A Systems Analysis of Army Long Range and

Support Fires
Manuela Cortes Chandler Ramirez David Reeves
Department of Systems Engineering Department of Systems Engineering Department of Systems Engineering
United States Military Academy United States Military Academy United States Military Academy
West Point, NY West Point, NY West Point, NY
Manuela.Cortes@westpoint.edu Chandler.Ramirez@westpoint.edu David.Reeves@westpoint.edu

Zachary Scott COL Hise Gibson

Department of Systems Engineering Department of Systems Engineering
United States Military Academy United States Military Academy
West Point, NY West Point, NY
Zachary.Scott@westpoint.edu Hice.Gibson@westpoint.edu

Abstract— The modern battlefield requires continuous
learning and development for effective warfighting. The United
States Army’s vision for the Army of 2028 is to be ready to meet
these evolving demands of warfare and to win decisively against
adversaries in multi-domain, high-intensity situations. A major
component of realizing this vision is enhancing the ability of long-
range fires and attack aviation assets to support ground
maneuver units (Infantry). At multiple Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers, research is being conducted
to support this effort. To support these research efforts, this paper
uses Systems Engineering concepts to conduct a fault analysis of
these support fires to identify where improvements need to be
made within these assets. Findings indicate that there are four
primary areas in which improvements can be made: computer
systems, communication systems, integrative training, and the
feedback system.
Keywords— Long Range Fires, Attack Aviation
command, Field Artillery units run into many issues when
carrying out operations. Within field artillery, research
indicates among the Five Requirements for Accurate Predicted
Fire, common faults are a result of communication and
positional system challenges [4]. The implementation of rotary
aircrafts with Army Aviation proved to successfully support
ground forces with close air support (CAS). Historically, Army
Aviation has been able to accomplish mission tasks that the Air
Force cannot meet with its fixed wing assets. For Aviation,
research indicates that common faults are a result of
communication and integrative challenges. Modern day
Aviation has attempted to lessen these fault challenges by
continuously improving or innovating new technologies. A
problem with the new solutions is that greater gaps may arise
within the greater system architecture. The introduction of new
systems generally negatively impacts their success due to the
steep learning curve and difficulty of use.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW

I. INTRODUCTION
The Army requires the use of long range and support fires
on the modern battlefield. The use of Field Artillery and Attack
Aviation assets are critical to supporting maneuver combat
teams. However, in a world characterized by rapid
technological advancement and emerging threats the systems
in place must improve. The systems architecture is complex
and is comprised of a variety of assets ranging across the
different branches of the Army. Therefore, this requires us to
conduct a fault analysis and answer the question: Where do the
greatest faults occur and how can they be mitigated?
II. BACKGROUND
Several Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers (FFRDC) are conducting studies to support the
Army’s modernization effort of long-range fires and close air
support. The vision for the Army of 2028 is to “be ready to
deploy, fight, and win decisively against any adversary,
anytime and anywhere, in a joint, multi-domain, high-intensity
conflict, while simultaneously deterring others and
maintaining the ability to conduct irregular warfare” [1]. The
Army’s number one modernization priority to meet this vision
is the enhancement of long-range precision fires [1].
Our project seeks to conduct a fault analysis of Field
Artillery and Attack Aviation assets in the support of
modernization efforts. Historically, Field Artillery
communication has been vital to successful implementation.
Without clear communication throughout the chain of
978-1-5386-8396-5/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
A. Field Artillery
The mission of the Field Artillery branch is to destroy,
defeat, or disrupt the enemy with integrated fires in order to
enable the maneuver and domination of unified land operations
[1]. The last thirty years have shown an increased dynamic
relationship between the Field Artillery and Aviation assets,
both from Army Aviation and the Air Force. The ability to
integrate Field Artillery seamlessly is possible due to its
responsiveness, precision, and inter-branch organization. The
two branches have a distinct mission set which allows for the
systems to complement each other. Field Artillery is primarily
used for special missions, nighttime operations, and missions of
large area; [6] Artillery is limited by its reliance on air and
ground observers for targets, the limited range, and on steady
resupply which requires air assets.
The modern Field Artillery unit, either a Division or
Brigade, can be augmented into different combat teams such
as the Armored Brigade Combat Team, Stryker Brigade
Combat Team, or Infantry Brigade Combat Team. Depending
on unit requirements and support needs, individual battalions
can adopt different mission structures such as a Standard
Cannon Battalion, Self-propelled Cannon Battalion, or Towed
Cannon Battalion. Each battalion generally consists of a
headquarters battery and two to three firing batteries. Their
capabilities vary depending on the artillery in use.
Modern Field Artillery units generally all aim to meet the
Five Requirements for Accurate Predicted Fire which are:
accurate target location and size, accurate firing unit location,
accurate weapon and ammunition information, accurate
meteorological information, and accurate computation
procedures [4]. In degraded conditions, Field Artillery units’
fail in meeting these requirements generally due to
communication and positional system challenges [4].
B. Attack Aviation
Dating back to World War II, the importance of Attack
Aviation and close air support proved to be significant in the
Army’s success. From the first wars of modern aviation, the
fixed wing aircraft proved to be a good start, but inevitably did
not meet the need of close air support for ground forces with the
lack of ability to stay centralized with ground forces [5]. Once
the US’s Air Force was created, Army Aviation was then able
to place its entire focus toward close air support advancements
with the Jonson McConnell agreement. This agreement took
place in 1966 and was fronted by the Army’s Chief of Staff and
Air Forces Chief of Staff [7]. The consensus of the agreement
was that the Army would take control of the close air support
with helicopters and the Air Force would focus its attention
strictly to fixed wing aircrafts. Technological advancements
steered the Army toward the implementation of the helicopter.
With the development of the Apache, a multifunctional attack
helicopter, the abilities to defend itself from attacks and
accomplish any close combat requirements have forced
enemies to back down from the fight [3].
According to Army Field Manuel 3-04, the primary
mission for the modern Attack Aviation is to perform
reconnaissance, security, attack, and movement to contact.
Attack Aviation is broken down into two separate attacks:
close combat and interdiction attack. Within the realm of long
range fires, the idea of multi-domain battlefields is becoming
more popular resulting in assets of Attack Aviation becoming
more complex. Experts say, “continued research and
collaboration among the long-range precision fires cross-
functional team will continue to be a driving force behind the
Army’s modernization efforts” (Lacdan, 2018). With that
understanding, Attack Aviation is currently increasing
capabilities and allowing for more potential growth in the long-
range fire sector of the fight.
C. System Decision Process
This study seeks to support modernization efforts by way
of the Systems Decision Process and fault analysis. The
Systems Decision Process (SDP) consists of four phases:
Problem Definition, Solution Design, Decision Making, and
Solution Implementation. For the purposes of our supporting
role in higher level research efforts, this group’s efforts will be
focused on Problem Definition and Solution Design.
Figure 1: Systems Decision Process [9]
978-1-5386-8396-5/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
The Problem Definition phase is comprised of three
different parts: research & stakeholder analysis, functional
analysis and value modeling. To begin the Problem Definition
phase the group identified our initial problem statement which
is: “Army close air support and Field Artillery assets lack
integrative capability and the technical functionality necessary
to fully maximize modern systems in accordance with the
Army’s modernization vision”.
The next step in the Problem Definition phase is research
and stakeholder analysis. For stakeholder analysis active duty
army officers’ relevant civilian personnel were interviewed
and surveyed. A summary of research findings can be
reference in the literature review section. The resulting
product of these efforts is the initial Findings, Conclusions,
and Recommendations table.
Figure 2: Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
These findings, along with combined research, translated to
our ability to conduct a functional and requirement analysis.
The functional hierarchy and further value modeling can be
referenced in Figure 2.
Having now developed a clear understanding of the
problem, the final step of the problem definition phase is value
modeling. For the needs of this project, Solution Design will
predominantly consist of idea generation and improvement
recommendation in the existing systems. Value modeling is
further explained in the Results and Discussion portion of this
paper. Value modeling, in addition to further functional
analysis, will be accomplished by conducting an in-depth fault
analysis of Field Artillery and Attack Aviation assets. The
findings in the problem definition phase will then support the
solution design phase. For the purposes of our research the
solution design phase will primarily consist of idea generation
and alternative generation & improvement. Specifically, the
fault analysis will be built on top of to generate solutions to the
problem defined in phase one. Moreover, we will ultimately
seek to model existing systems and identify alternative
improvement ideas that can then be used by those conducting
additional research
D. Limitations
Over the course of our research, we identified some
limitations to our project and system while analyzing ways to
increase functionality. Beginning with dilemmas to our
project, we found troubles with outsourcing information
relative to support our research due to a lack of quantitative
analysis. Being that the scope of our project is one aspect to the
entire integration of the Army, much of what we identify as a
significant finding has little to no data to support it. Another
limitation in addition to having scarce data relevant to our
system is also the restricted accessibility of information over
such topics. Most current data and research efforts over the
functionality of Army capabilities requires higher clearance
levels and approved environments, being that the information
is sensitive to national security.
Although we had limitations to supplement our research,
we were able to work around the problems through other
resources. During the extent of our research project, we worked
simultaneously under an expert research group at MIT—
Lincoln Laboratories. As we progressively dissected the scope
of our project, MIT provided feedback that allowed us to
further our findings. Another resource that we have access to
are the subject matter experts supplied here at the United States
Military Academy, as well as subject matter experts that are
actively interacting with assets that fall under our project. By
having this access, we were able to compile our independent
data and support the analysis of our research.
IV. METHOD
A. Data Collection
To define what the starting point of the project should be, a
series of interviews and surveys were sent out to members of
different combat branches: field artillery, aviation, and
infantry. The initial surveys were focused on defining what the
priorities of the system should be, where the biggest
vulnerabilities were, and what improvements were thought to
be necessary to existing systems. From the initial surveys we
found that a need for greater integration between the separate
branches and more unified communication systems along with
a more realistic training schedule was wanted. Throughout the
course of this project, these surveys assisted the group in
defining issues within the Army’s current structure that now
needed to be narrowed in scope.
The next sets of interviews conducted focused on the
effectiveness of field artillery. By interviewing former and
current members of the branch, the group narrowed the scope
to improvements to communication throughout the field
artillery branch when a fire mission is initiated. Of note, one
field artillery officer mentioned during his interview that
approximately 75% of the fire missions called into him never
occurred because communication to ensure the air was clear
was too slow.
Figure 3: Functional and Value Hierarchy Framework
978-1-5386-8396-5/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Results
Following the research and stakeholder analysis part of the
Problem Definition phase is functional and requirements
analyses. The hierarchy framework presented in Figure 3
incorporates aspects of both a functional hierarchy and a
qualitative value model. The functional portion of the
hierarchy displays the functions and subfunctions that are
necessary to achieve the system objectives. The objective
portion provides a statement regarding the preferred outcome
of the function. The value measure portion provides applicable
measures of effectiveness that can be applied to the objectives.
Collectively, this model seeks to guide concept development
and design.
Through research and stakeholder analysis, four primary
areas of improvement were identified to support the
fundamental objective of improving long range and support
fires: computer systems, communication systems, integrative
training, and the feedback system. For improving computer
systems, there was an overwhelming demand identified for
further integration of computer systems used between field
artillery and attack aviation. Additionally, research exploits the
vulnerability that outdated, faulty positional systems (i.e. GPS,
radio) and communication systems present.
Second, we identified that as a result of the Army’s
structured communication systems operations can be limited.
This calls for improvement in the fire’s clearance
communication structure. Unresponsiveness and slowed
communication can result in mission failure and target decay.
The third area of improvement identified is improvement in
integrative training efforts among long range fire and air
support. It was identified through stakeholder analysis that
there needs to be more emphasis on higher echelon units
planning and readiness. Also, related to the integrative efforts
of Field Artillery and Aviation information Systems, there
needs to be improvement in airspace deconfliction. Risk of
long-range fires and attack aviation confliction can be
computed through Army information systems and this needs to
be practiced more frequently. This is difficult to achieve due to
the severity of the results of failure such as fratricide; however,
if not practiced target decay can easily occur. Lastly, it was
identified that there is a lack of an accessible, unified data
system which impedes learning and feedback processes. In
Maximize Data
Availability
order to improve this, after action reports (AARs) can be
standardized to include critical mission data like source of
failure and mission time length.

C. Numeric Modeling
Working to better define the problem at hand, we reached
out to Field Artillery and Aviation officers within West Point.
As vital stakeholders to our integration of fire, these officers
helped us develop a list of criteria with the most correlation to
conduct a fires mission. With the developed criteria, we made
a survey that had a one through five ranking system alongside
each criterion. This ranking system allowed the officers who
took the survey to consider the certain criteria and rank what
they believed each criterion’s current ability was. A lower
ranking establishes that the criterion is in a poor state. We then
compiled all the rankings and developed a weighted score of
the criteria (see Figure 4)
Figure 5: System Ranges

“Integration of Range Capabilities”

Figure 4: Weighted Score Model
In Figure 4, notice that each criterion has a weighted score
showing the relationship of all the criteria. The higher rated
criteria in the figure are considered to be the best performers of
the criteria. This figure is very important to our problem
definition process because it located what exactly the problems
are within the fires system. There are three criterion that are
equally the lowest of the criteria: Clearance of Fires, Air
Deconfliction and Integrative Training. These are the three
functions within a fires mission, or the preparation for a fires
mission, that are showing most conflict. This is significant
information to our problem definition because we can now
narrow our research in these given fields of the integrative fires
system.
D. Discussion and Future Work
As discussed in the data collection section, the
minimization of miscommunication for an increased efficiency
became the primary concern. To identify points of contention
on the battlefield, the range capabilities for both
communication and weapon systems were analyzed through
simulations with a two-dimensional overhead view. Figure 5
shows the max range in meters of the communication systems,
Field Artillery weapons, and Attack Aviation weapons
involved in a fires mission.
From a design perspective, the graph
was created to show the distances linearly
so that it would be easy to identify which
systems can cover certain amounts of
distances. It is important to note that radio
signal is highly dependent on being within
line-of-sight.
To create a better understanding of the
impact location has on communication
systems, three figures were developed to
demonstrate a simplified fires mission
scenario. Since the ASIP radio is currently
the most commonly used device in combat
operations, it is used as our base
communication system for all three
figures. Figure 6 is the base legend for all Figure 6: Legend
three figures and lays out the symbols used within the figures.
Figure 7 shows a forward observer within sight of the enemy
and a fires platoon. Although the forward observer is in a direct
line of sight with the fires platoon, based off task organization,
the forward observer is attached the fires headquarters who is
around fifteen kilometers back. The forward observer relays its
information back to headquarters and then headquarters gives
its command to the fires platoon to information needed to
conduct fires as displayed in Figure 7.

978-1-5386-8396-5/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE


Figure 7: 20:20 Kilometer Situational Graphic
Figure 8 is twice the size of Figure 7 and show the larger
operational scale of fires coordination. This situational graphic
has multiple elevated surfaces causing line of sight issues
between fires headquarters and the firing platoon. One way our
Army has solved this problem is through Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATIDS). This is a system
that uses neighboring units’ servers to communicate through
the requirements for this system to work is every unit needs the
appropriate IP address for total connection throughout the
battlefield. The advantage of AFATIDS, is the more deployed
units on a battlefield the easier it is to communicate. In Figure
8, notice the fires headquarters uses the server’s connection of
two neighboring infantry units to reach its fires platoon.
Figure 8: 40:40 Kilometer S20:20 Kilometer
Another advantage of the AFATIDS system is that the units
being used only as server to communicate elsewhere are not
receiving any part of the information being sent through. This
is important because it does not distract the unit from operating
its own task nor does it cause a confusion of commands.
978-1-5386-8396-5/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
In the Figure 9, ASIP radios are used regardless of the steep
elevation and confining terrain features. The reason why all the
units can stay in constant communication with each other is
because the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). The ASIP
radios can reach the UAS from any position on the battlefield
because it hovers over all terrain features for a clear line of site.
This is important because units can use the lowest level of
system technology to reach an intended unit.
Figure 9: 40:40 Kilometer Situational Graphic with UAV
In Figure 9 the forward observer connects with the UAV and
the UAV relays the information to fires headquarters. This
action can also be done with an aviation unit in the area of
operation (AO). Headquarters then sends its decision through
the UAV to the fires platoon.
This method of increasing signal strength through the
integration of another system is what will allow ground units to
effectively communicate with one another and troubleshoot
communication gaps on the battlefield. The use of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems for more than intelligence will provide
stability to the operational battlefield.
For future work, these templates of different scenarios lay a
foundation of understanding the battlefield and proper systems
to employ in given situations. It is a simplified template that is
easy to add different factors when working to solve issues
within the fires system. This also helps the team we are working
with at Lincoln Labs better understand battlefield scenarios as
they continue this process to better integrate fires operations.
E. Conclusion
In conclusion, there are many factors to consider in attempt
to resolve the issues with long range fires. With our focus on
the problem definition portion for the systems decision
process, the focus of our research was in efforts to understand
the problem. After compiling all the considerable aspects of
long-range fires through additional stakeholder research and
quantitative modeling, our problem definition had to be
refocused. We took a broader look in the entire operation of
fires from initial training to reflection techniques of fires
missions. The four main issues in fires operations through our
fault analysis was air deconfliction, clearance of fires, and
integrative training. The aspect that we will narrow our focus
to is integrative training because each of the other issues are
subcomponents of training. Our focus going forward is to
better involve independent researchers that are also working to
solve this issue but lack the military expertise. The models we
created, are drawn to scale scenarios that can assist civilians
with the capability to understand the ranges and capabilities of
the army systems. The three Figures highlight the current way
the army responds to certain situations. Although affective,
since our overall objective it to help reduce inefficiencies, it is
first important to have a clear layout of the problem. The
problem definition phase is solely to accomplish the task of
better identifying the problem within the system. Though our
stakeholder analysis, value modeling and functional analysis,
we have opened the system of integrative fires to more easily
understand. Since the vulnerabilities of the system are now
highlighted, researchers can now move to the solution design
phase. This phase focuses on the solving the inefficiencies of
the system. The Army is a complex multi-level system with
numerous variables. We were able to breakdown the Army’s
unclassified doctrine and compile a simplified understanding
of long-range fires and the issues within.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
COL Gibson is currently an academy professor in the
Department of Systems Engineering at the United States
Military Academy (USMA), Visiting Scholar at the Harvard
Business School, and Military Fellow at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. COL Gibson serves as the team’s
faculty advisor and possesses a B.S. from USMA, a M.S. from
the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Ph.D. from the Harvard
Business School. Our team would like to extend
acknowledgement to Lincoln Labs of Massachusetts Institute
978-1-5386-8396-5/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
of Technology (MIT) for allowing us to work and provide the
necessary information to further their studies. Additionally,
our team would like to acknowledge the support from the
Department of Military Instruction (DMI) at West Point for
their vast assistance.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
do not reflect the official policy of the U.S. Army, Department
of Defense, or the U.S. government.
REFERENCES
[1] Department of the Army. (2014). Field Artillery Operations and Fire
Support (FM 3-09). Retrieved from
https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/FM.aspx.
[2] Failure Analysis Methods and Tools – ALD Service. (n.d.). Retrieved
from https://aldserviec.com/Fracas/failure-analsysis-methods-and-
tools.html.
[3] Hovering. (2017, August 19). History of the AH-64 Apache Helicopter.
Retrieved from http://www.hoveringhelicopter.com/history-ah-64-
apache-helicopter./.
[4] Leinberger, L.F. (2017). How Does a Modern Field Artillery Cannon
Battalion Operate in a Degraded, Denied, and Disrupted Space
Operating Environment? (master’s Thesis). Retrieved from
http://dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1038754.
[5] Liden, M. “ARMY AVIATION HISTORY.” Army Aviation History.
Accessed September 21, 2018. http://www.aircav.com/histavn.html.
[6] McGrath, J. J. (2013). Fire for Effect. Field Artillery and Close Air
Support. Fort Leavenworth, KS.:
[7] Ney, Virgil. “EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ARMY DIVISION 1939-
1968.” AD 697 844, January 1969, 1-92.
[8] Six-Step Approach to Fault Finding. (2017, September 13). Retrieved
from http://www.mcpeurope.com/six-step-approach-fault-finding/.
[9] Parnell, Gregory S., et al. Decision Making in Systems Engineering
and Management. Wiley, 2011.