For purposes of impeachment, “culpable violation of the constitution”

is defined as “the deliberate and wrongful breach of the

Constitution.” Furthermore, “Violation of the Constitution made
unintentionally, in good faith, and mere mistakes in the proper
construction of the Constitution do not constitute and impeachable
offense.”

During the impeachment of then Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato

Corona, it was held that failure to disclose some bank accounts in his
SALN constituted culpable violation of the constitution.

On the other hand, In Francisco Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga

Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., the Supreme
Court purposely refused to define the meaning of “other high crimes
or betrayal of public trust,” saying that it is “a non-justiciable political
question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power.” However,
the Court refuses to name which agency can define it; the Court
impliedly gives the power to the House of Representatives, which
initiates all cases of impeachment.

This was further elucidated in Gutierrez v House of Representatives

Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193495, February 15, 2011. Citing
the Constitutional deliberations, the Court said,

In Francisco, the Court noted that the framers of

the Constitution could find no better way to approximate
the boundaries of betrayal of public trust than by alluding
to positive and negative examples.9 Thus:

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is

recognized.

MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madam President.

I have a series of questions here, some for

clarifications, some for the cogitative and reading
pleasure of the members of the Committee over a happy
weekend without prejudice later to proposing
amendments at the proper stage.
 First, this is with respect to Section 2, on the
grounds for impeachment , and I quote:

. . . culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,

bribery, other high crimes, graft and corruption or
betrayal of public trust.

Just for the record, what would the Committee

envision as a betrayal of public trust which is not
otherwise covered by by other terms antecedent thereto?

MR. ROMULO. I think, if I may speak for the

Committee and subject to further comments of
Commissioner de los Reyes, the concept is that this is a
catchall phrase. Really, it refers to his oath of office, in
the end that the idea of public trust is connected with the
oath of office of the officer, and if he violates that oath of
office, then he has betrayed the trust.

MR. REGALADO. Thank you.

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, may I ask

Commissioner de los Reyes to perhaps add to those
remarks.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de los Reyes is

recognized.

MR. DE LOS REYES. The reason I proposed this

amendment is that during the Regular Batasang
Pambansa where there was a move to impeach then
President Marcos, there were arguments to the effect that
there is no ground for impeachment because there is no
proof that President Marcos committed criminal acts
which are punishable, or considered penal offenses. And
so the term "betrayal of public trust," as explained
by Commissioner Romulo, is a catchall phrase to
include all acts which are not punishable by
statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render
the officer unfit to continue in office. It includes
betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence
of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of
official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance,
cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice of public
interest and which tend to bring the office into
disrepute. That is the purpose, Madam President.
 Thank you.

MR. ROMULO. If I may add another example,

because Commissioner Regalado asked a very good
question. This concept would include, I think, obstruction
of justice since in his oath he swears to do justice to
every man; so if he does anything that obstructs justice,
it could be construed as a betrayal of public trust.

Thank you.

MR. NOLLEDO. In pursuing that statement of

Commissioner Romulo, Madam President, we will notice
that in the presidential oath of then President Marcos, he
stated that he will do justice to every man. If he appoints
a Minister of Justice and orders him to issue or to prepare
repressive decrees denying justice to a common man
without the President being held liable, I think this act will
not fall near the category of treason, nor will it fall under
bribery of other high crimes, neither will it fall under graft
and corruption. And so when the President tolerates
violations of human rights through the repressive decrees
authored by his Minister of Justice, the President betrays
the public trust.10

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution recognized

that an impeachment proceeding covers non-criminal
offenses. They included betrayal of public trust as a
catchall provision to cover non-criminal acts. The
framers of the Constitution intended to leave it to
the members of the House of Representatives to
determine what would constitute betrayal of
public trust as a ground for impeachment.

In Gonzales v Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, September

4, 2012, the Court ruled:

The invariable rule is that administrative decisions

in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be
set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or
error of law.64 In the instant case, while the evidence may
show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of
petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the correctness of
the OP's conclusion that the imputed acts amount to
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constitutive
of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner's
offenses, as they factually appear, weigh heavily enough
to constitute betrayal of public trust would be to ignore
the significance of the legislature's intent in prescribing
the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special
Prosecutor for causes that, theretofore, had been
reserved only for the most serious violations that justify
the removal by impeachment of the highest officials of
the land.

Would every negligent act or misconduct in the

performance of a Deputy Ombudsman's duties constitute
betrayal of public trust warranting immediate removal
from office? The question calls for a deeper,
circumspective look at the nature of the grounds for the
removal of a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor vis-a-vis common administrative offenses.

Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for

impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the
existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other high
crimes. While it was deemed broad enough to cover any
violation of the oath of office, 65 the impreciseness of its
definition also created apprehension that "such an
overarching standard may be too broad and may be
subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by the
legislature."66 Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of
public trust that referred to "all acts not punishable by
statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the
officer unfit to continue in office" 67 could be easily utilized
for every conceivable misconduct or negligence in office.
However, deliberating on some workable standard by
which the ground could be reasonably interpreted, the
Constitutional Commission recognized that human error
and good faith precluded an adverse conclusion.

MR. VILLACORTA: x x x One last matter with

respect to the use of the words "betrayal of public trust"
as embodying a ground for impeachment that has been
raised by the Honorable Regalado. I am not a lawyer so I
can anticipate the difficulties that a layman may
encounter in understanding this provision and also the
possible abuses that the legislature can commit in
interpreting this phrase. It is to be noted that this ground
was also suggested in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. A review of the Journals of that Convention
will show that it was not included; it was construed as
encompassing acts which are just short of being criminal
but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust,
tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of
duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary
powers. I understand from the earlier discussions that
these constitute violations of the oath of office, and also I
heard the Honorable Davide say that even the criminal
acts that were enumerated in the earlier 1973 provision
on this matter constitute betrayal of public trust as well.
In order to avoid confusion, would it not be clearer to
stick to the wording of Section 2 which reads: "may be
removed from office on impeachment for and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
and other high crimes, graft and corruption or
VIOLATION OF HIS OATH OF OFFICE", because if
betrayal of public trust encompasses the earlier acts that
were enumerated, then it would behoove us to be equally
clear about this last provision or phrase.

MR. NOLLEDO: x x x I think we will miss a golden

opportunity if we fail to adopt the words "betrayal of
public trust" in the 1986 Constitution. But I would like him
to know that we are amenable to any possible
amendment. Besides, I think plain error of judgment,
where circumstances may indicate that there is good
faith, to my mind, will not constitute betrayal of public
trust if that statement will allay the fears of difficulty in
interpreting the term."68 (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitutional Commission eventually found it

reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public
trust to refer to "acts which are just short of being
criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public
trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence
of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary
powers."69 In other words, acts that should constitute
betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office
may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad
faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the other
grounds for impeachment.

A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are

not impeachable officers. However, by providing for their
removal from office on the same grounds as removal by
 impeachment, the legislature could not have intended to
redefine constitutional standards of culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, as well as betrayal of public trust, and
apply them less stringently. Hence, where betrayal of
public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not
intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and
plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for
purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds
for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for
the removal by the President of a Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of
their nature nor the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of
public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover acts
that are not vicious or malevolent on the same level as
the other grounds for impeachment.

In his opinion piece published December 8, 2017,

(https://manilastandard.net/opinion/253545/culpable-violation-of-
the-constitution.html) Fr. Ranhilio Aquino gave his opinion on the
issue of culpable violation of the Constitution,

In respect to the duties of the highest officials of

the land towards the Constitution, the Constitutional
Court of South Africa ( Cases CCT 143/15 and CCT
171/15, March 31, 2016), in the case against President
Jacob Zuma, said of the President’s violation of the
Constitution: “This requires the President to do all he can
to ensure that our constitutional democracy thrives. He
must provide support to all institutions or measures
designed to strengthen our constitutional democracy.
More directly, he is to ensure that the Constitution is
known, treated and related to, as the supreme law of the
Republic. It thus ill-behooves him to act in a manner
inconsistent with what the Constitution requires him to do
under all circumstances.” From this South African
precedent, we are taught that acts or omissions that
undermine constitutional institutions and that run
roughshod over the workings of a democracy constitute
culpable violations of the constitution.
 Thus far, all references have been to the
impeachment of a president. Should the grounds be
construed differently when the officer at the bar is the
Chief Justice (or perhaps the chair of any of the
independent Constitutional Commissions)? Although quite
clearly, the way a Chief Justice will culpably violate the
constitution is different from the way a President will be
guilty of the same charge by virtue of the differences in
the nature of their offices, the Philippine Constitution
textually provides for the same grounds. Where the law
does not distinguish, distinctions subsequently introduced
are spurious!

What “culpable violation of the Constitution” can

further mean may very well be suggested by American
precedent. A thorough study by Jared Cole and Todd
Garvey of the US Congressional Research Service
(October, 2015) entitled “Impeachment and Removal”
includes a summary of different impeachment cases. In
1868, Andrew Jackson, the US President, was impeached
for violating the Tenure of Office Act and likewise for
haranguing Congress and for questioning legislative
authority. Nixon’s case in 1974 had to do with the
supposed misuse of the powers of his office to obstruct
investigation of the Watergate Hotel break-in. Then there
was the well-publicized and televised trial of President Bill
Clinton for behavior considered incompatible with the
nature of the office of the Presidency. The terms of
indictment should be instructive: “William Jefferson
Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office, has
brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his
trust as President and has acted in a manner subversive
of the Rule of Law and justice, to the manifest injury of
the people of the United States.” It is the Constitution
that lays down the powers of the Chief Justice and
whether or not her conduct as undermined the integrity
of her office or brought it in disrepute or whether her acts
or omissions have subverted the rule of law and justice all
constitute the question of whether or not she culpably
violated the Constitution.

But it is against federal judges that the

impeachment mechanism has been more frequently used.
Judge Harry Claiborne (1986) was impeached and
convicted for providing false information on federal
income tax forms, for having brought the judiciary into
disrepute by his conviction in a criminal case for perjury.
In relation to his case, it was said that while it was
devastating to the judiciary for judges to be perceived as
dishonest, it was as devastating for the entire
government for a President to perjure. And the
misbehavior need not be in the regard to the
performance of official duties. Judge Thomas Porteus
(2010) was impeached for misconduct committed prior to
his appointment to his present position—leaving no doubt
that actions prior to appointment may return to haunt the
respondent in impeachment proceedings.

While some earlier cases are disturbing in that

impeachment and removal from office after conviction
seem disproportional to the offense, the relative ease
with which judges are impeached and convicted is
explained by the fact that in the United States, the only
way federal judges can be removed from office is by
impeachment.

In respect to the “political justice” that

impeachment and trial mediate, Alexander Hamilton in
Federalist Papers No. 65 has a clear explanation: “…those
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public
men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of
some public trust. They are of a nature which may with
peculiar propriety be denominated ‘political’ as they relate
chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.”

As to “culpable”, the point should be clear: One is

punished for wrong deliberately perpetrated, but one
cannot be punished for a mistake or for an opinion. If one
in high office should maintain an opinion that should later
prove to be wrong, disastrous even—as a mistaken
command or maneuver during war, there certainly would
be error, and if error is so frequent and so egregious, it
may indicate incompetence, but that would not be the
“culpable violation” that is required for impeachment.
Rather a deliberate violation of the prescriptions and
precepts, the ordering and the principles, the premises
and the entailments of the constitutional order—this
would be actionable and a ground to evict the perpetrator
from high office.
 This understanding of the mechanism of
impeachment and trial coupled with what American,
Korean and South African precedents tell us about high
office and obligations towards the constitution leave us
with the conclusion that while “culpable violation of the
constitution” may not be susceptible of the parsing into
elements that is characteristic of common crimes, it is
neither a vacuous term and one that has to do with the
very nature of high office in the workings of a
constitutional democracy and in the support of its
institutions and vigilance over its fundamental principles.

In his dissenting opinion in the case of Republic v Sereno, Justice

Carpio forwarded the following opinion:

In Casimiro v. Rigor, 13 the Court stated that the

filing of SALN promotes transparency in the civil service
and serves as an effective mechanism to verify
undisclosed wealth, thus:

The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in the

Constitution to promote transparency in the civil service
and serves as a deterrent against government officials
bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means. By
mandate of law, every government official or employee
must make a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities
and net worth in order to avoid any issue regarding
questionable accumulation of wealth. The importance of
requiring the submission of a complete, truthful, and
sworn SALN as a measure to defeat corruption in the
bureaucracy cannot be gainsaid. Full disclosure of wealth
in the SALN is necessary to particularly minimize, if not
altogether eradicate, the opportunities for official
corruption, and maintain a standard of honesty in the
public service. Through the SALN, the public can monitor
movement in the fortune of a public official; it serves as a
valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed
properties and wealth. The failure to file a truthful SALN
reasonably puts in doubt the integrity of the officer and
normally amounts to dishonesty.
 Considering that the requirement of filing a SALN
within the period prescribed by law is enshrined in the
Constitution, the non-filing of SALN within the prescribed
period clearly constitutes a violation of an express
constitutional mandate. The repeated non-filing of
SALN therefore constitutes culpable violation of
the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which
are grounds for impeachment under the
Constitution.

Culpable violation of the Constitution must be

understood to mean "willful and intentional violation of
the Constitution and not violations committed
unintentionally or involuntarily or in good faith or through
an honest mistake of judgment." 14 The framers of the
Constitution, particularly the Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers, "accepted the view that [culpable
violation of the Constitution] implied 'deliberate intent,
perhaps even a certain degree of perversity for it is not
easy to imagine that individuals in the category of these
officials would go so far as to defy knowingly what the
Constitution commands."' 15

Betrayal of public trust, on the other hand, refers to

acts "less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith
and of such gravity and seriousness as the other grounds
for impeachment," as the Court held m Gonzales III v.
Office of the President of the Philippines, 16 thus:

Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for

impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the
existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other high
crimes. While it was deemed broad enough to cover any
violation of the oath of office, the impreciseness of its
definition also created apprehension that "such an
overarching standard may be too broad and may be
subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by the
legislature." Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of
public trust that referred to "all acts not punishable by
statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the
officer unfit to continue in office" could be easily utilized
for every conceivable misconduct or negligence in office.
However, deliberating on some workable standard by
which the ground could be reasonably interpreted, the
 Constitutional Commission recognized that human error
and good faith precluded an adverse conclusion.

xxxx

The Constitutional Commission eventually found it

reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public
trust to refer to "acts which are just short of being
criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public
trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence
of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary
powers." In other words, acts that should
constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant
removal from office may be less than criminal but
must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity
and seriousness as the other grounds for
impeachment. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the repeated failure to file the SALN

constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust, it is immaterial if the failure to file
the SALN is committed before appointment to an
impeachable office. However, it is up to Congress, which
is the constitutional body vested with the exclusive
authority to remove impeachable officers, to determine if
the culpable violation of the Constitution or betrayal of
public trust, committed before appointment as an
impeachable officer, warrants removal from office
considering the need to maintain public trust in public
office. For instance, if an impeachable officer is
discovered to have committed treason before his
appointment, it is up to the impeachment court to
determine if the continuance in office of the impeachable
officer is detrimental to national security warranting
removal from office.

It might be important to note that impeachment is only a mode of

removing an impeachable officer from office, and is not meant as a
punishment as explained by the Court in A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC,
January 12, 2021, Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Christina Roco Corona
Requesting the Grant of Retirement and Other Benefits, thus:

The object of the process is not to punish but only

to remove a person from office. As Justice Storey put it in
his commentary on the Constitution, impeachment is "a
proceeding, purely of a political nature, is not so much
 designed to punish an offender as to secure the state
against gross political misdemeanors. It touches neither
his person nor his property, but simply divests him of his
political capacity." Put differently, removal and
disqualification are the only punishments that can be
imposed upon conviction on impeachment. Criminal and
civil liability can follow after the officer has been removed
by impeachment. Prosecution after impeachment does
not constitute prohibited double jeopardy.21 (Emphasis
supplied)

Impeachment is, thus, designed to remove the

impeachable officer from office, not punish him.22 It is
purely political, and it is neither civil, criminal, nor
administrative in nature. No legally actionable liability
attaches to the public officer by a mere judgment of
impeachment against him or her, and thus lies the
necessity for a separate conviction for charges that must
be properly filed with courts of law.

The nature and effect of impeachment proceedings

is so limiting that forum shopping or alleged violation of
the right against double jeopardy could not even be
successfully invoked upon the institution of the separate
complaints or Information.

In a number of cases, including the case that ousted former CJ

Sereno, failure to file SALN’s were considered culpable violation of
the Constitution.