5e66ef07df0d7july Issue 2018

ISSN 1010-9536
ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK (AIIB)
243 From Passive Aid to Pragmatism: Humanitarian

Diplomacy in the Rohingya Crisis
Nazmul Arifeen
Rubiat Afrose Raka
263 Environmentally-Displaced Migrants in Bangladesh:

Human Security Perspectives
Sufia Khanom
287 Materializing the BBIN Initiative: Transport

Connectivity in Focus
Sajid Karim
Mohammad Jasim Uddin
303 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): Evolution,

Motivations and Geostrategic Implications
Samia Zaman
321 Balancing Game in the (Indo)Asia-Pacific: From

‘Thucydides Trap’ to Multiple Discourses?
A.S.M. Tarek Hassan Semul
Volume 39
Number 3
2018
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VOLUME 39 NUMBER 3 JULY 2018
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME 39 NUMBER 3 JULY 2018
Nazmul Arifeen
Rubiat Afrose Raka
From Passive Aid to Pragmatism: Humanitarian
Diplomacy in the Rohingya Crisis 243
Sufia Khanom
Environmentally-Displaced Migrants in Bangladesh:
Human Security Perspectives 263
Sajid Karim
Materializing the BBIN Initiative: Transport Connectivity in Focus 287
Samia Zaman
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): Evolution, Motivations and
Geostrategic Implications 303

Balancing Game in the (Indo)Asia-Pacific: From ‘Thucydides
Trap’ to Multiple Discourses? 321
BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 39, NO. 3, JULY 2018: 243-262
Nazmul Arifeen
Rubiat Afrose Raka
FROM PASSIVE AID TO PRAGMATISM: HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY IN

THE ROHINGYA CRISIS
Abstract
The ideas espoused in ‘diplomacy’ inherently contradict what ‘humanitarianism’

entails, if one goes by the realist or neoliberal institutionalist schools in international
relations. They contend that states, whose primary concerns are to maximize power
or security in an anarchic international system, cannot have the indulgence to be
humanitarian, theoretically speaking at the very least. Nonetheless, humanitarian
diplomacy has been instrumental in resolving intractable conflicts and severe crises
that states and the United Nations (UN) were unable to fix. This paper explores
why the idea of humanitarian diplomacy has not caught on by focusing on its
tension with state-centrism, legal weaknesses and the problem of politicization
by powerful states. An evolving and thriving praxis of humanitarianism is, then,
discussed as the international community strives to ameliorate human sufferings.
Despite tensions arising mostly out of how humanitarian diplomacy has been (ab)
used by powerful states, the paper traces new trends where states are shifting
their focus from passive aid to pragmatism. Based on a case study of humanitarian
diplomacy in the Rohingya crisis, the paper offers some evidence on how states
utilize humanitarian diplomatic instruments.
Keywords: Humanitarianism, Diplomacy, Rohingya Crisis, Humanitarian

Diplomacy
1. Introduction
It is fashionable these days to use the word ‘diplomacy’ in association with

other nouns. One frequently comes across public diplomacy, economic diplomacy,
climate diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and so forth. Some of these applications may be
local or regional; consider cricket diplomacy, ping-pong diplomacy, shuttle diplomacy,
etc. These uses involve some acts of what professional diplomats and foreign policy
practitioners perform as their daily activities. However, humanitarian diplomacy
is perhaps the most unlikely of these combinations. The reason is that unlike other
compound nouns involving diplomacy, it implies ‘intent’ of the actor rather than an
‘area’ of diplomatic activity. But scholars have questioned the appropriateness of this
Nazmul Arifeen is Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS).
His e-mail address is: arifeen@biiss.org; Rubiat Afrose Raka is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of
International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Her e-mail address is: raka@biiss.org
© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2018.
243
BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 39, NO. 3, JULY 2018
particular combination. Hazel Smith of School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)
puts forward arguments that capture the definitional complexities of humanitarian
diplomacy. She contends that humanitarian diplomacy is an oxymoron and, as such,
the most unlikely combination of diplomacy.1 The essence of the argument is that
ideas espoused in ‘diplomacy’ inherently contradict what ‘humanitarianism’ entails, if
one were to go by the realist and neoliberal institutionalist schools in international
relations. States whose primary concerns are to maximize power or security in an
anarchic international system cannot have the indulgence to be humanitarian,
theoretically speaking at the very least.
Humanitarianism was, therefore, championed mostly by individuals and

philanthropies. When Henry Dunant, a Swiss national and founder of the Red
Cross Movement, witnessed human sufferings in the Austro-Italian war in 1859, he
was extremely moved by the casualty of war. His experience ultimately led him to
convince global leaders of his time to agree on what came to be known as the Geneva
Conventions. Thus, the codification of international humanitarian law was a result of a
movement of an individual.2 Since then, humanitarianism has played a significant role
in ameliorating agonies of war victims and natural calamities alike. Red Cross (or Red
Crescent in Muslim-majority countries) founded by Dunant now operates in almost
all countries of the world. Other organizations like Doctors without Borders (MSF),
inspired by his idea, joined the bandwagon of humanitarian assistance and relief.
The domain of humanitarianism of this kind has been mostly dominated

by non-state actors. It was indeed required to be an apolitical cause because it is
‘neutrality’ that allowed humanitarians much-needed access to work in the crisis zones.
When conflicts occur, nations can seldom choose sides ignoring their own national
interests and other similar considerations. This is why humanitarian efforts by the likes
of Red Cross enjoyed widespread approval. The process that involves diplomacy per se
is less obvious when humanitarians respond to natural disasters. But during conflict
outbreaks, the UN Organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World
Food Programme (WFP) all had their own apparatus to discuss and negotiate with
conflicting parties to provide access to food and emergency healthcare to the victims.
There are justifiable grounds for realist school to argue that states cannot
practice humanitarianism in true sense. As far as praxis of humanitarianism is
concerned, it has been mostly a prerogative of the resourceful and powerful states.
The dominant actors have the leverage to pursue it with their power, capability and
1
Hazel Smith, “Humanitarian Diplomacy: Theory and Practice”, in Larry Minear and Hazel Smith (eds.),
Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft, India: United Nations University, 2007, p. 38.
2
Craig Calhoun, “The Imperative to Reduce Suffering: Charity, Progress, and Emergencies in the Field of
Humanitarian Action”, in Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), Humanitarianism in Question: Politics,
Power, Ethics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, p. 81.
244
HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY IN THE ROHINGYA CRISIS
influence. Humanitarian intervention sans UN authorization also leaves scope that

can potentially be exploited by some. This is why some states deem responsibility to
protect (R2P) as “a more sophisticated way of conceptualizing and hence legitimizing
humanitarian intervention”.3 It is likely that the justification for solely state-led
humanitarian diplomacy will be frowned upon. But this line of argument does not
adequately explain an emerging trend of state actors’ involvement in humanitarian
diplomacy—if entirely not state-led, but humanitarian diplomacy where states play
an important role. States with comparatively limited diplomatic clout and capacity
are also gradually engaging in humanitarian diplomacy. Turkey, for example, does
not hesitate to call some of its activities humanitarian diplomacy based on a “balance
between conscience and interest”.4 To illustrate this claim, the paper explores
humanitarian diplomacy as new academic domain and its application in the Rohingya
crisis especially focusing on the role played by Bangladesh. How Bangladesh has
creatively engaged state and non-state actors in the Rohingya issue to expedite
resolution of the problem is explored in the paper.
The Rohingyas have a history as old as the history of Arakan (present day
Rakhine State). A set of divisive state policies of Myanmar especially the announcement
of a discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law precipitated a long crisis. The draconian laws
stripped the Rohingyas of their citizenship accompanied by persecution and torture
by the military junta.5 This has led to internment influx of Rohingya population into
Bangladesh. Bangladesh has sheltered the displaced Myanmar nationals since the earliest
large-scale influx in 1978. Since then, there have been two UN-mediated repatriation
agreements between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 1978 and 1992. Nevertheless,
the Rohingya escaped yet another and by far the deadliest persecution in Myanmar
since August 2017. The recent exodus outnumbered previous mass displacements
of the ethnic group and outweighed the degree of human anguish caused by forced
displacement. Currently, the number of Myanmar’s Rohingya nationals sheltered by
Bangladesh is over a million,6 creating one of the major humanitarian disasters in recent
decades. This time around, Bangladesh has not only allowed the displaced Rohingya
population, but also stepped up its diplomatic endeavour.
The arguments are presented in four sections. After the introduction, the
paper attempts to clarify why it is problematic to put together ‘humanitarianism’
and ‘diplomacy’ in the second section. It offers a critical assessment of the notion of
3
Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention”, International
Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4, 2008, p. 616.
4
Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects”, Nationalities
Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2013, pp. 865-870; Pınar Akpınar, “Turkey’s
Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2013, p.
735.
5
AKM Ahsan Ullah, “Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary
Marginalization”, Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2011, pp. 139–161.
6
Rushanara Ali, “One year on, a million Rohingya refugees still fear for their lives”, The Guardian, 16 August 2018.
245
humanitarian diplomacy, its definition and why it contradicts many of the highly-
regarded assumptions of state-centrism as well as how states navigate around this.
In an effort to define the idea, the paper questions the concept itself, pertaining to
the issues of neutrality and legitimacy. The modern praxis of humanitarian diplomacy
and their various manifestations, discussed in the third section, cast more light as to
how state-sponsored humanitarian diplomacy affects the domain of humanitarian
work. The arguments discussed in the previous section are explored with their real
world ramifications. In the fourth section, the paper discusses how states with limited
diplomatic clout and capacity can exercise humanitarianism-inspired diplomacy. The
Bangladesh case is illustrative of a state-led humanitarianism because it has recently
been adversely affected by the Rohingya influx, although it itself is not a party to the
conflict.
Admittedly, the subsequent discussion gives a disproportionately greater

emphasis on humanitarian diplomacy involving man-made conflicts, although
theoretically, it applies to, and is more visible in, diplomacy involving natural disasters.
The paper justifies this approach on two grounds: the act of diplomacy per se is more
obvious when a third-party state involvement is required and when the stakes are
higher in conflicts. Humanitarian diplomacy following a natural disaster involves
more inter-agency and inter-governmental coordination than negotiation. Moreover,
the case at hand, i.e., the Rohingya crisis, relates to not a natural disaster-induced
humanitarian situation. Therefore, the discussion in this paper has been selective in
providing supporting evidence.
2. Towards a Conceptual Clarity
No matter how soothing humanitarian diplomacy sounds, as a concept, it

is highly contested. The following discussion attempts to decipher what constitutes
humanitarian diplomacy by questioning some of its basic tenets, juxtaposing it with
diplomacy of the conventional sort and contrasting it with its close cousins, namely
humanitarian relief/aid and humanitarian intervention in order to understand the
concept by exploring the caveats and their nuances. It does not readily accept the
existing definitions because they are too broad, making them practically unproductive.
Humanitarian diplomacy has remained a practitioner-dominated world. Its

long history notwithstanding, there has been little rigorous academic study. The first
book dedicated to the subject exclusively titled, Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners
and Their Craft appeared as recently as 2007.7 Much of the current literature is
contributed by practitioners with considerable knowledge and understanding of the
7
Philippe Régnier, “The Emerging Concept of Humanitarian Diplomacy: Identiﬁcation of a Community of
Practice and Prospects for International Recognition”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 884,
2011, p. 1212.
246
issue, but these ‘grey literature’ lacks academic rigour. While their wisdom is invaluable
both for understanding and extending current knowledge, they do not connect
the field of study with the larger body of scholarly discussion. The first step to fill in
the gap is to operationalize the terminologies. An agreement on what constitutes
‘humanitarian diplomacy’ is imperative if scholars were to analyze its applicability as
a foreign policy tool by states. In this section, the paper begins by questioning the
concept, analyzing existing definitions of humanitarian diplomacy, involvements of
different actors, issues of legality and neutrality, to show what is problematic about
them.
Humanitarian diplomacy is more than humanitarianism. There has to be

some form of diplomatic manoeuvre, in the form of negotiation and mediation for
it to be considered humanitarian diplomacy. This is what distinguishes humanitarian
diplomacy from humanitarian aid. One of the best ways to explain an idea is to
understand it in contrast to its opposite. That is why, humanitarian diplomacy is best
explained in comparison to ‘coercive diplomacy’ that uses some form of intimidation,
or does not rule out ‘carrot and stick’. It also negates the possibility of using force,
which would then fall into the category of humanitarian intervention.
This reinforces the case for appropriate actors and institutions that engage in
the humanitarian diplomatic activity. The answer to this question is relatively straight
forward when humanitarian diplomacy involves only response to natural disasters and
political issues that is unlikely to stir controversy. Nobody would object to a country
sending relief in the wake of a natural disaster. The international community came
forward in aid of Haiti and Nepal following devastating earthquakes and as they stood
by the Maldives and Sri Lanka during the Tsunami. But problems arise when there is
a question of taking sides in conflicts. Who decides who gets the aid? There are two
major concerns when it comes to humanitarian diplomacy: legitimacy and neutrality.
If one means ‘mediation’ by humanitarian diplomacy, then few actors have more
legitimacy than the UN to engage. The UN is best placed to practice and render the
services of humanitarianism. Why, then, would states or international organizations
require to fill in? After all, no organization in the world has more legitimacy than the
UN to intervene in a crisis situation. Its answer lies in the willingness, capacity and
viability of UN effort for humanitarian actions.
There were instances when the UN failed or was unwilling to render the services
of humanitarian diplomacy. Despite its unparalleled legitimacy and implementation
mechanism, there were cases where the UN could not protect human lives. States
were lackadaisical in resolving crisis. This indecision and failure to act, as Jan Egeland
puts it, “is measured in human lives”.8 The wide-ranging efforts of the UN to forestall
Jan Egeland, “Humanitarian Diplomacy”, in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), The
8
Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 353.
247
violence in Rwanda in 1994 failed due to a lack of connection among the various
attempts at conflict resolution, the lack of coherent strategy for managing spoilers
in the peace process and weak international support.9 United Nations–African Union
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) failed in protecting the defenseless people because of
the lack of intelligence and information gathering.10 The root causes of the UN peace-
enforcement failure in Somalia have been identified as unpreparedness of the UN
diplomats and the weaknesses of the UN appeasement diplomacy.11 The failure of
the UN involvement in Somalia in the mid-1990s resulted in its withdrawal, which
brought the mechanisms and effectiveness of the UN humanitarian efforts under
strong criticism. From the financial scandal of Iraq’s oil for food programme to the
cases of sexual harassment by the UN forces in the Congo, Cambodia, Bosnia, Haiti,
the idea of the UN as the sole legitimate authority for maintaining global peace and
stability is being seriously questioned. This is where humanitarian diplomacy outside
of the UN framework comes in. Its purpose is not to challenge the UN apparatus for
mediation and resolution of international crisis situations. Rather, previous experience
suggests that in some crisis situations, the bureaucracy of and bickering at the UN can
get in the way of peaceful resolution.
This discussion also relates to diverging worldviews and theoretical

standpoints of political leaders and decision makers. Realist scholars in International
Relations, convinced by state-centrism in an anarchic world, would outright reject that
there could be any other reason for states to engage in humanitarian diplomacy than
legitimizing hidden agenda of promoting national interest. This is captured by Hazel
Smith’s ‘oxymoron’ analogy discussed earlier.12 But those who argue that diplomacy
cannot be inspired by ‘morality’, because every state is motivated by self-interest and
there are hidden motives for such actions, often overlook the tremendous amount of
humanitarian work the military of some countries is contributing.13
Hence, neo-liberal institutionalists are convinced that states are internationally

adoptive which give them the ability to mitigate ‘anarchy’ by creating institutions
that promote harmony.14 The advent of globalization has further necessitated and
deepened cooperation between states. And, because of this mutual interdependence
among states, neo-liberalists contend that states have ‘responsibilities beyond their
9
Michael N. Barnett, “The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda”, Cultural Anthropology,
Vol. 12, No. 4, 1997, p. 551.
10
Nick Grono, “Briefing Darfur: The International Community’s Failure to Protect”, African Affairs, Vol. 105,
No. 421, 2006, p. 621–631.
11
Othman O. Mahmood, The Root-causes of the United Nations’ Failure in Somalia: The Role of Neighboring
Countries in the Somali Crisis, Bloomington: Indiana, 2011, pp. 50–61.
12
Hazel Smith, op. cit.
13
John King, “The Military and Humanitarian Action”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2002, pp. 212–
216.
14
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, New York:
Longman, 1989, pp. 20-28.
248
borders’.15 In the era of global interdependence on trade and global supply of goods
and services, crises can seriously undermine international effort. For example, a crisis
in the Middle East would not only slow down economic growth of the countries
involved, it will also harm far-off nations dependent on Middle Eastern oil. For
interdependence’ sake, states strive to resolve crisis motivated by the ‘moral’ logic
which realists undersell. An obvious example of this ‘responsibility beyond borders’ is
the framing of global initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The ‘humanitarian’ motivations
behind both the MDGs and SDGs should not be undersold.
Unlike the realists, the constructivists argue that anarchy is not a given
condition of international system; rather it is socially constructed and “anarchy
is what states make of it”.16 This social construction is not a phenomenon, rather a
process which is formulated by inter-subjective ideas.17 Thus, international norms
and principles become predominant due to its relational nature with the global
actors, which compel them to abide by the established structure. The Tsunami of
2004 was a huge catastrophe encircling and affecting Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India,
Thailand, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Malaysia, Myanmar and some countries of Africa.
At that point of time, the United States of America (USA) had the full potential to
address this crisis within the arena of humanitarianism. It responded positively as
it was expected, with the announcement of overwhelming support and assistance
towards the distressed humanity; including the use of transport aircrafts, marine
expeditionary units and aircraft carrier in the affected areas.18 At the same time, it also
announced the formation of a core regional group with Australia, Japan and India
to facilitate the process of humanitarian assistance. The ongoing relief initiatives by
the donor governments and the international agencies encountered a stalemate
situation, being confused whether to continue their work or wait for the regional bloc
to respond. Thus, instead of facilitating the humanitarian efforts under the purview of
international norms, it created ambiguity for a short period of time.
Here, a distinction has to be made between political and humanitarian

diplomacy. Diplomacy is not an end in itself, it is as merely a point in a continuum; where
end of conflict, restoration of ties and prevalence of peace lie on the other end of the
spectrum. Also, there are humanitarian repercussions for politically-created crisis. As
such, we cannot perpetually separate the two. If this is the case, peacebuilding should
be the next logical step ensuing humanitarian diplomacy in a conflict situation. If
15
Michael Barnett, “Duties beyond Borders”, in Amelia Hadfield, Steve Smith and Tim Dunne (eds.), Foreign
Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 226-228.
16
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”,
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, pp. 391-425.
17
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.
139.
18
Jan Egeland, op. cit., pp. 355-356.
249
political diplomacy is an extended process, humanitarian diplomacy addresses the

immediate need of a populace. Former UN relief coordinator Jan Egeland has rightly
called humanitarian diplomacy “a temporary band-aid”.19
But when do state-sponsored peace making and mediation become

humanitarian diplomacy? To be more concrete, how do we distinguish humanitarian
diplomacy from this third-party, state-led mediation attempt? This is where questions
of international human rights and human security come into play. Humanitarian
diplomacy embodies immediacy owing to exacerbating human sufferings and evokes
human rights. Peacemaking and mediation may not call to action human security as
such. One might wonder if there is also a ‘spatial factor’ related to humanitarianism,
as far as its practical usage is concerned. People do not readily use humanitarian
relief when they help their own countrymen affected by crises.20 Humanitarianism is
brought to the fore usually when nations help strangers going beyond their territorial
boundaries.
Based on this discussion, it can be argued that humanitarian diplomacy is

often precipitated by a crisis situation which requires diplomatic activity beyond
regular state affairs with some external help in terms of meditation, without recourse
to force, in order to protect human rights in line with international laws, with the
primary purpose of ameliorating human sufferings. As the practice goes, it has been
more commonly used by non-state actors but an increasing number of state actors
are engaging in this sort of diplomacy either as their moral obligation as responsible
members of the international community or as an instrument to further enhance their
international image.
3. An Emerging Praxis
Conceptual and theoretical differences apart, the praxis of humanitarian

diplomacy is not identical to conventional diplomacy, although they share many
commonalities. It is argued here why too much of state involvement can jeopardize the
cause of humanitarianism. This is why humanitarian diplomacy has been dominated
by non-state actors and inter-governmental organizations. In this section, the paper
tries to explore some practices to humanitarian diplomacy to show the commonalities
and distinctiveness of it with the conventional diplomacy.
Some have claimed, it is a matter of ‘common sense’ that humanitarian actors

will be involved in some sort of diplomatic activities as part of their job to ensure
access to conflict-prone territories and mobilization of relief materials from national
19
Ibid., p. 353.
20
Michael Barnett, “Humanitarianism as a Scholarly Vocation”, in Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss
(eds.), op. cit.
250
governments. This is what international civil servants e.g., those employed by the UN
organizations perform on a daily basis. Much like professional diplomats of states,
they also carry ‘red’ laissez-passer or UN passports, which entitle them to diplomatic
privileges and immunities. In addition to UN staff members, diplomatic passports
are also issued to high officials of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the
World Health Organization (WHO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the World
Bank. As per this argument, there is no need to ‘reinvent the wheel’ by associating
diplomacy with humanitarianism; since they are already recognized as diplomats.
Regardless, as for practice, humanitarian diplomacy is not the same as state

diplomacy. To a great extent, these differences emanate from types of actors—
state and non-state—who perform such diplomacy. The first distinction stems from
their legal status and its associated ramifications. Diplomatic actions are guided by
internationally-agreed upon principles of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961. As states are legal entities, they can be subjected to international
laws, norms and customs. Violations and breach of such diplomatic privileges are
punishable under international legal frameworks. This also implies that traditional
diplomatic actions have more accountability. Professional diplomats can be
declared persona non grata, if their actions are deemed out of line. Conversely, most
humanitarian workers do not represent any particular state. Contrary to laissez-passer
argument mentioned earlier, staff of international humanitarian organizations such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and MSF do not hold diplomatic
privileges, but nonetheless, often find themselves negotiating in humanitarian
situations.
The second character relates to one of the cardinal features of diplomacy—

bargaining chip. Effective diplomacy relies on an efficient use of ‘carrot and stick’ and
a combination of compromises and trade-offs. If it is assumed that humanitarian
diplomacy often involves a third-party, such as inter-governmental organizations or
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), their capacity to offer concessions is limited
considering that they are not a direct party to the conflict. Indeed, the trade-off which
a third-party mediator/negotiator can offer, other than ‘bribing’, is limited.
Major activities that traditional diplomats and their humanitarian counterparts

perform also vary. Diplomatic and consular staffs are stationed in different countries
as representatives of their respective states. They protect national interests, gather
information and pass them on as ‘diplomatic cable’ to their governments (but which
does not necessarily amount to espionage), promote trade and finally negotiate
agreements.21 Humanitarian diplomats, on the other hand, also negotiate with
21
Philippe Régnier, op. cit., p. 1214.
251
governments and other parties for their access to vulnerable population, mobilization
of scattered resources both in terms of financial support and public opinion. This often
involves persuasion and advocacy. These two are, perhaps, the strongest of instruments
available to humanitarian diplomats which will be discussed in the next section.
Because of this tension between national interests versus humanitarianism,

state-sponsored humanitarianism often comes under scrutiny. This irreconcilability
between politics and piety often, if not always, results in states exploiting
humanitarianism. The US humanitarian-inspired diplomacy often translates into
‘humanitarian intervention’ under the pretext of R2P. Nothing has stained the
image of humanitarian cause more than the US humanitarian intervention based
on fabricated intelligence gathering. Despite this, there are new state actors who
are foraying into the realm of humanitarianism, such as Turkey, Norway and Qatar.
Turkey engaged in humanitarian diplomacy in Somalia and dispatched a Turkish
flotilla to embattled Gaza; the latter received international attention after they were
intercepted by the Israeli forces. The Economist called former foreign minister of
Turkey Ahmet Davutoglu’s success in ‘freelance diplomacy’ the ‘Davutoglu effect’. If
not purely motivated by political interests, Turkey’s case was motivated, at the very
least, by its own version of the ‘US Monroe Doctrine’ whereby it decided to no longer
ignore its backyard.22 In other places such as Somalia, Turkish interest may have been
to promote business and secure the votes of smaller states for a non-permanent seat
at the UN Security Council.23
Though the state-sponsored humanitarian diplomatic efforts undergo

substantial scrutinies in recent times, it is not at all a new phenomenon in the
international system. Rather, there were state donors and sponsors of humanitarianism;
such as the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, etc.,24 who promoted
the concept from time to time in different crisis situations. When Norway facilitated
the peace agreement between Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2002, it was termed as ‘niche diplomacy’.25 These state initiatives
of humanitarian negotiations were also conducted keeping in mind the factors of
geopolitical realities, national interests, international law and humanitarian norms. The
only difference was the absence of implication of the term ‘humanitarian diplomacy’.
The recent trend of merging humanitarian diplomacy along with the foreign policy
initiatives by the state actors have thus only diversified and deepened the process.
The recent inclusion of humanitarian diplomacy in the strategic foreign policy

goals of Turkey, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has definitely given the
22
“The Davutoglu Effect”, The Economist, 21 October 2010.
23
Pınar Akpınar, op. cit., p. 748.
24
Antonio De Lauri, “Humanitarian Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda”, CMI Brief, No. 4, 2018, p. 3.
25
Hemantha Dayaratne, “An Appraisal of Norway’s Role in Sri Lanka”, Institute for Defence Studies and Analy-
ses, 03 February 2011.
252
term a recognizable ground.26 To what extent their humanitarian diplomatic efforts

have prioritized and facilitated the humanities in distress is questionable, but it has
undoubtedly opened up their engagement with new foreign policy actors. The UAE
developed its soft power strategy keeping humanitarian diplomacy as the first pillar,
which enriched its foreign policy and security objectives. Through Somalia and Syria,
Turkey has diversified its humanitarian diplomacy agenda as a part of its development
strategy and security assistance initiatives. Moreover, its pillar of humanitarian
diplomacy includes peacebuilding and mediation for the long-term solution of a crisis
situation.
4. Humanitarian Diplomacy in the Rohingya Crisis
Beyond realists’ skepticism over states’ ‘motives’ of humanitarianism amid

pervasive state-centrism, there is an emerging trend in state-led humanitarian
diplomacy. The unfolding Rohingya crisis following the forced displacement of a
million of mostly-Muslim ethnic minority from Rakhine State of Myanmar triggered a
mass exodus into neighbouring Bangladesh. Their arrival en masse since August 2017
has put Bangladesh in an uneasy situation. On top of existing hundreds of thousands
Rohingyas living inside Bangladesh from previous intermittent influxes, an additional
718,493 Rohingya crossed over to the country between August to December in 2017.27
Providing shelters to one million displaced people was an immense challenge for an
already-overpopulated Bangladesh. The fact that the exodus poured seven hundred
thousand Rohingyas within a few months further complicated response to the crisis.
It required not only immediate humanitarian assistance but also diplomatic efforts
internationally both to collect aid and create awareness for a peaceful resolution to
the problem.
Humanitarian diplomacy on the Rohingya issue was essentially multi-

level and multilateral diplomacy, while at the same time negotiating the modus
operandi of repatriation bilaterally with Naypyidaw. There were bilateral negotiations
commensurate with international diplomacy to work out the details with Myanmar.
Critical situation aroused when due to the post-October 2016 attack about 65,000
Rohingyas28 had a forced entry into Bangladesh.29 Its vulnerability was addressed by the
visit of a Myanmar delegation to Bangladesh on 11 January 2017.30 The situation further
26
Antonio De Lauri, op. cit., p. 2.
27
According to the UNHCR, 901,185 Rohingyas are now (as of November 2018) living in Bangladesh and 80
per cent of them arrived since August 2017. Since the beginning of 2018, a total of 14,922 people arrived.
See, UNHCR, “Bangladesh Refugee Emergency: Population factsheet”, 15 December 2018, available at
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67285, accessed on 20 December 2018.
28
Simon Lewis and Serajul Quadir, “Myanmar, Bangladesh agree to start talks on Rohingya refugees”,
Reuters, 12 January 2017.
29
“Myanmar says nine police killed by insurgents on Bangladesh border”, The Guardian, 10 October 2016.
30
“Myanmar sends envoy to Bangladesh as Rohingya crisis deepens”, The Guardian, 11 January 2017.
253
intensified after the August 2017 influx, on which Myanmar agreed for bilateral talks
when its special envoy Thaung Tun, Myanmar’s national security adviser, had a meeting
with Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister on 23 September 2017.31 A ten-point proposal was
presented and full implementation of the report of the Kofi Anan Commission was
suggested when Bangladesh’s Home Minister paid a visit to Myanmar on 24 October
2017. Both agreed to take concrete measures to repatriate the Rohingyas and to restore
normalcy in the Rakhine State. The urgency of immediate response to the Rohingya
issue was highlighted by the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh at the 13th Asia Europe
Meeting (ASEM) of Foreign Ministers held in Myanmar on 20 November 2017, where
Bangladesh delegation had an informal briefing on Rakhine State.32
A non-binding repatriation agreement was signed bilaterally between

Minister for the Office of the State Counsellor of Myanmar Kyaw Tint Swe and the
then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Abul Hassan Mahmood Ali in Naypyidaw on 23
November 2017.33 However, the breakthrough at the bilateral negotiation was the
formation of a Joint Working Group (JWG) on 19 December 2017 to make decisions
on the repatriation procedure of the Rohingyas.34 It had its first meeting on 15 January
2018 in Naypyidaw where an agreement on “physical arrangement” to initiate the
repatriation process was finalized.35 At the bilateral home ministerial meeting on
15 February 2018, which focused on border security and cooperation, a list of 8,032
Rohingyas was handed over to Myanmar for further assessment.36 The second JWG
meeting took place on 17 May 2018, where the technical aspects on the identification
and verification of the Rohingyas were discussed.37 Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister
along with the members of JWG paid a visit to Myanmar on 11 August 2018 to observe
the progress of the accommodation for Rohingyas in the Rakhine State.38 The decision
to start repatriation from mid-November 2018 was taken at the third JWG meeting on
30 October 2018.39
Bangladesh undertook drastic diplomatic efforts to stop the atrocities in

Rakhine State, worked closely with international organizations to provide food
31
Zulfiqer Russell, “Rohingya crisis: Myanmar proposes meeting Bangladesh”, Dhaka Tribune, 23 September
2017.
32
“ASEM participants agree on broad points of Rohingya issue”, Dhaka Tribune, 20 November 2017.
33
“Myanmar signs pact with Bangladesh over Rohingya repatriation”, The Guardian, 23 November 2017.
34
Sheikh Shahariar Zaman, “Rohingya repatriation: Joint working group formed, repatriation process to
begin by January 23”, Dhaka Tribune, 20 December 2017.
35
“Joint Working Group meets in Naypyitaw”, The Daily Star, 15 January 2018.
36
“Myanmar-Bangladesh hold Ministers of Home Affairs meeting”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 18 February
2018.
37
“Myanmar Delegation attends the Second Joint Working Group Meeting on the Repatriation of Verified
Displaced Persons from Bangladesh”, Reliefweb, 17 May 2018.
38
“Rohingya Repatriation: Progress quite insignificant: Diplomats say after Bangladesh delegation visits
Maungdaw”, The Daily Star, 12 August 2018.
39
“Repatriation to begin in mid-Nov: Says foreign secy after meeting of JWG on Rohingya return”, The Daily
Star, 31 October 2018.
254
and relief and ensure safe return of the Rohingyas. Several government ministries
and departments collaborated with the foreign donor agencies. The Ministry of
the Disaster Management and Relief of the Government of Bangladesh responded
to immediate needs of the displaced. A ministerial-level pledging conference was
held in Geneva on 23 October 2017. It was co-hosted by the European Union and
the Government of Kuwait and co-organized by the UNHCR, the IOM and Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It was aimed at raising the
necessary resources to enable the humanitarian community to meet the most
urgent needs of the Rohingyas.40 The Rohingya issue featured almost regularly in
Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s foreign visits posterior to the influx. At
the 73rd United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in 2018, she proposed
three recommendations to address the crisis which summarize both the root and
triggering causes of the problem. She argued that the present humanitarian crisis
stems from discriminatory laws that stripped the Rohingyas of their citizenship.
Second, the repatriation will be viable if inter-communal trust is restored and ‘safe
zones’ are provided to the returnees. Third, to prevent further atrocities, justice and
accountability need to be ensured in line with the recommendations of the Fact-
Finding Mission of the UN Human Rights Council.41
The foreign office brought up the issue of consultations with third party
countries, such as Foreign Office Consultation (FOC) Lithuania in 2018. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and foreign missions of Bangladesh made an effort to invite
diplomats to visit Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar. Bangladesh High Commission in
India invited and accompanied the diplomats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Ethiopia, Georgia, Greece, Mauritius, Portugal, Slovenia, Ukraine, Zambia,
Nigeria, Czech Republic, Austria, Ghana, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji to the largest
Kutupalong-Balukhali camp in December 2017.42 Bangladesh also invited Myanmar’s
civil society organizations such as the Myanmar Interfaith Dialogue Group to visit
Rohingya camps.43 The Rohingya camps were visited by the UN Secretary-General
António Guterres and the World Bank President Jim Yong Kim on 02 July 2018, where
they urged to pressurize Myanmar for fast solution of the crisis.44
40
A total of 36 pledges for Bangladesh and Myanmar were made and US$ 434 million was sought, of which
US$ 344 million was committed.
41
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, “Press Release: PM makes 3 proposals for resolving
Rohingya crisis”, 24 September 2018, available at https://mofa.gov.bd/site/press_release/16450e39-cff8-
4ad8-a8a2-e25b5399aba7, accessed on 30 September 2018.
42
Abdul Aziz, “19 foreign diplomats visit Cox’s Bazar Rohingya camps,” Dhaka Tribune, 17 December 2017,
available at https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/12/17/diplomats-coxs-bazar-rohingya-camps,
accessed on 20 September 2018.
43
Aung Kyaw Min, “Bangladesh Foreign Minister Ali invites interfaith group”, Myanmar Times, 15 August
2018.
44
Tanjir Rahman and Abdul Aziz, “Guterres calls for more pressure on Myanmar after visiting Rohingya
camps”, Dhaka Tribune, 02 July 2018.
255
JWG Meetings between the Foreign Secretaries of Bangladesh and Myanmar

discussed repatriation but it was delayed due to concerns over the safety of their
return. According to Dhaka Tribune (15 October 2018), Myanmar has pledged for the
repatriation of 718,493 Rohingyas and completed verification of 8,000 among them.
But new concerns emerged due to the conditions stipulated in the repatriation deal.
Most of the Rohingyas do not possess identity documents because Myanmar state
policies deprive them.
‘Comparative Advantage’ in Humanitarian Diplomacy
Alongside Bangladesh government, some intra-governmental and non-

governmental organizations are working with the Rohingyas, notably UNHCR and
IOM. But any uncharted territory of multilateral governance is prone to occasional
hiccups. A Switzerland-based news agency, Integrated Regional Information Networks
(IRIN), which specializes in reliable reporting on humanitarian affairs, points to an
inter-agency tension over the leading role in coordination of the Rohingya affairs.45A
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between UNHCR and the
Government of Bangladesh on the repatriation of the displaced Rohingyas in May
1993. From that time onwards, UNHCR has been working at the ground level of the
crisis.46 It has claimed of not being officially informed about the process47 and has
also expressed concern about the stability of the Rakhine State, which is still not
favourable for the Rohingya repatriation.
The national level policy of Bangladesh towards the Rohingya crisis avoided
the supremacy of a single organization, rather focused on coordinated approach
among them. Since it was not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, a National
Task Force (NTF) was formed under the National Strategy on Myanmar Refugees and
Undocumented Myanmar Nationals of 2013. It was chaired by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and composed of 22 Ministries and entities.48 To provide strategic guidance and
engagement with the government at the national level, a Strategic Executive Group
(SEG) worked for the humanitarian agencies. Both IOM and UNHCR are currently
working under the Strategic Executive Group, which is co-chaired by the UN Resident
Coordinator and the country representatives of both the agencies.
45
IRIN was originally based in Nairobi and was born out of a project of the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). See, Ben Parker, “Bangladesh resists greater UNHCR role
in Rohingya Crisis”, IRIN, 23 October 2017, available at https://www.irinnews.org/news/2017/10/23/
bangladesh-resists-greater-unhcr-role-rohingya-crisis, accessed on 30 October 2018.
46
NPM-ACAPS Analysis Hub, Review: Rohingya Influx since 1978, Thematic Report, December 2017.
47
“UN deplores Myanmar, Bangladesh deal on Rohingyas”, Prothom Alo, 01 November 2018.
48
“Situation Report Rohingya Refugee Crisis”, Inter Sector Coordination Group, 05 September 2018, available
at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/
iscg_situation_report_05_september_2018.pdf, accessed on 10 November 2018.
256
Besides working jointly, IOM and UNHCR are also contributing individually for
fast solution to the crisis. UNHCR urged the ministers of 26 countries in Bali, Indonesia
at the Seventh Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process for expressing their solidarity
with Bangladesh.49 It also launched the joint verification exercise with the Government
of Bangladesh since July 2018 for preparing a unified database of the Rohingyas.50 On
the other hand, to assist over a million displaced Rohingyas, IOM has appealed for
US$ 182.1 million, which is the part of the overall US$ 951 million UN Joint Response
Plan that began in March 2018.51 UNHCR has achieved significant success in areas of
health, education, hygiene and shelter; whereas IOM’s mandate on assisted voluntary
return and reintegration under the department of migration management is quite
strong. While assessing the comparative advantage of specific humanitarian agency
in a given crisis, their areas of specialization and organizational capacities are also
crucial factors. Bangladesh made an unorthodox move by leveraging the contribution
of both IOM and UNHCR, which has provided a combined and synchronized journey
towards the solution of the crisis.
‘Necessary Evil’ of Over-politicization
The third argument of Hazel Smith (the other two being ‘oxymoron’ and
‘common sense’ as discussed earlier) relating to humanitarian diplomacy is ‘necessary
evil’.52 She argues that humanitarian diplomacy suffers from a lack of enforcement
capacity and is further handicapped by little or no room for bargaining. Sometimes,
this is translated into a need for over-politicization of an issue at the international level
to create awareness and thereby compelling international community into action.
In the absence of ability to flex muscle, some actors must rely on the mobilization
of public opinion by exaggerating an issue out of proportion. The instances of
humanitarian diplomacy that resulted in successful resolution are often an outcome
of intense efforts at the international level. While it is clear why Smith calls this
necessary evil, nevertheless, given the degree of sufferings endured by the Rohingyas
and multiplied by the number of people displaced within a short span of time, the
resultant humanitarian disaster can never be adequately politicized through words.
That said, the current level of international awareness on Rohingya crisis owes its
success to two factors — ‘the CNN effect’ and ‘celebrity vogue’.
In a captivating book, Piers Robinson of the University of Liverpool has argued

how the ‘CNN effect’ compels the Western powers to take actions in a crisis situation.53
The real-time communication technology and continuous media coverage of crisis
49
“Rohingya Crisis: UNHCR head asks Asia-Pacific leaders to show solidarity with Bangladesh, offers support
and protection to refugees”, First Post, 08 August 2018.
50
“Joint Bangladesh/UNHCR verification of Rohingya refugees gets underway”, UNHCR, 06 July 2018.
51
“IOM appeals for US$ 182m to help Rohingyas, local communities”, Dhaka Tribune, 19 March 2018.
52
Hazel Smith, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
53
Piers Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 17.
257
situations portraying the vulnerabilities of unarmed civilians affect public opinion

and foreign policy decision. It stimulates the public opinion and activism of civil
society organizations which influences the decision making of Western countries.
Regarding humanitarian interventions in Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia and Iraq,
the contribution of ‘the CNN effect’ is conspicuous, their occasional controversy
notwithstanding. It has been used both as a state tool to legitimize state involvement
in crises and as a media tool to mobilize valuable public opinion. In the case of
Rohingya crisis, media coverage was quite comprehensive portraying the mass influx
and dreadful journey from Myanmar to Bangladesh both by land and waterways. In
this case, CNN played remarkable role of unearthing the atrocities committed by the
Myanmar military against the Rohingyas.54 There were over 1.2 million tweets on the
Rohingya crisis and there were numerous ‘hashtags’ and ‘retweets’ of the issue.55 This
was followed by the UN Fact Finding Mission report in September 2017 which urged
Myanmar to face the genocide tribunal.56 The power of media accomplished much to
mount pressure on that country.
The vocation of humanitarian diplomacy has often been championed by

celebrities and individuals. George Harrison and Ravi Shankar organized the ‘Concert
for Bangladesh’ in 1971 during the country’s Liberation War and raised US$ 240,000
which was donated for the refugees through United Nations International Children’s
Emergency Fund (UNICEF).57 Since then, celebrity-led humanitarian diplomacy has
become more common. In recent times, Hollywood actors George Clooney and
his spouse Amal Alamuddin played an important role in the Darfur crisis. In 2007,
George Clooney co-founded Not on Our Watch with Don Cheadle, Matt Damon, Brad
Pitt and others to stop genocide in the Sudan. Angelina Jolie in Syria, Ben Affleck in
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sean Penn in Iraq have been able to garner
valuable public support in favour of humanitarian diplomacy.
International organizations also invited celebrities to create awareness and

sensitization by visiting conflict zones and acting as especial ambassadors. They help
to mobilize charities and represent international humanitarian organizations. In the
context of Rohingya crisis so far, Michelle Yeoh, Cate Blanchett, Priyanka Chopra and
Matt Dillon visited Rohingya camps and expressed their solidarity with the distressed
Rohingyas.58 They expressed concern at different public events and criticized
54
Antonio Faccilongo and Kyle Almond, “A New Life for the Rohingya”, CNN, available at http://edition.cnn.
com/interactive/2017/10/world/rohingya-refugees-cnnphotos/, accessed on 09 October 2018; Matthew
Smith, “Rohingya Repatriation is Premature and Dangerous”, CNN, 29 January 2018.
55
Georgina Rannard, “What’s behind these 1.2 million tweets?”, BBC News, 05 September 2017.
56
James Griffiths, “UN calls for genocide tribunal over Rohingya Crisis”, CNN, 18 September 2018.
57
Alex de Waal, “The Humanitarian Carnival: A Celebrity Vogue”, World Affairs, Vol. 171, No. 2, 2008, pp. 43-56.
58
Michelle Yeoh visited as a goodwill ambassador of UNDP, Cate Blanchett of UNHCR, Priyanka Chopra
as of UNICEF, and Matt Dillon came responding to an appeal made by a Rohingya activist; “Michelle Yeoh
calls Rohingya crisis ‘Despicable’”, Gulf News, 28 January 2018; “Cate Blanchett questions Aung San Suu Kyi’s
stance on Rohingya refugee crisis”, The New Daily, 22 March 2018; Abdul Aziz, “Priyanka Chopra’s Celebrity
258
Myanmar for inaction over the harrowing condition of the Rohingyas. This is bringing
to fruition. A group of internet-celebrities from France targeted to raise fund worth
US$ 1 million for the displaced Rohingyas.59 The Canadian government rescinded an
honorary citizenship accorded to Aung San Suu Kyi. While most of these acts are not
likely to impact Myanmar in a significant way, but the symbolism these responses
embody will help mount moral pressure on Myanmar.
Internationalizing versus Localizing Humanitarianism
A dilemma was whether to pursue bilateral or multilateral diplomacy in

the situation. Major regional powers including China and Russia overtly advised
Bangladesh to deal with the issue bilaterally.60 Both approaches have their merits and
demerits. Despite Bangladesh’s disappointment with the Myanmar’s policy of pushing
its population into Bangladesh territory, on the one hand, and dragging its feet to
repatriate the displaced population on the other, Bangladesh is not a direct party per
se to the Rohingya conflict and it is not an issue of contention between Bangladesh
and Myanmar.
So far as international humanitarian actions are concerned, it has been

dominated by the Western countries. The western capitals are the sources where most
of aid and donation flows from. It affects the humanitarian domain in two ways. With
a gradually shifting of global centre of power, other actors amass clout and influence.
Furthermore, the second issue has to do with the places where conflicts occur, e.g.,
mostly in the non-western countries. The implications of this trend are more than
simply the oft-incompatible western solutions to regional crisis. Neglecting the
regional actors essentially implies missing out on important networks of and access to
regional powers that matter to a permanent conflict resolution. This has been evident
since the inception of the Rohingya catastrophe. Despite mounting international
pressure on Myanmar, a UN resolution in November 2017 to formally condemn the
gross violations of human rights in Rakhine State came as a disappointment because
of the position of regional actors.61 This reinforces the fact that humanitarianism can
barely ignore geopolitical interests of regional actors. Despite their mutual animosity,
both China and India share a similar stance vis-à-vis the Rohingya crisis, dictated by
extends to Rohingya Camps”, Dhaka Tribune, 24 May 2018; “Matt Dillon Puts Rare Celebrity Spotlight on
Rohingya During Visit to Myanmar”, The Hollywood Reporter, 01 January 2018.
59
“French Internet Celebrities Raise funds for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh”, The Daily Star, 03 December
2017.
60
Serajul Quadir, “China wants Bangladesh, Myanmar to solve Rohingya crisis bilaterally”, Reuters, 18
November 2017.
61
A total of 135 countries voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on ‘The Human Rights Situation in
Myanmar’ in November 2017. However, it was the position of the regional countries that was frustrating—
China, Russia, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines and Vietnam voted against the resolution, while India, Japan,
Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Singapore and Thailand abstained from voting. See, Humayun Kabir Bhuiyan,
“UNGA Voting on Rohingyas: Dhaka satisfied with outcome”, The Independent, 18 November 2017.
259
their significant investments in Rakhine State. India is involved in the India-Myanmar-

Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan multi-modal project which aims to
provide its landlocked northeastern states an access to Sittwe sea port.62 For China,
Rakhine State is an integral part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) grand design.
The proposed Kyaukpyu deep sea port in the Rakhine State will not only be another
node in what the US State Department terms ‘string of pearls’ but it will provide an
oil-gas pipeline and railroad link to landlocked Yunnan province of China.63 As it
turns out, the competition of the two rivals in securing strategic objectives gets in
the way of a humanitarian cause. Permanent solutions for the protracted human-
induced humanitarian crisis ought to include political diplomacy with regional actors.
China has attempted to facilitate bilateral solution of the Rohingya issue between
Bangladesh and Myanmar. The fact remains that despite the power of persuasion
of non-governmental and intra-governmental organizations, without combining
both the financial leverage of the Western governments and organizations as well
as the political leverage of regional powers, localized humanitarian crisis cannot be
effectively resolved.
Compromise is unthinkable in humanitarian crisis because doing so often

endanger human lives. Yet, maintaining a ‘fidelity to principles’ i.e., sticking to
unbending ideals of universal principles is harder than it seems in humanitarian
diplomacy and often considered an ‘enemy of action’. There are abundant cases of
international community compelled to bend rules to accommodate different factions
to ensure that life-saving aid supplies are not cut off. In Somalia, aid workers were
compelled to hire militiamen and their machine-gun-mounted pick-up trucks to
disburse aid. Since it was not possible to disclose this breach of Western principles
in official documents, they were passed off as ‘technical assistance’.64 Donor agencies
justified this on the ground that what was at stake, i.e., human lives, is much more
important. The best alternative for humanitarianism is making a delicate pragmatic
balance without jeopardizing the primary goals. In case of the Rohingya crisis, the
word ‘Rohingya’ itself is highly politicized inside Myanmar and is often linked to the
ethnic group’s secessionist aspirations. Myanmar’s denial is rooted in a false belief that
the Rohingyas are Bengalis. Hence, the word itself is banned in Myanmar. Prior to the
visit of Pope Francis to Rohingya camps in Bangladesh and Myanmar in November
2017, a Vatican Cardinal from Myanmar, Charles Maung Bo pleaded to the Pope to
62
Subir Bhaumik, “Why Do China, India Back Myanmar over the Rohingya Crisis?”, South China Morning Post,
18 October 2017; Martine van Mil, “Oil, gas and geopolitics: behind China’s three phase solution to the
Rohingya crisis”, JASON Institute for Peace and Security Studies (Jong Atlantisch Samenwerkingsorgaan
Nederland), The Netherlands, 17 December 2017, available at https://www.stichtingjason.nl/oil-gas-and-
geopolitics-behind-chinas-three-phase-solution-to-the-rohingya-crisis, accessed on 30 January 2018.
63
See, Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, New York: Random
House, 2010.
64
Karin von Hippel, “Blurring of mandates in Somalia”, in Larry Minear and Hazel Smith (eds.), op. cit., pp.
305-319.
260
refrain from using the word Rohingya.65 The impending possibility of Pope using ‘the
R-word’ was deemed so politically charged that the leader of communal Buddhist
organization ‘Ma Ba Tha’, Ashin Wirathu preempted by commenting that “There is
no Rohingya ethnic group in our country, but the Pope believes they are originally
from here. That’s false”.66 The dilemma for Pope Francis was that if he did not use the
Rohingya word, it may be considered as his failure to stand up for what was morally
right. Pope used the word Rohingya during his visit to Bangladesh, but refrained from
uttering it in Myanmar. Bangladesh also took a pragmatic approach in prioritizing the
alleviation of Rohingya sufferings first over secondary namesake debates. In smart
identity cards given out to the displaced population sheltered in Bangladesh, they
were called ‘forcefully displaced Myanmar citizens’ instead of the Rohingya.67
5. Conclusion
Whether it is diplomacy for purely a humanitarian purpose or diplomacy

in the veil of humanitarianism largely depends on the actors practicing it. It has
been a preferred tool for international organizations and large NGOs to provide
emergency relief in time of crises. However, there are situations when only relief
and aid is not enough to resolve the crisis; states need to move further from aid and
pragmatically use conventional diplomatic apparatus. In spite of ambiguity of the
concept, humanitarian diplomacy provides certain leverages both to the state and
non-state practitioners. Notwithstanding the criticism of some scholars and instances
of exploitation by powerful states under the pretext of humanitarian intervention,
humanitarianism is finding a niche in emerging middle powers. This paper illustrates
the case of humanitarian diplomacy in recent Rohingya crisis. Not only an active
diplomatic effort by Bangladesh has enabled to avoid an imminent humanitarian
catastrophe in the wake of the Rohingya exodus, but it has also signalled a shift from
solely aid-based humanitarianism to pragmatism.
It would be worthwhile to revisit the theoretical debates discussed in the

second section in light of state activism in the Rohingya humanitarian crisis. First,
65
Jason Horowitz, “Pope Francis’ Dilemma in Myanmar: Whether to Say ‘Rohingya’”, The New York Times, 26
November 2017.
66
‘Ma Ba Tha’ and closely related ‘969 Movement’ spawned in the aftermath of the same changing social
circumstances at the first of half of this decade. Alex Bookbinder notes that there is a cosmological
explanation for the 969 Movement’s name. It is common in South Asia’s Islamic culture to represent the
benediction “In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate and Merciful” with the number 786, hence some
businesses owned by Muslims in this region display this number in signboards outside their shops etc.
The numbers 969, and the Movement named after it, is intended to provide a countervailing effect to the
Muslim practice. The movement’s aim is to protect Buddhism against perceived threats from Islam. See,
Alex Bookbinder, “969: The Strange Numerological Basis for Burma’s Religious Violence”, The Atlantic, 09
April 2013.
67
Mohammad Nurul Islam, “Bangladesh faces refugee anger over term ‘Rohingya’, data collection”, Reuters,
26 November 2018.
261
Bangladesh’s involvement was more of ‘accidental humanitarianism’—reluctance

to respond would have resulted in grave sufferings or peril for an already-wearied
community who undertook a perilous journey to reach Bangladesh. Here, resorting
to humanitarianism motivated by solely national interest is not the only scenario as
realists would project. Second, Bangladesh’s diplomatic activity in the Rohingya crisis
does not contradict what realists would argue, because other non-state actors and
international organizations were also involved in the crisis alongside Bangladesh.
However, diplomacy in the Rohingya crisis also reveals a blurring line between
humanitarian and political diplomacy. In pointing out one of the differences between
the two, Lakhdar Brahimi noted that humanitarian diplomacy is often short-term
as opposed to political diplomacy which is often long-term.68 While international
organizations and NGOs have shouldered the tasks of collecting funds and providing
‘humanitarian assistance’, Bangladesh government has been using its diplomatic
tools to resolve the crisis.
68
Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, “Foreword”, in Larry Minear and Hazel Smith (eds.), op. cit., p. xv.
262
Sufia Khanom
ENVIRONMENTALLY-DISPLACED MIGRANTS IN BANGLADESH: HUMAN

SECURITY PERSPECTIVES
Abstract
This article has brought a critical perspective to the gendered nature of

insecurity as experienced by environmentally-displaced migrants through
their everyday experiences of insecurity and its effect on their long-term
capability. Both anthropogenic interventions and natural calamities in the
coastal zones directly affect one quarter of Bangladesh and the many people
living in these regions. Unexpected flows of migration shape both the nature
of cities and development processes. Dhaka already has a large influx of
migrants and is expected to receive a greater influx of environmentally-
displaced migrants due to the better economic opportunities available there
compared with other parts of the country. Different development sectors,
utility services and infrastructure developments have expanded rapidly but
have been unable to keep pace with the demand of the growing population.
There is a lack of coordination between different government bodies in
terms of implementation of policies, rules and regulations. The gap between
service provision and demand is further exacerbated by mismanagement
and brings every day to long-term insecurities of its residence. This insecurity
also arises not only from ‘being a man’ or ‘being a woman’ or ‘being a migrant’,
but is also due to specific practices, processes and power relations within
the social institutions at individual, community, national and regional
level. Environmental change is a global phenomenon and environmentally-
displaced migrants are forced to take the decision to migrate like refugees.
Yet, the protection of environmentally-displaced migrants is neither fully a
global nor a national responsibility. There remains insufficient attention to
protect the rights of environmentally-displaced migrants.
Keywords: Environmentally-Displaced, Security, Migration, Protection, Gender
Sufia Khanom is Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Her
e-mail address is: sufia@biiss.org
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable comments and thoughts of her two Supervisors Dr.
Fiona Miller and Associate Professor Dr. Sandie Suchet-Pearson, Department of Geography and Planning,
Macquarie University, Australia in the research on Environmentally-Displaced Migrants’ Insecurity as a part
of her PhD research.
263
Figure 1: Migrants from Bhola Island (top) and Streetscape in Bhola Settlement
in Dhaka (below)
Source: PhD Fieldwork, In-depth interview, 11 November 2016.
I am standing here to receive my friend’s family members in the Bhola settlement,

Dhaka. I know they are entering into the narrow dark lanes with lots of hopes. It reminds me
264
ENVIRONMENTALLY-DISPLACED MIGRANTS IN BANGLADESH
of the old days while migrating towards Dhaka. There was a famine in Ilisha, Bhola Island,
due to the devastating storm surge in 1970 and the nine months long Liberation war in
1971. My family did not have enough food for all of us. My parents died after four days of
starvation. I and my two brothers worked in the agricultural fields but could not earn enough
to cover our food needs. We survived on rice starch given to us by the neighbours for several
months… Households were taken away by the rivers. We had only one plot of land left. We
sold it to my neighbour and decided to come to Dhaka. We started working as housemaids
in three different houses. We got food if we could work, yet we have to tolerate so much
assault and pain… After four to five years, my father’s friend selected me as his daughter-in-
law before I had even reached puberty. However, I got a family again, they were a blessing to
me. My family has been living in this settlement for 30 years and we now have 21 rooms and
6 shops. I am aware of my friends’ suffering back in Bhola, due to cyclones, storm surges and
salinity. Bholayas [people of Bhola Island] are not scared of such disasters; they just need a
piece of land to stand on and for production. But when nature takes away our lands, we have
to migrate (Sabera, In-depth interview, PhD Field Work, 11 November 2016).
1. Introduction
This article is about Sabera's1 family and thousands of other environmentally-

displaced migrants’ insecurity in Bangladesh. River erosion and other ‘natural’
disasters such as cyclones, storm surges and salinity force people to migrate from
environmentally vulnerable areas to nearby cities.
According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Dhaka remains the

major internal migration destination.2 Although the total number displaced due to
environmental factors has not yet been estimated, several studies have found that
significant numbers have migrated due to environmental factors in Bangladesh. For
example, 4.4 million people were displaced after cyclone Sidr and consequent flooding
in 20073 and in 2013, about 1.1 million people were displaced because of cyclone
Mohasen, 137,000 by tornado and 22,000 by flooding.4 Approximately six million people
have already been displaced and 9.6 million will migrate due to environmental changes
excluding temporary and seasonal migration between 2011 and 2050.5 It is estimated
that every year, 100,000 people are displaced because of river erosion.6
1
Pseudonyms are used in this research in accordance with the Macquarie University Code for the
Responsible Conduct of Research, ethics approval reference number: 5201600616
2
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Population Census Report, Dhaka: Statistics and Information Division
(SID), Ministry of Planning, 2010.
3
“Bangladesh: cyclone Sidr OCHA situation Report No. 2”, available at: https://refiefweb.int/report/bangladesh/
bangladesh-cyclone-sidr-ocha-situation-report-no-2, accessed on 23 November 2018.
4
Bishawjit Mallick, “Cyclone-induced Migration in Southwest Coastal Bangladesh”, ASIEN, Vol. 130, 2014, pp.
60-81.
5
Ezekiel Simperingham, Climate Displacement in Bangladesh: The Need for Urgent Housing, Land, and Property
(HLP) Rights Solutions, Dhaka: Displacement Solution, May 2012.
6
Bishawjit Mallick, op. cit.
265
Unexpected flows of migration shape both the nature of cities and development
processes. Therefore, migration has huge potential to impact on many aspects of
urban life in terms of housing, utility services, health care, transportation and other
services. Yet, due to the incapacity of the state to meet the increasing demand for
basic services, resources, infrastructure and facilities in urban areas, environmentally-
displaced migrants are often pushed to the margins of development, often in urban
fringe areas or abandoned government land and into situations of insecurity. The
aim of this article is to explore the insecurities of environmentally-displaced migrants
through their everyday to long-term and gendered experiences.
Everyday insecurities affect the environmentally-displaced migrant’s long-

term human fulfillment. Amartya Sen, a renowned economist, identified human
development as the expansion of capability where capability reflects a person’s
freedom to choose between different ways of being and living.7 In this research, long-
term human fulfillment has been considered as immaterial perspectives of human
development. It seeks to evaluate the quality of life through understanding freedom
at an individual level and proposes alternative ways to view resources and utilitarian-
based forms of people’s capability rather than poverty. Similarly, people feel secure
by protecting their vital core (multidimensional human rights and human freedoms
based in practical reason) from direct and indirect threats without impeding long-
term human fulfillment.8 Insecurity here means lack of protection or the possibility
of being open to any threat. Therefore, human security should be consistent with the
ongoing human development goals to be sustainable.
Security is context specific. Different societies have their own meaning

of security in terms of freedom. The UN Human Security Council Report identified
three types of freedoms – freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom from
indignity,9 which are also identified as security threats to environmentally-displaced
migrants in this research. This study found that people are unable to experience or
feel secure due to their lack of freedom and restrictions placed on the potential for
a flourishing life. This insecurity also arises not only from ‘being a man’ or ‘being a
woman’ or ‘being a migrant’, but is also due to specific practices, processes and power
relations within the social institutions.
The article does not investigate the migration process, the decision making
behind the process of migration or the vulnerabilities people experience at the starting
7
Amartya Sen, “Why Human Security?”, Paper presented at the International Symposium on Human Security
in Tokyo on 28 July, 2000; and Amartya Sen, “Development as Capacity Extension”, in J. De Filipps and S.
Saeger (ed.), The Community Development Reader, London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 319-327.
8
Sabrina Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, Working Paper, Centre for Research on
Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, 2003, p. 8.
9
United nations, Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human
Security, Human security Unit: Human Security Council, 2005.
266
point of their migration journey. Though concerned with security, this article takes
a markedly different approach to contemporary security studies of environmental
migration which tend to analyze the state from the top down.10 Although
environmental change is a global phenomenon, it has effects at individual and local
scales and generates different experiences and emotional responses.11 This article
focuses on every day insecurities and the perspectives of environmentally-displaced
migrants themselves. However, the scalar difference between the experiences and
the extension of problems needs to be contextualized at individual, community and
national level.
In this backdrop, based on the existing literature, this article is an endeavour

to explore the theoretical dimensions of environmentally-displaced migration. It also
assesses the human security perspectives of environmentally-displaced migrants at
different level, i.e., individual, community, national, regional and global. The article
is divided into five sections including introduction and conclusion. Section two
discusses the complexity of defining environmentally-displaced migration/migrants.
How do the environmentally vulnerable areas with special reference to the coastal
areas of Bangladesh and other socio-political factors push people to migrate are
discussed in section three. Section four explores the insecurity of environmentally-
displaced migrants at multiple scales. The article concludes with discussions on
the national climate change policies of Bangladesh for ensuring the security of
environmentally-displaced migrants. Therefore, this article begins with the question:
who are environmentally-displaced migrants?
2. Approaching Environmentally-Displaced Migration
There is no internationally agreed definition of migration as a consequence

of environmental factors such as river erosion, salinity intrusion, storm surge,
cyclone, etc.12 El-Hinnawi, who first introduced the term ‘environmental refugee’,
used it to describe people who had been temporarily displaced, those who had
been permanently displaced and those who migrated because their home
environment could no longer sustain their basic needs.13 After that, environmental
refugees were defined as people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their
10
Francois Gemenne, Jon Barnett, W. Neil Adger and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, “Climate and Security: Evidence,
Emerging Risks, and a New Agenda”, Climatic Change, Vol. 123, No. 1, 2014, pp. 1-9; and Ben Saul, “The
Security Risk of Climate Change Displacement in Bangladesh”, Journal of Human Security, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2012,
pp. 5-35.
11
K. L. O’Brien and R. M. Leichenko, “Winners and Losers in the Context of Global Change”, Annual Association
of American Geographer’s, Vol. 93, 2003, pp. 89-103.
12
Olivia Dun and Francois Gemenne, “Defining Environmental Migration”, Forced Migration Review, 2011, pp.
10-11; and Francois Gemenne, “Why the Numbers Don’t Add Up: A Review of Estimates and Predictions of
People Displaced by Environmental Changes”, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 21, 2011, pp.41-49.
13
Essam El-Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees, Nairobi: United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP),
UNDP, 1985.
267
homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation and other

environmental problems, together with the associated problems of population
pressures and profound poverty.14 Renaud and others constructed a typology
of environmental migrants that distinguishes between: (1) an environmentally
motivated migrant who chooses to leave a steadily deteriorating environment to
pre-empt the worst outcome (2) an environmentally forced migrant who must leave
to avoid the worst outcome and (3) those who must flee the worst outcome.15
Figure 2: Framework for Determining Environmental Migrant Sub-Categories
Source: Fabrice G. Renaud, Olivia V. Dun, Koko Warner and Janos Bogardi, “A Decision Framework for
Environmentally Induced Migration”, International Migration, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2011, p. 7.
The ambiguity over the definition for migration caused in part by
environmental change and degradation is linked to two issues. Firstly, scholars
point out the challenge of isolating environmental factors from other migration
14
Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century”, Philosophical
Transactions: Biological Sciences, Vol. 357, No. 1420, 2002, pp. 609-613.
15
Fabrice G. Renaud, Olivia V. Dun, Koko Warner and Janos Bogardi, “A Decision Framework for
Environmentally Induced Migration”, International Migration, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2011, pp. 5-29.
268
drivers,16 as environmental factors are in most cases not solely responsible for driving
migration. Defining the phenomena becomes a complicated task of defining causes
and attributing consequences to environmental processes.17 This is also a reason why
quantifying the numbers of environmentally-displaced migration is problematic.18
Secondly, it has also been difficult to define the range of environment-related

migration because of the institutional and governance implications of doing so.19
Identifying a ‘‘problem’’ requires a response. Thus, the concept and recognition of a
problem also strongly influences what institutions bear responsibility for action. This
research uses the working definition of environmentally-displaced migrants proposed
by the International Organization for Migration (IOM):
Environmental migrants are “persons or groups of persons who, for compelling

reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely
affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or
choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within
their country or abroad”.20
This working definition is comprehensive and identifies environmental degradation

as an important push factor driving or at least triggering migration. Its limitations include
that it does not distinguish between temporal or permanent migration, nor does it identify
the destination of migrants (within country, or to a new country, to urban centres or other
rural areas). This definition does not address the circumstances under which people have
migrated (voluntary, forced, decided not to return, were not able to return) and does not
indicate how institutions and policies might help environmentally-displaced migrants.21
The definition also does not give any indication of how the migration is gendered in terms
of decision making, pattern and nature. Migration flows, both because of environmental
changes or other forms of labour migration, are predominantly within country.22 Migrants
often start their journey towards urban areas with lots of hopes and without proper
knowledge of urban life and end up in informal settlements.23
16
Richard Black, Dominic Kniveton, Ronald Skeldon, Daniel Coppard, Akira Murarata and Kerstein Schmidt-
Verkerk, “Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends and Their Policy Implications for Migration”,
Globalization and Poverty-Working Paper T-26, Brighton: Development Research Centre on Migration,
University of Sussex, 2008.
17
Ibid.
18
Gemenne, 2011, op. cit.
19
International Organization for Migration (IOM), Assessing the Evidence: Environment, Climate Change and
Migration in Bangladesh, Dhaka: IOM, 2010.
20
Ibid., p. 4.
21
Koko Warner, “Global Environmental Change and Migration: Governance Challenges”, Global Environmental
Change, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2010, pp. 402-413.
22
Tasneem Siddiqi, Mohammad Towhid Islam and Zohra Akhter, National Strategy on the Management of
Disaster and Climate Induced Internal Displacement (NSMDCIID), Dhaka, 2015.
23
UN-Habitat, World cities report 2016: Urbanization and Development Emerging Futures, Nairobi: United
Nations Settlements Programme, 2016, pp. 1-276.
269
Bangladesh is the world’s seventh most populated nation, with some 157
million people living in an area of 143,998 square kilometres.24 It is one of the least
developed countries (LDC) in the world according to the United Nations Development
Programme Human Development Index, with an annual per capita income of US$
1,516.25 Around 30 per cent of people live in urban areas.26 This number is growing,
with the urban population growth rate estimated at 3.5 per cent, including 1.3 per
cent natural growth and 2.2 per cent due to internal migration.27
Dhaka, the capital city of Bangladesh, has a total population of 8.906 million.28
It is estimated that this population will be 20 million by 2020, with about 400,000
new and mostly poor, migrants arriving in Dhaka each year.29 There are approximately
14.6 million acutely poor people living in Dhaka who earn less than US$1 per day.30
Dhaka is a deeply divided city. Inequality between economically poor and rich
people is stark. About 55 per cent and 32 per cent of the population, respectively,
are considered to be in absolute poverty. It is estimated that just 2 per cent of rich
people occupy some 20 per cent of the total urban area, whereas 50 per cent of poor
people occupy 6 per cent.31 Internal migration is the main reason for unprecedented
urban growth in Bangladesh. Internal migrants tend to live in informal settlements
with limited facilities in and around urban areas.
An estimated 70 per cent of urban development of Dhaka is informal in

nature.32 Informal settlement dwellers are usually deprived of access to the basic
services and infrastructure that most citizens are entitled to receive from the
government, such as adequate housing, clean water, sanitation, education, electricity,
gas and health care facilities.33 This reveals not only a lack of prioritization and
coordination in urban planning and policy, but sometimes an unlawful abrogation
of responsibilities, for example, the High Court of Bangladesh issued a ‘show cause’
notice to the Ministry of Housing and Public Works for their forced eviction of 100,000
24
Encyclopaedia of Nations, available at: https://www. Nationsencyclopedia.com/geography/ Afghanistan-
to-Comoros/Bangladesh.html, accessed on 11 December 2018.
25
The World Bank, Bangladesh Development Update: Towards More, Better and Inclusive Jobs, Dhaka: The
World Bank, September 2017.
26
The World Bank, Bangladesh Development Update, Dhaka: The World Bank, April 2015.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Population Distribution and Internal migration in Bangladesh, Dhaka:
Statistics and Information Division, Ministry of Planning, People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2015; The World
Bank, Bangladesh: Climate Change and Development, Dhaka, 2000.
30
J. A. Pryer, Poverty and Vulnerability in Dhaka Slums: The Urban Livelihoods Study, London: Routledge, 2017.
31
DFID, "Rural and Urban Development: Case Study-Bangladesh", Rural Development Report for Bangladesh,
Department of International Development, Dhaka, 2004.
32
The World Bank, “Dhaka: Improving Living Conditions for the Urban Poor”, Paper No. 17, Dhaka: Bangladesh
Development Series, 2007, pp. 1-158.
33
Nasreen Hossain, “History of Commercial Development in Dhaka and the Spatial Significance of
Spontaneous Retail Growth”, Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), Vol. 19, 2014, pp. 66-73.
270
residents from Korail informal settlement in 2008.34 The High Court determined that
it was an unlawful action by the Ministry and against the fundamental principles of
Bangladesh’s Constitution, which states that “the government shall provide the basic
necessities of life, including food, clothing, shelter, education and medical care” (Art.
15a).
Eviction has not been a solution to informal settlements and is related

to the unequal development process. As Banks et al. identified that “a number of
overlapping factors underpin this, including national identity and image, the political
economy of urban poverty and the structuring of knowledge creation.”35 Coordinated
efforts between government authorities and private informal development sectors
are inadequate. The majority of development assistance, policies and action in
Bangladeshis focused on rural areas rather than addressing urban poverty and the
privatization of service sectors in urban areas is exacerbating the insecurity of the
urban poor.36 In addition, the lack of real long-term commitment to pro-poor policies
and the small number of active development agencies (compared to rural areas)
further reinforce experiences of urban insecurity.37
With the increasing trend of environmental degradation, including the

spectre of worsening climate change,38 contributing to the flow of migration towards
urban areas, Bangladesh is likely to continue to confront challenges around meeting
the basic welfare, livelihood and infrastructure needs of its environmental migrants.
Environmentally-displaced migration is therefore a human security concern for
Bangladesh. The following section discusses the vulnerabilities of environmental
changes with special references to coastal areas of Bangladesh.
3. Vulnerability to Environmental Change and Nature of Migration in the

Coastal Areas of Bangladesh
Vulnerability and exposure of coastal areas to environmental changes

are dynamic and vary within spatial and temporal scales.39 Various studies show
34
Ain O Shalish Kendra (ASK), Bangladesh Legal Aid Services vs. Bangladesh and Other [Korail Basti Eviction
Case], Writ Petition No. 9763, Dhaka: BLAST, 2008.
35
Nicola Banks, Manoj Roy and David Hulme, “Neglecting the Urban Poor in Bangladesh: Research, Policy
and Action in the Context of Climate Change”, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2011, pp. 487-
502.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Golam Rabbani, A. A. Rahman and Nazira Islam, “Climate Change Implications for Dhaka City: A Need
for Immediate Measures to Reduce Vulnerability”, in K. Otto-Zimmermann (ed.), Resilient Cities: Cities and
Adaptation to Climate Change Proceedings of the Global Forum 2010, Local Sustainability 1, Dordrecht–
Heidelberg–London–New York: Springer, 2011, pp. 531-541.
39
Mohammed Fazlul Karim and Nobuo Mimura, “Impacts of Climate Change and Sea-level Rise on Cyclonic
Storm Surge Floods in Bangladesh”, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2008, pp. 490-500.
271
that for Bangladesh increasing surface air temperature, i.e., a variation in mean
annual temperature from 0.4-0.650C over the past 40 years, leads to changes in the
frequency and intensity of extreme rainfall events; prolongs winter and summer
seasons; increases riverine and monsoon flooding; riverbank erosion; intrusion of
salinity and changes in cyclone and storm surges in terms of their intensity, timing
and path.40 These phenomena vary from place to place, however, in the coastal areas
of Bangladesh, high intensity floods and river erosion have serious humanitarian
consequences and cause massive devastation of infrastructure and crops.
Moreover, the coastal areas of Bangladesh are the most ecologically fragile
zones compared with other parts of the country. They are vulnerable to cyclonic
storm surges and floods due to the funnel shape of the coast and the shallow
continental shelf.41 Tidal fluctuations, tropical cyclones and salinity intrusion are major
environmental threats, along with erosion and flooding. Low lying coastal areas and
poorly protected lands are occupied by large numbers of poor, vulnerable people
who are exclusively dependent on agricultural activities and fisheries. Approximately
154 cyclones hit the coastal areas of Bangladesh between 1877 and 1995 and killed
thousands of people.42
Conditions in the region are not uniform nor static, rather it is one of the most
variable and dynamic regions in the world due to the presence of the three rivers,
the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna.43 Land accretion and erosion are continuous
geomorphological processes of the coastal areas of Bangladesh, resulting in large areas
of land loss every year. Whilst some new land forms, this land tends to be less suitable
for agriculture and settlement.44 Such environmental changes and natural hazards push
people to decide to migrate after losing their family members and livelihoods.
The land emerging from this process is called char (sandbar) and provides
fertile alluvium for cultivation, despite punishing circumstances and unceasing
40
Susmita Dasgupta, Kamal Akhter, Farhana Hoque Khan, Zahirul Chowdhury, Sharifuzzaman and Ainun
Nishat, “River Salinity and Climate Change: Evidence from Coastal Bangladesh”, World Scientific Reference on
Asia and the World Economy, 2015, pp. 205-242; Saleemul Huq, Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change
in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), London: IIED, 2003; Saleemul Huq, Sari Kovats, Hannah Reid and David
Satterthwaite, “Reducing Risks to Cities from Disasters and Climate Change”, Environment and Urbanization,
Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007, pp. 3-15; Mohammed Fazlul Karim and Nobuo Mimura, “Impacts of Climate Change
and Sea-level Rise on Cyclonic Storm Surge Floods in Bangladesh”, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 18,
No. 3, 2008, pp. 490-500; Ainun Nishat and Nandan Mukharjee, “Climate Change Impacts, Scenario and
Vulnerability of Bangladesh”, Climate Change Adaptation Action in Bangladesh, London: Springer, 2013, pp.
15-41.
41
Ibid.
42
Anwar Ali, “Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Assessment in Bangladesh”, Climate Research, Vol.
12, 1999, pp. 109-116.
43
Hugh Brammer, “Bangladesh’s Dynamic Coastal Regions and Sea-level Rise”, Climate-risk Management,
Vol. 1, 2014, pp. 51-62.
44
Ibid.
272
vulnerability.45 Largely, the char inhabitants are the poorest and have been
dispossessed of their lands elsewhere in Bangladesh. The land tenure system in the
char has been identified as unstable in nature,46 for the following reasons:
• The chars are extremely fertile and have access to water. Thus, they are of
interest to both precarious peasants and to commercial interests intent
on harvesting mangrove forests, inserting commercial crops behind
protective polders47, or making fortunes in agro-fisheries and shrimp
farming.
• The government legally owns char land. This being so, land grabbers
must either keep the government at bay or enlist its considerable
assistance. As a result, powerful people uproot small producers from
their rich alluvial soils with government support and acquiescence.
Therefore, poor farmers in coastal areas are displaced through multiple
layers of injustice.
• “For poor peasants, sharecroppers and wage labourers, social reproduction

itself is being transformed by those who profiteer from the land, water
and other natural resources in the area and against which the poor are
unable to protect themselves. The region is thus changing as much
from these transformations in the social relations of land ownership as
from global environmental changes that characterized char lives and
livelihoods a generation ago”.48
People affected by river erosion are unable to get a share of land after the
emergence of char as its fertility attracts profiteers and furthers dispossession. The
following section discusses how human intervention influences river erosion.
Human interventions also affect the geomorphological processes of the

GBM basins49 along with anthropogenic contributions to global climate change.
These basins are the second largest in the world and are constantly reshaped. Unlike
other deltas, the Ganges, Brahmaputra, Meghna (GBM) basins carry huge amount
of sediment ranging from 1.1 to 44 million metric tonnes per year, both temporally
45
Shelley Feldman and Charles Gesler, “Land Expropriation and Displacement in Bangladesh”, The Journal of
Peasant Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3-4, 2012, pp. 971-993.
46
Ibid., p. 978.
47
Polder is a structure made by dikes parallel to the shoreline. The main purpose of constructing polder is
to save the inland agricultural lands from the body of water, mostly often from saline water of sea. There
are some regulatory gates are built in polder so that the inland water pass through. Sometimes, polders are
also made to reclaim new lands by pumping inland water outside the polder.
48
Shelley Feldman and Charles Gesler, op. cit., p. 979.
49
Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna are three mighty rivers in Bangladesh. Although the basins
characteristics of these three rivers are different, they are called together GBM basins.
273
and spatially.50 The GBM basins cover six countries - Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India,
Myanmar and Nepal. They cover 1.7 million square kilometres, with tidal influences
extending inland up to 100 kilometres. This means that tidal influences cover up to
one quarter of Bangladesh and these areas are also considered as coastal zones.51
Anthropogenic intervention started predominantly from European influence on
Kolkata, India, during the British colonial period (1757-1947) in the 18th century,
with dams and embankments constructed to increase agricultural production and
communication. The construction of water management structures by the Zamindars
(landlords), selected by British colonialists, continued until the 19th century and the
Basin Management Plan was divided between India and the then East Pakistan in 1948
after independence from the British. The GBM basins cross both India and Bangladesh.
They are managed by two different states for their own individual purposes, so the
river basins are managed not according to the characteristics of the basin, but the
state boundaries.
In 1958, the then East Pakistan government began to implement the Earthen
Coastal Embankment Project for the southern part of Bangladesh to protect the
agricultural land from saline water and control the river water flow. It included 2,600
miles of embankment with 92 polders to protect 2.7 million acres of agricultural lands
from salinity.52 The adverse impacts of that mega project began in the 1990s and include
drainage congestion inside the polder and heavy siltation outside of the embankment
areas.53 The natural flow of inland water bodies is not discharged into the sea as the
land levels outside the polders/embankments are higher. This converted agricultural
land into water-logged land and enabled salinity intrusion inside the embankment.
Another mega project, Farakka dam in India, in the upstream of the Ganges river basin,
adversely affected coastal areas of Bangladesh by retaining sediment and increasing
river erosion and changing the direction of water movements and tides.54 Other small
structures are also constructed to retain sediment and convert the waterways into
agricultural land throughout the basins. Therefore, both anthropogenic interventions
and natural calamities in the coastal zones directly affect one quarter of Bangladesh
and the many people living in these regions.
Bangladesh is more vulnerable to environmental changes than other

countries due to its geographical characteristics and high population density, the
overwhelming dependency of people’s livelihoods on natural resources and the
50
S. Brown and R. J. Niholls, “Subsidence and Human Influences in Mega Deltas: The Case of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna”, Science of the Total Environment, Vol. 527-528, 2015, pp. 362-374.
51
Md. Golam Sarwar Mahabub and Colin D. Woodroffe, “Rates of Shoreline Change Along the Coast of
Bangladesh”, Journal of Coastal Conservation, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2013, pp. 515-526.
52
M. S. Iftekhar and M. R. Islam, “Managing Mangroves in Bangladesh: A Strategy Analysis”, Journal of Coastal
Conservation, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2004, pp. 139-146.
53
Ibid.
54
M. M. Q. Mirza, “Diversion of the Ganges Water at Farakka and its Effects on Salinity in Bangladesh”,
Environmental Management, Vol. 22, No. 5, 1998, pp. 711-722.
274
limited capacities of the government to support vulnerable groups. Thus, a minor

change in environmental phenomena causes significant impacts on a huge number
of people. Bangladesh has been identified as one of the top fifteen ‘hotspots’ which
are largely exposed to natural hazards and environmental changes.55
Gradual environmental changes and sudden extreme environmental events

influence migration in Bangladesh. The key factors for migration in Bangladesh are
flood, cyclone and river bank erosion. Beside these, coastal flooding, storm surges,
cyclones and salinity intrusion are the main reasons for migration in the coastal areas
of Bangladesh. Approximately 24 districts among Bangladesh’s 64 districts contribute
to net out-migration flows, with an estimated six million people already migrating
away from the coast due to environmental changes.56 Figure 3 illustrates how four
main environmental changes affect areas from where migration is likely to occur in
the future.
55
Hugh Brammer, op. cit.
56
Ahsan Uddin Ahmed, Bangladesh Climate Change Impacts and Vulnerability-A Synthesis, Dhaka: Climate
Change Cell, Department of Environment, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme, Government
of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2006, pp. 1-50.
275
Figure 2: Framework for Determining Environmental Migrant Sub-Categories
Flood Cyclone
River erosion Soil salinity

Source: Natural Hazards of Bangladesh, available at: http://en. banglapedia. org/index. php? title= Natural_
Hazard, accessed on 15 June 2018.
Various studies of migration suggest that environmentally-displaced migration
in Bangladesh is largely localized and internal in nature and rural to urban rather than
cross-border.57 Cross-border, or international, migration needs some initial wealth in
57
Golam Rabbani, Fathimath Shafeeqa and Sanjay Sharma, Assessing the Climate Change Environmental
Degradation and Migration Nexus in South Asia, Dhaka: International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2016;
Rashed Al Mahmud Titumir and Jakir Hossain, “Barriers to Access to Public Services for the Urban Poor: An
Enquiry into Dhaka slums”, Journal of the Institute of Bangladesh Studies, Vol. 27, 2004, p. 28.
276
order to be able to take the decision to migrate overseas, a decision largely out of the
reach of many people in Bangladesh.58
The nature of migration observed in Bangladesh ranges from temporary

displacement due to sudden on-set disaster, to permanent displacement where
people are unable to return to their homes.59 It is evident that long term or permanent
migration tends to be gradual, due to slow on-set rather than sudden on-set
environmental change when people are usually able to find temporary or seasonal
relief.60 Whether the cause is gradual degradation of environmental conditions, or
sudden major disasters that force people to migrate to nearby urban areas or the
capital city as a mode of coping or adapting, the result is that the urban population is
growing and rural population is decreasing (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Bangladesh Rural-Urban Population Projection

25
20
15
Rural Population
10
Urban Population
5
0
1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 2000-10 2010-20 2020-30
Source: Reazul Ahsan, Sadasivam Karuppannan and Jon Kellett, “Climate Migration and Urban Planning
System: A Study of Bangladesh”, Environmental Justice, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2011, p. 167.
At present, about 50 million people are living in ecologically fragile areas

of Bangladesh such as islands (chars), areas prone to floods, salinity intrusion and
drought and coastal areas vulnerable to natural disasters.61 The United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP) estimates that sea level rise in Bangladesh would
affect 17 million people (15 per cent of the population) and result in the loss of about
22,000 square kilometres of land (16 per cent of the total landmass).62 Moreover,
58
Ben Saul, “The Security Risk of Climate Change Displacement in Bangladesh”, Journal of Human security,
Vol. 8, No. 2, 2012, pp. 5-35.
59
Ibid.
60
Centre for Environmental and Geographic Information Services (CEGIS), Trend and Impact Analysis of
Internal Displacement Due to the Impacts of Disaster and Climate Change, Study Report, Comprehensive
Disaster Management programme (CDMP II), Dhaka: Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, 2014.
61
IOM, op. cit.
62
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Environmental Problems of the Marine and Coastal Area
of Bangladesh, National Report, UNEP Regional Seas Reports and Studies No. 75, Dhaka: Regional Seas,
1995.
277
various disasters will further displace three to 10 million people internally over the
next 40 years.63
Global environmental change, human intervention in coastal ecology and

power plays over char land are fueling the displacement of poor inhabitants of
coastal areas of Bangladesh. The following section addresses security issues related to
environmentally-displaced migration.
4. Environmentally-Displaced Migration and Security
Dhaka already receives a large influx of migrants and is expected to receive

a greater influx of environmentally-displaced migrants due to the better economic
opportunities available there compared with other parts of the country. Different
development sectors, utility services and infrastructure developments have expanded
rapidly but have been unable to keep pace with the demand of the growing
population. There is a lack of coordination between different government bodies in
terms of implementation of policies, rules and regulations.64 The gap between service
available and demand is further exacerbated by mismanagement.65 Figure 6 illustrates
the trends of urban population growth of Bangladesh’s major cities.
Figure 5: Projected Urban Growth of Bangladesh

45
40
Urbanization rate
35
30
25
20
10
5
0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 2015 2030
Source: Reazul Ahsan, Sadasivam Karuppannan and Jon Kellett, op. cit., p. 165.
People escape deteriorating environmental conditions in their place of origin
when they migrate, however, they confront a new set of environmental hazards in the
city. Floods and water logging, in particular, contribute to difficult living conditions for
63
Behrooz Hassani-Mahmooei and Brett W. Parris, “Climate Change and Internal Migration Patterns in
Bangladesh: An Agent-based Model”, Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 17, No. 06, 2012, pp.
763-780.
64
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability, Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report, 2014.
65
Reazul Ahsan, Sadasivam Karuppannan and Jon Kellett, op. cit., p. 167.
278
some city residents.66 Dhaka is severely affected by floods along with other hazards
like air pollution, sewage contamination, ground water depletion and ground and
surface water contamination,67 leading some to argue it is the most exposed city in
the world in terms of the impacts of environmental change.68
Urban flooding is one of the most common hazards, becoming more frequent
and extensive with climate change, as along with disruption of drainage patterns due
to the congestion of the city’s waterways. Floods disrupt infrastructure (road, rail,
housing, industries and business centres), communication systems, utility services
(water supply, sanitation, electricity and gas) and sewage management.69 The increase
in mosquitoes, water-borne disease and flea infestations due to erratic temperatures,
improper management of sewerage and sanitation and air pollution are also causing
serious health concerns for city dwellers.70 The expansion of informal settlements
is another critical concern as they are usually located in high flood risk areas with
poor health and economic outcomes. There are 13,938 informal settlements in
Bangladesh71 and these contain 18 per cent of total world urban housing, consisting
of 125 million units.72 It is clear that Dhaka is neither coping nor prepared for the influx
of environmentally-displaced migrants.
The concept of human security is widely used in the field of international

relations and political science theories. However, the dynamics of human security are
generally viewed from a top-down perspective by security agencies. These endeavours
often fail to properly address individual experiences of insecurity.73 Environmental
change is increasingly considered as security concern because it undermines human
security at individual, community, national, regional and global scales.74
66
Golam Rabbani, Atiq Rahman and Nazira Islam, op. cit.
67
Shahadat Hossain, “Migration, Urbanization and Poverty in Dhaka, Bangladesh”, Journal of the Asiatic
Society of Bangladesh, Vol. 58, No. 2, 2013, pp. 369-382
68
Susan Hansen, Robert Nicholls, Nicola Ranger, Stephane Hallegatte, Jan Corfee-Morlot, Celine Herweije
and Jean Chateau, “A Global Ranking of Port Cities with High Exposure to Climate Extreme”, Climatic Change,
Vol. 104, No. 1, 2011, pp. 89-111.
69
Golam Rabbani, “Climate Change Vulnerabilities for Urban Areas in Bangladesh: Dhaka as a Case”, Paper presented
in Resilient Cities Conference organized by ICLEI at Bonn, Germany, 2010, available at: http://resilient-cities.iclei. org/
fileadmin/sites/resilientcities/files/docs/B4-Bonn2010-Rabbani. pdf, accessed on 29 January 2019.
70
Mozaharul Alam and MD Golam Rabbani, “Vulnerabilities and Responses to Climate Change for Dhaka”,
Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007, pp. 81-97.
71
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Preliminary Report on Census of Slum Areas and Floating Population,
Dhaka: Statistics and Informatics Division (SID), Ministry of Planning, Government of the People’s Republic
of Bangladesh, 2014, pp. 1-58.
72
UN-Habitant, The State of the World’s Cities, The Millennium Development Goals and Development
Sustainability, Kenya: United Nations Human Settlement Programme, 2006-2007, pp. 1-2.
73
Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity and Violent Conflict, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1999, p. 253; B. Kavanagh and S. Lonergan, Environmental Degradation, Population Displacement and Global
Security, Technical Report of Canadian Global Change Programme, 1992; Norman Myers, “Environment and
Security”, Foreign Policy, Vol. 74 (Spring), 1989, pp. 23-41.
74
Jon Barnett and W. Neil Adger, “Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict”, Political Geography,
Vol. 26, No. 6, 2007, pp. 639-655.
279
4.1 Individual
At an individual level, livelihood insecurity is an important component of

insecurity. Livelihood is defined as the utilization of tangible and non-tangible assets
for sustenance.75 Bebbington introduced cultural factors, along with the material and
economic factors, as critical to livelihood security.76 In this way, livelihood insecurity
is the combination of “livelihoods (material and intangible assets) + (exposure to) a
stress or shock”. When insecure livelihood assets are exposed to a stress, the stress can
diminish the asset’s productivity or quality and/or limit access.77 The consequences
are declining resource flows to households. Assets (mainly land) of people in
ecologically fragile areas were exposed and affected by river erosion along with
other environmental changes. These made livelihoods vulnerable because of their
dependency on land-based agricultural activities and fisheries.
Households have two types of assets such as tangible assets (money, land,
ornaments, property, etc.) and non-tangible assets (skill or human capital, social
capital, networks, etc.). Households’ livelihood strategies are mediated by social
factors or exogenous trends or shocks that influence their capacity to use tangible and
non-tangible resources over time. In other words, livelihood strategies are dynamic.78
They respond to changing pressures and opportunities and are adapted accordingly.
Additionally, livelihood strategies are composed of activities that generate the means
of household survival. Households that are exposed to a stress will likely reallocate
their assets to cope with the declining quality of life.79
Intangible assets, such as kin and friendship networks, are often the most
important relationships that households mobilize to pursue their livelihoods and in
so doing reduce insecurity. Social networks are central to socio-political processes.
They can reduce the level of fear, provide comfort, care and support as well as increase
people’s dignity, amongst other things. The asset status of a household and the
nature of flexibility of those assets are the main indicators of a household’s security
status,80 yet rarely does this take into account intangible assets, such as networks. The
asset status of a household increases their freedom of choice for functioning of their
capabilities.
75
Robert Chambers and Gordon R. Conway, “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for 21st
Century”, IDS Discussion Paper 296, London: Institute of Development Studies (IDS), December 1991.
76
Anthony Bebbington, “Capitals and Capabilities: A Framework for Analysing Peasant Viability, Rural
Livelihoods and Poverty”, World Development, Vol. 27, No. 12, pp. 2021-2044.
77
Ibid.
78
Frank Ellis, A Framework for Livelihoods Analysis, Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 28-51.
79
Anthony Bebbington, op. cit.
80
Frank Ellis, op. cit.
280
Environmentally-displaced migrants confront a number of socio-economic

and cultural issues that intensify their insecurity. Migrants who are uprooted from
their place of origin suffer almost complete loss. Migrants start to reconstruct their
lives in newly settled places with minimum resources. People are often indebted
when they move to new places. Therefore, environmentally-displaced migrants are
identified as a more vulnerable group than any other migrants.81 Motivations for
migration vary in accordance with the nature of environmental disasters – slow onset
or sudden disaster.82 Migrants quickly adjust to a new way of life, mostly in informal
settlements, characterized by alienation and marginalization in the urban governance
system.83 This process of adaptation or recovery has both material and social aspects
where material and social losses compound each other in these new destinations.84
Even when migrants find a place in the informal settlements of major cities, they are
at constant risk of eviction by the authorities. Loss of livelihood and the incapacity to
sustain oneself endangers an individual and their social ‘identity’.85 These processes
can produce a loss of status and result in feelings of marginalization through the
fragmentation of social networks. Marginalization, loss of social status and networks
and continuous threats of eviction are major sources of insecurity in their destination
areas.86
4.2 Community
Security can also be understood at a community scale. Migrants face

different dynamics within and between communities and these affect their
survival and well-being. Migrants who settle in informal settlements face particular
threats to their security, particularly in relation to economic opportunities, social
identity and networks, discrimination and precarity. Social insecurities reflect
the social injustices that arise from structural inequalities and abuses of power
over resources. Social insecurity research draws heavily from Sen’s concepts of
capability,87 insecurity in this perspective is considered a dynamic condition and
81
Sujan Saha, “Security Implications of Climate Refugees in Urban Slums: A Case Study from Dhaka,
Bangladesh”, in J. Scheffran, M. Brzoska, H. G. Brauch, P. M. Link, J. Schilling (eds.), Climate Change, Human
Security and Violent Conflict, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, 2012, pp.
595-611.
82
IOM, op. cit.
83
Sujan Saha, op. cit.
84
Anthony Oliver-Smith, “Climate Change and Population Displacement: Disasters and Diasporas in the
Twenty-first Century”, in Susan A. Crate and Mark Nuttall (eds.), Climate Change and Population Displacement-
From encounters to Actions, Walnut Creek, US: Left Coast Press, 2009, pp. 116-136.
85
Ibid.
86
Sarah Dalrymple, Duncan Hiscock, A. Kalam, Neila Husain and Ziaur Rahman, Climate Change and Human
Security in Bangladesh: A Case Study, Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies
(BIISS) and Saferworld, 2009.
87
Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford: Oxford university
Press, 1981; Amartya Sen, “Justice: Means versus Freedom”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1990,
pp. 111-121.
281
embedded in complex relations of power, resource distribution, knowledge and

technological development.88
Migration to the capital city may create better economic opportunities but at
the same time people may be worse off due to cost of living pressures. Income losses
may also occur due to environmental hazards, political turmoil, ill health and ageing.89
There is also perceived and real competition for employment amongst migrants in
informal settlements. The abundant supply of workers also leads to downward pressure
on wages which provokes tensions and conflicts.90 Landlessness and a lack of social
identity and networks constrain migrants’ access to jobs and credit.91
About 80 per cent of informal settlements are located on privately owned

land which makes settlement dwellers extremely vulnerable (especially women and
children) in terms of extra rent, exploitation by miscreants, hoodlums or muscle-men as
the land-owners often have good connections with political parties and criminal control
of informal settlements.92 Migrants are highly vulnerable to multiple displacements by
developers, police and other government authorities. For example, some people have
been evicted up to eight times.93 Despite the exploitation people are subject to, it is
often migrants who are stigmatized by society. They are often perceived to increase
crime rates and violence in Dhaka, even though they themselves are extremely exposed
to violence and crime and have limited or no access to the criminal justice system.94
Informal settlements are already vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in

terms of floods and high exposure to infectious diseases due to overcrowding and poor
housing. About 60 per cent of informal settlement residents in Dhaka live in flood-prone
and water-logged areas where there are no or poor drainage facilities. Among them,
about one third of dwellings are made of tin and bamboo which are very vulnerable
to flood damage. Moreover, flooding deteriorates the weak drainage and sewerage in
informal settlements, bringing water borne diseases and contaminated water supplies.95
All of these aspects bring insecurity for migrants at the community level. The following
section discusses why environmentally-displaced migration is also a security issue at
the national level.
88
Hallie Eakin and Lynd Amy Luers, “Assessing the Vulnerability of Social Environmental Systems”, Annual
Review of Environmental Resources, 2006, Vol. 31, pp. 365-394.
89
IOM, op. cit.
90
Sarah Dalrymple et al., op. cit.
91
C. R. Abrar and S. N. Azad, Coping with Displacement: Riverbank Erosion in North-West Bangladesh, Dhaka:
North Bengal Institute for Alternative Research and Advocacy and Refugee and Migratory Movements
Research Unit, 2004.
92
The World Bank, op. cit., 2007, p. ixv.
93
Nicola Banks, op. cit. and Sarah Dalrymple et al., op. cit.
94
Sujan Saha, op. cit.
95
The World Bank, op. cit., 2007.
282
4.3 National
The main objective of state security is to ensure security for its citizens
from both military (traditional) and non-military (non-traditional) threats. Therefore,
individual security and state security are linked. Any threat to the nation, such as
invasion by another state, is also a threat for individual citizens. Similarly, community
security is linked with individual and state security. For example, the state might have
a discriminatory policy towards a minority community which affects that group’s
security. On the other hand, small groups within communities, such as religious
fundamentalist groups96, may be considered as a security threat for the state.
Therefore, state security, community security and individual security are connected
with one another and one form of security cannot be achieved without the others.
Bangladesh’s vulnerability to natural hazards leads to environmentally-

displaced migration of individuals and communities from their homes and lands. This
is a result of both ‘sudden onset events’ such as floods, cyclones and river bank erosion
as well as ‘slow onset processes’ such as coastal erosion, seal-level rise, salt water
intrusion, changing rainfall patterns and drought.97 Internal migration and dislocation
of mass population in a small country creates huge pressure on the existing resources
and services of the destination areas within the country. Bangladesh is predicted
to lose 10.9 per cent of its territory if the sea level rises 45 centimetres, which will
potentially displace about 5.5 million people.98 This undermines national sovereignty
because of loss of this territory through physical processes. In addition, internally
displaced people will potentially pose serious problems for state legitimacy and
the internal harmony of the country. It is important not only to find the relationship
between sea level rise, the exposed population and the total number of people likely
to be displaced, but further analysis is needed to assess the adaptation options at the
starting point of migration.
Internal displacement increases competition and the risk of potential conflict

over key resources such as land, housing, food, water and employment. There is
evidence that this kind of social conflict has already arisen in Bangladesh.99 For
example, land is a critically scarce resource in this densely populated agrarian country.
96
Han Günter Brauch, “Securitization of Space and Referent Object”, Han Günter Brauch, Ursúla Oswald
Spring, John Grin, Pal Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Bechair Chourou, Patricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H.
Liotta (eds.), Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, Berlin: Heidelberg, 2008, pp.
323-343.
97
IOM, op. cit.
98
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report, Working
Groups I, II, and III, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
99
Iftekhar Ahmed and Guy Johnson, “Urban Safety and Poverty in Dhaka, Bangladesh: Understanding the
Structural and Institutional Linkages”, Australian Planner, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2014, pp. 272-280; Nesar Ahmed
and James S. Diana, “Threatening “White Gold”: Impacts of Climate Change on Shrimp Farming in Coastal
Bangladesh”, Ocean and Coastal Management, Vol. 114, 2015, pp. 42-52 and Sarah Dalrymple et al., op. cit.
283
Additional pressure on land comes from economic modernization and demands for
land from industry, such as shrimp cultivation, which exacerbates rural landlessness.
These industries are less labour-intensive than farming, resulting in increased
unemployment and migration.100
Internal movement of people within Bangladesh historically produced

tensions and conflict over land in a number of ways. Poorly conceived planned
resettlement has resulted in serious violence. The state-sponsored relocation of
400-600,000 Bengali settlers into the Chittagong Hill Tracts by the military regime
in the 1970s-80s provoked protracted violence and insurgency.101 This conflict was
only settled by a Peace Accord in 1997. The conflict was influenced by competition
over land, resources (forest) and political power between Bengali migrants and local
inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Large scale rural-urban migration is resulting in the growth of informal

settlements. The population density of informal settlements in Dhaka is 200 times
greater than the average population density of the country, with 80 per cent of people
in informal settlements living in areas with population densities of 500 to 1,500 per
acre.102 This overcrowding has serious, far reaching human security implications at a
national level.
4.4 Regional and Global
There is a widespread assumption that the impacts of environmental change

will stimulate large-scale cross-border immigration from Bangladesh and consequently
generate transnational security threats.103India is the most probable destination for
Bangladeshi migrants due to its geographic proximity, porous border area, potential
economic opportunities, and similar linguistic, ethnic and cultural heritage. Migration
can be transitory or permanent; some migrants use India as a transit point for another
destination. Indian authorities, mainly the Border Security Force (BSF), claim that
there are up to 20 million illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in India.104 It is also claimed
that people are migrating from the southern part of Bangladesh.105 However, several
100
Nesar Ahmed and James S. Diana, op. cit.
101
Dan Smith and Janani Vivekanda, “A Climate of Conflict: The Links Between Climate Change, Peace and
War”, Understanding Conflict- Building Peace, London: International Alert, 2007.
102
The World Bank, op. cit., 2007.
103
Jon Barnett, “Destabilizing the Environment-conflict Thesis”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No.
02, 2000, pp. 271-288; Jon Barnett, “Security and Climate Change”, Global Environmental Change, Vol.13,
No.1, 2003, pp. 7-17; Dan Smith and Janani Vivekanda, op. cit.
104
Jane McAdam and Ben Saul, “Displacement with Dignity: International Law and Policy Responses to
Climate Change Migration and Security in Bangladesh”, Sydney: The University of Sydney, Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 10/113, November 2010; and Ben Saul, op. cit., pp. 5-35.
105
Ashok Swain, “Displacing the Conflict: Environmental Destruction in Bangladesh and Ethnic Conflict in
India”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1996, pp. 189-204.
284
other studies claim that environmentally-displaced migrants become economically

marginalized by losing their livelihoods due to slow environmental changes and loss
of property (due to river erosion), and that most migration is internal in nature.106 Yet,
there is also immigration into Bangladesh with an estimated 500,000 Indians from
West Bengal, Meghalaya, Assam, Tripura and Mizoram states of India working in NGOs
and the garment and textile industries.107 Therefore, migration always remains an
issue of immense tension between Bangladesh and India.
The regional and global security dimensions of environmental migration

are not properly understood due to the paucity of empirical studies. Traditional
approaches to security risks tend to consider conflict over scarce resources, politicized
‘anti-foreigner’ movements, border securitization from a nationalistic view, and a
perceived association between Bangladeshi Islamist groups and regional insurgency
groups.108 Such studies tend to ignore the everyday insecurities migrants experience
at individual and community scales.
5. Conclusion
People feel insecure if they find themselves in a compromised situation where

they have limited options for ways of living and pursuing a livelihood. The threats to
people’s security change over the migration journey. At the point of origin, the effects
of the complex socio-environmental processes are exacerbated by the power plays of
different institutions, contributing to the push of displaced people from ecologically
fragile areas to towards Dhaka. At their destination, people find themselves living a
differently precarious life in the informal settlements, where they confront a new set
of power relations, they must negotiate in order to expand their capabilities to realize
security in everyday life.
Although environmental change is a global phenomenon, there remains

insufficient attention to protecting the rights of environmentally-displaced migrants.
Environmentally-displaced migrants are forced to take the decision to migrate like
106
Rita Afsar, “Internal Migration and the Development Nexus: the Case of Bangladesh”, paper presented
at Regional Conference on Migration, Development, and Pro-poor Policy Choices in Asia, Jointly organized by
Refugee and Migratory Research Unit, Bangladesh and the Department of International Development,
UK at Dhaka on 22-23 June 2003; Tahera Akhter, Climate Change and Flow of Environmental Displacement
in Bangladesh, Dhaka: Unnayan Onneshan, 2009; M. R. Bhuiyan and Tasneem Siddiqui, Migration in the
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Delta: A Review of the Literature, Deltas, Vulnerability and Climate Change:
Migration and Adaptation , Dhaka: DECCMA Working Paper, IDRC Project Number 107642, 2015, available
online at www.deccma.com, accessed on 21 July 2016; Tasneem Siddiqui, Migration as a Livelihood Strategy
of the Poor: the Bangladesh Case, Dhaka: Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit, 2003.
107
“15 Nations Sending Highest Remittances to India”, US: Siliconindia, 21 May 2013, available at: https://
www.siliconindia.com/news/business/15-Nations-Sending-Highest-Remittances-to-India-nid-147515-
cid-3.html, accessed on 18 January 2019.
108
Ben Saul, op. cit., p. 7.
285
refugees, but are not considered to be refugees under international law and are not
able to claim protection outside their nation state.109 If they cross national borders
due to environmental changes, they are not considered as environmental refugees.
Therefore, climate migrants are only entitled to avail the benefits of human rights from
their own state. Their rights are principally protected by the normative framework of
human rights law and the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Migration.110 Thus, the
national legal system continues to have the primary role in ensuring the protection of
environmentally-displaced migrants.
The government of Bangladesh has taken many steps to address adaptation

to environmental change, post disaster relief and recovery measures, rather than
fundamental rights protection. Major initiatives include the establishment of a
US$ 45 million Climate Change Fund, the development of the National Adaptation
Programme of Action 2005 (NAPA) and the Climate Change Strategy and Action
Plan 2009-18 (BCCSAP).111 The response of the government in dealing with storm
surges, cyclones, floods and riverbank erosion is limited to engineering solutions
such as building embankments, dams or dykes. A more holistic approach is therefore
needed to address some of the socio-cultural, demographic, economic and political
dimensions of the insecurity affecting vulnerable people and migrants documented
in this research. More attention to these complex socio-economic, political and
environmental issues may contribute to more successful adaptation measures and
initiatives being taken in the rural areas.
At the international level, Bangladesh has been most vocal in pushing for the
rights of climate vulnerable developing countries, however, climate migrants are still
not recognized nationally as an ‘especially affected group’ and are thus, deprived of
governmental benefits. The rights of environmental migrants remain unrecognized
in the legal and constitutional framework. The UN Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement are not fully incorporated into the domestic law of Bangladesh112 and
there is no appropriate machanism to define and protect their rights.
109
Mathew Walsam, “Assessing the Evidence: Environment, Climate Change and Migration in Bangladesh”,
Dhaka: International Organization for Migration, 2010.
110
United Nations, “60/1.2005 World Summit Outcome” Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly,
available at http://www.un-documents.net/a60r1.htm, accessed on 13 October 2018.
111
United Nations Development Programme, “Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme-II”, Phase-2,
Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, available at: http:// www. bd.undp. org/content/
bangladesh/en/home/operations/projects/All_Closed_Projects/Closed_Projects_Crisis_Prevention_and_
Recovery/ comprehensive-disaster-management-programme/CDMPHome.html, accessed on 23 September
2018.
112
Roger Zetter, Reframing Displacement Crises as Development Opportunities, Copenhagen: Copenhagen
Development Solutions Initiative, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, available at www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/
files/publications/other/pn-reframing-displacement-crises-2014.pdf, accessed on 17 September 2018.
286
Sajid Karim
MATERIALIZING THE BBIN INITIATIVE: TRANSPORT

CONNECTIVITY IN FOCUS
Abstract
A major thrust towards forming a new sub-regional grouping was observed

when Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal, also known as BBIN, signed an
agreement on 15 June 2015, titled “Motor Vehicle Agreement for the Regulation
of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic between Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India and Nepal”, with an ambition to facilitate seamless movement of passenger,
personnel and cargo vehicles within the territories of each other. Signing of the
agreement has ushered hope of a new sub-regionalism towards materializing
BBIN through seamless transport connectivity. BBIN as sub-regional cooperation
is still in formative stage and has to go a long way. This paper aims to evaluate
three aspects. What are the developments so far within the framework? What
are the challenges ahead of materializing BBIN and transport connectivity
in particular? And what are the possible doings to address the concerns? The
paper suggests five broad tasks, along with political commitment, to take
into consideration: developing comprehensive arrangement; harmonizing
standards, rules and regulations; mobilizing funds; exchanging information and
research and developing an effective cooperation mechanism.
Keywords: Sub-regional Cooperation, Multi-modal Transport Connectivity,

Harmonizing Standards, Developing Cooperation Mechanism, Political
Commitment
1. Introduction
Connectivity continues to be one of the key factors in the parlance of regional

integration.1 It is evident that development of physical links among countries in a
geographically contiguous region eventually leads to greater politico-economic and
Sajid Karim is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail
address is: sajidkarim87@gmail.com; Mohammad Jasim Uddin, PhD is Senior Research Fellow at Bangladesh
Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: jasim_biiss@yahoo.com
1
M. Rahmatullah, “Regional Transport Connectivity: Opportunities for Bangladesh”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 31, No.
1, January 2010, p. 73.
287
social interconnectedness.2 Seamless connectivity promotes trade3 and investment,

economic growth, transit and transport facilities, energy cooperation as well as
people-to-people contact. This, in turn, facilitates regional cooperation.
The renewed idea of sub-regional initiative came in South Asia in June 2015,
more than a decade after the inception of the notion of growth quadrangle,4 when
four countries, namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) signed a Motor
Vehicle Agreement (MVA), which is due to come into effect once it is ratified by all. As
the countries are geographically proximate to each other and there are ethno-cultural
affinities among them, BBIN initiative is likely to provide politico-economic synergy
that will facilitate sub-regional cooperation as well as greater integration in the
long run. The MVA expects to allow member countries to use roadways to transport
passengers and goods between them smoothly. It will also enable greater number
of border crossings of vehicles and recognize driver licenses from neighbouring
countries. It is expected that the MVA will streamline the process of acquiring
cross-border permits.5 Individual states would also be economically benefited from
providing port facilities and receiving various common fees and charges generated
from the connectivity. Besides, it would upgrade regional road transport network and
increase intra-regional investment opportunities, especially in the bordering districts
and trading in trade facilitation (e.g., transportation) services.
While initiating a new sub-regional platform in South Asia is a welcome step,

there exist challenges in its materialization. It must be recognized that, within BBIN,
there is heterogeneity concerning power structure, economic size, level of economic
development and domestic issues. The political objectives and domestic policy
priorities also differ from one another. Further, for countries with porous borders,
myriad of security issues, ranging from security infrastructure to protection of
passengers and cargoes, are also looming large, becoming an area of major concern,
which could hamper the smooth development of this new sub-regional integration.
Environmental concerns are also becoming an important factor in different negotiations
of BBIN. Besides, infrastructural constraints present a major challenge to ensure
2
Observer Research Foundation (ORF), “Advancing the BBIN Agenda: Exploring Possibilities in Trade, Transit,
Energy and Water Cooperation”, 11 December 2015, available at https://www.orfonline. org/research/
govts-in-bbin-nations-must-provide-cerebral-links-along-with-physical-ones/, accessed on 01 July 2018.
3
Parthapratim Pal, “Intra-BBIN Trade: Opportunities and Challenges”, ORF Issue Brief, Issue No. 135, March
2016, p.1; Amy Warren and Diya Nag, “Advancing the BBIN Agenda to Promote Sub-Regional Trade”, The
Asia Foundation, 27 April 2016.
4
BBIN was first conceptualized in 1990s with the idea of South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) which was
formally launched by the Foreign Ministers of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal in 1996 and endorsed
at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit in Maldives in 1997. SAGQ was
followed by the formation of South Asia Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) that was supported
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). For details, see Wu Zhaoli, “India’s Promotion of BBIN Sub-Regional
Cooperation: Aspirations and Challenges”, China International Studies, May-June 2017, pp. 80-82.
5
Tariq Karim and Madhumita Srivastava Balaji, “BBIN: Paradigm Change in South Asia”, Issue Brief, New Delhi:
Vivekananda International Foundation, May 2016.
288
MATERIALIZING THE BBIN INITIATIVE
seamless connectivity and trade opportunities. Ineffective transit agreements, lack of

common guarantee mechanisms and insufficient transit harmonization procedures
place limits on the capacity for greater integration. All these, coupled with political
intricacy and lack of convergence of interests among member states, raise question
regarding the future of BBIN initiative.
This paper is an endeavour to review the developments within the framework

of BBIN since signing of the MVA and challenges to materialize it as an effective platform
for sub-regional transport connectivity. It also tries to propose some options on how
the challenges can be addressed. The paper is divided into five sections including
introduction and conclusion. Followed by introduction, section two highlights
developments within the framework of BBIN. Section three presents challenges while
section four discusses possible options to overcome those. A conclusion has been
drawn in section five.
2. Developments So Far
Several developments, at both bilateral and multilateral levels, have already

been observed since the signing of the BBIN-MVA. On 14 November 2015, Bangladesh,
Bhutan and India arranged a friendship motor rally travelling from Bhubaneswar,
India through Bhutan and Bangladesh. The rally concluded its journey in Kolkata,
India. The 19-day rally covered almost 4,500 kilometres (km), driving through thirteen
major cities of the three BBIN countries. Trial runs of consignments of goods from
Kolkata to Agartala via Dhaka and from Dhaka to New Delhi via Kolkata have also
been completed.
BBIN initiative suffered a major setback when Bhutan decided to step out
of the MVA on the ground of domestic issues and environmental concerns. This has
delayed the whole process and forced the remaining three countries to redraw the
initial plan. However, the initiative has gained renewed momentum when India’s
Ministry of Road Transport and Highways in collaboration with the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) organized a meeting in India in early 2018. The outcome of the meeting
includes: three of the member countries will finalize the text of operating procedure
for passenger vehicle movement (passenger protocol), conduct more trial runs for
the BBIN-MVA along designated routes in Bangladesh, India and Nepal and work
toward finalizing the protocol for cargo vehicular movement. Bhutan participated in
the meeting as an observer. As an aftermath of the decisions, a trial run for bus service
among these three countries was conducted on 23-26 April 2018, where two buses
travelled from Dhaka to Kathmandu through Siliguri carrying delegates from three
countries.
At the bilateral level within the sub-regional notion, connectivity initiatives

between the member countries have also been gaining momentum. Letters of
289
Exchange between Nepal and India for transit between Nepal and Bangladesh
through Kakarbhitta-Banglabandha corridor have been completed during the
Nepalese Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli’s visit to India on February 2016.
In addition, India and Bangladesh have agreed on transit rights for goods’ transport
from the North-eastern part of India (Tripura) to Chattogram. Besides, Bangladesh has
started to develop two deep-sea ports at Matarbari and Payra which could be utilized
by the land-locked countries like Bhutan and Nepal. India has also launched a US$
1.04 billion project for developing 558 km road involving five highway stretches that
will ease movement between India with other three member states.6 On the other
hand, Bangladesh and Bhutan have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
on 18 April 2017 on the use of inland waterways for transportation of bilateral trade
and transit cargoes.
Discussion is going on to replicate the BBIN-MVA in the rail sector as well.

Currently, rail connectivity between India and Bangladesh exists with Sealdah and
Dhaka through Gede, Old Malda and Rohanpur through Singhabad and Radhikapur
and Birol. Further connectivity is in progress with the installation of a new line from
Agartala to Akhaura. Restoration of Haldibari to Chilahati is also progressing. The
government of Bangladesh is working on to transform about 67 km of metre gauge
rail line into dual gauge that will provide railway transit facility to India, Nepal and
Bhutan. By converting the rail link from Parbatipur to Kaunia in Rangpur to broad
gauge, Bangladesh wants to establish railway transit with India, Nepal and Bhutan
through the Rohanpur-Singhabad railway link and Radhikapur-Birol railway link. In
addition, Bangladesh Railway is looking to revive some other routes to India, namely,
Benapole-Bangaon, Banglabandha-Siliguri-Nepal and Khulna-Kolkata. Besides, an
MoU has been signed between the Container Corporation of India Limited (CONCOR)
and Container Company of Bangladesh Limited (CCBL) for starting the container
services between the two countries. As part of a trial run, a freight train travelled
from India and reached Darshana International Railway Station in Chuadanga on
03 April 2018. Bangladesh and India are now developing a formal protocol for this
containerized movement.
Bilaterally, India and Nepal have also completed letters of exchange on rail
transportation which includes rail transport to/from Visakhapatnam and rail transit
facility through Singhabad for Nepal’s trade with and through Bangladesh. They have
agreed to build a new rail link between the Indian city of Raxaul and Kathmandu
during the Nepalese Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli’s visit to India.7 India
has conducted the preliminary survey for four broad gauge lines - New Jalpaiguri
(India) to Kakarbhitta (Nepal), Jogbani (India) to Biratnagar (Nepal), Nautanwa (India)
to Bhairahawa (Nepal) and Nepalganj Road (India) to Nepalganj (Nepal). Among
6
Delhi Policy Group, DPG Roundtable Reports, Vol. 2, Issue 5, Nepal, 27-28 July 2017, p. 98.
7
Delhi Policy Group, DPG Roundtable Reports, Vol. 2, Issue 3, New Delhi, 04-05 May 2017, p. 75.
290
the four, work is in progress in Jogbani and Biratnagar track. It is to be noted that
currently, there is no rail connectivity between India and Bhutan. However, feasibility
studies are carried out for extending railhead from India to Bhutan at five locations:
Kokrajhar (Assam) to Gelephu (Bhutan), Pathsala (Assam) to Nganglam (Bhutan),
Rangiya (Assam) to Samdrup Jongkhar (Bhutan), Banarhat (West Bengal) to Samtse
(Bhutan) and Hasimara (West Bengal) to Phuentsholing (Bhutan).8
Regarding riverine connectivity, Bhutan and Nepal have agreements with

both India and Bangladesh on the use of inland waterways as well as roads, railways
and ports. These agreements will facilitate movement of cargo, within the framework
of trade and transit arrangements, providing much-needed access to sea for both
Nepal and Bhutan. Besides, India and Nepal have agreed to tap the potential of inland
waterways to facilitate cargo movement under the framework of trade and transit
agreements, which will provide additional access to sea for Nepal.
3. Challenges Ahead
Since signing of the MVA, BBIN has not been moving forward as expected.
Several studies indicate some possible routes (see Table 1 and Map 1), but these are
yet to be mutually agreed by all.
Table 1: Bilateral/Trilateral Routes

Bi/Tri-lateral Routes
Bangladesh-India - Kolkata-Petrapole/Benapole-Dhaka-Akhaura/Agartala
- Agartala-Akhaura-Chattogram
- Silchar-Sutarkandi-Chattogram
Bangladesh-India-Bhu- - Samdrup Jongkhar-Guwahati-Shilong-Tamabil-Sylhet-Chat-
tan togram
- Thimpu-Phuentsholing-Jaigaon/Burimari-Hatikamrul-Mongla
- Thimpu-Phuentsholing-Jaigaon/Burimari-Hatikamrul-Chattogram
Bangladesh-India-Nepal - Kathmandu-Kakarbhitta/Phulbari-Banglabandha-Hatikamrul-
Mongla
- Kathmandu-Kakarbhitta/Phulbari-Banglabandha-Hatikamrul-
Chattogram
India-Nepal - Kathmandu-Birgunj/Raxaul-Kolkata/Haldi
- Kathmandu-Bhairahawa-Sunauli-Lucknow
India-Bhutan - Thimpu-Phuentsholing-Jaigaon-Kolkata/Haldi
Source: SAARC Regional Multimodal Transport Study, 2006, Table 4, cited in M. Rahmatullah, “Transport
Issues and Integration in South Asia”, in Sadiq Ahmed, Saman Kelegama and Ejaz Ghamni (eds.), Promoting
Economic Cooperation in South Asia: Beyond SAFTA, New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2010, p. 182.
8
Delhi Policy Group, DPG Roundtable Reports, Vol. 2, Issue 1, Guwahati, 30-31 January 2017, pp. 69-71.
291
Map 1: BBIN Proposed Routes
Phuentsholing
Chattogram Port
Source: Shanjida Shahab Uddin, “Transport Connectivity in South Asia: The Case of BRI and BBIN”, Paper
presented at COSATT Regional Conference on Importance of BRI and BBIN for South Asia, jointly organized
by BIISS and KAS at BIISS Auditorium, Dhaka, Bangladesh on 04-05 July 2018.
There exist several concerns to make BBIN as an effective sub-regional transit and
connectivity initiative. One of the most challenging tasks ahead for the member states is
to operationalize the MVA. As mentioned earlier, Bhutan has already placed its reservation
and decided to stay out of the agreement until its ratification at their parliament. The
agreement has been criticized for not having comprehensive consultations with the
concerned stakeholders in respective countries before its signing. Besides, there was an
accusation of not carrying out any full-scale impact assessment of the agreement on the
national economy, culture and environment, lack of which have created confusion and
fear among the citizens of Bhutan regarding its implementation.9 Another concern to
operationalize the MVA is finalizing both passenger and cargo protocols and subsequently
getting those approved by the member states. The text of passenger protocol has
already been finalized, but all member states have not signed it yet. Challenges also
include - fixing various fees, rates and charges, building new infrastructure, diversity in
existing infrastructure and axle load, harmonization of design standards for roads, bridges
9
The Legislative Committee, The National Council of Bhutan, Review Report on Motor Vehicles Agreement
for the Regulation of Passenger and Cargo Vehicular Traffic between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal,
October 2016.
292
including sign and signals, etc. Besides, lack of institutional and regulatory framework (e.g.,
traffic rules, vehicle/safety norms, etc.), lack of harmonized visa process and stringent visa
regime, capacity gaps in understanding and operationalizing procedures and regulations
are some constraints for implementing the MVA.
Among the BBIN, transit and transport connectivity faces both soft and hard
infrastructural barriers, thus hampering the seamless movement of vehicles across the
borders. This is also limiting the growth of intra-regional trade and investment which,
in turn, is hindering the broader ambitions of sustainability and economic growth.10
Intra-BBIN trade is now more than US$ 13 billion (see Table 2) that is only 3.4 per cent
of the BBIN’s global trade. There are welfare effects of reduction in transaction cost
in bilateral trade (see Table 3) and some estimation also show that trade potential is
US$ 50 billion. But this potential would be unrealized, with a number of challenges,
including high cost of doing business, lack of physical infrastructure, etc.
Table 2: Existing Trade between BBIN Countries
Bangladesh’s Exports to Bhutan and Bangladesh’s Imports from Bhutan
Exports to Bhutan (FY2018) Imports from Bhutan (FY2017)
US$ 4.45 Million US$ 33.14 Million
Bangladesh’s Exports to India and Bangladesh’s Imports from India
Exports to India (FY2018) Imports from India (FY2017)
US$ 688 Million US$ 6146.2 Million
Bangladesh’s Exports to Nepal and Bangladesh’s Imports from Nepal
Exports to Nepal (FY2018) Imports from Nepal (FY2017)
India’s Exports to Nepal and India’s Imports from Nepal
Exports to Nepal (2017) Imports from Nepal (2017)
India’s Exports to Bhutan and India’s Imports from Bhutan
Exports to Bhutan (2017) Imports from Bhutan (2017)
Bhutan’s Export to Nepal and Bhutan’s Imports from Nepal
Export to Nepal (2015) Imports from Nepal (2015)
US$ 1.2 Millions US$ 1.4 Millions
Source: Bangladesh Bank, "Annual Exports Receipts of Goods and Services 2017-2018" and "Annual
Import Payments of Goods and Services 2017-2018"; Roundtable on “Advancing BBIN Trade and Transit
Cooperation”, DPG Roundtable Reports, Vol. 1, Issue 2, New Delhi, 04-05 October 2016, p. 131.
10
CUTS International and IRU, “Benefits of the TIR Convention for the Implementation of the BBIN Motor
Vehicles Agreement”, October 2017, available at https://www.iru.org/system/files/BBIN%20media%20
fact%20 sheet0.pdf, accessed on 21 June 2018.
293
Table 3: Welfare Effects of Reduction in Transaction Cost in Bilateral Trade

Country /Regions SAFTA- zero tariff with no sensi- Reduction in transaction cost in
tive list bilateral trade by 10%
EV (Million US$) EV as % of GDP EV (Million US$) EV as % of GDP
Bangladesh 173.15 0.25 939.04 1.37
India 1950.44 0.16 3148.27 0.26
Nepal 595.12 5.79 669.16 6.51
Source: Roundtable on “Advancing BBIN Trade and Transit Cooperation”, op. cit., p. 62.
Soft infrastructure barriers include domestic complexities, geopolitical concerns,

lack of harmonization of transport and transit procedures, lack of regulatory and
institutional reforms, cumbersome customs practices. Hard infrastructure barriers are
battered road networks, lack of multimodal transport connectivity, poor port connectivity,
absence of a permanent secretariat, etc. These soft and hard infrastructural barriers are
hampering the seamless movement of vehicles across the borders as well as limiting the
growth of intra-regional trade potentials.
Ineffective transport connectivity agreements can be attributed to domestic

intricacies and geopolitical concerns, trust deficit and lack of institutional capacity that
delay implementation of agreements. Absence of full-fledged transit agreement has
forced the BBIN countries to opt for transhipment that requires frequent loading and
unloading of goods at ports causing customs complexities, huge delays and traffic
congestion. Border area of India and Bangladesh is a key example of it. The cumulative
loss of time in loading at the point of origin in India, transport unloading at Kakarbhitta,
transport unloading at Benapole, parking, customs, border crossing and re-loading is
estimated at 99 hours compared to the ideal time of 29.6 hours.11
The condition of physical infrastructure, especially the roads in the region are in
extremely dire situation hampering the dream of seamless connectivity. Except India, three
of the member states of BBIN are ranked very low in Asia in the survey report conducted
by the World Economic Forum on the ground of extensiveness and condition of road
infrastructure.12 In the case of rail connections, the situation is even worse compared to
road connectivity. Though passenger train services between India and Bangladesh is
performing well, but in absence of a rail protocol and mismatch in gauge and rolling stock,
coupled with missing links and load restrictions on Bangabandhu Bridge (over Jamuna
11
CUTS International and IRU, “Benefits of the TIR Convention for the Implementation of the BBIN Motor
Vehicles Agreement”, IRU Summary, August 2017, available at http://www.cuts-citee.org/pdf/Benefits_ of_
the_TIR_Convention_for_the_implementation_of_the_BBIN_Motor_Vehicles_AgreeAgre.pdf, accessed on
20 June 2018.
12
“Best and Worst Asian Countries for Road Quality”, The Nation, 22 February 2018, available at http://
www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/asean-plus/30339429, accessed on 19 April 2018; “Bangladesh’s Roads
among Worst in Asia”, The Daily Star, 28 February 2018.
294
river) that connects the eastern and western parts of Bangladesh, there is no direct freight
train service between the two countries. Officially bilateral rail cargo moves through three
interchange points (Gede-Darshana, Singhabad-Rohanpur and Petrapole-Benapole)
of which Gede-Darshana is the largest in terms of traffic. But the volume of rail cargo is
negligible compared to the total trade.13
Besides, none of the BBIN countries has the reputation in timely project
completion and the majority of crucial rail projects are falling far behind their original
schedule.14 Many projects under the Indian line of credit that was extended to Bangladesh
in 2010 are yet to be completed. The Khulna-Mongla rail link, which was scheduled to be
completed in 2018, has progressed only 31 per cent of the work. The link is vital for Nepal
to use Mongla port. Similarly, the 120 km Chattogram-Cox’s Bazar link has observed only
20 per cent completion of the work.15
Air connectivity, a crucial component for multimodal transport connectivity

in the sub-region suffers from either inadequate number of airports in some of the
member states like Bhutan and Nepal, or insufficient airport services. Some of the airports
situated within BBIN are performing way below the global standard and considered worst
performing airports in Asia.16
Lack of port connectivity is another serious concern that plays a crucial role in
limiting intra-regional trade within BBIN. Sluggish, inefficient and expensive mechanism
hampers the connectivity, which in turn reduces trade potential. It takes at least 30 days
for 20 containers to move between New Delhi and Dhaka via indirect routes (Colombo,
Singapore) that costs around US$ 2,500.17 If proper land transport facilities were there, it
would have taken only 5-6 days with one-fourth of the cost. Lack of adequate infrastructure
costs almost twice the amount of money to import a container in South Asia, compared
to the same in the East Asian region. The average time for turnaround of ship in the
sub-region is more, which is almost four times than that of Singapore. Some of the land
ports like Banglabandha in Bangladesh (opposite Phulbari) and Panitanki/Naxalbari in
India (opposite Kakarbhitta in Nepal) are of particular interest to the sub-region. These
ports lack necessary infrastructure like adequate roads, testing facilities, parking space,
13
Delhi Policy Group, DPG Roundtable Reports, Vol. 2, Issue 6, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 15-16 October 2017, p. 91.
14
Sohel Mamun, “Bangladesh Railway’s ‘priority’ projects chug along at snail’s pace”, Dhaka Tribune, 22
September 2017.
15
Delhi Policy Group, DPG Roundtable Reports, Vol. 2, Issue 6, op. cit., p. 95.
16
“Worst Airports in Asia 2016”, 15 October 2016, available at https://www.sleepinginairports.net/2016/
worst-airports-asia.htm, accessed on 27 July 2018; Geethanjali Nataraj, Infrastructure Challenges in South
Asia: The Role of Public-Private Partnerships, ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 80, Tokyo: Asian Development
Bank Institute, available at https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156719/adbi-dp80.pdf,
accessed on 27 July 2018.
17
Pranav Kumar and Chandan Mukherjee, “Trade Facilitation Needs Assessment in South Asia: A Case Study
of Eastern Sub-region” available at http://www.cuts-citee.org/PDF/TF-RReport.pdf, accessed on 23 March
2018, p. 14.
295
quarantine office, proper customs offices, essential amenities, etc., which increases the
cost of trade by manifold.18
Cumbersome customs procedure and stringent visa regime among the countries
are some major hurdles for sub-regional transport connectivity. For instance, customs
clearance between India and Bangladesh is still not harmonized. It requires around 22
documents, 55 signatures and a dozen of photocopies, where the format and standards
vary significantly.19 Different customs procedures among member states create bottleneck
during cross-border movement of passenger and goods. Besides, customs formalities
such as paperwork, working hours, rules and regulations are also not harmonized. There is
also an absence of mutually recognized guarantee mechanism that slows down the entire
procedure. The cost of national guarantees varies across the countries and the national
mechanisms are not recognized outside the issuing country.20 For instance, Nepalese
trucks have to obtain transit papers separately for each state of India. The cost for issuing
transit paper varies from state to state increasing the cost of transport for Nepal.21 The
process increases time of transporting goods and additional barriers. Mismatch in office
hours of customs offices of the countries also creates sufferings for commuters and
traders.22
4. What to Do?
Success of regional initiative depends largely on cooperation mechanism and

taking state’s stakes into consideration. Successful implementation of BBIN-MVA can be
the first step and so, Bhutan’s concerns on environmental issues and regulation of traffic
and traffic handling capacity are to be met. Implementation of MVA requires institutional
and regulatory reforms. The contracting parties also must accept the fact that many
provisions of the agreement cannot be implemented without additional legislation or
a new institutional framework. Priority needs include finalizing passenger and cargo
protocol, identifying routes, harmonizing fees, charges and taxes, creating a functioning
BBIN Secretariat and forming Joint Working Group (JWG) at the political level. It is also
essential to undertake some early harvest projects, e.g., developing road stretches to have
concurrent development on both sides of the border, improving roadside amenities and
warehouse facilities, introducing electronic data management system and screening,
introducing GPS-enabled transport vehicles and biometrics for transport licenses, etc.
18
19
CUTS International and IRU, op. cit.
20
Ibid.
21
Selim Raihan, Enhanced Regional Economic Cooperation through Dealing with NTMs in the BBIN Sub-Region
in South Asia: A Political Economy Approach, Dhaka: Asia Foundation, 2017.
22
A. Didar Singh, “Advancing BBIN Trade Coop: BBIN Trade Connectivity – Recent Developments, Hurdles
and Possible Solutions”, Roundtable on Advancing BBIN Trade ad Transit Cooperation, op. cit.; Delhi Policy
Group, DPG Roundtable Reports, Vol. 2, Issue 5, op. cit., p. 100.
296
It is to be noted that the text of protocol agreement for passenger movement

(passenger protocol) has already been finalized. Unfortunately, it is yet to be approved
by the cabinet of the respective member states.23 Nepal seeks additional time for further
scrutinizing the agreement and completing other formalities related to it. Consultation
meetings need to be arranged to eliminate any ambiguity that the newly formed Nepal
government might have on MVA. Strong politico-diplomatic efforts should be channelled
to convince Nepal to sign the protocol in the shortest possible time in order to launch
passenger bus services among the three-member states of BBIN. This will help expedite
entire operationalization process of MVA.
Strengthening of relevant institutions with well-endowed human resource is

essential. Institutions in respective countries must have necessary capacities to effectively
and efficiently deal with issues related to the operationalization of MVA like development,
harmonization and standardization of the protocols, dispute settlement, fixation of fees,
etc. Adequate financing is of high priority. Exchange of data, collaborative survey and
research work are also essential. Most importantly, a cooperation mechanism needs to
be developed. Member states need to be prepared to bear social, environmental and
economic costs incurred from any transit agreement among them. Consequently, fees
and charges are to be fixed in a manner that ensures compensation for the costs. Benefit
sharing must be considered as the key strategy in this regard. Reciprocity in allowing
flexibilities and support provided by countries in developing infrastructure also need to
be considered with proper importance.
4.1 Developing Comprehensive Arrangements
For transport connectivity, first of all, it is vital to develop physical infrastructure,

land port coordination mechanism, one-stop border service and rail grid network
for cargo and passenger traffic. Development of multimodal transport connectivity
also bears utmost importance. BBIN lacks a comprehensive connectivity model. A
connectivity model inclusive of physical infrastructure, rules and regulations, customs
policy, multiple stakeholders and comprehensive visa regime should be devised for
managing the entire system better. A connectivity master plan needs to be developed
to limit overlapping of infrastructure development as part of different regional and
sub-regional treaties. Various agreements and treaties should be supplementary to
each other, not overlapping or contradictory.
For multimodal transport connectivity, along with road, developing rail, air and
inland water transport connectivity is essential. Member countries need to create new
rail corridors connecting Kakarbhitta, Siliguri, Banglabandha and Panchagarh. Here, a
23
Sanjeev Giri, “Draft protocol ready, awaits Cabinet approval”, Kathmandu Post, 26 July 2018, available at
http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-07-26/draft-protocol-ready-awaits-cabinet-approval.
html, accessed on 30 July 2018.
297
major concern is harmonizing rail gauge. Four countries must have an exclusive Railway
Agreement under the banner of BBIN for interlinking the region that will ease people and
container traffic movement in a much cheaper way. Like railway, inland waterways system
for trans-country transportation also needs to be devised to reduce costs. It is also essential
to improve airport connectivity in smaller airports and increase the frequency of flights in
strategic airports. Connecting numerous 2nd and 3rd tier towns with major aviation hubs
will help control traffic and facilitate cargo movement. The quality, efficiency and capacity
of the major aviation hubs of the region like Dhaka, Kathmandu, Paro, Kolkata, Guwahati,
etc. need to be increased to handle more traffic and provide client friendly services. In
every mode of transportation and multilateral vehicle agreements, it is crucial to prepare
and adopt appropriate protocols and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for their
smooth functioning. International best practices might be consulted for this purpose.
Unhindered connectivity largely depends on various security aspects. Within

BBIN, there exist multiple security concerns like lack of in-country security infrastructure,
border conflicts, illegal migration, trafficking and smuggling, etc. A key task will be to
develop a robust security mechanism and border infrastructure that will ensure security
of persons, vehicles and cargo during inter-country movement as well as border crossing.
Incident management system and road information system need to be introduced to
provide safety through installation of GPS-based state-of-the-art tracking equipment and
vehicle and driver detection system, as well as for safeguarding against violation of law
and addressing and mitigating consequences of accidents and vehicular malfunctioning.
Appropriate use of ICT in a well-synced manner can be an effective strategy in this regard.
Containerized vehicular movement, under seal, can be promoted and security check posts
with adequate human resources can be deployed at border crossing points to ensure
safety and security.24 Border security cooperation at the state level is also needed to avert
any unwanted situation in the border areas between the contracting parties of BBIN.
Political commitment bears paramount importance for any sub-regional

initiative. This would be a decisive factor for the success of BBIN initiative. It is, therefore,
imperative to bring change in the mindset of the political decision makers and develop
an amicable environment that will influence the policy decisions and public opinion in
favour of this new sub-regional initiative.
4.2 Harmonizing Standards, Rules and Regulations
For harmonization, there are several issues to be addressed such as domestic

standards with regional/international norms, immigration policies, customs procedure,
visa regime and facilities at ports, borders and other transit points. Standardization of
road, axle load and transport equipment insurance, uniform emission requirements and
24
Mustafizur Rahman, “An emergent urgency for Bangladesh: improving trade facilitation”, The Daily Star,
23 February 2017.
298
rules and regulations are also critical concern for BBIN to ensure seamless connectivity
and reduce procedural hassle.
There are differences in working hours among Land Customs Stations (LCS) of
BBIN which need to be addressed by introducing 24x7 customs operation. Automation
and link-up between customs can also be an effective way to address this, which will,
in turn, help to reduce transaction time and cost. To save resources, time and cost, joint
management of exports and imports at the border can be an effective measure. For
instance, border cargo scanners can be shared together. Introducing One Stop Border
Post (OSBP) principle would allow member countries, contiguous to one another, to
coordinate the import, export and transit processes. This will help to ease duplication of
regulatory formalities on both sides of the same border.25 BBIN might also promote the
use of Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) scheme complemented with post-clearance
audit. Automation, digitalization in monitoring movement of vehicles or payment of
duties and toll taxes, etc. will pave the way for faster clearances of goods at the border
and along the corridors. Faster movement of goods and services is contingent upon
harmonization of rules and regulations of motor vehicles in the sub-region. In this regard,
BBIN members can go for TIR (Transports Internationaux Routiers or International Road
Transports) Convention.26 Besides, implementation of Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC)
and WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) will also help BBIN to achieve simplification
and harmonization of customs procedures.27
Harmonization of road standards and axle-load is a priority issue for BBIN.

The axle-load of Indian and Bangladeshi roads is different. It restricts fully-loaded
Indian trucks or containers plying through Bangladesh. The countries need to develop
specially designed containers, which are adjustable with global standards for road and
rail transportation. There is a difference between containerized goods and goods in
container. The BBIN-MVA talks about containerized goods, but there is no mention of
the movement of containers in the sub-region. For safe and fast movement of goods,
container movement needs to be encouraged among BBIN.
4.3 Mobilizing Funds
Modernization and expansion of transport facilities, one of the linchpins

of greater transport connectivity, require considerable amount of investment. Lack
of funding can be a stumbling block for BBIN initiative and its momentum. It is thus
important to mobilize fund from development partners, set up regional development
25
Prabir De, “Deepening Regional Integration: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Motor Vehicle Agreement",
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 50, Issue No. 52, 26 December 2015, pp. 114-115.
26
The Convention on International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention) is a
multilateral treaty that was concluded at Geneva on 14 November 1975 to simplify and harmonize the
administrative formalities of international road transport.
27
299
fund, attract and harmonize relevant regulations on transport oriented financial sector.
One estimation by the BBIN Ministerial Meeting shows that US$ 8 billion will be needed
for the already identified 30 priority projects.28 This implies that resources must be
mobilized from both traditional financers (e.g., the World Bank, Asian Development Bank
(ADB), etc.) as well as the new ones such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
and New Development Bank (NDB), etc. Attracting private investment for commercially
viable infrastructure projects is also essential. Successful Public Private Partnerships (PPP)
projects implemented in Sri Lanka and India can be analyzed for learning best practices.29
Implementation of MVA will create a surge of vehicles through the roads of member
states, some of which are not well prepared for that. Therefore, funding will be required
not only for development of hard infrastructure but also for their regular monitoring and
maintenance. Resorting regional development fund is essential in this regard.
4.4 Exchanging Information and Research
Exchange of data and information among the member countries is important

to make the cumbersome customs and other procedures easy in order to have smooth
movements of vehicles. Both exporters and importers need to know detailed information
on all procedures, associated costs, time, etc. Data exchange among customs authorities of
the countries is also crucial. All the issues related to procedural obstacles could be reduced
through implementation of digital mechanism. Introduction of a sub-regional single
window can be helpful.30 Another important issue is data harmonization and regular update
of data, lack of which is severely hampering the policy decisions within the BBIN. Special
emphasis is needed in this sector to ensure data harmonization as well as its availability and
timeliness. Establishing a central data storehouse can be effective for this purpose.
A detailed sub-regional logistics survey is now the need of the hour. Three
surveys conducted so far by the World Bank, SAARC Regional Multimodal Transport
Study (SRMTS) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation (BIMSTEC) have taken a broader view but did not get into the details of
some crucial issues like the mapping of cargo potential, specific logistics requirements
and socio-environmental implication of the agreements in the region. This is important
to focus on the priority routes and logistics options. Some other steps to accelerate BBIN-
MVA include encouraging research on transit and connectivity among BBIN, involving
academia and researchers in the trial runs of MVA to monitor the experience and
subsequently disseminating outputs on a public platform so that several bottlenecks can
be brought forward for further assessment and discussion. Media needs to be engaged
in communicating developments of BBIN with grassroot stakeholders. Besides, human
28
“Joint Statement on the Meeting of the Ministers of Transport of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal on
the Motor Vehicles Agreement”, 15 June 2015, available at https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.
htm?dtl/25365/ Joint+Statement+on+the+meeting+of, accessed on 25 June 2018.
29
Atiur Rahman, “Implementation of Sub-regional Connectivity Accords”, The New Nation, 17 February 2017.
30
300
resource development is another area of concern that lies in the parlance of education
and research.
4.5 Developing Cooperation Mechanism
Institutional framework or arrangement facilitates cooperation among

contracting parties. It provides a guideline on how to conceptualize an issue, how to
initiate an idea, how to coordinate among parties and how to monitor and follow-up
the agreed proposals, projects and programmes. Indeed, a cooperation mechanism is
essential and that has to be cognizant of the agreed/emerging objectives, principles
and modalities. To develop a cooperation mechanism for BBIN, the following
points need to be explored (a) regular discussions and consultations within BBIN
cooperation framework, (b) sharing of experience of some of the similar, relevant,
existing regional and sub-regional cooperation frameworks in respect of their
institutional arrangement, (c) considering the evolution of institutions based on the
extent of cooperation and nature/level of cooperation and (d) considering the issue
of setting up a permanent Secretariat with adequate authority. Besides, modalities of
cooperation need to be devised. It is to keep in mind that coordination between and
among countries and stakeholders is important, lack of which might create confusion
and duplication of works. Therefore, effective coordination within the framework of
cooperation mechanism also needs to be ensured.
It is imperative for the member states of the BBIN to address the Bhutanese
concerns regarding the environmental issues. Clause 6 of Article 6 of MVA can be
taken into account for that.31 Some of the initiatives like keeping a cap on the
number of vehicles, reducing axle load of vehicles and vehicle emission levels
can be considered. Besides, full-scale Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) need to be conducted to have a proper
understanding of the possible impact of the MVA on the environment. Some
other safeguarding measures for Bhutan may include (a) transhipment facilities
to discharge import cargo at the Bhutanese border unless the consignment is of
perishable and urgent nature as determined by competent national authority,
(b) enabling trucks carrying exports from Bhutan to the BBIN countries to pick
up import consignments on return journey without applying the principle of
reciprocity, (c) restricting the entry of private and passenger vehicles only up to
the border towns in Bhutan so as to protect the internal transport business for
national transporters and (d) limiting the number of private or passenger vehicles
for entry into Bhutan. These may assure the Bhutanese transporters that they will
also be a beneficiary through participation. Importantly, building a mechanism for
regular review of the enforcement of the MVA is crucial to ensure that approved
31
According to Clause 6 of Article 6, contracting parties will decide on the number of cargo and personal
vehicles and volume of traffic under the MVA through mutual consultation and agreement.
301
procedures are followed strictly and there are no cases of misuse of temporary
admission of motor vehicles.32
5. Conclusion
Ineffective transport and transit facilitation, infrastructural bottlenecks and state

politics have impacted inter and intra-regional connectivity and economic integration
among the South Asian countries. In spite of a shared history, culture, value systems and
geographical contiguity, the countries of the region are still not well connected with each
other and regional integration remains a distant dream for the people living here.33 BBIN
offers a ray of hope for the region to revive the long cherished ambition of South Asian
regionalism. Signing of BBIN-MVA was a breakthrough in terms of regional transport
connectivity that can pave the way for further collaboration.
The cost of non-cooperation in transport connectivity in South Asia is already

very high. The region could save a huge amount of money by developing transport
infrastructure and facilitating multi-modal connectivity within its framework. Some
progress has already been visible in the areas of transport connectivity and transit facility.
Besides, the countries have achieved some significant development in the areas of trade
and energy under the banner of BBIN. However, there exist numerous issues and concerns
that need to be taken care of in order to make BBIN an effective platform, especially for
transport connectivity. It is crucial to address issues raised by Bhutan regarding MVA and
to get the passenger protocol approved by Bangladesh, India and Nepal. It is also vital
to overcome soft and hard infrastructure barriers and develop multimodal transport
facility. Establishing BBIN as an effective initiative can only be facilitated through multi-
stakeholder consultation approach that is participatory in nature. It is thus important to
focus on formulating practical policies and their effective implementation.
For better transport connectivity within BBIN region, five broad tasks along
strong political commitment are suggested in this paper. These include developing
comprehensive arrangements (e.g., multimodal transport connectivity); harmonizing
standards, rules and regulations; mobilizing funds; exchanging information and
research and developing an effective cooperation mechanism. Prolonged steps and
implementation will only delay this new hope of BBIN sub-regional transport connectivity,
which needs to be nurtured by all member countries very carefully.
32
33
CUTS International and IRU, op. cit.
302
Samia Zaman
ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK (AIIB): EVOLUTION,

MOTIVATIONS AND GEOSTRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
Abstract
China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was launched in 2016.

Prior to that, the leadership and authority of the Multilateral Development Banks
(MDB) were mainly controlled by the United States (US), Western Europe and
Japan. Now the world has been experiencing the emergence of a new player in
this domain, China. The China-led AIIB has sparked a major debate over China’s
motivations behind establishing the Bank and the geostrategic implications
of the Bank for both regional and extra-regional actors. Therefore, the paper
endeavours to understand why China has created the AIIB. It also explores the
geostrategic implications of the Bank for the region and beyond. Finally, the
paper addresses certain challenges which the Bank needs to address to be a full-
fledged MDB.
Keywords: Multilateral Development Bank, Financial Governance, Infrastructure,

Connectivity, Environmental Safeguard
1. Introduction
The creation of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), led by an Asian

country targeting to fill up the infrastructure funding gaps of Asia, has brought a
major shift in the political economy of the multilateral financial institutions of the
world. Besides, AIIB’s establishment has created a profound impact on contemporary
international relations. Till date, the existing multilateral financial institutions are
mainly led and dominated by the United States (US), Western Europe and Japan.
Now, the world is experiencing that an Asian country, without the politico-economic
support of any western country, has led a multilateral financial institution to provide
assistance to other countries in the region and beyond. This is a clear indication that
the roles of Asian countries, predominantly China, are shifting to a more prominent
position in the world economic order. Chinese President Xi Jinping has spoken about
building “a community of common destiny” throughout the world for several years.1
Samia Zaman is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Her
e-mail address is: samiazaman.sz@gmail.com
1
Martin A. Weiss, “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)”, Congressional Research Service, 03 February
2017.
303
The AIIB can be seen as a primary manifestation of his overarching foreign policy
goals to deepen political, economic and security ties within the neighbourhood and
beyond. The launching of the AIIB has created a lot of hype in the field of international
relations in terms of motivations behind its creation and its overall implications.
Against this backdrop, the paper aims to understand China’s motivations

behind establishing the AIIB. It also aims to explore the Bank’s geostrategic implications
for the region and beyond. Finally, the paper maps out some challenges that the Bank
is facing to become a full-fledged Multilateral Development Bank (MDB). Given that,
the feature that distinguishes the paper from the existing literature is that it takes
into account all possible motivating reasons of China for establishing the AIIB. It is
worth mentioning that most of the existing literature which the paper has termed
as conventional wisdom is based on a set of interpretations. There are several
interpretations for China’s motivations for establishing a new MDB. First, China has
created the Bank to challenge the Bretton Woods Institutions given the context of the
US’ reluctance to restructure these institutions; second, China has created the Bank
to increase its geopolitical and economic interests by cementing its trade relations
with the regional countries of Asia and beyond; finally, China has established the
Bank to reduce massive infrastructure financing gaps in Asia. After examining all
the interpretations, it gives and validates an alternative explanation to the existing
literature on China’s motivations behind establishing the AIIB. Drawing on different
documents, the paper has been organized as follows. After the Introduction, section
two describes the institutional development of the AIIB. Section three examines the
structure, governance and membership of the Bank and explains why China has
created it. Section four explores the geostrategic implications of the AIIB. Section five
addresses challenges facing by the Bank. After addressing the challenges, the paper
concludes by summarizing the findings of the paper.
2. Institutional Development
Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the setting up of the AIIB in October

2013 in Bali, Indonesia. The Bank was launched in a ceremony at the Great Hall of
the People in Beijing in October 2014.2 A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
on establishing the AIIB was signed by 22 Asian countries in October 2014.3 The
ceremony was attended by the then Chinese finance minister Lou Jiwei and delegates
from 21 countries including India, Thailand and Malaysia.4 After signing the MoU,
2
“Three Major Nations Absent as China Launches World Bank Rival in Asia”, Reuters, 05 November 2014,
available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-aiib/three-major-nations-absent-as-china-launches-
world-bank-rival-in-asia-idUSKCN0ID08U20141105, accessed on 13 March 2018.
3
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), “50 Countries Sign the Articles of Agreement for the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank”, 29 June 2015, available at https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/ news/
2015/ 20150629_ 001.html, accessed on 23 February 2018.
4
“Three Major Nations Absent as China Launches World Bank Rival in Asia”, op. cit.
304
the Prospective Founding Members (PFMs) discussed the Bank’s Charter through
the mechanism of Chief Negotiators’ Meetings. The first Chief Negotiators’ Meeting
was held in Kunming, China.5 The second, third and fourth meetings were held in
Mumbai (India),6 Almaty (Kazakhstan)7 and Beijing (China) respectively.8 Finally,
the final text of the Articles of Agreement was adopted on 22 May 2015 in the 5th
Chief Negotiators’ Meeting in Singapore.9 On 29 June 2015, representatives from 50
of PFMs out of 57 signed the Bank’s Articles of Agreement at the Great Hall of the
People in Beijing, China.10 PFMs include Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia,
Germany, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of
Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom (UK), Uzbekistan and Vietnam. The
agreement entered into force on 25 December 2015. It was ratified by 17 member
states which represented 50.1 per cent of the Bank’s total capital stock.11 The member
states which ratified the Articles of Agreement are Australia, Austria, Brunei, China,
Georgia, Germany, Jordan, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Myanmar, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea and the United Kingdom.12 Article
59 of the Articles of Agreement “required deposit of such instruments by at least 10
Signatories with at least 50 per cent of the shares allocated.” Thus, the AIIB entered
into force. The next step for the AIIB to become a full-fledged MDB was the inaugural
meeting of the Board of Governors which, in accordance with Article 60, can announce
the commencements of the Bank.13 Headquartered in Beijing, it started functioning
in January 2016.14
As of now, the AIIB is an Asia-based financial institution. According to the official

website of the Bank, it is aimed at building sustainable infrastructure and connecting
people, services and market in Asia and beyond.15 The purpose of the AIIB is to “(i)
foster sustainable economic development, create wealth and improve infrastructure
connectivity in Asia by investing in infrastructure and other productive sectors; and (ii)
promote regional cooperation and partnership in addressing development challenges
5
Rahul Mishra, “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: An Assessment”, India Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2016.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
“Three Major Nations Absent as China Launches World Bank Rival in Asia”, op. cit.
10
“50 Countries Sign the Articles of Agreement for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”, op. cit.
11
Ankit Panda, “China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Enters Into Force: What Next?", The Diplomat,
30 December 2015.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, available at https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.html, accessed
on 01 May 2018.
15
Ibid.
305
by working in close collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral development

institutions”16 which are listed in Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement.
To achieve its purpose, the AIIB stated that it intends to promote investment in
the region for development purposes and to finance the development of infrastructure
and other productive sectors which includes energy and power, environmental
protection, rural infrastructure and agriculture development, transportation and
telecommunications, water supply and sanitation, urban development and logistics. It
wants to invest and encourage private investment in such projects that will contribute
to spur economic development in the region.17
The AIIB has started initially with an authorized capital stock of US$ 100
billion. Since its Asian character is predominant from the membership status, the
majority of its shareholders are the regional countries. The official website of the AIIB
categorized between regional members and non-regional members. Regional countries
include Afghanistan, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, China, Cyprus, Fiji, Georgia, Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia,
Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Samoa,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Uzbekistan, UAE,
Vanuatu and Vietnam. They are representing 75 per cent shares.18 The total authorized
capital stock of US$ 100 billion is divided into 1 million shares. Each share is holding
a value of US$ 100,000.19 Additionally, under special terms and conditions at times,
the authorized capital stock can be increased by a supermajority vote by the Board of
Governors which is selected by the member states.20 Each member state is entitled to
appoint a Board of Governors and one alternative governor to represent the country
in the AIIB Board of Governors.21 The AIIB Board of Governors is vested with all the
powers. It has an effective say in selecting any AIIB president. The Bank has a Board of
Governors, a Board of Directors, a President, one or more Vice-Presidents and other
officers and staffs as required.22 Currently, Jin Liqun is serving as the President of the
AIIB.
Regarding membership, Article 3 of the Articles of Agreement conveys that

membership is open to the members of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD) or the Asian Development Bank (ADB).23 Presently, it has 86
16
Articles of Agreement, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, available at https://www.aiib.org/en/news-
events/news/2015/_download/20150629094900288.pdf, accessed on 20 February 2018.
17
Ibid.
18
“50 Countries Sign the Articles of Agreement for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”, op. cit.
19
Rahul Mishra, op. cit.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Articles of Agreement, op. cit.
23
Ibid.
306
members from around the world.24 It has been able to include almost all the major
countries of the world except the US and Japan. Both the regional and extra-regional
countries have shown huge interest in the Bank due to its declaratory posture of using
the resources and facilities of the Bank for improving infrastructure connectivity in
Asia and beyond by promoting both public and private investment in infrastructure
development and other productive sectors.
In brief, the Bank wants to play a driving role in the growing demand for
infrastructure funding in the region and beyond through increasing investment
which would accelerate overall development process.
3. China’s Motivations for Establishing the AIIB
Why China established the AIIB? There are different interpretations roaming
around the establishment of the Bank. China argues that Asia is in dire need of funding
for infrastructure development. According to ADB’s report in 2010, Asia can match the
living standards of Europe by 2050, if it can facilitate its infrastructure development.25
Investment in infrastructure can spur the economic growth in the region. Asia as a
region has been experiencing a vibrant economic momentum over the last few
decades. The report reveals that Asia needs an investment in the infrastructure
about US$ 8 trillion over 2010-2020 to maintain the growth. In this context of a huge
infrastructure gap, existing institutions cannot fill it. The ADB has a capital stock of
around US$ 160 billion and the World Bank has its capital base of US$ 223 billion.26
Thus, the AIIB could play a driving role in reducing this massive infrastructure gap. The
infrastructure development will also accelerate regional cooperation efforts in Asia.
But this interpretation has its own limitations. Although the AIIB can always increase
its stock, it has started its journey only with the capital of US$ 50 billion which is not
adequate given the context of huge infrastructure funding gap in the region. It is
certain that the AIIB can contribute to the growing needs of infrastructure financing
in the region, but it is not something which motivated China solely to establish a new
financial institution.
Another interpretation is that China is creating its own institution to challenge

the Bretton Woods Institutions in the face of the US’ reluctance to restructure
these institutions. The US is not interested to cede its power and authority in the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The voting structure in these
institutions is not fairly distributed and commensurate with the present distribution
24
Ibid.
25
“The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Implications to Thailand”, Research Department,
Krungsri, September 2015, available at https://www.krungsri.com/bank/getmedia/aad28c04-274f-4e92-
929d-19530b3d847e/Research-econ-14092015.aspx, accessed on 10 January 2018.
26
“Why China is Creating a New “World Bank” for Asia”, The Economist, 11 November 2014.
307
of power. In other words, China wants to usurp US leadership in the economic arena.27
Some skeptics argue that China-led AIIB will not be able to stand as a multilateral
development institution; rather, it will be used as a soft tool to realize China’s own
strategic interest in the region. There are two aspects of China’s emerging role in
global economic governance.28 First, Chinese policymakers want China to play a
bigger role in the emerging regime of global economic governance.29 Second, China
has been relentlessly called on by various state actors to increase its weight in these
economic institutions compatible with its rising profile.30 But this interpretation also
has limitations. Although the China-led AIIB will yield China’s growing soft power in
global economic governance without fail, the current financial resources of the Bank
will fall short to fulfill its overarching aims of financing development needs of the
region of Asia and beyond.
There are other arguments as well. China created the AIIB to increase its
geopolitical and commercial interests by intensifying its economic linkage and trade
relations in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia.31 Thus, China wants to utilize
the mechanism of the AIIB to leverage its high currency reserves since it has the largest
foreign exchange reserve in the world.32 The AIIB can promote internationalization of
Renminbi (RMB). China has taken a number of steps to promote greater use of RMB.
It has issued sovereign bonds denominated in RMB to offshore investors in Hong
Kong worth RMB 6 billion in 2009.33 It was a significant development in the process of
internationalization of RMB. The World Bank, the ADB and the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) also issued RMB-dominated bonds in 2011 in Hong Kong.34 Similarly,
it is expected that the AIIB will also follow the footsteps of these MDBs. AIIB’s loan in
infrastructure projects and other productive sectors would be mainly RMB dominated
loans which will “lead to RMB offshore market” and internationalization of RMB.35 It
would also promote China’s infrastructure export activities. China’s investments in
infrastructure are mainly positioned in Asia and Africa. Besides, other parts of the
world such as America and the Arctic region are also expected to experience China’s
investments.36 Figure 1 shows China’s infrastructure-related exports in the AIIB
countries from 2007 to 2014. The trend suggests that China’s infrastructure-related
exports to the AIIB member countries are going to expand voluminously under a
27
Mike Callaghan and Paul Hubbard, “The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism on the Silk
Road”, China Economic Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016, p. 116.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
“The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Implications to Thailand”, op. cit.
32
Ibid.
33
Robert Cookson, “China in Offshore renminbi bond issue”, Financial Times, 08 September 2009.
34
“The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Implications to Thailand”, op. cit.
35
Ibid.
36
Penelope Marbler and Lea Shan, “Chinese Investments in Infrastructure Worldwide”, Asia Programme, IRIS,
2017, available at http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Asia-Focus-36.pdf, accessed on
20 March 2018.
308
formal mechanism of the AIIB. Thus, the AIIB will boost the demand for RMB in the
international market. But the study has found limitations regarding this interpretation.
The paper argues that whereas the internationalization of RMB will definitely take
place through using different channels of the AIIB, it is obvious that China has not
established a new financial institution merely to promote internationalization of
its currency as it has been seeking internationalization of RMB for over the last-half
decade through taking different policies.37
Figure 1: China’s Infrastructure-related Exports to AIIB Countries
44, 210 45, 878

42,727
35,523
32,6275 41,262
24,864
26,304 RMB (mn)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Note: Data based on value of China’s exports of railways, cars, airplanes,
ships and other transport equipment to 32 countries included in China’s
custom statistics.
Source: “The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Implications to Thailand”, op. cit.
Amidst all these interpretations, the paper presents an alternative explanation
which argues that the AIIB would be instrumental in implementing Chinese President
Xi Jinping’s signature project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Silk Road Economic
Belt (SREB) was announced in September 2013 in Kazakhstan. The 21st century
Maritime Silk Road was proposed later in Indonesia subsequently with the AIIB. This
alternative explanation is based on a three-pronged analysis.
First, in different key economic meetings in China presided by Xi Jinping,

the President said that the primary task of the AIIB is to provide capital for schemes
related to BRI.38 Thus, the speeches of Xi Jinping show that the establishment of the
AIIB has been driven by the funding needs for projects related to BRI.
Second, when the world was hit by the global financial crisis and recession
in the North Atlantic, China’s export-led growth faced some limitations.39 A working
37
Craig Chan and Wee Choon Teo, “RMB Internationalization: Prospects and Challenges”, BRINK ASIA, 12 June
2018, available at https://www.brinknews.com/asia/rmb-internationalization-prospects-and-challenges/,
38
“Xi Stresses Implementing Central Economic Policies”, Xinhua, 10 February 2015, available at http:// www.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-02/10/c_127481077.htm, accessed on 01 March 2018.
39
Mike Callaghan and Paul Hubbard, op. cit.
309
paper was published by the ADB Institute in 2009, which was translated into Chinese
and published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.40 The paper argued that a
modern Silk Road is imperative to tap the potentials of Asia.41 The crux of the paper is
an integrated Asia needs to restore Asian Silk Route. Once upon a time Asia was the
most important trade and economic center of the world, the Silk Road served as the
cross border network of trade routes across the continent of Asia.42 It was an extensive
interconnected artery. But in recent times, the transport cost and lack of connectivity
is seriously hindering the process of intra-regional trade. Although the economies
of Asia have been emerging vibrantly and have become important components of
international trade network, the economic potential of Asia remains largely untapped
due to lack of connectivity. Thus, Asia needs to strengthen its physical connectivity
base to revive its position as an international trade hub. In this process, restoring
the ancient Asian Silk Road could be instrumental. It is very much possible that this
literature has had a profound impact on Chinese policymakers. Upon considering this,
China-led AIIB can be used to revive the ancient Silk Road, which is now termed as
SREB, through financing infrastructure development.
Finally, some other prominent Chinese scholars have pointed out some key
hindrances for the BRI initiatives. The most important impediment is the absence of
a platform through which the member countries can be financially supported to be
integrated with BRI project.43
Thus, the AIIB has been established as an instrument of influence in the context
of implementing the BRI. China’s BRI project, which was initially known as One Belt
One Road (OBOR) Initiative, offers a proposed infrastructure network which connects
more than “60 countries across the land terrain of the ancient Silk Road land route
(Silk Road Economic Belt) from China to the Mediterranean, plus an ocean route (Silk
Road Economic Belt) connecting Europe with the Middle East, Africa and Southeast
Asia”.44 There are perceptions that the AIIB is working as the financing wing of the BRI.
China has set up a number of institutions and initiatives to make the BRI a reality. The
AIIB is one of them. If the BRI is a complete plan for connectivity and investment, the
AIIB is a vehicle through which China’s investment capacity would be diverted out.45
The BRI is China’s grand strategy which is financially backed by the AIIB and two other
development funds: the Silk Road Infrastructure Fund and the New Development
Bank (NDB) established by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)
40
Ibid.
41
ADB Institute, “Restoring the Asian Silk Route: Toward an Integrated Asia”, ADBI Working Paper Series, 2009,
available at https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/155995/adbi-wp140.pdf, accessed on 30
December 2017.
42
Ibid.
43
44
“Perspectives on the Emerging Role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”, International Affairs, Vol.
93, No. 5, 2017, p. 1066.
45
Ibid.
310
in 2014. The Silk Road Infrastructure Fund is funded by Chinese foreign exchange
reserves. It can act like a sovereign wealth funding mechanism. The AIIB will facilitate
the implementation of the BRI by expanding China’s economic influence. The BRI is
much more interregional and pan-continental than regional. The pan-continental
nature suggests China’s expanding influence on other countries. The programme got
a massive boost when China unveiled a separate Silk Road Fund of US$ 40 billion in
November 2014. Thus, these initiatives will definitely enhance China’s influence and
stakes in the region.46 In brief, the AIIB, amongst other funding mechanisms, is created
to implement the BRI successfully.
4. Geostrategic Implications
The China-led AIIB is expected to yield significant geostrategic implications

for the region and beyond. The AIIB’s formation is going to have a significant impact
on both China as well as the regional order. China’s growing footprint in international
political economy will be tangible with the gradual maturity of the Bank. Its geopolitical
importance also lies in the fact that both regional countries and extra regional
countries will be impacted. Following are the geopolitical implications that the Bank
is likely to make with its course of action.
4.1 Expanding China’s Regional and Global Influence
Although the AIIB is an economic endeavour, it is not just about economics.

The AIIB will yield significant strategic and political authority for China over the region
and beyond. The way the US achieved strategic and political preeminence through
its status, position and authority in the Bretton Woods Institutions, China will also
be benefitted through its pivotal role in the AIIB, as economic might begets political
power. The AIIB will help China to project its influence while attempting to facilitate
connectivity between Asia and Europe. With better connectivity and regional
integration of Asia, Africa and Europe, China can take advantage of its burgeoning
economic needs and growth. Economic influence through the mechanism of the AIIB
would translate into strengthened Chinese soft power in regional power dynamics
and beyond. The AIIB represents “a new tool of statecraft to build and exert influence
and authority”.47 This will also enhance the leadership status of China in international
politics. A more prominent Chinese voice will be heard in the global institutional
order. According to G. John Ikenberry and Darren J. Lim, “the AIIB can increase
China’s influence and authority in two distinct ways. Firstly, China has established an
alternative to Bretton Woods system in terms of multilateral development lending. If
46
Yong Deng, “China: The Post- Responsible Power”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2015, pp. 117-132.
47
G. John Ikenberry and Darren J. Lim, "China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft", Brookings Institute, 2017, available at
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/chinas-emerging-institutional-statecraft.pdf, accessed on
15 March 2018.
311
the AIIB can be properly functional and provide equivalent service, many developing
countries will depend on it. As there are complaints about the Bretton Woods system
about being inefficient and bureaucratic, the prospective reduced participation of
these states in Bretton Woods system will give China greater authority and power
in the international order. China can also threaten to withdraw its membership from
existing institutional arrangements. Second, the AIIB will allow China to consolidate
its engagements with the member countries. The growth of economic relations
between the loan recipient countries and the AIIB will translate into strengthened
political ties with China.”48 Thus, China can foster bilateral relations by leveraging its
institutional authority.
Besides, utilizing institutions to provide foreign investment will lead to close

bilateral relations of China with the rest of the world. Thus, these engagements will
erode anti-China sentiment to the regional and extra-regional actors. In brief, the
AIIB, being an MDB, has a broad base of membership. The eagerness with which the
member states from Asia and Europe joined the Bank is itself a source of confidence
for China. It gives both credibility and legitimacy to China that such a large number
of countries have confidence in its leadership. This elevated China’s status in global
political arena to a great extent. Despite vehement opposition from both the US and
Japan, some critically important actors in the global political economic arena have
joined the Bank which is a major source of viability for China-led AIIB. Thus, the AIIB
is an enabler for China which is translating its increasing capabilities into greater
Chinese political clout.
Finally, the history of other existing dominant institutions such as the World
Bank and the ADB suggests that position and authority in multilateral institutions
worked as a source of political influence. Japan’s dominance in the ADB worked in
favour of Japan while garnering support for temporary membership in the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). Thus, it can be expected that the China-led bank
will work as an additional source for softening China’s image in its neighbouring
countries and worldwide. The countries in Asia may hesitate to accept financing from
China for infrastructure and other development projects, but they will be comfortable
if the financing comes from a multilateral institution. Thus, China can pursue its BRI
initiative backed by the AIIB by yielding considerable politico-strategic clout in the
region and beyond.
4.2 Norm Setting
Since the end of the World War-II, global financial and trade arrangements
were largely shaped by the US. With the US at the centre, the pillars of global
financial architecture, commonly known as the Bretton Woods Institutions, reflected
48
Ibid.
312
the US interests. In the regional context of Asia, Japan has been the prominent actor
in terms of dominating financial arrangements. Japan has dominated the ADB.
Presently, China has come up with an idea to cut down the dominance of them in
the region. It intends to change the regional economic setup. It aims to establish a
new financial framework dominated by China itself. China also wants its economic
prowess and decisions reflected in the newly emerging financial architecture. For
many, the AIIB presents as “vanguard for an alternative economic world order”.49
It is because China is frustrated over the slow progress in reforming process of the
MDB governance. The present distribution of voting power in the World Bank, IMF
and the ADB does not reflect the growing economic weight of China. China, being
the World’s second largest economy, holds a minor role in the leading MDBs. The
US is the largest contributor in both the World Bank and the IMF. Voting power is
based on the individual country’s funding contributions. Currently, the US holds a
17.48 per cent voting share in the World Bank and 16.21 per cent voting share in the
IMF.50 Along with this, Japan holds a voting share of 12.80 per cent in the ADB where
as China holds 5.477 per cent.51 Thus, Japan’s voting power is more than double
from China. Besides, the US holds a voting share of 12.752 per cent in the ADB.52
These realities added frustration to Chinese policymakers. In this backdrop, China
continued to push for reforms that can address the changing scenario of global
economy and the US Congress continued to block such reforms.
China can now use the AIIB to promote its own policy goals. It has its own
industrial goals which are designed by the State-Party. Its industrial goal aims to
strengthen China’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)53 which plays an important role
in Chinese economy. They also dominate China’s strategic sectors and industrial
pillars.54 China wants its SOEs to compete with the most powerful multinational
companies. Since the AIIB is established to offer loans to countries to develop
infrastructure projects such as building of roads, dams, power plants, rail transports
and air transports, these SOEs of China can undertake these projects under the
AIIB framework.55 Thus, China will provide loans to countries which are in need of
infrastructural development. A significant amount of these loans will be used again
to pay to China’s SOEs which are experiencing excess capacity to some extent from
building infrastructure projects in China.56
49
G. John Ikenberry and Darren J. Lim, op. cit.
50
Daniel C. K. Chow, “Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank”, Vanderbilt Journal
of Transnational Law, Vol. 49, available at https://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/wp-content/uploads/sites/78/7.-
Chow_ Paginated.pdf, accessed on 30 February 2018.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard,“Can China keep controlling its SOEs?”, The Diplomat, 05 March 2018.
55
Daniel C. K. Chow, op. cit.
56
Ibid.
313
Besides, at present, most of the international transactions are conducted in US

dollars. It yields soft powers for the US. The US dollar holds considerable confidence.
Besides, the US can freeze any transactions in US dollars by blocking the transfer of
dollars by its banks. In this context, China intends to make the Asian region less dollar
dependent. For this purpose, China-led AIIB can sanction loan in RMB. Currently,
China wants to promote RMB and consequently, the IMF declared RMB as one of its
official currencies.57 If China becomes capable to conduct the transaction in RMB, it
can easily deal directly with the countries which have been facing the US sanctions
against them. It is because China will not need dollars to do transactions with these
countries. In addition to that, China will also be able to control transactions in RMB by
using Chinese banks. Conducting transaction in RMB would be an issue of prestige for
China. The AIIB has the potential to make RMB a powerful currency.
The AIIB has provided China with an opportunity to project itself as a norm
setting international actor in the global politics. The existing dominant financial
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF are primarily dominated by the US,
which promotes US policies in the loan recipient countries. These policies embodied in
a set of political and economic conditions are known as the Washington Consensus.58
These policies include fiscal discipline with a focus on limits on government spending,
redirection of public expenditures toward education, health and infrastructure, tax
reform with a focus on broadening the tax base, market dominated interest rates,
competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, openness to foreign direct investment,
privatization of state owned enterprises, deregulation, legal security for property
rights and reduced roles for the state. These conditions aim to flourish the western
concept of capitalism and economic liberalism in the loan recipient countries. The
loan recipient countries have to comply with decisions imposed by the World Bank
and the IMF. Besides, these institutions also impose conditions of environmental
protection, sustainability and workers’ right to loan to the potential loan seeking
countries.59 Overall, the US has been using the mechanisms of the World Bank and
the IMF to further its policy goals in different countries of the world irrespective of the
individualistic character of the individual states. Thus, the US has been dominating
the international trade and financial regime. Ian Bremmer, President of the Eurasian
Group once noted that “for decades (the US has) used its authority in the World
Bank and IMF………to guide developing countries onward western values”.60 Joseph
Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate and Chief Economist of the World Bank from 1997-2000,
also spoke against the conditions imposed on the individual countries by the World
Bank and the IMF. He spoke against the simplicity of both Washington Consensus and
IMF’s “one - size - fits - all”.61 He argued that these conditions which are referred to as
57
Ibid.
58
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
“The bumpy ride of Joe Stieglitz”, The Economist, 16 December 1999.
314
“conditionality” are too rigidly applied to countries regardless of their individualistic

characteristics. He also argued that “traditional conditionality has failed by and large”.62
By contrast, China does not support imposing conditions to grant loans to

the loan recipient countries which will appear very appealing to many countries. The
formation of the AIIB will directly or indirectly challenge the western-style trade and
financial regime. It is perceived that China will set a new set of rules for international trade
and financial activities. China believes that each country has its own right to decide its
course of action in its domestic affairs. These sovereign states should not be subjected to
a set of political and economic conditions imposed by any international institution. This
Chinese stance goes in direct opposition to the US stance to use conditions to realize their
policy goals across the world. Some scholars are thinking of a new competing ideological
agreement named as “Beijing Consensus”.63 In contrast to the doctrine of conditionality,
China is expected to follow a doctrine of non-interference.64 China is not concerned with
the political characteristics of an individual country with which it engages in economic
affairs. For China, the economic system, environmental protection regime, sustainability
and workers’ right of an individual country are important but China will not dictate their
course of action to grant them loans. It respects individual countries’ decision to govern
their own administration. This signals a clear shift from the previous trade and financial
regime.
4.3 Declining US influence in Asia-Pacific Region
The AIIB is comprised of almost all major economies of the world except the
US and Japan. It is interesting to map out that the AIIB has been able to attract many
countries in the region and beyond. Several important and close partners of the US
have joined the Bank. Although the apprehension about a China-led bank was lurking
around, the countries decided to join the Bank due to commercial reasons. Despite the US
opposition, the member countries preferred the burgeoning bank to get more financial
support. Besides, many countries take bilateral loans from China. In this regard, it is more
convenient for countries to take loans from a MDB rather than an individual country.
Initially, Australia and South Korea which are deemed as major US partners in the Asia-
Pacific region, took a decision not to join the Bank.65 Similarly, Indonesia also stepped
back from joining the Bank. Later, all three of them became members of the Bank. The
consideration of financial benefits came prior to politico-strategic consideration. In fact,
Australia was the first country which signed the Articles of Agreement. Similarly, Indonesia
62
Ibid.
63
64
Ibid.
65
Ricardo Bustillo and Maiza Andoni, “China, the EU and multilateralism: the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank”, SciELO, 16 July 2018, available at http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-
73292018000100207, accessed on 30 July 2018.
315
wanted China to establish AIIB’s headquarter in its capital, Jakarta.66 Even the US plea was
ignored by many Western European allies. Even the UK which is the US’ closest ally refused
to the US plea to shun the AIIB. G-7 members also discussed the issue of the AIIB. The first
country of G-7 to join the Bank was the UK.67 And it acted without waiting for its other G-7
partners like France, Germany or Italy. Later, France, Germany and Italy processed their
applications to join the Bank. Some other smaller European countries rushed to join the
AIIB prior to 31 March 2014, so that they can become founding members. In fact, Canada
was the only country which did not join the Bank. Besides, the first western country which
applied to join the Bank was New Zealand. It expressed its interest to join the Bank in
2014. In return, President Xi Jinping praised New Zealand’s “independent voice”. In brief,
although the US official position was that joining the AIIB is up to the individual states to
decide, the US tried informally to keep the G-7 unified to take a uniform stance regarding
joining the AIIB. The US’s inability to enforce a uniform decision among G-7 members and
its failure to dissuade its key allies from joining was viewed as a serious setback to the US
diplomacy. There are many criticisms regarding the US approach towards the AIIB. Joseph
Nye noted that the “US deciding people should not join” the Bank is a “sign of stupidity”.68
5. The Way Ahead
The AIIB is a newly emerged MDB in the landscape of contemporary international

financial governance. It has been operating its activities of providing loans or investing
in infrastructures for almost two years. It is playing important roles in contributing to the
member countries’ infrastructural development ranging from development of motorway
to development of gas storage facility. Thus, it provided loans of about US$ 1.3 billion in its
first year and US$ 3.30 billion in its second year.69 However, there are still skepticisms in the
field of contemporary international finance governance that whether the AIIB would able
to stand as a viable new MDB. From the perspective of viability, the paper has mapped out
several challenges which are crucial to address.
First, there are still suspicion and apprehensions regarding the motivation and
objectives of the AIIB. There are perceptions that the Bank would be used for furthering
Chinese commercial and political interest. The paper argues that, with 85 member
countries, it would be very difficult for China to finance the projects only favourable for
its own political and economic needs. Besides, China should make sure that the AIIB is
66
“Indonesia says Jakarta will compete with Beijing to host AIIB”, China Daily, 23 March 2015, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-03/23/content_19883346.htm, accessed on 30 July 2018.
67
Ana Swanson, “Is the UK ‘Accommodating’ China by Joining its New Investment Bank”, Forbes, 15 March
2015, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/anaswanson/2015/03/15/is-the-uk-accommodating-china-
by- joining-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/#61abba5e4dfd, accessed on 23 June 2018.
68
Rahul Mishra, op. cit.
69
Salvatore Babones, “China’s AIIB Expected to Lend $10-15B a Year, But Has Only Managed $4.4B in 2 Years”,
Forbes, 16 January 2018, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/salvatorebabones/2018/01/16/chinas-
aiib-expected-to-lend-10-15b-a-year-but-has-only-managed-4-4b-in-2-years/#31933f0b37f1, accessed on
30 January 2018.
316
led by China, not dominated by it. All the members will be treated equally based on the
principles of the Bank agreed in the Articles of the Agreement. China’s share in the Bank
has raised another concern. China is the largest shareholder of the Bank. Many countries
are worried of China’s 30.34 per cent shares in the Bank with a voting share of 26.06 per
cent.70 However, China can assure the members and potential members that the present
distribution of share and voting can change with the expansion of the membership of
the Bank. Besides, the US and Japan have not joined the Bank. They remain un-committal,
although their official positions have improved from the past regarding the AIIB. For
China, the AIIB is a new forum to advance its relations with these countries. China should
work harder to appease these concerns and skepticism; it is because participation of these
countries could enable the Bank earning higher credit rating.71 Memberships of these
countries would also serve as a source of legitimacy for the Bank.72
Second, the nature of the Bank is ambiguous. The Bank needs to take a
clear stance on its very identity. Whether it would be a development aid agency or an
MDB? Although the Bank started with the objective of filling the financing gaps in the
infrastructure market of Asia, China also focused on the idea that the Bank should act like
an MDB which needs to be paid back of its loans. The infrastructure projects in the region
have a long tradition of funding cycles. It takes a lot of time for the completion process of
the projects. There is also a potential for waste and mismanagements. In this backdrop,
question rises that how China is going to balance these two traits of the Bank of becoming
MDB with the motivation to fill the infrastructure financing needs of the region. What
seems more realistic is that the Bank will end up limiting its scope in providing financing
for infrastructure projects in the region. The Bank needs to be cautious and selective in
project selection and financing process.
Third, the AIIB must adhere to the policies of environmental and social safeguard
propagated by the existing MDBs. There are concerns that the Bank will “lend to dictators,
despoil the environment and trample human rights”.73 President Xi Jinping announced
earlier that the Bank will follow the “good practices” of existing institutions out there.74 The
AIIB has included in its founding principles that its foundation is built on “the lessons of
experience of….existing Multilateral Development Banks. In addition to that, the Bank’s
mode of operation is “lean, clean and green”.75 Although setting policy theoretically is
different from getting things in practice. In 2015, the World Bank admitted that it had
70
Enda Curran, “The AIIB: China’s World Bank”, Bloomberg, 06 August 2018, available at https://www.
bloomberg.com/ quicktake/chinas-world-bank, accessed on 25 August 2018.
71
Zhiqun Zhu, “China’s AIIB and OBOR: ambitions and challenges”, The Diplomat, 09 October 2015, available at
https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/chinas-aiib-and-obor-ambitions-and-challenges/, accessed on 30 October
2017.
72
Ibid.
73
74
Don Rodney Ong Junio, “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?”, The
Diplomat, 04 December 2014.
75
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, op. cit.
317
failed miserably to uphold its policies to protect the poor in the process of building dams
and roads. Many people were swept aside which was a direct implication of building these
projects. In this context, the AIIB will be scrutinized more closely in the aftermath of its
lending in projects whether there are any negative environmental or social implications.
Fourth, security of the investments is another big challenge for the AIIB. Many
countries which are suffering from lack of infrastructure or weak infrastructure are also
facing violent conflicts. Violent conflicts such as insurgency, terrorism, violent extremism
would hinder the implementation process of any development project. For instance,
the Kashgar-Gwadar corridor which links Western China and Pakistan through roads
and pipelines is such a route which has many conflict-prone areas. Besides, China has
announced to build 81,000 kilometres of high-speed railway which will involve more than
65 countries.76 Many of these countries embody conflict-ridden and vulnerable territory.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region of Pakistan, Western Thailand and Afghanistan are such
conflict-ridden parts of the project. Thus, the security aspect of such gigantic projects is a
great concern.
Fifth, the AIIB wants to maintain high standards and regulations for its governance.
It wants to deliver funding more efficiently than the existing MDB like the World Bank and
the ADB. The AIIB has realized that maintaining high standards in the governance process
of the Bank will protect it against a bad lending decision. High standards and regulations
are also prerequisites for good credit rating which in turn also determines its legitimacy
and international fundraising. The AIIB has been given AAA rating, the highest possible
rating in Asia by Moody’s Investors Service due to “the strength of AIIB’s governance
frameworks, including its policies on risk management, capital adequacy and liquidity”.77
The Chinese leadership and the AIIB authority are willing to maintain standard regulations
for governance purpose, but there are alleged disagreements domestically. Sometimes,
certain domestic interest lobby wants to view the AIIB as a tool to extend Chinese interests
around the world. Therefore, the AIIB needs to take these issues under consideration to
become a viable financial institution.
Sixth, the Bank needs to be more independent in the selection and completion
of the financing of the projects. In 2016, the Bank committed to finance nine projects
worth of US$ 1.73 billion.78 Among them, six were co-financed by the World Bank, the
ADB or other financial institutions. In these projects which were co-financed, the AIIB has
taken the assistance of these financial institutions in terms of knowledge sharing, project
management, technical expertise and so on. Although the AIIB is still in its nascent stage,
it should gradually obtain its own capabilities in terms of legal, technical and managerial
issues of the projects so that it could operate the projects independently. Mutual
cooperation with other MDBs will always provide the AIIB with an opportunity to share
76
Zhiqun Zhu, op. cit.
77
Fu Jun, “Three major challenges AIIB must overcome”, China Daily, 07 May 2017.
78
Ibid.
318
experience on the management of the projects, but in the long run, if it could finance the
potential projects independently, it will strengthen its portfolio.
Finally, since its inception, the AIIB has financed those projects which belong to
hard infrastructure. Its financing covered gas pipeline, two power plants, a port facility,
redevelopment of a poor district, a power distribution line, a motorway construction
and railway and road improvement in the year 2016. On the other hand, the World Bank-
financed projects not only cover hard infrastructure but also soft infrastructure. Hard
infrastructure includes roads, electricity transmission/distribution, water supply and urban
development, etc., and soft infrastructure includes health policy, urban management,
decentralization, assistance to subnational governments, etc. For Asia, development of
both hard and soft components of the infrastructural body is critical for comprehensive
development. The AIIB, thus, needs to expand its scope of funding in accordance with the
development needs of Asia.
6. Conclusion
The AIIB has started functioning with the declaratory objective of promoting
investment in the region for development purpose. It began its journey with an
authorized capital stock of US$ 100 billion. The Bank is predominantly Asian in nature
since most of its member countries are from Asia. The Asian countries presently represent
75 per cent share of the Bank. Given these characteristics, a major MDB like the AIIB has
been established in a generation. There are different arguments roaming around China’s
motivations behind creating such a major MDB. For China, it has led the Bank to meet the
huge infrastructure development needs of Asia which in turn will accelerate the regional
cooperation process. Another school of thought views the establishment of the Bank led
by China as a means to challenge the Bretton Woods Institutions. It is because the US is
reluctant to restructure these institutions with the growing politico-economic profile of
China. Some scholars also think that the AIIB will not be able to establish itself as a viable
MDB. Rather it will be used as a tool to realize China’s regional strategic interest through
deepening commercial ties and economic relations with the regional countries. In other
words, the AIIB will increase China’s political clout in the region and beyond. Besides,
there are interpretations that China wants to use the mechanism of the AIIB to leverage
its high currency reserve. Through the channels of the AIIB, China wants to promote RMB.
Amidst all these arguments, the paper presents an alternative explanation that China-led
AIIB will be instrumental in implementing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s BRI project. To
have the successful implementation of the BRI, China will need the AIIB as one of the BRI’s
principal funding mechanism. The alternative explanation is based on a three-pronged
analysis. First, in different meetings, Chinese President Xi Jinping verbally expressed that
the funding needs of different projects related to BRI has driven China to establish the
AIIB, which, among other instruments, will contribute to the successful implementation
of the BRI. Second, the global financial crisis and its aftermath research works might have
a profound impact on China’s establishment of the Bank since many research papers
319
especially the ADB Working Paper suggested that a modern Silk Road should be restored
to tap the full potential of Asia in terms of enhancing connectivity. Thus, the AIIB would be
instrumental in reviving the Ancient Silk Road. Finally, the absence of a financial platform
through which the member countries of the BRI can be fully integrated with the BRI, might
have motivated China to establish the Bank.
Therefore, the paper has explored the geostrategic implications of the AIIB for
the region and beyond. The paper has found out several key geostrategic implications of
the Bank. First, the establishment and well functioning of the Bank will result in expanding
China’s regional and global sphere of influence. China will yield significant soft power in
regional power dynamic and beyond through economic influence using the mechanism
of the AIIB. Besides, history shows that leading position and authority in dominant MDB
generally works as a source of political influence. Thus, China can strengthen its leadership
status in international politics. Second, the formation of the AIIB and its governance
maintaining standard ethical, economic and environmental rules and regulations will
provide China with an opportunity to project itself as an important stakeholder in the norms
setting domain of international political economy. Third, the formation of the AIIB will lead
the world to the emergence of a China-led financial architecture. A significant portion of
global trade and financial arrangements will largely be shaped by China onwards. Finally,
it is interesting that the AIIB has been able to attract a large number of regional and extra-
regional countries in the face of US reluctance. Many close and important partners of the
US have joined the AIIB because they prefer business first. The influence of the US is thus
diminishing in the Asia-Pacific region. The paper has also mapped out the way forward in
terms of its further development. It has mapped out several challenges the Bank is facing
to become a full-fledged MDB. First, there are apprehensions and suspicions regarding
China’s motivation for creating the Bank as well as its objectives. China needs to assure the
member countries as well as the potential members that it is leading and not dominating
the Bank, given the provisions of distribution of share and voting arrangements. Second,
the objective of the Bank should be in line with its scope of the investment considering
the regional context which is creating an ambiguity on the very identity of the Bank. Third,
maintaining high standards of social and environmental safeguards propagated by existing
MDBs would be another major challenge for China. Fourth, security of investment remains
a big challenge for the Bank considering the ongoing violent conflicts such as insurgency,
terrorism and violent extremism in the member countries’ political environment. Fifth,
maintaining high standards and regulations in the governance process of the Bank will
lead to its good credit rating and legitimacy which appears as another source of challenge
for the Bank. Sixth, selection and financing of projects independently on the part of the
Bank is another important area of expertise which is yet to be obtained. Finally, the AIIB’s
project financing should not only cover hard infrastructure but also soft infrastructure.
Addressing these challenges would help the Bank to become a viable MDB.
320
BALANCING GAME IN THE (INDO)ASIA-PACIFIC: FROM ‘THUCYDIDES

TRAP’ TO MULTIPLE DISCOURSES?
Abstract
The (re)emergence of China and the relative decline of the power of the United
States (US) as the unipolar super power has shifted the geostrategic centre of
gravity towards the Asia-Pacific region, also known in its extended form as Indo-
Pacific region. Multiple new and frozen flashpoints have emerged in this region
as China is increasingly seeking to tilt the power balance in its favour and the US
is growing doubtful and impatient regarding the Chinese intentions. To mitigate
the China threat, the US has already rebalanced its foreign policy under the
Obama administration from the Middle East to the Pacific and current President
Trump has extended the geographical reach of his new grand strategy of Free
and Open Indo-Pacific to bring the Indian Ocean into play. One of the most
predominant discourses that tries to explain this emerging great power relation
and power transition is the ‘Thucydides Trap’. This discourse maintains a binary
understanding that in a bipolar setting, the rise and decline of great powers make
war inevitable. However, this oversimplified assumption may lead to a limited
understanding of a region which has emerged with the support of the liberal
order and slowly replacing the West as the epicentre of economic progress.
This paper argues that there are ‘other discourses’ where middle and smaller
regional powers not necessarily stranded between great power rivalry, rather
they renegotiate the order in the (Indo)Asia-Pacific region to create multipolarity.
On the contrary, the interdependence of the US and China in a globalized world
compels the great powers to find ways to keep peace in the troubled waters of
the Indo-Pacific. To find out to what extent all these discourses are intertwined
and influence each other is another objective of this paper.
Keywords: (Re)emergence of China, Thucydides Trap, Great Power Rivalry, Pivot

to Asia, Indo-Pacific Strategy
1. Introduction
Following the end of the Cold War, the thesis of the ‘end of history’ received
significant currency among the policy makers and academics in projecting the future
trajectory of the global system. The prophecy regarding the triumph of Western liberal
order was apparently fulfilled as democracy and capitalism were hailed to be the only
A.S.M. Tarek Hassan Semul is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic
Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: tarek@biiss.org
321
future for a unipolar world order. However, only a couple of decades later, following
the relative decline of the United States’ (US) ‘unipolar moment’, the (re)emergence
of China, brought an uncomfortable competition over the power transition between
the two great powers which has been famously summed up as the ‘Thucydides Trap’.
In this power rivalry, while China is expanding its global clout, relatively diminishing
global influence of the US is visible. The misadventures of post-9/11 War on Terror and
subsequent invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq and military engagements in Libyan and
Syrian war can be attributed to American waning global war fighting capacity and
exhaustion. By 2010, Washington started to shift its foreign policy focus towards Asia
as the policymakers felt the need to counterbalance the growing Chinese presence in
the Asia-Pacific. In the fall of 2011, the Obama administration announced a strategic
pivot to the Asia-Pacific region.
The rebalancing policy entailed a gradual shift from the US military

campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan to a deeper strategic involvement in the Asia-
Pacific, which brought the disputed South China Sea into the ambit of the policy
as well.1Conversely, as promised during his election campaign, shortly after taking
office, President Donald Trump has relinquished multiple pillars (i.e., US withdrawal
from the Trans Pacific Partnership) of the Obama administration’s ‘rebalance’ approach
to Asia. Washington replaced ‘pivot to Asia’ with ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy,
a regional policy first coined by the Japanese policy makers. In consistency with the
Indo-Pacific strategy, Trump administration is trying to revitalize Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue or ‘Quad’ in order to counterweight China’s growing assertiveness and
military prowess in the Asia-Pacific. However, coupled with global financial recession
of 2008 and Washington’s relative isolationist foreign policy (preferring unilateralism
over multilateralism) approach under Trump administration, strenuous military
campaigns in the Middle East have left a question mark on Washington’s worn-out
capability as a unipolar superpower to lead the free world.
Therefore, (re)emergence of China has contributed to the predominant

‘bipolar’ type discourse regarding the distribution of power in the Asia-Pacific region
which is the US-China competition. The realist tradition of international politics
describes the global structure as a place for the continuous struggle for power. Within
this structure, a rising power or challenger to the existing status quo (whether a rising
power like China will challenge the status quo or maintain the status quo depends
on its own interests and the potential hazard the change in the balance might incur
on its adversary) such as China will seek to maximize its security by expanding its
clout over its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. China can expand this clout
or influence, once it has the general capacity to influence the behaviour of other
states or the ability to get other states to do what they otherwise would not do and
1
Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michael E. O’ Hanlon, “Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy: A
Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 3, 2012, p. 33.
322
BALANCING GAME IN THE (INDO)ASIA-PACIFIC
this capacity and ability has been defined by the realists as the ‘power’.2 As China
increasingly perceived as the challenger to the US led order, in particular within the
(Indo)Asia-Pacific region, the ‘Thucydides Trap’ discourse has not only set the US
and China on a collision course, it has brought the other regional powers and small
states in the realm of this balancing game. According to the realist tradition, such
a balancing game in this region will join alliances in order to either balance (ally in
opposition to the principal source of perceived danger) or bandwagon (ally with the
state that poses the major threat).3 However, the paper argues that this simplified
discourse of balancing game or ‘Thucydides Trap’ fails to take ‘other discourses’ and
actors, i.e., Japan, India, Australia, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
into cognizance. Hence, ignoring emerging factors of leverage in the region or
the geopolitical complexities of changing relationships will paint a limited and
superficial understanding of the region. Therefore, this paper argues that there are
multiple discourses in the Asia-Pacific region other than the US-China relationship.
This paper seeks to go beyond this pre-dominant bipolar discourse to find if there is
any correlation among these discourses and to what extent the other ‘discourses’ are
intertwined with the predominant discourse of ‘Thucydides Trap’ in the (Indo)Asia-
Pacific region.
The second section of the paper will try to look into the buildup of this
predominant ‘Thucydides Trap’ thesis in relation to China’s rise, while third section
will deal with the grand strategy taken by the US during the Obama and the current
Trump administration. Finally, the fourth section will focus on the ‘Thucydides Trap’
discourse in relation to other discourses in the (Indo) Asia-Pacific region.
2. (Re)emergence of China as a Great Power
The recent rise of China has invigorated much interest among the social
scientists and historians as they criticize the Eurocentric scholarship and question
the discourse of Europe’s ‘technological superiority’ over China’s so called ‘oriental
backwardness’ which forgets China’s technological global leadership between 1100
and 1800 AD. In contrast to this Eurocentric thesis, empirical evidences suggest that
European Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution in Europe were only possible
by borrowing and assimilating Chinese innovations.4 Hence, the recent Chinese
emergence has often been narrated as (re)emergence or (re)rise of a great power that
used to be at the apex of the global power structure for the most of the last millennium.5
2
Suisheng Zhao, “A New Model of Big Power Relations? China-US Strategic Rivalry and Balance of Power in
the Asia–Pacific”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 24, No. 93, 2014, p. 378.
3
Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power”, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1985, p. 4.
4
John Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004,
pp. 190-218.
5
Andre Gunder Frank, Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age, California: University of California Press,
1998.
323
Contrary to China’s historical ascent on the global power structure, current Chinese
global economic clout is not accompanied by any imperialist undertakings. Ironically,
it was Washington’s power projection capability that has underpinned the stability
and global norms to ensure free flow of energy supplies and other key commodities
for Chinese factories. Consequently, the US nurtured a liberal and benign politico-
economic world order in which Beijing could integrate itself and reap the best of an
intensely globalized world. Hence, much of the post-Cold War era (at least until 2012)
was marked by China’s strategy of ‘peaceful rise’.6 During this period, policymakers
in Beijing tried to forge an accelerated economic growth through intensified global
trade of manufacturing goods while maintaining a relatively passive posture in the
security arena. However, this ‘going under the radar’ strategy has gradually shifted
once Xi Jinping assumed the role of Chinese President since 2012 as he started to
describe China’s role more of a ‘Great Power’ (daguo) or a ‘Strong Power’ (qiangguo).7
Since the global financial recession of 2008-2009, the US has failed to control the
‘liberal slump’ that has brought Brexit, fuelled the populist movement across Europe
and put an inward-looking American President to the Oval office. This has provided
Beijing with strategic opportunities to fill the global leadership void as the US and
China in particular seem to be shifting in their roles on the global stage.
This shift has been well manifested under the leadership of Xi Jinping, where
Beijing has not shied away from presenting the Chinese development model as
an alternative to neo-liberal norms of path to development. The Chinese model is
based on its own impressive modernization project that entails colossal state-funded
infrastructure development ventures to kickoff industrial development. President
Xi rooted for the Chinese model at his first speech to the UN General Assembly in
September 2015, as he said, “It is important for us to use both the invisible hand and
visible hand to form a synergy between market forces and government function and
strive to achieve both efficiency and fairness.”8 The ‘China Model’ offers an alternative
path to modernity to the developing states which is sceptical regarding neo-liberal
policies and do not want to let go state control over the economy. Xi’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) provides international acceptance of Chinese state-market relationship
as it calls for Government-to-Government (G2G) loans to spur major infrastructure
projects and policy coordination between China and loan recipient states. However,
China is more interested in seeking global legitimacy for its norms of economic
governance rather than exporting it as the West did.9
6
T. V. Paul, “When Balance of Power Meets Globalization: China, India and the Small States of South Asia”,
Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2018, p. 3.
7
Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher, “Xi Jinping’s marathon speech: five takeaways”, New York Times, 18 October
2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-party-congress. html,
accessed on 02 December 2018.
8
“Chinese president advocates new type of int’l relations”, Xinhua, 28 September 2015, available at http://
news.- xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/29/c_134670372.htm, accessed on 18 June 2018.
9
“China Will not ‘export’ Chinese Model: Xi”, Xinhua, 01 December 2017, available at http://news.xinhuanet.-
com/english/2017-12/01/c_136793833.htm, accessed on 27 June 2018.
324
Conversely, China has been more assertive in overhauling old international

institutions and building new ones as it has established or been a party to establishing
at least twenty-two multilateral institutions. This signifies the existence of a norm
based alternative global politico-economic architecture that competes with the
Bretton Woods organizations.10 For example, initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) has already been instrumental in funding infrastructure
projects along with Western multilateral lenders. Other multilateral initiatives such as
the New Development Bank under BRICS, Contingency Reserve Agreement and the
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) manifest
Beijing’s emergence as the new source for global finance.
With the growing economic clout, China is showing all signs of a great power
as it has used a series of multilateral fora to portray its role as a responsible great
power. It has hosted the G20 summit in Hangzhou in September 2016, promoted the
BRICS grouping and played the central role as a broker for the 2015 Iran nuclear deal
and the 2016 Paris Agreement on climate change. This trend will likely to continue,
especially when the unilateralist foreign policy of Trump administration provides an
opportunity for Beijing to showcase its capacity for global leadership. President Xi’s
report to the 19th Party Congress, sets the tone for China to exert greater influence over
global governance in the coming years: “China will continue to play its part as a major
and responsible country, take an active part in reforming and developing the global
governance system, and keep contributing Chinese wisdom and strength to global
governance.”11 Although it was only since Xi’s era that Beijing’s growing assertiveness
in global governance and specifically in the Asia-Pacific region was visible; however,
since the time of the Obama administration, the US has adopted rebalancing strategy
on its Pacific flank to curtail Beijing’s growing regional influence. The following section
will discuss how the Asia-Pacific region has emerged as the ‘pivot’ and the inclusion
of the Indian Ocean within the realm of the US grand narrative and eventually
contributing in making ‘Thucydides Trap’ the predominant lens to explain the (Indo)
Asia-Pacific region.
3. From ‘Pivot to Asia’ to ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’: Balancing Game
Since the attack on the Pearl Harbor during the World War II, the US has been
deeply engaged on its Pacific flank as the Asia-Pacific region is home to its Pacific
alliance system including Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and the
Philippines. While the Cold War era has seen substantial support extended to its
Pacific allies to undermine any Soviet influence in the region, the post-Cold war era
10
Oliver Stuenkel, Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order, Malden, MA: Polity
Press, 2016, pp. 99-100.
11
“Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress”, Xinhua, 03 November 2017, available at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm, accessed on 27 June 2018.
325
has not been any different for Washington and its regional allies to protect their vital
interests in free and unhindered commercial and military access across the Pacific.
Hence, denying any strategic edge to any potential great power and sustaining liberal
norms in the region has been ever so important in the backdrop of (re)emergence of
China. In the post-Cold War era, although Clinton Administration officially regarded
China as a ‘strategic partner’, however, Beijing-Washington relations were not so
smooth since the mid-1990s due to the Taiwan Contingency Crisis in 1995 and other
contentious issues.12 On the contrary, by the early 2000s, the Bush administration
started to perceive Beijing as a ‘strategic competitor’.13
3.1 Pivot to Asia: Rebalancing Strategy
In 2009, when Obama administration assumed the Oval office, at home the
US was in the brink of a financial disaster due to the global recession and at abroad,
it was haemorrhaging trillion of dollars and lost six thousand of US soldiers due to
the Afghanistan and Iraq war.14 On the contrary, the resurgent China influenced the
Obama administration to change its grand strategy to promote the ‘rebalancing
towards Asia-Pacific’ strategy. The strategy entails global retrenchment and Asia-
Pacific engagement in order to relieve Washington’s burdens on a global scale, to
shift the deployment of its strategic resources from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific,
to repair its economy, to cope with rising China, to safeguard America’s continued
predominance in the region and to maintain its global leadership position as the sole
hegemon. Therefore, in the fall of 2011, the Obama administration overtly identified
the Asia-Pacific region as a geo-strategic priority for the US as highlighted by the then
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in October 2011:
“[A]s the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces
from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point …. In the next ten
years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest … so we put
ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and
advance our values.”15
At the initial stage, the policy was more dependent on military initiatives
in the region. However, in response when Beijing started to flex its naval muscle in
maritime territorial disputes with the US allies in the South China Sea, the Obama
administration readjusted to play down on military initiatives and strengthened the
economic and diplomatic elements to forge a closer relationship with China.
12
Thomas J. Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
13
Martin A. Smith, Power in the changing global order: The US, Russia and China, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.
14
Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010, p. 1.
15
Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific century”, Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011, available at http://foreignpolicy.
com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/, accessed on 16 December 2018.
326
Despite that, the most significant and concrete ‘rebalancing’ under this strategy
took place in the military sector as the US tried to readjust its military focus on the Asia
Pacific, as it reinvigorated its traditional alliance and looked for new military cooperation in
the region. In that regard, by 2012, the US decided to deploy 60 per cent of its naval assets
under the US Pacific Command in the next 10 years.16 Additionally, in 2010, Pentagon
published a report detailing a plan to invest US$ 12 billion to improve combating abilities
of the US troops in this region by comprehensive upgradation of Guam Military Base and
constructing several military bases centering Guam.17 Furthermore, under the rebalancing
strategy, new combating concept of Air-Sea Battle was proposed as counter measures
on China’s enhanced anti-access and area denial capabilities (A2/AD) in the region.18 The
US-South Korean security cooperation was strengthened since 2010 as they held several
large-scale military exercises on the Korean Peninsula. Following the third North Korean
nuclear test in 2013, this bi-lateral security cooperation got stronger to deter North
Korean nuclear threat on the Peninsula. On the other hand, since the US treats US-Japan
alliance as the ‘indispensable pillar for the regional and world security’, it deployed Osprey
aircraft to Okinawa and brought the Diaoyu Island under the US–Japan Security Treaty
umbrella. Following the 2013 nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Washington deployed the new X-band radar in Japan. In the Tasmanian sea, Washington
stationed 200-250 US Marines in Port Darwin to reinforce the ‘second island chain’ and
to consolidate joint defence treaty between the US and Australia. During the same time
the US air surveillance got increased over the Philippines and troops got stationed on the
land, while littoral combat ships were anchored in Singapore.19 Along with that, the US
went beyond its traditional regional partners to forge newer security alliance as it signed
its first formal military agreement with Vietnam in 2011.20 India became a key security ally
during Obama’s presidency as it held more annual military exercises with the US than any
other country and both the nations signed the military logistics agreement.21 Therefore,
the US strengthened its military presence to rebalance the Asia-Pacific.
On the diplomatic front, Washington tried to rebalance through non-military

manoeuvers as it got engaged with the plethora of existing multilateral and regional
16
US Department of Defense (US DoD), “Shangri-La Security Dialogue: A Regional Security Architecture
Where Everyone Rises”, available at http://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1681,
accessed on 02 January 2019.
17
Dario Agnote, “Makeover to turn Guam into key U.S. fortress”, The Japan Times, 12 January 2010, available
at http://www..japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/01/12/national/makeover-to-turn-guaminto-key-u-s-fortress/,
accessed on 06 January 2018.
18
Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald O’Rourke and
Bruce Vaughn, “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” toward Asia”, Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012, p. 17.
19
Ibid.
20
Ernest Z. Bower, “The fifth U.S.-Vietnam political, security, and defense dialogue”, available at https://www.
csis.org/analysis/fifth-us-vietnam-political-security-anddefense-dialogue, accessed on 03 January 2018.
21
Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), “U.S.-India security and defense cooperation”, available
at https://www.csis.org/programs/wadhwani-chair-us-indiapolicy-studies/past-india-chair-projects/us-india
security-and, accessed on 10 January 2018.
327
mechanisms in the Asia Pacific region. Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
with ASEAN is one such example, which paved the way for the US to get involved
with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). In addition,
Washington increased its regional engagement by taking interest on regional issues,
such as nuclear non-proliferation and disaster preparedness. The rationale behind
these regional engagements was to keep an eye on China from the inside of the region
and increase its legitimacy to intervene on regional security matters to safeguard
its interest as the ‘Pacific Power’.22 Over the months, Washington’s policy of ‘non-
intervention’ on the maritime territorial dispute in the South China Sea region has
changed. Upto 2011, the official US position was not to take sides on the sovereignty
disputes as it was affirmed by the then US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the
2010 Shangri-La Dialogue and at the 2011 EAS by the US President Barack Obama.23
However, that stance of ‘neutrality’ started to change as South China Sea (SCS) regional
territorial disputes became the new pivot for the US to rebalance towards the region
and Washington sided with Vietnam and Philippines by military means such as naval
exercises and defence arrangements and challenged China’s ‘nine-dash line’ in the
SCS.24 Therefore, Washington’s approach took more consolidated shape as it started
to extend diplomatic assistance to its allies vis-à-vis China in the SCS region.
China, being the economic driving force and at the centre of economic
integration in the Asia-Pacific region, economy was the cause and mean for the US
to rebalance towards the region. Apart from that, the region has a significant share
of global GDP and has the potential to become the global economic hub in very near
future. Therefore, to boost US economic engagement, the Obama administration tried
to put forward a new regional economic cooperation mechanism in the form of Trans
Pacific Partnership (TPP). The US-centric and ‘anyone but China’ spirit of this initiative
envisage dictating the economic cooperation scenario in Asia- Pacific as Washington’s
economic interests in the region has significant diplomatic and military implications.
Deeper economic engagement in the region provides the US with more justifiable
reasons for its claim for freedom of navigation and for engaging in regional territorial
disputes over the SCS region.25
The rebalancing strategy provided the US with certain strategic leverages (at least
during the early phases) in the field of military, diplomacy and economy as Washington
established credibility in the region regarding its commitment in protecting liberal
order and putting strategic pressure on China. The US intervention in the region had a
22
Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 17,
No.1, 2004, pp. 49-54.
23
Ralf Emmers, “US rebalancing strategy and the South China Sea disputes”, 04 September 2012, available
at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/1827-usrebalancing-strategy-and-th/#.WOo_gIWcHic,
accessed on 04 November 2018.
24
Robert S. Ross, “The Revival of Geopolitics in East Asia: Why and How?”, Global Asia, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2014, p. 14.
25
Mark E. Manyin, op. cit., p. 21.
328
direct impact through instigating claimant countries such as Japan, Philippines on their
territorial disputes with China. Security commitments to its allies in the East Asia gave the
US the perfect justification to interfere in the regional security system of the Asia-Pacific.26
Diplomatically, the US successfully intervened the regional multilateral mechanisms and
swung the focus back on security and geopolitical issues from economic integration
and cooperation. Furthermore, the strategy worked in favour of the US as the regional
powers such as Japan and India got engaged in strategic confrontations with China. As
a result, disputes over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan got escalated and
India got concerned regarding India’s oil interest in the SCS as well as the Chinese naval
modernization project.27 Moreover, the US has exploited the maritime disputes in the East
China Sea (ECS) and the SCS to turn many of the claimant Chinese neighbours against
China. Hence, the US allies such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan are now willing
to take part in the strategic manoeuvres against Chinese preponderance in the region
and that has complicated and polarized China’s ascendance as a great power. However,
the rebalancing strategy came at a few costs as well. To match its commitment, the US
had to redraw its military deployment in Asia-Pacific which could put a considerable
amount of pressure on its already underperforming economy due to ‘massive debts’
and ‘improper industrial structure’ during that time. In retrospect, although at the initial
phase, the rebalancing strategy paid off strategic benefits to the US, however, at the later
stage of implementation process, the strategic costs outweighed the initial benefits. The
centre of gravity of international politics has already been tilted towards the East and with
rebalancing so has the focus of the US grand strategy. Hence, after the triumph in the US
election, Trump administration did not change the geographical focus of its new grand
strategy rather adjusted to bring the Indian Ocean and its actors in the play.
3.2 Indo-Pacific Strategy
Since the implementation phase of the rebalancing strategy, US policymakers

realized the limitation of using the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ to complement its grand strategy in
Asia. Ever since the US withdrawal from the TPP (one of the cornerstone of Obama’s Pivot to
Asia) by the Trump administration, it was imperative for the policymakers in Washington to
come up with a clear strategy to assure its Asia-Pacific allies that the US is not retrenching
from its security commitments in the region. Additionally, the Indian Ocean has gained
substantial significance as a geopolitical and geo-economic nerve centre and replaced the
Atlantic Ocean to become the world’s busiest and strategically most important maritime
sea-lane. In this backdrop, China is expanding its politico-strategic purview from the
western Pacific to the Indian Ocean, for example, setting up a military base in Djibouti and
intensified ties with countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives proves stronger Chinese
26
Robert S. Ross, op. cit., pp. 11-13.
27
Ross Colvin, “Indian navy prepared to deploy to South China Sea”, Reuters, 03 December 2012, available at
http://in.reuters.com/article/south-china-sea-india-navy-oil-ongcidINDEE8B209U20121203, accessed on 31
December 2018.
329
presence and intent in the Indian Ocean region. Furthermore, India became an important
cog in American security architecture in this region. Hence, this led to the expansion of
the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ to initially ‘Indo-Asia Pacific’ to merge both the entire Pacific and the
Indian Ocean. Later, the term was changed to only ‘Indo-Pacific’ (Figure 1) to prioritize the
US security considerations vis-à-vis China.28 The US National Security Strategy, published
in December 2017, defined the Indo-Pacific territory as stretching from “the west coast
of India to the western shores of the United States”. Moreover, the strategy describes the
nature of the Indo-Pacific where “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive
visions of world order is taking place” and where “China is using economic inducements
and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states
to heed its political and security agenda.”29 In this backdrop, plethora of official statements
and addresses started to come up in clarification of the strategy.
Figure 1: Expansion of the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific Region
Source: Angelo Wijaya, “Reconfiguring Foreign Policy Focus: time for an Indo-Pacific region?”, available at
https://medium.com/@angelowijaya/refocusing-strategy-time-for-an-indo-pacific-region-deae9b1ba6d1,
28
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Challenge in the Spotlight at 2018 Shangri-La
Dialogue”, The Diplomat, 05 June 2018, available at https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/trumps-indo-pacific-
strategy-challenge-in-the-spotlight-at-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/, accessed on 28 June 2018.
29
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Confronting the Economic Challenge”, The Diplomat, 31
July 2018, available at https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/trumps-indo-pacific-strategy-confronting-the-economic-
challenge/, accessed on 01 August 2018.
330
In 2017, during his inaugural Asia tour, President Trump introduced the new US
strategy of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) or Indo-Pacific in the APEC’s conference in
Vietnam. Later on during 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, address by the US Defence Secretary
James Mattis provided more clarity as the strategy envisage a ‘free’ and ‘open’ region
based on US-led rule-based international order and deter any threat from any regional
power shifts, revisionist powers and rogue regimes. The strategy also entails freedom for
sovereign nations and in their shared interests to pursue openness of various domains,
including sea and air, trade, investment and infrastructure.30 On 30 July 2018, the US
Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo revealed the economic component of strategy
in his address at the US Chamber of Commerce. In his address, Pompeo pledged an
initial fund of US$ 113 million and identified cyber security, energy and infrastructure
as the priority sectors for the US economic engagement in the region and emphasized
on engaging ASEAN-led multilateral institutions. However, the immediate challenge for
the Trump administration is to separate FOIP and explain how this strategy will work in
relation to other competing actors and projects such as China and BRI.31
In this backdrop, there has been a deliberate effort to reinvigorate the Quad-Plus
Dialogue from the ashes of the first official Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue (QSD) which
took place in May 2007. Although, it was established in the post-tsunami scenario to
increase humanitarian cooperation, following its first Malabar naval exercise in September
2007, Japan and Australia two of the Quad members drifted apart due to their domestic
political changes. However, with Trump administration at helm, Quad has found some
common grounds as the Quad members refused to endorse China’s BRI and continuously
getting weary of Chinese intentions in the region. On November 2017, based on the US
and Japanese vision for FOIP, the four member states reformed their QSD. From 2007-
2017, the QSD states carried on security cooperation, military exercises and intelligence
sharing arrangements at the bilateral level. For example, in 2007 while India did not own
any American military hardware to speak off, a decade later, now it owns from advanced
US artillery to missiles and planning to purchase armed-drones and fighter jets.32 On the
other hand, China threat has enabled Japan to reinterpret its constitution to seek the path
of stronger defence cooperation with the US and other regional allies. Hence, a decade
later of its inception, the Quad member states now have more in common regarding their
ideas and vision on the region and have a common power to counterbalance.
4. From ‘Thucydides Trap’ to Multiple Discourses
A bipolar US‐Chinese discourse like ‘Thucydides Trap’ may not only lead to
an oversimplification of a complex regional dynamics, but it also has two possible
30
Prashanth Parameswaran, op. cit.
31
Ibid.
32
Jeff M. Smith, “The Return of the Asia-Pacific Quad”, The Heritage Foundation, available at https://www.
heritage.org/ global-politics/commentary/the-return-the-asia-pacific-quad, accessed on 09 July 2018.
331
dangerous ramification for the security of the region. Explaining the region’s primary
security dynamic as a bipolar standoff may lead the policymakers in Washington and
Beijing to think they are part of a zero-sum game scenario where only defeat can avert
a conflict for them otherwise war is inevitable. This seeing ‘ghost’, where there might
be none might led to a false strategy and prompt a ‘containment’ approach on the part
of the United States and its allies resonating of the adversarial dynamic of the Cold
War.33 As a result, other regional states may find themselves choosing one between
the two competing great powers and thereby undermining their own interests and
security and reinforcing the narrative the new ‘Cold War’. This sort of misperception
and miscalculation has a dangerous implication that may lead to a self-fulfilling
prophecy of US-China war. Hence, it is imperative to understand the changing power
distribution in the Asia-Pacific region, which is marked by growing geopolitical and
economic complexity. Due to this complexity, often the enormous changes that the
regional environment is going through, may lead to severe debate regarding what
constitutes order and stability within the (Indo) Asia-Pacific region. Part of this discourse
is the reflection of the changes in the internal dynamics and external aspirations of
individual nations; part of it is the role of the evolving character of regional institutions
and another part manifests the influence of non-state actors and global forces such
as globalization. While both the competing great powers, the US and China are in the
state of flux, this analysis is true for a number of other emerging or re-emerging powers
such as India, Indonesia, Australia and Japan as well. Hence, it is imperative to take all
the possible discourses into cognizance to understand the geopolitical complexities
that this region poses. However, the following sub-sections of the paper will first try to
analyze the predominant discourse of ‘Thucydides Trap’ and then move on to look into
other discourses to find any potential interplay among them.
4.1 ‘Thucydides Trap’ in the Asia-Pacific
Harvard Professor Graham Allison coined the term ‘Thucydides Trap’ for the first
time in 2012 and later on the comparison with the 2,500 year old concept was endorsed
by Joseph S. Nye as they compared the challenge that two great powers (China and the
US) are faced with the ‘Thucydides Trap’.34 In his explanation for the war between Athens
and Sparta, Thucydides wrote, “what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian
power and the fear which this caused in Sparta”. Although both the Athenians and
Spartans had disputes against one another, in those disputes Thucydides did not find
any reason for war. Rather, Thucydides noted that Athenians’ rise and the fear among
the Spartans regarding Athenians’ rise has triggered the war. This dystopian analogy
arose from the growth of Chinese capability and the fear that China will challenge
33
Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York:
W. W. Norton & Co., 2011, p. 95.
34
Graham Allison, “Thucydides’ Trap has been sprung in the Pacific,” Financial Times, 21 August 2012; Graham
T. Allison Jr., “Obama and Xi Must Think Broadly to Avoid a Classic Trap,” The New York Times, 06 June 2013.
332
the status quo and alter it against the US and that might lead to war.35 However, the
Chinese President Xi Jinping firmly overruled this fearful apprehension as he claimed,
“there is no such thing as the so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’ in the world. But should major
countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might
create such traps for themselves.”36 However, Graham Allison differs with the claim from
the Chinese president as he based his speculation on the ‘offensive realist’ tradition and
warned that “the preeminent geostrategic challenge of this era is not violent Islamic
extremists or a resurgent Russia. It is the impact that China’s ascendance will have on
the US-led international order, which has provided unprecedented great-power peace
and prosperity for the past 70 years”.37 On the other hand, Allison and other analysts
received significant currency for their ‘Thucydides Trap’ thesis as the National Security
Strategy of the US, published under Trump administration in December 2017, explicitly
labeled China and Russia as ‘strategic competitors’ and ‘revisionist powers’.38 It also
goes on to accuse China bluntly, “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-
Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the
region in its favor.”39 These claims find its justification in the growing Chinese power
and dissatisfaction in the (Indo)Asia-Pacific region. By building up a larger share of
global power, China has become more assertive to make the world order more ‘just and
reasonable’ in accordance with Chinese interests. For example, the US always maintained
that China should follow international norms that are based on the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the South China Sea region. However,
Beijing discarded this calling based on the US’s double standard in the compliance with
the international rules as the US Congress itself did not ratify the UNCLOS. Hence, there
has been a sense of discontent among the Chinese policymakers with the ‘inequality’
of the order heavily in favour of the US’s interests at the expenses of Chinese interests.
Therefore, to make this ‘order’ right and ‘just’ for China, many believes that Xi Jinping has
discarded the earlier Chinese approach of ‘grand strategic patience’ that it has developed
under Deng Xiaoping and has vowed to provide Chinese solutions, Chinese wisdom
and Chinese voices to reform the global governance.40 Furthermore, other smaller states
in the region may be provoking China into aggressive behaviour since they want the
US to remain engaged as the Pacific power.41 There is motivation for the Chinese as
35
A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in
World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of The Great
Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random House, 1988; John J.
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, 2001.
36
“Xi offers ways to build new model of major-country relationship with US”, Xinhua, 23 September 2015.
37
Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China headed for war?”, The Atlantic, 24 September
2015.
38
White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.: White House,
2017.
39
Ibid., p. 25.
40
J. Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014.
41
Robbie Gramer and Keith Johnson, “China Taps Lode of ‘Fire Ice’ in South China Sea”, Foreign Policy, 19 May 2017,
available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/19/china-taps-lodeof-fire-ice-in-south-china-sea/, accessed on
333
well to expand to fuel its continued rise and it feels the need to guaranteed access to
certain resources essential for its continued growth. The most recent warming up of the
frozen flashpoint like the Taiwan Strait is one such example. In his 2019 New Year’s Day
Address, Taiwanese President Tsai talked about four imperatives for Beijing as it must
recognize the island’s existence, respect Taiwan’s freedom and democracy, deal with it
peacefully and on equal terms and only communicate through government-authorized
channels. This has turned into a duel as President Xi responded at the 40th anniversary
of China’s ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan’ by referring to the 1992 Consensus,
which allows ‘different interpretations’ of ‘One China’ and stressed on ‘one country,
two systems’ as cross-strait political framework. For him, this will allow one China to
have different governments across the Taiwan Strait. However, this interpretation was
discarded by Taiwan as President Tsai in her response said, “we have never accepted the
1992 Consensus” and Taiwan “absolutely will not accept ‘one country, two systems’.”42
Therefore, adding to the tally of the flashpoints in US-China relations, Taiwan Strait will
put strain on the already strenuous relationship in the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand,
on 04 January 2019 in a meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC), President Xi
underlined “the importance of preparing for war and combat” and ordered the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared for war.43 He reminded the PLA regarding the
unprecedented “period of major changes”, and China’s “important period of strategic
opportunity for development.”44 How this message to the PLA will be interpreted by the
policymakers in Washington has to be seen in coming days, however, this may fuel the
‘Thucydides Trap’ thesis and may bring further uncertainties to the (Indo)Asia-Pacific
region.
4.2 Other Discourses
When a discourse such as ‘Thucydides Trap’ get conceived in order to predict

relations between a declining great power and emerging great power which might
lead to ‘order’ changing conflict, often historical evidences get picked up without
considering the context. Hence, such comparison may lead to incomplete or wrong
interpretation of the puzzle. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has
been able to establish a liberal democratic order, where invisible hands not only
determined the rules of the market rather integrated the economies of the world
regardless of their ideological inclination. This unprecedented integration of markets,
manufacturing, finance, labour, culture, ideas, values, norms were possible due to
a force called globalization. Realists claim that a functional nuclear deterrence has
compelled both the US and the Soviet Union from going into an all out war. Along
with nuclear deterrence, the inter-connectedness and interdependence of the
10 December 2018.
42
Derek Grossman, No Smiles Across the Taiwan Strait, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/
no-smiles-across-the-taiwan-strait/, accessed on 10 December 2018.
43
“Xi orders PLA to step up war-preparation efforts”, Global Times, 04 January 2019.
44
Ibid.
334
Chinese and the US economy play a major role in shaping the relationship trajectory
of these two great powers. It is imperative to understand China’s interest for stability in
order to sustain its continued economic growth, which was possible due to a regional
stability created by the US led order. Hence, by the realist logic, as long as the cost of
cooperation does not surpass the cost of conflict, will motivate both the countries
to avoid any ‘inevitable conflict’. On the other hand, while Washington or Beijing still
may have been able to adopt more aggressive balancing strategies toward each-
other, but forces of globalization increased the short-term incentives for continued
cooperation. Hence, making it harder for the policymakers to contemplate paying the
short-term costs of disrupting that relationship. The most recent evidence of such a
case is the backing off by both the countries from a disastrous trade war which might
have resulted in another global recession.
China’s incentive for a stable global order is often get overlooked. After the rise
of populist Trump as the US President, speculation has been made that an isolationist
US will not only remove itself from its commitment to liberal economic order, it will
disrupt the globalization process. The US withdrawal from Paris accord and TPP are
strong evidences to back this thesis. In this backdrop, the address made by the Chinese
President Xi at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017, explains China’s
motivation for taking this liberal order forward. In his speech, Xi called for world leaders
to “keep to the goal of building a community of shared future for mankind”45 and argued
that “while developing itself, China also shares more of its development outcomes
with other countries and people”.46 He argued that “rapid growth in China has been a
sustained, powerful engine for global economic stability and expansion … And China’s
continuous progress in reform and opening-up has lent much momentum to an open
world economy.”47 In short, Xi Jinping pledged to be a defender, promoter and leader of
global capitalism and free trade.
The ‘Thucydides Trap’ thesis often conceives the (Indo) Asia-Pacific as a region
increasingly dominated by adversarial power relations between the United States and
China, potentially leading to military conflict. By doing that, the discourse undermines
the predicaments of many smaller states and middle powers, who are stranded
between the two ‘poles’.48 Although most of the regional states perceive the US as the
security guarantor and China as the leader of economic growth and depends on both
of them, these smaller states have agency and the capability to make choices. This
bipolar discourse also fails to see the power distribution of the region through the Asian
lens. The declining US and the rise of China does not automatically mean that power
has diffused to another great power. From a larger context, the emerging economies
45
James Pennington, “One year on from Xi Jinping’s 2017 Davos speech”, The Telegraph, 02 February 2018.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Brian Bridges, “From ASPAC to EAS: South Korea and Southeast Asia”, Asian Affairs: An American Review,
Vol. 41, No. 2, 2014, p. 34.
335
of Southeast Asia signals the rise of Asia and relative decline of the West. Hence, the
US-China relationship needs careful scrutiny from the Asian century perspective as well
where there has been a relative shift in power from developed economies to emerging
economies.49 In support of this argument, Global Trends 2030 report can be placed
which predicts that by 2030, Asia is likely to have surpassed North America and Europe
in global power and that the health of the global economy will depend mainly on China,
India, Brazil and other emerging markets.50
The renegotiation of order in the (Indo)Asia-Pacific region often gets obscured.51

There has been a rise to a plethora of regional institutions and multiple emerging
power constellations in this region. In a bipolar setting, the realist understanding of
power balance often narrowly and mistakenly undermines them either as balancers
or bandwagoners. For example, Chinese and the US diplomacy with India can be
interpreted from a different perspective where both the great powers are trying to
negotiate regional order, rather than as a zero-sum struggle for primacy. This has brought
the argument to see the region from the perspective of an emerging multipolarity. While
the centre of the bipolar narrative has been on the US and China, this narrative often
misses the emergence of large power, such as India, the ‘middle powers’ such as Australia,
Indonesia or South Korea and smaller powers with significant clout in economy and
often politico-strategic affairs, such as Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Therefore, the
concept of multipolarity is perhaps the discourse that most accurately depict this trend.
On the other hand, multilateral forum such as ASEAN provides smaller nations with a
collective voice as a power in the evolution of Asian regionalism since the 1990s. In stark
contrast to the idea of a bipolar, zero-sum game, the US and China, often act collectively
with other regional players in tackling regional issues such as environment, combating
piracy, terrorism and disaster management. Obama administration’s ‘rebalancing’ of the
US foreign policy towards Asia is an appreciation of the fact that multiple numbers of
large and small actors play within the power dynamics of the region. During this period,
the US interaction and relations with traditional allies and partners such as Australia and
Singapore has deepened. At the same time, Washington has extended its diplomatic
engagement with new or historically important actors such as the Philippines and
Vietnam. Thus, thinking in terms of multiple power centres’ multiple perceptions on the
trajectory of US-China relationship is a useful lens to decipher the unpredictability and
dynamic nature of the power structure in this region.
From China’s perspective, Chinese President Xi Jinping has proposed a New

Type of Major Power Relations based on a peaceful, positive-sum game of mutual
benefit and respect rather than the zero-sum game of traditional great power rivalry
and war. Through this concept, Beijing is seeking the very status of great power that
49
Michael Pilsbury, The Hundred Year Marathon, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2015.
50
US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, Washington, D.C.: US National
Intelligence Council, 2012.
51
Evelyn Goh, op. cit.
336
will reshape the hierarchical US-China relationship reflective of the current relationship.
However, the US is not yet inclined to give the parity to Beijing.52 Despite that, both the
US and China acknowledge the cost of non-cooperation to avoid a great power standoff
in the (Indo) Asia-Pacific region and thus how to peacefully manage the great power
relations has been one of the key focus of their strategic narrative.
5. Conclusion
The new strategic narrative to regulate the relations and free the great powers
from the ‘Thucydides Trap’ will require the US and China to agree on the implicit and
explicit norms. This will establish rules of the potential geopolitical engagement that
can lead to mutual restraint and help to decelerate the strategic competition. However,
the discourse like ‘Thucydides Trap’ paint a disappointing and dystopian outlook for
the (Indo)Asia-Pacific region. It also increases the danger of self-fulfilling prophecy
for both the US and China as the analysts, policymakers may put these nations on a
collision course. The (re)emergence of China does not merely represent a challenger
to the existing order; the complexities of the globalization process compel China to
sustain the order in certain spaces where the US is an unwilling leader. However, as the
US becomes increasingly worried about Chinese intentions, it will be difficult for the
policymakers in Washington to ignore the inclination to prevent China now while they
still can. However, the cost of such a venture outweighs the benefits as it also faces
multiple immediate challenges ranging from Russia to the greater Middle East. Hence,
the paper tried to argue that the predominant discourse of bipolarity or ‘Thucydides
Trap’ between the US and China is not the complete reflection of the power dynamics
in (Indo)Asia-Pacific region. Developing a more accurate and complete understanding
of this region requires careful investigation of other discourses which influence and
interplay with this predominant construction. Therefore, alike to the multipolarity of
discourses, the multipolarity of power and forces such as globalization paints a far
more complex and complete understanding in comparison to the contribution of a
bipolar narrative.
52
François Godement, “Expanded Ambitions, Shrinking Achievements: How China Sees the Global Order”, Policy
Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, 09 March 2017, available at: http:// www. ecfr.eu/publications/
summary/expanded_ambitions_shrinking_achievements how_china_sees_the_global_order, accessed on 11
January 2018.
337
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ISSN 1010-9536

ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK (AIIB)

243 From Passive Aid to Pragmatism: Humanitarian

263 Environmentally-Displaced Migrants in Bangladesh:

287 Materializing the BBIN Initiative: Transport

303 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): Evolution,

321 Balancing Game in the (Indo)Asia-Pacific: From

Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS)

Fax: (880-2) 48312625, e-mail: po@biiss.org, website: www.biiss.org

A.S.M. Tarek Hassan Semul

FROM PASSIVE AID TO PRAGMATISM: HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY IN

The ideas espoused in ‘diplomacy’ inherently contradict what ‘humanitarianism’

Keywords: Humanitarianism, Diplomacy, Rohingya Crisis, Humanitarian

It is fashionable these days to use the word ‘diplomacy’ in association with

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2018.

Humanitarianism was, therefore, championed mostly by individuals and

The domain of humanitarianism of this kind has been mostly dominated

influence. Humanitarian intervention sans UN authorization also leaves scope that

Admittedly, the subsequent discussion gives a disproportionately greater

2. Towards a Conceptual Clarity

No matter how soothing humanitarian diplomacy sounds, as a concept, it

Humanitarian diplomacy has remained a practitioner-dominated world. Its

Humanitarian diplomacy is more than humanitarianism. There has to be

This discussion also relates to diverging worldviews and theoretical

Hence, neo-liberal institutionalists are convinced that states are internationally

Here, a distinction has to be made between political and humanitarian

political diplomacy is an extended process, humanitarian diplomacy addresses the

But when do state-sponsored peace making and mediation become

Based on this discussion, it can be argued that humanitarian diplomacy is

Conceptual and theoretical differences apart, the praxis of humanitarian

Some have claimed, it is a matter of ‘common sense’ that humanitarian actors

Regardless, as for practice, humanitarian diplomacy is not the same as state

The second character relates to one of the cardinal features of diplomacy—

Major activities that traditional diplomats and their humanitarian counterparts

Because of this tension between national interests versus humanitarianism,

Though the state-sponsored humanitarian diplomatic efforts undergo

The recent inclusion of humanitarian diplomacy in the strategic foreign policy

term a recognizable ground.26 To what extent their humanitarian diplomatic efforts

4. Humanitarian Diplomacy in the Rohingya Crisis

Beyond realists’ skepticism over states’ ‘motives’ of humanitarianism amid

Humanitarian diplomacy on the Rohingya issue was essentially multi-

A non-binding repatriation agreement was signed bilaterally between

Bangladesh undertook drastic diplomatic efforts to stop the atrocities in

JWG Meetings between the Foreign Secretaries of Bangladesh and Myanmar

‘Comparative Advantage’ in Humanitarian Diplomacy

Alongside Bangladesh government, some intra-governmental and non-

‘Necessary Evil’ of Over-politicization

In a captivating book, Piers Robinson of the University of Liverpool has argued

situations portraying the vulnerabilities of unarmed civilians affect public opinion

The vocation of humanitarian diplomacy has often been championed by

International organizations also invited celebrities to create awareness and

Internationalizing versus Localizing Humanitarianism

A dilemma was whether to pursue bilateral or multilateral diplomacy in

So far as international humanitarian actions are concerned, it has been

their significant investments in Rakhine State. India is involved in the India-Myanmar-

Compromise is unthinkable in humanitarian crisis because doing so often

Whether it is diplomacy for purely a humanitarian purpose or diplomacy

It would be worthwhile to revisit the theoretical debates discussed in the

Bangladesh’s involvement was more of ‘accidental humanitarianism’—reluctance

ENVIRONMENTALLY-DISPLACED MIGRANTS IN BANGLADESH: HUMAN

This article has brought a critical perspective to the gendered nature of

Keywords: Environmentally-Displaced, Security, Migration, Protection, Gender

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2018.