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Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

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DOI: 10.1177/20578911211019257
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China’s image-building

Lina Gong
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Abstract
Image-building has been an important goal of China’s foreign policy. Humanitarian diplomacy
provides a useful instrument to build a benign international image, given the altruistic nature of
humanitarian action. China’s humanitarian diplomacy has undergone changes in recent years, such
as substantial increases in humanitarian spending, institutional reforms and the emergence of
Chinese non-state actors. The existing literature on China’s humanitarian activities is scant due to
the country’s limited engagement in global humanitarian action previously. This article aims to
contribute to the scholarship by examining China’s humanitarian activities in Southeast Asia during
the COVID-19 pandemic through the lens of image-building. Specifically, it answers the questions
of how China uses humanitarian action to improve its international image and how effective such
efforts have been. This article finds that the outcome of China’s image-building through humani-
tarian activities is influenced by the severity of the crisis, the national response of the country
affected and the perceived legitimacy of China’s action. It concludes that China’s humanitarian
diplomacy has achieved mixed outcomes in Southeast Asia. While China has been recognized as a
major provider of help during the pandemic, its assistance has not substantially improved its image
in the region.

Keywords
China, COVID-19, humanitarian diplomacy, image-building, Southeast Asia

Introduction
China has been seeking a benign and responsible image in the past two decades, and participating
in global governance has provided an important avenue for the country to achieve this foreign
policy goal. Among global challenges, China has been more active in areas that are related to trade

Corresponding author:
Lina Gong, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Block S4, Level B3, 50 Nanyang
Avenue, 639799, Singapore.
Email: islinagong@ntu.edu.sg
2 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

and economic development and has placed humanitarian affairs on the periphery of its diplomatic
work. This approach has gradually shifted under President Xi Jinping as the humanitarian sector
has witnessed the increased willingness of the Chinese government to contribute to addressing
humanitarian challenges, including emergencies in conflict settings, which Beijing used to con-
sider controversial and sensitive and maintain limited involvement in. Some examples include
President Xi Jinping’s pledge of $US29 million to Geneva in 2017 to help Syrian refugees (Xinhua,
2017), and Premiere Li Keqiang’s announcement of a contribution of $US100 million to New York
in 2018 to deal with the refugee crisis (Brunnstrom, 2016).
Apart from increased support for global humanitarian action in conflict settings, China has
become more active in responding to natural hazards in other countries. The Nepal earthquake in
2015 saw the participation of many Chinese non-governmental relief groups in an overseas oper-
ation for the first time (Chen, 2015). Following the collapse of a hydropower dam in Southern Laos
in July 2018, a Chinese military medical team arrived at the disaster site two days after the deadly
flood hit (Gong, 2018). In the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia in September
2018, Chinese telecommunication companies dispatched emergency technical teams to restore the
infrastructure in the most affected areas (Gong, 2020). In these cases, diverse actors got involved in
China’s disaster relief efforts overseas, from government agencies and the military to non-govern-
mental groups and enterprises. In particular, the Chinese non-state actors began to make contri-
butions beyond providing aid in kind and in cash, and they have become partners of humanitarian
operations in the field.
The aforementioned developments demonstrate that China’s humanitarian action now differs
from its previous approach, which featured limited engagement and modest contributions. How-
ever, China’s growing humanitarian assistance has met with issues and challenges. During
Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, China’s initial small donation drew widespread international criticism,
which was reportedly due to its territorial disputes with the Philippines in the South China Sea
(Salmons, 2019: 296). With regard to its role in solving the Rohingya crisis, some people have
accused Beijing of being self-interested and prioritizing development over human rights in its
approach, despite China’s assistance to the Rohingya people displaced in Bangladesh (Khan and
Ahmed, 2020; McPherson, 2020; Song, 2019: 688–689). China’s relief efforts in Nepal in 2015
were complicated by the question of Taiwan and the competition with India for influence (Denyer,
2015). These controversies lead to questions as to what the value of humanitarian diplomacy for
China’s foreign policy is and under what circumstances it can contribute to a better image of China.
For that purpose, it is worth examining how China perceives humanitarian affairs, how this
thinking has shaped its humanitarian action and the factors that influence the conversion of China’s
humanitarian assistance to a more positive international image.
Due to China’s limited engagement in humanitarian affairs previously, the literature on its
humanitarian action is limited and often incorporated into broader debates on Chinese foreign
policy on issues such as global governance, foreign aid, peacekeeping and humanitarian interven-
tion. Within the scholarship on China and global governance, humanitarian action is analysed as an
instrument for the rising (or risen) China to influence the norms in areas such as developmental
assistance, the responsibility to protect and conflict resolution. Studies point to the differences
between China and the major developed countries in its approach to issues such as humanitarian
intervention and foreign aid (Richmond and Tellidis, 2014; Rotmann et al., 2014; Thakur, 2013;
Woods, 2008). Such differences have given rise to the concern that China’s greater engagement in
humanitarian issues can challenge the dominant paradigm in global governance, which emphasizes
democracy, human rights and good governance. Another group of studies focuses on exploring the
Gong 3

domestic factors that shape China’s thinking of and approach to humanitarian work, with culture,
history and past experience of disasters identified as the key explanations (Hirono, 2013, 2020;
Yeophantong, 2016). This article aims to contribute to the literature by examining whether and
how China’s humanitarian action can help improve its international image and identifying the
external factors that influence how its humanitarian assistance will be received.
The article discusses China’s humanitarian diplomacy by examining its perspective on huma-
nitarianism and the features of its humanitarian action. It then assesses and analyses how effective
China’s humanitarian diplomacy has been in strengthening its positive image. The article also
identifies the factors that influence the outcome of China’s image-building through humanitarian
action. The rest of this article proceeds in four sections. The first section reviews image-building in
China’s foreign policy in the past two decades. The second section explains why humanitarian
diplomacy can be an instrument for building a positive international image. The third section
examines China’s humanitarian diplomacy and assesses its place in the international humanitarian
system. The fourth section analyses the circumstances that influence the outcome of China’s
humanitarian diplomacy, focusing on its humanitarian assistance to Southeast Asia during the
COVID-19 outbreak in 2020.

Image-building in China’s foreign policy

The image of a state has important implications for its external relations, as states tend to cooperate
with those with a benign image (Hartig, 2016: 661). China has been seeking to build a good
international image in the past four decades, with shaping a favourable external environment for
domestic development as a primary goal (Foot, 2001; Li, 2008: 300; Xia, 2001). The approach to
pursuing this goal has varied as China’s capacity and international standing have changed. In the
1980s and early 1990s, guided by Deng Xiaoping’s principles of ‘keeping a low profile’ and ‘not
seeking leadership’, China’s international behaviour featured relative cooperation but limited
contribution, with its engagement in United Nations peacekeeping a good example (Fravel, 1996).
A major task of China’s diplomacy in the 2000s was to address the negative impact on its image
caused by the China threat theory. Beijing increased its contributions to and engagement in
regional and global governance, conveying the message that China’s development would benefit
the world. The Chinese government adopted the idea of responsible power and advanced the
narrative that China’s development is peaceful (Breslin, 2010; Zheng, 2005). China’s decision
not to depreciate its currency in the 1997 Asian financial crisis was widely perceived as the
beginning of the effort to build and project the image of a responsible major power (Deng,
2014: 120). China’s troop contribution to UN peacekeeping increased from 52 in January 2000
to 103 in 2001 and further to over 1038 in 2005.1 Foreign aid was another sector that witnessed
China’s greater commitment. For instance, China became the third largest donor of food aid in
2005 (United Nations, 2006).
The global financial crisis in 2008 exposed the weaknesses in the existing economic order and
created opportunities for China to increase its say on global affairs, as the crisis shook the faith in
the global economic order. China joined with other emerging economies calling for reforms in the
existing global financial institutions. In 2010, the member states of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) agreed that 6 per cent of voting power would be transferred to the emerging markets
and developing countries (IMF, 2010), which put China in the third place in terms of voting share
in the organization. While the reform did not fundamentally change the distribution of power in the
4 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

IMF, it reflected the growing importance of emerging economies, China in particular, in the global
economy.
While the narrative of responsible power and peaceful development contributed to a relatively
positive international perception of China in the 2000s, there were still concerns and criticisms, due
to issues such as the Darfur crisis, the military rule in Myanmar, China’s growing quest for energy
and other resources and environmental pollution (Brautigam, 2011; Kleine-Ablbrandt and Small,
2008). Increasing active international behaviours as well as a firmer position on issues such as the
South China Sea disputes led to assertiveness being attributed to China’s image (Jerden, 2014;
Scobell and Harold, 2013; Zhou, 2016). While the debate on China’s assertiveness was incon-
clusive, scholars within China had their own debate on the country’s future strategy. The focus was
on whether it should continue the strategy of ‘keeping a low profile’ or become more proactive in
the international arena. Yan (2014: 161) argues that a more active international strategy is essential
for China to build a benign image. Such thinking to some extent has been reflected in China’s
diplomacy under President Xi.
President Xi pays particular attention to the issue of international image, evident in his remarks
on the importance of explaining China’s story well to the international audience (Xinhua, 2013).
Within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there are elements that reflect Beijing’s attention to how
it is perceived internationally, such as growing emphasis on sustainability, governance and people-
to-people communication. While China claims not to be seeking global leadership, narratives such
as ‘China’s solution to global challenges’ and ‘the BRI as a public good offered by China to the
world’ reflect the confidence and interest in a more prominent role in global governance. For
instance, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made the point that the BRI was ’the most popular
public good and the biggest cooperation platform’ when addressing Symposium on the Interna-
tional Situation and China’s Foreign Relations in December 2018 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2018). In a media interview, Foreign Minister Wang in November 2020, Foreign Minister Wang
referred to President Xi’s proposed relief package for global economic recovery from the COVID-
19 pandemic as ’China’s solutions to global challenges’ (Xinhua, 2020e). However, the contro-
versies and criticism associated with the BRI, such as the debt trap (Jones and Hameiri, 2020), pose
a major challenge to China’s current image-building efforts and raise the question as to which
factors influence the external perception of China’s image.

Humanitarian diplomacy
Humanitarian action is supposedly a useful instrument for states to generate attractiveness and thus
enhance their benign image, given its strong moral and ethical values. Humanitarianism essentially
refers to the sense that humankind has a duty to help vulnerable populations who are threatened by
immediate harms (Barnett, 2013). Humanitarian diplomacy in this article refers to the efforts
‘maximizing support for operations and programs, and building the partnerships necessary if
humanitarian objectives are to be achieved’ (Christopher Lamb, cited in Régnier, 2011: 1212).
Traditionally, humanitarian diplomacy is practised by international humanitarian actors such as
UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and major international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) like Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières,
MSF).
The existing humanitarian system is underpinned by the guiding principles for humanitarian
action (neutrality, independence, impartiality and humanity), which are upheld by international
humanitarian actors. The legitimacy of humanitarian activities is linked to the observance of these
Gong 5

principles. This however raises questions over humanitarian diplomacy exercised by the state.
Diplomacy is supposed to defend and promote national interest, but humanitarian objectives are
not necessarily always in line with a state’s national interests (O’Hagan, 2016: 664). Relief efforts
driven by factors such as geopolitical considerations, economic interest and political gains tend to
be controversial.
Views about and approaches to humanitarian action have become more diverse as more non-
western states seek to play more substantive roles in humanitarian affairs. Although humanitarian-
ism is believed to be universal, despite the differences between cultures and traditions, countries
divide over key issues related to humanitarian action, such as the actors, motives, means and
consequences (O’Hagan and Hirono, 2014: 412). While humanitarian activities are ideally altruis-
tic, states in reality are often motivated by mixed factors to become involved in humanitarian
activities (Paris, 2014: 581). The respective role of the state and the military in humanitarian action
is debated. Influenced by the four humanitarian principles, western societies view non-state actors
such as the ICRC and MSF as legitimate humanitarian actors, while in the Asia-Pacific the state
and the military are accepted as key responders to humanitarian situations (O’Hagan and Hirono,
2014; Simm, 2019).
Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008 and the Libyan civil war in 2011 presented two examples
of such divisions over humanitarian action in the international community. In the wake of Nargis,
the slow progress in the government-led response led to calls by some NGOs and western diplo-
mats for a military intervention to open humanitarian access under the principle of the Responsi-
bility to Protect (RtoP). This however was opposed by Southeast Asian countries and BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which argued that RtoP did not apply to natural
hazards (Junk, 2016). In the case of Libya in 2011, countries that initially supported or acquiesced
in the airstrikes by NATO became critical, such as China, Russia and South Africa (Paris, 2014:
581). Central to the debate is whether it is legitimate to promote regime change in the name of
humanitarianism, particularly in view of the humanitarian consequences (Kuperman, 2013). Such
debates between states reflect the struggle over the legitimate approach to dealing with global
challenges. Such a competition between the north and the South can have impacts on whether
humanitarian action is perceived positively in a specific context.

China’s humanitarian diplomacy

The Chinese perspective of humanitarianism
Humanitarianism in Chinese literally consists of three parts – ‘ren’ (human), ‘dao’ (the way of
things) and ‘Zhuyi’ (a set of thoughts or values). Humanitarianism per se has been taken up as a
foreign term introduced to China, together with concepts like freedom, equality and human rights,
between the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when China lagged far behind the West and Chinese
intellectuals sought to find a way to rejuvenate the country by learning from the then great powers
(Luo, 2005). However, elements of humanitarianism such as benevolence, compassion, dedication
and sacrifice can be found in the classics of Confucianism and Taoism. For instance, it is written in
Dao De Jing that the ways of harmony are creating without possessing, acting without expecting
and guiding without interfering (Lao Zi, 2006: 130). Confucianism advocates that the ruler should
put people first and aspires for an ideal world where one takes care not just of oneself and one’s
families but also of others (Hirono, 2013). The sense of responsibility/duty towards others shares
the ethos with western humanitarianism that calls for alleviating others’ suffering.
6 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

Regarding the agent and actor of humanitarianism, the state has been assumed to be the primary
provider of humanitarian assistance. In China’s ancient dynasties, as the emperor was believed to
be the Son of Heaven (Tianzi), he was supposed to care for its population (Zimin) in times of
disaster. This way of thinking influences how disasters are managed today in China. While non-
governmental relief groups in China have emerged and developed after the Sichuan earthquake in
2008, disaster management in the country remains highly state-centric. The preference for a state-
centric approach is also reflected in China’s humanitarian action overseas as Chinese humanitarian
aid has primarily been provided through the government-to-government channel. In addition, past
experience plays a role in shaping China’s humanitarian diplomacy. Positioning itself as a third
world country, the Chinese government emphasizes the consent of the receiving state to foreign aid
and refer to itself as a partner rather than donor of countries in need.

China’s approach to humanitarian diplomacy

Aid work has been on the periphery of China’s foreign policy, serving as a complementary means
to enhance its relations with the country or inter-governmental organization concerned. Apart from
cultural and historical factors, political considerations shape China’s approach to humanitarian
diplomacy. As aforementioned, humanitarianism was spread to China together with notions such
as democracy and human rights, and this led to its wariness of the political implications of
promoting the term. China’s cautious approach to the use of ‘humanitarian’ in the Chinese official
language was strengthened by the rise of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, given its long-
held position on non-interference and reluctance to endorse use of force (Liu, 2014). Humanitar-
ianism and humanitarian are used in their strict sense and often jointly with ‘emergency’. The
changes in the wording of China’s official documents indicated the new dynamics in its involve-
ment in humanitarian affairs. In its white paper on foreign aid in 2011, humanitarian aid was only
referred to in association with natural hazards (State Council of China, 2011). In the 2014 version,
humanitarian disasters induced by war are mentioned, as China provided aid to conflict situations
like Syria in 2013 (State Council of China, 2014).
It is interesting to note China’s preference for using the term humanitarian in relation to public
health, referring to the efforts of medical personnel to rescue the dying and to take care of the
injured. The phrase ‘the spirit of international humanitarianism’ is used to praise the Chinese
medical teams that are dispatched to disaster/conflict-affected areas. For instance, providing
emergency medical aid and technical support to West African countries affected by the Ebola
outbreak in 2014 and 2015 was cited as an example of China’s humanitarian aid overseas in its
white paper on foreign aid in 2014. This shows that humanitarian situations caused by public health
emergencies are less contested from China’s perspective, which reflects its tendency to contribute
to humanitarian situations in non-conflict settings.
China still prefers the government-to-government channels for providing aid, while the existing
global humanitarian landscape features the key roles of UN agencies and major international
humanitarian NGOs. Influenced by its state-centric worldview and limited interactions with
non-state humanitarian actors, while commending the contribution of NGOs to areas like huma-
nitarian relief, China has reservations over their activities in some cases. The Chinese represen-
tative to the UN cautioned during one meeting that humanitarian agencies and NGOs should
strictly adhere to the principles of justice, neutrality, objectivity and independence in delivering
humanitarian assistance. Speaking on the Rohingya issue, China’s Deputy Representative to the
UN even warned that UN agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Gong 7

(UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) should avoid politicization
(of the issue) and that the international community should make greater efforts in poverty eradica-
tion and sustainable development so as to achieve stability and harmony in the affected areas
(United Nations, 2018). Their preference for bilateralism over multilateralism in humanitarian
action in some cases can lead to questions over the legitimacy of their humanitarian action, as
bilateral aid from more powerful states tends to be viewed with suspicion (Weiss, 2016: 316).
However, humanitarian action can lead to positive foreign policy outcomes when the offers of
assistance match the needs of the affected country and conform to regional and local norms.
China’s emphasis on the linkage between development and peace and security has shaped its
approach to humanitarian action in conflict settings since the end of the Cold War. Chinese aid to
these situations has been development oriented. Apart from immediate relief items, China also
offered debt relief, dispatched medical teams and supported capacity building, recovery and
reconstruction in post-conflict areas. In response to the humanitarian crisis induced by the Syrian
civil conflict, the Chinese government in 2017 alone donated US$1 million to the World Health
Organization (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the ICRC respectively, signed three
assistance gratis agreements worth over US$40 million and pledged to continue its assistance
(Xinhua, 2017).
Despite the controversies and criticism, economic interests have been a factor that has driven
China’s increasing commitment to humanitarian affairs. The expansion of China’s economic
presence in other parts of the world has made its economic interests more vulnerable to foreign
security crises. The Chinese enterprises in Libya for instance suffered losses of US$1.5 billion in a
week after the situation deteriorated in mid-February 2011 (Ding, 2011). Thereafter, security risks
to China’s overseas interests were specifically noted in China’s Defense White Paper in 2013. The
BRI, which is designed to enhance connectivity, trade and investment between countries along the
two routes that cross Asia, Africa and Europe, serves as an important instrument for Beijing to
encourage countries concerned to consider solutions supported by China. From the Chinese per-
spective, this approach links China’s interests with the security of other countries more closely and
increases its own incentive to engage in addressing humanitarian crisis in foreign countries,
evident in the aforementioned increases in funding for the projects of UN agencies in conflict
situations.

A limited Chinese role in the global humanitarian sector

China’s new moves in recent years suggest its aspiration to play a more substantive role in
humanitarian affairs. This trend has been evident in the creation of funds to support development
and humanitarian projects in other countries. Between 2015 and 2017, the Chinese government
allocated US$3 billion to the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund (SSCAF) and US$1
billion to the United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund over a 10-year period, part of
which can be assigned for humanitarian aid for refugees (Brunnstrom, 2016; Nichols, 2016; Wu
and Li, 2015). Due to the lack of experience and capacity in project implementation in the field,
China primarily partners with the UN on implementing many projects funded by the SSCAF.
Despite the increases, however, China’s contributions to global humanitarian funding remain
modest. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported
humanitarian donations worth of over US$128 million from China in 2017, which accounted for
only one per cent of the global humanitarian funding.2 This was already the largest annual dona-
tions in China’s own record. These figures represent only China’s humanitarian spending in the
8 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

UN system and the actual level of humanitarian donations through bilateral channels is likely to be
higher. Much of China’s assistance was delivered bilaterally rather than through the UN system.
This approach poses a major challenge to studying the humanitarian aid of China and gives rise to
criticism over a lack of transparency. While the United Nations’ records are not exhaustive, the
figures to some extent still provide a general estimate of the size and trend of humanitarian
donations from the country.
A key feature of Chinese donations is the focus on emergency situations caused by natural
reasons (such as food crises, epidemics/pandemics and natural hazards) rather than conflict-
induced issues (such as refugee crisis). Such a tendency is reflected by the distribution of its
donations to different UN agencies. Between 2000 and 2020, the WFP has been the top destination
for donations from both countries. Among China’s 51 donations to the WFP between 2005 and
2019, six were specifically allocated to conflict-affected populations including refugees.3 The
WHO has been the second largest recipient of Chinese funding. The top two recipients together
accounted for 90 per cent of the country’s donations to the UN.4 There have been eight Chinese
donations to the projects and plans of the UNHCR between 2001 and 2019.5

China’s humanitarian diplomacy in Southeast Asia during the COVID-

19 pandemic
The outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 has induced multifaceted implications for global governance.
The WHO declared COVID-19 as a pandemic on 12 March 2020. According to the WHO, by 22
April 2021 there had been over 143 million cases reported and over 3 million people had died from
the disease (WHO, 2021). The global economy has suffered significant losses from the outbreak.
An IMF forecast published in June 2020 suggests a 4.9 per cent contraction in the global economy
in 2020 and an average contraction of 8 per cent in developed economies (IMF, 2020). Moreover,
the outbreak has exacerbated social problems, such as inequality, unemployment and exclusion,
which can fuel public discontent and threaten social stability.
Amid this global crisis, humanitarian needs surged, evident in the competition for medical
supplies between countries in March and April 2020 and the United Nations’ appeal for
US$10.3 billion for the Global Humanitarian Response Plan for COVID-19. Against this back-
ground, the diplomatic offensives by China, particularly in the early phase of the outbreak, were
noteworthy. China offered assistance to over 150 countries and several international organizations
in the form of medical supplies, medical teams and funding support (Government of China, 2020).
In addition, President Xi pledged in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in
September 2020 that Chinese vaccines would be offered as global public goods for the global
combat against the pandemic, in addition to further funding commitments to the UN system for the
combat against COVID-19.

Assistance to Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia has been a priority of China’s diplomatic offensive in this period. China has a long
history of providing medical assistance to countries with weak healthcare systems, including some
Southeast Asian countries. The Chinese government was swift in responding to the needs in
Southeast Asia, as much of the assistance was delivered in March and April 2020, the early phase
of the pandemic outbreak. In addition to medical supplies, China sent medical teams to Cambodia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar and the Philippines. Cambodia received the first medical team that
Gong 9

China sent to its neighbours and the first batch of Chinese military medical personnel overseas,
which according to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was in return for Cambodia’s support for
China’s own response to COVID-19 in January and February 2020 (Xinhua, 2020a). Amid the
quick increase in cases in the Philippines in March 2020, China sent a medical team and several
batches of critical medical supplies to Manila from early April onwards (Embassy of China in
Indonesia, 2020a, 2020c). Secretary Carlito Galvez, the Head of the Philippines COVID-19 task-
force, described China’s support as a sign of good bilateral relations when receiving the first batch
of aid in April (Embassy of China in Indonesia, 2020b). In addition, the Chinese biotech company
BGI Group provided technological support for setting up a laboratory in Pamganga Province,
which increased the Philippines’ testing capacity (Xinhua, 2020d).
In response to the shortage of medical supplies in Indonesia, China donated several batches of
medical aid from April onwards; online exchanges were organized between medical professionals
from the two sides to discuss ways of combating the disease (Embassy of China in Indonesia,
2020a, 2020c). In addition, pharmaceutical companies of the two countries (Bio Farma and
Sinovac Biotech) entered into a partnership in producing and distributing a COVID-19 vaccine
in Indonesia (Straits Times, 2020). The cooperation amid the pandemic has contributed to the
positive momentum in the bilateral relations. The Head of Indonesia’s National Agency for
Disaster Management described the cooperation as a manifestation of ‘the long-lasting friendship
between the two countries’ (Embassy of China in Indonesia, 2020a).
The interactions between China and ASEAN member states on COVID-19 also meant military
exchanges. Some of the medical experts dispatched to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar were from
the Chinese military, which signalled the level of military exchanges in the health sector (Xinhua,
2020a, 2020b, 2020c). The involvement of the Chinese military in Beijing’s medical assistance to
Myanmar is an indication of good bilateral military relations. China sent military medical experts
on 30 April 2020 to help Myanmar build a testing lab and provide training for local professionals
(Xinhua, 2020b). Upon receiving China’s aid, Myanmar’s Union Minister for Health and Sports
described the assistance as a symbol of their Pauk-Phaw (fraternal) friendship (Embassy of China
in Myanmar, 2020). COVID-19 even opened a window for the Chinese and Indonesian militaries
to increase interactions, such as having virtual meetings between military medical experts
(Embassy of China in Indonesia, 2020b, 2020c). The donations from China’s Ministry of National
Defense were perceived by the Indonesian side as a demonstration of goodwill and friendship
(Embassy of China in Indonesia, 2020b).
Learning from the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) experience, China moved
quickly to engage its Southeast Asian neighbours from the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak,
evident in the Special ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in February 2020. The statement
released after the meeting recognized China’s response to the outbreak, which rendered political
support for China that has been under pressure as the first country to detect the disease (ASEAN-
China, 2020). This was followed by the Special ASEAN Summit and Special ASEAN Plus Three
(APT) Summit on COVID-19 in April. The APT countries agreed on emergency measures like the
utilization of the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve and proposed establishment of the
COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund (ASEAN Plus Three, 2020). The thirteen countries expressed
recognition for the important role of the WHO and emphasised the need for cooperation in the
response to COVID-19 and other infectious diseases (ASEAN Plus Three, 2020). The official
document from the regional meetings addressed key issues in the response to the pandemic, such as
the controversies over the WHO and a lack of cooperation and coordination between countries in
10 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

their response. The ASEAN-centred platforms have been crucial for shaping the East Asian
discourse on COVID-19, which has an impact on the global discourse.

Analysis
The pandemic led to criticism and controversy over China’s response to the outbreak in the early
phase and thus caused damage to its international image. China’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia has
seen mixed results in terms of reducing the damage. On the one hand, Chinese assistance was
welcomed by Southeast Asian countries due to the severe shortage of essential items for COVID-
19 response. The was reflected in the recognition of China as the largest assistance provider in the
region during the pandemic (Seah et al., 2021). However, the image of China in the region has not
necessarily improved, as many people in the region are more concerned about China’s behaviour
on issues such as the South China Sea disputes and trust in China has declined (Seah et al., 2021).
The mixed outcomes of China’s diplomacy in this region can be explained by the non-contested
nature of the crisis from the perspectives of both China and ASEAN, the state-centric approach to
COVID-19 response in Southeast Asian countries and the history of cooperation in public health
emergencies since the SARS epidemic in 2003.
As aforementioned, China prefers to engage in humanitarian action in natural hazards or public
health emergencies over conflicts. Due to the scale and features of this pandemic, the global
humanitarian system has been overwhelmed by the humanitarian needs across the globe and the
traditional donors have been preoccupied with domestic outbreaks, giving an opportunity for
China’s humanitarian action. In addition, the COVID-19 response has been state-centric in many
countries, including Southeast Asian countries. Such an approach to the COVID-19 response has
enabled China to carry out bilateral diplomatic efforts. The outbreak of SARS in 2003 culminated
in an understanding between China and Southeast Asian countries about the threat posed by
infectious diseases and the need to cooperate in dealing with such challenges. This shared under-
standing facilitated the early engagement and cooperation between China and its Southeast Asian
neighbours during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the international criticism on China’s slow
COVID-19 response at the beginning has had an impact on how China’s humanitarian diplomacy
has been received and perceived in the region (Wong, 2020).

Conclusion
China’s state-centric outlook on various humanitarian challenges differs in agency, norms and
priorities from the dominant approach in the humanitarian system which is featured by a multi-
plicity of actors. While there are enormous demands for expanding sources of support for huma-
nitarian work, China’s greater involvement faces challenges. The absence of non-governmental
and informal channels in Chinese diplomacy limits the channels of engagement at China’s disposal
as the role of non-state actors has been proven to be instrumental in dealing with humanitarian
emergencies in different settings. The UN system remains the most important venue for China to
engage the humanitarian sector, at normative, policy and practice levels. There are signs that
Beijing will continue to uphold the centrality of the UN in dealing with these challenges. While
regional mechanisms are essential for Beijing, bilateral diplomacy features prominently in China’s
response to overseas humanitarian emergencies.
Emphasis on the principle of non-interference and the primary role of the national government
concerned is regarded by China as another feature of its approach to humanitarian affairs. This
Gong 11

normative preference however creates a dilemma for China’s diplomacy in conflict settings
because it has to justify the legitimacy of its involvement without defeating its traditional adher-
ence to non-interference, which has been seen in cases like South Sudan and the Rohingya issue.
While Chinese diplomats and scholars try to distinguish its involvement in foreign crises from
interference and elaborate the conditions and circumstances that justify China’s role, there are still
questions not answered by their framing of China’s involvement. It will be a test for Beijing if
creative involvement will be exercised for humanitarian reasons. As China’s role in these situa-
tions is often associated with its own interests from the perspective of some international huma-
nitarian actors, such involvement has led to controversies or even criticism rather than an
improvement in image.
There is the expectation both inside and outside China to use the BRI as a vehicle for China to
provide greater humanitarian and developmental support for countries that are affected by huma-
nitarian crises. Such efforts exist to tie China’s humanitarian action with the BRI, evident in the
fact that BRI partner countries are prioritized in China’s humanitarian aid. However, the analysis
of China’s engagement in Southeast Asia during COVID-19 shows that humanitarian assistance
does not necessarily improve its image in the region. While the nature of the crisis and the national
approach to the COVID-19 response created opportunities for acceptance and recognition of
Chinese humanitarian aid, the perceived legitimacy of Chinese action can be undermined by its
own domestic COVID-19 response and the underlying causes of tension in China’s relations with
the region.

Acknowledgements
The research for this article is part of the project on Asia and the Humanitarian World, supported by the Centre
for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore. The author is grateful for the great lead and support of co-editor Dr Alistair DB Cook
in this project. The author remains responsible for the final version.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for authorship and/or publication of this article. The author(s)
received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD
Lina Gong https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5282-6512

Notes
1. Author’s compilation from United Nations Peacekeeping (n.d.).
2. Author’s compilation from OCHA (n.d.).
3. Author’s compilation from OCHA (n.d.).
4. Author’s compilation from OCHA (n.d.).
5. Author’s compilation from OCHA (n.d.).
12 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

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