Jcms 12288

JCMS 2016 Volume 54. Number 2. pp. 353–369 DOI: 10.1111/jcms.
12288
(Not) in the Hands of the Member States: How the European

Commission Influences EU Security and Defence Policies*
MARIANNE RIDDERVOLD
ARENA, Centre for European Studies, Oslo
Abstract
The European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is run using special
procedures. The Member States have not delegated powers to the supranational institutions. Yet
a number of studies challenge the assumption that policy-making lies exclusively with Member
States’ governments. The Commission’s putative influence within the CFSP, however, remains
to be studied systematically from an analytical perspective. Aiming to fill this gap in the literature,
this article asks how the Commission de facto influences EU foreign and security policies beyond
its delegated powers. Two least likely cases are analysed: the launch of EU naval mission Atalanta
and the adoption of an EU Maritime Security Strategy. By adressing this question, the article con-
tributes to a better understanding of the level of EU foreign policy integration. It also adds knowl-
edge on the possible causes of this development, and thus to the EU integration literature more
generally.
Keywords: bargaining; circumvention; common foreign and security policies; European Commission;
European integration; influence
Introduction
Compared to all other existing IOs (international organizations), the Member States
of the European Union (EU) have transferred authority to common institutions in
an unprecedented manner. Decision-making is based on qualified majority voting;
legislative powers are shared between the Member States and the EP (European
Parliament) policy initiatives come from the European Commission (the Commis-
sion); while the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) oversees the appli-
cation of EU law and settles legal disputes between the EU institutions and the
Member States. There is however one important exception to this ‘ordinary’ proce-
dure: the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy). In this domain, Member
States have not delegated authority to the supranational institutions but have instead
decided to keep it as an inter-governmental instrument, run by special procedures.
Decision-making is subject to unanimity among Member States’ executives, and they
all have the power to veto common policies. Since the late 1990s, a growing number
of studies have however suggested that in reality, the CFSP might not be as different
from other policy areas as a reading of the treaties suggests. Instead, findings point
* I want to thank Morten Egeberg, Karolina Pomorska, Guri Rosén, Helene Sjursen, Peter Aagaard, and three anonymous
reviewers for helpful comments and questions. Thank you to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence for financing this research.
Not least, thank you to my interviewees, and in particular my key informants, for so willingly sharing information on pro-
cesses that are most often closed both to researchers and to the public at large.
© 2015 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street,
Malden, MA 02148, USA
354 Marianne Riddervold
to how processes of institutionalisation, socialization and the development of informal

decision-making norms have led to a de facto ‘move beyond intergovernmentalism’
in EU foreign policy (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010; Sjursen, 2011). Since ‘the processes
producing the policies in question […] [are] markedly different from a traditional
state policy-making process’ (Jørgensen, 2004, p. 11), authors have, among other
things, described the CFSP as a ‘form of transgovernmentalism’ (Hoffmann, 2012)
or as an example of ‘supranational intergovernmentalism’ (Howorth, 2012). Some
studies also find that the Commission has a bigger role in CFSP policy-making than
the formal structure suggests (Smith, 2004; Kostadinova, 2013; Dijkstra, 2014). Its
influence, however, remains to be studied systematically from an analytical perspec-
tive in which different theoretical perspectives are applied. In particular, few studies
account for how the Commission putatively influences policy decisions (see however
Blauberger and Weiss, 2013; Chou and Riddervold, 2015). The Commission is per-
haps involved in decision-making, but how, if in any way, does it exert influence
within this formally intergovernmental domain? Addressing this question will not
only contribute to a better understanding of the extent to which EU foreign and se-
curity policy integration has developed ‘beyond intergovernmentalism’, and thus the
very status of the EU polity itself (Sjursen, 2011); by also exploring how the Com-
mission influences decision-making within the CFSP, the article contributes important
knowledge on the possible causes of this development, and thus to the EU integra-
tion literature more generally.
This article adds to the existing literature by a study of the Commission’s de
facto influence in two cases: (1) the launch of EU naval mission EU NAVFOR
Somalia (Atalanta); (2) the adoption of an EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS).
In both of these cases, decision-making remains inter-governmental due to the
Member States’ strong resistance toward integration both within security and defence
and maritime issues. Yet there is evidence to suggest that the Commission influenced
the policies agreed to and conducted.
The article has two main parts. In the first, I elaborate on the Commission’s for-
mal competences within the CFSP, present the cases and discuss the analytical and
methodological framework. This is followed by the analysis, which is conducted in
two steps. First, I substantiate the claim that the Commission influenced Atalanta
and the EUMSS. Second, I discuss how it exerted such influence. I here draw on
the main theoretical perspectives found in the EU integration literature to develop
and discuss the relevance of three alternative hypotheses of Commission influence
(building on Chou and Riddervold, 2015): first, by using available bargaining tools
as leverage to enforce or build Member States’ support in favour of its proposals;
second, by presenting expert-based arguments that, if perceived as convincing by
(at least some of) the Member States, may find their way into the policy-making
outcomes; third, by ‘circumventing’ the formally inter-governmental line of policy-
making within the CFSP. By using these analytically distinct but empirically
overlapping hypotheses to tease out the Commission’s influence on Atalanta and
the EUMSS, I expect to provide a fuller picture and a better understanding of the
ways in which the Commission influences policy developments than is provided
by the existing literature. In a concluding section I sum up the findings and discuss
their broader empirical and theoretical implications.
© 2015 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
(Not) in the hands of the member states 355
I. Cases, Framework, Methodology

The Formal Role of the Commission in the CFSP
Policy-making within the CFSP is ‘subject to specific rules and procedures’ (Art. 24.1(2)
TEU). Decision-making powers lie exclusively with the Council and its preparatory
bodies, most importantly the Political and Security Committee (PSC), who decides on
the basis of unanimity among the Member States.
Accordingly, the Commission has no formal role in decision-making (Merket, 2012:
628). It has no monopoly of initiative and it cannot take cases of non-compliance to the
CJEU. Neither does it control the inter-governmental external action units in the new
‘EU foreign service’, the EEAS (European External Action Service; Thym, 2011, p. 16).
Actually, some argue that the Member States formally reduced the Commission’s
influence within the field with the Lisbon treaty, as the previous treaty’s ‘full association’
in the CFSP has been ‘replaced by the HR’s [High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy and her foreign service service, the EEAS] involvement who in
CFSP does act outside the Commission’s ambit control’ (Thym, 2011, p. 15). Formally,
the fact that the HR is also vice-president of the Commission does not change this. When
the HR chairs the EU Foreign Affairs Council, she ‘takes off her Commission hat’ and
‘receives her instructions from the Council in CFSP’, tasked to implement the decisions
that are taken by the Member States (Thym, 2011, p. 14).
Cases
Military missions and Atalanta
Unitary (European) Council decisions form the legal basis of all CFSP actions and poli-
cies. The PSC has the political control and decides the strategic direction of EU missions.
Member States’ military contributions are voluntary, and they cover the costs themselves.
There is also a joint budget, shared by the EU members, but the Commission does not
have budgetary powers (Thym, 2011; Merket, 2012). The ongoing mission Atalanta is
the EU’s first naval military operation. Its mandate allows for the use of force to ‘contribute
to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off
the Somali coast’ (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP). All Member States have
contributed, with ships, helicopters or forces and/or with military personnel to Atalanta’s
operational headquarters.
The EU maritime security strategy (EUMSS)

The EUMSS decision-making process was also formally inter-governmental. Initiated by
the Spanish Presidency, the Council adopted its first conclusions on maritime security
within the framework of the CSDP in April 2010 (Council, 2010). In December 2013
the European Council called for the EEAS and the Commission to present a Communica-
tion on ‘an EU Maritime Security Strategy by June 2014’ (European Council, 2013, p. 4).
The Communication was published in March 2014. The final EUMSS was adopted at the
General affairs council (GAC) on 24 June 2014, following the conventional CFSP
procedures (Council, 2014). The Greek presidency also activated the ad hoc expert
‘Friends of the Presidency group’ to prepare the Council discussions. Building on the
GAC conclusions, the Italian presidency developed an action plan adopted by the GAC
in 2014.
These cases are particularly helpful in order to shed light on the Commission’s de facto
influence in the CFSP. On the one hand, they are representative of what is becoming more
and more ‘typical’ in the CFSP, namely that decisions and actions link up to Community
policy areas – a trend that is likely to increase with the consistency requirement in the
Lisbon treaty. EU maritime external policies are also very topical and increasingly
relevant for understanding EU foreign policies more generally. At the same time, the
cases represent a policy field in which most of the Member States have strong economic
and security-related interests and therefore have guarded their right to veto common
policies. Not only security and defence but also maritime policies have been jealously
protected by the Member States, which have been particularly keen to remain sovereignty
in these areas. One would thus not expect the supranational institutions to have influence
beyond their delegated powers on EU maritime security policies. If the Commission
nonetheless has influence, in a policy area typical of the CFSP but also a least likely case
of influence, this would thus be a strong indication of how the Commission influences the
CFSP more generally.
Framework and Hypotheses

To tease out how, if in any way, the Commission influenced Atalanta and the EUMSS, I
develop and discuss the relevance of three alternative hypotheses drawn from different
strands of the EU integration literature (Chou and Riddervold, 2015). All build on the as-
sumption that human action should be studied as the result of rational behaviour, that is,
as intended actions performed to obtain a particular goal or intention. They however differ
in their assumptions of the mechanisms by which collective policies are made, as well as
the type of goals actors may pursue, and thus have different expectations as to how the
Commission putatively influences EU policies.
The first hypothesis builds on the conventional rational choice-based bargaining
perspectives. Such perspectives assume that international organizations are arenas
where strategically rational Member States meet to utilize their preset material interests
through aggregative bargaining (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009). These
assumptions apply to the EU in general and in the field of foreign and security policies
in particular. Not only is the CFSP run by inter-governmental procedures; it is also the
policy area most closely linked to Member States’ sovereignty, and thus the area where
they are least likely to give up their veto powers (Hoffmann, 1966). Within EU studies,
so called rational institutionalist perspectives apply the rational choice-based
assumptions in studies also of non-state actors’ behaviour. Rather than simply being
an agent of the Member States, the Commission assumedly seeks to maximize its
own interests by using whatever bargaining tools it has at its disposal (Pollack, 1997;
Tallberg, 2003). In particular, building on empirical studies, it is often claimed that
the Commission is a ‘purposeful opportunist’ (Cram, 1994) which has an interest in in-
creasing its own competences through stronger integration across policy fields (Pollack,
1997; Kostadinova, 2013).
It follows that the Commission may have influenced Atalanta and/or the EUMSS by
successfully applying particular bargaining tools as leverage to encourage the Member
States to consider or abide by its proposals. The Commission’s resources could be
financial or legal, but could also be linked to its ‘ability to exit, veto and set institutional
agendas’ (Tallberg, 2003; Bailer, 2010, p. 746). Commission incentives or threats could,
moreover, cut across policy areas (Dijkstra, 2014).
As discussed in the introduction, a number of studies have however pointed to the
rational choice perspectives’ failure to account for the policies adopted and the frequency
and level of de facto integration within the CFSP. Against this background it may thus be
that the Commission influences policy-making through mechanisms other than changing
the bargaining game in favour of its preferences. To explore this possibility, I consider
two alternative hypotheses building on alternative perspectives found in the EU integra-
tion literature (Chou and Riddervold, 2015). The first builds on communicative action
theory (e.g. Risse, 2004; Sjursen, 2006; Deitelhoff, 2009), and suggests that the Commis-
sion influenced Atalanta and/or the EUMSS through the mechanism of argument-based
learning: by justifying its suggestions and proposals through presenting expert arguments
accepted as relevant by the Member States (Riddervold, 2011). This hypothesis rests on
the basic assumption that EU policy-makers co-ordinate their behaviour through commu-
nication and that they have the ability to justify and explain their actions, as well as to
evaluate suggestions forwarded by others. Being communicatively rational, they may thus
reflect on the relevance and validity of different arguments and also be convinced of why
they should be complied with (Sjursen, 2006) – whether such arguments refer to material
interests during aggregative bargaining or to expert knowledge or common norms, as one
might typically expect during deliberative processes (Riddervold, 2011). It also builds on
the empirical observation that Commission officials’ expert knowledge in different fields
is important for understanding EU integration, including in inter-governmental policy
areas (Hooghe, 2001; Egeberg, 2006; Chou and Riddervold, 2015). After all, the Com-
mission is ‘a body of unelected officials appointed for their expertise’ within Community
policy areas (Hooghe, 2001, p. 7). Within EU security and defence policies, however,
there is no particular DG composed of bureaucrats having expert knowledge in the field.
Thus, intuitively, one would not expect the Member States to adopt the Commission’s in-
put or policy proposals simply because they acknowledge its expert authority (Barnett and
Finnemore, 2004); instead, it is reasonable to assume that its policy proposals and sugges-
tions are presented and assessed by the Member States before any decisions on common
actions are made – not least when discussing new actions such as the EU’s first naval mis-
sion or its first maritime security strategy.
So far, the framework has focused on alternative micro-mechanisms by which the
Commission may influence CFSP agenda-setting and decision-making outcomes. How-
ever, we know from studies applying institutionalist perspectives (e.g. March and Olsen,
1998; Hooghe, 2001; Egeberg, 2006; Olsen, 2009; Trondal, 2010) that ‘opportunities and
constraints in the internal and external environment’ (Olsen, 2009, p. 25) largely deter-
mine the actors’ ability to influence policy developments within particular fields. The
framework of international organizations might, in other words, be key to understanding
their functioning. Also pointing to how institutional frameworks affect both behavioural
options and policy outcomes, Egeberg (2006) argues that the sector organization of the
EU allows the Commission to ‘circumvent’ the Member States’ governments by working
directly with national administrations along sectoral policy lines. On this basis, a third
hypothesis that will be discussed to tease out how the Commission influenced Atlanta
and the EUMSS: that it ‘circumvented’ the formally inter-governmental lines of
policy-making within the CFSP. More precisely, such ‘circumvention’ can take two
forms: 1) the Commission may have co-operated directly with national bureaucrats to
thereby indirectly influence the Member States’ positions on Atalanta or the EUMSS;
or 2) it may have influenced decision-making outcomes by co-operating with other EU
institutions such as the EEAS (Chou and Riddervold, 2015).
Although analytically distinct, the three hypotheses are treated as complementary
rather than as mutually exclusive in the analysis. By using a set of hypotheses derived
from a wide range of perspectives and studies found in the literature, I expect to be able
to tease out a more comprehensive picture of the Commission’s influence than if only
relying on one or a few theoretical perspectives. Developed to help capture empirical
realities, the hypotheses’ relevance may thus vary across the different cases.
Methodology
The Member States formally initiate, discuss and decide on military missions and
common security strategies. When studying how the Commission de facto influences
the CFSP, the dependent variable is thus ultimately the common policies the Member
States agree to conduct: to launch Atalanta and to adopt a particular maritime security
strategy. A well-known methodological challenge is, however, how to measure such
influence empirically. In addition to challenges linked to controlling for the impact of
other variables, it is difficult to know what the policy outcome would have been had it
not been for the Commission’s actions. Aware of these challenges, I take an interpretative
approach and seek to uncover the Commission’s influence on Atalanta and the EUMSS
from the actors’ own perspective (Eliaeson, 2002, p. 52). To do so, I define influence
in an inter-relational way to mean that the Commission has influence when evidence
suggests that its interactions with other actors during the decision-making process
affected the Member States’ decisions. The Commission’s influence can be strong or
weak, or it can be exerted directly or indirectly – these are empirical questions. The def-
inition is, however, broader than the conventional understanding of influence as power,
where actor A’s influence is linked to whether or not he/she can ‘cause’ or implicitly
coerce actor B to do something he/she would otherwise not have done (Dahl, 1974). This
narrow definition would be helpful if the aim was simply to tease out the extent to which
the Commission exerts influence beyond the Member States’ initial interests. To capture
additional aspects of influence – including cases where it shares some or all of the
Member States’ preferences but nonetheless has an impact on outcomes – it is however
necessary to apply a wider definition. As Joseph Weiler (1980, p. 181) argued, in studies
of the European Parliament, ‘[h]ad a narrow construction of the term “power” been
adopted, including an actual capacity to sanction decisively the formulation and execution
of foreign relations, it would become clear, as expected, that Parliament has a marginal
role in the process’.
Data
The secrecy that typically characterizes security and defence policy-making processes
means that written data on the Commission’s involvement is limited. There are few avail-
able public documents of the Atalanta and EUMSS decision-making processes, such as
meeting schedules, agendas or minutes. Aware of the methodological challenges linked
to the use of interviews as primary sources, data in this article consists of 27 semi-
structured interviews and follow-up interviews (phone, email) with participating actors
across the different EU institutions, as well as documents from EU webpages where avail-
able. Allowing for some triangulation, I also obtained the different drafts of the EUMSS
Communication (2012–2014) and the Greek presidency’s EUMSS drafts (2014), and
observed some of the informal discussions between the Commission and Member State
officials in May 2014. Regarding Atalanta, the United Kingdom House of Lords hearings
(House of Lords, 2010) and five control interviews conducted with NATO staff and
delegates to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) involved in anti-piracy
measures are additional sources. Most interviewees requested anonymity; thus, the inter-
view data quoted contain the speaker’s institutional affiliation only. To avoid biases, a key
tool in the analysis has been to control for consistency between different actors and insti-
tutions involved in decision-making, across different data sources and, not least, between
arguments and actual behaviour (Checkel, 2005: 11). If I get a consistent picture on this
basis, it is reasonable to assume that this gives a good indication of the Commission’s
influence in the two decision-making processes.
II. Commission Influence: Beyond Inter-governmental Co-operation?

Military missions and Operation Atalanta
According to all the interviewed national delegation members, the Commission was
‘really active’ (NatDel#2) in the process leading to Atalanta’s launch. ‘They were in all
the meetings… They also speak’ (NatDel#4). It is telling that the Commission came with
the Presidency to the EP before Atalanta’s launch, to discuss the possibility of an EU
military mission, and several times took the floor (EP 2008). The Commission’s involve-
ment in all phases of military missions was moreover described as a general trend: ‘The
Commission comes in from the beginning’ (NatDel#4); ‘It is involved in the entire
process… Meetings, correspondence, emails etc’ (NatDel#6); ‘But this is not something
new. I remember I was involved in the EU operation in Chad, and the first thing we
did was go to the Commission and talk to them about our intentions’ (NatDel#2).
When asked about the Commission’s influence when planning military missions, all the
interviewed moreover claimed that the Commission ‘gains influence by sitting in on the
meetings’ (NatDel#5). When discussing Atalanta, the Commission ‘had no role in
defining the exact mandate of the operation’ (NatDel#2). However, according to involved
national delegates, it had a big impact on their decision to launch an EU naval mission,
since it helped the French presidency establish EU agreements with countries in the
region on the transfer of suspected pirates (NatDel#2, NatDel#4, NatDel#5). Such
agreements were key to understanding the Member States’ agreement on an EU mission:
None of the Member States wanted to take suspected pirates home for prosecution, but they
were also concerned with upholding international law (Council 2008; NatDel#2, NatDel#4,
NatDel#5). To achieve this, they needed to establish legal agreements with third countries
in the region. And for this, they depended on the Commission’s development aid tools:
agreements with Kenya, and later Tanzania and the Seychelles, on prosecuting pirates
in accordance with their rights were made in return for different types of EU aid
(Commission#2; Council 2008, NatDel#2, NatDel#4, NatDel#5). By doing this, the
Commission was more than an agent of the Member States. Only months before Atalanta
was launched, there were ‘strong objections on the principle of launching a military
operation, objections on its potential efficiency, and some Member States were not
convinced that we could act in an efficient way against pirates in a military operation’
(NatDel#2). There was also disagreement among the Member States on whether or not the
EU was the right organization to use if military means were to be deployed, given many
countries’ traditional preference for NATO operations (interviews 2010 and 2013). ‘Atalanta
was somewhat controversial in the beginning because ESDP had never executed a naval
operation before. Not all the Member States were on board. Moreover, NATO ships were
already in the region, as were those of non-EU nations’ (Cross, 2010, p. 19). Eventually,
the EU’s ability to reach third country agreements was the main reason why the Member
States agreed to launch an autonomous EU mission instead, at the expense of strengthening
the humanitarian NATO mission that was already operating in the area (Riddervold, 2014).
‘In the end, most of the Member States were convinced that something needed to be done’,
and ‘in the EU we were able to build a coherent approach against piracy. We were able to
negotiate transfer agreements with the countries in the region, and to use our financial instru-
ments in order to push for a conclusion of these agreements. On the NATO side there was a
military operation and nothing more’ (NatDel#2). Due to the lack of competences and tools
similar to those held by the Commission – tools falling under the Commission’s budgetary
powers, and thereby beyond the reach of the Presidency – NATO simply didn’t have the
means needed to provide these types of legal arrangements, and thus the type of operation
desired by the European states (Interviews 2010 and 2013. Also see Cross, 2010;
Riddervold, 2014). Also according to NATO staff, ‘because the EU was further ahead on
the necessary legal framework […] many countries who initially planned to contribute to
the NATO operation changed hats and took part in the EU operation instead’ (NATO#1).
By co-operating with France, the Commission, in other words, helped form consensus
among the Member States. It did not simply implement the Member States’ decisions, but
actively contributed to make the Member States support an EU mission.
The Maritime Security Strategy

The Commission’s role in the EUMSS process is even clearer from the data, and it
strongly increased during the decision-making process. The Commission’s increased in-
volvement is evident from the Council conclusions. In 2010, the HR (i.e. in practice
the EEAS) was tasked to work together with the Commission and the Member States in
‘preparing options for the possible elaboration of a Security Strategy for the global mar-
itime domain’, underlining that ‘work will take place in the context of CFSP/CSDP,
within the framework of the European Security Strategy’ (Council, 2010). In 2013, the
European Council conclusions instead called for an EUMSS to be developed by June
2014 ‘on the basis of a joint Communication from the Commission and the High Repre-
sentative, taking into account the opinions of the Member States’ (European Council,
2013, p. 4). Accordingly, although formally still a CFSP process, the HR and Maria
Damanaki, European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG Mare), to-
gether presented the Communication when it was launched. More importantly, however,
the Commission had de facto already been writing a draft EUMSS together with the
EEAS since mid-2012, co-chairing regular meetings between the two, 18 months before
the defence European Council meeting asked for a joint Communication (Comm#2,
Comm#3, Comm#4, Comm#5, EEAS#1, EEAS#3). It is telling that in June 2013, ‘nine
DGs1 with various competencies’ were involved in the EUMSS drafting process
(EEAS#2), while in February 2014 11 DGs were listed as key contributors (email with
EEAS#1 21/2-2014; EEAS#3). Their various policy-specific contributions are particu-
larly evident in the early drafts (author’s copies, 2012–13). Similarly, representatives of
the Commission were both present and had the right to speak and to propose amendments
during the Friends of the Presidency group meetings in March–June 2014 (Author copies;
NatDel#8, NatDel#9, NatDel#10).
The Commission’s involvement also gave it a lot of influence over the EUMSS. More
precisely, the Commission influenced the EUMSS in two main ways.
First, and key to understanding its impact on the final strategy, in 2012 the Commis-
sion redefined the strategy from a security and defence-oriented one to a cross-sectoral
strategy that also covers a wide number of Community policy areas falling under Com-
mission competences. ‘We [i.e. the Commission and the EEAS] have broadened the
scope tremendously… Where we have gone now is very different from the initial pro-
posal, which was within the CSDP process’ (Comm#2). While the Member States
initially asked the EEAS to prepare suggestions on a possible EU maritime security
strategy within the framework of the CSDP, the Communication process became ‘a
project… done by the Commission and by the High Representative’ (EEAS#1), that
‘brings together elements from the Commission side and also the EEAS side’ (NatDel#1).
As a consequence, ‘the Member States’ intention was very different from what became
the process and the outcome’ (Comm#2).
Second, and because of this reorientation from a CSDP to a cross-sectoral strat-
egy, the EUMSS content is highly influenced by the Commission. Since mid-2012,
the EEAS and the Commission had regular meetings and together decided on and
wrote the text of the Communication: ‘All the DGs have left their marks… many
DGs add a lot’ to the text (Comm#3) and ‘all the DGs add whatever they want’
to the document (Comm#2) are examples of how the Communication drafting
process was described by the actors themselves while in writing.
III. How Did It Influence: Bargaining, Expert Knowledge or Circumvention?

In both cases, the Commission influenced the policies agreed by the Member States.
Its influence was clearly strongest in the EUMSS case, but evidence suggests that
the Commission influenced the final outcome also for Atalanta. This is puzzling
not only in light of the Commission’s formally limited role in CFSP decision-
making processes, but also because the interviewees themselves referred to the
national sensitivity of maritime security issues: for example, ‘I am a bit surprised,
because a few years ago this was a non-topic […] Because the issue is too sensitive,
they don’t want the Commission to interfere’ (Comm#3). Both with Atalanta and
with the EUMSS, several Member States initially wanted to limit the Commission’s
involvement let alone influence on their decisions (Council 2010; NatDel#2–11). In
particular, according to military staff at the EU Operations Center, ‘the UK has been
1
Commission departments are known as Directorates-General (DGs).
keen to control the Commission more’ (OpCen#1). So how, then, did the Commis-
sion influence EU policies?
Atalanta
Looking at the Atalanta case first, the Member States clearly expect that the Commission
has certain bargaining tools at its disposal when they discuss the launch of new military
missions. Although a military operation ‘is a government task, you can’t plan anything’
without the Commission onboard (NaDel#6). In particular, as argued by Dijkstra
(2014), the Commission’s budgetary powers over instruments that the Member States
want to apply in parallel may give it leverage to inform CFSP decision-making. In line
with this, interviewees argued that ‘the Commission is able to tie into the EUs security
and defence policy’ (NatDel#7) through its competences and budgetary powers in inter-
linked Community policy fields. Moreover, ‘to connect Commission activities to the
CSPD means a more efficient use of resources’ (OpCen#1). For such reasons, ‘the
Member States are schizophrenic. On the one hand they want inter-governmentalism,
but they also want access to the Commission`s instruments’ (NatDel#5); ‘now that
budgets are declining, there is also an interest to see what money we can tap out of the
Commission’ (NatDel#4).
As discussed above, the French presidency needed the Commission’s instruments
when launching Atalanta: ‘When we launched this idea of transfer agreements, we had
to have some incentives… the incentive was the money from the Commission’
(NatDel#2. Also NatDel#4, NatDel#5). It therefore co-operated closely with the Commis-
sion in the early Atalanta planning phase, even before a military mission was discussed at
the Council level (NatDel#2, NatDel#3, NatDel#4).
However, there is no evidence from interviews or written data to suggest that the Com-
mission strategically used its potential bargaining tools to log-roll or threaten its way into
the Atalanta decision-making process, or to force any of the reluctant Member States to
support an EU mission. Instead, it co-operated with the French Presidency and the Coun-
cil secretariat to reach their common goal of realizing an EU mission (EEAS#3, NatDel
#2). Rather than submitting to threats and promises, reluctant Member States – including
the key actor that one would expect most clearly to rather prefer a NATO mission, the UK
– endorsed an EU mission due to legitimacy considerations linked to its legal framework;
a legal framework the Commission helped to create precisely to reach such a consensus.
The main source of the Commission’s influence on Atalanta was, in other words, that it
drew on its competences and expertise to make an agreement on an EU mission possible
despite initial disagreements among the Member States. According also to Atalanta Com-
mander Rear Admiral Jones, finding ways to deal with suspected pirates was ‘one of the
most difficult areas of setting up this operation’ (House of Lords, 2010). Eventually, ‘the
Council, the General Secretariat made the drawing’ of the agreements, and in doing this
they drew on legal services and ‘the expertise of DG DEVCO and… Justice and so on’
(NatDel#1). ‘At that time [the Commission] was really active […] and they entered into
a collaborative work on these transfer agreements […] We had some quite important
support from… both the Council Secretariat and the Commission” (NatDel#2)’.
Further underlining the importance of expertise and competences for understanding
Commission influence, all the interviewees justified its early involvement in EU mission
planning in general by referring to its expertise. ‘The Commission (is) able to advise’
(NatDel#2) and therefore ‘should be present and available for consultation’ (NatDel#1).
It is telling that in the EU operations centre, the EEAS unit who co-ordinates the EU’s
missions on the horn of Africa, ‘half of (the) staff is now focused on talking to the Com-
mission’ due to its knowledge and competences in particular areas (OpCen#1). Thus,
although the Commission gains access and influence since the CFSP and Community
policies are to be inter-linked, the Commission’s expertise is also an important factor:
‘it is also on the expertise – when you see it works, then they [the Member States] gain
trust’ in the Commission’s advice (EP#1). The Commission ‘also has power through its
competences and skills. It is only the big Member States who… can challenge the Com-
mission’s competence in some areas’ (NatDel#6).
The Maritime Security Strategy

What then about the EUMSS? How was the Commission able to so clearly change its
scope and content?
In a first step, the Commission vetoed the initiation of the process. When in 2010 the
EEAS started working on a military-oriented strategy in line with the 2010 Council
conclusion, ‘the EEAS didn’t understand the needs of the Commission’ and therefore
‘we stopped the process’ (Comm#4). Also according to EEAS officials, the Commission
drew on this bargaining tool to influence the strategy in the direction it preferred. It is
telling that the EEAS’s initial attempt ‘had to be aborted […] Because it is absolutely
not possible to do it without the Commission […] Sometimes I joke that […] if you read
an American maritime security strategy, it is about the employment and deployment of
carrier battle groups. If you read the European maritime security strategy, it is all about
keeping the Commission on board’ (EEAS#1). The EEAS simply could not do it without
the Commission, leaving the Commission with much bargaining leverage to increase its
own role and impact. ‘It will not fly if it is not led by the Commission’ (Comm#4), and
in the Commission’s view ‘it was natural that Mare took ownership’ of the EUMSS
(Comm#5).
Due to the Commission’s vetoing of the process it almost took one and a half
year where the process came to a full stop – despite the fact that some of the Mem-
ber States actively tried to move work on the EUMSS forward (NatDel#10). And
when DG Mare and the EEAS eventually started writing a draft text together in
2012, it was with a very different and now cross-sectoral focus, in line with the
Commission’s initial preference. All the Commission DGs were invited to partici-
pate, and the DGs with ‘particularly relevant competences’ (EEAS#3) were
approached directly. In mid-2012, an ‘inter-service working group to explore ways
on how to approach the Member States’ was established (EEAS#3); ‘Mare was in-
vited as a co-chair’ (EEAS#1) and ‘the Secretariat general told opponents [of a
cross-sectoral strategy] to soften the tone’ (Comm#3). It is telling that a national
PSC ambassador argued that ‘it is not only the Commission, it is the EEAS also
who got more and more involved in the process’ and not the other way around, de-
spite this formally being an inter-governmental process run by the EEAS (NatDel#2).
However, although the Commission’s successful use of veto is important to under-
stand that it got the option of a cross-sectoral strategy on the agenda in the first
place, it is not sufficient to explain that this focus was kept in the final strategy. Af-
ter all, decision-making on the EUMSS remained within the CFSP framework; if
they wanted, the Member States could thus have resisted the Commission’s attempts
to make it cross-sectoral. To fully understand how first the EEAS and later the
Member States came to support the Commission’s preference for a cross-sectoral ap-
proach, we therefore turn to look at the relevance of the other hypotheses.
First, interview data across the different institutions consistently indicate that the
Commission influenced the scope and thus the content of the EUMSS Communica-
tion by presenting expert justifications that were accepted as relevant by the EEAS
and the Member States, in line with the expert hypothesis. According to the Com-
mission, in mid/autumn 2012, ‘[we] understood that the only way to make it [the
EUMSS] fly was to link it to the integrated maritime policy’ (Comm#4). And the
EEAS was convinced by the Commission’s argumentation: ‘The first attempt was
military in its approach. But you can say now we have reconsidered and have said
well […] our approach to maritime security needs to be comprehensive’ (EEAS#1.
Also EEAS#2 and EEAS#3). When presented with the Commission’s suggestion,
the EEAS ‘got very interested […] they saw the benefit of linking it to the
integrated maritime policy’ (Comm#4). Or, as a central EEAS official put it: ‘A
European security strategy without the involvement of the Commission is not worth
anything because […] you would devise the complete wrong instrument […] This
first attempt was not good enough’ (EEAS#1). Thus, a cross-sectoral approach was
‘a necessary and logical conclusion of our analysis’ (EEAS#1).
Also, much of the detailed content in the EUMSS can be traced back to the
Commission’s expert knowledge. Different DGs contributed directly to the Commu-
nication text on the basis of their sectoral skills (Comm#2, #Comm#3, Comm#5
EEAS#1, EEAS#3). However, as opposed to what one would expect following the
expert hypothesis developed above, the EEAS did not accept the different DGs’
direct text proposals because they were convinced on the basis of the Commission’s
arguments; rather, both the Commission and the EEAS interviewees said that all the
different DGs’ suggestions were included in the text without much justification,
objection or discussion (Comm#1–5, EEAS #1–3. Author’s copies). Having redefined
the strategy from a security and defence-oriented to a cross-sectoral one, the differ-
ent DGs contributed on the basis of their expert authority in different fields (also see
Chou and Riddervold, 2015). The following quote is telling: ‘Discussions between
the DGs and in the meetings and with the EEAS have not been so much on the
content because the text from the different DGs is taken in directly’ (Comm#2).
The Commission also influenced the Member States on the basis of its expert
knowledge. Once the Communication was published, the Greek presidency took over
the process. It ‘wanted its own paper’, however (Comm#4, NatDel#8), and made a
new draft strategy which formed the basis of the Member States’ discussions in prepa-
ration for the Council meeting (author copies; Comm#2, Comm#4; NatDel#8-11
Observations 2014). Compared to the Communication, the focus and the language is
more defence-oriented; four actions suggesting new regulation were removed, and some
of the DGs lost some of their input (authors’ copies). However, the cross-sectoral focus
was kept, and the remainder of the initial actions were adopted (author copies;
Comm#3; NatDel#8, NatDel#9).
The evidence suggests that the Commission’s actions mattered also to this final out-
come. In particular, and in line with what one would expect if the Commission’s expert
knowledge helps explain its influence on the EUMSS, it worked closely with the presi-
dency at the bureaucratic level in preparing the Friends of the Presidency group meetings
and the text to be discussed by the Member States – even sitting in the same room and
together writing the different EUMSS drafts (Comm#4, Comm#5, EEAS#1, EEAS #4,
NatDel#8, NatDel#10; Observations 2014).
Due to its competences and skills and the informal structure of the Friends of the Pres-
idency group meetings, the Commission was moreover perceived as ‘an equal partner’ in
the Member States’ discussions (NatDel#10). It was active during the discussions, and
suggested amendments that were adopted by the Member States (NatDel#8, NatDel#9,
NatDel#10). It also directly approached member state officials from different ministries
in between these meetings to convince them to influence their country’s positions
(NatDel#8; observations, 2014). What is more, according to participants and further in
line with the expert hypothesis, it helped solve Member States’ disagreements by having
‘bilateral talks with countries who had outstanding issues’ linked to Community policy
areas, for example ‘in discussions on competences, maritime training, common standards,
research and development’ (NatDel#9). And according to the Member States themselves,
a key reason ‘why it is listened to’ is that it has competence and expert knowledge
(NatDel#8; also NatDel#2, NatDel#9, NatDel#10).
A third factor that matters for understanding the Commission’s influence on the final
strategy is, however, that many of the Commission’s initial inputs to the EUMSS simply
were not discussed by the Member States during these meetings, and therefore were kept
in the final strategy. Contrary to what one would expect if the Member States fully control
CFSP processes and their outcomes, due to time limits set earlier in the process, the Mem-
ber States’ discussions in the Friends of the Presidency group mostly focused on a few
national sensitive issues such as the link to NATO, the integration of maritime surveil-
lance or terms such as ‘territorial disputes’ and ‘common capacity building’ (author’s
copies; NatDel#8-11). Thus, on many issues the Commission influenced the strategy
indirectly, via the impact it had on the EEAS in the period between the first Council
conclusion on maritime security in 2010 and the presentation of their joint Communica-
tion in March 2014.
These observations thereby point toward the importance of the institutional EU
structure for understanding the Commission’s influence. In particular, and in line
with the circumvention hypothesis, a key reason why the Commission was able to
influence the EUMSS so strongly was that in an early phase it managed to take im-
portant parts of the process out of the Member States’ hands. Despite the fact that
the Member States initially decided to develop an EUMSS ‘in the context of the
CFSP/CSDP’ (Council, 2010), following an informal inter-institutional agreement
from 2012, the Commission and the EEAS decided to ‘apply the Commission
policy-making procedures’ (EEAS#3). This was agreed without involving the Mem-
ber States and implied that the ‘Communication [was] not to be shared with the out-
side world, not even the Member States, before it [was] finished’ (EEAS#3). It also
implied that all the Commissioners had to sign the Communication before it was
presented officially – in practice giving the two institutions a veto over when and
what Communication would be presented to the Member States in what was
formally an inter-governmental EU process (EEAS#3). Both the EEAS and the

Commission consulted Member States informally (Comm#5, EEAS#1, EEAS#3,
NatDel#2); however, interviewees across different Member States, DGs and EEAS
departments claimed that ‘the Member States have not been involved so much’
(Comm#4), despite the fact that many of the suggested actions fall under their
competence and, more importantly, despite the fact that at least some of the Member
States asked to be more involved in the process. It is for example telling that it was
only after the Communication was published that the PSC became involved, despite
complaints from Member States. As late as in March 2014, ‘there were a lot of ten-
sions’ because the Member States’ ambassadors ‘complain that you did not consult
us’ (Comm#4). Or as put by an ambassador from one of the big EU countries:
‘In the beginning… the Commission was in charge. It did it without consulting
the Member States. When I asked why not, (the Commission) answered that there
was not enough time’ (NatDel#11). This was, in other words, not a process that
all the Member States wanted to delegate beyond their control. As argued by an-
other national delegate, the role of the Commission in this process has been ‘a
mixed blessing, because on the one hand [we] see the advantage of bringing in
the Commission… on the other hand [we]don’t have control over it’ (NatDel #4).
IV. Concluding Remarks

This article asked if, and if so how, the Commission de facto influences the CFSP. I found
that the Commission was strongly involved both in the EUMSS and Atalanta decision-
making and that it indeed influenced EU policies. Its influence was the strongest in the
EUMSS case, but also in the Atalanta case it had an impact beyond what one would
expect in a pure inter-governmental system: it was more than an agent of the Member
States. Exploring a set of hypotheses drawn from different parts of the literature moreover
proved helpful to tease out how the Commission exerted such influence. The analysis did
not find much support for the bargaining hypothesis in the Atalanta case, but in the
EUMSS case the Commission vetoed the initiation of the process until it got support for
its main preference for a cross-sectoral approach. More importantly, however, institutional
features and expertise must be taken into consideration to capture Commission influence.
The particular institutional structure of the EU combined with the treaty obligation to co-
ordinate external actions across policy areas creates a demand for services from the Com-
mission (Dijkstra, 2014, p. 4). However, it also allows the Commission to ‘circumvent’ the
inter-governmental policy-making procedures that security and defence issues are to fol-
low. And once it had access to the de facto decision-making arenas, it convinced both
the EEAS and the different Member States of the relevance of its suggestions.
What are the more general implications of these findings? Empirically, a study of two
cases cannot give a full picture of how the Commission de facto influences the CFSP. More
studies are needed to draw such general conclusions. Having explored two cases that are
both ‘typical’ of the CFSP and are least likely cases of Commission influence, it is
however reasonable to expect that the findings at least are relevant also across other cases.
Analytically, the findings have implications both for how we theorize the EU in the field of
CFSP and for the EU integration literature more generally: first, the study lends support to
the claim that the EU does not behave as a classic international organization in the domain
but rather that the CFSP is moving beyond inter-governmental co-operation – although the
Member States remain the key players, policy-making does not lie exclusively in their
hands. Second, by this, the analysis suggests that rational choice-based approaches to in-
ternational relations and European integration cannot fully capture policy-developments.
To understand common policies and integrative moves, there is a need for a broader
theoretical approach that at least allows us to explore the relevance of alternative
hypotheses. Studying least likely cases of influence, the article thus also provides
important insights for the delegation literature’s general assumption that Member States
control the delegation of authority to common institutions. Much of the delegation litera-
ture, moreover, focuses primarily on why Member States chose to delegate authority to
common institutions in the first place. This study however suggests that a focus on Mem-
ber States’ decisions might be too narrow if we want to fully capture who has influence and
on what grounds, even in the policy field most closely associated with state interest, the
CFSP. Had I started from rational choice-based assumptions, I would not have been able
to capture how a non-state actor such as the Commission gained substantial de facto influ-
ence even beyond its delegated powers.
Lastly, and most importantly, the analysis contributes to a better understanding of the
actors and factors that help shape EU foreign policy integration, that at the very least have
relevance also in other inter-governmental policy areas. It underlines how important it is to
go beyond formal characteristics and Member States’ bargaining to capture integrative
moves. By teasing out the Commission’s de facto influence, the article illustrates how so-
cial factors such as informal co-operation, expertise and the ability to present convincing
arguments all are factors that may have integrative consequences even in cases where
Member States have strong interests. In particular, the analysis suggests that the Commis-
sion’s actions, behaviour and informal interaction with other actors may be among the fac-
tors that help explain the move toward closer co-operation and integration within the CFSP
more generally. It also identifies some of the factors that condition the Commission’s im-
pact on EU foreign policy integration. Both the particular organizational structure of the
EU and the Member States’ requests for expert knowledge in inter-linked policy areas
were key to understanding that it affected the policies agreed to and conducted by the
Member States. In light of the Lisbon treaty’s increased focus on consistency across differ-
ent policy fields, it is likely that this trend will become stronger. Further studying the role
and influence not only of the Commission but also of other supranational and non-state
actors may thus increase our understanding not only of empirical CFSP developments,
but also of the drivers of EU integration within inter-governmental policy areas and thus
in the EU more generally.
Correspondence:
Dr. Marianne Riddervold
ARENA, Centre for European Studies
P.O box 1143
Blindern
0318 Oslo
Norway
Tel: +47 22858861/+47 90920951, Fax: +47 22858710
email: Marianne.riddervold@arena.uio.no
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JCMS 2016 Volume 54. Number 2. pp. 353–369 DOI: 10.1111/jcms.

(Not) in the Hands of the Member States: How the European

to how processes of institutionalisation, socialization and the development of informal

I. Cases, Framework, Methodology

The EU maritime security strategy (EUMSS)

Framework and Hypotheses

II. Commission Inﬂuence: Beyond Inter-governmental Co-operation?

The Maritime Security Strategy

III. How Did It Inﬂuence: Bargaining, Expert Knowledge or Circumvention?

The Maritime Security Strategy

formally an inter-governmental EU process (EEAS#3). Both the EEAS and the

IV. Concluding Remarks

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