Delta Initiative Guide to Source Management

Introduction
The Delta Initiative views the world through the lens of geopolitics, the study of hard, physical
constraints on man's ability to shape reality. Political decisions are limited by the geography in
which they take place, eliminating many of the options concocted by ideologues and making their
human decisions easier to predict. But the study of geopolitics only takes the understanding of
global affairs so far: It identifies the geographical constraints but leaves an array of options open
to human actors. So when forecasting on a shorter time frame, analysis must go beyond
geographical constraints to more specific, temporal constraints. For this reason, predicting the
short-term activities of human actors requires an understanding of the constraints they face in the
human terrain within which they operate.

As a result, one task common to any intelligence organization is defining the human network of a
state, criminal organization, militant movement or any other organization to better determine and
understand a group's characteristics and abilities. A human network in this sense is a broad term
used to describe the intricate web of relations existing in an organization and within a specific
region. For anyone or any organization with interests in a given geographic area, understanding
the networks of individuals with influence in the region is critical.

Mapping a human network

People use human networks to organize the control of resources and geography. No person alone
can control anything of significance. Presidents, drug lords and CEOs rely on people to execute
their strategies and are constrained by the capabilities and interests of the people who work for
them. Identifying these networks may be a daunting task depending on the network. For obvious
reasons, criminal organizations and militant networks strive to keep their membership secret, and
it is not always apparent who gives the orders and who carries out the orders in a political body.
To discern who's who in a group, and therefore whether an individual matters in a group, requires
both intelligence and analysis to make sense of the intelligence.

How intelligence is acquired depends on the resources and methods available to an intelligence
organization, while the analysis that follows differs depending on the intent. Resources available
to provide intelligence are named sources. For example, International Security Assistance Force
military operations aimed at disrupting militant networks in Afghanistan would require the
collection of informants and signals intelligence followed by analysis to pinpoint the exact
location of individuals within a network to enable targeted operations. Organizing intelligence
collected from various sources and the management of these sources is an essential aspect of an
analyst’s job. Simply knowing who belongs to a militant network and their location is not enough;
the value lies in the significance and capabilities of an individual in the group. Detaining an
individual who lays improvised explosive devices on a road may result in short-term disruptions to
the target's area of operations, but identifying and detaining a bombmaker with exclusive
experience and training will have a far greater impact.
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The true value of analysis lies in understanding the significance of a particular individual in a
network. Mapping out a human network begins with the simple question of who belongs to a
particular network. Next, identify and define relationships with other known individuals and
organizations. For some, this process takes the form of link analysis, which is a visual
representation of a network where each individual is represented in a diagram. Links between the
individuals who interact with one another are then depicted. These links show an individual's
significance in a group and establish whether he is a lowly scout within a transnational criminal
organization who may only interact with his paymaster. The paymaster, by contrast, could be
linked to dozens of other group members. Examining how many links within a group an individual
has, however, is just scratching the surface of understanding the network.

Every individual within a given human network has reasons to be tied to others within the
network. Understanding what unites the individuals in an organization provides further depth of
understanding. Whether it be ideology, mutual interests, familial ties or paid services, why a
relationship exists will help determine the strength of such bonds, the motives of the network and
the limitations to what a network can accomplish. For example, when assessing the strength of the
Syrian regime, it is imperative to identify and examine the inner circle of President Bashar al
Assad. Analyzing these members can indicate which factions of the Syrian population and which
political and familial groupings support or reject the al Assad regime. That key posts within the
government are now occupied primarily by Alawites indicates a combination of regime distrust of
the Sunnis and dwindling levels of support from even high-ranking Sunnis. Similarly, examining
the once-strong ties of inner circle members who have defected indicates which factions no longer
support the regime and points toward other groups that might also have doubts about remaining
loyal.

Rarely is there a completely isolated human network. Human relations typically span multiple
regions or even continents. Politicians can have their own business interests, drug traffickers may
have counterparts in another country and militant groups may have the sympathy of other groups
or even members in a state's government. There are no limits on how separate networks may
interact with one another. Understanding a group's ties to other groups further defines the
original group's influence. For example, a political leader at odds with the powerful military of his
state may find significant constraints in governing (due to the limitations within the human
network on figures linking the military assets to political leaders). A drug trafficker with a law
enforcement officer on his payroll will likely find less resistance from authorities when conducting
illicit business (due to the capabilities that a police officer would provide to the network).

The reasons for, and methods of, defining a human network will vary depending on the
intelligence organization. A nation with vast resources like the United States has an exceptionally
large focus on human networks around the world and a full array of intelligence disciplines to
gather the necessary information. At the Initiative, our reasons to map the intricate web of human
relations within an organization differ as we look to understand the constraints that human
networks place on actors.

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The individuals in an organization are constantly changing. This means the job of mapping the
driving forces in an organization never ends, since relations shift, roles change and individuals
often are taken out of the picture altogether. As a result, intelligence collectors must continually
task their intelligence assets for new information, and manage that intelligence through source
management.

Logically, the more fluid the membership of an organization, the more difficult it is for an
intelligence organization -- or rival organization -- to follow it. It is no simple matter for an analyst
to ask his sources about, or to eavesdrop through surveillance, for information about the personnel
changes. Additionally, an analyst's assets may not be able to provide updates right away. In the
case of an informant, does the informant have the same access to the target as another, more
reliable source? Roles are more constant within an organization and can be split up among
individuals. Therefore, analysts must seek to understand the roles of individuals inside an
organization.

Understanding that the players within organizations change frequently, but that the roles and
constraints of an organization transform far more slowly, is key to how the Delta Initiative
approaches human networks. For the leader of a nation, the geopolitical imperatives of the nation
serve as impersonal forces directing the decisions of a rational individual. For a criminal or
insurgent leader, there is only so much that can be done while attempting to avoid notice by law
enforcement and the military, and the organization's imperatives will likely remain in place. In
determining the constraints and imperatives, we can better identify the significance and courses
of actions of an organization without necessarily knowing the details about the individuals serving
specific roles.

Particularly with more clandestine human networks, we continually examine the external effects
of known personnel changes. For example, how has the death of a Taliban leader in Pakistan
affected the operations of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan as a whole, such as in the case of the Jan.
3 death of Taliban leader Maulvi Nazir in South Waziristan? Nazir commanded a relatively benign
faction of the Pakistani Taliban that kept more aggressive, anti-government factions out of South
Waziristan. His removal, and the nature of his removal, could invite militants waging an active
fight against the Pakistani government to return to South Waziristan. Ultimately, Nazir was a
distinct figure in the Pakistani militant network due to his alliance with Islamabad. While his
removal won't change the fact that militants will thrive on the Pakistani-Afghan border (which
geography dictates), it does marginally tilt the balance away from Islamabad and toward the
militants.

In forecasting the political, economic or security climate of a geographic region, understanding

human networks must be incorporated into any analysis. Areas such as Mexico and Syria have
geographic elements that define conflicts. Mexico's location between the cocaine producers of the
northern Andes and cocaine consumers in the United States ensures that groups will profit off the
cocaine flow from south to north. The Sierra Madre Occidental and Sierra Madre Oriental divide
trafficking corridors between the east and west coasts of Mexico. But geography alone can't be

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used to predict how groups will organize and compete with each other within those trafficking
corridors. Predicting the spread and scope of violence depends on knowledge of the human
network and of who controls the resources and terrain. Similarly, the geographic significance of
the Levant to Iran and Iraq determines the importance of Syria as an access point to the
Mediterranean, but that alone doesn't determine the future of al Assad's regime. Understanding
who his most trusted confidants are, what their relationships are based on and watching their
moves enables us to filter the constant news of death and destruction coming out of Syria and to
focus on the individuals who directly support al Assad and determine his immediate fate.

To sum up, building a comprehensive map of human relations within an organization requires:
1. Identifying the individuals belonging to the organization.
2. Defining the relationships between these individuals.
3. Determining how the organization relates to other organizations in the same area.
4. Defining the role of each element in the organization.
5. Determining the constraints and imperatives of the organization.

Acquiring sources

In the previous guide, Guide to Information Gathering, we discussed three basic techniques for
gathering information (reconnaissance, footprinting and social engineering). Those techniques can
be used by pretty much anyone as they don’t represent a high security risk for the informant and
don’t require lengthy preparation beforehand. However, harder targets may require the use of
infiltration. Infiltration is the action of acquiring one or several sources that can surreptitiously
share information with an analyst. Sources can be informants, weaknesses in a network, virtual
backdoors (eg. Trojan horse). etc. Even though newspapers and public archives are also sources
that can provides valuable information, infiltration requires to go one step further and acquire
information from a covert source.

 Reconnaissance – Intelligence collected by observation

 Footprinting – Analysis of publicly available information
 Social engineering – Acquiring intelligence from human sources through deception
 Infiltration – Covertly acquiring intelligence from inside

The use of infiltration for gathering information requires a good understanding of the network you
need to infiltrate. Reconnaissance ops are often planned before infiltration in order to better
identify flaws and weaknesses inside a network. As an analyst, managing your sources is your
main job. From recruiting new sources to tasking existing one with news orders, sources
management can take various aspects.

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Intelligence provided by sources can be classified into four distinct categories, based on what they
are and how they were acquired. The following image shows a screenshot of how the Delta
Initiative’s analysts file new intelligence acquired by sources under their supervision.

SIGINT – SIGnal INtelligence

SIGINT is intelligence acquire through interception of signals. The signals intercepted can either
be electronic signal emitted by machines (ELINT – ELectronic Intelligence) or communications
between people (COMINT – COMmunication INTelligence).

PASINT – PASsive INtelligence

PASINT is intelligence that doesn’t require effort to be acquired and arrives to the analyst on its
own. Widely available, PASINT is usually acquired from public sources. Google Alert and online
databases are good example of passive intelligence.

IMINT – IMagery INtelligence

IMINT is intelligence acquired through analysis of satellite and aerial photography. Formally
reserved to armies with aerial reconnaissance or governments with satellites, high definition aerial
photography has now been made available to the public through services like Google Earth and
the Landsat public archives.

HUMINT – HUMan INtelligence

HUMINT is intelligence gathered directly from informants. Techniques for acquiring HUMINT
range from simple conversation to forced interrogation, depending on the informant’s willingness
to cooperate. An analyst managing a human source is called a handler. Handlers base their
analysis of intelligence on the informant’s credibility and motives. Those factors determines in
which of the following categories an informant belongs.

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Sources Classification

The nomenclature used by our analyst mostly comes from standard operations manual and are
generally accepted by the intelligence community. The following, however, are borrowed from
leaked internal documents from Stratfor, the private intelligence company. Those terms ironically
categorize human sources based on their motivation and exploitable flaws. They are also a dark
but realistic reminder of the relationship an analyst must keep with his sources. That’s why our
secure Sources Development application also uses these terms for source management.

 Businessman – A source that gives out information for money.

 Contractor – A source that has been placed under contract by the Initiative.
 Clancy – A paranoid source who has read too much Tom Clancy novels.
 Coerced – Someone who is forced to give out information.
 Honest – A source who consistently deliver good, actionable intelligence.
 Legal – A source with a government job or a public servant office.
 Swallow – A girl whose job it is to entertain potential sources.
 Door-keeper – Intermediary or middle-man with no power and little knowledge.
 Green-carder – A source who cooperates in hope of getting an immigration visa.
 Expat – A citizen of a NATO member state who emigrated to a foreign country.
 True-Believer – A source whose motive is defending an idea, an ideology or a religion.
 Cut-out – Subcontractor or intermediary placed by the Initiative to manage a source.

While a source’s motivation is one of its defining characteristic, other attributes can help sources
classification. A source’s credibility and reliability are also very important. Not be confused with
its reliability, a source’s credibility rates the believability of the intelligence provided by that
source. Does that source provides actionable intelligence or do we have to double-check every
piece of intel provided? Credibility ranges from 1 to 5, 1 being the equivalent of “Lying Sack
of Shit” and 5 being “Word of God”.

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The reliability of a source measures the ability of a source to provide intelligence whenever it’s
needed. It also indicates how much control an analyst has over its source. Can your informant be
contacted when needed or do you have to wait for him to contact you? With human sources,
reliability is associated with availability and willingness. Reliability also ranges from 1 to 5, 1
meaning that the analyst barely handles his source and 5 meaning absolute control over a
source that’s always available.

By default sources under the care of our analysts are active, meaning that they are ready to give to
provide intel and need analysts to make contact on a regular basis. However, situations occur
when contact with a given source needs to be interrupted: that source becomes then becomes a
sleeper. Sleeper can also be Business-type sources between paychecks or a source that needs to
gain trust from the organization it’s planted in before becoming reliable. Sleeper that can’t be
reactivated becomes archived. Archived sources and the intelligence they provided are
inaccessible to analysts and are consider to have never existed.

Another exception worth mentioning occurs when a source becomes hostile. Hostile sources are
sources that became targets. It might be a Coerced-type source we lost control of or a source that
fed us damaging counter-intelligence. Hostiles are some of the hardest targets there is because they
know the Delta Initiative and how we operate. They usually have the power to compromise active
operations and have to be considering dangerous.

In conclusion, the value of a good analyst resides in his ability to acquire and maintain new
sources, as well as classifying the intelligence he receives. Without accurate classification, intel
cannot be part of our decision-making process and becomes useless. A source that isn’t contacted
on a regular basis won’t be much use either. That’s why it is the analyst’s responsibility to create a
routine where he can recruit new sources while keeping regular contacts with his active sources.