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A Phenomenological Analysis of the Metamemory of Five Six-year-old Children

Article  in  Qualitative Research in Psychology · September 2007

DOI: 10.1080/14780880701522387

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 A phenomenological analysis of the metamemory of five-six

year old children

Dr. Shirley Larkin1

King’s College
University of London
e-mail: s.larkin@175a.freeserve.co.uk

1
Dr. Shirley Larkin is now Research Fellow and Lecturer in Educational Studies, School
of Education and Lifelong Learning, University of Exeter, St. Lukes Campus, Heavitree
Road, Exeter, Devon, UK EX1 2LU e-mail: s.larkin@ex.ac.uk

1
A phenomenological analysis of the metamemory of five-six year old children

Abstract

This paper draws on the phenomenological philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and the

phenomenological method of analysis developed at Duquesne University to explore the

phenomenon of metamemory in young children. It is suggested that cognitive and

developmental approaches to metamemory result in a deficit model which fails to

appreciate the nature of metacognition in young children. Through a simple stimulus

activity 18 five to six year old children from three different schools were encouraged to

talk about their memory and how they remember. The data were subjected to a four stage

phenomenological analysis to produce specific, general and composite descriptions of

what these children know about their own memory. The results reveal the richness of the

children’s ideas and show that children of this age can not only be metacognitive but that

they can also communicate a unique perspective on memory and remembering derived

from their own lived experience. The phenomenological approach enables the

metacognitive processing of young children to be revealed and provides an enriched

discourse of the development of metacognition in developmental psychology.

Key words: young children; remembering; metamemory; metacognition; phenomenology

2
Biography

Shirley Larkin is a research fellow and lecturer in Educational Studies at the School of

Education and Lifelong Learning, University of Exeter, UK. Her main areas of interest

are the development of metacognition in young children and the creation of

metacognitive environments in primary classrooms. She takes a multi-perspective

approach to this work combining aspects of developmental and cognitive psychology

with phenomenological analysis to reveal aspects of metacognitive processing from the

child’s point of view.

3
A phenomenological analysis of the metamemory of five-six year old

children

Introduction

Metamemory was one of the first components of metacognition to be studied and as

described by Flavell (Flavell, 1971; Flavell & Wellman, 1977), it forms the basis for the

concept of metacognition. It involves knowledge of one’s own memory; how it works;

what factors may influence it as well as an awareness of one’s own memory at the

moment, including control and monitoring aspects and knowledge of possible strategies

that could enhance memory performance.

In the early years of research on metamemory, Flavell, drawing on Piaget’s work, made

the connection between awareness of memory and effective learning (Flavell 1971).

Learning, as described by Flavell, includes both formal academic learning and learning

about self and others. Around the same time Hagan suggested that memory develops on

two levels. On the cognitive level children develop skills through experience, practice

and imitation, which enable them to become more proficient at storage and retrieval of

information. On the second or meta level children become increasingly aware of their

own ability to affect how they store and retrieve information (Hagan, Hargrove & Ross

1973) . The study of children’s development of knowledge and control of their memory

processes has been used to argue for different pedagogical practices at different stages of

education. In particular the many ‘thinking skills’ programmes designed to accelerate or

facilitate the development of metacognition are introduced at what are deemed

4
developmentally appropriate ages (Shayer and Adey 2002). A great deal of work on

metamemory and memory performance was carried out in 1970’s and 80’s. Much of this

work focused on children’s knowledge of and use of strategies to aid memory

performance on recall tasks. In general, it was found that pre-school children can use

memory strategies when the task is simple (DeLoache, Cassidy, & Brown, 1985).

However, middle-school children were found to be more likely to understand that a

memory strategy can help recall (Moynahan, 1978), and even older children are not

consistent in their knowledge and use of memory strategies. Young children have also

been found to overestimate their memory capacity, claiming that they can remember

more than they do, yet being unaware of the deficit between their prediction and

performance (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982). From a developmental perspective

metacognition quickly became associated with abstract levels of thinking, particularly in

a Piagetian sense it was linked with “reflected abstraction” (Piaget, 1976).

Cognitive psychology research into the development of metacognition shows

metacognition developing on a monotonic line in relationship with IQ (Veenman 2004,

Alexander et al 2006). The result of this emphasis as Whitebread points out, is that

young children are viewed as deficient in metacognition and research studies emphasize

what children cannot do (Whitebread et.al., 2005).

In recent years more naturalistic studies such as those by Whitebread et al, in nursery

classrooms [ibid] and by Georghiades, Thomas and Larkin in primary classrooms,

(Georghiades, 2004; Larkin, 2002; Thomas, 2003) have shown that the early laboratory

based studies may have under-estimated the metacognitive abilities of young children.

5
Whilst developmental psychologists have begun to show the extent to which young

children can access and talk about their own mental states, (Flavell, 2000; Kontos, 1983;

Markman, 1979; Moss, 1990; Pramling, 1988; Wertsch, 1978), none of these studies has

sought to describe what this is like for the child, in terms of the child’s own language.

Instead many of these studies are couched in the prevailing discourse of Piagetian stage

development, or developmental psychology and aim to compare children’s metacognitive

behaviour to adult theoretical models.

In order to break this cycle of comparison and challenge the prevailing developmental

theories of metacognition it is necessary to get as close as possible to the way the child

participants in the present study experience aspects of metacognition. In particular this

paper focuses on how children experience themselves as active storers and retrievers of

information.

The study is framed in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty developed

a critique of Piaget’s genetic epistemology, which challenged the rational logical

developmental model, (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). In the Primacy of Perception (1947)

Merleau-Ponty states “all consciousness is perceptual, even the consciousness of

ourselves” pg.197. It seems that in order to investigate reflections on the world or even

reflections on internal processes we must take account of the relationship of the

experiencing subject to the object. However, in the case of reflecting on our own

memory, memory is not an object, which can be perceived from different angles. Instead

it makes more sense to think of memory as a process of thinking and so metamemory is a

6
reflection on an active process. Merleau Ponty suggests that experience of self is

experience of thought in action.

“I grasp myself, not as a constituting subject which is transparent to itself, and

which constitutes the totality of every possible object of thought and experience, but as a

particular thought, as a thought engaged with certain objects, as a thought in act;” (ibid.)

pg.206

Merleau-Ponty speaks of becoming aware of thinking not as an objective observer on

thought, but as another thought which feels itself rather than sees itself.

“I somehow find myself thinking and I become aware of it. In this sense I am

certain that I am thinking this or that as well as being certain that I am simply thinking”

[….] “I am a thought which recaptures itself as already possessing an ideal of truth […].

This thought which feels itself rather than sees itself.” (ibid.) pg206

Thus an investigation into metamemory is re-conceptualised as an investigation into a

relationship between thoughts as experienced by a perceiving subject. If metamemory is

a shift in perspective, or a different degree of remembering or thinking, a “clarification of

the same knowledge” (ibid. pg208), then there is no reason to consider that children are

any more deficient in it than an adult. Similarly if all aspects of the thoughts about

memory are already present within any notion of having a memory, then it seems likely

that given the opportunity small children will show signs of experiencing meta levels of

thinking. However, in order to provide this opportunity a different methodological

approach from that usually used in cognitive science is called for.

7
Methodology

One of the least contested areas in theories of metacognition is that true metacognition

must be conscious or at least available to consciousness (Brown, 1987, Baker, 1994). It

is acknowledged that some monitoring and control aspects of metacognition can become

automatic, but since these were once conscious they could with effort be brought back to

our conscious awareness, even though this may have less than positive effects. In

exploring the development of metacognition in children we are exploring their expanding

consciousness. The debates surrounding the investigation of consciousness are beyond

the scope of this paper, but one aspect of the debate is particularly significant. Whilst

scientists, psychologists and philosophers debate the nature of consciousness, it remains

that from a first person perspective we experience consciousness as affecting our lives

and development. In terms of child development theory there is a consensus view that

conscious experience of the world affects development and can shape lives and we aim to

protect children from traumatic experiences for just that reason. From a third person

observer’s point of view it may not be apparent what effect the experience is having on

the person. Similarly, a first person account of an experience omits other information

available only to an observer. It seems appropriate that an exploration of children’s

metamemory should attempt to use methods which take account of both the child’s own

reports of their conscious experience of memory and remembering and the observer’s

interpretation of that experience. To concentrate on one perspective at the expense of the

other would give only a partial account as Max Velmans has argued:

“Information processing models and other third-person perspective

models are incomplete in so far as they do not encompass the subject’s

8
 first-person perspective. Conversely, as subject’s first person account

of his actions (based on what he experiences) is incomplete in so far

as it does not encompass information available to an external observer.

In this sense, first person and third person perspectives are

complementary and mutually irreducible. A complete psychology

requires both. (Velmans, 1991 p.705)

Similarly Braddock (2001) argues that whilst phenomenology investigates subjective

experience, its methods and evidence need not be only subjective self reports. He argues

for a pluralistic view of phenomenological method which uses any data sources to gain

better understanding. However, in order to gain the fullest account of an experience the

data should be explored within a phenomenological frame. Chamberlin argues that the

phenomenological method encourages educationalists, who come to a subject with

predetermined theories and with their own experience of the structures of education to

look at their subject afresh. The methodological procedures of phenomenology

encourage investigators to seek new understanding from analyzing “the essence of

things” (Chamberlin 1974). In order to investigate the essence of metamemory in young

children it is necessary to first put to one side the predominant theory of its development

as described by cognitive psychology. Phenomenological method encourages just this

stance and seeks to return the investigator to a position of starting from the lived

experience of the participants. The phenomenological method focuses attention on

meaning and on the perspective of the active subject. Whilst a phenomenological

analysis of an experience may never be finished in the sense of giving certitude, it can

9
provide new interpretations and lead to new theoretical conceptualizations of phenomena.

In an area so dominated by cognitive psychology as is the theory of metamemory,

phenomenology may help us to understand the theory by interpreting it as lived

experience.

Whilst the theoretical framework for this study is the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty,

the analytical method used here is that described by Amedeo Giorgi, (Giorgi, 1985). In

this project, the initial bracketing of adult perception is later removed in order to make

explicit the perspective of the researcher. However, the experience that has been

explored is that of the children as told to me. The discussion which follows is based on

the phenomenological exploration of these data and not on any pre-conceived notion of

theoretical frameworks. This is not a naturalistic phenomenology, but one that seeks to

combine first person and third person narratives to form a rich description of what it is to

be metacognitive at this age and to explore how children of this age relate their cognitive

processing.

Method

This study focuses on 18 five to six year old children. The children were all in year one

classes, six in each school, in one London Borough. The children were chosen by their

class teacher to represent a cross section of their class in terms of ability, gender and

ethnic background. Many of the children spoke more than one language or had English

as an additional language. However, all the children were fluent in English. In order to

10
encourage the children to talk about their experience of their own memories and

remembering, a memory game was used and followed up with interview questions.

The memory game consisted of 16 small natural and plastic objects as follows: shell,

snake, butterfly, frog, pirate, necklace, seahorse, leaf, snail, shark, insect, flag, parrot,

stone, fish, chest.

The children participated individually in a one on one with the researcher. Each child was

invited to name the objects. The child’s own names for the objects were accepted. For

instance the pirate figure was variously called a pirate, a man, a captain by different

children. The children were allowed to touch them and ask questions about them. Some

children believed the frog and the insect to be real. The child was then asked to try and

remember as many objects as possible and told that in a couple of minutes the objects

would be covered and they would be asked to recall them. They were told that they could

do anything they liked that would help them to remember the objects. After the recall

session the following questions were asked:

1. When I gave you a little time to remember them what did you do to remember them?

2. If somebody else wanted to remember as many as you had done what would you tell

them to do?

3. Which bit of you does the remembering?

4. Was it easy to do or was it difficult?

5. Why?

The questioning was adapted to the child’s responses but all participants covered these

five questions.

11
The whole sequence was audio taped and then transcribed. The transcriptions of each

child constitute the data which were subsequently analysed using the steps described by

Giorgi and Wertz (Giorgi, 1985; Wertz, 1983), as follows:

Step 1

The entire description is read to get a sense of the whole.

In this case each child’s interview data was read. This instruction is not as self-

explanatory as it at first seems. Wertz points out that the basic stance or attitude of the

researcher during this reading process is important. He suggests we should aim to

empathise with the description before us:

“We cannot be spectators but must experience the joys and pains

of our subjects in full detail and in our very depths if we are to

faithfully know them”. (Wertz, 1983) p.204

This includes using the description and language used to imaginatively place oneself in

the position of the respondent. It also involves slowing down and dwelling on the

description, not assuming that the meaning is clear but allowing the sense of the words to

emerge in relation to each other. This is the raw data of a transcribed interview with

Charlotte following the memory game. Charlotte is 5 years old.

12
Interview with Charlotte

R= Researcher (myself); C= Charlotte

1. R: [Goes through objects with child explains test] [Charlotte describes each object as

she names them eg. this is a shark that catches its prey in the water etc]

2. Observation: [Makes characters out of objects and talks for them, plays especially

with necklace. Touches each. Makes a story out of all objects]

3. C: Leaf, and the leaf is very special because when it’s autumn the leaves fall down

…..

[The above first section is summarised to save space but gives a flavour of what

Charlotte did with the objects]

4. R: OK tell me the ones you can remember

5. C: I can remember the pirate that sails ships and boats, and I can remember lots of

things I could remember the butterfly it has different kinds of colours and I can

remember the snail that moves very slowly and I can remember the snake that hunts

for his or her prey, I can remember the fish that swims around and lives under the sea

and the shark and I can remember the shell that is somewhere that lives under the sea

that’s just like floating on the sea, it doesn’t really float it sinks and I could remember

the insect he crawls around somewhere, I can remember the flag, that’s all, and the

necklace I can remember, and parrot

6. R: When I gave you a little time to remember them what did you do to remember

them?

13
7. C: Because everytime my Dad tells me to remember things I still remember it and

you know something that happened on the 99 a long time ago and I still remember it

8. R: But how did you remember these objects what did you do to remember them?

9. C: I remembered them by remembering my memory and playing with them so that I

could hear them so I could remember them so much

10. R: OK so if somebody else wanted to remember as many as you had done what

would you tell them to do?

11. C: Remember their memory and if they can’t they just have to try their best to

remember

12. R: So

13. C: If they can’t remember their one or two or ABC like they say ABD like they

forgot C and they try to do it over again and they have to use their memory

14. R: Right is there anything they could do to help them remember it?

15. C: To look at them very carefully and see like that’s an insect, that’s a spider, that’s a

snail

16. R: And which bit of you does the remembering?

17. C: Memory

18. R: And where’s your memory?

19. C: My memory is in my brain

20. R: And any idea how it remembers things?

21. C: It’s because I was trying on the necklace and I remember the necklace I was

playing with the pirate and the parrot and I was playing with the slug and the fish and

14
 like the necklace was a chain to stop the shark eating all the fishes, that’s how I

remember

22. R: So was it easy to do or was it difficult?

23. C: It was just a little difficult

24. R: What was difficult about it

25. C: To remember all those things was a little hard

26. R: How could I have made it easier?

C: If you just had like a little bit like one or 4, just a little bit.

(Note: That at line 7 the researcher should have let the child continue with her story of the

99 bus, but failed to do so, thereby limiting the scope of the interview.)

Step 2

The reader becomes aware of the individual’s meanings.

The researcher must be interested in the way the situation appears to the individual rather

than its distance from the researcher’s theoretical view point. In this step the language of

the individual is not changed but units of meaning are discriminated and taken as a

description of the phenomenon (in this case ‘remembering’). The meaning units are

discriminated through a psychological lens and thus the analysis is only one aspect of a

much more complex reality. Through the discrimination of meaning units the researcher

is aware of the phenomenon as different from other phenomenon.

15
Step 3

The language of the meaning units is transformed into psychological language.

The transformation of the language of the meaning units into psychological language is

achieved through a process of reflection and “imaginative variation”. The researcher

must ask “how am I understanding this phenomenon such that this statement reveals it?”

or “what does this statement reveal about the phenomenon” (Wertz 1983 p.207). Whilst

the researcher reflects on the description of remembering the ultimate aim of this

reflection is to focus on the individual child’s experience of remembering. The reflection

should then be of the relationship between the individual and the description.

Step 4

A consistent and specific description of the phenomenon is made by synthesising the

transformed meaning units. As this can be expressed at different levels, a general

description then follows and if more than one subject is involved these general

descriptions are combined. Thus Step 4 level one is a specific description relating to

Charlotte’s experience. Step 4 level two is a generalised description of Charlotte’s

experience, where my interpretation of the essence of her related experience is produced.

Finally, the individual general descriptions are combined into a composite general

description.

16
Stage 2 Stage 3

All constituents present in C’s Constituents of description expressed

description in terms revelatory of remembering

1) C- describes each object as she 1) C- engages with the objects, she feels

names them – “this is a shark that them and describes them. She

catches its prey in the water”, “this is verbalises her thoughts about each

the frog that hops”, “this is the beautiful object.

butterfly”. She also picks each one up

and looks at it before describing it.

2) During observations period C turns 2) C- turns R’s memory game into a

each object into a character. She story. She makes her own game and

touches them and makes a story out of expresses fun, curiosity and excitement.

them. She tries the necklace on, taking

great care.

3) C- singles out a leaf as a special 3) C- relates specialness of leaf to

thing “leaf is very special because when autumn. She expresses her remembered

it’s autumn the leaves fall down.” knowledge that leaves fall down in

autumn.

4) C- lists the items she can remember 4) C- goes further than listing items.

using “I can remember” at start of each She places herself at the beginning of

17
one and using some of the descriptions each object. She refers to her

she used in 1) above. Sometimes she knowledge of her own memory “I can

elaborates on a description. “I can remember lots of things”. She plays

remember the shell that is somewhere with the initial descriptions, elaborating

that lives under the sea that’s just like and adding information from stored

floating on the sea, it doesn’t float it knowledge about the properties of a

sinks”. shell.

5) C- refers to her Dad, “everytime my 5) C- refers to parental figure as a

Dad tells me to remember things I still function of her memory.

remember it”.

6) C- remembers things that happened a 6) C- displays long term memory. This

long time ago on the 99. is rooted in being present at the time of

the event.

7) C- “I remembered them by 7) Remembering is connected to

remembering my memory and playing memory. C explains strategies for

with them so that I could hear them, so I remembering. Playing with the objects

could remember so much” allows her to hear them, this makes for

greater recall.

8) Others must “remember their 8) Looking and seeing, paying attention

18
memory” to be successful. Also to to what the objects are is important for

“look very carefully” and “see like remembering

that’s an insect”

9) C- “my memory is in my brain” 9) Memory is located in the brain

10) Difficult to remember so many, 10) Shows awareness of capacity of

“Just a little bit would be easier”. memory. Less objects would be easier

to remember.

Step 4 Level 1

Specific description of situated structure of remembering

Charlotte engages with the objects fully. She feels them individually. She describes

each, making distinctions between them. Then she turns them into characters, speaking

for them and changing her voice to suit the character. She turns my game into her story.

She appears fully engaged in the story she made and expresses fun, curiosity and

excitement. She becomes aware of my presence again and tells me what she perceives as

the special quality of one object (the leaf). In recalling the items she sets up a mantra and

describes each item to me as she had earlier done to herself. She adds information about

the object as it comes to mind and elaborates on the descriptions. She refers to a parental

19
figure and being told to remember things. She displays a long term memory, which is

rooted in being present at an event. The act of remembering is connected by Charlotte to

her memory, which she locates in her brain. Playing with the objects, making them into

characters with a voice has allowed her to remember them, because she can hear them.

Other people would do well to pay attention and look carefully in order to see what the

objects are this will help them to remember. The number of objects affects recall. Fewer

objects would be easier to remember. Charlotte shows an awareness of the capacity of

memory and one variable (no. of items) which will affect successful performance.

Step 4 level 2

General description of remembering

Remembering a large number of objects necessitates becoming fully involved with them.

Making distinctions between them and paying attention to their essential qualities will

help. When told to remember something it is possible to do so. Long term memory is

connected to being present at the time of the event to be remembered. Remembering is

connected to memory, which is located in the brain. Memory has a limited capacity. One

variable that will affect memory performance is the number of objects to be remembered.

This method was used to provide general descriptions of remembering for all 18 children.

Data were transformed in this manner up to and including step4 level2. When all the

individual general descriptions of remembering were achieved, these were combined to

form a group or composite description.

20
Composite general psychological structure of remembering

When these children speak of remembering they refer most often to long-term memories.

These are given as stories of situations and events at which they were physically present

and which have some essential meaning for themselves. The stories can be related in

great detail and often include the feelings of the participants as the events unfold.

Relating these stories from long term memory appears natural, they are often

accompanied with physical gestures and are told with energy and enthusiasm. There is a

tension apparent between this free remembering and reflected thought on remembering

(or metamemory). However, children of this age are also able to reflect on processes and

strategies that accompany remembering.

Remembering can be linked to knowledge, to retrieval of stored facts. “I know snakes

are poisonous, I remembered it”. This is the type of remembering that is dictated by

adults especially in educational settings. Remembering is linked to learning, but it is not

the same thing. Children of this age can make this distinction in the sense of we can learn

by watching others but we cannot remember that way. Remembering is different too

from other things we learn such as reading and writing. Strategies that help us in reading

and writing do not help in remembering.

To remember things you need to think. Thinking and remembering take place in the

brain but they are not the same thing. Remembering is performed by the memory, and

thinking about things or concentrating on them allows those things to enter memory and

be stored there until they are needed, when thinking about them again will bring them out

21
again. Remembering is both an internal and a physical act, there is a mystery to how the

things to be remembered enter memory, but once there they are real. The memory store

is limited and some things have to be deleted to make room for new things.

Memory is located in the brain or in the head. The brain is a control centre for the body,

it is different from the heart. But the brain is physical, it requires “warming up” or

“exercise” before it begins to work and something inside the brain starts it working. The

brain is fallible, it can get things wrong and it can find things difficult. Remembering is

not easy and knowing that you have forgotten something brings about an emotional

experience, it makes you feel sad and uneasy.

Remembering a lot of objects requires that you first get to know them. The sense of sight

and touch enable the remembering. Concentration and focus on what the objects actually

are or represent means that you can then name them and repeat naming aloud or to

oneself will help you to remember them. The first objects to be named will be the first to

be remembered.

It is easier to remember things if you use a strategy, but not all strategies are good.

Making stories from the objects and giving voice to the characters in them will enable

recall of the characters' voices and thus the objects. Making order out of the objects

either as a pattern or a group (the groups should refer to real-life) is a good strategy as is

rearranging the objects in alphabetical order. Counting, closing your eyes or writing a list

are all good strategies.

22
The type of objects to be remembered is important. Consistency of size and objects that

are similar are easier to remember.

Findings

The general composite description of metamemory results from the children’s experience

of remembering and my interpretation of that experience from a psychologist’s

perspective. It shows us the richness of these young children’s reflections. These

reflections are based upon lived experience, as shown by the extent to which the children

relate detailed stories about remembering, often re-living these through their bodies. The

phenomenological analysis has allowed access to an aspect of metamemory, which can be

lost in the procedures of cognitive psychology laboratory studies. The composite

description shows these five year old children distinguish between metacognitive

knowledge about memory eg. The link between memory and learning, or the use of

memory strategies and their individual personal experience of using their memories in

their own lives.

Merleau-Ponty speaks of the world as already pregnant with meaning (Merleau-Ponty

1947). Things at first ambiguous become more determinate as we bodily engage with

them. It seems from this phenomenological analysis of the children’s experience that

counter to developmental models of metamemory, these children have the ability to

process information on a meta level, but they have no need or intention to do this, unless

asked to by someone else. This ability to reflect may be hidden from the children and

from the researcher. However, through dialogues, firstly of the child with the objects,

23
and then with me, the indeterminate process of reflecting on remembering begins to

become determinate. In the case of an abstract process such as metamemory the

dialogues take place at different locations. Whilst cognitive psychology would suggest

that they take place at different hierarchical levels, the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty

suggests that instead they may be part of foreground or background at different times.

(ibid). In this study the dialogue is originally pre-reflective as the child engages with the

objects. A second dialogue is intersubjective between the researcher and the child. At

this point the objects themselves recede into the background and a reflective experience is

foregrounded.

Discussion

This paper has described a method of phenomenological analysis, which attempts to

clarify what it means to be metacognitive at the age of five or six years old. A

phenomenological approach has been necessary because it is unclear what metamemory

is for this age group or even whether children of this age can be metacognitive.

Metamemory, like all reflective aspects of consciousness, is difficult to observe in

everyday experience. Braddock makes this point:

“As emphasised by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty the object-directedness

of consciousness makes it difficult for the conscious subject to focus

attention on the nature of conscious states themselves without

becoming lost in the objects of these states”(Braddock, 2001)pg.2

24
The metamemory test carried out as an interview makes just these demands of the

children. Thus the data it produces is not as far as we know everyday data of the child’s

life.

The phenomenological method of analysis is sensitive to personal experience. It involves

the researcher in actively putting to the side all notions of what metamemory is or what a

reflection on remembering is in order to make clear what the children say about these

processes. Whilst it is impossible to completely eradicate a knowledge of the theory of

metacognition during the phenomenological analysis it is sufficient, as Merleau-Ponty

said to “slacken the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus bring them

to our notice” (Merleau-Ponty 1962 p.13).

The phenomenological method used here involves the researcher in a process of

imaginative variation in firstly discriminating meaning units from the initial

communication and then reflecting on those in terms of their intentionality towards the

phenomenon characterised here as remembering.

The imaginative variation has helped to clarify the essence of metamemory for children

of this age. Charlotte has told us something of her personal experiences of her memory.

These are described in terms of physical events such as being on the 99 bus or as

relational in terms of her circular connection of father-memory-self. Metamemory, the

ability to reflect upon one’s memory tends towards relationships and events. Whilst the

cognitive model of metamemory remains an abstract, this phenomenological analysis has

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shown that the experience of being metacognitive at this age necessitates thinking about

real experiences. The phenomenological analysis has had the effect of transforming the

abstract theory of metamemory back to its essence as a lived experience. In this way this

type of analysis has made the link between the cognitive psychological concept of

metamemory as a constituent of metacognition and the phenomenological experience of

what it is to be metacognitive at this age. Through the process of imaginative variation

we now see that metamemory is a reflection on different constituents such as the memory

as an object or remembering as a process.

It is clear from the composite general description of remembering above, that children of

this age can experience themselves as cognitive beings and can reflect on their own

cognition when asked to do so. They can distinguish cognition from action and yet make

the intentional link between cognition, emotion and sensory experience. However, this

analysis would suggest that there may be something we can call a pre-formal-operational

metacognition, which is embodied and intuitively employed when necessary. It may be

this intuitive metacognition which is being brought to light by the phenomenological

analysis of an intentionally directed cognition. To clarify, asking children to firstly

undertake a memory task and secondly to reflect on how they did it, involves them

bringing their intuitive metacognition to consciousness. Thus the shift from remembering

to awareness of remembering can be thought of as bringing thinking that is in the

background to the fore. In this sense meta processes including metamemory may be a

shift in perception and focus rather than a development of different and more

sophisticated representations. This conceptualization of metamemory would suggest that

26
meta-level processing is as natural for children as it is for adults, but that children have no

real need to shift to reflection on thinking and articulate this unless specifically asked to

do so or motivated to do so by some other event.

The adoption of a phenomenological approach to these data aimed to clarify what it is to

be metacognitive at the age of five or six years old, specifically with regard to knowledge

of and experience of memory and remembering. The phenomenological approach

maintains the richness of the children’s explanations, often lost in more quantitative

methodologies. Although a phenomenological analysis is, by its nature, never completed,

the work presented here goes some way towards privileging the voiced experience of the

children and begins to throw light on what it means to be metacognitive at the age of 5 to

6 years old.

Framing this study in the philosophy of Merleau Ponty demands a review of how

metamemory is investigated and conceptualized by developmental psychology. The

phenomenological method enables us to reconceptualise metamemory as a shift in focus

and perception, rather than as a higher level or different structure of thought.

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