159

Lessons on building design from the

22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake*

HM Goldsworthy†
Department of Infrastructure Engineering, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria

ABSTRACT: This paper summarises some key observations made after the 22 February 2011
(Christchurch) earthquake from a reconnaissance mission conducted by the author on behalf of the
Australian Earthquake Engineering Society (AEES), and from other investigators. It is an updated
version of a keynote paper given at the AEES annual conference in November 2011. It highlights
the damage observed in reinforced concrete buildings and the effects of liquefaction. The author
reflects on the adequacy of Australia’s existing seismic design philosophy after reporting on the
effect of a level 6.3 magnitude shallow earthquake at close range to the CBD of Christchurch.

KEYWORDS: Reconnaissance; Christchurch; earthquake; reinforced concrete; liquefaction;

design philosophy; structural engineering; lessons for building design.

REFERENCE: Goldsworthy, H, M. 2012, “Lessons on building design from the 22 February

2011 Christchurch earthquake”, Australian Journal of Structural Engineering, Vol. 13, No. 2,
pp. 159-174, http://dx.doi.org/10.7158/S11-136.2012.13.2.

1 INTRODUCTION The reconnaissance trip commenced on 9 March, two

This paper gives a summary of a reconnaissance
mission conducted by the author on behalf of the
Australian Earthquake Engineering Society (AEES)
after the 22 February 2011 (Christchurch) earthquake.
It highlights the damage observed in reinforced
concrete (RC) buildings, the effects of liquefaction
and also of the large vertical accelerations generated
by this near-field event. Some observations made by
others are included to give a more complete picture
than could be obtained by one person in the space
of four days. Lessons from the observed generally
poor behaviour of unreinforced masonry (URM)
buildings have not been addressed in detail here.
They have been well covered already in Ingham et
al (2011) and in a report to the New Zealand Royal
Commission investigating building failure caused
by the Canterbury earthquake sequence (Ingham &
Griffith, 2011).
* Reviewed and revised version of a paper originally presented
at the 2011 Australian Earthquake Engineering Society Annual
Conference, 18-20 November 2011, South Australia.
† Corresponding author A/Prof Helen Goldsworthy can be
contacted at helenmg@unimelb.edu.au.
weeks and one day, after the Christchurch earthquake.
A preliminary report (Goldsworthy & Hao, 2011) and
a more detailed report (Chouw et al, 2011) on the
key observations made over the four-day trip can
be found on the AEES website. On the first two days
the author, Prof Hong Hao from the University of
Western Australia and A/Prof Nawawi Chouw from
the University of Auckland observed first-hand the
dramatic effects of liquefaction, ground vibrations
and landslides on buildings, roads and bridges in the
area surrounding the city centre, and also close to the
fault rupture at the port city of Lyttelton. Researchers
from the Department of Civil and Natural Resources
Engineering at the University of Canterbury, Greg
Cole, a PhD student, and A/Prof Rajesh Dhakal,
accompanied the group and provided local guidance
and advice. The last two days were spent conducting
Level 2 building assessments in the cordoned-off city
centre on a voluntary basis for the Christchurch City
Council. In Level 1 rapid damage assessments, a
quick overview of the building’s structural integrity
had been made by a team which included a qualified
structural engineer. The assessment was based
on the observed outer damage and the building
was assigned a coloured placard to represent the

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 160 “Lessons on building design from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake” – Goldsworthy
engineer’s conclusion. A green placard means there
is no apparent damage, a yellow placard represents
safety concerns with limited access permitted, and a
red placard indicates that the structure is unsafe to
enter. Level 2 assessments were performed later by a
different team, also including a qualified structural
engineer, and involved entering the building and
performing more detailed structural evaluations. In
some cases this resulted in a change to the colour of
the placard determined in a Level 1 assessment.
The observed damage to buildings was sometimes
associated with inappropriate design and construction
practices such as structural irregularity in the
horizontal and/or vertical directions, lack of continuity,
poor anchorage and connectivity of structural
components, and lack of separation between adjacent
structures. URM buildings performed poorly, unless
they had been comprehensively strengthened. Older
RC buildings (pre-1980s design) were known to be
vulnerable even though they had behaved reasonably
well in the September 2010 Darfield earthquake.
Pampanin et al (2011) referred to the on-off nature of the
structural response of these structures, ie. reasonable
behaviour until their ductility is exceeded and then
dramatic and sometimes totally catastrophic failure.
More recent (from the 1980s onwards) medium-rise
and tall buildings had been designed in accordance
with capacity design principles. Given that the ground
motions due to the Christchurch earthquake generated
much higher levels of acceleration and displacement
response throughout the frequency range relevant
to built structures than the design level earthquake
(typically designed for a 500-year return period), it is
not surprising that some of these buildings suffered
extensive damage in the more recent event. The
damage was usually in the regions of the building
that had been deliberately designed to be weak and
to act as “structural fuses” in a large event, dissipating
energy in a controlled cyclic manner.
One interesting phenomenon observed in
Christchurch that has not commonly been reported
after previous earthquakes in other countries is
that of damage caused by a strong vertical pulse.
Another defining feature of this event was that the
Christchurch central business district (CBD) and
suburbs (particularly the eastern suburbs along
the Avon river, and also the southern suburbs) are
highly vulnerable to liquefaction and this earthquake
resulted in the effects of liquefaction being spread
extensively through these areas.
There are salutary lessons for Australian engineers to
be gained from our observation of the effect of a level
6.3 magnitude shallow earthquake at close range to
the CBD of a city. Given that most of the Australian
capital cities have known faults in their vicinity
that are capable of generating damaging shallow
earthquakes, it forces us to reflect on the adequacy
of our existing design philosophy.
Australian Journal of Structural Engineering
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2 SEISMOLOGY IN THE
CANTERBURY REGION
Even though the city of Christchurch is at a
considerable distance from the plate boundary
between the Pacific Plate and the Indo-Australian
Plate, it is in a seismological region that is influenced
by the complex movements along this plate boundary.
The secondary faults near to Christchurch result from
the bend in the plate boundary to the north of the city.
A deep bed of river gravels covering the Canterbury
Plains has hidden the evidence of previously active
faults in this region and, even though seismologists
were aware that such faults existed, both the Darfield
and Christchurch earthquakes were generated by
faults that had not previously been mapped and
identified. The Canterbury earthquake sequence has
more similarities with the continental earthquakes
experienced in Australia, rather than the large,
often deep, plate boundary earthquakes previously
experienced in New Zealand, in that the Canterbury
earthquakes are caused by high compressive stress,
have occurred at very shallow depths within the
Pacific plate, and have produced many aftershocks
lasting for a prolonged period. The 6.3 Magnitude
Christchurch earthquake generated highly damaging
ground motions because it occurred at a shallow depth
of only 5 km and the rupture zone of approximately
10 × 10 km was oriented such that it passed directly
under the CBD. The location of the earthquake
epicentre relative to the Christchurch CBD is given
in figure 1 (NZSEE, 2011b). In this type of event it is
expected that ground shaking will be severe within a
distance of about 10 to 20 km of the epicentre.
Strong ground motions from the Christchurch event
were recorded at four sites throughout the city and
at other locations in the vicinity of Christchurch. The
recordings from the Christchurch Cathedral College
site are given in figure 2 (NZSEE, 2011b). It should also
be noted that recorded vertical accelerations (shown in
the bottom record in figure 2) were sometimes higher
than the largest recorded horizontal accelerations at a
measuring station, probably due to the close proximity
10km
Figure 1: Location of epicentre relative to the
Christchurch CBD (NZSEE, 2011b).
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 “Lessons on building design from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake” – Goldsworthy
of the upthrust from the fault. For more information
on the seismology of the region refer to GNS (2011),
Bradley (2012) and to the papers published in the
special edition of the Seismological Letters journal in
November/December 2011 (Kalkan, 2011).
3 SUMMARY OF STRUCTURAL
OBSERVATIONS
Although the strong ground motion only lasted
about 10 seconds, the intensity of the vibrations was
such that many structures were severely damaged.
An overview of the impact of the earthquake on the
built environment is given in figure 3 (Department
of Housing and Building, 2012). Failures of URM
commercial buildings were common. Many iconic
heritage structures were severely damaged including
the much loved Christchurch cathedral. A significant
number of RC buildings suffered moderate or severe
Figure 2: Recorded time histories from the
Christchurch Cathedral College site
(NZSEE, 2011b).
Figure 3: Overview of the impact of the earthquake on the built environment
(Department of Building and Housing, 2012).
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161
damage. From the 1980s onwards many RC buildings
were designed using capacity design principles, a
design approach that leads to controlled structural
yielding (in a ductile manner) during a major
earthquake (and hence damage). The catastrophic
collapse of two non-ductile RC buildings, the
Canterbury Television (CTV) building and the Pyne
Gould building, had a high consequence in terms of
fatalities. In contrast, some low-rise RC buildings in
the Christchurch CBD suffered very little damage.
Timber and steel buildings typically performed
well, as did some reinforced masonry ones, although
not those of the older type. The presence of heavy
masonry elements that were poorly attached to the
structure, or of plan irregularities that induced a
strong torsional response, resulted in considerable
damage in some low-rise buildings, typically those
with timber or RC frames. RC rather than steel was
the dominant building material for commercial
buildings during the 1980s property boom in
Christchurch. Hence most of the steel buildings
that are in existence, including concentrically and
eccentrically braced frames and moment-resisting
frames, have typically been designed to modern
codes. An excellent summary of the effect of the
earthquake on steel structures in Christchurch is
given in Bruneau et al (2011).
In general, there was a significant correlation between
the age of the structure and the extent of damage. No
loss of life occurred in any building constructed after
1991. One reason given for this correlation is that
“whenever the seismic loadings requirement has been
increased, it has not been a retrospective requirement
in New Zealand to strengthen existing buildings”
(IPENZ, 2011). The most recent Building Act in New
Zealand, which came into effect in 2004, required
territorial authorities to develop an earthquake-prone
buildings register, compulsorily including buildings
for which the assessed strength was less than 34% of
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the Building Code’s requirements for a new building
(IPENZ, 2011). Each territorial authority was allowed
to set the time scale within which the building owners
had to act to reach this minimum level. At the time
that this Act came into being, the New Zealand
Society for Earthquake Engineering indicated that
this was not stringent enough; they (supported by
IPENZ) strongly recommended that the minimum
requirement for any strengthening undertaken be set
at double this requirement, ie. 67% rather than 34%.
Liquefaction and lateral spreading were the
predominant geotechnical characteristics of the
earthquake; the Christchurch earthquake not only re-
liquefied areas that had been affected in the Darfield
earthquake, but also caused a more widespread
liquefaction. Lateral spreading that occurred close to
the local rivers caused damage to some of the bridges.
4 RESPONSE SPECTRA
The 5% damped elastic spectral acceleration and
displacement response spectra (Kam et al, 2011) for
four different sites in the CBD are shown in figures
4 and 5, respectively. Also shown is the ultimate
limit state (ULS) earthquake design response spectra
for soft soil (Class D) and for buildings of normal
importance (representing the 500-year return period)
from the current New Zealand earthquake loading
AS1170.4 (Standards Australia, 2007); this is based on
an assumed peak ground acceleration (PGA) of 0.22g
for Christchurch. The comparable design response
spectra from the 1976 NZ loading code is shown to
be much less demanding. The current loading code’s
2500-year return period event is also represented; it
is derived simply by multiplying the 500-year return
period spectra by 1.8. Figures 4 and 5 are derived
from the ground motions in the principal directions
at the four different sites. These directions are shown
in the inserts within the figures. (The response spectra
for the secondary horizontal direction can be found
in Kam et al (2011)). The east-west direction is the
Figure 4: 5% damped elastic spectral
acceleration response spectra for four
sites in the CBD (Kam et al, 2011).
Australian Journal of Structural Engineering
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predominant one, although the north-south direction
is still significant (usually only 15% to 30% lower)
and it even exceeds the east-west spectra in the 0.35
to 0.60 period range. In the east-west direction the
acceleration spectra matched or exceeded the typical
NZ 2500-year return period earthquake in the 0.5 to
1.75 second period range.
Throughout the period range relevant to building
structures, shaking in the CBD exceeded the 500-year
typical ULS design response spectra. Hence, an
increase in the required retrofitting strength from
34% to 67% of the Building Code’s requirement for
a new building may still have been insufficient if it
relied on strength alone. The Structural Engineering
Society of New Zealand (SeSoc) stated:
Buildings strengthened to the minimum standard
(new systems, up to 33%) achieved life safety
performance, but will still be demolished in many
cases. Buildings strengthened to a higher standard
(new systems, 67% or more) performed better –
many survived with moderate to low damage. From
this, we would conclude that 33% of code is still
too low in most cases. (SeSoc, 2011).
There was, in general, considerable spatial variation
in the spectral values. For example, the spectra
obtained using records from the four recording
station within the CBD itself can be seen to be quite
different in figures 4 and 5. According to Smyrou et
al (2011), the highest spectral values for short period
motion tended to be close to the epicentre of the
earthquake whereas those for higher period motion
were close to the CBD. They think that this can be
partly attributed to potential source effects, but may
also be due to soil softening, in particular due to
soil liquefaction. They stated that “response spectra
obtained in liquefied areas are often characterised
by bulges in the long-period range”. Bulges of this
type were observed in spectra from both the Darfield
and Christchurch earthquakes; the bulge in the
acceleration spectra occurred at 2.5 to 3 seconds for
Figure 5: 5% damped elastic spectral
displacement response spectra for four
sites in the CBD (Kam et al, 2011).
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 “Lessons on building design from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake” – Goldsworthy
the Darfield earthquake and at approximately 1 to
1.5 seconds and at 3 seconds for the Christchurch
earthquake. Other researchers (Galloway et al, 2011)
have simply referred to the “significant amplification
of long period response due to the depth of
underlying gravels” and have questioned whether
“the response of the Canterbury Plains gravels is well
modelled by the current spectral shape for Class D
(deep) soils specified in NZ1170.5:2004”.
5 NON-DUCTILE REINFORCED
CONCRETE BUILDINGS
The pre-1970s RC buildings in the CBD are typically
non-ductile. The response spectra indicate that
mid-rise to tall structures in the CBD are in a period
range that made them particularly susceptible in this
earthquake. Smyrou et al (2011) described a “typical
mid-rise RC concrete building” in the city as one
that has been built with RC walls around stairs and
lift shafts. They say that studies on such structures,
where RC walls have not been built with the primary
concern of earthquake resistance, indicate that
the following simple formula gives a reasonable
approximation to the yield period of these structures:
Ty = 0.075H
where H is the total height (m).
A similar formula was given by Priestley et al (2007)
for both walls and frames, using 0.1 instead of 0.075.
Code estimates of the period are usually lower, and
this is justified on the basis that it allows for the
contribution to the stiffness made by “secondary
elements” such as gravity frames, or precast
facades or masonry infill. It is usually considered
conservative to use a lower period when determining
the design acceleration from the response spectra.
However, as can be seen in figure 4, in the case of the
Christchurch earthquake, structures in the CBD could
have been subjected to even higher accelerations if
they softened when “secondary elements” failed.
Using equation (1) for a 5-storey building with
3  m floor-to-floor heights, Ty = 1.1 seconds. It can
be seen in figures 4 and 5 that this is in a range
of high spectral values for both accelerations and
displacements. At the Resthaven rest home site
shown in the location insert on figures 4 and 5, if
the corresponding substitute structure behaved
elastically it would have been subjected to a
450 mm displacement at the centre of mass (and an
acceleration of 1.5g), hence approximately 675 mm at
the top of the building. If evenly divided between the
five levels this would cause a 4.5% drift. This simple
calculation indicates that the building would have
yielded (yield usually occurs at less than 1% drift
for a building of this type (Bull, 2005)). It should be
noted that yielding would have led to a higher level
of effective damping than 5% and the displacement
and acceleration of the substitute structure would
Australian Journal of Structural Engineering
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163
have been less than estimated above. Nevertheless
these simple calculations are indicative of the extreme
deformations and forces such buildings would have
been subjected to.
In the case of the 5-storey Pyne-Gould building
(built in 1963 to 1964), the sequence in which the
failure occurred has been reported in a preliminary
report from the Royal Commission and is shown in
figure 6 (Beca, 2011). In that case, the longitudinal
reinforcement in the western core wall fractured
in tension (figure 6(c)) followed by a catastrophic
compressive failure of the eastern wall (figure 6(d)).
The columns, and/or joints between the columns and
the beams, in the non-ductile perimeter frames (with
no ties in the joints) then failed due to excessive lateral
drifts (figure 6(e)). The slab-to-wall connections were
unable to withstand the rotations, shears and tensions
resulting from the forced displacement of the shear
core, leading to a sequential collapse of the floors
(figure 6(f)). Photos of the collapsed Pyne Gould
building are included in figures 7 and 8 (Kam, 2011b).
6 MODERN CONCRETE BUILDINGS
As discussed previously many of the modern concrete
(1) buildings sustained some damage, something that
was not unexpected given the prevailing design
philosophy, that of “capacity design”. Many
observations have been recorded and discussed in
various reports by New Zealand engineers, including
SeSoc (2011), Buchanan et al (2011), Department of
Building and Housing (2012), Kam & Pampanin
(2011), Henry & Ingham (2011) and Baird et al (2012).
Some important conclusions are listed here:
• Although capacity designed buildings usually
behaved as expected by structural engineers,
there is a disconnect between societal expectations
and the actual extent of damage and disruption.
Concerns are also expressed about low cycle
fatigue and the current ability of engineers to assess
the reliability of buildings that have experienced
several cycles of plastic deformation in the
plastic hinge regions. More research is needed
(SeSoc, 2011) in this area. Something that has
compounded this problem is the field observation
that yielding in the plastic hinge regions was often
concentrated in one or two wide cracks rather than
being distributed within several narrow cracks as
observed in laboratory tests. In some elements this
was observed to lead to fracture of the longitudinal
bars as shown in figure 9 (Buchanan et al, 2011).
This is probably due to concrete strengths being
much higher than the design characteristic values,
or possibly to the Ru to Re ratio (the strain hardening
ratio) of the reinforcement being unacceptably low.
The estimation of the extent to which the cyclic
plastic capacity of the bars has been exhausted is
critical in determining whether low-cycle fatigue
could be an issue in future earthquakes.
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Figure 6: The failure sequence of the Pyne-Gould building (Beca, 2011).

Figure 7: Pyne Gould collapse from the southern side (Kam, 2011b).

(a) (b)

Figure 8: (a) Detail of joint failure in the Pyne Gould perimeter frame, and
(b) collapsed Pyne Gould building from the northern side (Kam, 2011b).

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 “Lessons on building design from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake” – Goldsworthy
(a)
Figure 9: (a) Small cracks in base of a tall wall, and (b) damaged end of wall after breaking out some
concrete. The vertical bars have yielded then fractured (Buchanan et al, 2011).
• Compressive failures in walls were often excessive
with loss of concrete and buckling of reinforcing
bars in the plastic hinge zones as shown in figure
10 (Buchanan et al, 2011). These observations
indicate that additional sources of loading need
to be considered and the confining steel may
need to be spread out over the length of the wall
rather than just concentrated at the end zones.
Importantly, according to SeSoc (2011), “it is
debatable whether the current practice of ignoring
out-of-plane movement of concrete walls may
be unconservative. There may be cases where
the combination of in-plane and out-of-plane
movements has caused failure of walls, including
possibly the Grand Chancellor shear wall.” (See
further discussion below).
• Vertical accelerations were thought to be a
factor in the failure of the shear wall in the
Hotel Grand Chancellor building (see further
discussion below). SeSoc (2011) cautioned
against overemphasising this factor since the
high vertical accelerations were typically very
short period transient effects. Nevertheless they
are also concerned about transfer structures
where an increased vertical load may result in a
disproportionate impact.
• Floor elongations due to the formation of plastic
hinges in moment-resisting frames has been
observed to lead to substantial tearing of floors,
sometimes across the full width of the diaphragm,
often fracturing the brittle mesh within the slabs. This
can potentially result in the loss of a force transfer
from the floor to the lateral force resisting system.
Precast slab systems are especially vulnerable since
they often have pre-existing floor cracks due to
shrinkage and creep; also the frame elongation can
reduce the length of seating available for the precast
elements (Fortunately, in this earthquake, no precast
floor slabs actually collapsed due to loss of seating
(Buchanan et al, 2011).)
• Given that stairs are sometimes the only means
of emergency egress, stair failures have been
Australian Journal of Structural Engineering
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165
(b)
Figure 10: Compressive failures in walls. Loss of
concrete and buckling of reinforcing
bars in the plastic hinge zones
(Buchanan et al, 2011).
subject to close scrutiny. In the conclusions of
the Expert Panel Report (Department of Building
and Housing, 2012) relating to the collapse of
the stairs in the Forsyth Barr building, the Panel
states “the seismic gap specified on the drawings
met the design standards prevailing at the time
the building was designed”. It goes on to say
that “The specified gap would not have been
sufficient to avoid compression if the current
(2010) code-derived displacements had been
applied”. The gaps are very necessary and yet it
was also concluded that “it is possible that the
seismic gaps at the lower supports had been filled
with material that restricted movement (including
debris, mortar or polystyrene) which reduced
their effectiveness”.
The results of the investigation into the collapse of a
shear wall in the Hotel Grand Chancellor Building by
the Royal Commission’s Expert Panel (Department
of Building and Housing, 2012) exemplify some of
the points made above. This 22-storey hotel was built
between 1985 and 1988. The collapsed 4.5 m long RC
shear wall is shown in figure 11 (Kam, 2011a). Its
findings are summarised as follows:
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Figure 12: Effect of lateral spreading on the

roadway (photo taken by author).
Figure 11: Collapsed shear wall in Hotel Grand
Chancellor (Kam, 2011a).

Extremely high compression loads combined with

low levels of confinement reinforcing led to the
wall failure. The lapping of vertical reinforcing
and the slenderness of the wall also appear to
have contributed to the onset of failure. Under the
action of high compression loads, a small transverse
displacement was enough to initiate failure in the
unconfined concrete. The high axial loads arose
from the building geometry and induced actions
resulting from the severe horizontal accelerations.
It is highly likely that vertical accelerations
Figure 13: Flotation of pipe below causes
contributed to the high compression loads.
the manhole to rise (photo taken
by author).
7 THE EFFECTS OF LIQUEFACTION

As mentioned previously, Christchurch is situated

on deep alluvial deposits and sites are generally
classified as level D (deep or soft soil) for structural
purposes in the New Zealand Design Standards NZS
1170.5:2004 (Standards Association of New Zealand,
2004). According to Tonkin and Taylor (2011) there
is a geological formation that underlies many areas
in Christchurch called the Springston Formation
and alluvial deposits within that formation include
deposits of silt and sand that are highly susceptible to
liquefaction. Although the Christchurch earthquake
was of short duration, the ground accelerations were
sufficiently high to cause much of the saturated
loose sands and silts below the water table to liquefy
leading to some spectacular effects including major
ground settlement, lateral spreading and foundation
support failure. The effects on bridges and buildings
have been documented by several researchers
(Chouw et al, 2011; Smyrou et al, 2011). Some photos
taken by the author are included to highlight some
of the major problems: lateral spreading (figure
12), flotation of pipes (figure 13), rotation of bridge
abutments around the bridge deck leading to
localised crushing of the bridge deck and buckling of
the roadway (figure 14), and subsidence of fill behind Figure 14: Rotation of bridge abutments and
the bridge abutments (figure 15). Figure 16 is a photo buckling of roadway (photos taken
(Kam, 2011a) which illustrates the tilting effect of by author).

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 “Lessons on building design from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake” – Goldsworthy
Figure 15: Subsidence of fill behind the
abutment (photo taken by author).
Figure 16: Tilting of building caused by
liquefaction (Kam, 2011a).
liquefaction on a 5-storey concrete frame building on
shallow foundations close to the Avon River. In this
figure the river is behind the building and the entire
building has tilted down towards the river.
8 EFFECTS OF VERTICAL ACCELERATIONS
Pounding due to high vertical accelerations was an
issue in bridges. This caused crushing of the cover
concrete in bridge piers in one case. In another, the
edge of a long wall support was knocked off at the
top due to intense localised vertical forces from the
bridge bearings (as the wall pounded on the bridge
deck from below). This is shown in figure 17.
Australian Journal of Structural Engineering
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167
Figure 17: Crushing of the cover concrete in a
bridge pier (photos taken by author).
The effects of vertical accelerations on buildings have
been discussed above.
9 LESSONS FROM THE
CHRISTCHURCH EARTHQUAKE
9.1 Proposed changes to NZ
Building Code philosophy
Although there was considerable damage in the
Darfield earthquake of September 2010, there were
no fatalities. The Christchurch earthquake had a
much greater impact on the psyche of the people.
Just when they had thought the worst was over, they
were subjected to a significantly more damaging
event, and one with 181 fatalities. It was the horror
of people losing their lives that shocked the general
populace more than anything else.
Christchurch is in a zone of moderate seismicity.
The codified design level (500-year return period)
PGA for Christchurch is half that of Wellington
and 1.5 times that of Auckland. Nevertheless, as
mentioned previously, the ground motions recorded
in the Christchurch earthquake were very high in
the Christchurch CBD, causing response spectral
accelerations and displacements in excess of those
codified for a 2500-year return period earthquake
over a significant portion of the building-relevant
frequency range. SeSoc (2011) has commented that:
in many cases the effect of deep alluvial soils
appears to have been underestimated. Although
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the sub-soils clearly complied with the description
of Class D in AS/NZS 1170.5, there has been
significant amplification of the high period response
in some cases. It is not known if this is unique to
Christchurch, but [it] needs further research.
Capacity design principles and detailing
methodologies, as applied to RC in particular,
were developed at the University of Canterbury
by Robert Park, Tom Paulay and their successors,
Nigel Priestley, John Mander and others. It is
largely because of those developments and the
implementation of them by practicing structural
engineers in New Zealand, that the number of
fatalities in the Christchurch earthquake was not
greater. The plastic deformations of hinge regions in
many of the medium-rise to high-rise RC buildings
enabled the buildings to deform without collapse
in this extreme event. It appears, however, that the
general public has been underwhelmed by the end
result: the extent of the damage, the cordoning off
of the CBD, the societal and economic effects of the
disruption to services and business activities, and
most importantly, the deaths of 181 people, were
worse outcomes than the general populace had
anticipated.
The poor performance of some of the older buildings
was expected and recommendations have been made
to increase the required strengthening from 33% to
67% of the code requirement for new structures. Some
Figure 18: The proposed performance objective matrix (Buchanan et al, 2011).
Figure 19: The current performance objective matrix (Buchanan et al, 2011).
Australian Journal of Structural Engineering
S11-136 Goldsworthy.indd 168
engineers are also dissatisfied with the philosophy of
capacity design and the extent of the damage suffered
by some modern buildings in the Christchurch
earthquake (Buchanan et al, 2011). They would like to
implement new design technologies to improve the
seismic performance of buildings even under extreme
events. The proposed performance objective matrix
of Buchanan et al (2011) is given in figure 18, which
is intended to replace the current performance matrix
given in figure 19. They proposed a combination
of two different tactics: that of increasing the level
of seismic design loading, and that of switching to
higher performance building technologies such as
base isolation and damage-resistant technologies.
These damage-resistant design technologies are on
the cusp of earthquake-resistant design inventiveness
and include rocking walls and frames, with and
without post-tensioning, and a variety of different
energy dissipating devices attached to the building
in different ways. According to Buchanan et al (2011),
“if not already the case, damage-resistant design will
soon become no more expensive than conventional
design for new buildings”. These technologies have
already been implemented in New Zealand at the RC
Endoscopy building at Southern Cross Hospital in
Christchurch, TePuni Village steel building at Victoria
University in Wellington and the new NMIT timber
building in Nelson.
SeSoc (2011) noted that base-isolation has often been
used successfully in overseas practice and tries to
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 “Lessons on building design from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake” – Goldsworthy
give possible explanations as to why it has not gained
greater popularity in New Zealand. It also observed
that “the impact of deep soft soils [in Christchurch in
particular] also needs careful consideration with the
potential increased accelerations in the long period
range”. With regard to what it called “low damage
design”, the society was concerned that “we do
not inadvertently swap the mistakes of the past for
new mistakes in our eagerness to move forward”.
It cautioned against rushing into the widespread
adoption of these new “low damage” technologies
without recognising their short-comings. SeSoc (2011)
said that “concern should be expressed about PRESSS
systems in any material which do not address beam
elongation issues that are potentially just as severe
as in ductile moment frames”.
In the Christchurch earthquake even if someone
owned a building in the CBD that suffered only
minor damage, this building would have been out
of operation for many months after the earthquake.
This was because of the extreme damage suffered
by many buildings and doubts about their safety,
which led to the CBD being cordoned off. If
damage-resistant design is achievable and is widely
employed quite a different post-earthquake scenario
would be expected. In particular, the minimum
performance objectives for an ordinary building
at importance level 2 would be very similar to that
of the importance level 3 and 4 buildings, even
for very rare earthquakes. Hence, in all cases the
buildings would be expected to be repairable, and
widespread closures of entire city areas would be
rendered unnecessary.
9.2 Implications for Building
Code changes in Australia
The level of seismic hazard used in Australian
loading codes to determine the design level
earthquake (the “rare” event) needs to be reassessed.
The Building Code of Australia (Australian Building
Codes Board, 2011) stipulates the return period for
design level earthquakes to be 500 years for ordinary
buildings (importance level 2), with a higher return
period for “more important” buildings, eg. 1500
years for buildings of importance level 4. This differs
from recent US practice reflected in the American
Loading Code (ASCE, 2005) which attempted to
create a uniform margin against collapse at the
design ground motion for all regions across the US.
It has been recognised for some time that there is a
larger ratio, between the level of ground motions
experienced in a 2500-year return period event to
those in a 500-year return period event, in regions of
low to moderate seismicity, as compared with regions
of high seismicity (Nordensen & Bell, 2000). To
account for this, the ground motion hazards in the US
have been defined in terms of maximum considered
(MCE) ground motions. A lower bound estimate of
the margin against collapse in structures designed
Australian Journal of Structural Engineering
S11-136 Goldsworthy.indd 169
169
to the seismic provisions in the US standard has
been taken as 1.5 in terms of ground accelerations.
Hence, the design earthquake ground motion was
selected at a ground shaking level that is 1/1.5 (or
2/3) of the MCE ground motion. For most regions in
the U.S. the MCE ground motion has been defined
with a uniform probability of exceedance of 2% in
50 years (return period of about 2500 years). There is
a later modification of the American Loading Code
(ASCE, 2011) in which the MCE terminology in the
2005 edition has been replaced by “Risk-targeted
MCE”. In this case the mapped ground motions were
developed on the basis of risk of collapse, however,
the values themselves have only changed slightly.
More research is also needed by Australian
seismologists to determine the ground motions in the
various capital cities that are likely to be experienced
in a “very rare” event, especially in zones with deep
soft soils. Although Australia is located in a region
of low to moderate seismicity, it is one of the most
active intraplate regions in the world due to strains
created by the Indo-Australian plate colliding
with the Eurasian and Pacific plates. Most of the
Australian capital cities have known faults in their
vicinity that are capable of generating damaging
shallow earthquakes; historical earthquakes of
magnitude 6 or higher in Australia have been
caused by ruptures on shallow reverse faults and
are similar to the event experienced in Christchurch
on 22 February 2011. For example, the Mw 5.7 1989
Newcastle earthquake occurred on a reverse fault
and would cause losses of $3.2 billion if it were to
recur today. Australian earthquakes have sometimes
occurred in clusters (three Mw 6.25 to 6.5 earthquakes
occurred in one day in the 1988 Tennant Creek
sequence (Bowman et al, 1990)), and have been
followed by aftershock sequences like that of the
Canterbury sequence (eg.  the sequence of events
that occurred off the east coast of Tasmania near
Flinders Island in the late 1800s with magnitudes
as large as Mw 6.9 (Michael-Leiba, 1989)). Due to the
vulnerable nature of the current building stock, if a
magnitude Mw = 6.0 event or higher did occur in an
Australian capital city, it would be likely to cause
extensive damage and a large number of fatalities.
This is recognised by the insurance industry which
has determined that Sydney presents one of the
highest insured earthquake risks in the world due
to the universal coverage of earthquake losses
provided by the Australian insurance industry
(Captive Review, 2006).
The seismic designs implemented in accordance
with the Australian Earthquake Loading Code
AS1170.4 (Standards Australia, 2007) are typically
“force-based” and the ULS 500-year return period
PGA in the capital cities is about one third of that in
Christchurch. The code-compatible ULS displacement
design spectrum for a soft soil site is said to have a
transition period, T 2 (at which the variation in
spectral displacement with period changes from
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 170 “Lessons on building design from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake” – Goldsworthy
linear to a constant value) of just 1.5 seconds, and
hence a maximum value of 150 mm (much less than
the 1.2 m realised at some sites in the Christchurch
CBD). The current performance objective in Australia
is to achieve life safe performance or better in a rare
event (currently defined as the 500-year return period
event). However, for most buildings, there is no
provision made for a higher level event. As happened
in Christchurch, it is the very rare event that could
cause major damage, potentially rendering the CBD
unusable for a long period. This is exacerbated in
Australia by the fact that material design standards
such as the Steel Structures code (Standards
Australia, 1998) and the Concrete Structures code
(Standards Australia, 2009) do not require designers
to use capacity design principles in their design; yet
the implementation of these design principles in
New Zealand (since the 1980s) saved many lives in
the Christchurch earthquake. Most of the fatalities
were due to the collapse of two older RC buildings
with non-ductile detailing, the Pyne Gould and the
CTV buildings.
In Australia, due to the lack of thought given to
strength hierarchies within a building and the failure
to incorporate weak ductile zones that allow the
building to safely deform into the plastic range, the
performance of some buildings is likely to be poor in
a very rare earthquake event. The robustness clause
in the loading code AS1170.0 (Standards Australia,
2007) is intended to ensure that the damage caused by
an event is not disproportionate to the magnitude of
that event. The question here is what type of damage
would the structural engineering community view
as appropriate for a very rare earthquake event. It is
the author’s opinion that “prevention of collapse”
is the minimum performance objective that should
be considered.
10 CONCLUSIONS
A general summary of the damage caused by the 22
February Christchurch earthquake has been given,
with considerable emphasis on the behaviour of
RC buildings, and some emphasis on the effects of
liquefaction and vertical accelerations. Some types
of damage have not been discussed here: damage
due to rock falls, damage to masonry buildings
(both unreinforced and reinforced), pounding of
one building against a neighbouring building or of
a bridge deck against its abutment, failure of glass
windows and others. Many of these have been
covered in the detailed report produced by Chouw
et al (2011) and in a special edition bulletin of the
NZSEE (2011a).
Any major earthquake event leads to a reassessment
of design philosophies, and the Christchurch
earthquake is no exception to that. As has been
discussed here, the New Zealand engineers
and authorities are in the process of thoroughly
Australian Journal of Structural Engineering
S11-136 Goldsworthy.indd 170
reassessing their design philosophy and detailing
requirements. Australia has a large stock of URM
buildings including many highly regarded heritage
structures. This is a type of construction that is known
to be especially vulnerable to earthquakes, and the
need to address this has been covered in Ingham et
al (2011). There are several other important lessons
for Australia from the Christchurch earthquake:
• The level of seismic hazard used in Australian
loading codes to determine the design level
earthquake (the “rare” event) needs to be
reassessed.
• The level of seismic hazard associated with a
“very rare” event should be defined and codified.
• The minimum performance objective for a “very
rare” event should be stipulated in the Australian
Building Code; the author believes the objective
of “prevention of collapse” under this level of
event would be appropriate for most buildings in
Australia, although consideration should be given
to achieving even higher levels of performance as
has been advocated by some engineers in New
Zealand (Buchanan et al, 2011).
• Following on from this, some revision of the
material design standards may be required
to ensure compliance with the newly defined
performance objective for a “very rare” event,
with consideration given to strength hierarchies
and capacity design principles.
Structural engineers in New Zealand are currently
trained to incorporate reliable ductility in buildings
so as to enhance the building’s ability to withstand
a very rare earthquake event without collapse,
and there is no reason why Australian engineers
cannot be trained to do the same where it is
necessary. Displacement-based methods to assess
building performance when subjected to a very
rare earthquake event should become a routine
part of the structural design. This approach will
lead to more resilient types of building construction
(with better details) being favoured by designers,
and the adoption of newly developed forms of
construction including “low damage” solutions for
some buildings of high importance. Consideration of
these issues will result in a building stock which will
be more robust than it is now when and if a major
earthquake does strike one of the Australian capital
cities in 100 years’ time or more.
It is anticipated that if engineers were forced to make
these considerations, cost increases would be likely
to be marginal. In SeSoc (2011), it is said that the
cost of multi-storey office buildings are marginally
more expensive in Auckland than in Wellington or
Christchurch, but are all within 2% over a range of
building types. SeSoc thinks that this suggests that
regional material and labour cost factors more than
compensate for any cost difference as a consequence
of seismic loading.
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 “Lessons on building design from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake” – Goldsworthy
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 “Lessons on building design from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake” – Goldsworthy 173

HELEN GOLDSWORTHY

Dr Helen Goldsworthy is an Associate Professor in the Department of

Infrastructure Engineering at the University of Melbourne, Victoria. She received
her BEng (Hons1) from the University of Adelaide (1981), her MSc from the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1982), and her PhD from the
University of Melbourne (1990). She is a member of the national committee of
the Australian Earthquake Engineering Society. Her research interests include
the seismic design of buildings.

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