMEA
and FMECA methodologies. The risk analysis focused on how the impacts
on the availability of the desired outputs can be managed through risk
management strategies such as risk avoidance, elimination, reduction or
absorption (Verbano and Venturini, 2011). Table 6 presents the summary
of the twenty items including the components/parts of the system, their
functions, potential failure modes, mechanisms of failure and the effect of
the failures on the capability of the system to supply electricity and hot
water.
Fig. 3 shows a bar chart for the RPN of the items. Notably, the impact
of the intermittency of solar energy ranked highest. This is so because the
availability of solar radiation equally determines the quality and quantity
of electricity and hot water that can be generated from the system.
Although the possibility of forecasting solar radiation with pyranometer
increases the detectability of solar radiation, the measurement of solar
radiation does not in itself increase the energy output of the system.
However, the ability to measure and forecast solar radiation can improve
the energy demand and supply planning process to reduce the risks of the
intermittency of solar radiation. In the first instance, risks associated with
the intermittency of solar radiation can be addressed by optimal sizing of
an IPVTFC system (Cano et al., 2014; Hadidian Moghaddam et al., 2019;
Silva et al., 2011). Optimal sizing can increase energy availability and
also reduce the overall cost of the system (Bukar and Tan, 2019). The
second importance of the detectability of solar radiation is to inform
energy demand and supply planning. This means that forecasting the
solar radiation might help to adjust energy generation expectation or
plan for an alternative back-up source including purchasing additional
power from the grid.
Fig. 3. RPN ranking of risk items for an IPVTFC system.
8
Cleaner Environmental Systems 2 (2021) 100021
The current design control for an IPVTFC system to mitigate the risks
of the intermittency of solar radiation on the availability of electricity
includes an addition of batteries or supercapacitors and PEMFC. By
integrating batteries and PEMFC components with a PV/T module, the
batteries can meet the short-term energy need while the PEMFC can meet
the long-term energy need. Hydrogen as an energy vector can be stored
longer than the electrical charge stored in the batteries. Furthermore, the
combination of batteries and fuel cell reduces the risk of not satisfying a
sudden spike in the electrical energy demand since the PEMFC compo-
nent can step in to meet demand above the capacity of the batteries.
A critical analysis of the function of the battery and PEMFC as power
sources in the system showed that there was a higher number of parts in a
PEMFC compared to a battery. Multiple parts predisposes a PEMFC
component to a higher risk of failure compared to a battery. This risk
assessment is based on the fact that generating power from the PEMFC
component involves many mass and energy-active components
compared to that of a battery. For instance, from Fig. 1, if there was any
failure in the mechanism of mass and energy conversion/transfer in a
PEME component and its ancillaries, it would pose a risk to the capability
of a PEMFC to generate electrical energy since a PEMFC depends on the
hydrogen produced by the PEME. The batteries or supercapacitors do not
require an intermediary component to store or generate energy. On the
other hand, the risk of discharge of the battery does not apply to the
PEMFC as long as hydrogen (fuel) and oxygen/air (oxidant) are contin-
uously supplied. This means that whereas the battery can only be
recharged by electrical energy consumption, the PEMFC generates power
using stored hydrogen. Moreover, hydrogen can come from different
sources which makes a PEMFC more flexible and adaptable for power
generation.
Given that the batteries/supercapacitors are suitable for short-term
needs while the long-term needs can be better met with hydrogen as
an energy vector, combining a battery/supercapacitor and a PEMFC
component for power generation can be so complementary that the risk
profile of using either of the components alone will be diminished. For
instance, the system could be designed to generate hydrogen in summer
when there is a potential overgeneration of electricity so that the
hydrogen can be recalled during winter when solar radiation is poorer
and the risk of lower generation of electricity from the PV/T is higher. It
is also necessary to highlight that generating hot water from the system
depends on solar radiation. This means that there is a heightened risk of
unavailability of hot water during winter when it is needed most. To
mitigate this risk, a reheater is needed to raise the temperature of the
water. The reheater will consume power generated from the PEMFC
component. By achieving an optimal size and cost of the system, the
system could provide sustainable energy throughout the year.
Fig. 4 shows the bar chart for the Criticality values which were
calculated based on Equation (2). Apart from the sun, the source of solar
radiation, the PV module ranks high in terms of criticality. The value of
the criticality of the PV falls within “red colour” based on the energy risk
assessment matrix in Table 5. The implication is that the source of power
Fig. 4. Criticality ranking for the risk items of an IPVTFC system.
C. Ogbonnaya et al. Cleaner Environmental Systems 2 (2021) 100021

to charge battery, generate hydrogen, power ancillary components such Table 7

as reheater, pumps, compressor, fans is critical to the availability of Risk classification of the items using colour codes and criticality ranking.
electricity and hot water from the system. For instance, a failure of the Risk assessment Risk items Range Composition
electricity supply to the pump that feeds cold water into the PV/T module colour codes (%)
may affect the supply of hot water as much as the failure of the electricity Red No solar radiation; No electricity 40–100 40
supply to the pump that feeds hot water to the house. Thermodynami- output from the PV module;
cally, the thermal quality of the stored hot water will eventually degrade Hydrogen tank empty; No
by convective heat transfer if the hot water generated is not utilised. The electricity input into the
electrolyser; Membrane dry; H2
risk of cooling of the hot water would also increase if there is a poor leak.; O2 leak; No electricity
insulation of the pipes and hot water tank. Failure of electricity supply to passing through the charge
the ancillaries is a major risk when operating the system under off-grid controller.
applications and it has to be addressed through a robust energy storage Orange Electrolyser not receiving water; 20–39 25
Oxygen tank empty; Heat lost to
system and an effective power management control strategies (Hassani
surrounding from the hot water
et al., 2020). To increase the reliability of the system as well as reduce the tank; No power output from the
risks of unavailability, it can be integrated with an alternative source of battery; No electricity flowing
electricity such as wind turbine which can also be operated under off-grid through the bus bar.
mode (Cano et al., 2014). By integrating a PV/T module with other RETs, Yellow No cold water in the PV/T; No hot 5–19 35
water output from PV/T or tank;
the breakdown of a PV/T module would not render the system FC not receiving hydrogen (fuel);
completely inoperable. FC not receiving oxygen; No
The results of the FMEA and FMECA processes can help to predict the electricity output from FC current
likelihood that certain types of catastrophic failures would occur based collector; No electricity through
the DC/DC converter; No
on the criticality of failures. Thus, the exercise can help to identify and
electricity through the DC/AC
prioritise the attention to be given to high-risk-high-impact failures. inverter.
From the criticality analysis, it appeared that failures that may not Green None 1–4 0
necessarily be occurring frequently but may prove catastrophic anytime
they materialise are as important as some risks that may not be severe but
may constitute a huge nuisance to users. Whereas the former may be of made to manage the identified risks to facilitate an optimal design and
regulatory relevance, the later is crucial in the ultimate commercialisa- reliable operating conditions for an IPVTFC system.
tion of the system. As of it, from a commercial perspective, customers
may not patronise products that cause them frequent annoyance unless 1. There is a compelling justification to combine a fuel cell and
there is no affordable alternative. battery in the design of the energy storage for a self-sustaining
Table 7 shows that the failure of all the items selected for this study IPVTFC system so that the batteries would meet short-term de-
would be noticed by the users. Out of the 20 items, 40% of them may be mand for power while the fuel cell would meet the long-term
hazardous or render the system completely or partially inoperable. 25% demand for power.
of the risk items may be hazardous or simply leave the user of the system 2. The IPVTFC system should be designed to allow the PEMFC to use
very dissatisfied and complaining. The outstanding 35% of the risk items hydrogen from central gas infrastructure or hydrogen from a
may render the system uncompetitive and leave the customer very hydrogen filling station. This will reduce the impact of the failures
dissatisfied. The criticality analysis saliently revealed that the process of of the electrolyser and its ancillaries on the operability of the
our risk quantification was extremely strict, and this was because the system.
study was based on a linguistic translation of the failure modes and their 3. Hydrogen leakages may render the PEMFC inoperable or even
effects into numerical values as opposed to an analysis that is based on hazardous because it can cause explosion, deflagration, or deto-
operational statistical data generated from the system. At this conceptual nation. Hydrogen can be explosive when it mixes with atmo-
phase, probabilistic approach with data is not possible and a strict spheric oxygen over a wide range of concentrations such as 4–75%
quantification is probably an alternative. Nevertheless, the RPN and and 18–59% (Dagdougui et al., 2018). Therefore, the installation
criticality values are realistic, and it is better to over-estimate a risk item of alarms to detect hydrogen leakages could be one way to reduce
which would turn out to have a lesser impact rather than under- the risks posed by leakages. The IPVTFC system should also be
estimating a risk item that eventually proved disastrous. Being risk- installed outside the building where leakages would not be
averse at the conceptual phase in the absence of operational data concentrated in an enclosed space to the extent the ignition would
would allow designers to take a critical look at the risk acceptance be more probable.
criteria for an IPVTFC system as well as manage the risks with the best 4. An IPVTFC system can be designed to use compressed air as a
possible risk management strategy. backup source of oxidant. This will complement the use of
Furthermore, a comparison of the trend between the RPN and Criti- hydrogen from an external source when the electrolyser breaks
cality values of the risk items showed that the risk of failure of photo- down. However, air contains other gases or impurities which may
voltaic module and leakage of the oxygen has a risk priority number of affect the electrochemical reaction or the activity of the
240 each whilst their corresponding Criticality values were 80 and 48, electrocatalysts.
respectively. Further interrogation of the result revealed that the failure 5. Since an IPVTFC is a system of systems, modular design may be
of the PV module would lead to power failure just as the lack of oxygen adapted to allow for easy isolation of any malfunctioning sub-
due to leakage would lead to power failure in the fuel cell. However, the system or component. Modularisation of the system can enhance
criticality value of the failure of the PV module is higher than that of the the design for manufacturability and maintainability (Ogbonnaya
failure of oxygen supply because compressed air can be used to substitute et al., 2020a,b,c).
oxygen whereas charging of the battery and generating hydrogen with 6. Failures of the components/parts of an IPVTFC system should be
the PEME component will fail as a consequence of the failure of the PV logged into a risk management database. This will allow the
module. Therefore, in ranking the critical item lists, the failure of the PV improvement of the risks and reliability of future generations of
module should top the leakage of stored oxygen so that priority attention the system based on actual statistical data.
can be given to the failure of the PV module anytime it occurs. 7. Integrating the system with an alternative RETs such as a wind
From the foregoing analysis, the following recommendations are turbine or the grid could enhance its operational efficiency. This is

9
C. Ogbonnaya et al.
due to the high risks associated with the intermittency of solar
radiation.
8. Auxiliary heating can be used to increase the temperature of hot
water from the PV/T module if solar radiation is not intense
enough to achieve the desired temperature of the working fluid.
At night when there is no solar radiation, the auxiliary heating
may utilise power from the PEMFC or the grid to raise the tem-
perature of stored hot water if the thermal energy has decreased
due to convective heat transfer.
9. Furthermore, since PEME and PEMFC operates at a temperature
between 70 and 100  C and there is a waste of electrical energy in
form of heat generation during renewable-to-hydrogen conver-
sion in the PEME and during hydrogen-to-electricity conversion in
the PEMFC, harnessing the waste heat from the two components
could increase the reliability of hot water supply given that hot
water can be generated from the PEMFC in the absence of solar
radiation. In addition, recovering the waste heat from the PEME
and PEMFC could improve the overall energy and exergy effi-
ciencies of the IPVTFC system.
10. The power source, configuration, and sizing for the ancillaries
need to be considered at the design phase to ensure that there is
always power to start ancillaries before a PEMFC component starts
generating power.
5. Research limitations and future works
The current study is based on expert judgement and the quantification
of the epistemic description of the failure modes and their impacts into
numerical values for S, O and D for each risk item. This is because there is
no existing IPVTFC system that can be used to establish the failure modes,
probability of occurrences of the failures and the severity of the failures
on the operability of the system. Therefore, this limitation can be over-
come during prototype testing phase of the manufacturing stage of an
IPVTFC system so that actual statistical data can be collected to further
reduce the epistemic uncertainties in quantifying the RPN and the Crit-
icality values. In addition to this engineering risk analysis, our future
work will focus on a thermo-economic analysis and optimisation of an
IPVTFC system in order to provide further insights into the overall effi-
ciency, annual energy demand coverage, optimal sizing and control of
the system for both grid and off-grid applications.
6. Conclusions
In this study, FMEA and FMECA methodologies were used to critically
analyse an integrated photovoltaic-thermal-fuel cell (IPVTFC) system to
gain insights into how the failure modes of the components could impact
the reliable operation of system. A total of twenty risk items that could
cause the conversion/transfer of mass or energy through the system to
fail were identified and critically studied. The severity of failures, prob-
ability of occurrence and detectability of the failure modes were esti-
mated based on MIL-STD-882D, MIL-STD-1629A standards and SAE
J1739 and AIAG FMEA guidelines for performing FMEA/FMECA in
conjunction with insights from literature and expert judgment. Based on
the analyses, the following conclusions can be drawn from this study.
 The risk of no solar radiation, hydrogen leakage, failure of photo-
voltaic module, leakage of the oxidant has a risk priority number of
450, 270, 240, 240 whilst their corresponding Criticality values are
90, 54, 80, 48, respectively. Consequently, the risk posed by the un-
availability of solar radiation and the breakdown of the PV module
appeared to be extremely critical to the availability of electrical en-
ergy from an IPVTFC system while the leakage of hydrogen could
cause the failure of power generation from the fuel cell as well as pose
health and safety risks in form of explosion, deflagration, or
detonation.
10
Cleaner Environmental Systems 2 (2021) 100021
 Overall, 40% of the 20 risk items may be hazardous or render the
system completely or partially inoperable. 25% of them may be
hazardous or simply leave the user of the system very dissatisfied and
complaining while 35% of the risk items may render the system un-
competitive and leave the customer very dissatisfied.
 A seamless integration of batteries and fuel cells could enhance the
overall reliability of the system since they could act complementarily.
The impact of sub-optimal sizing of the energy storage system will
have more adverse effects in an off-grid mode compared to a grid-
connected mode. Therefore, adequate energy storage consideration
should be given to an IPVTFC system applied in an off-grid and
distributed applications.
 The results generated from this study could help to prevent or miti-
gate undesired energy curtailing incidents during the commerciali-
sation phase of IPVTFC systems. If the risk items identified in this
study are adequately addressed, the effects of the failure modes on the
safety, operation, reliability, and maintainability would significantly
reduce whilst the system would become more competitive among
alternative integrated RETs.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgement
This work is supported by a scholarship of the Petroleum Technology
Development Fund (PTDF) Nigeria number PTDF/ED/PHD/OC/1078/
17.
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