KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL ROGELIO

SOLUTA; REP. FERNANDO HICAP FOR HIMSELF AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST: CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS.
REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DAISY ARAGO: JOSELITO USTAREZ
AND SALVADOR CARRANZA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KMU; NENITA GONZAGA, PRESCILA A
MANIQUIZ, REDEN ALCANTARA, PETITIONERS,
V.
HON. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO Il1, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, AND EMILIO S. DE QUIROS,
JR., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 210500, April 02, 2019

Facts
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, praying that a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to annul the Social Security System premium hike embodied in the following
issuances:

(1) Resolution No. 262-s, 2013, dated April 19, 2013, of the Social Security Commission (SSC) providing for
an increase in the SSS members' contribution rate from 10.4% to 11% and the maximum monthly salary credit
from P15,000 to P16,000 subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines;

(2) Resolution No. 711-s. 2013, dated September 20, 2013, of the SSC, approving, among others, the foregoing
increases; and

(3) Circular No. 2013-010, dated October 2, 2013, issued by the SSS, through its President and Chief Executive
Officer Emilio S. De Quiros, Jr., providing for the revised schedule of contributions that would be in effect in
January 2014. Per the circular, the employer and employee shall equally shoulder the 0.6% increase in
contributions. Thus, the employer would pay a contribution rate of 7.37% (from 7.07%); the employee, 3.63%
(from 3.33%).

Issues

1. Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review;

2. whether there was valid delegation of per to respondent SSS pertaining the increase in
contribution rate and maximum monthly salary credit
3. Whether there was unlawful exercise of police power

Ruling

1. No. The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review: (1) there must be an actual case or
justiciable controversy before this Court; (2) the question before this Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the
person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.

As to the first requisite, the Court notes that petitioners failed to prove how the assailed issuances violated
workers' constitutional rights such that it would warrant a judicial review Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely
on the Constitution without specifying how these rights translate to being legally entitled to a fixed amount and
proportion of Social Security System contributions.

As to the second requisite, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies affects the ripeness to adjudicate the
constitutionality of a governmental act, which in turn affects the existence of the need for an actual case or
controversy for the courts to exercise their power of judicial review. Here, it is clear that petitioners failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies.

Petitioners allege that they "have no appeal nor any plain, speedy!] and adequate remedy under the ordinary
course of law except through the instant Petition.

However, Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security Act are clear that the Social Security Commission has
jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the law regarding coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties. The
law further provides that the aggrieved party must first exhaust all administrative remedies available before
seeking review from the courts petitioners should have first filed their case before respondent Social Security
Commission.

As to the third requisite, not all petitioners have shown the requisite legal standing to bring the case before this
Court. Petitioners Joselito Ustarez, Salvador T. Carranza, Nenita Gonzaga, PrescilaA. Maniquiz, R. Alcantara,
and Anakpawis Party-List Representative Fernando Hicap, for himself, are Social Security System members
who stand to suffer direct and material injury from the assailed issuances' enforcement. They are, thus, clothed
with legal personality to assail the imposed increase in contribution rates and maximum monthly salary credit.

On the other hand, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno, Anakpawis Party-List, Center for Trade Union and Human
Rights, and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno all failed to show how they will suffer
direct and material injury from the enforcement of the assailed issuances.

2. Yes. The "delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed in the face
of increasing complexity of modern life." Petitioners are putting in issue not only the validity of the exercise of
the delegated power, but also the validity of the delegation itself. They are, thus, collaterally attacking the
validity of the Social Security Act's provisions.

Collateral attacks on a presumably valid law are not allowed. Unless a law, rule, or act is annulled in a direct
proceeding, it is presumed valid.

Further, what are needed for a valid delegation are: (1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation;
and (2) the presence of a sufficient standard. Not only is the Social Security Act complete in its terms; it also
contains a sufficient standard for the Social Security Commission to fix the monthly contribution rate and the
minimum and maximum monthly salary credits as provided in Sec 18 of the said Act.

3. No. To be a valid exercise of police power, there must be a lawful subject and the power is exercised through
lawful means. The second requisite requires a reasonable relation between the purpose and the means. Using the
parameters above, we hold that the increases reflected in the issuances of respondents are reasonably necessary
to observe the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice under the Social Security Act. The public
interest involved here refers to the State's goal of establishing, developing, promoting, and perfecting a sound
and viable tax- exempt social security system. To achieve this, the Social Security System and the Social

Security Commission are empowered to adjust from time to time the contribution rate and the monthly salary
credits. Given the past increases since the inception of the law, the contribution rate increase of 0.6% applied to
the corresponding monthly salary credit does not scream of unreasonableness or injustice.

G.R. No. 232131

REY NATHANIEL C. IFURUNG, Petitioner
vs.
 HON. CONCHITA C. CARPIO MORALES JARDELEZA, in her capacity as the Ombudsman,
CAGUIOA, HON.MELCHOR ARTHUR H. MARTIRES, CARANDANG, HON. GERARD ABETO
TIJAM, MOSQUERA, HON. PAULELMER M. REYES, and CLEMENTE, HON. RODOLFO M.
GESMUNDO, JJ. ELMAN, HON. CYRIL ENGUERRARAMOS in their capacities as Deputies
Ombudsman, and THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents

MARTIRES, J.:

FACTS:
On July 25, 2011, Conchita Carpio Morales was appointed to a seven-year term following the resignation of
then-Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez who resigned on May 6, 2011 to avoid impeachment trial in the Senate
over allegations of incompetence and inaction on various cases. Merceditas Gutierrez left an unexpired term
until November 30, 2012.

In his Petition, Ifurung argued that Respondent Morales and her deputies must vacate their post for supposedly
overstaying as they must serve only the unexpired term of their predecessor. He alleges that Sec. 8(3), in
relation to Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 6770 also known as the Ombudsman Act, which provides that in case of a
vacancy at the Office of the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or permanent disability of the
incumbent Ombudsman and his deputies, the newly appointed Ombudsman and his deputies shall be appointed
to a full term of seven (7)years, is constitutionally infirm as it contravenes Sec. 11 in relation to Secs. 8 and 10
of Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

He avers that like all constitutionally created positions should serve only the unexpired term of the predecessor.
Hence, petitioner insists that the incumbent Ombudsman and deputies have been overstaying in their present
positions for more than two years considering that their terms have expired on 1 February 2015.

Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not
be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the incumbent Ombudsman and her deputies are overstaying on their positions.

RULING: No. The quoted provision of the Constitution is clear and explicit: (a) the Ombudsman and the
deputies shall serve the term of seven years; (b) that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall not be reappointed;
and (c) the Ombudsman and the deputies shall not run for any office in the election immediately succeeding
their cessation from office.

Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions where none is
provided from considerations of convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose; neither may it
engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated.

Further, the Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission.

Petition is DISMISSED.

Gerwin M. OrtegaJanuary 11, 2016

Natividad C. Cruz and Benjamin Dela Cruz Vs. Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc.
G.R. No. 188213. January 11, 2016
Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz (Cruz) was Punong Barangay or Chairperson of Barangay 848, Zone 92, City of
Manila.2 On November 10, 2006, around five o'clock in the afternoon, and along Central Street, Pandacan,
Manila, within the vicinity of her barangay, she allegedly confronted persons playing basketball with the
following statements:

Bakit nakabukas ang (basketball) court? Wala kayong karapatang maglaro sa court na 'to, barangay namin ito!
xxx xxx xxx Wala kayong magagawa. Ako ang chairman dito. Mga walanghiya kayo, patay gutom! Hindi ako
natatakot! Kaya kong panagutan lahat!

Then, she allegedly gave an order to the other petitioner, Barangay Tanod Benjamin dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), to
destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw which Dela Cruz promptly complied with, thus,
rendering the said basketball court unusable.

Petitioners maintain that they acted merely with the intention to regain free passage of people and vehicles over
the street and restore the peace, health and sanitation of those affected by the basketball court. Cruz, in
particular, asserts that she merely abated a public nuisance which she claimed was within her power as barangay
chief executive to perform and was part of her duty to maintain peace and order.

1.    May the Petitioners summarily destroy the basketball ring?

No. Prevailing jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated.

In the case at bar, the basketball ring can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose
an immediate effect upon the safety of persons and property. A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate
harm or danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation. Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to rights of
property, of health or of comfort of the community and, thus, it may not be abated as a nuisance without the
benefit of a judicial hearing.

2.    Explain the police power of the local government units under the general welfare clause to abate nuisance.

The general welfare clause provides for the exercise of police power for the attainment or maintenance of the
general welfare of the community. The power, however, is exercised by the government through its legislative
branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights.

Flowing from this delegated police power of local governments, a local government unit exercises police power
through its legislative body, in this case, its Sangguniang Barangay

3.    How may a private individual abate a public nuisance?

Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if
necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or
doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:

a)    That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;

b)    That such demand has been rejected;

c)    That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the local
police; and
d)    That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.

4.    Assuming that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se, but without posing any immediate harm or threat
that required instantaneous action, may the petitioners summarily destroy the basketball ring?

No.

Under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including one without judicial proceedings, of a public
nuisance is the responsibility of the district health officer. Under Article 702 of the Code, the district health
officer is also the official who shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the
best remedy against a public nuisance. The two articles do not mention that the chief executive of the local
government, like the Punong Barangay, is authorized as the official who can determine the propriety of a
summary abatement.

SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, vs.

THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, et. al,
G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the
petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation against the Department of Social Welfare
and Development , the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National Council on
Disability Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (collectively, the
respondents), which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257,
otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which
amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and treating them as tax
deduction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of R.A. No.9442 are constitutional and valid
exercise of eminent domain?

RULING:

There is no question that the grant of mandatory discount is germane to the purpose of R.A. Nos. 9257 and
9442, that is, to adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development and make essential
goods and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost, with special priority given to the
elderlies and the disabled, among others. The privileges granted by the laws ease their concerns and allow them
to live more comfortably.

The subject laws also address a continuing concern of the government for the welfare of the senior citizens and
PWDs. It is not some random predicament but an actual, continuing and pressing concern that requires
preferential attention. Also, the laws apply to all senior citizens and PWDs, respectively, without further
distinction or reservation. Without a doubt, all the elements for a valid classification were met.

Q1. THE VALUATION USED:

The Court also entertains no doubt on the legality of the method taken by the legislature to implement the
declared policies of the subject laws, that is, to impose discounts on the medical services and purchases of
senior citizens and PWDs and to treat the said discounts as tax deduction rather than tax credit. The measure is
fair and reasonable and no credible proof was presented to prove the claim that it was confiscatory. To be
considered confiscatory, there must be taking of property without just compensation.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.

Q2. WHEN AND HOW JUST COMPENSATION WAS COMPUTED:

It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, the laws mandating
a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs. It is also in further exercise of
this power that the legislature opted that the said discount be claimed as tax deduction, rather than tax credit, by
covered establishments.

One of the salient amendments in the law is the insertion of Chapter 8 in Title 2 thereof, which enumerates the
other privileges and incentives of PWDs, including the grant of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines.
Similar to R.A. No. 9257, covered establishments shall claim the discounts given to PWDs as tax deductions
from the gross income, based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered.

The establishments may claim the discounts granted in subsections (a), (b), (c), (e), (t) and (g) as tax deductions
based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, however, That the cost of the discount
shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is
granted: Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if
applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper
documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended.

It bears emphasizing that the law does not place a cap on the amount of mark up that covered establishments
may impose on their items. This rests on the discretion of the establishment which, of course, is expected to put
in the price of the overhead costs, expectation of profits and other considerations into the selling price of an
item.

Q3. WHICH POSITION WAS UPHELD BY THE COURT:

In view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9257 and Section 32 of Republic Act
No. 9442 are hereby declared CONSTITUTIONAL.

G.R. No. 221366

CITY OF MANILA, Petitioner
vs.
ALEJANDRO ROCES PRIETO, BENITO ROCES PRIETO, MERCEDES PRIETO DELGADO,
MONICA , LOPEZ PRIETO, MARTIN LOPEZ PRIETO, BEATRIZ PRIETO DE LEON, RAFAEL
ROCES PRIETO, BENITO LEGARD A, INC., ALEGAR CORPORATION, BENITO LEGARD A, JR.,
PECHATEN CORPORATION, ESTATE OF ROSARIO M. LLORA, and all persons claiming interests
against them, Respondents

Doctrine: 
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. -A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose[,] or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That
the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market
value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the
fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Several requisites must concur before a local government unit can exercise the power of an eminent domain, to
wit:
(1) an ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, on behalf of the
local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property;
(2) the power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose, or welfare, or the benefit of the poor and
the landless;
(3) there is the payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and
other pertinent laws; and
(4) a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated
but said the offer was not accepted
 
 
Facts:
The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8070 on January 19, 2004,  that authorized the City Mayor
to acquire certain parcels of land belonging to respondents Alejandro Roces Prieto, Benito Roces Prieto,
Mercedes Delgado Prieto, Monica Lopez Prieto, Martin Lopez Prieto, Beatriz Prieto De Leon, Rafael Roces
Prieto, Benito Legarda, Inc., Alegar Corporation, Benito Legarda, Jr., Pechaten Corporation, and Rosario M.
Llora (collectively, respondents) to be used for the City of Manila's (petitioner) Land-For-The-Landless
Program.

Initially, the petitioner attempted to acquire the subject lots by negotiated sale, offering the amount of P2,000.00
per square meter, which respondents refused to accept on the ground that their respective properties are worth
more than that.

Thus, the petitioner filed a Complaint dated September 3, 2004, before the RTC, asserting its authority to
expropriate the subject lots for its project.

Invoking Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of possession for
it to be able to immediately take possession of the subject properties. Petitioner manifested that it had already
deposited the sum of P4, 812,920.00 in the bank, representing more than one hundred percent (100%) of the
assessed value of the properties as shown in the declarations of real property. [8]

On February 2, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying the issuance of a writ of possession pending the deposit
of the additional amount of P852,519.00. Instead of the general provisions on expropriation under Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, the RTC applied the provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC), mandating the
deposit of 15% of the fair market value of the properties subject of expropriation, for the petitioner's immediate
possession thereof. Upon compliance, the petitioner manifested that the additional amount of P852, 519.00 has
already been satisfied. Petitioner deposited the amount of P425, 519.00, while the prospective beneficiaries of
the project deposited P443, 621.00 to complete the additional amount. The RTC issued a Writ of Possession on
October 6, 2006.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding that petitioner failed to prove that it complied with pertinent laws in the
exercise of its power of an eminent domain.
 
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit. In resolving expropriation cases, this Court has always been reminded that the
exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of fundamental right. The exercise
of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner's right to private property, which is as much a
constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and
intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty."[28] Therefore, the exercise of such power must undergo
painstaking scrutiny

Such scrutiny is especially necessary when eminent domain is exercised by a local government considering that
it merely has a delegated power of eminent domain. A local government unit has no inherent power of eminent
domain. Such power is essentially lodged in the legislature although it may be validly delegated to local
government units, other public entities and public utilities. Thus, inasmuch as the principal's exercise of the
power of eminent domain is subject to certain conditions, with more reason that the exercise of a delegated
power is not absolute. In fact, strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to the local government
unit is, in reality, not eminent but inferior since it must conform to the limits imposed by the principal.

In granting the petitioner's complaint about expropriation, the RTC concluded that all the requisites for the local
government's exercise of the power of eminent domain have been met by the petitioner. The RTC found that
there was an ordinance passed by the City Council of Manila to expropriate the subject lots for a public purpose.
The requirement that it should be for public use was, according to the RTC, satisfied by the fact that the
properties were sought to be expropriated according to the petitioner's "Land for the Landless and Onsite
Development Programs."

The RTC also noted that before the filing of the complaint in court, the petitioner made "definite and formal
offers" to respondents to purchase the subject lots, which the latter rejected. Further, despite "privately-owned
lands" being last in the list of priorities in a land acquisition under Section 9 of the Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7279 or the Urban Development Housing Act of 1992, the RTC dispensed with a said list, subscribing to
petitioner's allegation that an on-site development is more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries.

Case No.: G.R. No. 223366

Topic: Inherent Powers of Government – Power of Eminent Domain
Case Title: National Transmission Corporation vs. Oroville Development Corporation

Facts: In 2006, National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) offered to buy two properties from Oroville
Development Corporation (Oroville). These two properties were privately owned by different individuals when
the National Transmission Corporation constructed a power transmission line back in 1983. During the
negotiations for TransCo to buy the two properties, Oroville brought up the fact that they were not paid the just
compensation for the construction of the power transmission line back in 1983. Once the amount for the just
compensation was released, TransCo elevated an appeal before the CA, which also disappointed him, but
moved for reconsideration, however, was denied, which is why he petitioned to the Supreme Court:

Issue:
(a) Whether TransCo had the right to construct power transmission line on private properties
(b) Whether the computation of just compensation for the expropriated property should be based on its value at
the time of the taking of property

Ruling:
(a) Yes. Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property for uses to
promote public welfare. However, there are conditions to this power, (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.

(b) Yes. According to Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, Order of Expropriation, “If the objections to and
the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears
to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property
or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.”

Main Point: The government has the power to appropriate private property on the grounds of (1) for a public
purpose; and (2) with just compensation.

Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp

G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws, both
engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.

Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital recovery component of Php10.00 per bag of
fertilizer. The levy was to continue until adequate capital was raised to make PPI financially viable. Fertiphil
remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted the depository bank of PPI.
Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986.

After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphil demanded
from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and
damages, questioning the constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust, unreasonable, oppressive,
invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process. PPI argues that Fertiphil has no
locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have a "personal and
substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil
did not suffer any damage from the imposition because "incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or
the farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. What is the power
of taxation?

RULING:

Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mere procedural technicality
which may be waived. The imposition of the levy was an exercise of the taxation power of the state. While it is
true that the power to tax can be used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy was
revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial
purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.

Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct and have
different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to
levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or
conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects" and "lawful means" tests are used to
determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is
circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

G.R. No. 199113

March 18, 2015
David vs Agbay
Petitioner, Renato M. David
Respondents, Editha A. Agbay and People of the Philippines
Ponente, Villarama, Jr.

Provisions
Article XII, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution: “No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization
for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it
shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The
State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign
investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines.”

Facts

In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife
returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria,
Oriental Mindoro. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is
public land and part of the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is
disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while petitioner’s MLA was pending, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225 as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07 issued
by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto).

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a
Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the
subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in
fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family.

On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution finding probable cause to
indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent
re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio. Petitioner
argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his
citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said
naturalization.

Issue
WoN David be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application
despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225?

Ratio
YES – David is rightfully indicted for the falsely representing himself in his MLA. He made an untruthful
statement in his MLA that he was a Filipino citizen at the time he filed the document but he was in fact at that
time a Canadian Citizen. Even though he subsequently reacquired his Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225,
that has no retroactive effect in as so far as his false misrepresentation.

Ruling
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED
and UPHELD. With costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

TAN VS. CRISOLOGO

November 8, 2017 | Martires, J

PETITIONER: VIVIENNE TAN

RESPONDENT: VINCENT “BINGBONG” CRISOLOGO

SUMMARY: Vivienne Tan was a naturalized US citizen who sought to run for QC 1 st district representative.
However, she only took her Oath of Allegiance to the PH, as required by RA 9225, after she had applied to be a
registered voter. Crisologo challenged her inclusion in the voter’s list, saying she was not a citizen at the time of
her registration, and that she failed to meet the residency requirement. SC held that she was not a PH citizen at
the time she registered.

DOCTRINE
1. RA 9225 makes a distinction between 1) those who lost PH citizenship before RA 9225 and reacquired
it under the same and 2) those who lost PH citizenship after RA 9225 and retained citizenship.
2. Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the US on 19 Jan 2003, before the enactment of RA 9225. If
retroactive application is permitted, then the distinction is RA 9225 is rendered futile.
3. To consider that the reacquisition of the PH citizenship retroacts to the date it was lost = absurd scenario
where the person would still be considered a PH citizen when he had renounced his citizenship.

FACTS
1. 19 Jan 1993: Vivienne Tan became a naturalized US citizen.
2. 20 August 2003: RA 9225 was enacted.
3. 26 Oct 2009: Tan applied to be a registered voter in Quezon City. She indicated that she was a Filipino
by birth. The Election Registration Board approved her application on 16 Nov 2009.
4. 30 Nov 2009: Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the PH in Makati.
5. 1 Dec 2009: Tan filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration for the reacquisition of her PH
citizenship and executed a declaration renouncing allegiance to the US. The BI confirmed her
reacquisition.
6. 1 Dec 2009: Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy to run as QC 1st District representative.
7. 28 Dec 2009: Bingbong Crisologo filed a petition before the MeTC seeking to exclude Tan from the
voter’s list, alleging 1) she was not a PH citizen when she registered as a voter and 2) she failed to meet
the residency requirement.
8. MeTC ruled to exclude Tan from the voter’s list, holding that she was not a PH citizen at the time she
registered as a voter.
9. Tan appealed to the RTC. RTC reversed the MeTC and dismissed Crisologo’s petition. RTC opined that
the question of her citizenship was cured by Tan’s subsequent Oath, Petition for Reacquisition, the BI’s
Order granting the said petition, and Sworn Declaration re: renouncing her allegiance to the US.
10. The RTC decision became final and executory due to RA 8189. Hence, Crisologo filed for certiorari
before the CA.
11. The CA held that the RTC committed GADALEJ in reversing the MeTC decision, hence this Petition.

ISSUE/HELD
W/N Tan can be considered a PH citizen at the time she registered as a voter – NO. Basically, no legal basis for
the retroactive application of RA 9225. Her inclusion in the voter’s list is highly irregular.

W/N when PH citizenship is reacquired after taking the Oath as required by RA 9225, the effect on citizenship
status retroacts to period before taking said oath - NO

RATIO
 1. The reacquisition of PH citizenship under RA 9225 requires only the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the PH.
2. RA 9225 makes a distinction between 1) those who lost PH citizenship before RA 9225 and reacquired
it under the same and 2) those who lost PH citizenship after RA 9225 and retained citizenship.
3. Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the US on 19 Jan 2003, before the enactment of RA 9225. If
retroactive application is permitted, then the distinction is RA 9225 is rendered futile.
4. An interpretation giving RA 9225 retroactive effect as contemplated by Tan would cause confusion,
especially with respect to Sec. 3, RA 9225. Verba legis.
5. The Court also used the holistic approach, citing Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport Authority vs. Urgello. The
law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law.
6. RA 9225 contains to provision regarding the retroactivity of its effects as regards natural-born citizens
who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country before RA 9225.
7. To consider that the reacquisition of the PH citizenship retroacts to the date it was lost = absurd scenario
where the person would still be considered a PH citizen when he had renounced his citizenship.
8. Rule is also that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless legislature
intended to tive them a retroactive effect.
9. Citing Maquiling vs COMELEC (penned by CJ Sereno): the renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a
hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
10. We cannot consider one a Filipino citizen unless and until his or her allegiance to the Republic of the PH
is reaffirmed.
NOTES

121 TAN VS. CRISOLOGO

G.R. No. 193993; November 8, 2017 | Martires, J; kpm

SUBJECT MATTER: Qualifications

SUMMARY: Vivienne Tan was a naturalized US citizen who sought to run for QC 1 st district representative.
However, she only took her Oath of Allegiance to the PH, as required by RA 9225, after she had applied to be a
registered voter. Crisologo challenged her inclusion in the voter’s list, saying she was not a citizen at the time of
her registration, and that she failed to meet the residency requirement. SC held that she was not a PH citizen at
the time she registered.

DOCTRINE: A natural-born Filipino citizen who renounces his or her Philippine citizenship, effectively
becomes a foreigner in the Philippines with no political right to participate in Philippine politics and
governance.

RA 9225 makes a distinction between 1) those who lost PH citizenship before RA 9225 and reacquired it under
the same and 2) those who lost PH citizenship after RA 9225 and retained citizenship.

Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the US on 19 Jan 2003, before the enactment of RA 9225. If retroactive
application is permitted, then the distinction is RA 9225 is rendered futile.
Renunciation or the relinquishment of one's citizenship requires a voluntary act for it to produce any legal effect

To consider that the reacquisition of the PH citizenship retroacts to the date it was lost = absurd scenario where
the person would still be considered a PH citizen when he had renounced his citizenship.

FACTS

Petitioner VIVIENNE TAN

Respondent VINCENT “BINGBONG” CRISOLOGO

19 Jan 1993: Tan, born to Filipino parents, became a naturalized citizen of the United States of
America (US.A.).

20 August 2003: RA 9225 was enacted.

26 Oct 2009: Tan applied to be a registered voter in Quezon City. She indicated that she was a Filipino
by birth. The Election Registration Board approved her application on 16 Nov 2009.

30 Nov 2009: Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the PH in Makati.

1 Dec 2009: Tan filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration for the reacquisition of her PH
citizenship and executed a declaration renouncing allegiance to the US. The BI confirmed her
reacquisition.

1 Dec 2009: Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy to run as QC 1st District representative.

28 Dec 2009: Bingbong Crisologo filed a petition before the MeTC seeking to exclude Tan from the
voter’s list, alleging
a. she was not a PH citizen when she registered as a voter and
b. she failed to meet the residency requirement.

MeTC - ruled to exclude Tan from the voter’s list, holding that she was not a PH citizen at the time she
registered as a voter.
a. If indeed she was a Filipino citizen as she claimed and represented, she would not have gone
to the extent of re-affirming her Filipino citizenship, by her act of applying for the same
RTC- reversed the MeTC and dismissed Crisologo’s petition.
a. RTC opined that the question of her citizenship was cured by Tan’s subsequent Oath,
Petition for Reacquisition, the BI’s Order granting the said petition, and Sworn
Declaration re: renouncing her allegiance to the US.
b. With these acts of [Tan], she is deemed to have never lost her Filipino citizenship.

The RTC decision became final and executory due to RA 8189. Hence, Crisologo filed for certiorari
before the CA.

The CA-RTC committed GADALEJ in reversing the MeTC decision, hence this Petition.
ISSUE: WON Tan can be considered a Philippine citizen at the time she registered as a voter? No

HELD: NO. Basically, no legal basis for the retroactive application of RA 9225. Her inclusion in the voter’s
list is highly irregular.

A natural-born Filipino citizen who renounces his or her Philippine citizenship, effectively becomes a foreigner
in the Philippines with no political right to participate in Philippine politics and governance.

In this indicated in the 1987 Constitution

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law
who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
(emphasis ours)

To be registered a voter in the Philippines, the registrant must be a citizen at the time he or she filed the
application.

In the present case, it is undisputed that Tan filed her voter's registration application on 26 October 2009, and
that she only took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 November 2009, or more
than a month after the ERB approved her application.

Tan argues that

 her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through R.A. No. 9225 has a retroactive effect, such that a
natural-born Filipino citizen is deemed never to have lost his or her Filipino citizenship, and that

 the reacquisition cured any and all defects, assuming any are existing, attendant during her registration
as a voter

R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens, who lost their Philippine citizenship through
naturalization in a foreign country, to expeditiously reacquire Philippine citizenship.
Congress declared as a state policy that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions laid out by the law. The full
implications of the effects of R.A. No. 9225 can be fully appreciated in Section 31
SC: the law makes a distinction between Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 9225 and reacquired their citizenship under the same law from those who lost their
Philippine citizenship after R.A. No. 9225 was enacted and retained their citizenship
In other words, by declaring "deemed to have not lost their Philippine citizenship," it DOESN’T mean that once
Philippine citizenship is reacquired after taking the Oath of Allegiance required in R.A. No. 9225, the effect on
the citizenship status retroacts to the period before taking said oath. It does not retroact

Once Philippine citizenship is renounced because of naturalization in a foreign country, we cannot consider one
a Filipino citizen unless and until his or her allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines is reaffirmed. Simply
stated, right after a Filipino renounces allegiance to our country, he or she is to be considered a foreigner.

1
Note that Tan's act of acquiring U.S. citizenship had been a conscious and voluntary decision on her part.
While studying and working in the U.S.A., Tan chose to undergo the U.S. naturalization process to acquire U.S.
citizenship. This naturalization process required her to renounce her allegiance to the Philippine Republic and
her Philippine citizenship.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225 cannot be used as basis for giving a retroactive application of the law. R.A. No.
9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who
became naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of the said law.
It is a well-settled rule that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the
legislature intended to give them a retroactive effect
In this case:
It is a well-settled rule that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the
legislature intended to give them a retroactive effect

During the time Tan lost her Philippine citizenship, R.A. No. 9225 was not yet enacted and the applicable law
was still Commonwealth Act No. 63.1âwphi1 Under this law, both the renunciation of Philippine citizenship
and the acquisition of a new citizenship in a foreign country through naturalization are grounds to lose
Philippine citizenship: 

Since the foregoing law was still effective when Tan became an American citizen, the loss of her Philippine
citizenship is but a necessary consequence. As the applicable law at that time, Tan was presumed to know the
legal effects of her choice to become a naturalized U.S. citizen. The loss of Tan's Philippine citizenship is
reinforced by the fact that she voluntarily renounced her Philippine citizenship as a requirement to acquire U.S.
citizenship.

All said, absent any legal basis for the retroactive application of R.A. No. 9225, we agree with the CA that Tan
was not a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter and her inclusion to the permanent voter's list is
highly irregular.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition Denied

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION TO CITIZENSHIP

OF MANISH C. MAHTANI, MANISH C. MAHTANI, PETITIONER, V.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. 211118 – March 21, 2018
J. Tijam

Digest Author: Jasmine Obbus

Topic: Territory, People, and Government—Territory—Citizenship

Petitioners: Manish C. Mahtani

Respondents: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
 01/02/07: Mahtani, a citizen of the Republic of India, filed a Declaration of Intent to become a citizen
of the Philippines with the Officer of the Solicitor General
 05/18/08: Mahtani filed a Petition for Naturalization alleging he has complied with all the
qualifications required under the law to become naturalized Filipino citizen
 05/26/11: RTC of Pasig city granted the petition
 Herein respondent, Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals on
the following grounds:
o Mahtani failed to prove that he has a lucrative trade, profession, or occupation
o He failed to present credible persons as character witness
o He failed to present evidence that he has been paying taxes to the government (related to
requirement of having lucrative occupation and of conducting himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines)
 Mahtani averred that the in the provision, the word “lucrative” referred to “trade” and not “profession.
Nonetheless, he claimed he has presented enough evidence to prove his lucrative occupation
 08/01/13: CA reversed the RTC ruling
o Mahtani failed to prove an essential qualification (that he has a lucrative occupation) and that
there is no showing that he paid taxes due to the government
 Mahtani filed a motion for reconsideration
 CA denied motion
 Mahtani files a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
 RTC—CA—CA(motion for reconsideration)—SC

ISSUES + HELD:
1. W/N Mahtani was able to prove that he has some known lucrative trade, profession of lawful occupation
in accordance with Section 2, paragraph 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
o The Court held that Mahtani indeed failed to prove that the requirement in Section 2(4) of
the Commonwealth Act No. 473 was complied with
o The court emphasizes that the granting of citizenship to an alien is one of the highest, most
valuable privilege the Republic can confer—thus, it rightfully demands for strict compliance
with the law
 No presumption can be indulged in favor of the applicant
 Burden of proof rests upon the applicant
o Court cited Republic of the Philippines v. Ong in setting the standard for the requirement of
“lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation”
 It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for
an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to
 work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge.
o Mahtani failed to provide documentary evidence that would show his actual financial status. As
it appears, from the expenses he listed, as well as the income stated in the income tax returns he
belatedly submitted, his income may be able to sufficiently meet his family’s basic needs, but
there is no sufficient proof that his income has an appreciable margin over expenses

RULING: Mahtani has not proven his possession of a known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation
to qualify for naturalization

FULL DISPOSITIVE TEXT: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated August 1, 2013 and Resolution dated January 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
97125 are hereby AFFIRMED. The Petition for Naturalization of Manish C. Mahtani is DENIED for failure to
comply with Section 2, Paragraph 4, of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.

G.R. No. 161434             March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, 

vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.)
and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

Facts:
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known FPJ, filed his certificate of candidacy
for President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and place of birth to be Manila.

Fornier initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the COMELEC to disqualify
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

Petitioner, presented in COMELEC several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2)
a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a
case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous
relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit, 4) a certified photocopy of the
certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or
Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of
the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the
files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.

FPJ, presented 22 documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by
Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a
certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available
information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of
Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. in the name of Lorenzo Pou, his tax declaration and death
certificate

COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration and denied by Comelec en banc.

1. WON SC has jurisdiction to determine qualification of a candidate

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.Tesco invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 42, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003
and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it.

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

2. WON FPJ is a Filipino citizen

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

The term "natural-born citizens," under Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution3 defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship."

2
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
3
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years
of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election
Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis
– had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born”
citizen of the Philippines.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of
respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some
degree of certainty from the documents would be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents.4

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on
1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a
breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of
record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the
place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain,
DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain,
DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and
to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

Dissenting
Carpio
Jurisdiction:To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine the qualification of a candidate for
President only after the elections would lead to an absurd situation. The Court would have to wait for an alien to

4
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court- Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is
recorded in a public office
be elected on election day before he could be disqualified to run for President. If the case is not decided
immediately after the election, an alien who wins the election may even assume office as President before he is
finally disqualified. Certainly, this is not what the Constitution says when it provides that "[N]o person may be
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."The clear and specific language of the
Constitution prohibits the election of one who is not a natural-born citizen. Thus, the issue of whether a
candidate for President is a natural-born Philippine citizen must be decided before the election.

Governing Laws: The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force in 1939, are the
governing laws that determine whether a person born in 1939 is a Philippine citizen at the time of his birth in
1939. Any subsequent legislation cannot change the citizenship at birth of a person born in 1939 because such
legislation would violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine citizen
from birth. In short, one who is not a Philippine citizen at birth in 1939 cannot be declared by subsequent
legislation a natural-born citizen.

General Principles if the Filipino father is legally known because the filiation (blood relation of illegitimate
child to the father) of the child to the Filipino father is established in accordance with law, the child follows the
citizenship of the Filipino father. This gives effect, without discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate
children, to the provision of the 1935 Constitution that "[T]hose whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines"[16] are Philippine citizens.

Nature of Citizenship the illegitimate child must prove to the proper administrative or judicial authority the
paternity of the alleged Filipino father by "sufficient and convincing documentary evidence." Clearly, an
administrative or judicial act is necessary to confer on the illegitimate children Philippine citizenship. The mere
claim of the illegitimate child of filiation to a Filipino father, or the mere acknowledgment of the alleged
Filipino father, does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship on the child. The State must be convinced
of the veracity of such claim and approve the same. Since the illegitimate children need to perform an act to
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship, they are not natural-born Philippine citizens. They become Philippine
citizens only from the moment the proper administrative or judicial authority approve and recognize their
filiation to their alleged Filipino fathers.

Proof of Filiation After the birth of one who is not a natural-born Philippine citizen, a subsequent legislation
liberalizing proof of filiation cannot apply to such person to make him a natural-born citizen. A natural-born
Philippine citizen is expressly defined in the Constitution as one who is a citizen at birth. If a person is not a
citizen at birth, no subsequent legislation can retroactively declare him a citizen at birth since it would violate
the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen.

To establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ must present either an acknowledgement in a record of birth,
or an acknowledgment in some other public document executed at the time of his birth. An acknowledgment
executed after birth does not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen from the time of such acknowledgment
since the acknowledgment is an act done after birth to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.

G.R. No. 173034             October 9, 2007  PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  vs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III;
HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY.
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR.
MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.
FACTS : Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular
clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and
child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect
on July 7, 2006.

Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by
the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held: YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that
conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the
WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to
any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being
followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be

transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.

 Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law.
The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

Bayan Muna vs. Romulo - GR No. 159618 Case Digest

Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of
society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period
material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law,
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which,
by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. As of the filing of the
instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval
and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92. RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter)
between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP,
represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US
Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement
aims to protect what it refers to and defines as “persons” of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits
that might be brought against them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the
strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral
agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are current or former Government officials, employees (including
contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first
Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such
tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or

b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third country,
for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established
by the UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a third country, the
[US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country, the
[GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the
Government of the [US].
This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other of its intent to
terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or
any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice
and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement
and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are
either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03
cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and
jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international
jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An
exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-governmental agreements,” which is an internationally accepted form of
international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record
its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of
exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of
legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used interchangeably,
exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the
other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President “sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other
times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As former US High Commissioner to the
Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements – whether
denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, maysometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03––be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement
itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a
legally binding international written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at
variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact
that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, “leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities
that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the
[ICC] x x x.”63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner’s earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the
RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty
obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national
criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.”

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect.
Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the
Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the
formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement
contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the
consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of
things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws
and the Rome Statute.

Lambino vs. Comelec GR # 174153

Facts: Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado (“Lambino Group”), with other groups1 and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. They filed a petition
with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and
Section 73 of the Initiative and Referendum Act (“RA 6735”).

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Legislative and Executive
Department and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.”6 These proposed changes will shift
the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino
Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following
proposition in a plebiscite for the voters’ ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO
A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group’s petition for lack of an enabling
law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court’s ruling in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.

The Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC
Resolution and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since
Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the
parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the “will of the sovereign people.

On the other hand, Binay Group pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show
cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC’s verification of signatures and for
“entertaining” the Lambino Group’s petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the
Binay Group’s petition as an opposition-in-intervention.

the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the
Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules “as
temporary devises to implement the system of initiative.

Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino
Group’s petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary
view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent.

Issues:

1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and

Ruling:

1. No, Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly
stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First,
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential
to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the
draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is
not the “petition” that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Furthermore, The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives

A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution.
“the proposed changes to the Constitution effect major changes in the political structure and system, the
fundamental powers and duties of the branches of the government, the political rights of the people, and the
modes by which political rights may be exercised.”48 They conclude that they are substantial amendments
which cannot be done through people’s initiative. In other words, they posit the thesis that only simple but not
substantial amendments can be done through people’s initiative.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is
no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit
Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to
implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.