Assignment 20210910

CIVIL LAW REVIEW CASES
II. Persons (Article 40-47 NCC)

1. Juridical Capacity
a. Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc., G.R. No. L-27956, [April 30, 1976], 162 PHIL 616-622
2. Capacity to Act
3. Natural Persons
4. Juridical Persons
a. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, Vs. Citibank, N.A. And Bank Of America, S.T. & N.A.,G.R.
No. 170290: April 11, 2012
b. BPI Family Bank vs CA, CTA and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 117319. July 19, 2006
III. Citizenship and Domicile (Article 48-51)

a. Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700 (Dissenting Opinion),
[March 8, 2016]
b. Filipinas Compañia De Seguros v. Christern, Hunefeld & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-2294, [May 25, 1951], 89 PHIL
54-60
IV. Funerals (Articles 305-310 NCC)

a. Ventanilla v. Centeno, G.R. No. L-14333, [January 28, 1961], 110 PHIL 811-818

V. Care and Education of Children (Articles 356-363)
a. Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138,
205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172 & 207563, [April 8, 2014], 732 PHIL 1-99
VI. Use of Surnames (Article 364 – 380 NCC)

a. Heirs of Fabillar v. Paller, G.R. No. 231459, [January 21, 2019]
b. Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, [March 5, 2010], 628 PHIL 181-193

VII. Emancipation and Age of Majority (Republic Act No. 6809)
VIII. Absence (Article 381-389 NCC)
a. In re: Reyes v. Alejandro, G.R. No. L-32026, [January 16, 1986], 225 PHIL 49-54

IX. Presumption of Death (Article 390-392 NCC)
a. ANGELITA VALDEZ vs. Republic (G.R. No. 180863, Sept 8, 2009)
b. In re Lukban v. Republic, G.R. No. L-8492, [February 29, 1956], 98 PHIL 574-578
c. In re Gue v. Republic, G.R. No. L-14058, [March 24, 1960], 107 PHIL 381-386

X. Civil Registry (Article 407 -413 NCC)
Act No. 3753 (Law on Registry of Civil Status)
a. Civil Service Commission v. Rasuman, G.R. No. 239011, [June 17, 2019]
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FAMILY RELATIONS (Executive Order No. 209)
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

1. MARRIAGES

a. Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio Vs. Republic Of The Philippines GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007
b. Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, [September 3, 2019]
c. Selanova vs Mendoza, Admin Matter 804-CJ, May 19, 1975
d. In re Santiago, Admin Case No. 923, June 21, 1940

1.1 Proof of Marriage

a. Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, G.R. No. 178221, 1 December 2010, 636 SCRA
420, 429-430

1.2 Presumption of Marriage

a. Peregrina Macua Vda. De Avenido vs. Tecla Hoybia Avenido, G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
2. Concept of Marriage - Declaration of State Policy

3. Requisites of Marriage
3.a Essential Requisites
a. Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, [October 16, 2013], 719 PHIL 622-638
b. Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
3.b Formal Requisites
Local Government Code Chapter 3 Article 1

a. Abbas vs. Abbas 689 SCRA 646
b. Beso Vs. Daguman 323 SCRA 566
c. Navarro Vs. Domagtoy 259 SCRA 129
d. People Vs. Santiago G.R. No. 27972 October 31, 1927
e. Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406, [January 13, 2016], 778 PHIL 326-344)
f. Diaz-Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, [July 27, 2016])
g. Morigo y Cacho v. People, G.R. No. 145226, [February 6, 2004], 466 PHIL 1013-1025)
h. Perfecto v. Esidera, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 (Resolution), [July 22, 2015], 764 PHIL 384-407
i. Cosca v. Palaypayon, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-92-721, [September 30, 1994], 307 PHIL 261-287)
j. Cariov.Cario G.R. No.132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133
k. Mercedita Mata Araes vs. Judge Salvador Occiano A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390.April 11, 2002
l. Sy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127263, [April 12, 2000], 386 PHIL 760-771)

4. Role of Civil Registry (Article 11-25)
a. Nullada v. Civil Registrar of Manila, G.R. No. 224548, [January 23, 2019]
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Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc.,
G.R. No. L-27956, [April 30, 1976], 162 PHIL 616-622
FACTS:
Pedro Oria died on April 23, 1959. On June 13, 1960, Quality Plastic Products, Inc. filed a case gaianst Pedro
Oria, Vicente Soliven, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbog, and Juana Darang.
On June 24, 1960, Vicente Soliven received and signed the summons and copies of the complaint in his
behalf and his co-defendants’. On February 18, 1962, CFI ordered the defendants to pay P3, 667.03 to
Quality Plastic Products Inc. to avoid foreclosure of their surety bonds. However, Oria failed to pay (eh kais
patay na nga) the said amount. Thus the lower court ordered the foreclosure of his surety bond and sale of
his public land which he had given as a security for the bond.
On March 1, 1963, Oria’s land was sold through auction by the sheriff. Hence, the testamentary heirs of
Oria sued Quality Plastic Products and prayed for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the sale
of his land. Quality Plastics did not know about Oria’s death.
ISSUE:
W/N the judgment against Oria and his land are valid
HELD:
The Quality Plastics only learned about Oria’s death upon receipt of the summons of Oria’s heirs. They
acted in good faith in including Oria as a co-defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria.
Hence, the judgment against him is patent nullity. Oria, upon his death, had no more civil personality and
his juridical capacity which made him capable of legal relations was lost through death. However, Dumlaos
(heirs) are not entitled to claim attorney’s fee for the corporation.
“Lack of jurisdiction over a dead person; civil personality is extinguished by death; even juridical capacity
which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.”
Phil. Deposit Insurance Corp., v. Citibank, N.A. And Bank Of America, S.T. & N.A.,
G.R. No. 170290: April 11, 2012
FACTS:
PDIC is a government instrumentality created by RA No. 3591 as amended by RA 9302 while respondent
Citibank is a banking corporation and Bank of America is a national banking association. In 1977 and 1979,
in an examination conducted by the PDIC, it discovered that both respondents received funds from their
respective head offices and their foreign branches. These funds were covered by Certificates of Dollar Time
Deposit that were interest-bearing with corresponding maturity dates and lodged in their books under the
accounts “Their Account-Head Office/Branches-Foreign Currency” and“ Due to Head Office/Branches”
respectively. PDIC assessed both banks deficiency of sum. Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief
before the RTC in which the latter favored reasoning out that the money placements subject of the
petitions were not assessable for insurance purposes under the PDIC Charter because said placements were
deposits made outside of the Philippines and that there was no depositor-depository relationship between
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the respondents and their head office or other branches. As a result, such deposits were not included as
third-party deposits that must be insured. Rather, they were considered inter-branch deposits which were
excluded from the assessment base. Aggrieved, PDIC appealed to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the funds placed in the Philippine branch by the head office and foreign branches of
Citibank and BA are insurable deposits under the PDIC Charter and, as such, are subject to assessment for
insurance premiums. (NO)
RULING:
In the case of Citibank and BA, it is apparent that they both did not incorporate a separate
domestic corporation to represent its business interests in the Philippines. Their Philippine branches are, as
the name implies, merely branches, without a separate legal personality from their parent company,
Citibank and BA. Thus, being one and the same entity, the funds placed by the respondents in their
respective branches in the Philippines should not be treated as deposits made by third parties subject to
deposit insurance under the PDIC Charter In addition, Philippine banking laws also support the conclusion
that the head office of a foreign bank and its branches are considered as one legal entity.
Section 75 of R.A. No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000) and Section 5 of R.A. No. 7221 (An Act
Liberalizing the Entry of Foreign Banks)both require the head office of a foreign bank to guarantee the
prompt payment of all the liabilities of its Philippine branch.
Finally, the Court agrees with the CA ruling that there is nothing in the definition of a “bank” and a “banking
institution” in Section 3(b) of the PDIC Charter which explicitly states that the head office of a foreign bank
and its other branches are separate and distinct from their Philippine branches. Based on the foregoing, it is
clear that the head office of a bank and its branches are considered as one under the eyes of the law. While
branches are treated as separate business units for commercial and financial reporting purposes, in the
end, the head office remains responsible and answerable for the liabilities of its branches which are under
its supervision and control. As such, it is unreasonable for PDIC to require the respondents, Citibank and
BA, to insure the money placements made by their home office and other branches.
Deposit insurance is superfluous and entirely unnecessary when, as in this case, the institution holding the
funds and the one which made the placements are one and the same legal entity.
Petition is denied
Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,

G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700 (Dissenting Opinion), [March 8, 2016]
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from May 24, 2005.
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Grace Poe was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991
after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a
naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who
then eventually demice on February 3, 2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving
mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that
her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as
candidate for Presidency.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which
are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality
wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that
Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstantial evidence are admissible under
Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations
of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is
no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where
they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements
of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of
not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24, 2005, upon returning to
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the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship
under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.
Ventanilla v. Centeno, G.R. No. L-14333, [January 28, 1961], 110 PHIL 811-818
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 18833 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Oscar Ventanilla vs. Edilberto
Alejandrino and Aida G. Alejandrino, plaintiff retained the service of Atty. Gregorio Centeno to
represent him and prosecute the case. Civil Case No. 19833 was an action for the recovery of P4, 000.00
together with damages. Decision unfavorable to the plaintiff was received by Atty. Gregorio Centeno on
July 21,1955, and a notice of appeal was filed by Atty. Centeno on July 25, 1955. On July 30, 1955, Atty.
Centeno wrote to the plaintiff the letter, enclosing copies of the decision and that notice of appeal,
and stating that he was not conformable to the decision and had not hesitated to file the notice of
appeal.Atty. Centeno informed him that he intended to appeal and plaintiff agreed. Plaintiff, however, did
not leave with Atty. Centeno at that time the amount for the appeal bond. About the middle of Aug. 1955,
Atty. Centeno wrote a letter to the plaintiff enclosing therein forms for an appeal bond. The
plaintiff Ventanilla, however, instead of executing an appeal bond, and because use of his reluctance
to pay the premium on the appeal bond, decided to file a cash appeal bond of P60.00. He went to the office
of Atty. Centeno at about 4 o'clock on August 18,1955, but was informed by the clerk, Leonardo
Sanchez, that Atty. Centeno was in Laguna campaigning for his candidacy as member of the Provincial
Board. Plaintiff then issued the check, for P60.00 as appeal bond and delivered the same to
Leonardo Sanchez with instruction to give the same to Atty. Centeno upon his arrival. The Court does
not believe plaintiff's testimony that Sanchez had contacted Atty. Centeno by telephone and that he
issued the cheek upon instruction of Atty. Centeno. Leonardo Sanchez had informed the plaintiff that
Atty. Centeno was in Laguna, and if he were in Manila, Sanchez could not have known the whereabouts of
Atty. Centeno. On August 17, Atty. Centeno prepared the motion for extension of time to file the record on
appeal, which was filed only on August 20, 1955. Atty. Centeno returned to Manila and went to his
office at about 10 o'clock in the morning of August 22. He cash the check, with the Marvel Building
Corporation and then went to the office of the Clerk of Court to file the appeal bond. According to Atty.
Centeno it was not accepted because the period of appeal had already expired, and that it was only at that
time he came to know that the period of appeal had expired. The court does not likewise believe the
testimony of Atty. Centeno. Neither the Clerk of Court, or any of the employees had the right to
refuse an appeal bond that is being filed, for it is not in his power to determine whether or not the
appeal bond has been filed within the time prescribed by law. In fact the record on appeal was
accepted and filed on September 5, 1955, but no appeal bond has been filed by Atty. Centeno. The
appellant claims that the trial court erred in not ordering the appellee to pay him actual or
compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, and exemplary or corrective damages; in ordering the
appellee to pay the appellant only the sum of P200, and not P2,000 as nominal damages; and in not
ordering the appellee to pay the appellant the sum of P500 as attorney's fee.
ISSUE:
Is the award of nominal damages excessive?
What is the basis thereof?
RULING:
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Relative to the sufficiency of the sum of P200 as nominal damages awarded by the trial court to the
appellant, article 2221 of the new Civil Code provides: “Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.” The
assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of the
case. Considering the circumstances, as found by the trial court, and the degree of negligence
committed by the appellee, a lawyer, in not depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the record on
appeal within the extension period granted by the court, which brought about the refusal by the
trial court to allow the record on appeal, the amount of P200 awarded by the trial court to the
appellant as nominal damages may seem exiguous. Nevertheless, considering that nominal damages
are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or
invaded; and that even if the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it was not an
assurance that the appellant would succeed in recovering the amount he had claimed in his
complaint, the amount of P2,000 the appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is excessive.
After weighing carefully all the considerations, the amount awarded to the appellant for nominal
damages should not be disturbed.
Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,

G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138, 205478,
205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172 & 207563, [April 8, 2014], 732 PHIL 1-99
FACTS:
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), challengers from various sectors of
society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the
controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and
refined them to the following principal issues:
1. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
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Right to Life
Right to Health
Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
The Family
Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
Due Process
Equal Protection
Involuntary Servitude
Delegation of Authority to the FDA
Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
RULING:
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to
resolve some procedural impediments.
The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. In the scholarly
estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three
great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority
and control between them.” To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation –
or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation. Lest it be misunderstood, it
bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim
of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited
by four exacting requisites, viz:
(a) There must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) The petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. In this case,
the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes
which one’s thoughts are externalized. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the
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U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well-being of this nation, specially the youth;
hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court
need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them
as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is well-settled that the “one title-one subject”
rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks
to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences
of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” In this case, a textual analysis
of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood”
are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.
According to him, “fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it
is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected. This theory of implantation as the
beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but
to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it is a living human
being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity
not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life begins at fertilization,
not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but
that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. These provisions are self-executing.
Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.
In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:
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x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that –… in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . .
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall
be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one’s
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that
matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
church … are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.” The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court
makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom. Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot
enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its
legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot
refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church
and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that
are God’s. The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a
patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods,
his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private,
should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with
the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction,
it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise
of religion.
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated
by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes
such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section
23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion.
The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive
health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who
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declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a
clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody
of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling
state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule
on its constitutionality or validity.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance
with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part
of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s reproductive health care program is
not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus: Section 11.
The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable
cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should be noted that Section 7
of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to
have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor
to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated
above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the “promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health.”
The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar
means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono
service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to
choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to
provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono
service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with
PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary
incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest. Consistent with
what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are
exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render
reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
11 | P a g e
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health
services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood
as “health products.” Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make
it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to
ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes “service” and
“methods.” From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the
permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let
alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities,
the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health workers, it will be the national
government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
In re: Reyes v. Alejandro,

G.R. No. L-32026, [January 16, 1986], 225 PHIL 49-54
FACTS:
On October 25, 1969 Erlinda Reynoso filed a petition for the declaration of absence of her husband Roberto
L. Reyes. She alleged that her husband had been absent from their conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and
since then had not been heard from and his whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her
husband left no will nor any property in his name nor any debts. She also said that they have not acquired
any properties during their marriage and that they have no outstanding obligation in favor of anyone and
her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of
Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code. The court dismissed the said petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a need for the declaration of absence of Roberto Reyes
HELD:
No. The purpose of the declaration is to provide an administrator of the property.
In Rule 107 of the Rules of Court is based on the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on absence.
The provision is concerned with the interest or property of the absentee. The purpose of the declaration is
to provide an administrator of the property. The reason and purpose of the provisions of the New Civil
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Code on absence (Arts. 381 to396) are: 1. The interest of the person himself who has disappeared; 2. The
rights of third parties against the absentee, especially those who have rights which would depend upon the
death of the absentee; and 3. The general interest of society which may require that property does not
remain abandoned without someone representing it and without an owner.
When to declare for absence:

1. when he has properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed
by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code);
2. the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or
3. his wife is asking the Court that the administration of all classes of property in the marriage be
transferred to her (Article. 196, Civil Code).
For civil marriage law-Necessary to judicially declare spouse an absentee only when (1) there are properties
which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (2) the spouse
of the absentee is asking for separation of property (3) wife is asking the Court that the administration of
property in the marriage be transferred to her.
Otherwise law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living,
that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of
the celebration of the marriage
In this case, since there were no properties to speak of, it was right for the court to dismiss the case.
ANGELITA VALDEZ vs. Republic (G.R. No. 180863, Sept 8, 2009)

FACTS:
Petitioner Angelita Valdez married Sofio and had one child. Petitioner alleged they have constant quarrels
with Sofio which then the latter left their conjugal home eventually. Petitioner Valdez and child waited for
Sofio to come home but didn’t so petitioner decided to go back to her parent’s house in Tarlac. Three years
have passed and no word from Sofio.
Sofio showed up and they talked, agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. After that
meeting, Sofio disappeared again and from then on, Valdez didn’t hear any news of him anymore.
Believing that her Sofio was dead, petitioner married the second time. Her new husband Virgilio’s
application for naturalization as an American citizen was denied because of the wife’s subsisting 1st
marriage.
Valdez filed a petition before the RTC seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. RTC denied
because it found that the wife did not try to find her husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement of
separation and their daughter also alleged that her mother prevented her from finding her father Sofio.
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Valdez filed for an MR which the SolGen recommended so since the SolGen argues that the requirement of
"well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because the
petitioner could not expected to comply with the requirement since it (the rule) was not yet in existence
when she married her 2nd husband in 1985 (1988-FC). SolGen further argues that before the effectivity of
the FC, the wife already acquired a vested right as to her validity of her married to her 2nd husband due to
the presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Valdez’s marriage with Virgilio (2nd husband) is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of 1st husband.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of 1st
husband. It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January
11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he
has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Hence, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the
presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence,
Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
Since the Civil Code applies, proof of “well-founded belief” isn’t required. SC declared that the wife was
capacitated to marry Virgilio (2nd husband) at the time of their marriage in 1985 and therefore, their
marriage is legal and valid.
Civil Service Commission v. Rasuman,

G.R. No. 239011, [June 17, 2019]
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Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio Vs. Republic Of The Philippines,

GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his
birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was
born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962.
His name was registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate).
His sex was registered as “male.”
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a “woman” culminated
on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to
“female.”
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Firstly, the court is of the opinion
that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his
sexual re-assignment, petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should
not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition.
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
sex alteration. The CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision
lacked legal basis.
ISSUE:
Whether the changes in the petitioner’s entry shall be allowed?
RULING:
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Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make
his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of
first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer
as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not
within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper
venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly,
it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person.
Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or
events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity
and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that: “all other matters pertaining
to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.” But there is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician
or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
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Petitioner pleads that “the unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and the
realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General,

G.R. No. 217910, [September 3, 2019]
FACTS:
On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. His Petition sought to “declare article 1
and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the
Family Code.”
Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing Magallona v. Executive Secretary, Araullo v.
Executive Secretary, and the separate opinion of now-retired Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (Associate
Justice Brion) in Araullo. Again citing Associate Justice Brion’s separate opinion, he claims that this Court
should follow a “‘fresh’ approach to this Court’s judicial power” and find that his Petition pertains to a
constitutional case attended by grave abuse of discretion. He also asserts that the mere passage of the
Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, and that the
issues he raised were of such transcendental importance as to warrant the setting aside of procedural
niceties.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the mere passage of the Family Code creates an actual case or controversy reviewable by
this Court;
2. Whether or not the self-identification of petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III as a member of the
LGBTQI+ community gives him standing to challenge the Family Code;
3. Whether or not the Petition-in-Intervention cures the procedural defects of the Petition;
4. Whether or not the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance is warranted;
5. Whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry are cognates of the right to life
and liberty;
RULING:
1. No. Parties coming to court must show that the assailed act had a direct adverse effect on them. In
Lozano v. Nograles:
An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness”. In the United States,
courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold
aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the
parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally
17 | P a g e
treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to
review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or
performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
2. No. Legal standing or locus standi is the “right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” To
possess legal standing, parties must show “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they
have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.”
The requirement of direct injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
The requirements of legal standing and the recently discussed actual case and controversy are both “built
on the principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the
judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.” In addition, economic
reasons justify the rule. Thus:
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate
constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts
to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their
doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render
themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary
today.
Standing in private suits requires that actions be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, interest being “material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case[,] [ not just] mere curiosity about the question involved.” Whether a suit is public or private, the
parties must have “a present substantial interest,” not a “mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest.” Those who bring the suit must possess their own right to the relief
sought. (Citations omitted)
Petitioner’s supposed “personal stake in the outcome of this case” is not the direct injury contemplated by
jurisprudence as that which would endow him with standing. Mere assertions of a “law’s normative
impact”; “impairment” of his “ability to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex
relationships”; as well as injury to his “plans to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved
country”; or influence over his “decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly country” cannot be
recognized by this as sufficient interest. Petitioner’s desire “to find and enter into long-term monogamous
same-sex relationships” and “to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country” does not
constitute legally demandable rights that require judicial enforcement. This Court will not witlessly indulge
petitioner in blaming the Family Code for his admitted inability to find a partner.
Petitioner presents no proof at all of the immediate, inextricable danger that the Family Code poses to him.
His assertions of injury cannot, without sufficient proof, be directly linked to the imputed cause, the
existence of the Family Code. His fixation on how the Family Code is the definitive cause of his inability to
find a partner is plainly non sequitur.
Similarly, anticipation of harm is not equivalent to direct injury. Petitioner fails to show how the Family
Code is the proximate cause of his alleged deprivations. His mere allegation that this injury comes from
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“the law’s normative impact” is insufficient to establish the connection between the Family Code and his
alleged injury.
3. No. Intervention requires: (1) a movant’s legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) a showing that
the intervention will not delay the proceedings; and (3) a claim by the intervenor that is incapable of being
properly decided in a separate proceeding. Here, while petitioners-intervenors have legal interest in the
issues, their claims are more adequately decided in a separate proceeding, seeking relief independently
from the Petition.
The Petition-in-Intervention suffers from confusion as to its real purpose. A discerning reading of it reveals
that the ultimate remedy to what petitioners-intervenors have averred is a directive that marriage licenses
be issued to them. Yet, it does not actually ask for this: its prayer does not seek this, and it does not identify
itself as a petition for mandamus (or an action for mandatory injunction). Rather, it couches itself as a
petition of the same nature and seeking the same relief as the original Petition. It takes pains to make itself
appear inextricable from the original Petition, at the expense of specifying what would make it viable.
4. No. Diocese of Bacolod recognized transcendental importance as an exception to the doctrine of

hierarchy of courts. In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear threats to constitutional
rights warrant a direct resort to this Court. This was clarified in Gios-Samar. There, this Court emphasized
that transcendental importance-originally cited to relax rules on legal standing and not as an exception to
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts-applies only to cases with purely legal issues. We explained that the
decisive factor in whether this Court should permit the invocation of transcendental importance is not
merely the presence of “special and important reasons[,]” but the nature of the question presented by the
parties. This Court declared that there must be no disputed facts, and the issues raised should only be
questions of law:
[W]hen a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the
resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or
invocation of compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case. Such
question must first be brought before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially
equipped to try and resolve factual questions.
5. Yes. Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations will earn state
recognition is better left to Congress in order that it may thresh out the many issues that may arise:
Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforceable according to legal
rules. Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent “legalness” of marriage, the constitutional right to
marry cannot be secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the law.
Rather, the law itself must create the “thing” to which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry
necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal framework. (Emphasis
supplied)
In truth, the question before this Court is a matter of what marriage seeks to acknowledge. Not all intimate
relationships are the same and, therefore, fit into the rights and duties afforded by our laws to marital
relationships.
For this Court to instantly sanction same-sex marriage inevitably confines a class of persons to the rather
restrictive nature of our current marriage laws. The most injurious thing we can do at this point is to
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constrain the relationships of those persons who did not even take part or join in this Petition to what our
laws may forbiddingly define as the norm. Ironically, to do so would engender the opposite of loving freely,
which petitioner himself consistently raised:
The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the other formulaic. That is,
that it is shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are dominant in government regard as romantic. In
truth, each commitment is unique, borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone
through, and defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different for each couple. It is
that which we should understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free as possible,
bound not by social expectations but by the care and love each person can bring.
Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can delay other more inclusive and egalitarian
arrangements that the State can acknowledge. Many identities comprise the LGBTQI+ community.
Prematurely adjudicating issues in a judicial forum despite a bare absence of facts is presumptuous. It may
unwittingly diminish the LGBTQI+ community’s capacity to create a strong movement that ensures lasting
recognition, as well as public understanding, of SOGIESC.
The evolution of the social concept of family reveals that heteronormativity in marriage is not a static
anthropological fact. The perceived complementarity of the sexes is problematized by the changing roles
undertaken by men and women, especially under the present economic conditions.
To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the complementarity of the sexes
is to perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into
that mold.
It renders invisible the lived realities of families headed by single parents, families formed by sterile
couples, families formed by couples who preferred not to have children, among many other family
organizations. Furthermore, it reinforces certain gender stereotypes within the family.
Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,

G.R. No. 178221, 1 December 2010, 636 SCRA 420, 429-430
FACTS:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate
Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration to commence the judicial settlement of the latter's estate. The petitioners and their siblings
filed a Manifestation before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the
children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)--who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel)
with one John Desantis.
Petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother--Isabel--was, at the time of Rodolfo's death,
the legal spouse of the latter. For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
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Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to
intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.
To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following
documents:
a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;
b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia; and
c.) Their respective proof of births.
The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its Special
Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground that the petitioners
and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence
presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage
with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo.
As it turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John
Desantis.
The document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as "married."
The respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry, constitute prima
facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
According to the respondent, Isabel's previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was dissolved,
made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing the
petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.
RULING:
Petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse
of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has
interest in Rodolfo's estate.
The existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
Birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries:
(a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and
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(b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child. In clear and categorical language, Sylvia's birth certificate speaks of
a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly
appreciated, and supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis.
Peregrina Macua Vda. De Avenido vs. Tecla Hoybia Avenido,

G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
FACTS:
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same
man, now deceased.
Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful wife
of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in
rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the marriage certificate was recorded with the
local civil registrar, the records of the LCR were destroyed during World War II. Tecla and Eustaquio begot
four children, but Eustaquio left his family in 1954.
In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla
presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and certificates to the fact
that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.
Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22
September 1989, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed the marriage
contract between her and Eustaquio.
RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.
The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four children. Such
presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the
RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. The CA found that its
appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?
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RULING:
TECLA
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no other proof can be
accepted.
The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have
previously narrated the execution thereof.
In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party to
the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating priest. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law.
Republic v. Albios,
G.R. No. 198780, [October 16, 2013], 719 PHIL 622-638
FACTS:
Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later on filed a petition to
nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying
with any of their essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum
of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00
because he never processed her petition for citizenship. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
The RTC ruled in her favor.
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In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went
on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to
the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the
respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered
into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended
to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.
RULING:
No, respondent’s marriage is not void.
The court said:
“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and
valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.”
The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.”
“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”
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Republic v. Cagandahan,
G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008Case Digest
TOPIC: Change of Name, Change of Sex, Changes in Birth Certificate, Intersex
FACTS:
Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC. She alleged that she
was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) – a condition where persons afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating
that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent’s
uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He
further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender
because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition.
Hence, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned
ruling. The OSG contends, among others, that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth
certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the petition on the ground of her medical condition.
RULING:
No.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look
to the statutes. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated
under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
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Respondent undisputedly has CAH. It is one of the many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. An
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex
as variations, which should not be subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the
birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific
development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subject’s birth
certificate entry is in order.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male.
Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his
body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken
its due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so
innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit
of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to
take along the path of his sexual development and maturation; In the absence of evidence that respondent
is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm
other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid
and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
We respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s
change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
The Republic’s petition is denied.
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Perfecto v. Esidera,
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 (Resolution), [July 22, 2015], 764 PHIL 384-407
FACTS:
Petitioner Eladio Perfecto filed an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Alma Consuelo
Desales- Esidera for falsification of public document and dishonesty.
Petitioner Perfecto alleged that respondent Judge Esidera falsified her daughter’s birth certificate to make
it appear that she and Renato Verano Esidera were married on March 18, 1990 when in fact they were
married on June 3, 1992, hence, in order to show that their daughter was a legitimate child of Renato
Verano Esidera. It was also alleged that her first marriage with Richard Tang Tepace was contracted on May
7, 1987 and was later declared void on January 27, 1992.
Perfecto prays for respondent Judge Esidera’s dismissal from office for her alleged dishonesty. However,
respondent Judge Esidera argued that everything she did was legal and in accordance with her religious
beliefs. She was indeed, married to her second husband (Renato Verano Esidera) on March 18, 1990, but
only under recognized Catholic rites. The priest who officiated their marriage had no authority to solemnize
marriages under the civil law. She said that couples who are civilly married are considered living in state of
sin, and may be ex-communicated. They cannot receive the sacraments.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent Judge Esidera was guilty of immoral conduct based on, among others, her
alleged affair and falsification of her daughter’s birth certificate.
RULING:
No. The Court finds respondent Judge Esidera’s omission to correct her child’s birth certificate is not
sufficient to render her administratively liable under the circumstances. The error in the birth certificate
cannot be attributed to her. She did not participate in filling in the required details in the document. The
birth certificate shows that it was her husband who signed it as informant.
Respondent Judge Esidera is also not guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court cannot conclude that respondent Judge’s acts of contracting a
second marriage during the subsistence of her alleged first marriage and having an alleged “illicit” affair are
“immoral” based on her
Catholic faith. The Court is not a judge of religious morality.

The Court may not sit as judge of what is immoral conduct according to a particular religion. The Court has
no jurisdiction over and is not the proper authority to determine which conduct contradicts religious
doctrine. They have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it involves conduct that affects the
public or its interest.
For purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, “immoral conduct” should
related to their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of “immorality” under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public’s confidence in the Rule of
Law. Religious morality is not binding whenever this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and
persons under this court’s supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on the Court.
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Hence, the Court cannot properly conclude that respondent judge’s acts of contracting a second marriage
during the subsistence of her alleged first marriage and having an alleged “illicit” affair are “immoral” based
on her catholic faith.
The Court is not a judge of religious morality.
Cosca v. Palaypayon, Jr.,

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721, [September 30, 1994], 307 PHIL 261-287)
FACTS:
Complainants Juvy n. Cosca, Edmund B. Eralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I,
Interpreter I, Cler II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding
Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4)
non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6)
requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.
Complainants alleged that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage
licenses. Thus, the following couples were able o get married by the simple expedient of paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. In addition, respondent
judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being
that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. The marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of
July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents
likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial
Registrar will show that there were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial
fee of only P 18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P 20.00 therefore and failed to
account for the difference.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent are guilty of violating the provision of Article 4 of the Family Code.
RULING:
On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code patiently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily,
it declares that the absence of any of the essential requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab
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initio and that, while and irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage,
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what
the court provides for pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that priests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall
be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.This is of course, within the province of
the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
Cario v. Cario
G.R. No.132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133
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Mercedita Mata Araes vs. Judge Salvador Occiano

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390.April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Lawviaa
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her
marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.They lived together as husband and wife on the
strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity,
petitioner’s right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived
of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy. In his Comment dated 5
July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000
to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents
to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty
walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from
his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua,
to which request he acceded. Respondent judge further avers that he refused to solemnize the marriage
due to missing required marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Later on, petitioner filed
her Affidavit of Desistance with the Office of the Court Administrator. She confessed that after reading the
Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her
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conscience. Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage
license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:
Office of the Court Administrator’s decision AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,Camarines Sur, is found guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. He is fined P5,
000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
Sy v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127263, [April 12, 2000], 386 PHIL 760-771)
Nullada v. Civil Registrar of Manila,

G.R. No. 224548, [January 23, 2019]
FACTS:
In 1997, Marlyn and Akira (a Japanese national) got married in Japan. The document was registered with
both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National Statistics Office, Civil Registry
Division.
The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their relationship, however,
eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira
and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce Certificate that was issued by the Embassy of
Japan in the Philippines.
Marlyn and Akira’s acceptance of the notification of divorce by agreement was supported by an Acceptance
Certificatethat was issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku in Japan.
Hence, Marlyn sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines by filing a Petitionfor
registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and cancellation of entry of marriage that was
filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code.
Akira did not file an Answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons by publication. The Republic also did
not offer any evidence to rebut the case of Marlyn.
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The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. According to the RTC, the fact that Marlyn also agreed
to the divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the application of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, which would have otherwise allowed a Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien spouse
had validly obtained a divorce. While the intent of the law is to equalize Filipinos with their foreigner
spouses who are free to marry again after the divorce, the Filipino spouse cannot invoke the intention of
equity behind the law when he or she is an initiator or active participant in procuring the divorce.
Dissatisfied, Marlyn moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. This prompted
Marlyn to file the present petition for review on certiorari directly to the Supreme Court (this Court).
ISSUES:
A. Whether Marlyn’s direct recourse to the Supreme Court from the decision of RTC is proper.
B. Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code has a restrictive application so as to apply
only in cases where it is the alien spouse who sought the divorce, and not where the divorce was mutually
agreed upon by the spouses.
C. Whether there is a need to prove the foreign divorce decree despite the lack of opposition from the
OSG.
RULING:
A.
The direct recourse is proper. This Court explains that it allows the direct recourse from the decision of the
RTC on the ground that the petition raises a pure question of law on the proper application of Article 26 of
the Family Code. “Direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken
where only questions of law are raised or involved” [Rep. of the Phils. v. Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378, 384 (2014)].
In this case, the RTC’s resolve to dismiss the petition filed before it delved solely on its application of the
statutory provision to the facts undisputed before it.
B.
The legal provision that is pertinent to the case is Article 26 of the Family Code, which states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), [36, 37] and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
The facts in Rep. of the Phils. v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo [G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018], are similar to the
circumstances in this case. It was held that Article 26 of the Family Code should apply even if it was Manalo
(a Filipino) who filed for divorce. The decree made the Japanese spouse no longer married to Manalo; he
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then had the capacity to remarry. It would be unjust to still deem Manalo married to the Japanese who, in
turn, was no longer married to her. The fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce was inconsequential.
Applying the same legal considerations and considering the similar factual milieu that attended in Manalo,
the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC’s decision that refused to recognize the divorce decree that
was mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner spouse in Japan solely on the ground that the divorce
was jointly initiated by the spouses.
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse
and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short
in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right
to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the
marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses
change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien capacitating him or
her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce
validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. “The legislature is
presumed to know that meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its
intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.”
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse
is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign
divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should
not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreing divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter’s national law.
C. While Marlyn and Akira’s divorce decree was not disputed by the OSG, a recognition of the divorce,
however, could not extend as a matter of course. Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the submission
of the decree should come with adequate proof of the foreign law that allows it. The Japanese law on
divorce must then be sufficiently proved. “Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven x x x like any other fact” [Ando v. Department of Foreign Affairs, 742 Phil. 37, 48
(2014)].
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In ATCI Overseas Corp., et al. v. Echin, 647 Phil. 43 (2010), the Court reiterated the following rules on proof
of foreign laws:
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which read:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by his seal of office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy of excerpts of
The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped “LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy of
Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City 1300”.This clearly does not constitute sufficient compliance with
the rules on proof of Japan’s law on divorce. In any case, similar to the remedy that was allowed by the
Court in Manalo to resolve such failure, a remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings and
reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the Court.
33 | P a g e

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Assignment 20210910

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW CASES

II. Persons (Article 40-47 NCC)

III. Citizenship and Domicile (Article 48-51)

IV. Funerals (Articles 305-310 NCC)

VI. Use of Surnames (Article 364 – 380 NCC)

2. Concept of Marriage - Declaration of State Policy

3.b Formal Requisites

Local Government Code Chapter 3 Article 1

4. Role of Civil Registry (Article 11-25)

Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,

Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,

2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:

In re: Reyes v. Alejandro,

When to declare for absence:

ANGELITA VALDEZ vs. Republic (G.R. No. 180863, Sept 8, 2009)

The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:

Civil Service Commission v. Rasuman,

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio Vs. Republic Of The Philippines,

Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General,

4. No. Diocese of Bacolod recognized transcendental importance as an exception to the doctrine of

Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,

Peregrina Macua Vda. De Avenido vs. Tecla Hoybia Avenido,

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

The court said:

The RTC granted respondent’s petition.

We respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male.

The Republic’s petition is denied.

Catholic faith. The Court is not a judge of religious morality.

The Court is not a judge of religious morality.

Cosca v. Palaypayon, Jr.,

Mercedita Mata Araes vs. Judge Salvador Occiano

Nullada v. Civil Registrar of Manila,

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