March 16, 2021

For: Sir ECL

From: JMF
Re: May Congress Enact Laws Contrary to Established
Jurisprudence

ARTICLE VI

The Legislative Department

SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the

Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.

ARTICLE VIII

Judicial Department

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to

settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.

The power of the Legislative to enact laws, though may be subject to

Judicial review in appropriate cases, does not stop it from exercising
such power, regardless of whether it is contrary to a previously
decided case by the Supreme Court, provided the said enactment is
not unconstitutional.

While there are restrictions on enactment of ex post facto laws and

bills of attainder, as well as judicial legislation, which is forbidden by
the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of
government, Congress may, in exercise of its power enact laws as it
deems fit, as legislative power rest solely to congress.

Even the Courts have issued rules when the doctrine of stare decisis
may be abandoned, as in the case of Chong v Secretary of Labor,
G.R. No. 47616, September 14, 1947, viz:

“The principle of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to

precedents. The doctrine or rule laid down, which has been followed
for years, no matter how sound it may be, if found to be contrary to
law, must be abandoned. the principle of stare decisis does not and
should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and
the law. The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any
doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.”

In the case of Umali v JBC, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017, the Court
Ruled:

The principle of stare decisis is derived from the Latin maxim "stare
decisis, et non quieta movere"; that is, "it is best to adhere to
decisions and not to disturb questions put at rest." 97 Its function is to
ensure certainty and stability in the legal system. 98 Ruling by
precedent is meant to assure the public of the court's
objectivity.99Stare decisis provides the public with a reasonable
expectation that courts will rule in a certain manner given a similar
set of facts.

Courts, however, are cautioned against "blind adherence to

precedents."100 Decisions of this Court previously found to have been
valid may become impractical, contrary to law, or even
unconstitutional. It then becomes the duty of this Court to abandon
that decision: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The principle of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to

precedents. The doctrine or rule laid down, which has been followed
for years, no matter how sound it may be, if found to be contrary to
law, must be abandoned. The principle of stare decisis does not and
should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and
the law. The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any
doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force. 101
Similarly, in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:102

The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not
controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new
membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that
it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The
adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting
 like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an
Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system; hence,
judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A
judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a
precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and
justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts
such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The
application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and
stability.103 (Citations omitted)
Whenever this Court renders its decisions, the intended effects of
those decisions to future cases are taken into consideration. The
changing membership of the bench likewise contributes to the
evolution of this Court's stand on certain issues and cases. Ruling by
precedent, thus, requires more than a mechanical application: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[T]he use of precedents is never mechanical.

Some assumptions normally creep into the facts established for past
cases. These assumptions may later on prove to be inaccurate or to
be accurate only for a given historical period. Sometimes, the effects
assumed by justices who decide past cases do not necessarily
happen. Assumed effects are given primacy whenever the spirit or
intent of the law is considered in the interpretation of a legal
provision. Some aspect of the facts or the context of these facts
would not have been fully considered. It is also possible that
doctrines in other aspects of the law related to a precedent may
have also evolved.

In such cases, the use of precedents will unduly burden the parties
or produce absurd or unworkable outcomes. Precedents will not be
useful to achieve the purposes for which the law would have been
passed.104 (Citations omitted)
There is also a need to abandon decisions "when this Court discerns,
after full deliberation, that a continuing error in the interpretation of
the spirit and intent of a constitutional provision exists." 105 Assuring
the public of stability in the law and certainty of court actions is
important. It is, however, more important for this Court to be right.
Thus, it becomes imperative for this Court to re-examine previous
decisions to avoid continuing its error: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect. Stability in the law . . .

is desirable. But idolatrous reverence for precedent, simply as
precedent, no longer rules. More important than anything else is that
the court should be right. And particularly is it not wise to
subordinate legal reason to case law and by so doing perpetuate
error when it is brought to mind that the views now expressed
conform in principle to the original decision and that since the first
decision to the contrary was sent forth there has existed a
respectable opinion of non-conformity in the court. Indeed, on at
least one occasion has the court broken away from the revamped
doctrine, while even in the last case in point the court was as evenly
divided as it was possible to be and still reach a decision.

If the Courts themselves, consider that there should be no blind

adherence to precedence when necessary, all the more that the
Supreme Court has no reason to question the wisdom of the
legislative provided that the enacted laws are not unconstitutional,
despite being contrary to an already previously decided issue.

The doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances are

applicable and are settled in jurisprudence, viz:

“At the outset, it is well to remember that one of the fundamental

tenets underlying our constitutional system is the principle of
separation of powers, pursuant to which the powers of government
are mainly divided into three classes, 7 each of which is assigned to a
given branch of the service.8 The main characteristic of said principle
is not, however, this allocation of powers among said branches of the
service,9 but the fact that: 1) each department is independent of the
others and supreme  within its own sphere; and 2) the power vested
in one department cannot be given or delegated, either by the same
or by Act of Congress, to any other department. The reason is that,
otherwise, instead of being separated, said powers are likely to be
concentrated - and hence united - in one (1) department, 10 thereby
seriously jeopardizing our republican system. Indeed, history has
shown that sovereignty cannot long remain in the people when the
powers of Government are in the hands of one man, for the latter is
thus placed in a position, and would eventually be inclined, to change
his role, from that of a public servant  to that of master  of the people.

The separation of powers in our Government is not, however,

absolute. Not all legislative powers are vested in Congress. Some, like
the veto power and the power to make rules of Court, are explicitly
vested in the President and the Supreme Court,
11
respectively.   Similarly, not all executive powers are vested in the
President. Some, like the treaty-making power, are shared by him
with the legislative department. 12 Not all judicial powers are vested
in courts of justice. Some — like the pardoning power — are lodged
exclusively in the President. 13

As a consequence, there is some overlapping of powers and a system

of checks and balances, under which a department may exercise
some measure of restraint, upon another department. Such is the
situation as regards appointing power of the Executive, which is
subject to said restraint by the legislative department. 14 Indeed, the
latter may limit said executive power by, inter alia,  prescribing the
qualifications of the appointees, fixing their term of office, or
disapproving appointments to some offices.
Guevarra v Inocentes, G.R. No. L-25577, March 15, 1966

For repugnancy to result it is not necessary that there should be an

actual removal of the disqualified Justice from his office for, as above
demonstrated, were it not for the challenged section 14 there would
have been an uninterrupted continuity  in the tenure of the displaced
Justice and in his exercise of the powers and fulfillment of the duties
appertaining to his office, saving only proper cases or disqualification
under Rule 126. What matters here is not only that the Justice
affected continue to be a member of the Court and to enjoy the
emoluments as well as to exercise the other powers and fulfill the
other duties of his office, but that he be left unhampered to
exercise all  the powers and fulfill all  the responsibilities of said office
in all  cases properly coming before his Court under the constitution,
again without prejudice to proper cases of disqualification under Rule
126. Any statute enacted by the legislature which would impede him
in this regard, in the words of this Court in In re  Guariña, supra,
citing Marbury vs. Madison, supra, "simply can not become law."

It goes without saying that, whether the matter of disqualification of

judicial officers belong to the realm of adjective, or to that of
substantive law, whatever modifications, change or innovation the
legislature may propose to introduce therein, must not in any way
contravene the provisions of the constitution, nor be repugnant to
the genius of the governmental system established thereby. The
tripartite system, the mutual independence of the three departments
— in particular, the independence of the judiciary —, the scheme of
checks and balances, are commonplaces in democratic governments
like this Republic. No legislation may be allowed which would destroy
or tend to destroy any of them.

Vargas v Rilloraza, G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the
enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that
a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President
to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case
may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On
the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the
Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers;
and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to
the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine
what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to
define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support,
the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

Angara v The Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

Recently, in Garcia v. Drilon,102 this Court has upheld the long-settled

principle that courts do not go into the wisdom of the law:

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute. Hence, we dare not venture into
the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress . . . Congress has made its choice and it is not our
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived
as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its
amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.  We only
step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. 103 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

Hence, the Social Security Act has validly delegated the power to fix
the contribution rate and the minimum and maximum amounts for
the monthly salary credits. It is within the scope of the Social Security
Commission's power to fix them, as clearly laid out in the law.

KMU v Aquino, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or

not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally
mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives
of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue
interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the
protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental
tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this
issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present
political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its
action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the
nation’s thrust to progress.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of

the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government."

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of

judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also
includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have
been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one
hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other.
Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over
the other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a
good source of enlightenment, to wit: "And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them."107

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not

imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making
sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the
authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after
said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort,
then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said
act as void and unconstitutional.

It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with

noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and
its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical
principle: "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble
and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to
be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. 108 The Court
cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to
uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.

"The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the
mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its
strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude."109

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth

commission as nobly envisioned by the present administration.
Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the
earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of
reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the
branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most
interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a
hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be
emphasized that the search for the truth must be within
constitutional bounds for "ours is still a government of laws and not
of men."
Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December
7, 2010

 There is another consideration that militates against the stand of

petitioner. The question before the judiciary in its appraisal of the
validity of the acts of the President or of Congress is one of power. It
is not for this Tribunal, much less for an inferior court, to inquire into
the motives that may have prompted the exercise of a presidential
authority. At the most, it can look into the question of whether there
is legal justification for what was done. If the answer were in the
affirmative, that disposes of the matter. In the same way that the
judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress
would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it
should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work
that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way
it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual
respect by and between the three departments of the government.
At the very least then, the presumption is to be indulged in that the
exertion of a legitimate governmental power springs from a belief
that thereby public interest is served and the common weal
promoted.

Tecson v Salas, G.R. No. L-27524, July 31, 1970

Our governmental structure rests on the principle of separation of

powers. Under our constitutional order, the legislative branch enacts
law, the executive branch implements the law, and the judiciary
construes the law. In reality, however, the powers are not as strictly
confined or delineated to each branch. "[T]he growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws"26 require the delegation of powers traditionally belonging to the
legislative to administrative agencies. The legislature may likewise
apportion competencies or jurisdictions to administrative agencies
over certain conflicts involving special technical expertise.
Administrative actions reviewable by this Court, therefore, may either
be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. As the name implies, quasi-
legislative or rule-making power is the power of an administrative
agency to make rules and regulations that have the force and effect
of law so long as they are issued "within the confines of the granting
statute."27 The enabling law must be complete, with sufficient
standards to guide the administrative agency in exercising its rule-
making power.28 As an exception to the rule on non-delegation of
legislative power, administrative rules and regulations must be
"germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law."

PBOAP v DOLE, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2017

It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief Executive performed

within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is
non-interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
follow that we are precluded from making an inquiry into the validity
or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in
an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of
governmental powers, whether viewed in the light of the political
philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Montesquieu, or of the postulations
of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government.
There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in
independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice
Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down "with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight
compartments" not only because "the great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white" but
also because "even the more specific of them are found to terminate
in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other."
(Springer vs. Government [1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845,
852.) As far as the judiciary is concerned, while it holds "neither the
sword nor the purse" it is by constitutional placement the organ
called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme
Court is entrusted expressly or by necessary implication the
obligation of determining in appropriate cases the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines.) In
this sense and to this extent, the judiciary restrains the other
departments of the government and this result is one of the
necessary corollaries of the "system of checks and balance" of the
government established.

Planas v Gil, G.R. No. L-46440, January 13, 1939