Imagining and Linking Latin America: Chinese Regional

Mobilities and Social Networks in Chile

Carol Chan

Journal of Latin American Geography, Volume 17, Number 2, July 2018, pp.
23-45 (Article)

Published by University of Texas Press

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 Imagining and Linking Latin America:
Chinese Regional Mobilities and
Social Networks in Chile
Carol Chan
Programa Interdisciplinario de Estudios Migratorios (PRIEM),
Universidad Alberto Hurtado
Centro de Estudios Políticos, Culturales y Sociales de América Latina (EPOCAL),
Universidad Bernardo O’Higgins.
zchan@uahurtado.cl

Abstract ground-up perspective to the shifting power

Studies of relations between China and Latin
America have largely focused on economic
and political relations between the Chinese
state and specific countries in the region, or
examined the experiences of Chinese mi-
grants in Latin American countries. This is
also true in studies of China-Chile relations.
Drawing on ongoing ethnographic fieldwork
and interviews with ethnic Chinese per-
sons in Santiago, Chile, this article examines
how “China” and “Latin America” are mu-
tually constituted and negotiated through
ethnic Chinese intra-regional geographical
mobilities and social networks. These mobil-
ities and networks illustrate that “China-Lat-
in America relations” are not disembodied
macro-processes. Instead, they constitute
and dramatically shape the lives and oppor-
tunities of ethnic Chinese persons in the
Americas. I attend to the concrete ways these
persons exchange and create information,
and negotiate complex regional identities
and networks, in response to historical and
contemporary geopolitical uncertainties. In
doing so, this article provides an important
dynamics between China and Latin America.
Key words: intra-regional mobility,
geopolitics, identity, social networks, Chinese
diaspora, China-Latin America
Resumen
Los estudios sobre las relaciones entre
China y América Latina se han centrado
principalmente en las relaciones económi-
cas y políticas entre el estado chino y países
específicos de la región. También se han
examinado las experiencias de los migran-
tes chinos y chino-descendientes en Lati-
noamérica. Este patrón también se eviden-
cia en los estudios de las relaciones entre
China y Chile. Basándose en una investiga-
ción etnográfica y entrevistas con personas
de origen chino en Santiago de Chile, este
artículo examina cómo “China” y “Améri-
ca Latina” se construyen mutuamente y se
negocian a través de las movilidades geo-
gráficas intrarregionales y las redes sociales
de las personas de la etnia china. Estas mo-

23
 Journal of Latin American Geography

vilidades y redes ilustran que las “relaciones Introduction

entre China y América Latina” no son ma- One evening at a Chinese restaurant in down-
croprocesos incorpóreos. En cambio, ellas town Santiago, Chile, I attempted to speak
constituyen y configuran dramáticamente in Mandarin to the owner, a middle-aged
las vidas y oportunidades de las personas de woman. However, she summoned a wait-
la etnia china en las Américas. Este artículo er and asked him in Spanish to show me
se enfoca en las formas concretas en que where the bathroom was. Switching to Span-
estas personas intercambian y crean infor- ish, I apologized for my presumptuousness.
mación entre ellos, y negocian identidades Explaining that she only spoke Cantonese
y redes regionales complejas, en respuesta and Spanish, she revealed that she arrived in
a las incertidumbres geopolíticas históricas Chile three years ago. Responding to my curi-
y contemporáneas. Al hacerlo, este artículo osity about her native Spanish and incompre-
proporciona una importante perspectiva hension of Mandarin, she said, “I come from
desde la base de la cambiante dinámica de somewhere else.” By “somewhere else” (otro
poder entre China y América Latina. lado), she was simultaneously responding to
and rejecting the common assumption that
Palabras claves: movilidad intra-regional, she was “from China.”
geopolitica, identidad, redes sociales, diáspora Flora was born in Venezuela to Canton-
china, China-América Latina ese-Chinese parents in the 1960s.1 With
her Hong Kong-born, Venezuela-raised hus-
中国与拉美关系的研究主要集中于中 band, she moved to Chile in 2013, the year
国国家与拉丁美洲特定国家之间的经济 that then-president Hugo Chavez died and
和政治关系，或探究中国移民在拉丁美洲 Nicolas Maduro came to power. Prior to
国家的经历。中国与智利关系的研究也是 their move, Flora recalled that life there had
如此。本文通过对智利圣地亚哥地区民族 already been increasingly tough, partially due
志的实地调查和对当地华裔的访谈，探讨 to the impact of inflation and food shortages
了中国和拉丁美洲是如何通过区域内华裔 on their supermarket business. “There was
的地域流动和社会网络，来建立联系并进 nothing to eat or sell,” she said. Through
行协商。这些地域流动和社会网络表明，中 her husband’s ethnic Chinese acquaintances
拉关系不是脱离现实的宏观进程。相反地， in Chile, the couple found and rented this
它们构成并极大地影响了美洲华裔的生活 Chinese restaurant from its previous owner.
和机遇。为应对历史和当地地缘政治的不 Three of her adult children accompanied
确定性，我将着重关注人们交流和创造信 them to Chile. A married daughter stayed
息的具体方式，并就复杂的区域特征和网 behind in Venezuela with her own family,
络进行协商。通过这样做，本文为中拉之 while another moved with her husband to
间权力的动态变化提供了一个重要的视角。 the United States of America, where he had
relatives. Flora worried about her daughter’s
decision to go to the USA, saying, “They are
trying to stay there legally, but it is hard with

24
 Imagining and Linking Latin America
increasing visa restrictions. Let’s see what
happens.” Flora had not been back to Ven-
ezuela since she left. She hoped to bring her
siblings to Chile if profits from their modest
restaurant could afford the journeys and visas.
Ideally, she would eventually return to live
in Venezuela, where, compared to Chile, the
weather and the people were warm and the
air was clean. For now, the future for each of
her close kin — whether in Venezuela or the
USA — was uncertain.
In Latin America and elsewhere, the so-
called “rise of China” in the 21st century
has provoked praise, criticism, and much
ambivalence. Talk about China’s ascension
typically refers to efforts by the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) to dominate the
global economy by establishing economic
projects and political ties with foreign gov-
ernments. Studies of China-Latin America
relations have largely focused on economic
and political relations between states and
the consequences for the countries involved,
including social and environmental impact
(e.g. Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012). This is
also true of analyses of China-Chile relations
(Alvarez and Opazo, 2011; Rehner and Montt,
2013; but see Labarca, 2015, which also focus-
es on intercultural communication), where
macro-perspectives dominate and there is
little understanding of how actors feature in
the mediation of broader politico-economic
relations (cf. Levy, 2015).
Building on ethnographies and historiog-
raphies of Chinese residents in specific Latin
American countries (e.g. Lausent-Herrera,
2011; Lopez, 2013), this article examines instead
how ethnic Chinese people living and moving
within Latin America experience these broad-
er shifts in China-Latin America relations. The
multi-national, intra-regional mobilities and
social networks of ethnic Chinese people il-
lustrate that “China-Latin America relations”
are not disembodied macro-processes, but
constitute and dramatically shape the lives
and opportunities of the ethnic Chinese in the
Americas. In other words, China-Latin Amer-
ica relations unfold at scales other than the
nation-state (Klinger, 2015). They impact the
lives of the ethnic Chinese concretely through
the ways in which countries’ policies towards
China over decades have shaped racist and
xenophobic anti-Chinese anxiety, which is
often linked to these immigrants’ perceived
legitimate and illegitimate economic advan-
tages. Presenting narratives of mobility and
belonging among the ethnic Chinese in Chile,
this article highlights racially-specific violence
and insecurities they face in comparison to
their non-Chinese peers, which are intricately
linked to their socio-economic positions as
small-scale business owners. Such insecuri-
ties are reinforced by and exist paradoxically
alongside economic opportunities enabled by
China-Latin America free-trade agreements,
including new opportunities for those with
higher education to harness their cultural
knowledge in professional occupations, where
they can bridge “China” and “Latin America”
as cultural intermediaries (cf. DeHart, 2018).
Data for this article is based on ethno-
graphic fieldwork and semi-structured in-
terviews conducted between October 2016
and November 2017 with diverse groups of
ethnic Chinese persons in Santiago, Chile.
Participants vary according to age, place of
origin, gender, class, nationality, migrant sta-
tus, and length of time spent in the country.
25
 Journal of Latin American Geography

This article forms part of a broader and ongo- geographers (King, 2012; Coulter et al., 2016).
ing project on the multi-nodal transnational The next section contextualizes the PRC
migrations of the ethnic Chinese in Santiago government’s tumultuous historical efforts
and their intra-ethnic dynamics. Drawing on to establish economic and political ties with
the multiple migration trajectories and aspi- Latin American countries, efforts intimately
rations of eleven interviewees and their fami- linked to Chinese migration to and within
lies,2 this article engages with the scholarship the region since the late 19th century. I then
on migration geography and citizenship in describe contemporary shifts in China-Latin
several ways. It challenges assumptions that America relations, and how these have reig-
migrants identify straightforwardly with a nited negative media representations of the
country of origin and destination, which has ethnic Chinese and popular protests against
led many studies of Chinese migrants in par- them in various Latin American countries
ticular to emphasize their multi-dimensional today. Finally, I describe the life stories and
ties to China (see Portes and Armony, 2016). migratory trajectories of the ethnic Chinese
Instead, the data reveals a pattern where, currently living in Santiago, Chile, to show
prior to their arrival in Chile, substantial that broader diplomatic and economic ties
numbers of ethnic Chinese were permanent between Chinese and Latin American states
residents or citizens in other Latin American affect their lives, mobility, and physical secu-
countries such as Bolivia, Panama, Ecuador, rity in indirect and ambivalent ways.
Peru, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Argentina (cf.
the case of Peru in Lausent-Herrera, 2013).
While residing in Chile, many maintain reg- Historicizing China-
ular journeys to — and sometimes citizen- Latin America Relations
ship identifications with — these other coun- through Chinese
tries, due to enduring relations with family, Migration
friends, and business associates there. Most China-Latin America relations from the mid-
expressed stronger ties to kin and peers living 19th to the 20th century were primarily ne-
elsewhere in the Americas than to those in gotiated through Chinese migration to Latin
China or Asia. Due to the contingent nature America. These migrations can be catego-
of the people’s residency and nationalities, rized in two broad periods, historical and
such narratives and strategies of constrained contemporary, each consisting of diverse
mobility and citizenship subvert and remap flows. The first began in the 1840s when Chi-
enduring ideas about “cultural assimilation” nese contract labor or “coolies” were sent
or “integration” linked to transnationalism mainly by the Portuguese and British from
(Kivisto, 2001). Their serial relocations blur Macao and Southern China sea ports to
the line between migration and other kinds Cuba and Peru. The Chinese replaced the
of spatial mobilities, and further illuminate demand for labor after slavery was grad-
“transnational tensions” between mobility ually abolished (Hu-DeHart, 1994; McK-
and emplacement identified by migration eown, 2001). Young Chinese men mostly

26
 Imagining and Linking Latin America

from southern Fujian and Guangdong were ferior races” believed to impede moderniza-
deceived or coerced into signing contracts to tion (Vega, 1896). Anti-Chinese regulations
work abroad in sugar plantations, agriculture, were also imposed in Costa Rica in 1862 and
and mining in exchange for food, lodging, 1897 (DeHart, 2015), by the Spanish govern-
and pay for a period of time. Nevertheless, ment in Cuba in 1871 (Hearn, 2016, p. 109),
historians have argued that their living and in Panama between 1903 and 1941 (Fleischer,
working conditions were akin to slavery in 2012; Siu, 2005), and in Peru in 1909 (Lau-
all but name (Hu-Dehart, 1994; Yun, 2008). sent-Herrera, 2011). Despite attempts by the
In the 1860s and 70s, more Cantonese-Chi- Qing government to establish diplomatic and
nese contract laborers arrived to the West economic ties with some countries, such as
coasts of the USA, Costa Rica, and Panama/ the signing of the Tsientsin treaty with Peru
Colombia to build infrastructure such as rail- in 1874, restrictive laws were typically put in
roads and the Panama canal (DeHart, 2015; place by governments due to pressure from
Fleischer, 2012; Gómez and Díaz, 2016; Siu, xenophobic local elites (Lausent-Herrera,
2005; Young, 2014). Such indentured labor 2011, p. 71–75).
ended in Cuba and Peru beginning in 1874 Intra-regional migration of the Chinese in
due to international pressure (Hu-Dehart, the Americas during this time was partially
1994), giving way to smaller flows of free mi- influenced by racial discrimination and im-
gration (both regular and irregular), includ- migration restrictions. Violence and racism
ing intra-regional mobilities detailed below. against them in parts of the USA, which
Despite the commercial demand for cheap culminated in the Chinese Exclusion Act
Chinese labor, ethnic Chinese presence in of 1882 (Zesch, 2012), also saw the arrival of
Latin American countries during this time “Californian Chinese” to Colombia, Cuba,
was generally considered by social and po- Peru, Mexico, and other countries (Fleischer,
litical elites as socially undesirable, so that 2012; Hearn, 2016; Lausent-Herrera, 2011;
many countries — except Colombia — par- Lin Chou, 2004). To circumvent stricter an-
adoxically attempted to restrict or formally ti-Chinese migration regulations in Peru in
exclude Chinese migrants from entering their the 1920s, some Chinese entered illegally via
territories (Fleischer, 2012; Young, 2014). the Ecuador frontiers (Lausent-Herrera, 2011,
Post-colonial efforts in several Central and p. 76). During the War of the Pacific with
South American countries expressed similar Chile (1879–1883), some Chinese workers in
hopes to “whiten” their national populations Peru joined the Chilean army to fight against
and identities, which included encouraging Peru, even attacking their own employers’
European migrants and investments and property. Subsequently, these Chinese even-
excluding the Chinese, Africans, and their tually moved across the border to Chile to
descendants, who were perceived by gov- work in railroad construction and nitrate ex-
erning elites as immoral and less civilized. In traction, which led to the gradual establish-
Chile, for example, the state aimed to deter ment of a Chinese community in northern
the immigration of Chinese and other “in- Chile (Lin Chou, 2004; Palma and Montt,

27
 Journal of Latin American Geography
2017). Finally, the increase in Chinese popu-
lation in Colombia between 1950s and 1980s,
when migration out of China was restrict-
ed, has been attributed to their relocations
from neighboring countries that were due
to anti-Chinese sentiments and regulations
(Fleischer, 2012).
This phenomenon of intra-regional Chi-
nese mobilities has been rarely explicitly
noted (except see Siu, 2005), an omission
which I argue reproduces misleading ideas
of the ethnic Chinese as persons with citi-
zenship and affective ties to China who are
generally perceived as eternal foreigners in
Latin America (Young, 2014). As my contem-
porary ethnographic data reveals, the ethnic
Chinese have and continue to be central not
only to specific national histories of Peru and
Cuba (Lausent-Herrera, 2011; Lopez, 2013;
McKeown, 2001), but their mobilities and
presence continue to mediate diverse ideas
about China and link the social, economic,
and political aspects of various countries in
North, Central, and South America.
Throughout the 20th and 21st century,
Latin America saw minimal shifts in percep-
tions of the ethnic Chinese from “coolies” to
merchants and small business-owners par-
tially linked to a modernizing and liberalizing
China in the 1980s-90s. While some of the
early Guangdong-Chinese migrants facilitat-
ed the later journeys of families to the region,
the next significant surge in migration from
China to Latin America occurred at the end
of the Cold War. This second and contempo-
rary period of migration was partially the re-
sult of broader political and economic shifts
in the PRC, Taiwan, Latin America, and the
USA. Journeys were made from both main-
28
land PRC and Taiwan due the gradual eco-
nomic liberalization of the former, inspiring
fears about the uncertain nature of Taiwan-
ese sovereignty. Some early (male) migration
from China during this time was to escape
the political oppression of the Communist
regime. Others who identified with Taiwan
and its ruling party sought refuge in Latin
American countries that recognized Taiwan-
ese sovereignty (e.g. Bolivia, Paraguay, and
Panama). In the 1990s, significant numbers
of Fujian-Chinese persons arrived on the
continent partially due to unemployment
in Southern China (Denardi, 2016; Gómez
and Díaz, 2016; Marrero, 2016). Many per-
ceived Latin American countries as a tempo-
rary destination as they planned or saved for
their onward routes to the USA or Canada.
News reports in Peru, Argentina, and Colom-
bia at the time exposed “trafficking” gangs
and “Chinese mafias” who charged migrants
exorbitant prices for their journeys, some-
times by promising routes via Latin Ameri-
ca to the USA (Lausent-Herrera, 2011, 2013;
Fleischer, 2012; Oviedo, 2015). Nevertheless,
the bureaucratic and logistical difficulty of
moving to the USA meant that many such
migrants eventually stayed (Lausent-Her-
rera, 2013). 21st-century Chinese migration
to Latin America has diversified to include
professionals, teachers, traders, and workers
not only from Guangdong and Fujian, but
also Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Henan, Beijing, and
Shanghai, among others (see below).
Despite shifts in the broader global polit-
ical economy shaping diverse Chinese mo-
bilities to and within Latin America, and
regardless of their varying levels of visibility
and social integration in each national con-
 Imagining and Linking Latin America

text, stereotypes persisted about the Chinese portance for the PRC due to the availability
as a population associated with unsanitary of natural resources and its potential as mar-
living conditions, illicit activity, and illegit-
ket for Chinese products (e.g. Klinger, 2015;
imate presence. The next section outlines Oviedo, 2015). While China buys soybeans
what is enduring and “new” about China-Lat- from Argentina, copper from Chile and Peru,
in America relations, before analyzing how and oil from Venezuela, other countries such
perceptions of China’s global-regional posi- as Mexico negotiate more unequal trade
tioning impact the contemporary lives and relations with China due to their limited
mobilities of the ethnic Chinese. natural resources and production capabil-
ities (Hearn and León-Manríquez, 2011).
Although scholars and economic observers
Responses to Global China have been both cautious and critical of the
in Latin America potential and actual impact of China’s in-
Deep ambivalence characterizes public and vestments on the region, less attention has
political attitudes towards China and Chi- been paid to how China’s “presence” in Latin
nese migrants globally as well as in Latin America has generated social, economic, and
America in the 21st century. The PRC state political anxieties among local populations.
has emerged as a significant source of in- A few scholars have remarked on the con-
vestment in the “developing world” that has temporary “return” of strong anti-China pub-
been perceived as a commercial and less lic sentiment across the region (Armony and
condescending alternative to Western mod- Velasquez, 2015). Historian Kathleen López
els of aid-based development (DeHart, 2018; noted that much of these contemporary an-
Nyíri, 2006). Latin America, alongside Afri- ti-Chinese discourses echo similar “voices
ca and Eastern Europe, is a relatively recent that filled newspapers and speeches across
geographical area where the PRC state is the region a century ago” (2014, p. 201). Be-
accelerating economic ties and exchange in sides protests against the environmental im-
terms of trade and investment. The increased pact of Chinese resource extraction such as
involvement of China in these regional and in Peru, popular protests and attacks against
domestic economies has arguably led to local the ethnic Chinese in Colombia, Venezuela,
perceptions of China as “a threat and a new Dominican Republic, Panama, and Argenti-
colonial power interested only in grabbing… na have been framed in terms of unfair mar-
natural resources and flooding its markets ket competition, ostensibly illicit Chinese
with cheap goods” (Oreglia, 2012, p. 4). Such trade practices such as tax evasion and labor
perceptions have also sparked national de- exploitation, and generalized perceptions
bates about balancing the benefits of cheap of China’s powerful economic influence on
Chinese goods offered to consumers and the domestic development (ibid.). Anti-Chi-
threats this poses to local business and labor nese actions are notably heightened during
(Vallejo, 2016). times of widening economic inequality and
Indeed, Latin America is gaining in im- political instability, as in the case of Vene-

29
 Journal of Latin American Geography
zuela (Carroll, 2016). While such anti-Chi-
nese actions due to the perceived economic
advantages of Chinese merchants are not
new, it is important to note that some such
discontent towards small-business owners
is now redirected from a generalized sense
of injustice at broader trade agreements and
the actions of large PRC state-linked corpo-
rations, exchanges that often have practically
little to do with independent merchants and
their families.
These diverse sources of and responses
to “China” — perceived as a modern super-
power, as constituting “backward” mafia net-
works or sources of unfair competition — are
linked to the diversification of Chinese mi-
grants. China takes multiple forms within
each Latin American context (DeHart, 2015).
Alongside older populations of Cantonese
restaurant owners and Fujian merchants, ed-
ucated young Chinese with more financial
and cultural capital from Wenzhou, Beijing,
and Shanghai are moving to Latin Amer-
ica as professionals for Chinese telecom-
munications or automobile companies, as
Mandarin teachers and cultural ambassadors
via PRC-funded Confucius Institutes, or as
business investors (Pieke, 2007; Gómez and
Díaz, 2016). Chinese miners and construc-
tion workers have also accompanied Chinese
investments in Chile and Costa Rica. In the
latter, the presence of both Chinese financial
capital and mass labor shaped local residents’
ambivalent perceptions of China as both a
“first world donor and the quintessential third
world worker” (DeHart, 2015, p. 190). Such
dual perceptions of China as modern and
backward, appealing and fear-inducing, have
shaped the identity and mobility strategies
30
of diverse ethnic Chinese currently living in
Santiago, Chile.
Chinese Regional
Mobilities and Identities:
Imagining and Linking
Latin America
Ethnic Chinese movements within Latin
America parallel key mobility trends in the
region, where intra-regional mobility dom-
inates today. Until the 1990s, Argentina and
Venezuela were important destination coun-
tries due to their relatively better political and
economic situation, attracting Paraguayans,
Chileans, Bolivians and Uruguayans (Villa
and Martinez, 2001) alongside Chinese and
Taiwanese nationals. The life history narra-
tives of eleven interviewees, which include
familial migratory trajectories, show how the
ethnic Chinese make up these intra-regional
networks and interactions. Families moved
from Taiwan or PRC to Bolivia and Para-
guay (sometimes fleeing changing political
conditions between PRC and Taiwan) before
making a second move to Argentina or Ven-
ezuela, which were deemed more attractive
countries in the region. Recent crises in those
countries led interviewees to move from Ar-
gentina and Venezuela to Chile, alongside
their Argentinian and Venezuelan peers. This
section highlights the ways in which their
narratives of mobility and belonging in Latin
American countries reveal racially-specific vi-
olence and insecurities they faced in compar-
ison to their non-Chinese peers, a situation
intimately linked to their socio-economic
positions mainly as small-business owners.
Such insecurities co-exist with new profes-
 Imagining and Linking Latin America
sional and trading opportunities to forge
links with China/Taiwan and accumulate
cultural capital associated with a modern
China, and thus to increase their economic
competitiveness in Latin America.
In what follows, I present the factors shap-
ing contemporary Chinese intra-regional
mobilities, before elaborating specifically on
the nature of their transnational networks
in Latin America and how China/Taiwan
features in the mediation of their identities,
mobilities, and networks. Finally, I briefly
highlight the role of the USA and Canada in
shaping the mobility and citizenship strate-
gies of the ethnic Chinese in Chile, in terms
of the USA-China and USA-Latin America
relations.
Factors shaping contemporary Chinese
intra-regional mobility
Nine of the eleven main interviewees moved
to Chile from elsewhere in the region to es-
cape immediate threats of violence or due to
economic crises in their previous country of
residence. Like Flora (see introduction), Jon-
athan and Carolina, a married couple in their
30s, moved from Venezuela to escape the
economic crisis and increasing social unrest.
While Flora’s move was partially facilitated
by her husband’s business acquaintances, the
couple’s move was arranged by Jonathan’s
employer, a multinational corporation es-
tablished in Taiwan. His wife’s kin, long-time
Chilean residents, helped in their relocation.
Compared to these relatively recent arrivals
from Venezuela, other ethnic Chinese moved
to Chile from Peru and Argentina after eco-
nomic crises in the early 2000s. Ex-Argentini-
an residents, Pablo (an independent contrac-
tor in the construction industry), Hua (who
runs a supermarket), and Cai (who co-owns
two Chinese supermarkets with her husband
and children) all narrated their relocation
from Buenos Aires and Mendoza to Santiago
due to the 2001 Argentinian economic crisis
(Gómez, 2006). The mass looting of Chinese
supermarkets during that time made it neces-
sary for them to leave the country for neigh-
boring Chile, which was then considered po-
litically and economically stable.
Racially-targeted violence and insecuri-
ty were common themes in Chinese nar-
ratives of mobility. These threats — which
were almost always intimately linked to the
individuals’ socio-economic positions as
small-scale business owners with limited
capital — exacerbated the urgency of their
movements and highlight the necessity of
regional ethnic networks to facilitate their
escape to Chile. News reports of looting
and robbery of Chinese-run businesses were
common in Argentinean and Venezuelan cit-
ies during respective crises, when the ethnic
Chinese were perceived as easy scapegoats
to blame for socio-economic inequality. As
noted above, such anti-Chinese sentiments
were partly linked to ambivalence about the
impact of Chinese investments on local jobs
and businesses (Carroll, 2016). Thus, chang-
ing attitudes towards the ethnic Chinese
evidence the ways in which evolving Chi-
na-Latin America relations impact the lives of
Chinese residents, since Chinese migrations
are now also perceived by local residents as
partially linked to broader political-econom-
ic agreements between countries rather than
simply independent migrations of individu-
als and families. Indeed, while older Chinese
31
 Journal of Latin American Geography
communities have had a limited role in the
increased economic engagement between
China and Latin America, the latter phe-
nomena have nevertheless impacted their
social and political position in the countries
in which they are located by challenging
their previous attempts at integration and
assimilation. Distinctions between “new”
Chinese — linked to the import-export busi-
ness of China in Latin America — and the
“old” Chinese in Latin America are “fuzzy,” a
combination of respect for the perceived dil-
igence of the Chinese and prejudice about
their “perceived otherness” (Ellis, 2014, pp.
181–82).
Chen, a Taiwanese restauranteur in Chile
who moved from Panama, alluded to an-
ti-Chinese antagonisms there that were part-
ly related to increasing inter-governmental
trade agreements with China and the “new”
Chinese arrivals (cf. Siu, 2005). His sense
of insecurity as an ethnic Chinese resident
led Chen to quit his job and move to Chile
in 2010 with his wife and children, because
“Panama really isn’t a suitable place for chil-
dren to grow up.” He added that “there are
kidnappings” specifically targeted at ethnic
Chinese children, ostensibly due to the abili-
ty to charge high ransoms. Chen chose Chile
partly due to business ties and the free-trade
zone in the north, which is occupied main-
ly by PRC merchants. Similarly, Fang, who
was born in Taiwan and grew up in Paraguay
since the age of 10, said that he left Paraguay
the moment he turned 18 because of the rac-
ism he experienced:
They called me ‘Chino cochino’ [dirty
Chinese] and I felt insulted... I didn’t
32
want to stay in that kind of country and
have more or less negative emotions…
[As] a teenager, it was very easy to have
conflicts with the Paraguayans and
think that all of them were bad, just as
they thought that all the Chinese were
bad… thus I left that country.
While such anti-Chinese racism and vio-
lence prompted some to leave their countries
of residence for Chile (which was perceived
in general to be more “welcoming” and more
politically and economically stable), other in-
terviewees normalized the everyday violence
and insecurity they experienced. This is evi-
dent from Jonathan’s experiences of armed
robbery when he was working at his father’s
Chinese restaurant in Venezuela. He said:
[The Venezuelans] would tease you,
calling you chino cochino, but at least
for me, I didn’t have any issues with
that… I was used to it… The first time
[I experienced armed robbery], I was
by the cash register. Suddenly, a person
walked in and casually pointed a gun
towards us. We were very nervous. A
Venezuelan [worker] was with me… I
really trembled with fear… But later,
when it was the fifth [robbery], a gun
was put to my head… I didn’t mention
it to my father, because it was already
quite normal to me. Recalling this inci-
dent now, I feel it was… loco [crazy]. I
was only sixteen.
Jonathan’s narrative sheds light on why
some friends and relatives of Chinese in-
tra-regional migrants choose instead not to
 Imagining and Linking Latin America

move during times of crisis and unrest. An-
other reason cited was the fact that entrepre-
neurs can and do take advantage of chaotic
contexts to “seize [economic] opportunities.”
However, Jonathan eventually chose to move
to Chile only after he had spent ten years
studying and working in Taiwan and China at
his mother’s request. Despite having roman-
ticized Venezuela, and wishing to return to
work and live there, when he finally returned
to work as an expatriate professional he ex-
perienced a deep shift in his sense of identity.
He said:
Being back in Venezuela was a big
shock for me. When I returned from
Taiwan, my attitude had changed great-
ly. I would not dare to go out at night…
to go to places with too many people.
Yes, I was scared… scared of a lot of
things. If I saw a local who was not very
well dressed, I would assume that they
wanted to rob me. Yeah [that was when
I realized] I had become Taiwanese.
propriate cultural and linguistic knowledge
of China and Mandarin in order to posi-
tion themselves as cultural brokers between
China and Latin America. As Jonathan put it:
I know how to combine the serious
work ethic of the Chinese and the
warmth of the South Americans. [The
latter] was something that I learnt from
living there. But when I came [back to
Latin America from studying in Tai-
wan], I brought with me this serious-
ness. I feel that this combination of
seriousness and personal warmth is
quite special… People like me [i.e. Chi-
nese-Latin Americans], we take the best
of both worlds, so that my competi-
tive advantage lies overseas rather than
Taiwan. It’s not just language. My real
value is in knowing how to communi-
cate with the [Latin American] locals,
to interact with them, influence them,
and gain their trust. … My value can be
maximized overseas.

Yet moving back permanently to Taiwan Like Jonathan, Felipe also grew up in a
or China was not a realistic option for the Latin American country, Ecuador, but later
interviewees and many in their situation be- went to Taiwan for university and to start
cause they had affective ties and kin in Latin his career. Both knew upon graduation that
America, feelings of exclusion as “foreigners” they would eventually return to Latin Amer-
in Taiwan or China, and also the compara- ica. They applied for jobs that would allow
tive economic opportunities for the Chinese them to be “transferred back to the region”
who had already been living in Latin Ameri- ( Jonathan), with the “keyword” in the job
ca for a long time. As Monica DeHart (2018) search being “South America.” Both their
observed among educated Chinese-Costa China and Taiwan-based employers were ex-
Rican youths, the youths I interviewed who panding their markets to Latin America and
grew up in Latin American countries per- required cultural mediators like them. Those
ceived that they had more opportunities jobs required intensive intra-regional mobil-
in the region if they could acquire the ap- ities, whereupon both men decided to settle

33
 Journal of Latin American Geography
in Chile based on observations about its sta-
bility and liveability.
In sum, local perceptions of Chinese as
“dirty,” illegitimate, and/or negatively im-
pacting local economies drove some ethnic
Chinese away from particular Latin Ameri-
can countries. Yet the increasing political and
economic clout of China globally and in the
region — alongside increasing difficulties for
the Chinese to enter the USA legally (espe-
cially for the Fujianese; see Laurent-Herrera,
2013) — also paradoxically shapes the desires
of the ethnic Chinese to stay in the region to
seek or create opportunities for themselves,
and to participate actively in this changing
global and regional context (see also Denar-
di, 2015).
Evidently, whether as traders, small-busi-
ness owners or professionals, ethnically-in-
flected economic opportunities and con-
straints are more central to explaining these
intra-regional movements (or non-move-
ments) than family reunions or political mo-
tivations linked to Taiwan and PRC, as was
the case with previous Chinese-Latin Amer-
ican migrations (see Laurent-Herrera, 2013).
In contrast to current studies of transna-
tionalism broadly and of ethnic Chinese in
Latin America in particular, the mobilities
described here also illuminate the regional
nature of these people’s attachments, net-
works, and mobility, as opposed to only eth-
nic — or nation-based identities (Ong, 1999;
Siu, 2005).
Transnational longings and networks
among the Chinese as Latin Americans
Interviewees underscored the affective ties
they had with their countries of Latin Amer-
34
ican citizenship and residence, and their
attachment to “Latin/South America” in
general as compared to “Asia” or “China/Tai-
wan.” Thus, even as they experienced specif-
ic necessities to move, partially due to their
status as “eternal outsiders” in their “home
countries” (Young, 2014), they nevertheless
laid subjective claims to Latin American
countries and Latin America as a region (cf.
DeHart, 2018), especially youths who grew
up there. While middle-aged and older in-
terviewees are less explicit about identify-
ing with the region, their affective ties to it
are clearly expressed and linked to family as
well as sentimental reasons having to do with
building businesses and social networks
from modest beginnings. Ethnic Chinese
ties across the region is also a factor in the
confidence of both younger and older mi-
grants in intra-regional migration. For exam-
ple, Fang explained his process of “choosing”
to settle in Chile after having lived in Para-
guay during his teenage years:
At the time (1989), I even went to Ar-
gentina and Brazil to have a look, but
I felt that Brazil wasn’t very stable — I
would have to learn another language,
so it was more convenient to choose
Argentina or Chile. But when I went
to visit colleges in Argentina, I saw that
they were on strike, and I saw high in-
flation rates in the supermarket. In one
day, the US dollar can depreciate a lot,
and for the first time in my life I saw
people shop crazily in the supermarket
due to the inflation. ... In Buenos Aires,
I stayed for a few months in a class-
mate’s place. There were many ethnic
 Imagining and Linking Latin America

Chinese in Paraguay, from Taiwan and These youths described an affinity that exists
Hong Kong, but in the end everyone among the Chinese who speak Spanish and
left [for other Latin American coun- who meet one another in Asia, in a mutual
tries]… When I went to Chile, the pres- recognition of their unique subjectivities as
ident was Pinochet… I saw through the Chinese-Latin Americans. Apart from their
referendum that Chile was very demo- own intra-regional mobilities, meeting other
cratic... So I felt that even though Chile Chinese who grew up in other Latin Ameri-
was a small country, it’s well developed can countries shapes their subjectivities and
in many aspects, including the econom- awareness of “Latin America” and “China”
ic policies. beyond their nationalistic identifications
as, for example, merely Chinese-Venezue-
Fang’s regional ethnic networks from lan or Taiwanese-Ecuadorean. As Jonathan
growing up in Paraguay reveal the extent to expressed, many youths emphasize their
which intra-regional mobility is diverse and “Latino” side as warm, outgoing, and relaxed,
common. His networks enabled his own while their “Asian” side is diligent and seri-
mobilities and grounded knowledge about ous. Embodying aspects of both cultures is
various countries in the region, their relative perceived to be key for mediating business
economies and politics. Furthermore, upon transactions and trade exchanges between
settling in Chile, Fang eventually went on to companies and players in both regions (cf.
enable the transnational mobility of Taiwan- Gómez and Díaz, 2016).
ese friends in the region. “I have friends in Nation-based ties and identities are never-
almost every country,” he explained, “A good theless relevant. Cai, who runs a supermar-
friend from Paraguay who was in Argentina ket in Chile, spoke fondly of annual visits to
later came to Chile because of the crisis… I Argentina, where she lived for twenty years,
did offer him some kind of help, indirectly compared to fewer trips to Taiwan. She added
through my close contacts I helped him get whimsically, “If I could live anywhere in the
a job at the time.” Interviewees who escaped world, if I did not think about the business or
the Venezuelan crisis relied on contacts in economy… I would choose Argentina.” Flora,
Chile to relocate, and they themselves had who runs a Chinese restaurant, spoke of the
also facilitated or were planning to facilitate natural beauty of Venezuela (where she was
the relocations of kin and peers to Chile. born), highlighting her reluctance to move
Others who grew up in the region, such to Chile if not for economic necessity and
as Jonathan (Venezuela) and Felipe (Ecua- concern for her children’s career prospects.
dor) similarly spoke of extensive regional Jonathan also actively maintains familial and
networks due to contacts from Mandarin friendship ties to Venezuela, his birth country.
language schools in their respective countries. During and after the peak of the crisis, he facil-
They also befriended other Chinese-Lat- itated the arrival to Chile of some close Vene-
in Americans during their education and zuelan peers, which included helping them to
work experiences in Taiwan and China. obtain information, temporary visas, and jobs.

35
 Journal of Latin American Geography

In contrast to their previous countries and the PRC state, just as Lausent-Herrera
of residence or birth, for some of the inter- has observed in Peru (2013, p. 394). Further-
viewees, especially those who arrived more more, convenient social media platforms
recently, Chile emerged as a practical and such as Wechat and Facebook have also
temporary country to make a livelihood and significantly replaced or complemented in
to remain relatively close to other kin in the important ways the “cultural” purposes that
region. Indeed, family and kin relations are those associations previously served: con-
central to understanding the expansion and necting fellow members, providing advice
persistence of ethnic Chinese transnational and enabling a sense of the diasporic col-
networks in the region. Several interviewees lective.
spoke of relatives who married Latin Amer-
icans or other Chinese-Latin Americans. Transnational longings and networks
These networks necessitate and facilitate among the Chinese as Chinese
frequent and mutual intra-regional travels The interviewed ethnic Chinese embodied
to visit nieces, nephews, and grandchildren, and constituted diverse networks with China
or to attend weddings and funerals of close or Taiwan depending on their age, genera-
or extended family members. Such intra-re- tional positions, citizenship status and par-
gional and multi-national journeys and resi- ents’ country of birth. As other scholars have
dences described here are personal, informal, observed, the younger generation of Tai-
and linked to the dynamic social networks wanese who spent the majority of their lives
of the ethnic Chinese. These actively forged outside of Taiwan tended to downplay the
networks must be contextualized within eth- political affiliation with Taiwan and clear
nic biases against them — partially linked to distinctions between Taiwan and PRC as
continual and newer flows of migrants from independent nation-states. Rather, their ori-
different regions of China to Latin Ameri- entations were more practical and linked
ca — that persist alongside educational, busi- to desires to accumulate cultural capital as
ness, and professional opportunities linked “modern Chinese” associated with Beijing
to China-Latin America institutional ties. that will be useful for their global competi-
The family lives of the ethnic Chinese tiveness as workers and entrepreneurs (De-
described here thus complement and com- Hart, 2018; see also McKeown, 2001).
plicate existing studies of Chinese transna- Despite these differences, three gener-
tional networks in the region mainly from ations of Chinese or Taiwanese in Latin
the viewpoint of organized diasporic asso- America tended to emphasize the cultural
ciations rooted in a (Chinese) hometown and pragmatic importance of learning Man-
and/or destination country (Denardi, 2015; darin (rather than the Minnan and Canton-
Siu, 2001; Portes and Armony, 2016). Indeed, ese dialects). The pragmatic importance of
while such associations exist in Chile, they sending children to Mandarin school (typ-
have grown to serve economic rather than ically on Saturdays) has arguably increased
cultural purposes in relation to members in the past decade with China’s emergence

36
 Imagining and Linking Latin America
as an economic and political superpower.
Hui Ling, for example, who married a Chi-
nese-Argentinian and bore children with
Chilean citizenship, spends a third of the
family income on her children’s education.
Additionally, she plans to send her elemen-
tary-school age children to Mandarin-lan-
guage summer camp in China that the PRC
government has invested in partially to at-
tract diasporic capital, and also to change
China’s global image via the diaspora as
cultural ambassadors (Sun, 2010). Similar-
ly, though Fang grew up “indoctrinated” by
his parents that they were Taiwanese rather
than zhongguoren (Chinese nationals), he is
now committed to taking his teenage son to
China annually so that he can not only learn
Mandarin, but also “let them see the prog-
ress and growth of China, so they can come
back and have a better impression of China.”
The importance of learning Mandarin due
to its pragmatic and cultural significance
rather than as a sign of political allegiance is
also clear from the fact that, in recent years,
the Taiwanese-run Mandarin school in San-
tiago has been accepting students who are
children of newer migrants and Chinese
nationals.3
Transnational links to China and Taiwan
are thus actively forged and cannot be as-
sumed to be “natural” for the ethnic Chinese
living in Latin America. Intensive efforts are
taken by ethnic Chinese actors — whether as
parents or as young career seekers — to po-
sition themselves strategically, particularly
as Latin American residents or citizens, in a
changing global order where China’s increas-
ing clout is acknowledged. Fang explained his
decision to teach his son about China rather
than Taiwan, where his parents were from:
If you ask whether I’m Taiwanese, I can-
not say yes. I have a family-like feeling
toward Taiwan, whenever something
bad happens in Taiwan, I still feel sad.
After all, Taiwan is where I was born
and I still want it to do well. But every
time I stay in Taiwan for three days, I
want to leave already. I don’t have a
sense of belonging there. In the past I
went back every year because my par-
ents were still alive, but [not since] they
passed away.
Further emphasizing pragmatic motiva-
tions behind forging links to China, Fang
elaborated that all countries
…need to please China because China
is their biggest buyer. Though the USA
might be the biggest currently, it will be
surpassed soon… and if any changes
happen in China, Chile will be influ-
enced greatly. All our business relies on
import, and so if there are any issues,
such as military conflict between the
USA and China, then the USA has the
political power to cut off the Pacific
Ocean, and my containers cannot come
through, and so my import-export busi-
ness will suffer. I feel this crisis deeply
and that is why I need to develop a busi-
ness unrelated to importation.
Fang’s comments demonstrate a funda-
mental ambivalence that many ethnic Chi-
nese in Latin America face, and reflect how
broader geopolitical uncertainties shape indi-
37
 Journal of Latin American Geography
vidual negotiations of persons in Chile with
complex ties to China.4 All interviewees I
spoke to with a family history of intra-re-
gional migration have built their livelihoods
based on links with China/Taiwan, wheth-
er in importing goods or creating or selling
products based on representations of China/
Asia (e.g. restaurants). While their links to
China/Taiwan provide them with opportu-
nities to work in various countries in the re-
gion, many interviewees also acknowledged
the vulnerability of their dependency on
China and the international political econo-
my. One way of coping with such uncertainty
for the ethnic Chinese is to forge links with
the USA/Canada, which many perceive as
offering more secure futures and citizenships
for their families.
Citizenship and social networks in the
USA and Canada
Observations of intra-regional mobili-
ty — both of the ethnic Chinese and other
Latin American residents — would be incom-
plete without acknowledging the symbolic
role that the USA and/or Canada plays in
shaping migrants’ geographical trajectories
and aspirations as well as their mobile sub-
jectivities. Ethnographies of ethnic Chinese
in Latin America have noted parental aspira-
tions for their children to be educated in the
USA, if familial economic resources allow.
A study in Colombia mentioned that the
children of the president of the main Chi-
nese association there were born in Puerto
Rico and are U.S. citizens (Gómez and Díaz,
2016, p. 94). Another study in Costa Rica
also noted that a “well respected member of
the community… had come to Costa Rica
38
from Macao in the 1980s, and after moving
to Canada for several years with his wife and
children (a very typical trajectory for many
of the immigrants arriving in Costa Rica at
the time), returned to Costa Rice to build
a growing empire of businesses…” (Dehart,
2015, p. 198).
For participants in this study, educational
and residence opportunities in the USA and
Canada featured in their narratives of mobil-
ity and family, regardless of their affiliation
to China/Taiwan or the length of time spent
in Latin America. For example, Chen had
moved with his wife to Panama from Taiwan
in 2007, before moving to Chile in 2010. His
wife traveled twice to the USA to give birth
to their two children. Chen partially rational-
ized this decision in terms of Taiwan’s uncer-
tain political status and an assumed econom-
ic stability associated with the USA:
Taiwan’s position is not clear. In a few
years we don’t know if Taiwan will still
be there. Also, we saw that many friends’
children are in the USA, with good
grades and skills. But after you graduate,
you’re only given one year to look for a
job. If you don’t find a job or someone
to get documents for you, then you
have to leave. So we decided that we’ll
give birth in the USA. … After they’re
done with their studies in the USA,
they won’t be chased out of the country
just because they don’t have a job or the
necessary documents.
Chen’s narrative is representative of ide-
ologies (among ethnic Chinese and other
Latin American residents) about the long-
 Imagining and Linking Latin America
term benefits of U.S. citizenship. But neither
Chile nor Latin America is expressed as likely
or desirable for his children’s future. Chen’s
visions for his children contrast starkly with
his own attachments to Chile, where he had
been able to develop and prove himself as
an independent and successful businessman.
Fang’s narrative supports this general pattern.
While he planned for his daughter to be ed-
ucated in Europe, he and his wife would re-
main in Chile permanently, adding that many
peers have made similar plans. Both men’s
attachments to Chile are linked to a relative
sense of security the country had provided
their businesses and families, in comparison
to the instability of China/Taiwan relations
and concerns about fickle attitudes towards
migrants in the global North. Such strategic
family separation — sending children to Eu-
rope in hopes of their eventual settlement
there, while remaining in Chile — affirms
how contemporary citizenship is no longer
necessarily tied to loyalty to a specific na-
tion-state. Nor does acquiring multiple citi-
zenship seem to be a matter of flexibility and
about “claims to participate in labor markets”
(Ong, 1999, p. 2). While a more detailed dis-
cussion of citizenship is beyond the scope of
this paper, here I tentatively suggest that for
many ethnic Chinese in Latin America, such
multiple residencies and citizenships are
comforting indicators of rights to live and be
included in these countries, set against the
uncertainty of Taiwan’s political future, Chi-
na’s treatment of its minorities and dissidents,
regional political and economic instabilities,
and the historical expulsions of Chinese sub-
jects on the continent (Chang, 2011; Young,
2014), among other factors.
Nevertheless, with increasing China-Latin
America economic relations, ethnic Chinese
in Chile and likely elsewhere in the region
(DeHart, 2018) are turning to China and Tai-
wan alongside or instead of Euro-America for
the accumulation of cultural capital. While a
few interviewees (part of the broader sam-
ple) studied either Mandarin or pursued a
university education in China and Taiwan
(due to limited financial resources and pa-
rental wishes for them to “know” their coun-
try), others who had been educated in the
USA also eventually undertook either inten-
sive language classes or post-graduate study
in China/Taiwan. In other words, despite
strong ideas that a U.S. or Chinese educa-
tion might be socially or professionally de-
sirable, of the interviewees who form part of
a broader sample of this study, including the
“second generation,” only two had expressed
a previous desire to live and work outside of
Latin America.
China’s growing influence in Latin Amer-
ica has led scholars to characterize the
USA-China-Latin America relationship in
terms of a “triangle,” where Latin Ameri-
can countries’ increasing economic links
with China can enable their political inde-
pendence from U.S. hegemonic influence
(Gallagher, 2016). Though such a “triangle”
analysis has been criticized for ignoring in-
tra-regional dynamics and influence, the ap-
proach enables the examination of three
sets of interdependencies in the group: the
impact of China-Latin America relations on
the USA, the impact of USA-Latin America
relations on the PRC, and the impact of the
USA-China relationship on Latin America
(Ellis, 2014). Seldom explored is the negotia-
39
 Journal of Latin American Geography

tion of these relational dynamics by residents tions to nationalist and development projects
and governments of Latin America. This on- in the past century (cf. McKeown, 2001).
going study reveals some ways in which these These diverse and uneven ethnic Chinese
relations are impacting the ethnic Chinese in attachments to “Asia” and “Latin Ameri-
Latin America to still aspire to education in ca” — alongside the apparent contradictions
the USA, in addition to an increasingly valu- and tensions in their aspirations, trajectories,
able Chinese education, in order for them and practices — evidence “the kinds of social
to uniquely take advantage of the various worlds, geoscapes, and subjectivities pro-
cultural capital and linguistic skills required duced by this juxtaposition and relationali-
to remain not only globally but regionally ty” of Asia-Latin America (Kim, 2017, p. 112).
competitive, regardless of how the “triangle” These mobilities and associated discourses
relations unfold. and identities illuminate “the processes of
production of the nexus between capitalism,
geopolitics and biopolitics” (ibid.). Attend-
Conclusion ing to the intra-regional mobilities of the
Even as the ethnic Chinese intra-regional mi- Chinese in Chile reveals the concrete ways
grants in Santiago expressed identity and sen- in which the ethnic Chinese in Latin America
timental attachments to a region that tended are exchanging and creating information, and
to marginalize them socially and political- negotiating complex identities and networks
ly, some have also come to depend on their in the region. Their affiliations to China or
unique positions as both “eternal foreigners” Taiwan can no longer be taken for granted;
and “locals” for their livelihoods and social instead, such ties or identities may be active-
mobility. Some examples of their unique po- ly and pragmatically created in response to
sitions are their bilingualism or tri-lingualism, “the rise of China” in the region. By revealing
their existential comfort, and their cultural the unstable relationships or “cacophonous
knowledge of and ties to markets in Asia and encounters” (Kim, 2017, p. 101) between eth-
Latin America. Thus, the mobilities and cre- nic Chinese persons, the Chinese state, and
ation of ethnic networks within and beyond Latin American social and political contexts,
Latin America enable the Chinese in Chile this article has thus provided an important
and the region to confront and shape existing ground-up perspective on the shifting power
inequalities and opportunities in the region- dynamics between China and Latin Ameri-
al and global political order (DeHart, 2018; can countries.
Ong, 1999; Nyíri, 2006). Further research on
China-Latin America relations should, how-
ever, ground analyses in the historical and on- Acknowledgments
going social and political marginalization of Research for this article was supported by
the ethnic Chinese in countries in the region, Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y
whether despite or due to their consistent Tecnológico (FONDECYT) Chile, Proyecto
and diverse economic and political contribu- Postdoctorado N° 3170051, 2017–2020. Spe-

40
 Imagining and Linking Latin America

cial thanks to the people I spoke with and article has benefited from the thoughtful
interviewed for their patience and time, and comments of Julie Klinger, Maria Montt, and
to Vivi Hsu for her transcription work. This two anonymous reviewers.

Notes
1  All personal names are pseudonyms to ensure the anonymity of participants. I have used
Spanish, Anglophone, or Mandarin first and last names according to the names with which
participants presented themselves.
2  “Chinese” identities in terms of ethnicity and citizenship tend to constitute distinct, overlap-
ping, and increasingly contested categories in Mandarin (Nyíri 2005). The data draws on six
interviews with persons who identify partially as Taiwanese, and five interviews with persons
who emphasize ties to China/PRC. I selected these interviews to demonstrate the diversity of
ethnic Chinese intra-regional mobilities and identity discourses. Despite the limited number
of interviews, their analysis is carefully informed by many more informal conversations with
other ethnic Chinese in Chile, including accounts of intra-regional mobilities of kin or peers
of those who have not personally moved within the region.
3  This school, established by the Taiwanese community, also serves as a semi-official space for
Taiwanese-identified residents to host events celebrating annual festivities such as the mid-Au-
tumn festival, the Lunar New Year, and Chilean’s Independence Day.
4  I thank Julie Klinger for making this explicit point.

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