CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.

JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REFUGIO DEVARAS,

FELIPE LADOY and ENRIQUE SALVE defendants, ENRIQUE SALVE, Defendant-
Appellant.

FACTS:

Around 10pm, Marcellana and Aniceto heard Salve calling from the outside asking for
cigarettes. Aniceto opened the door and Felipe hacked him with a bolo on the head.
Salve and Devaras followed and they helped on wounding Aniceto. Then they pointed
their bolos at Marcellana and searched her person and they were able to get 625 pesos.
They also took away other belongings of the couple.

Aniceto was in a serious condition and Ramulte, the investigator could not even get him
to sign his statement that the three were responsible for the robbery and the wounds
inflicted upon Aniceto. The latter died the next day.

Marcellana’s testimony was not shaken on cross-examination. There was also no effort
to discredit the statement of Aniceto because he was too weak and in a very serious
condition.

ISSUE:

Whether the declaration was part of the res gestae.

HELD:

The Court found that the statement from Aniceto is a dying declaration as it is a
statement coming from "a seriously wounded person" even if death occurs "hours or
days after it was inflicted" if there be showing that it was due to the wound whose
gravity did not diminish from the time he made his declaration "until the end came."

The principle is thus well-settled that there is no need for proof that the declarant state
"that he has given up the hope of life, It is enough if. from the circumstances, it can be
inferred with certainty that such must have been his state of mind." Thus "it is sufficient
that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that the time [of
such statement] the declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he actually
died." To repeat, its admissibility is not affected by death occurring "hours or days"
afterwards.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO LAQUINON,

alias "JOLLY", defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Gunshots were heard by the barrio Captain, Samama, from the riverbanks. His brother,
Leacarion told him that somebody was shouting for help at the same location. Smama
told his brother to summon the barrio councilman. They proceeded to the place where
the unidentified man was and Samama asked the man who he was. The man answered
“I am Pablo Remonde”.

Samama then took the "ante mortem" statement of Pablo Remonde. He asked him who
he was to which he answered that he was Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat asked "who
shot you" and Remonde said that it was Gregorio Laquinon. He asked Pablo Remonde
whether from the gunshot wounds he suffered he would survive to which the victim
answered "I do not know"

The trial court found the accused guilty of murder.

ISSUE:

Whether Pablo Remonde’s statement is inadmissible in evidence as an ante-mortem

declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending death.

HELD:

Yes, it was inadmissible as an ante-mortem declaration.

The Court found the dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde as inadmissible
as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would
die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in
extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole
basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."

However, it may be admitted as part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time
to concoct a charge against the accused.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. RODULFO SABIO, alias

"PAPU", defendant.

FACTS:

At about 5am, a witness heard a shout for help coming from the victim’s house.
Suddenly, she saw Sabio coming out of the door of the store at the victim's house. The
accused was wearing a black shirt with sleeves up to the elbow and dark trousers. She
had known the accused since his birth because his house is located at the seashore in
Barrio Looc, just about 40 meters from her own house, and she is familiar with his
appearance because she used to see him everyday passing by her house or at the
seashore.

Fuentes a police man also testified that when they proceeded to the victim’s house, he
asked the latter who had hacked him and the latter answered that it was "Papu" Sabio,
son of Menes. Patrolman Fuentes asked the victim why "Papu" hacked him and the
latter answered that "Papu" had demanded money from him. Patrolman Fuentes also
asked the victim how much money he had lost but the latter was not able to answer that
question. Sensing that the wound was serious since it was bleeding profusely
Patrolman Fuentes decided to take down the statement of the victim. He detached a
leaf from a calendar and wrote down on it the questions he propounded as well as the
answers of the victim. He then had it thumbmarked by the victim with the latter's own
blood as no ink was available. Present at the time were Pedro Burgos, another police
officer, and Camilo Semilla, the grandnephew. 

ISSUE:

Whether the statement of the victim is an ante-mortem declaration and may be

admissible as evidence.

HELD:

Yes.

The Court found that the victim must have known that his end was inevitable. The Court
considered the seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which had affected the
brain and was profusely bleeding as well as the victim's inability to speak until his head
was raised. Furthermore, the spontaneous answer of the victim that "only Papu Sabio is
responsible for my death" and his subsequent demise from the direct effects of the
wound on his forehead are conclusion that it was indeed a dying declaration.

The fact that the death occurred 3 days after the incident does not reduce the probative
force of the declaration since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS
thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in
point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible.

Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew Camilo Semilla to fetch the police,
does not negative the victim's feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather
emphasizes the realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to the
authorities. The mere failure of the police to confront the accused cused with the
antemortem declaration the first time the latter was arrested and incarcerated from
October 5 to October 6, 1965, neither militates against the fact of its execution
considering that it was evidence that the police was under no compulsion to disclose.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ

FACTS:

The victim, Eulalia was home alone when her daughter and son in law went to work.
Her grandson, Alvin was also out of the house for school.

At 3pm, a neighbor saw de Joya standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the
victim’s house. When Alvin got home, he saw Eulalia drenched in blood. Alvin asked
her, “Apo, Apo, what happened?”. Eulalia responded and said “Si Paqui” and then she
expired.

Upon learning of the incident, the daughter went home and found that two of her
mother’s gold rings were missing as well as her right earring.

The trial court found de Joya guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE:

Whether the dying statement of Eulalia is complete and admissible.

HELD:

The Court held in the negative.

The deceased uttered the words “Si Paqui.” The latter was undisputedly the nickname
of de Joya but those two words could have been intended to designate either the
subject of the sentence or the object of the verb.

It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself.
However, it does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the
res gestae, but that his statement should be a full expression of all that he intended to
say.

The Court held that the dying declaration of the victim here is incomplete. She was cut
off by death before she could convey a sensible communication to Alvin. The Court said
that it could not speculate what the rest of the victim’s communication might have been.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS

GERONIMO DUSEPEC, administrator of the estate left by the deceased Tan Po

Pik, YU TENG NIU, TAN CHIONG YAN, TAN CUI and TAN YIN TI, the last two being
represented by their guardian TAN Po O, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. MARTA TORRES
and JULIANA TORRES,

FACTS

Tan Po Pik died intestate in the Philippines and Marta Torres, who is claiming to be his
widow, took possession of his estate and partitioned it between herself and her children
from the Tan Po Pik.

Plaintiffs who are claiming to be the legal wife and children of the deceased from China
are suing to recover their share of the estate. The Court found inconsistencies to the
testimonial and documentary evidence of the plaintiffs regarding the conclusion that the
plaintiffs are not who they claim to be. Plaintiffs offered in evidence a sworn declaration
of the deceased that the plaintiffs were his children. Defendants offered letters between
the deceased and his brother showing that deceased’s sworn declaration was to
deceive the customs authorities to allow plaintiffs to enter the country.

ISSUE:
Whether the letters are admissible in evidence.

HELD: 

The foregoing facts evidently prove that Tan Po Ho and Tan Po Pik have agreed as to
what they should declare before Customs authorities in order to effect the entrance of
the plaintiffs into the Philippine Islands. Now then, if these plaintiffs were really children
of Tan Po Pik and Yu Teng Niu, there would have been no necessity in preparing such
declarations; Tan Po Ho would not have said that Chiong Cui is a nephew of Tan Po Pik
and could appear as son of the latter; neither would there have been any necessity for
Tan Po Ho revealing to Tan Po Pik the genealogy of the family of Chang Yuen. Hence,
if Tan Po Pik testified before the customs authorities that they were his children, he did
it in order that the said children might be allowed to enter the Philippines, and such a
declaration is entirely false. These plaintiffs had no other means of living than to come
to the Philippines and be under the protection of Tan Po Pik, and had no other means to
secure their entrance into the Islands than to present themselves as the minor children
of Tan Po Pik, and, so they did with the help of Tan Po Ho and Tan Po Pik who also
deceived the Customs authorities.

All these documents formed an essential part of the fact of the coming of these plaintiffs
to Manila, because if these letters had not been transmitted and received the plaintiffs
could not have succeeded in entering the Philippines. Moreover, these documents show
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS
a conspiracy between Tan Po Ho and Tan Po Pik to evade the Chinese Immigration
Laws. Therefore, all the statements and declarations of Tan Po Ho in these documents
relative to the prosecution of the object of the conspiracy are admissible in evidence,
even if Tan Po Ho were within the jurisdiction of the Philippines at the time of the trial of
this case .
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS

ALEX JACOBO y SEMENTELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

FACTS:

During a wake, Bermudes was gathering the drinking glasses used by the mourners
when he heard Jacobo ask if anybody would kill him. Jacobo, while holding a foot-long
knife, approached Jessie Peralta who was seated asleep on a chair, and took aim at
Peralta. Bermudes shouted at him to stop but the latter desisted and approached
Romeo de Jesus who was lying down on a bench. De Jesus woke up and a quarrel
between the two ensued.

Jacobo and De Jesus, who was likewise armed stabbed each and then separated, both
appearing not seriously injured because they were still standing. De Jesus asked
appellant why the latter was going away instead of finishing the fight. Jacobo and de
Jesus resumed stabbing each other until the latter suddenly fell down and Jacobo ran
away.

Bermudes was presented as a witness.

ISSUE:

Whether Bermudes' testimony was worthy of credence despite his earlier sworn
statement corroborating the petitioner's testimony.

HELD:

The trial court and the CA gave full faith and credence to the testimony of prosecution
witness Bermudez despite his earlier affidavit or "Salaysay" for the reason that affidavits
are incomplete reproduction of what the declarant had in mind because they are
generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after
the same have been read to him.

The Court agreed to such findings that an affidavit being taken ex parte is almost
always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion, and
sometimes from want of suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness
may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the
correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all
that belongs to the subject. An affidavit will not always disclose all the facts and will,
oftentimes and without design, describe some occurrences without the deponent
detecting inaccuracies or contradictions. 

This is substantially the same as his direct testimony that the deceased asked petitioner
why he was walking away instead of finishing the fight. They resumed stabbing each
other as a result. Clearly, in both the Salaysay and Bermudes' testimony, the deceased
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS
and the petitioner agreed to fight. This was what the trial court had found and what
Respondent Court affirmed. It must also be mentioned that the defense counsel allowed
the case to be submitted for decision without cross-examining Bermudes, failing thereby
to take advantage of an opportunity to impeach (assuming that he could) Bermudes'
credibility and testimony.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS

NG MENG TAM, Petitioner, v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:

China Bank file a collection suit against Ever, the heirs of Go Tong, Vincente Go,
George Go and Ng Meng Tam. China Bank alleged that Ever defaulted in payment and
the former sent demand letter to George, Vicente and petitioner.

Petitioner alleged that the surety agreements were null and void since these were
executed before the loan was granted in 2004. Petitioner posited that the surety
agreements were contracts of adhesion to be construed against the entity which drafted
the same.  Petitioner also alleged that he did not receive any demand letter.

Having failed mediation and judicial dispute resolution, the case was reraffled. Petitioner
again moved for the hearing of his affirmative defenses. Because he found Yap’s
answers to the interrogatories to parties evasive and not responsive, petitioner applied
for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum against George Yap.
When the case was called for the presentation of George Yap as a witness, China Bank
objected citing Section 5 of the JAR.  China Bank said that Yap cannot be compelled to
testify in court because petitioner did not obtain and present George Yap’s judicial
affidavit. 

Petitioner contended that Section 5 does not apply to Yap because it specifically
excludes adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses from its application.  Petitioner
insists that Yap needed to be called to the stand so that he may be qualified as a hostile
witness pursuant to the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether JAR includes adverse party and hostile witnesses.

HELD:

No, based on the wording of Section 5, adverse party and hostile witnesses are clearly
excluded.

Under Section 10, parties are to be penalized if they do not conform to the provisions of
the JAR. Parties are however allowed to resort to the application of a subpoena
pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules of Court in Section 5 of the JAR in certain situations.  

The Court agrees with the RTC that Section 5 has no application to Yap as he was
presented as a hostile witness, it did not agree that there is need for a finding that
witness unjustifiably refused to execute a judicial affidavit.
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS
Section 5 of the JAR contemplates a situation where there is a (a) government
employee or official or (b) requested witness who is not the (1) adverse party’s witness
nor (2) a hostile witness.  If this person either (a) unjustifiably declines to execute a
judicial affidavit or (b) refuses without just cause to make the relevant documents
available to the other party and its presentation to court, Section 5 allows the requesting
party to avail of issuance of subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21
of the Rules of Court.  Thus, adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses being
excluded they are not covered by Section 5. 
CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
JD 3A HEARSAY CASE DIGESTS

AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

On March 28, 1958, Air France, through its agent, PAL, Inc., issued to Carrascos a first
class round trip ticket from Manila to Rome.

From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso travelled in first class, but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the Air France forced him to vacate the “first class” seat that he was
occupying because there was a “white man”, who, the Manager alleged, had a “better
right” to his seat. Carroscos refused to vacate his seat resulting to a commotion. Then,
he reluctantly gave his “first class” seat in the plane.

ISSUE:

Whether the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.

HELD:

Yes.

The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry
does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible.

From a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of
the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not
as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical
condition of the declarant". 

The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res
gestae. At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee
of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted
Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the
deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.