The Royal African Society

Agrarian Change and the Revolution in Burkina Faso

Author(s): Mike Speirs
Source: African Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 358 (Jan., 1991), pp. 89-110
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/722641 .
Accessed: 17/06/2014 21:04

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Oxford University Press and The Royal African Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to African Affairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Affairs
African (1991), 90, 89-110

AGRARIAN CHANGE AND THE

REVOLUTION IN BURKINA FASO
MIKESPEIRS

WITHTHERECURRENCE of drought and famine in the Sahel during the 1980s,

and in spite of official policies which have emphasized the objective of food
self-sufficiency, the countries in this region of Africa are increasingly depen-
dent on cereals imports and are recipients of large quantities of food aid both
in 'good' and 'bad' harvest years. In the face of declining or stagnant per
capita food output levels due to a combination of economic, ecological and
political factors, and with the prospects of long term 'aid dependence'l,
steadily increasing debt repayment burdens and high rates of population
growth and urbanization, a re-appraisal of agricultural development strat-
egies in the region is underway. Efforts to devise and implement policies
which could reverse these trends have led to the recognition that the agrarian
crisis reflects a series of unresolved conflicts between the different groups
which seek to influence the state, and that peasant communities have
generally been the losers in this struggle.2
This paper concentrates on the political implications of the agricultural
production and food supply crises, with reference to Burkina Faso, one of
the 'least developed' countries in the Sahel region of West Africa.3 The
political upheaval following the coup d'etat in August 1983, which brought
the ConseilNational de la Revolution(CNR) to power, appeared to include
elements of an alternative approach to the problem of improving the food
security and livelihood of peasant farmers in Burkina Faso. This study
emphasizes the difficulties and contradictions encountered in 'economic
management' reforms through food price policies and agricultural market-
ing strategies. In exploring these issues, it is necessary not to confine the
Mike Speirs is a researcher at the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University in Copenhagen.
This work was conducted with colleagues at the Centred'Etudes,de Documentation, et de
Recherche Economique et Sociale(CEDRES), University of Ouagadougou.
1. This term is used in a comprehensive study of the economic, ecological, social, political and
demographic problems which face the inhabitants of the Sahel by J. Giri et al, TheSahelfacing
thefuture increaslng dependence orstructuraltransformation. (OECD, Paris, 1988).
2. A critical study of the 'agrarian crisis' in Africa concludes by noting that the dominant
image is of 'misguided, incompetent, exploitative and corrupt states that are actually killing the
peasantry from which they draw a living.' J. Platteau, Thefood crisisin Africa a comparative
structuralanalysis,Wider working papers 44, (World Institute for Development Economics
Research, Helsinki, 1988), p. 99.
3. The issues outlined arise from research in Burkina Faso in 1988, which included discus-
sions at the Centred'Etudes,deDocumentationj, etdeRecherche Economique et Sociale(CEDRES)
of the University of Ouagadougou, meetings with representatives of agricultural agencies
extension services and NGOs, and interviews with villagers in several provinces of the coun-
try. I wish to thank my colleagues at the University, as well as Roger Leys in Copenhagen, for
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
89

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
9o AFRICANAFFAIRS

analysis'to the textbookvariablesof supplyand demand,and markets[but

also to] investigatethe institutionaland political channelsthrough which
supplyand demandareexpressed'.4
Numerousthreadshave to be untangledin this exercise. Much of the
interestin the policies introducedby the CNR focussedon the charismatic
leadershipof Thomas Sankara,who was killed in anothercoup d'etat in
1987.5 The events of September 1989, in which two members of the
presentgovernmentwere executedaftera suspectedcoup attempt,suggest
that the political situationin BurkinaFaso remainshighly unstable. In
order to understandwhat has been happeningsince 1983, and to assess
changes in the balanceof power in relation to the peasant farmerswho
constituteover 80 per cent of the population,a complexof political, social
and economicconflicts,constraintsandparadoxeswill be explored.
Firstly, the background to the revolution of August 1983 will be
described,indicatingthe variousfactorsand forces which have influenced
the developmentofthe post-colonialstatein BurkinaFaso. This is followed
byanoverviewof themeasuresthathavebeenintroducedsinceindependence
to modernizethe agriculturalsector and to improvethe marketingof food
crops. The marginalizationof ruralcommunitiesfrom the power base of
the stateis one of the main issues emergingfromthis historicalsurvey. In
the third sectionof the paper,the implicationsof the revolutionin 1983are
explored with particularreferenceto the conflictingand complementary
interestsof agriculturalproducers,merchantsand traders,urban workers
and the military and bureaucraticelites. The aim of this section is to
analysethe powerstruggleswhichhavetakenplacewith an emphasison the
difficultiesencounteredas a result of governmentinterventionin cereals
marketsto resolve the 'food price dilemma'.6 This leads to some brief
concluding remarksabout different conceptions of the role of the state
and the organizationof the peasantryin Africa, and on the limitationsof
liberalizationreformsin the agriculturalsector.

Colonizationandindependence in BurkinaFaso
Upper Volta, as BurkinaFaso was called until 1984, was colonizedby the
French throughmilitarycampaignsin the 1890s. Prior to the incorpor-
ation of the territoryinto French West Africa,about sixty differentethnic
groupsinhabitedUpper Volta, comprisingtwo main 'families':the Voltaic
4. P. Streeten, Whatpricefood? agricultural pricepoliciesin developing countries(Macmillan,
London, 1987), p. 84.
5. The coup d'etat of 4th August 1983 has become known as the RevolutionDemocratique et
Populaire(RDP). The FrontPopulaire,led by Blaise Campaore who took over after the assassi-
nation of Sankara, calls the coup d'etat of 15th October 1987 'La rectification' (see section 4,
below).
6. Defined by Streeten, Whatpricefood,p. 1, as a conflict between high food prices to encour-
age agricultural production, and low prices 'to protect (at least in the short run) the poor buyers
of food'.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 AGRARIANCHANGEAND THE REVOLUTIONIN BURKINA FASO 91

and the Mande peoples.7 Until the end of the sixteenthcenturythe West
African Sahel was dominatedby the ancient empiresof Ghana,Mali and
Songhai. However the Voltaic Mossi maintaineda distinct social and
politicalidentity throughoutthe rise and decline of these empires. Their
kingdomsextendedover the centraland northernregionsof Upper Volta,
unitedby a commonlanguage,anideologybasedon a hierarchicaldivisionof
labourbetween farmers,craftsmen,warriorsand chiefs, and a centralized
system of power and authority. By contrast,the southern and westerr
regions of Upper Volta have been inhabitedby a diversemosaic of ethnic
groups including the Birifor, Bobo, Bwa, Dioula, Gourounsi, Lobi and
Senoufo. Other importantgroups include the pastoralPeul in the north,
and the Gourmantchein the sparselypopulatedeasternregions. Unlike
the Mossi, these ethnicgroupshave been characterizedby systemsof social
and political organizationin which power is structuredaround lineage
relationsandvillagecommunitieswithouta centralizedauthorityin the form
of a 'state'.
Throughoutpre-colonialUpper Volta, as in other regionsof the Sahel,
subsistence food crop cultivation and livestock herding constituted the
livelihoodof the majorityof the population:

Crops were rainfed and production relied solely on human labour.

Land lay fallow for long periodsto regainfertility. Transhumantlive-
stockactivitieswere practisedover vast areas. This type of production
system clearlydependedon the availabilityof virtuallyunlimitedspace
and was well adaptedto the region. ...Although productivitywas low,
the systemdid generatea surplusthatsupporteda small,butnot insignifi-
cant class of non-food producers. . . and certaincategoriesof craftsmen
andgriots who workedparttime in agriculture.8

The developmentof the trans-Saharantradein gold, slavesand agricul-

turalproducts(whichdatesbackto beforethe tenthcentury)andthe gradual
penetrationof Islam, were importantfactorsthat influencedWest African
economies. But the colonialconquestof the Saheldestroyedthe traditional
patternof tradethroughrestrictionsimposedon localcommercialactivities
and throughthe re-directionof agriculturalproductiontowardsthe culti-
vation of cash crops for export.9 Colonialrule also imposed severe con-
straintson the indigenouspopulationsthroughthe introductionof military
7. This sectiondrawson the studyby C. Savonnet-Guyot,Etat et societeau BurkinaFas
essagsurla politiqueAfricaine(Karthala,Paris,1986),who alsoanalysesthe socialorganization
of threeethnicgroupsin BurkinaFaso;the Mossi, the Biriforand the Bwa, contrastingtheir
politicalsystemswith chepoliticsof the post-colonialstate.
8. J. Giri et al, TheSahelfacingthefuture,p. 34.
9. See, inter alia: K. Hart, The political economyof West African agriculture(CUP,
Cambridge,1982)and A. Hopkins, Theeconomichistoryof WestAfrica(Longman,London,
1973).

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
92 AFRICANAFFAIRS

conscription and forced labour, as well as taxation. The development of

plantation agriculture in Cote d'Ivoire encouraged migration from the Sahel
(and Upper Volta in particular), leading to the emergence of what Amin
called a 'labour reserve economy' in the region. lO
The colonial history of Upper Volta was divided into five phases,
during which the territory itself was partitioned and regrouped on several
occasions. Between 1896 and 1904 military rule was imposed, followed by
the incorporation of the region into the colony of Haut-Senegal-Nigeruntil
1919. The territory was then reconstituted as Haute Voltaunder the auth-
ority of the governor general of French West Africa until 1932 when it was
again divided up. Different regions were placed under the jurisdiction of
the colonies of Cote d'Ivoire, Soudan and Niger. This subdivision was
designed to facilitate the movement of labour towards the coastal plantations
and the irrigation schemes under the Officedu Niger. It was particularly
opposed by the Mossi, whose kingdoms were partitioned between the Cote
d'Ivoire and the Soudan. Colonial rule had already undermined the auth-
ority of the Mossi chiefs, whose political unity under an emperor, the Mooga
Naaba, was further threatened by this division of their territory.
Resistance to colonial taxation and to attempts to intensify agricultural
production using imported technology were widespread. Meanwhile, the
character of political struggles in West Africa was altered by the new 'actors'
who gradually emergesl during this period. Urban growth, coupled with
the establishment of a trade union movement and a French educated civil
service, gave rise to tensions between the traditional structures of authority
and the new 'political class'. Elections to the French National Assembly in
1945 constituted the starting point for the activities of newly formed political
parties in West Africa. Amongst the various groupings which developed in
this period, the Rassemblement Democratique Africain(RDA) was undoubt-
ably the most significant. Many of the political developments in Upper
Volta from 1946 to 1980 were intertwined with the activities of this party. l 1
The RDA derived much of its support from the union of plantation workers
in Cote d'Ivoire, and was involved in organizing strikes and protests against
colonial rule in the early 1950s.l2
However the section of the RDA which was formed in Upper Volta was
regarded with suspicion by the Mossi chiefs, because it was seen to represent
an 'anti-unification' position. With the formation of the Union Voltaic,
and the suppression of the RDA by the French, reunification was rapidly
10. S. Amin, Neo-colonialismin WestAfrica (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973),
p. 124.
11. Felix Houphouet-Boigny('le Vieux'),who is still presidentof Cote d'Ivoire, led the
RDA from its radicalorigins,throughcompromiseswith the Frenchwhich resultedin self-
determinationunder the Communauteof French West African states (in 1956), to
independence.
12. C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, AfriqueNoire permanences et ruptures(Payot,Paris,1985),pp.
358 60.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 AGRARIANCHANGEAND THE REVOLUTIONIN BURKINA FASO 93

enacted in 1947. Other political parties soon emerged in the colony,

while the struggle for independenceand the problemsof regionaldiffer-
ences began to dominatethe agenda. However, following the introduc-
tion of the Loi Cadrein 1956 throughwhich the self-administrationof the
French colonies was recognizedwith the creationof nationalparliamen-
tary assemblies, the RDA gradually gained more support. The RDA
emergedvictoriousfrom the election in 1959, and oppositionto the presi-
dent, Maurice Yameogo, was quickly suppressed. The republic of Up-
per Volta obtainedindependencein August 1960, under presidentialrule
with a single partygovernment.
Nevertheless,the politicaland social instabilitywhich characterizedthe
final phase of colonial dominationcontinued during the six year rule of
Yameogo. Financialausteritywhich particularlyaffectedthe salariesof
civil servantsand attemptsto reducethe powerand authorityof traditional
chiefs, alienatedboth the urbanand ruralpopulations. Againstthis back-
ground, the military takeoverin 1966 under General Lamizanareflected
growingpopulardiscontentwith the policiesof the civiliangovernment,as
well as the increasingpowerof the tradeunions. Two attemptsweremade
to transferpowerbackto an electedparliamentduringthe fourteenyearrule
of PresidentLamizana. But social unrest and economicdisruption,par-
ticularlyafterthe severedroughtin the early1970s, led to politicalstalemate
on both occasions. Tradeunionprotestsagainstdeclininglivingstandards
and corruption,the polarizationof the dominantpoliticalgroupingsin the
parliameilt,and the increasing divergence between different tendencies
within the armyled to anothercoup d'etatin 1980:

Colonel Saye Zerbo who seized power was a tough nationalistwith no

ideas for social change. He manageda token clean up of corruption
before setting his regime on the same road of political alienation as
Lamizana's. He barredpolitical parties and unions in an attempt to
restoreorderand dependedeven more than Lamizanaon foreignaid as
the deusex machinawhich couldhold the countrytogether.l3

It was in this period that radicalgroups within the army startedto flex
their muscles, and to initiate undergrounddiscussionswith varioussmall
communistpartieswitha viewto elaboratinga commonpoliticalprogramme.
However, Zerbo's government encountered other difficulties including
revivedethnic tensions between the Mossi and the minoritygroups in the
west. Continueddisputeswith the tradeunionsled to a rapiddeterioration
in the politicalclimate,which was only partiallyresolvedwhen Zerbowas
overthrownin 1982by a groupof young soldiersincludingThomas Sankara
13. V. Brittain,'Introductionto Sankaraand BurkinaFaso', Reviewof AfricanPolitical
Economy,32, (1985),p. 41.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
94 AFRICANAFFAIRS

and BlaiseCampaore. A new militarygovernmentwas formed,calledthe

Comitede SalutPublic(CSP),but it wasparalysedby the divergingideologi-
calpositionswithinthe army. Frenchinterventionin the internalaffairsof
the countrywas suspectedwhen Sankara,who had been given the post of
primeministerin the CSP, wasarrestedin May 1983. But studentprotests
led to his subsequentrelease, enablingthe radicalsection of the army to
continuetheirpreparationsfor anothercoup d'etat.
The ConseilNationalde la Revolution(CNR) led by Sankara,Campaore
and other officers, was establishedafter the CSP was overthrownon 4
August 1983. Local revolutionarydefence committeesl4and popular
courtswere immediatelyset up to mobilizethe populationand to examine
cases of corruptionunder the previousgovernments. At first, the revol-
utionarytakeoverwas welcomedby manypeople who had sufferedduring
the repressionand instabilityof the early 1980s.l5 But before examining
the contradictionsand difficultieswhich have arisensince this 'Revolution
Democratique et Populaire'(RDP) it is useful to outline the post-colonial
patternof agriculturaldevelopmentandfood securityin BurkinaFaso, indi-
catingsome of the institutionaland politicalfactorswhich have influenced
efforts to transformsupply and demand. In this predominantlyrural
country,the processesof agrarianchange,thoughapparentlymarginalto the
concernsof the successivecivilian and militarygovernmentsin the 1960s
and 1970s,are centralto an understandingof the strugglesfor powerin the
revolutionaryperiod.

Agriculturalmodernization andcerealsmarketing
Retrospectiveassessmentsof the efficiencyof the agriculturalsector in
BurkinaFaso at independencein 1960 suggestthat the colonialauthorities
had done little to encourageeffectivelyoutputgrowthin both food andcash
cropproduction. Low productivity,resultingfromthe insignificantuse of
non-traditionalinputsand the underuseof both labourand land, as well as
the neglect of commercialrelations and infrastructure,characterizedan
agriculturalsystemwhichwas'virtuallyautarchic'.16 However,population
growth, labourmigrationand colonialtaxationinitiateda process of rural
restructuringwhichhascontinuedthroughoutthe post-colonialperiod. It
is also importantto note that the civilianand militarygovernmentswhich
have been in power since 1960, inherited, but did not fundamentally
14. Comitesde Detfensede la Revolution.
15. As Savonnet-Guyot,Etat et societe'sau Burkina Faso, noted: Le capitaine Sankara
s'employant a rassurer tout le monde, les commerfantsse disentfavorables a la Revolution si on
respecte la libre enterprise, les hie'rarchiesreligieuses si on reconnait leur pouvoir spirituel, les
chefferiescoutumieressi la tradition est maintenue, les syndicats si leur pouvour est respectepar les
CDRs, p. 135.
16. J. Lecaillon,& C. Morrisson,Economicpolicies and agriculturalperformance the case of
Burkina Faso (OECDDevelopmentCentre,Paris,1985),p. 21.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 AGRARIANCHANGEAND THE REVOLUTIONIN
BURKINA FASO 95
alter, the 'structures, mechanisms and traditions' of
the colonial state.l7
Independence did not involve a return to pre-colonial forms
of political
organization; thus building the nation on the basis of
common laws and
centralized authorities, together with the modernization of
the economy
(including the development of industry, transport, health
and education)
have characterized the programmes of all the
independent governments in
Burkina Faso and elsewhere in the Sahel.
Modernization necessitated investment strategies based on
foreign aid
and on the taxation of export crop production, the
latter representing the
only significant source of domestic revenue. Various
parastatalinstitutions
were set up to manage this process, since colonial
restrictions had effectively
undermined the development of a class of entrepreneurs and
merchants
Thus it has been argued that a dualistic pattern of
commercial activity has
emerged in West Africa. On the one hand, parastatal and
foreign owned
companies have dominated the key sectors of export
production and manu-
facturing,while on the other hand, an extensive 'parallel'
market operated by
irldigenous traders has become increasingly significant. 18
The impli-
cationsof this pattern of trade in terms of cereals marketing
will be explored
aftera brief survey of the main features of state
intervention in agricultural
productionin Burkina Faso.
Since the 1960s, the state has intervened in agricultural
markets in order
to gain 'greater control over the resources to be
extracted from the rural
sector,and to ensure regular and sufficient supplies of
food for the popu-
lationin the towns and in regions with recurrent food
shortages'.l9 These
twoprocesses, extracting a revenue surplus from
agricultural producers and
ensuringfood supplies for consumers, resulted in the
introduction of a series
ofinstitutional and economic measures. In order
to 'modernize the sub-
sistenceeconomy' of the rural communities in Burkina
Faso, regional agri-
culturaldevelopment organizations (ORDs20) were set up
in 1965. These
institutionsderived most of their operating resources from
foreign aid pro-
grammes,and were responsible for 'training and visit'
extension schemes,
theprovision of production inputs and assistance
with product marketing.
Theyhave consistently suffered serious management
deficiencies, including
thefraudulent use of funds and lack of trained staff.
An offshoot of the
17.Giriet al, TheSahelfacingthefuture,p. 91.
18.See, interalia: O. Igue, 'L'officiel,le paralleleet le
Afriquede l'Ouest',PolitiqueAfricaine,9, (1983),and A.clandestin commerceset integrationen
Lambert,'La dynamique
marchandsenAfriquedel'Ouest'.Document desreseaux
espaces presenteauseminaire duClubduSahellCILSS surles
cerealiersregionauxan Afriquedel'Ouest,Lome, 1989.
l9. L. Filippi-Wilhelm,Tradersand marketingboards
interventionin agriculturalmarketing.In K. Arhin et al in Upper Volta-ten yearsof state
(eds), Marketingboardsin tropical
Africa
(KPI, London, 1985),p. 120.
20.The OrganismesRegionauxde Developpement,
Development, were renamedCentres coordinatedby the Ministry of Rural
1988.See: B. Tallet, 'Le CNR faceRegionaux de ProductionAgro-Pastorale(CRPAs) in
au monderural le discoursa l'epreuve
Politique
Africaine,33, (1989). des faits'

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
96 AFRICANAFFAIRS

ORD system, the AVV2l, established integrated rural development pro-

grammes along the valleys of the Volta rivers, with the objective of resettling
families in order to produce irrigated cash crops. Other large scale irri-
gation schemes supported by parastatal authorities and designed to encour-
age rice cultivation have been set up in the valley of the river Kou and in the
northern Sourou region.
The output of cotton in Burkina Faso has increased rapidly since indepen-
dence. The provision of extensive technical support by the French
CFDT22 contributed to expanding the production of this important cash
crop, particularly in the south-western provinces of the country where aver-
age yields increased six fold between 1960 and 1982. Cotton is grown on
land owned by the peasant farmers, while inputs are provided and the fibres
are marketed through the ORDs according to prices and contracts agreed
with SOFITEX (the parastatalcotton marketing board). The World Bank
allocated funds for cotton production and processing projects in the 1970s.23
In addition to cotton, groundnuts are grown as a cash crop in some areas,
and shea nuts (a tree crop which is used in the manufacture of vegetable oils)
are collected and exported. Another cash crop in Burkina Faso is green
beans, grown on land owned by a state run cooperative and destined pri-
marily for export. Sugar cane has also been grown in Burkina Faso since
1975 when 10,000 hectares of land irl the Comoe province were acquired by
SUSUCO. Many families were displaced by the transformation of this
area into a huge sugar cane plantation with processing facilities again based
on foreign investment.24 Livestock production has also represented an
important source of foreign exchange, although the number of cattle was
drastically reduced during the drought in the 1970s, and competition in the
export markets of the coastal states has affected earnings in the 1980s.25

21. The appropriation of landby the AutoritedesAmenagements desValleesdes Volta,andthe

integrationof peasantproducersintothe monetary,cashcropmarket,arediscussedin detailby
M. Gervais,Peasantsandcapitalin UpperVolta,In J. Barker(ed), Thepoliticsof agriculture in
tropicalAfrica(Sage,BeverlyHills, 1984).See also:H. Kabore,sL'aideet lespriorite'sinternes
despolitiquesagricolesnationales le casduBurkinaFaso',Paperpresentedat a seminaron the
impactof bilateralandmultilateralaidon Africanagriculture,CODESRIA,Dakar,1987.
22. The activitiesof the Compagnie Francaisepourle DeveloppementdesFibresTextileshave
significantlydeterminedthe structureof the West Africancottonmarket,as describedby T.
Thiombiano,'Statepoliciesandfood andagriculturalproduction the caseof BurkinaFaso',
In T. Mkandawire&N. Boureane(eds), Thestate,foodandagriculture in Africa(CODESRIA,
Dakar,1987).
23. Cottonexportshaveaccountedforaboutone thirdof the totalexportearningsin Burkina
Fasoduringthe 1980s. See:BurkinaFaso,AnnuaireStatistique1987(InstitutNationalde la
Statistiqueet de la Demographie,Ouagadougou,1987).
24. The establishmentof the SocieteSucrierede la Comoe,as an 'agro-industrialenclave'is
documentedby T. Thiombiano,L'enclaveindustrielle la SocieteSucrierede Haute Volta
(CODESRIA,Dakar,1984). The reactionsof the sugarplantationworkersandtheirunionto
the changesfollowingthe revolutionin 1983aredescribedby B. Jaffre,BurkinaFaso,lesannees
Sankara dela re'volution a la rectification
(L'Harmattan,Paris,1989),pp. 65-69.
25. See, interalia: H. Josserand,'Effetsdes importations de viandesextra-africainessur les
echangesdebovinsentrelespaysde l'Afriquedel'Ouest'.Document pre'sente
au setminaire
du Club
du Sahel/CILSSsurlesespacesce'retaliers regionauxenAfriquedel'Ouest,Lome, 1989.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 IN BURKINA FASO
CHANGEAND THE REVOLUTION
AGRARIAN 97
peasant farmers
establishment of agricultural credit schemes,
With the to become inte-
encouraged to adopt cash crop cultivation and
been
have prices of agri-
the monetary economy. But declining
within
grated with high costs of
commodities on world markets, combined problems
cultural have given rise to serious
productionand processing in the Sahel, few initiatives have been
sectors in the 1980s. At the same time, output
these
in and the overall yield and
to promote food crop production,
taken rice) have only
main staple grains (millet, sorghum, maize and
of
levels the and 1980s revealed the
increased.26 The drought years in the 1970s by climatic
slightly
to which agricultural production increases are constrained the cereals
extent degradation.27 Thus,
as well as by environmental
factors, is barely sufficient to
sheet for Burkina Faso shows that production malnutrition
balance of adequate rainfall, and
meetdemand even in 'good years'
widespread. purchase,
remains
to the developments in the cash crop sector, the
In contrast in the hands of
and sale of cereals has remained largely
distribution 1970s.28 The re-
despite state intervention since the early
privatetraders, the 1960s has had a
network of indigenous merchants during
emergence of a market. Although a
impact on the organization of the cereals
considerable in 1971, it has only
marketing board, oFNACER29, was set up
parastatal on the market,
an average of about 10 per cent ofthe cereals available A large
bought
have rarely exceeded 10 per cent of total consumption. market,
andits sales the
Burkina Faso never enter
proportion of the cereals produced in
for local consumption.30
butremain in household stores

performance, andBurkina
Morrisson,Economic policiesandagricultural et annexes(CILSS
26. See: Lecaillon&du Faso, Phase 1, diagnostique-bilan
Faso,Plan cerealier Burkina andfoodsecurity
Ouagadougou, 1988). of agriculturalproduction
27. These phenomena areillustratedin the study
systemes alimentaires au Burkina Faso(Centre
& C. Wetta,Les 1988),which
byT. Thiombiano,S. Soulama Economique et Sociale, Ouagadougou,
deDocumentation et deRecherche fromtheheavilyerodedand
d'Etudes,
theproblemsarisingin thesouth-westasfamiliesmigrate On the ecologicalconstraints
describes northern'Mossi platteau'.
deforested land of the centraland zones of West Africa, see the articleby P.
in the semi-arid theWestAfrican
whichaffectcerealscultivation in foodproduction technology development
foodproduction in
Matlon,'Potentialandpractice & M. Blackie (eds), Accelerating
semiarid tropics',In J. Mellor,C. Delgado 1987). and
Africa(JohnsHopkins,Baltimore, L. Filippi-Wilhelm,Traders
sub-Saharan in BurkinaFaso include: Thedynamicsofgrain
28. Studiesof cerealsmarketing K. Shapiro & E. Gilbert,
(Centerfor
marketing boardsiZt UpperVolta,J. Sherman, analysisof grain marketing
Volume1. An economic Agricultural
marketingin BurkinaFaso,Development,University of Michigan, and International
'Etudessur
Researchon Economic Wisconsin,1987),andH. Some,P. Ginies&D. Coulibaly,
presenteauseminaire
Programs,Universityofcirculation descerealesau Burkina Faso', Document
Lome, 1989.
lesobstaclesinternesa la surlesespacescerealiersregionauxan Afriquedel'Ouest,
duClubduSahel/CILSS tonnes
29. OfticeNationaldesthatCereales. as muchas 1,500,000are
indicate village levelstoragecapacitymaybe and private merchants able
30. Estimates a security stockof 30)000tonnes, pp. 149). With
while OFNACER manages Faso, Plan cerealier,
same quantity(Burkina anda totalof
to store approximatelytheoutput
severedroughtin 198985,
hasincreasedsincetherice in 1988/89.
adequate cereals
rainfall, were harvested
sorghum,maizeand
about2 milliontonnesof millet,

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
98 AFRICANAFFAIRS

In the private sector there is intense competition between intermediate

level traders, particularly in the surplus producing areas of the south and
west of the country. Nevertheless:

the merchants have great power in the market . . ., because of the large
funds they control and the network of active buying agents, thanks to
which they can exert oligopsonistic pressures on the prices paid to pro-
ducers . . . [Similarly] the large stocks they hold in the cities also give them
great power in the consumer market.3l

OFNACER, which purchases and sells cereals at the official prices deter-
mined by a price commission, has struggled from crisis to crisis particularly
in the drought years of the last decades. Despite access to working capital
raised through counterpart funds from the sale of food aid, the narrow
margin between official producer and consumer prices has meant that costs
have exceeded revenue in most years. Due to these financial difficulties the
marketing board has been unable to operate as an efficient purchasing agency
in the rural areas where private traders have dominated the market. How-
ever, in the urban areas through the management of the national security
stock of cereals and the administration, distribution and sale of food aid
donations, OFNACER appears to have fulfilled its 'social mission' (supply-
ing cheap food) in conjunction with the price control authorities. Never-
theless, neither the private merchants nor the marketing board control the
cereals market in ways which are beneficial to the peasant producers. For
the former, profit motives necessitate hard bargaining to keep prices low and
margins high, although the smaller grain traders (especially women) are
under increasing pressure as the market is increasingly dominated by 'major
urban merchants (dealing) directly with their regional suppliers who have
quasi-monopsonies in their respective regions'.32 As far as OFNACER is
concerned, fixed price sales of domestic and imported cereals have reflected
the importance attached to the provision of cheap food to specific groups,
and to avoiding urban unrest. Although studies suggest that increases in
official producer prices do not necessarily elicit significant output responses,
given inadequate rural infrastructure and the limited market for consumer
goods, there is little doubt that OFNACER has failed to stabilize the

31. M. Saul,'The developmentof the grainmarketandmerchantsin BurkinaFaso',3rournal

of ModernAfricanStudies,2s1, (1986)p. 143. Similarly,as noted by J. Shermanet al, The
dynamicsofgrainmarketing,pp. 19S191: 'Whilein manywaysthe marketingsystemis quite
competitive,particularlyat eachindividuallevelof trade,a largenumberof wealthytradersare
an importantforcein the marketbecauseof the largeamountsof capitalthey control.'On the
private sector, see the study by P. Labazee,Entrepriseset entrepreneurs du BurkinaFaso
(Karthala,Paris,1988).
32. Saul, Thedevelopment of thegrainmarketandmerchants, p. 151.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 AGRARIANCHANGEAND THE REVOLUTIONIN BURKINA FASO 99

producerside of the marketingequation.33 Furthermore,the production

of 'traditional'cerealsin BurkinaFaso has faceda rapidlychangingdemand
patternas the urbanpopulationconsumesincreasingquantitiesof imported
wheatand rice.34
Given the lack of investment in food crop production, low producer
price levels, increasinglysevereland degradationin many regions,and the
emphasis on expandingthe output of cash crops (especiallycotton), the
food securityof the majorityof peasanthouseholdshas scarcelyimproved
since independence. The adoptionof intensive cash crop cultivationin
the south-westernprovincesof BurkinaFaso which has led to increasing
differentiationbetween rich and poor peasant farmers and agricultural
labourers, is in stark contrast to the precariousproduction conditions
which prevailin the northernregions. Furthermore,stateinterventionin
the agriculturalsectorand in the organizationof the cerealsmarket,reflects
the converging interests of a powerful coalition of merchants and the
bureaucraticand military elite.35 The provision of cheap food supplies
throughlow consumerprices togetherwith the importof 'non-traditional'
staplefoods, has coincidedwith the concentrationof purchasingpowerand
political authorityin the hands of a small (mostly urban) section of the
population.
At variouslevels in the processesof productionand marketing,peasant
farmers have been faced with centralizedand bureaucraticinstitutions
whoseauthoritarianmethodsand 'ideologyof modernization'have encour-
aged the persistenceof a strategyof passiveresistancewhich first emerged
undercolonialrule. Smallholderhouseholdshavebecomemarginalizedas
a result of the top down approachto ruraldevelopmentin BurkinaFaso.
The emergence of new alliances between the rural elite (including the
chiefs and merchants)and the bureaucraticclass, togetherwith foreignaid
agencies,has preventedmanypeasantfarmersfromcontrollingtheirmeans

33. See M. Lipton, 'Limitsof pricepolicyfor agriculturc whichwayfor the WorldBank?

Development PolicyReview,5-2, (1987)andthe studiesby Platteau,ThefoodcrisisinAfrica,and
Streeten,Whatpricefood?,forcriticalassessmentsofthe 'producersupplyresponse'issue.This
has been centralto the WorldBankapproachto the liberalizationof agriculturalmarketingin
Africa,as outlined in: World Bank, Accelerateddevelopment in sub-SaharanAfrica (World
Bank,Washington,1981)and World Bank, WorldDevelopment Report,1986 (WorldBank
Washington,1986).A discussionof the effectsof pricechangeson food cropoutputin Burkina
Fasois presentedby T. Thiombiano,Le roledesprixdansla de'cision paysannedeproduireet de
vendreles ce'retales
traditionelles
au BurkinaFaso'.Papierpre'senteau seminairede l'Association
Europeen desEconomistes Agricoles,Montpellier,1989.
34. See, T. Reardon, T. Thiombiano & C. Delgado, 'L'importancedes ce'retales non-
tradztlonelles
dansla consommation desricheset despauvresa Ouagadougou',EconomieRurale,
35. Both Filippi-Wilhelm,Tradersand marketingboardsin UpperVolta,and M. Saul, The
developmentof thegrainmarketandmerchants, describehowOF7NACER andthe privatetraders
cooperatedduringthe 1970s,the latternotingthat 'majormerchantshaveoftenbeenfavoured
by governmentpolicies;indeedwithoutpublicsupportandunofficialcomplicitythe successof
the mostprominentfiguresin this groupcannotbe explained'p. 152.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 AFRICANAFFAIRS
100
of production and exchange.36 The
significance of these processes in terms
of the conditions of access to productive
resources has also been emphasized
in a major study of agrarian change in Africa:

Arguments that African food deficits are attributable

to inadequate
investment in appropriate technology, to price policies
which discourage
agricultural expansion, or to the legacy of colonial
domination and
commercial exploitation are not so much wrong as
incompletc-
especially when they are limited to short term changes
in relative returns
to alternative production activities. What the
cumulated record of local
agrarianchange in Africa suggests is that the eSects of
an increase in price
of say, maize on maize production depend not
only on the availability of
inputs and rural infrastructure, but also on who
controls the resulting
increases in output and income, and how they are used
over time. These
effects depend, in turn, on the changing relations
of power and legal
practices as well as on available technology and market
incentives.37
The revolutionary military government which
took over in 1983 explicitly
aimedto change these 'relations of power' in
Burkina Faso. But, as indi-
catedin the next section of this paper, challenging
the powerful forces which
havecombined to marginalize the rural
communities has not proved to be an
easytask.

ThePopularandDemocraticRevolution
The political strategy of the CNR government was
defined in the
'Discours
d'Orientation
Politique'(DOP) pronounced in a speech by Thomas
on2 October 1983. In addition to emphasizing Sankara
that the aim of the 'popular
anddemocratic revolution' (RDP) was to
create an 'independent, self-
reliantand planned economy' in Burkina Faso, the
revolutionary govern-
mentstressed its intention to mobilize the peasants
and workers irl a socialist
transformation of the country. But numerous conflicts and
tensions devel-
opedduring the four year rule of the CNR,
culminating in the coup d'etat in
October1987 which brought the FrontPopulaire
(FP) to power. Foreign
politicaland economic relations have also been
important factors in the
domesticpower struggles in Burkina Faso.
Another cornerstone of
thepolitical analysis of neo-colonialism
presented in the DOP was the
anti-imperialiststance of the new government.
Following the creation of a network of revolutionary
defence committees
(CDRs)and popular tribunals (TPRs) which
formed the institutional
framework for the mobilization and political education of
the population
36.As C. Savonnet-Guyot, Etat et societeau
etatique Burkina Faso, p. 203, concludes: 'Dans le systeme
moderne,ce sont les paysanneries, dans
37.S. Berry, 'The food crisis and agrarian leur totalite, qui restenten marge du politique.'
Review, change in Africa a review essay', African Studies
27-2, (1984), p. 95.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 AGRARIANCHANGEAND THE REVOLUTIONIN BURKINA FASO 101

along the lines presentedin the DOP, the CNR proceededto drawup an
economic developmentplan for the country.38 This stressed the satis-
faction of basic needs through improvementsin the health and education
servicesas well as increasingagriculturalproductionwith a view to achiev-
ing food self-sufficiency. Ruralvaccinationand literacycampaignswere
launchedthrough the CDRs in 1984, while plans to develop the agricul-
tural sectorfocussedon the improvedmanagementof waterresources,the
implementationof large scale irrigationschemes and programmesto halt
environmentaldegradation.39
The populardevelopmentprogrammesalso envisageda majorimprove-
ment in infrastructure,notablythroughthe constructionof a railwayfrom
Ouagadougouto the northernprovinces and Tambao where deposits of
manganese are located. But although these sectoral investment pro-
grammeswereintendedto mobilizeindigenouslabourandlocalresources,it
is significant,and paradoxical,that 80 per cent of the financewas derived
from external sources.40 Agriculturaldevelopmentschemes in Burkina
Faso, and elsewherein the Sahel, remaindependenton the availabilityof
project and programmeaid channelledthrough numerous bilateraland
multilateralagencies. However the flow of remittances from migrant
labourersworkingin Cote d'Ivoirealso continuesto representan important
sourceof incomefor manyruralcommunities.
The 'popularinvestmenteffort'promotedby the CNR was accompanied
by a seriesof austeritymeasuresdesignedto reducethe budgetarydeficitof
the state and to transferresourcesinto the developmentof the agricultural
sector. Butthe realincomesof stateemployees,includingcivil servantsand
teachers,weredrasticallyaffectedby wagerestrictionsandby the imposition
of compulsorylevies to raise funds for the developmentprogrammes.4l
During the droughtin 1984 and 1985, officialagriculturalproducerprices
were increased,addingto the financialsqueezefacedby food consumers.42
Onthe otherhand,althoughtradersandthebusinessclassweredenouncedas
'enemiesof the people' in the DOP, privateinvestmentin manufacturing
industries, in constructionand in agriculturalinput supply sectors was

38. This 'ProgrammePopulaire de Developement' from 1984to 1985,was replacedby a five

yearplancoveringthe periodfrom 1986to 1990.
39. In additionto reforestationandanti-erosionschemes,the governmentstarteda campaign
knownas 'les trois luttes' orthethreestruggles,against:(i) indiscriminategrazingof arableland
(ii) treefellingwithoutpermission,and(iii) deliberateburningof bushvegetation.
40. The scaleandimportanceof foreignaid programmesin BurkinaFasoareassessedby G.
Martin,'Ideologie et praxis au Burkina Faso', Geneve-Afrique, 2F1 (1986),pp. 4S48. See also
J-J. Gabas,L'aide contrele developpement l'exempledu Sahel (Economica,Paris,1988).
41. See: L. Konate, & R. Matha Sant'Anna,'Adjustement structurel et remuneration des
fonctionnaires au Burkina Faso', CEDRES-Etudes, 24 (1988).
42. 'Le relevementdes prix officielsd'achat, imposepar le CNR, est avant tout un acte politique
mayeurarticule d'atlleurs a un corps de mesuresdestineesa reduire le pouvoir d'achat des salaries
urbains, base sociale des regimes qui se sont succede depuis l'independence.' P. Labazee,
'Reorganisationeconomiqueet resistancessociales', Politique Africaine, 20 (1985).

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
102 AFRICANAFFAIRS

encouraged by the CNR.43 It is also paradoxical that the economic policies

initiated by the CNR under Sankara resembled the approach advocated by
the World Bank in terms of regulating the public sector:

Drastic budget reductions, cuts in pay and number employed in public

administration, a general reduction of deficits, an upward shift in agricul-
tural producer prices, tight control upon parastatal operations and the
demand that they meet financial equilibrium and an appeal to private
sector investors to engage in new productive investment are examples of
such public policy reforms. Roughly speaking, something like three-
quarters of the World Bank's recommendations were met by Sankara
without any World Bank intervention.44

In distinguishing between the pro- and counter- revolutionary forces and

groups in the political programme outlined in the DOP, the CNR also aimed
to control political expression in the 'civil society'. As described above, in
the period prior to the RDP a number of different organizations and group-
ings (including the military) had struggled for political influence in Burkina
Faso. By relocating the focus of debate and activity within the framework
of the CDRs, the CNR attempted to challenge the power of the trade unions
as well as political parties and the traditional figures of authority in the rural
areas. This led to increasingly divisive conflicts, both within the CNR
itself and in relation to the various alliances of classes and groups in the
towns and the countryside.45 The emphasis which was given by Sankarato
the emancipation of women, including a campaign against prostitution and
the drafting of a new 'family code' which would outlaw polygamy, was
perhaps one of the most contentious issues in the attempt to transform
society in Burkina Faso.46
The trade unions, and particularly the teachers' union, having been
severely repressed under the previous military governments adopted a
cautious attitude to the CNR right from the first days of the revolution.
Declining living standards of urban workers and civil servants as a result of
wage controls and price increases led to a rapid deterioration in the relations
between the government and the representatives of the state employees. At
43. See P. Labazee, Entrepriseset entrepreneursdu Burkina Faso, pp. 219-225.
44. J. Fontaine, 'Evolving economic policies and disinvolving states notes in an African
context', IDS Bulletin,1S4 (1987), p. 17.
45. This process was thoroughly analyzed by P. Labazee, 'Reorganisation economiqueet
re'sistancessociales', who concluded on a prophetic note: 'la questionessentiellesemblecelle des
alliances socialesque le re'gimesera a mezmedegetne'rer; l'e'liminationprogressivedespartis politiques
et organisationssyndicales des organes de de'cisionet l'anesthe'siedes detbatscontradictoiresqui en
re'sulte,risquentd'isoler l'e'quipeau pouvoir et de re'duirela participation des travailleurs urbainset
ruraux a l'elaboration des orientations e'conomiques,alors que celle-ci conditionne leur degre'de
mobilisation'(p. 28).
46. See, inter alia: B. Jaffre, Burkina Faso-Les annees Sankara, pp. 107-111, M. Monimart,
Femmes du Sahel la de'sertificationau quotidien (Karthala, Paris, 1989), and J. Ziegler, La
victoire des vaincus oppressionet re'sistanceculturelle (Seuil, Paris, 1988), pp.199214.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 AGRARIANCHANGEAND THE REVOLUTIONIN
BURKINA FASO 103
the sametime, the concentrationof powerin
the handsof the CDRs which
had been set up in all workplaces,threatenedto
underminethe negotiating
strengthof the traditionalworkers'organizations.
the teachers'union in 1984, linkedto a Strikesand protestsby
suspectedattemptto overthrowthe
CNR, resulted in the dismissalof a largenumber
of teachers.47 Despite
differencesof opinion within the CNR, which in
additionto the military
comprisedrepresentativesof severalsmall
on the activitiesof the tradeunionswere communistparties,restrictions
imposed.48
Radicalrestructuringof the relationsof
productionin the agricultural
sector and in the rural communitieswas also
high on the agenda of the
CNR. Howeverthe introductionof an agrarian
landin BurkinaFaso becamethe propertyof the reform,throughwhichall
stateand the formationof
CDRs in the villages,alsopresentedthe
governmentwith seriousdifficulties
focussingon the transferof power away from the
young people in the rural areas became traditionalchiefs. As
organized in the CDRs which
assumedresponsibilityfor allocatingland, the
authorityof the chiefs was
weakened. Traditionalsystems of land management
ationwerecondemnedas feudalpracticesin the and labourorganiz-
thesametime, the CDRs attemptedto gain rhetoric of the DoP.49 At
controlover the extensivenet-
workof groupements villageois whichhad
developed
duringthe 1970s.5? Furthermore,increasing throughoutthe country
economic inequalityin the
cashcrop producing regions, and the
emergence of a group of richer
'innovative' farmersusing modernproductiontechniques,
conflictswith the CDRs in the villages. The extentto accentuatedthe
mentprogrammesshould be organizedon a which ruraldevelop-
.
.
'collective'basis was also a
contentlous lssue.
As faras food securitywas concerned,the
governmentwasalsoanxiousto
restrictthe speculativeactivitiesof the private
merchantswho controlledthe
distribution of cereals. Although producer prices for
raisedin 1984, an enforcementof the regulations food crops were
was difficultdue to the
operational inefficiencyof OFNACER. Numerousemployeesof
otherparastatalswere also accusedof corruptionand tried this and
tribunals.Strengtheningthe networkof cooperative by the popular
had cereals banks which
been set up throughoutthe countrysincethe mid
1970swas seen by the
CNR as a meansof improvingthe bargaining
positionof peasantproducers
47.The reinstatement of these teachers in
1988 is one of
which led the government (FP) to open the reasons for the present budgetary
difficulties,
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in order to obtain a negotiations with the International
48.As outlined by C. Kabeya-Muase, structural adjustrnent
'Un pouvoir de travailleurs peut-il loan.
eStrecontre les
syndicats?',
Politique Africaine, 33 (1989).
49.See: G. Martin, 'Ideologieet praxis au
rural'. Burkina Faso' and B. Tallet, 'Le CNR face au monde
50.These 'GVs' or village associations
are well established in Burkina Faso, and
many
small scale development activities, as
experiences described in: Graap, Nouvelles paroles decoordinate
brousso
villageoises au Burkina Faso (Karthala, Paris, 1988).

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 104 AFRICANAFFAIRS
in the cereals market. The cereals banks,
particularlyin the northern
deficit producingregions of the country,provide
an important'insurance
scheme'for many villagerswho have become
dependenton supplies from
otherregionsor on food aid fromabroad.5l
Howeverattemptsto negotiate
purchasingagreementsbetween OFNACER and the
cerealsbank groups
flounderedon the inability of the parastatalmarketing
board to meet its
commitmentsfor paymentand collectionof the harvest.
the privatemerchantsmountedoppositionto At the sametime,
the cerealsmarket,andnegotiationson delivery government interventionin
pricesfor cerealssuppliesto
OFNACER collapsedon severaloccasions. The
larly hostile to the creationof a series of 'GIEs', merchantswereparticu-
which were intended to
regulate and control commercial activities and
raise revenue through
taxation.52
The productionof largecerealssurpluses,
followingincreasedrainfallin
1986,combinedwith the latearrivalof food aid
in1984and 1985,led to a rapidfall in prices, shipmentsafterthe drought
whichfurtherweakenedefforts
tostabilizethe cerealsmarket. OFNACER,
which managedthe security
stocksconstitutedlargelyon the basisof food aid
topurchasegrainat officialprices, and the consignments,was unable
producerswere forcedto sell to
theprivate merchantsat lower prices. This
failure to develop efficient
modesof state interventionin the cerealsmarket,
linked to the problems
arisingas the productionof cerealssurpluses
becameincreasinglyconcen-
tratedin the south-westernregionsof the country
while ensuringadequate
food supplies in the deficit regions of the
north remained difficult,
represented a majorsetbackfor the government.
But the rhetoricof food self-sufficiencyin
BurkinaFaso was also com-
promised by the growingurbandemandfor imported
as wheatandrice,as well
the failureto increasedomesticoutputof the latter
onimportsof fruitand vegetablesfrom Cote product. Restrictions
d'Ivoireandan increasein the
priceof beer, added to the dissatisfaction
amongst the urban
whose purchasingpowerhadbeen steadilyeroded. Declining population
livingalso encouragedthe merchantsand standardsof
'entrepreneurs'to seek oppor-
tunitiesfor profit outside the country.53 It is
significantthat the Front
51.The potentialand the weaknessesof the
examinedby G. Ledoux, 'Inventaire et evaluation cereals bank system have been thoroughly
Rapportde mission,(FAO,Rome,1986)and des Banques de cereales au Burkina Faso',
food by P. Woodrow,Cerealsbanksin Burkina Faso-
security,drought.anddevelopment,In M.
ashesdevelopmentstrategiesin timesof disaster Anderson&P. Woodrow(eds),Risingfrom the
See
alsothepaperby A. Pecquer, (Westview/UNESCO,Boulder&Paris,1989).
laHauteVolta, In Haubert,M. etAutonomie paysanne et autosuflisancealimentaire l'exemplede
al (eds),Politiquesalimentairesat structures
(PUF, Paris,1985),who arguedthatexchanges
noire socialesen Afrique
inBurkina
Fasorepresentedanopportunityto improve betweenthesevillagebasedcooperatives
support
the establishmentof autonomouspeasant food securityin the deficitareas,andto
52.The problemsof these 'Groupements organizations.
d'IntereotEconomiques'aredescribedby P.
Entreprises
et entrepreneursdu Burkina Faso, p. 233. Labazee,
53.See:P. Labazee,Entreprises et entrepreneursdu Burkina Faso, p. 226.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 AGRARIANCHANGEAND THE REVOLUTIONIN
BURKINA FASO 105
Populaire,
well aware of the increasing economic
hardship faced by the
urban workers, included wage increases, price
reductions and the lifting of
import restrictions amongst the first measures
introduced after the coup
d'etat in October 1987.
The alienation of merchants, state employees
and urban workers under
conditions of severe financial austerity was
accentuated by the degeneration
of the CDRs into instruments of
coercion. Internal disagreements
between the members of the CNR, and
increasing international pressures
also contributed to the isolation of Sankara.54
under the leadership of Campaore and the FP
Although the 'rectification'
has not entailed a complete
rejection of the revolutionary programme put
forward in the DOP, the new
government has abandoned the previous strategy of
majorinstitutions of 'civil society'. In confrontation with the
recognizing the strength of the trade
union movement and the private sector in the
towns, as well as the traditional
political authorities in the rural areas, the FP
has shifted towards an
emphasis on the need to generate renewed
economic activity based on the
consolidation of an 'entrepreneurial middle class' and
the introduction of
'statecapitalism'.55
But, although the reorganization of the CDRs
and the abolition of restric-
tionson the activities of the trade unions,
combined with a renewed effort to
encourageprivate investment, have created the basis
for a 'democratic open-
ing',the military still remains in power.
The legalization of political par-
ties,as well as the inclusion of various political
groupings in the coordination
ofthe FP, are also frequently discussed.
But, as the execution of suspected
opponentsof the present political and economic
strategy suggests, a stable
coalitionaround the government no longer
exists. In this sense it seems
thatthe cycle of alternating waves of
democratization and militarization
whichhave characterized Burkina Faso
since independence, is set to
continue.56

54.Relationswith the neighbouringcountries,

deterioratedfrom 1983to 1987.The USA, whichnotably with Cote d'Ivoire,Mali and Togo,
was criticalof the linksestablishedbetween
Burkina
Faso and Libyaunder Sankara,reduced
were
generallymaintained.These, and otherfactors foreignaid, althoughFrenchcommitments
the
governmentin 1987,areexaminedby R. Otayek, which led to the increasinginstabilityof
rythme,il est indispensablequeles danserschangent 'Burkina Faso-Quand le tambourchange
de
E. depas', Politique Africaine, 28 ( 1988)andby
Skinner,'Sankaraand the Burkinabe
dimensions', revolution-charismaand power,local and external
3'ournalof Modern African Studies,
55.The 'rectification'thusmarksa significant 2S3 (1988).
out changein theorientationof theRDP, as pointed
by R. Otayek,'Rectification',Politique Africaine,
passee
au Burkina . . . une recompositiondes 33 (1989):'I'heurede la paysannerie est
du pays des campagnesvers les villes alliances
politique (si tant
de classes re-deplacant le centre de gravite
privees, est, bien sur, que celles-ci en aientjamais ete
autrement qu'au plan symbolique ...). See also:
Sankara,pp 261-277. B. JaffreBurkina Faso-les annees
56.C. Savonnet-Guyot,Etat et Societes au
assessment Burkina Faso, p. 166.Fora further,highlycritical,
of the balanceof powerafterthe
& K. Somerville,'BurkinaPaso' 'Rectification'
J.Baxter in BurkinaFaso, see the surveyby
in B. Szajkowski(ed), Marxist Regimes
Economics,
Politics and Society (Pinter,London,1989). series-

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 106 AFRICANAFFAIRS

Concluding remarks
This survey of agrarianchange and political conflict in BurkinaFaso
raisesa numberof issues which have been examinedin the extensiveliter-
ature on the agriculturalproduction and food supply crises in Africa.
Although there is no simple, all-embracingexplanationof the economic
crisis of African agriculture,it has frequenttybeen attributedto 'mis-
management'bygovernmentswhosepoliciesarethoughttohavediscouraged
or inhibitedproductivityandoutputincreases. Consequently,revitalizing
the agriculturalsector by 'getting crop prices right' has been encouraged,
basedon the privatizationof agriculturalmarketingandthe liberalizationof
trade.57 However, the limitationsof this approachhave been thoroughly
explored,pointingout that structuralproblems,such as deficientresearch,
transport,input supply and credit systems have had significanteffects on
agriculturalproductivityin Africa. Given the need to increasethe output
of food and cash crops and to improvelevels of food security,income and
employmentin rural communities,it has been argued that development
strategiesshould be based on enhancedrural investmentcombined with
improvementsin production techniques, credit systems and marketing
arrangements.58
Furthermore,since manyAfricancountriesderivemuch of their foreign
exchange earnings from export crop production, declining levels of
commoditypriceson worldmarketshave accentuatedbalanceof payments
deficits. This shift in the terms of trade, together with increasingdebt
repaymentburdens,has forced many governmentsto introduceausterity
measures, often through stabilization and structural adjustment pro-
grammesagreed with the InternationalMonetary Fund and the World
Bank. But as BerryandCopanshaveobserved,manyof the policyreforms
whichhave been introducedin Africasince the end of the 1970shave dealt
withthe effectsratherthanthe causesofthe agrariancrisis.59 This becomes
all the more apparentwhen the internationalor 'external'constraintson
Africanagriculturaldevelopmentaretakeninto account.60
One of the majorcontentiousissues in studies of the relationsbetween
post-colonialstatesand peasantfarmersin Africais the role of government
interventionin agriculturemarkets. An influentialmodel developed by

57. Thus, duringthe 1980s, the WorldBankhas encouragedthe adoptionof strategiesin

whichthe emphasisis on 'increasingproducerpriceincentivesthroughhigherfoodprices,and
diminishingthe size of government,particularlyparastatals.'C. Delgado & J. Mellor, 'A
structuralview of policy issues in Africanagriculturaldevelopment',American3tournalof
AgriculturalEconomics, 6S5 (1984),p. 665.
58. See, interalia:J. Platteau,Thefoodcrisisin Africa.
59. See: Berry, 'The food crisis an agrarianchange in Africa'and J. Copans, 'Une crise
conceptuelle
opportune', PolitiqueAfricaine,26 (1987).
60. Seeforexample:V. Jamal,'Gettingoche crisisright missingperspectiveson Africa',ILO
Review,1274 (1988),andthe studyby P. Raikes,Modernising hunger-famine,foodsurplusand
farmpolicyin theEECandAfrica(CIIR/JamesCurrey/Heinemann, London,1988).

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 AGRARIANCHANGEAND THE REVOLUTIONIN BURKINA FASO 107

Bates to explain the political basis of economic policy making in Africa,

suggests that a powerful alliance of urban based industrial and bureaucratic
interest groups have exploited politically marginalized rural producers by
distorting prices, exchange rates and resource allocation.6l According to
this theory, market distortions which discriminate against the agricultural
sector are the logical consequences of an 'urban bias' in development strat-
egies emphasizing industrialization through import substitution. The
solution proposed, which has initiated a lively debate on the politics of state
intervention in African agriculture, rests on the assumption that removing
price distortions by reducing government control and regulation of agricul-
tural marketing will generate the conditions required for improvements in
production and living standards in the rural areas. But paradoxically:

the liberal, market orientated policies being pressed upon most African
countries by their aid donors and international bankers, frequently
require strong (authoritative) governments to sack public officials or
increase consumer food prices without incurring equivalent off-setting
expenditure on the military or on repairing riot damage.62

A central proposition arising from the 'urban bias' analysis is that econ-
omic mismanagement in Africa is due to the concentration of power in hands
on an urban elite. But the effects of external constraints and increasing
differentiation between classes and groups in both the urban and rural areas
are significant processes which cannot be dealt with by an explanation which
reduces political conflict to a simple dichotomy between the interests of the
urban (rich) and the rural (poor).63 The economic policies introduced by
governments in Africa are determined by complex sets of political forces and
alliances as well as class relations which go beyond the urban-rural divide.
Thus explanations of the agrariancrisis have begun to focus on the struggles
which have taken place between post-colonial states and peasant farmers,
revolving around access to resources and political power.
There are a number of important elements which have been identified in
the analysis of these processes. One argument is that government schemes

61. R. Bates,Marketsandstatesin tropicalAfrica(Universityof CaliforniaPress,Berkeley,

1981).
62. M. Moore,'InterpretingAfrica'scrisis politicalscienceversuspoliticaleconomy',IDS
Bulletin,184 (1987),p. 9.
63. See alsoM. Bienefeld,'Analysingthe politicsof Africanstatepolicy somethoughtson
RobertBates' work', IDS Bulletin, 17-1 (1986) for a criticalanalysisof the weaknessesof
the 'rationalchoice'model in explainingthe supposed'urbanbias'of economicdevelopment
strategiesin Africa.Streeten,Whatpricefood?has also examinedthis issue, concludingthat:
'Governmentsdo sometimestranscendtheir individualand group interestsand act in the
commoninterestor in the interestof the poor and weak.The pictureof the statepaintedby
RobertBatesas an instrumentof ruthlesslyamassingwealthandpowerby those in office,and
thoseon whosesupporttheydepend,withoutregardto eitherefficiencyorthe publicinterest,is
surelylimited'(p. 78-79).

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
108 AFRICANAFFAIRS

to transform agricultural production and parastatal intervention in agricul-

tural markets have failed to 'capture the peasantry', since African farmers
maintain a 'relatively high degree of autonomy from other groups and insti-
tutions in society'.64 According to this theory, production and exchange
are based on an 'economy of affection', and peasants have resisted the
incursions of a bureaucratic state apparatus with its foreign ideology of
modernization. But, while Hyden suggests that 'networks of support,
communication and interaction between structurally defined groups
connected by blood, kin, community or other affinities such as religion'65
are powerful factors in the functioning of the economy, this 'ahistorical'
approach has been criticized for its failure to account for the incorporation of
peasant producers in monetary, market exchanges and their domination by
other classes as well as by the state.66
In contrast, it has been argued that economic stagnation and the agrarian
crisis reflect a pattern of accumulation of wealth in African societies which is
characterized by efforts to exert control over resources rather than increasing
productivity.67 Privileged access to the resources of the expanding public
sector in post-colonial African countries developed through patronage and
kinship relations associated with the emergence of black markets, smuggling,
corruption and tax-evasion. In order to 'govern and hold together uninte-
grated peasant societies in the absence of legitimate authority',68systems of
personal rule, political patronage and military domination have evolved.
However further paradoxes arise:

The state is simultaneously strong in the sense that the state sector com-
prises a large proportion of the national economy, weak in the sense that
the political leadership lacks legitimacy (i.e. a capacity to command
obedience) among its citizens) strong in the sense that the public sector
bureaucracy is the only cohesive and organized group in national politics,
and weak in the sense that certain regional groups are disaffected and
secessionist because excluded from this bureaucracy.69

Gradually, there is a resurgence of interest in the conditions for the emerg-

ence of democratic systems of government in Africa.70 But the idea that
'less state means better government', which has been forcefully promoted by
64. G. Hyden,Africansocialstructureandeconomicdevelopment,In R. Berg&J. Whitaker
(eds),StrategiesforAfricandevelopment
(Universityof CaliforniaPress,Berkeley,1986),p.55.
65. Hyden,Africansocialstructureandeconomicdevelopment,p. 58.
66. See, interalia: J. Copans,Une criseconceptuelle
opportune,and N. Kasfir,'AreAfrican
peasantsself-sufficient?',
DevelopmentandChange,17-2 (1986).
67. Berry,'The food crisisandagrarianchangein Africa'.
68. R. Sandbrook,'The stateandeconomicstagnationin tropicalAfrica',WorldDevelopment,
1s3 (1986),p. 321.
69. Moore,'InterpretingAfrica'scrisis',p. 8.
70. See, for example: P. Anyang Nyong'o, 'Political instability and the prospects for
democracyin Africa',AfricaDevelopment, 13-1 (1988).

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 AGRARIANCHANGEAND THE REVOLUTIONIN BURKINA FASO 109

the internationalfinancialinstitutionsduringthe 1980s,detractsfrom, and

conceals,the fundamentaldebateaboutthe role andfunctionsof stateagen-
cies and institutions in economic development.71 As the 'structuralists'
haveemphasized,increasesin agriculturalproducerpricesandreductionsin
parastatalinterventionin markets('liberalisationet privatisation')are not
sufficientresponsesto the agrariancrisis. It has also been pointedout that
the privatizationof parastatalmarketingboardsin Africamaysimplyreplace
a publicmonopolywith privatetradingnetworkswhich do little to improve
the bargainingpower of the peasant producers,or to improve the food
security of the poorest farmerswhose needs are not backedby 'effective
demand'in the formof purchasingpower.72
On the otherhand,Richardssuggeststhatthe debtproblemsandresource
constraintsfaced by African states may offer an opening for 'populist'
strategiesto encourage'peoples science' in agriculturalproductionrather
than enforced modernization.73This in direct contrastto the approach
advocatedby Hart who argued that the modernizationof West African
agricultureshouldbe basedon the rapidcommercialintegrationof peasant
producersandon the developmentof capitalintensiveproductionsystems.74
However,raisingfood production:

cannotbe achievedby state directionof peasantproducers,but only by

encouraging peasant initiative based on their own experience and
improvingtheir own materialwell-being,and defendingtheir own gains
againstthe demandseven of the revolutionarystate.75

In attemptingto restructurethe 'relationsof power'in BurkinaFaso, to

'take the part of peasants',the CNR governmentunder Thomas Sankara
inevitablyencounterednumerouscontradictionswhichultimatelyled to the
'rectification'of the revolutionary strategy. Simultaneous attacks on
the powerandprivilegesof the urbanworkers,civil servants,merchantsand
the embryoniccommercialclasses,aswell as effortsto subvertthe traditional
Revue Tiers-Monde,114
71. P. Jacquemot,'La desetatisationen Afriquesubsaharienne',
(1988).The problemsof 'structuraladjustment',and the need for a 'politicalrenewal'which
would strengthenthe capacityof Africanpublicinstitutionsin orderto contributeto a stable
investmentenvironment,haverecentlybeenexaminedby the WorldBankitself, Sub-Saharan
Africa fromcrisistosustainablegrowth. (WorldBank,Washington,1989).
72. See Raikes,Modernising hunger.In criticizingthe limitationsof economicreformpro-
grammesin the Sahel,Girietal, TheSahelfacingthefuture,notethat:'Actiontakenon a specific
part of the system cerealsprices yesterday,tomorrowperhapsexchangerates createsa
disturbancethatwill verysoonbe absorbedby the system,whichis veryresilient,andwill not
ultimatelychangethe internalstructureof that system. Structuraladjustmentprogrammes
themselves,despitetheir name,do not reallyaffectthe structuresof Saheliansocieties.They
modifythe distributionof wealth,andmayhelpcreateconditionsforsubsequentchangesin the
internalstructure,althoughthis is farfromcertain',p. 252.
73. P. Richards,Indigenous agriculturalrevolution(Hutchinson,London,1985).
74. Hart, Thepoliticaleconomyof WestAfricanagriculture.
75. G. Williams,Takingthe partof peasants.In J. Harriss,(ed),Ruraldevelopmenttheories
ofpeasanteconomyandagrarianchange(Hutchinson,London,1982),p. 395.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
110 AFRICAN AFFAIRS

hierarchy in the rural communities gradually destroyed the initial support

for the revolution. Dissatisfaction amongst these powerful groups was
reinforced by growing resentment towards the controls and restrictions
imposed through the network of CDRs and popular tribunals in the villages,
workplaces and urban districts. Furthermore, although the CNR govern-
ment emphasized the intention to reduce dependence on foreign aid and
imports, insufficient financial and technical resources as well as continued
recourse to food imports increasingly compromised the rhetoric of self-
reliance. Nevertheless, it is ironic to note that in terms of output (GDP)
growth and agricultural production, the economy of Burkina Faso performed
remarkably well during the 1980s.
By abandoning the 'populist' strategy, the FP government has reverted to
a modernization approach relying on the transformation of production and
exchange through strengthening the commercial classes. In this process
the familiar practices of patronage and corruption have resurfaced, together
with a realignment of forces in favour of negotiations with the international
financial institutions and aid donors in order to reschedule debt repayments
and obtain new grants and loans.76 But although the new policies appear to
have encouraged private sector investment, continuing political instability,
as well as severe environmental degradation and food insecurity in many
rural areas, threaten to undermine the long term development potential.
The problem of 'generating an alternative dynamic of agricultural access,
accumulation and production'77remains unsolved, in Burkina Faso and else-
where in Africa. Despite the emergence of peasant associations (such as the
cereals bank cooperatives in Burkina Faso), and the reorganization of state
intervention in the agricultural sector through programmes of adjustment
and liberalization, 'the peasantry as such is unlikely to form the basis for a
major change in political structure'.78 But as long as states are dominated
by military, bureaucratic and commercial elites, the exclusion of smallholder
peasant farmers from political power and influence represents a major
obstacle to effective agrarian change.
76. See:Otayek,'Rectification',andBaxter& Somerville'BurkinaFaso.'
77. Berry,'The food crisisandagrarianchangein Africa',p. 97.
78. Raikes,Modernising hunger,p. 261.

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.145 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:04:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions