Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 182522               March 7, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NOEL T. ADALLOM, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a review on appeal of the Decision1 dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00365, which affirmed in toto the Decision 2 dated December
15, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case
Nos. Q-01-105875 and Q-01-105877, finding accused-appellant Noel T. Adallom guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and attempted murder.

Accused-appellant was originally charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1)
count of attempted murder under the following Informations:

Criminal Case No. Q-01-105875

That on or about the 28th day of October 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating with two other persons whose true names
and other personal circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill, qualified with evident premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of DANILO
VILLAREAL y ESPIRAS by then and there shooting him with the use of a firearm
hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Danilo Villareal y Espiras. 3

Criminal Case No. Q-01-105876

That on or about the 28th day of October 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating with two other persons whose true names
and other personal circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill, qualified with evident premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of ROMMEL
HINA by then and there shooting him with the use of a firearm hitting the latter on the
head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wound which was the
direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said Rommel Hina.4

Criminal Case No. Q-01-105877

1
That on or about the 28th day of October [2001], in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with two other persons whose true
names and identities have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commence the commission of the crime of murder directly by overt acts, by then and
there shooting one BABELITO E. VILLAREAL with the use of a firearm but said
accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
crime of murder by reason of some cause or accident other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is complainant was able to ran away, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.5

When arraigned on January 15, 2002, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charges against him.6

At the pre-trial conference on January 29, 2002, the parties stipulated only as to the
deaths of Danilo Villareal (Danilo) and Rommel Hina (Rommel). 7

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Babelito Villareal

(Babelito),8 Danilo’s brother who survived the shooting; Janita Villareal
(Janita),9 Danilo’s wife; Dr. Joselito Rodrigo (Joselito),10 the Chief Medico Legal of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory who examined Danilo’s cadaver;
and Diorito Coronas, Jr. (Diorito),11 who was present at the time and place of the
shooting.

Below are the testimonies of Babelito and Diorito as summarized by the RTC:

Prosecution witness Babelito Villareal, a construction worker and residing at 120

Senatorial Road, Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, testified that he was with his
brother, Danilo, and Rommel Hina, a neighbor, towards midnight of October 27, 2001
in front of the store of his sister, Nanieta. His house was just across the street. They
were drinking beer but ran out of it. Danilo asked Rommel Hina to buy cigarettes from a
nearby store because their sister’s store was already closed. When Hina returned, they
stayed in the same place. Babelito had his back against the wall fronting the road while
he was facing his brother’s back. Hina was on his right side. Soon a tricycle with its
lights out and its engine turned off, arrived. It was still moving because the road was on
a downward slope. He saw Noel Adallom alight from the sidecar. Adallom was with
Johnwayne Lindawan and a tricycle driver. After Adallom alighted, he fired his carbine.
There was a successive burst of gunfire and Adallom was saying, "Ano? Ano?" His
brother went down and Rommel Hina was moaning. The tricycle came from his left
side. When Adallom fired his gun, Danilo turned his head and tried to run but he was
hit at the back. He himself, when he saw the gunfire just closed his eyes and leaned
against the wall and turned his head to the right and moved his leg downward just
waiting for what would happen next. When his brother and Rommel fell, the firing
stopped and when he turned his head, he noticed that Adallom upon seeing him alive,
again fired successive shots and then he heard, "tak-tak." The gun must have jammed
then he heard another burst of gunfire, "rat-tat-tat." He sought cover beside a vehicle
and ran. He showed some pictures and pointed to the place he testified on (see Exhibit
A). There were bullet marks shown in the pictures (Exhibit B). He ran to an alley and
then he went back to Senatorial Road where the incident happened and saw people
2
milling around. His brother was already dead while Rommel Hina was rushed to the
hospital. Noel Adallom, a long time resident of their place is the cousin of the husband
of his sister while Johnwayne Lindawan is the son of his brother-in-law. During the
wake of his brother, he saw Johnwayne with a new haircut. Adallom also had a new
haircut. They used to have long hair prior to the incident. Both of them were sporting
army cut. He tried to watch Adallom’s movements. He saw him fixing the gate of his
house and when he could not take it anymore he told Jeanette, the wife of his brother
Danilo Villareal, that what Adallom was doing was very insulting. He did not give any
statement to the police because there was still the wake and he wanted to consult
Jeanette who was very confused. He knows that it is hard to fight an Ifugao. After the
funeral, he told his siblings about the incident. They decided to have Adallom arrested.
His Ate Jeanette went to Station 6 but the police were not cooperative and he was
losing heart. On November 19, 2001, he saw Adallom alight in front of his house. He
asked his siblings to go to the barangay hall while he waited for Adallom because he
might leave. When the barangay people came, they picked him up and informed him
about the complaint against him. Adallom was detained at the barangay hall and taken
at Station 6. Babelito executed a sinumpaang salaysay marked Exhibit C.

On cross examination, among others, he said that Adallom’s house is just near the
eskinita. The following day when he saw Adallom sporting a new haircut, he tried to
keep track of his movements. He did that for several days. He was shown a sketch
marked as Exhibit D for the prosecution and said, the house of his sister was along
Senatorial Road at the corner of an alley in Avocado Street. After Adallom alighted
from the tricycle, he positioned himself before he fired the shots. When Babelito
returned to the scene of the incident, he instructed some people to bring Rommel Hina
to the hospital. He saw Agustin Adallom and Anderson Tuguinay that night. He saw
Adallom’s wife by the gate of their house. He did not see Noel Adallom after the
incident. The police investigators came to the scene and he went with them to the
Criminal Investigation Unit. The investigator was Lawa-Lawa. When he was about to
give a statement at the Criminal Investigation Unit, Nathaniel Hina, the father of
Rommel appeared and he was telling a different story. Nathaniel was a usual drinking
companion of Noel Adallom. Immediately prior to the incident, Rommel’s father was
coming down from the tricycle with some companions, the barkada of Noel Adallom, he
passed by the eskinita and took a look at them. That was before the tricycle with
Adallom as passenger passed by. At the police precinct Rommel’s father was saying
that it was another Ifugao, a certain Hubert who was responsible for the shooting.
Because of this incident with the father of Rommel, he did not give a statement. He
reiterated that he saw his brother hit as he was slowly moving his head and then he
closed his eyes. After the first burst of gunfire it stopped for a while. When the gunman
saw him, he raised his gun again and pointed it at him then he heard, "pak." It did not
fire then he heard successive shots. He saw Adallom with the carbine only that night
but he knew that his family has a carbine. He was shown a photograph marked Exhibit
2 depicting the wall of his sister Nanette’s store marked as Exhibits A and B. There
were no chairs in front of the store even when they were drinking. He was there first
before Danilo and Rommel arrived. There were also two women who came thirty (30)
minutes prior to the incident Danilo and Rommel had been drinking in front of his
house. When they arrived, they gave him a bottle of beer to drink. And then, Danilo
asked Rommel to buy cigarettes at Anderson’s store. The father of Rommel arrived
and stared at them, just as Rommel arrived. He knows that Nathaniel gave a statement
at the police station. Although in his affidavit he also mentioned Johnwayne Lindawan,
the police have not arrested him. Lindawan also alighted from the back of the tricycle
driver and he stood by the side of the road. He could not identify the tricycle driver.
3
Diorito Coronas, Jr., a billiard player by profession, usually played at the billiard hall
near the house of Noel Adallom in Sarep Street on the right side going up the road. On
October 28, 2001, about midnight, he was at the videoke bar, his usual hang out in
Sitio 6 going towards Talanay. While there, he heard gunfire so he immediately went
near a parked vehicle in front of the videoke bar. When he tried to investigate, he saw
three persons fall to the ground (Bumulagta noong pinagbabaril). Two of them were
already down and the third one stood up and ran even as the gunman continued firing.
He identified the man who ran away as Babelito Villareal (Samboy). It was Noel
Adallom whom he saw carrying the firearm which he described as a little less than 2
feet, shooting the three men. He saw Adallom’s companion and a third one who was
manning the tricycle. The place of the incident was well lighted but from where he was
standing, the light came only from the videoke bar. Then he noticed a yellow tricycle
without any plate number moving toward his direction while the two other guys went to
the opposite direction going upward. When he saw that they left, he immediately
approached the two men lying down. He identified one of them as Rommel who was
still moaning. He became apprehensive that someone might see him and his family
might be involved. He ran toward his house. He identified three sets of pictures marked
Exhibits A and B. He pointed to the place where the three guys who were shot at were
positioned.

On cross examination, Coronas identified the owner of the videoke bar as Anderson
Tuguinay.12

Janita, when she took the witness stand, detailed the expenses incurred for the funeral
and burial of her husband, Danilo.

Dr. Joselito reported that as a result of his autopsy examination of Danilo’s body, he
had determined that Danilo died from hemorrhagic shock due to multiple gunshot
wounds. There were six gunshot wounds in Danilo’s trunk and lower extremities. All
points of entry were at Danilo’s back. There were five exit wounds at the front portion of
Danilo’s body while one slug was recovered in Danilo’s liver. Dr. Joselito submitted the
recovered slug for ballistic examination. Dr. Joselito further elaborated on his findings
during his cross-examination:

On cross examination, among others, he stated that the autopsy was conducted on
October 28, 2001 at around 11:30 a.m. The abrasion on the victim’s right acromial
region was caused by friction of the skin on a rough hard surface. Gunshot wound no.
1 was directed anteriorwards, upwards and lateralwards meaning it came from the
back, traveled upwards from the center towards the sides. Its point of entry was 10 cm.
from the posterior midline while the point of exit was 20 cm. from the posterior midline.
The point of entry of gunshot wound No. 2 (depicted as POE No. 1 in Exhibit J) is 4 cm.
from the posterior midline and exited 6 cm. from the anterior midline. The bullet
traversed from the rear to the front going to the right side of the cadaver. The third
gunshot wound’s point of entry is at the right infrascapular region end exited also on
the right side of the chest but more towards the outer portion. The fourth gunshot
wound’s point of entry is on the left side, back to front, lateralwards meaning from
center or near the center towards the most outer part of the left side of the body. The
entrance and exit wound were on the same level. It is superficial wound meaning it did
not enter the peritonial cavity. The fifth gunshot wound was directed anteriorwards,
downwards and medialwards. Anteriorward means from the back, it is noted
downwards towards the foot while medialwards is towards the center. The sixth and
final gunshot wound was sustained at the right buttocks directed anteriorwards,
4
upwards and lateralwards, meaning from the back upwards going to the head and
lateralwards, meaning from the center to the outer side of the cadaver. Since the
entrance wounds were at the back of the cadaver, assuming the victim was not
moving, the assailant or muzzle of the gun was at the back of the victim. Except for the
fourth gunshot wound which entered and exited at the same level and the fifth gunshot
wound which was downwards, all the other gunshot wounds were directed upwards. If
the victim was in a sitting position at the time he sustained the wounds with an upward
trajectory, he would probably be in a ducking position, hence the upward trajectory. If
the victim was stationary at the time he was shot, it is possible the assailant was
moving but the most probable explanation for the differences in the level of the points
of entry in relation to the points of exit of the wounds is that the victim moved as a
result of the force of the bullet that entered his body. The slug that he extracted from
the cadaver of the victim was from a .30 caliber firearm based on the report of the
ballistician.13

The defense presented the testimonies of accused-appellant 14 himself; Mila Adallom

(Mila),15 accused-appellant’s wife; Aida Marquez (Aida); 16 Sgt. Anderson Tuguinay
(Anderson);17 Sgt. Agustin Adallom (Agustin);18 Editha Gutierrez (Editha);19 and
Elizabeth Buyayo (Elizabeth).20

Accused-appellant interposed the defenses of denial and alibi, to wit:

Noel Adallom, a machine operator, testified that on October 27, 2001, he arrived home
from work at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening and he saw his wife working on the
screen. He had coffee because he was not yet sleepy. He told his wife that he was
going to the billiard hall at Retota. On his way, he saw the group of Boying Hina having
a drinking spree. They gave him a shot of liquor but he refused because in that place,
riots were rampant. He has known Boying Hina since he started residing in Batasan
Hills in 1988. He went to the billiard hall owned by Ilustre. He is a new player and he
played in with one Zaldy. After that, he transferred to the Retota billiard hall. He arrived
there at about midnight. He played billiard with Danilo and Dominador Baldaba. They
were playing when they heard gunshots. The sound of the gun fire was rat-tat-tat. They
continued playing billiard until his wife arrived to fetch him. They stopped playing and
he went with her. His wife asked him to pass by Senatorial Road where the sounds of
gunshots came from. He saw Nanette Villareal Lindawan and asked her what was
happening. Nanette was crying and she said, "Patay na si kuya," referring to Danilo
Villareal. He has known Nanette from the time she got married. He talked to her in front
of her house in the middle portion of Senatorial Road. He identified a picture marked
Exhibit 3 showing the place where he talked to Nanette. When he was about to leave
the place, he saw Sgt. Tuguinay holding a flashlight. When he asked Sgt. Tuguinay
what happened, Tuguinay looked at him and did not say anything. He proceeded to
talk with Sgt. Agustin when a police patrol arrived. The police were asking for someone
who witnessed the incident. Babelito Villareal came out shirtless and boarded a mobile.
He and his wife proceeded home. The place as shown in Exhibit 3 was not lighted. It
was illuminated by some lights from other houses about ten meters away and you
would not be able to recognize faces. When shown a sketch, Exhibit 1, he pointed the
billiard place of Retota (Exhibit 1-I). The Avocado Road alley was marked Exhibit 3-A.
He was passing by that alley everyday in front of the house of Nanette. For the month
of October 1 to 15, he was assigned to the first shift and went to work in the morning
from 6:00 to 3:00 o’clock. From October 16 to the end of that month, he was on the
second shift arriving home at 11:00 o’clock in the evening. There was no electric bulb
in front of the house of Nanette. Across the house of Nanette is the house of Sgt.
5
Agustin Adallom. There was no bulb in front of his house. In the morning of October 28,
2001, he was planting pechay at the house of Agustin Adallom at about 9:00 o’clock in
the morning. On succeeding days after the incident, he usually left the house at
noontime because his work started at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon. He identified his
time record from October 1 to 15 marked Exhibit 4; the time card for October 16-31
marked Exhibit 4-A; the time card for November 1-15 marked Exhibit 4-B; and the time
card for November 16-30 marked as Exhibit 4-C. Exhibit number 7 has no signature
because that was the time he was arrested on November 19. When he is not working
he stayed at home. At the time he was arrested he was preparing coffee when he
heard someone calling from outside and found out that they were barangay officials
looking for him. He saw one BSDO jump over the fence with a gun so he became
afraid. They told him that he was the one who killed Danilo Villareal. They were not
accompanied by policemen. He was asking them why he was being apprehended
without a warrant of arrest. They told him to give his explanation at the barangay office.
He was handcuffed. They just placed him inside the cell for an hour. Policemen came
and brought him to Station 6. On the 20th of November, he was brought to Camp
Karingal and they asked for his name and occupation. They brought him to a vacant
room and asked him, "bakit mo pinatay si Villareal." He said he did not commit the
crime and they brought him back to the cell. On the 21st of November, he was brought
to Quezon City Hall for inquest. He saw the name of Wilfredo Maynigo on top of his
table. Upon investigation the prosecutor placed on top of the paper, "for further," (see
Exhibit 8). He knows Danilo Villareal and his wife Janita because their wives were
doing business of paluwagan. He met his wife in the house of Agustin Adallom and he
did not know that she and Danilo had an affair.

On cross examination, Noel Adallom said that he works as a machine operator since
1988. He recalled that October 28, 2001 was a Sunday and it was his day-off. He was
alone when he went to Retota billiard hall near Senatorial Road after telling his wife
that he would go there. Riots frequently happen on the upper portion of Senatorial
Road. When they heard gunshots they were playing billiard, and they stopped
momentarily. He was married to Mila Adallom in the year 2000 at a mass wedding but
he knew her since 1992. He did not have any knowledge that Danilo and his wife were
having an affair. He does not know of any such relationship nor did he hear any gossip
about that. He knew Babelito Villareal since 1988. There had been no quarrel between
them and does not know why he would point to him as the assassin. Mila fetched him
that early morning of October 28, 2001 at Retota. He would have still played billiard
with Danilo and Dominador but Mila came and asked him to go home because there
was a shooting at the upper portion of Senatorial Road. After the incident he talked
with Nanette, sister of Danilo Villareal and Babelito Villareal, and asked her what
happened. She told him that [her] kuya was dead. He has known Danilo since 1998
because Danilo’s wife and his wife were engaged in a paluwagan business. He seldom
talked with Danilo Villareal because both of them were working and they seldom saw
each other. He does not know of any reason to be jealous of Danilo because he does
not know anything about the alleged relationship between him and his wife. 21

Mila confirmed on the witness stand that her husband, accused-appellant, went out to
play billiards at around 11:30 p.m. on October 27, 2001. After midnight, she heard a
burst of gunfire. Fearing that accused-appellant might get into trouble, Mila decided to
fetch accused-appellant at Retota’s billiard hall. When she reached the billiard hall,
Mila asked accused-appellant, who was then still playing billiards, to go home with her.
To get home, Mila and accused-appellant took the route from Avocado Street to
Senatorial Road. There, at Senatorial Road, Mila saw Danilo and Rommel already
6
sprawled on the ground. On cross-examination, Mila denied having an affair with the
deceased Danilo.

Aida, an ambulant vendor, testified that in the early morning of October 28, 2001, she
was at a billiard hall watching accused-appellant, together with a certain Paeng and
Zaldy, play a game, when she heard gunshots.

Sgt. Anderson, who resided within the vicinity of the shooting incident, recollected that
at around past midnight of October 28, 2001, he was in a videoke bar with a certain
Boying, when he heard two successive automatic gunshots. He went out of the bar and
saw Nanette, Danilo’s sister, who he asked about what happened. Nanette responded
"binaril si manong." Sgt. Anderson went home and called the authorities. He went back
to the scene of the shooting with a flashlight to look for empty shells. Sgt. Anderson
also remembered that accused-appellant approached him and asked him about what
happened.

Sgt. Agustin, who likewise resided within the vicinity of the shooting incident, narrated
that he was awakened by a burst of gunfire in the early morning of October 28, 2001,
at around 12:45 a.m. He then heard someone shouting "wag sarge, wag sarge!" Then
he heard another burst of gunfire. He went out of his house and proceeded to
Senatorial Road. There he saw blood in front of the window of the house of Nanette,
Danilo’s sister, and a lot of people already milling around. Among the people he saw
were Nanette, accused-appellant, and Sgt. Anderson. Sgt. Agustin acknowledged that
accused-appellant is his first-degree cousin and that he did not personally witness the
shooting incident.

Editha is another ambulant vendor who recalled that at around 2:00 a.m. on October
28, 2001, she met a certain Boying (purportedly Rommel’s father) on the road, who told
her that his son was shot. Editha admitted, however, that she had no personal
knowledge of the shooting incident.

The last witness for the defense was Elizabeth, accused-appellant’s distant relative,
and the neighbor and close friend of Janita, Danilo’s wife. Elizabeth stated under oath
before the RTC that on October 28, 2001, she opened her gate and saw people
gathering at Senatorial Road. From listening to the stories of the bystanders, she
learned that someone was shot at around 1:00 a.m. on October 28, 2001 by two
persons wearing bonnets and riding a motorcycle. According to Elizabeth, Janita had
never confided to her any marital problem with Danilo.

The prosecution presented on rebuttal Nanieta Lindawan (Nanieta), who gave the
following account of the events that transpired in the early morning of October 28,
2001:

Testifying on rebuttal, Nanieta Lindawan denied having met, seen or talk[ed] with
Adallom, a townmate of her husband, in the early morning of October 28, 2001. There
was never a time after the killing of [her] brother Danilo that she saw the accused on
Senatorial Road. She belied the testimony of Agustin Adallom that he talked to her in
the morning of October 28, 2001. She knows that he is a soldier stationed in Camp
Capinpin and that he comes home only once a month for a day, either Saturday or
Sunday. She is also sure that witness Sgt. Anderson Tuguinay was not able to talk to
her that morning because after the incident, she was alone in the middle of the road
crying.

7
On cross-examination, among others, she stated that the incident happened right in
front of her house. She was at home with her sisters and they were sleeping when she
heard successive gunfire. She peeped out of the window and she saw two persons
lying face down, Danilo and [Rommel]. She was able to recognize her brother because
he was facing the window. She went out of the house minutes after the last gunshot.
She called for her siblings. Except for the neighbor of her Ate [Janita], none of their
neighbors came out because they were afraid. Her brother Babelito was also there and
he told her that he was almost hit. Danilo was already brought to the hospital before
the police arrived in unmarked vehicles. Although Sgt. Tuguinay owns a delivery van,
they did not try to borrow it to bring Danilo to the hospital because Tuguinay does not
lend his vehicle to anyone. She denied having borrowed facilities, like chairs and
tables, from her best friend Elizabeth, who owns a school. Elizabeth told Nanieta’s
husband that she was afraid to go to the wake because it was her gun which was used
in the shooting. She admitted she saw Elizabeth at the wake once. She does not
remember the last time when Sgt. Agustin Adallom came home from Camp Capinpin.
Her husband is also stationed in Camp Capinpin and if Sgt. Agustin was really there at
the time of the incident, he would have offered to inform her husband about the
incident.22

The documentary exhibits for the prosecution – consisting of Babelito’s sworn

statement, in a question and answer form, executed before PO3 Leo Tabuena on
November 21, 2001; sketch and photographs of the location of the shooting incident;
Danilo’s death certificate; the autopsy report on Danilo’s body; receipts and list of
funeral and burial expenses incurred by Danilo’s heirs; and the ballistics report which
stated that the bullet recovered at the scene came from a .30 caliber firearm – were all
admitted by the RTC in its Order23 dated September 2, 2002.

The defense submitted its own documentary exhibits, specifically, photographs of

several bullet holes at the store where Danilo, Rommel, and Babelito were shot to
show the trajectory of the bullets; sketch of the location of the shooting incident;
accused-appellant’s daily time records from his work for the months of October and
November 2001; and Janita’s letter-complaint dated November 19, 2001 against
accused-appellant. All these exhibits were admitted by the RTC in its Order 24 dated
June 23, 2003.

On December 15, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision giving more credence to the
positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses Babelito and Diorito and finding
implausible accused-appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi. The RTC pronounced
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder of Danilo in
Criminal Case No. Q-01-105875 and attempted murder of Babelito in Criminal Case
No. Q-01-105877; but dismissed the charge against accused-appellant for the murder
of Rommel in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105876 because of insufficiency of evidence.
The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused NOEL ADALLOM guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder described and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Article 63 thereof, and there being no other aggravating
circumstance attending the commission of the crime, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Danilo
Villareal, as follows:

1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

8
 2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

3. ₱57,084.80 as actual damages; and

4. To pay the costs.

With respect to Crim. Case No. Q-01-105817 for the attempted murder of Babelito
Villareal after applying the indeterminate sentence law, the court hereby sentences
accused to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of
prision mayor.

For insufficiency of evidence, Criminal Case No. Q-01-105876 is hereby dismissed. 25

Accused-appellant appealed the foregoing RTC judgment before the Court of Appeals.
Accused-appellant filed his Brief26 on January 13, 2006 while plaintiff-appellee,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Brief 27 on May 29, 2006.

In its Decision dated July 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals agreed with the factual
findings of the RTC and ruled thus:

Verily, we reiterate the jurisprudential doctrine that great weight is accorded to the
factual findings of the trial court particularly on the ascertainment of the credibility of
witnesses; this can only be discarded or disturbed when it appears in the record that
the trial court overlooked, ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight
or significance which if considered would have altered the result. In the course of our
review, the records disclose, that the trial court has considered all the evidences of
both parties and, thus, has ruled correctly. Trial courts have the opportunity to see
witnesses as they testify in court, an opportunity not readily available to appellate
courts.

Thus, we find no reason to depart from the above ruling. We have examined the
records and we confirm the trial court’s findings that the testimonies of the witnesses
are more trustworthy than the testimonies of the defense witnesses, particularly the
appellant’s.

With the application of prevailing laws and jurisprudence to the evidence presented,
We cannot conclude otherwise but rule for the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in
toto.28

Hence, accused-appellant comes before us on appeal.

In our Resolution29 dated July 23, 2008, we required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs. Both plaintiff-appellee and accused-appellant manifested,
however, that they had already exhausted their arguments before the Court of Appeals
and would no longer file any supplemental brief. 30

Accused-appellant assails his conviction for murder and attempted murder on these
grounds:

9
A. The trial court erred in finding the testimony of Babelito Villareal and Diorito
Coronas, Jr. credible.31

1.) The trial court misapplied the doctrine that the relationship of the witness to
the victim does not make the former a biased witness, but rather makes his
testimony more credible.32

2.) The trial court’s findings that Babelito and [Diorito] narrated as they saw the
incident in a clear, simple and direct manner; and, that their testimonies jive on
material points are seriously belied by the evidence extant on the record. 33

3.) The trial court’s finding that Babelito and [Diorito] could not have been
mistaken with the identity of Noel Adallom because he had been a long time
resident of the place is highly speculative.34

4.) The trial court’s finding that the place where the incident occurred was
lighted.35

5.) The trial court’s finding that no motive was shown for the two witnesses to
prevaricate and concoct the story to implicate Adallom with the killing is uncalled
for.36

B. The trial court erred in relying on the weakness of the defense rather on the strength
of the prosecution’s evidence.37

C. The trial court erred in not finding that the evidence on record raise a reasonable
doubt that the accused was the assailant.38

Plaintiff-appellee counter-argues that:

The testimony of Babelito Villareal, an eye witness and survivor of the assault,
established with utmost certainty the identity of appellant as the assailant and
gunman.

II

The prosecution established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

III

Appellant’s defense of denial is weak and without factual basis. 39

We sustain the conviction of accused-appellant for both crimes.

Jurisprudence dictates that "when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of
fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if
such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial
court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
binding upon this Court."40

10
We find no cogent reason to deviate from the cited case doctrine.

As aptly appreciated by the RTC, prosecution witnesses Babelito and Diorito both
positively identified accused-appellant as the person who treacherously shot Danilo
and Babelito, and ultimately succeeded in killing Danilo. Said witnesses gave a
forthright and consistent narration of what they had actually witnessed the early
morning of October 28, 2001 at Senatorial Road.

Babelito had to relive before the RTC the traumatic experience of seeing his brother
Danilo killed and barely escaping with his own life:

Q And can you tell us where were the three of you during that time?

A I was in front of my house which is also in front of the store of my sister

Nanieta.

xxxx

Q And what were the three of you doing at that time?

A We were seated in front of the store of my sister drinking beer, sir.

xxxx

Q And you said that you ran out of beer, what happened after you ran out of
beer?

A We stopped drinking and then a tricycle arrived with its lights out and its engine
turned off. It was still moving because the road was on a downward slope, sir.

xxxx

Q At the time that you noticed the said tricycle, can you tell us what time was
that?

A 12:45 in the morning of October 28, 2001, sir.

Q When you noticed the said tricycle moving downwards because of the sloping
road, what happened next?

A Noel Adallom alighted from the tricycle. He got out of the sidecar.

Q By the way, were you able to count how many persons were inside the
tricycle?

A There were three of them: the tricycle driver, Noel Adallom and John Win
Lindawan.

Q You said Noel Adallom was inside the tricycle, at the time, where was he
seated in the tricycle?

A Inside the tricycle, sir.

Q Now, what happened next when Noel Adallom alighted?

11
A He fired his gun, sir.

Q From the place wherein Noel Adallom alighted immediately thereafter fired his
gun, how far was your group from him?

A About 4 meters, sir.

Q Now, you said Mr. Adallom alighted and fired his gun, can you remember what
kind of firearm he used at the time?

A Carbine.

Q Was it a long or short firearm?

A Long firearm, sir.

Q And when he alighted and fired his gun, what happened to your group, if any?

A There were successive shots and I just saw gunbursts and he was saying,
"Ano? Ano?" while he was firing successively at my brother and Rommel Hina
who was already moaning.

Q Can you tell us your relative positions at the time Mr. Adallom fired his gun?

A I was at the back by the wall fronting the road and my brother’s back was
fronting the street facing me.

Q How about Mr. Hina, where was he positioned?

A On my right side, sir.

Q Can you tell us from what direction the said tricycle came from?

A From my left side, sir.

Q So, you are telling us that the tricycle which had no lights and with engines not
running just came by the road and 4 meters from you, Mr. Adallom alighted and
fired his gun?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what was the relative position of your brother when Noel Adallom fired his
gun?

A While the tricycle was coming down the road, my brother turned his head and
tried to run but he was already hit all at the back by the volley of fire.

Q What about Rommel Hina, what happened to him?

A He was also hit.

Q How about you?

12
A When I saw gunfire, I just closed my eyes and leaned against the wall and
turned my head to the right and slowly, I moved my leg downwards and just
waited for what would happen next.

Q And can you tell us what happened to you after you just left your fate to God?

A When my brother and Rommel fell, the firing stopped. I turned my head and I
noticed that Noel Adallom looked surprised.

Q When Noel Adallom looked surprised upon seeing you still alive, what
happened next?

A He again fired a succession of shots and then I heard "tak-tak."

Q And would you know what that sound was that you heard?

A I surmised that the gun must have jammed, sir.

Q What did you do, if any, when you realized that the gun must have jammed?

A I thought of standing up and running and I again heard a burst of gunfire, "rat-
tat-tat."

Q What happened when you heard another round of gunfire?

A I sought cover behind a vehicle and I ran towards the corner to

escape.41 (Emphases supplied.)

Diorito corroborated Babelito’s testimony when he recounted before the RTC the
following:

Q Now, you said that you were at the said videoke bar at around 11:30 to 12:00
o’clock; while you were there at the said videoke, what happened if any?

A When I heard a gunfire, I immediately proceeded near the vehicle to look on

what is happening.

Q Now, you said that you heard a gunfire; when you heard that gunfire, who were
with you during that time?

A I was alone.

Q And you said that after hearing a gunfire you went out near a vehicle that was
parked; can you tell us where is that vehicle that was parked where you went for
cover?

A The vehicle is right in front of the videoke bar where we usually hang out and it
so happened that the vehicle is also owned by the owner of that videoke bar.

xxxx

Q You said you went to that vehicle which was parked, what else did you do after
going near the vehicle?

13
A I was looking who shot who.

Q And what did you see if any?

A I saw three persons who fell (bumulagta noong pinagbabaril).

Q Now, you said that you saw three men who just fell when shots were fired
upon, [is] any of those three men present in today’s courtroom whom you said
that fell down, can you identify them?

A The two persons are already dead but the other, I got surprised when he
immediately ran.

Q That person that stood up, can you identify him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you kindly tell us his name if you know it?

A Samboy, sir.

Q Is he present in today’s courtroom? Can you kindly stand up and point to us

that person? Kindly tap the shoulder of that person.

A (Witness tapping the shoulder of a man who when asked answered that his
name is Babelito Villareal.)

Q Aside from seeing those three men whom you said fell down, what else did
you see if any?

A I saw one person firing shots and the other one is facing in front of the house of
Samboy and the other person was manning the tricycle.

Q So, all in all, there were three persons that you saw other than those three
other persons whom you said fell down, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q You said that you saw one of those three persons firing a gun, can you kindly
describe to us that gun that was used by the said person?

A The size of the gun that he was using was like this (witness demonstrating),
less than two feet. But I don’t know what kind.

Q That person whom you saw carrying a firearm and was shooting that men, if
that person is present in today’s courtroom, can you identify him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you kindly step down again and tap the shoulder of that person whom you
saw?

A (Witness tapping the shoulder of a person who gave his name as Noel
Adallom)
14
Q Now, when this shooting incident took place, can you kindly tell us how far
were this group of men whom you said were shot from the place where you were
hiding or covering near the vehicle?

A Same distance more or less eight meters.

Q How about the gunman who was shooting these three men, how far were you
from him?

A It is farther by half meter.

Q You said that you saw this incident that took place, can you kindly tell us what
was the lighting condition during that time that this incident happened?

A The place where the incident happened, it was well-lighted, however, from
where I stand, the place was not lighted. The light came only from the videoke
bar.

xxxx

Q You said that after you saw Mr. Adallom shot these three men, what else did
you see if any?

A When he started firing at these three men, right after, I saw one person
immediately stood up and ran away and right after that, Noel Adallom kept on
firing at the guy who was running.

Q When you said that guy stood up you were referring to Babelito Villareal, that
one that you just pointed prior to the accused?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what happened next after Mr. Adallom was not able to hit Mr. Babelito
Villareal?

A I noticed a yellow tricycle without plate number which immediately started its
engine and moved downward towards my direction and the other two guys went
on the other direction going upward.

Q How about you, what did you do next after seeing that incident?

A I immediately approached the two guys who were lying down.

Q And what did you see if any after that?

A I still heard one guy in the person of Rommel who was still moaning.

Q After hearing Rommel still moaning, what did you do, if any?

A I was a bit apprehensive because maybe somebody will see me and my family
will be involved so I immediately ran away from the scene.

Q Where did you go after running away?

15
 A I immediately went to my house.42 (Emphases supplied.)

Accused-appellant’s attacks on the credibility of Babelito and Diorito are unconvincing,

each having already been soundly rejected by the Court of Appeals, thus:

The accused-appellant is not successful in proving the incredibility and improbability of

the testimonies of the [prosecution’s] two eye witnesses, hence, his arguments on the
slight difference in the location and nature of gunshot wounds as opposed to the
position of the assailant as testified by the witness are not sufficient to overturn the
eyewitness accounts of Diorito and Babelito. The positive identification of the witnesses
is more than enough to prove the accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant argues that the delay in charging him raises serious doubts on
Babelito’s testimony. Well settled is the rule that "Delay in making criminal accusations
will not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily
explained." It has been established that the delay in filing a criminal complaint is
attributed to his confusion and desire to consult his sister-in-law who is the wife of
deceased Danilo. He also testified that he did not file a complaint immediately,
because he did not want to disturb the wake of his brother. Such explanation is
acceptable. True enough, he filed a complaint with the barangay officials and asked for
their assistance in bringing accused-appellant to Station 6 after the funeral of his
brother.1âwphi1

Accused-appellant tried to attack the reliability of Babelito’s testimony by insisting that

the story told by Babelito does not jive with the story told by the physical evidence
consisting of the wounds sustained by the body of Danilo. We are not convinced.
Accused-appellant is capitalizing on the fact that the location and nature of the gunshot
wounds sustained by deceased Danilo is anteriorwards, lateralwards and going to the
right. Simply stated, the direction of the wounds are slightly going upwards to the right,
which according to the accused-appellant is impossible to be sustained by the
deceased, because (as told by Babelito) he is standing up when he shot deceased
Danilo, who is seated on the street. Such argument lacks merit. As explained by Dr.
Rodrigo in his testimony, the body of Danilo could have moved and slumped forward
when he was being hit by bullets in rapid succession and the position of his body has
changed. When the bullets hit the body of the deceased, the body was already on the
ground face down and the natural trajectory of bullets is upward, toward the head of
the deceased. It is established that accused-appellant Noel was shooting while he was
standing and the deceased was already on the ground. So when you try to examine
the body and let it stand up, it would naturally create an impression that the bullets’
direction is upward. The explanation is so simple, the body received the bullets while it
is slumped, with face forward on the ground, and accused-appellant Noel was shooting
while he was standing up. Such explanation is corroborated by Babelito’s account that
Danilo tried to turn his shoulders to face his left side, before he fell furthermore, such
testimony is also corroborated by the testimony of Nanette which claimed that Danilo
fell at the spot marked as Exhibit 2-C as told by Babelito. 43 (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted.)

In contrast, accused-appellant proffered the defenses of denial and alibi, which are the
weakest of defenses in criminal cases. The well-established rule is that denial and alibi
are self-serving negative evidence; they cannot prevail over the spontaneous, positive,
and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who pointed to and identified the

16
accused-appellant as the malefactor. "Indeed, alibi is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove."44

Although accused-appellant presented other witnesses to supposedly corroborate his

alibi, we could not ascribe much probative weight to said witnesses’ testimonies. None
of said witnesses actually saw the shooting, most only heard the gunshots and arrived
at the scene after the shooting took place and, thus, had no personal knowledge of the
said incident. Except for Aida, no other witness for the defense was physically with
accused-appellant at the exact time of the shooting. And even Aida’s testimony is
unreliable given the observation of the RTC that it is in conflict with that of accused-
appellant. Accused-appellant claimed that he first went to the billiard hall owned by
Ilustre where he played with a certain Zaldy and then he transferred to Retota’s billiard
hall where he was playing with Danilo and Dominador Baldaba when he heard the
gunshots. Yet, Aida attested that she was watching accused-appellant playing billiards
with a certain Zaldy when she heard the gunshots.

In sum, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-
appellant for the murder of Danilo in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105875 and attempted
murder of Babelito in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105877.

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to
death.45 With the repeal of the death penalty law, the only penalty prescribed by law for
the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua. The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not
apply, inter alia, to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life
imprisonment, including reclusion perpetua. Hence, accused-appellant has been
properly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the murder of Danilo
in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105875.

However, we find it necessary to modify the award of damages to Danilo’s heirs in

Criminal Case No. Q-01-105875. Consistent with prevailing case law, 46 accused-
appellant must pay Danilo’s heirs the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to
the sum of ₱57,084.80 as actual damages.

For the crime of attempted murder, the penalty shall be prision mayor, since Article 51
of the Revised Penal Code states that a penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in
an attempt to commit a felony. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
of the sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending
circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range of
prision mayor in its medium term, which has a duration of eight (8) years and one (1)
day to ten (10) years; and that the minimum should be within the range of prision
correccional, which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Hence, we sentence accused-appellant to suffer imprisonment from six (6) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum, for the attempted murder of Babelito in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105877.

We further order accused-appellant to pay Babelito the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as civil

indemnity, ₱10,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages in
Criminal Case No. Q-01-105877.
17
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant Noel T. Adallom is DENIED for
lack of merit. The Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00365, which affirmed the Decision dated December 15, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-105875 and
Q-01-105877, finding Noel T. Adallom guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
murder and attempted murder, respectively, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS as to the penalties and awards imposed:

1) For the murder of Danilo Villareal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105875, Noel T.
Adallom is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ORDERED to pay the heirs of Danilo Villareal the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and ₱57,084.80 as actual damages; and

2) For the attempted murder of Babelito Villareal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-
105877, Noel T. Adallom is SENTENCED to suffer imprisonment from six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum, and ORDERED to pay Babelito Villareal the
amounts of ₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱10,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

____

G.R. No. 180291               July 27, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA,

in his capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS, Petitioners,
vs.
DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL
RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE
LEGARDA, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for certiorari of Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil Service Commission's Resolution No.
062177.

THE FACTS:

Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the

GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth
Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco,
and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative
Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in relation to
Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
18
Civil Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987, committed as follows:

That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees,
marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation
Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and
Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;

x x x           x x x          x x x

That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS
management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred
by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing
as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known
as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;

That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution
No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on
Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened
some employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours. 2

This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum
dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-SD),
Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS Investigation Unit (GSIS-
IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents
requiring them to explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they
should not be administratively dealt with.3

Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two
others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005. Denying that
there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained that their act of going to
the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former
union president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support,
they were interested in that hearing as it might also affect them. For her part,
respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a scheduled
pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate
supervisor about it, attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing. These letters were not
under oath.4

PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct
and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against each of the
respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to submit their
written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt thereof. 5 None was filed.

On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding
all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of one (1)
year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the

lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced
the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied their right
to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,
19
x x x. The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red shirts, to witness a
public hearing cannot be considered as constitutive of such offense. Appellants'
(respondents herein) assembly at the said office to express support to Velasco, their
Union President, who pledged to defend them against any oppression by the GSIS
management, can be considered as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a
constitutionally guaranteed right.6 x x x

PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the
Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure.7 The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:

The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the act sought to be
punished hardly falls within the definition of a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the
respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the public service.
Only about twenty (20) out of more than a hundred employees at the main office,
joined the activity sought to be punished. These employees, now respondents in this
case, were assigned at different offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite the
belated claim of the petitioners that the act complained of had created substantial
disturbance inside the petitioner GSIS' premises during office hours, there is nothing in
the record that could support the claim that the operational capacity of petitioner GSIS
was affected or reduced to substantial percentage when respondents gathered at the
Investigation Unit. Despite the hazy claim of the petitioners that the gathering was
intended to force the Investigation Unit and petitioner GSIS to be lenient in the
handling of Atty. Molina's case and allow Atty. Velasco to represent Atty. Molina in his
administrative case before petitioner GSIS, there is likewise no concrete and
convincing evidence to prove that the gathering was made to demand or force
concessions, economic or otherwise from the GSIS management or from the
government. In fact, in the separate formal charges filed against the respondents,
petitioners clearly alleged that respondents "marched to or appeared simultaneously at
or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of
protest and support for Mssrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter
surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises." Thus, petitioners are aware at the outset
that the only apparent intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to show
support to Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, their union officers. The belated
assertion that the intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to disrupt the
operation and pressure the GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina
and Albert Velasco, is only an afterthought.8

Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review presenting
the following:

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY SUPPLETORILY THE

PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY
THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND FAILURE TO FILE ANSWER,
WHERE THE RESPONDENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS DID NOT
FILE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE FORMAL CHARGES AGAINST THEM.

20
 II

WHETHER THE RULE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS CANNOT BE

EQUATED WITH DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL SENSE AUTHORIZES AN
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL TO CONSIDER IN EVIDENCE AND GIVE FULL
PROBATIVE VALUE TO UNNOTARIZED LETTERS THAT DID NOT FORM PART OF
THE CASE RECORD.

III

WHETHER A DECISION THAT MAKES CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS BASED ON

EVIDENCE ON RECORD BUT MAKES A CONCLUSION OF LAW BASED ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF A DOCUMENT THAT NEVER FORMED PART OF THE CASE
RECORDS IS VALID.

IV

WHETHER FURTHER PROOF OF SUSBTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE

OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF AN AGENCY, DUE TO UNRULY MASS GATHERING
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN OFFICE
HOURS, IS REQUIRED TO HOLD THE SAID EMPLOYEES LIABLE FOR CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE PURSUANT TO CSC
RESOLUTION NO. 021316.

WHETHER AN UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF TWENTY EMPLOYEES, LASTING

FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR DURING OFFICE HOURS, INSIDE OFFICE
PREMISES AND WITHIN A UNIT TASKED TO HEAR AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE,
TO PROTEST THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR
LEADER AS COUNSEL IN THE SAID ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, FALLS WITHIN THE
PURVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY.

VI

WHETHER THE CONCERTED ABANDONMENT OF EMPLOYEES OF THEIR

POSTS FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR TO HOLD AN UNRULY PROTEST INSIDE
OFFICE PREMISES ONLY CONSTITUTES THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE OF
VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS. 9

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters of

explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The
respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges. The petitioners argue that
there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed should
have been deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court
which provides:

SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.- Material averment

in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of liquidated damages, shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to
21
recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under
oath.

According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to
Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election
cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (underscoring supplied)

The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners' own rules,
Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 178-
04, specifically provides:

If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of the
Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he shall be considered to
have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in
proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the facts and evidence
submitted by the prosecution.

A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an
answer merely translates to a waiver of "his right to file an answer." There is nothing in
the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not done away with the
burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.

It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a
"suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying deficiencies." 10 It means
that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an
insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules
of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly
stated there is that GSIS may "render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and
evidence submitted by the prosecution."

Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this
case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not deemed
admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial allegations and
incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint. 11 Thus, even if
respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the
complaint will be considered as true and correct in their entirety, and that the
forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget
that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the
petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations
in the complaint or in the formal charges.12

A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case was
resolved against petitioners based, not on the absence of respondents' evidence, but
on the weakness of that of the petitioners. Thus, the CA wrote:

Petitioners correctly submitted the administrative cases for resolution without the
respondents' respective answer to the separate formal charges in accordance with
Section 4, Rule XI of the RPAI. Being in full control of the administrative proceeding
and having effectively prevented respondents from further submitting their responsive
22
answer and evidence for the defense, petitioners were in the most advantageous
position to prove the merit of their allegations in the formal charges. When petitioner
Winston Garcia issued those similarly worded decisions in the administrative cases
against the respondents, it is presumed that all evidence in their favor were duly
submitted and justly considered independent of the weakness of respondent's
evidence in view of the principle that ''the burden of proof belongs to the one who
alleges and not the one who denies." 13

On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question of
whether or not there was a violation of Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316.
Stated differently, whether or not respondents' actions on May 27, 2005 amounted to a
"prohibited concerted activity or mass action." Pertinently, the said provision states:

Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ''prohibited concerted activity or
mass action'' shall be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or through their employees organizations, with
intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands
of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the
government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.
(underscoring supplied)

In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office
wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or
mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations can be deemed
an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no
cogent reason to deviate therefrom.

As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the
political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action
proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing similarly
colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them
recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards and PGM
Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service
disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.

Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-
1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective
activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we
would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression.

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the
land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights
and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It
would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof
have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated
only but can never be taken away.

A review of PGM Garcia's formal charges against the respondents reveals that he
himself was not even certain whether the respondents and the rest of the twenty or so
GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful day marched there or just

23
simply appeared there simultaneously.14 Thus, the petitioners were not even sure if the
spontaneous act of each of the twenty or so GSIS employees on May 27, 2005 was a
concerted one. The report of Manager Nagtalon of the GSIS-SD which was the basis
for PGM Garcia's formal charges reflected such uncertainty. Thus,

Of these red shirt protesters, only Mr. Molina has official business at the Investigation
Unit during this time. The rest abandoned their post and duties for the duration of this
incident which lasted until 10:55 A.M. It was also observed that the protesters, some of
whom raised their clenched left fists, carefully planned this illegal action as evident in
their behavior of arrogance, defiance and provocation, the presence of various
recording gadgets such as VCRs, voice recorders and digital cameras, the bad
mouthing of the security guards and the PGM, the uniformity in their attire and the
collusion regarding the anomalous entry of Mr. Albert Velasco to the premises as
reported earlier.15

The said report of Nagtalon contained only bare facts. It did not show respondents'
unified intent to effect disruption or stoppage in their work. It also failed to show that
their purpose was to demand a force concession.

In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, 16 the Court
upheld the position of petitioner GSIS because its employees, numbering between 300
and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest or
demonstration outside the GSIS for four straight days. We cannot say the same for the
20 or so employees in this case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the
GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action in Kapisanan ng
mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner would most
certainly be unfair and unjust.

Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the government's
right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct, tend to lean towards a
broad definition of "public concern speech" which is protected by their First
Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v. Meters. 17 In said case, the New York
Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New York City's mass transit
service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their
uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition
to a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its rule
and threatened to subject these union members to discipline. The court, though
recognizing the government's right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that the
NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard."

In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital

District,18 it was held that,

A county hospital employee's wearing of a "Union Yes" lapel pin during a union
organization drive constituted speech on a matter of public concern, and the county's
proffered interest in enforcing the anti-adornment provision of its dress code was
outweighed by the employee's interest in exercising his First Amendment speech and
associational rights by wearing a pro-union lapel button. 19

Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's
Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action
has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition,

24
respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the assailed August 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals as well
as its October 16, 2007 Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 98952 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184500               September 11, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PIIILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WENCESLAO NELMIDA @ "ESLAO," and RICARDO AJOK @
"PORDOY," Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The subject of this present appeal is the Decision 1 dated 18 June 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246, affirming the Decision 2 dated 30 September 2005
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. 21-910, finding herein appellants Wenceslao Nelmida @ "Eslao"
(Wenceslao) and Ricardo Ajok @

"Pordoy" (Ricardo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder, thereby sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellants were likewise ordered to indemnify, jointly
and severally, the heirs of each of the deceased victims, i.e., Police Officer 3 Hernando
P. Dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz) and

Technical Sergeant Ramon Dacoco (T/Sgt. Dacoco), the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 each
as moral damages and ₱ 50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for the death of each of the
said victims. Similarly, appellants were directed to pay, jointly and severally, Mayor
Johnny Tawan-tawan the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees, as well as
the costs of the suit.

Appellants and their co-accused Samuel Cutad @ "Sammy" (Samuel), Brigido Abais
@ "Bidok" (Brigido), Pedro Serafico @ "Peter" (Pedro), Eduardo Bacong, Sr. (Eduardo,
Sr.), Eduardo Bacong, Jr. @ "Junjun" (Eduardo, Jr.), Alejandro Abarquez (Alejandro),
Ruben Bartolo @ "Yoyoy Bulhog" (Ruben), Arnel Espanola @ "Toto Ilongo" (Arnel),
Alfredo Paninsuro @ "Tambok" (Alfredo), Opao Casinillo (Opao) and other John Does,
were charged in an Amended Information3 dated 3 October 2001 with the crime of
double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 5th day of June 2001, at SAN MANUEL, Lala, Lanao del Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
appellants and their co-accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with assorted high-powered firearms and hand-grenade, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery, evident premidation (sic),
taking advantage of their superiority in strength and in numbers, and with intent to kill,

25
ambush, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the persons of the following,
namely:

1. PO3 Dela Cruz, Philippine National Police (PNP);

2. T/Sgt. Dacoco, Philippine Army (PA);

3. Private First Class (PFC) Haron Angni, PA;

4. PFC Gador4 Tomanto, PA;

5. Juanito Ibunalo;

6. Mosanif5 Ameril;

7. Macasubar6 Tandayao;

8. Mayor Johnny Tawantawan;7 and

9. Jun Palanas

by then and there firing and shooting them with said high-powered firearms thereby
inflicting upon the persons of PO3 De la Cruz, T/Sgt. Dacoco, PFC Haron Angni, PFC
Gapor Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba Tandayao gunshot
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of the death of PO3 De la Cruz
and T/Sgt. Dacoco and the serious wounding of said PFC Haron Angni, PFC Gapor
Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba Tandayao that without the
medical assistance would have caused their deaths, while Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan
and Jun Palanas were not hit.8

When arraigned, appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo, assisted by their counsel de

parte9 and counsel de oficio,10 respectively; and their co-accused Samuel, likewise
assisted by counsel de oficio,11 all entered separate pleas of

NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. The rest of the accused in this case, however,
remained at large. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

Meanwhile, or on 21 January 2003, however, the prosecution filed a Motion to

Discharge Accused Samuel To Be Utilized As State Witness, 12 which the court a quo
granted in an Order dated 12 February 2003. 13 Also, upon motion of the prosecution,
the court a quo issued another Order dated 17 March 2003, 14 directing the release of
Samuel from detention following his discharge as state witness.

As such, Samuel, together with 13 more witnesses, namely, Macasuba Tandayao

(Macasuba), Mosanip Ameril (Mosanip), PFC Gapor Tomanto (PFC Tomanto), Merlina
Dela Cruz (Merlina), Senior Police Inspector Renato Salazar (Senior P/Insp. Salazar),
PFC Haron Angni (PFC Angni), Senior Police Officer 4 Raul Torres Medrano (SPO4
Medrano), Senior Police Officer 1 Ferdinand Suaring (SPO1 Suaring), Senior Police
Officer 2 Ivan Mutia Evasco (SPO2 Evasco), Senior Police Officer 4 Emmie
Subingsubing (SPO4 Subingsubing), Juanito Ibunalo (Juanito), Senior

Police Officer 3 Tommy Umpa (SPO3 Umpa), and Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan (Mayor
Tawan-tawan), testified for the prosecution.

26
The factual milieu of this case as culled from the testimonies of the aforesaid
prosecution witnesses is as follows:

On 5 June 2001, Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, together with his
security escorts composed of some members of the Philippine Army, Philippine
National Police (PNP) and civilian aides, to wit: (1) T/Sgt. Dacoco; (2) PFC Angni; (3)
PFC Tomanto; (4) PO3 Dela Cruz; (5) Juanito; (6) Mosanip; (7) Macasuba; and (8) a
certain Jun, respectively, were in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. In the afternoon, the group
went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on board the yellow pick-up service vehicle of
Mayor Tawan-tawan with Plate No. JRT 818 driven by Juanito. Sitting at the passenger
seat of the aforesaid vehicle was Mayor Tawan-tawan while those at the back seat
were Mosanip, Jun, and Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind Juanito. Those
seated on a wooden bench installed at the rear (open) portion of the said yellow pick-
up service vehicle were PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.
PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were sitting beside each other facing the right side of the
road while PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco were both seated behind PFC Tomanto
and PFC Angni facing the left side of the road. 15

At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their aforenamed co-
accused, brought Samuel to a waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, the one located on the left side of the road going to Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
Samuel was instructed by appellants and their co-accused to stay in the said waiting
shed while they assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of the
road, which is more or less five (5) meters away from the shed. Then, appellants and
their co-accused surreptitiously waited for the vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-
tawan.16

A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-
tawan approaching towards the direction of Salvador, Lanao del Norte. The moment
the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan passed by the aforesaid
waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the
vehicle using high-powered firearms.

Both Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind the driver, and PFC Tomanto,
who was then sitting on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle,
saw appellant Wenceslao on the right side of the road firing at them in a squatting
position using an M-16 armalite rifle.

Macasuba was also able to identify appellants Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo,
Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the ambushers. Mayor Tawan-tawan ordered Juanito
to keep on driving to avoid greater casualties. The vehicle stopped upon reaching the
army and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) detachment in Curva,
Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Mayor Tawan-tawan then asked assistance
therefrom.17

Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house
of Samuel’s aunt located, more or less, 10 meters away from the site of the ambush to
get their bags and other stuff. The house of Samuel’s aunt was the place where
appellants and their co-accused stayed prior to the incident. Samuel followed
appellants and their co-accused to the house of his aunt. Thereafter, appellants and
their co-accused hurriedly ran towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy,
Lanao del Norte.18
27
On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, namely,
PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, died, while others suffered injuries. In particular,
Macasuba was slightly hit on the head by shrapnel; Mosanip sustained injury on his
shoulder that almost severed his left arm; PFC Tomanto was hit on the right and left
sides of his body, on his left leg and knee; PFC Angni was hit on his left shoulder; and
Juanito was hit on his right point finger, right head and left hip. Mayor Tawan-tawan
and Jun were not injured.19

All the victims of the ambush, except Macasuba, were brought to Bontilao Country
Clinic in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and were later transferred to Mindanao
Sanitarium and Hospital in Tibanga, Iligan City. PO3 Dela Cruz, however, died before
reaching the hospital while T/Sgt. Dacoco died in the hospital. PFC Tomanto stayed at
Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital for 13 days before he was transferred to Camp
Evangelista Hospital in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, and then in a hospital in Manila
and Quezon City. PFC Angni stayed for seven (7) days in Mindanao Sanitarium and
Hospital before he was transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital, where he was
confined for one (1) month. PFC Angni was transferred to V. Luna Hospital in Quezon
City and was confined therein for two (2) months. 20

On the other hand, Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members of the CAFGU
went back to the site of the ambush but appellants and their co-accused were no
longer there. Not long after, SPO4 Medrano, Chief of Police of Salvador Municipal
Police Station, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and his troops arrived. It was while inside
the Salvador Municipal Police Station that SPO4 Medrano heard gunfire and he came
to know that the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed prompting him and his
troops to go to the scene of the crime. Mayor Tawan-tawan informed SPO4 Medrano
that appellant Wenceslao was one of those responsible for the ambush. SPO4
Medrano and his troops, then, conducted an investigation during which he noticed
Samuel at the scene of the crime. Upon interrogation Samuel denied any involvement
in the ambush. Even so, SPO4 Medrano still found Samuel suspicious, hence, he and
his fellow police officers arrested him and turned him over to a certain SPO4 Micabalo,
Chief of Police of Lala, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was then brought to Lala Municipal
Jail in Lanao del Norte.

Subsequently, SPO4 Medrano, together with the members of the CAFGU, PNP and
the rest of the troops who were at the scene of the crime, found a trail of footprints
believed to be from the culprits. They conducted a hot pursuit operation towards
Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte, where appellants and
their co-accused were believed to have fled. They were able to recover an M-16
armalite rifle caliber 5.26 concealed near a nipa hut. SPO4 Medrano then sent a Spot
Report and a follow-up report about the ambush. He did not, however, reveal the
identity of appellant Wenceslao so that with a warrant of arrest, appellant Wenceslao
could be arrested at the earliest possible time. SPO4 Medrano also informed the
provincial headquarters about the incident through a radio message. 21

The following day, or on 6 June 2001, Samuel informed SPO1 Suaring, member of
PNP Lala Municipal Police, Lala, Lanao del Norte, that there were electrical supplies
and radio antenna in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, left by the malefactors. SPO1
Suaring, together with Samuel, Senior P/Insp. Salazar, SPO4 Subingsubing and a
certain SPO4 Sumaylo, proceeded to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where they
found the materials near the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) canal, which is 30
meters away from the house of Samuel’s aunt. These were photographed. 22
28
Later, SPO2 Evasco, who was assigned at Lala Police Station, received a call from
Barangay Kagawad Renato Senahon (Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon) that a black backpack
was found in Mount Curay-curay, Rebe, Lala, Lanao del Norte, which is two (2)
kilometers away from the highway. Immediately, SPO2 Evasco and Brgy. Kgwd.
Senahon went to the location. Upon inspection, they recovered from the backpack an
army camouflage with name cloth, one Garand pouch and one fragmentation grenade
cacao type. SPO2 Evasco then brought these to the police station in Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, and turned it over to Senior P/Insp. Salazar. 23

On 8 June 2001, Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying appellants and their
co-accused as the persons responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
companions. Samuel was, thereafter, incarcerated at the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP) in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. 24

On 29 August 2001, or more than two (2) months after the ambush, appellant
Wenceslao was arrested while he was in Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was arrested on 20 December 2001 while
working in Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte. It was Senior P/Insp. Salazar who
effected the arrest of the appellants.25

Appellants denied having any involvement in the ambush. Appellant Wenceslao

presented as witnesses Armida Nelmida (Armida), Jeffrey Paninsuro (Jeffrey),
Luzviminda Apolinares (Luzviminda), Rudy Alegado (Rudy), Sergeant Teofanis
Garsuta (Sgt. Garsuta) and Master Sergeant Pio Cudilla (M/Sgt. Cudilla). Appellant
Ricardo, on the other hand, did not present any witness other than himself.

Appellant Wenceslao testified that on 5 June 2001, he was in their house with his
family. At around 1:00 p.m., he went outside their house to clean the pigsty and feed
the pigs. Then, at around 2:30 p.m., Jacob Pepito, Rudy and a certain Romy, who is a
military personnel, arrived to get a copy of the election returns of the 15 May 2001
elections upon the orders of Tanny Pepito, a gubernatorial candidate. He told them that
he has no copy of the returns. He then advised them to get it to Atty. Aldoni Umpa
(Atty. Umpa) who has a copy. At that time, he, Jacob Pepito and Romy were outside
the house while his wife and nieces were just eight (8) to 10 meters away from them.
After 10 minutes, his visitors left.26 Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao heard gunfire
coming from the direction of the house of Mayor Tawan-tawan. His nephew, Jeffrey,
approached and informed him that Mayor Tawan-tawan and the latter’s group were
ambushed. After about one (1) or two (2) minutes, he again heard gunfire. This time
the bullets were already hitting the roof and walls of their house. He then instructed
Jeffrey, who is also a CAFGU member, to report the said incident and to ask help from
the members of the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del
Norte.27

When Jeffrey left, appellant Wenceslao stayed at their house. He did not know where
his wife and the rest of the women, who were in their house, went after the gunburst.
After more or less 15 minutes, he walked barefooted and unarmed towards Camp
Allere. There he saw M/Sgt. Cudilla and he informed the former regarding the incident
happened in their house. Not long after, a certain Captain Esmeralda (Capt.
Esmeralda), Commanding Officer of Bravo Company of the Philippine Army, arrived.
He also approached and informed Capt. Esmeralda about the incident in their house.
Capt. Esmeralda then ordered his men to board the samba and a six-by-six truck to
fetch appellant Wenceslao’s wife and relatives in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del
29
Norte. A six-by-six truck returned to Camp Allere carrying appellant Wenceslao’s wife
and relatives.28

On the evening of 5 June 2001, appellant Wenceslao, together with his wife and
daughter, slept in his father’s house located, more or less, 100 meters away from
Camp Allere and stayed there for five (5) days. Appellant Wenceslao’s wife then
requested for transfer to their son’s house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, as she
could no longer sleep because of what happened at their house. Thus, they went to
their son’s house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and stayed there for eight (8) days.
During that period of time, he did not hear of any case filed against him. No policemen
even bothered to arrest him. His wife, however, was still afraid, so they left the house
of their son and moved to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. They stayed there
until he was arrested on 29 August 2001.29

Appellant Wenceslao, however, disclosed that it would only take, more or less, a 15
minute-vehicle ride from his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to the
site of the ambush in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. Also, from his house to
Camp Allere it would only take, more or less, 5 minute-vehicle ride. Appellant
Wenceslao also admitted that he ran for the vice-mayoralty position in Salvador, Lanao
del Norte, against Rodolfo Oban during the 2001 elections. Way back in the 1998
elections, he ran for mayoralty position in the same locality against Mayor Tawan-
tawan but he lost. On both occasions, he and Mayor Tawan-tawan were no longer in
the same political party. Similarly, during the term of Mayor Tawan-tawan in 1998,
appellant Wenceslao revealed that he and his son were charged with illegal
possession of firearm.30

Other defense witnesses, namely, Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are appellant
Wenceslao’s wife, nephew and niece, respectively, corroborated appellant
Wenceslao’s testimony on all material points. They all denied that appellant Wenceslao
has something to do with the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group.
Nonetheless, Armida admitted that there is a road connecting San Manuel, Lala, Lanao
del Norte, to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. There are also vehicles for hire plying the
route of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and vice-
versa.31

Another defense witness, Rudy, corroborated appellant Wenceslao’s testimony with

respect to the fact that on 5 June 2001, he, together with Jacob Pepito and a certain
member of the army intelligence group, went to the house of appellant Wenceslao to
get the election returns. However, he could not recall anything unusual that happened
while he was in the house of appellant Wenceslao. They left the house of appellant
Wenceslao at around 2:45 p.m. Still, no unusual incident happened thereafter. Rudy
similarly revealed that he did not go inside the house of appellant Wenceslao but
merely waited for Jacob Pepito and a member of the army intelligence group inside
their vehicle parked at a distance of, more or less, three (3) meters from the house of
appellant Wenceslao. As such, he did not hear the subject of the conversation between
appellant Wenceslao, Jacob Pepito and a member of the army intelligence group. 32

Sgt. Garsuta, who also testified for the defense, stated that in the afternoon of 5 June
2001, while he was at the legislative hall in Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, to
secure the canvass of the elections, they received a radio call from M/Sgt. Cudilla
informing them that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed and the house of appellant
Wenceslao was strafed. Thereafter, Capt. Esmeralda called them to board a six-by-six
30
truck and to proceed to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. As they passed by San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, they stopped to get some information from the police officers
therein. They proceeded to Camp Allere in Salvador, Lanao del Norte. They arrived at
Camp Allere at around 4:30 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. and there he saw appellant Wenceslao
waiting and talking to 1st Sgt. Codilla. Appellant Wenceslao then requested that his
family and some personal effects be taken from his house. Thus, Capt. Esmeralda
ordered them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to appellant Wenceslao’s
house. Upon reaching the house of appellant Wenceslao, nobody was there.
Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao’s wife came out from the nearby house. Then they
ordered her to board a six-by-six truck after taking some personal belongings of
appellant Wenceslao in the latter’s house. 33

M/Sgt. Cudilla alleged that at around, more or less, 3:00 p.m. of 5 June 2001, while he
was at their command post at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, his detachment
commander, a certain T/Sgt. Quijano, called and informed him through radio that an
ambush incident happened in his area of responsibility, i.e., Curva Miagao, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. He advised T/Sgt. Quijano to verify the incident. M/Sgt. Cudilla then
called Capt. Esmeralda to inform the latter about the said ambush incident. He,
thereafter, prepared a perimeter defense in the camp. In the second call of T/Sgt.
Quijano, the latter told him that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed. After about 15
minutes, M/Sgt. Cudilla heard gunbursts from Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
Later, more or less, 10 civilians arrived at Camp Allere.

M/Sgt. Cudilla further confirmed that on 5 June 2001, also at around 3:00 p.m., he saw
appellant Wenceslao at the back of the stage inside Camp Allere near Km. Post one.
Appellant Wenceslao then informed him of the strafing incident in his house. When
their commanding officer arrived, appellant Wenceslao approached the former.
Thereafter, a platoon was organized heading towards Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del
Norte.34

Appellant Ricardo, for his part, maintained that on 5 June 2001, he was also in his
house in Purok 5, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, attending to his wife and
children because his wife had just given birth in April 2001. In the afternoon thereof, he
heard a gunburst somewhere in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, followed by
some commotion in the street. Later, his brother, Joji Ajok, arrived and informed him
that appellant Wenceslao was shot in his house. 35

Appellant Ricardo also confirmed that on the early evening of 5 June 2001, he and his
family transferred to the house of his parents-in-law at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao
del Norte. He so decided when he heard rumors that the supporters of Atty. Umpa, the
political rival of Mayor Tawan-tawan in the 2001 local elections, were being
persecuted. Being one of Atty. Umpa’s supporters, he got scared, prompting him to
bring his family to Camp Allere. They stayed there until the following morning and then
he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and stayed there for three (3)
months. Thereafter, he moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, where he
worked in the farm of his friend. He stayed there until he was arrested on 20 December
2001.36

Nevertheless, appellant Ricardo divulged that there was never an instance that Atty.
Umpa was harassed or intimidated by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He claimed
that only Atty. Umpa’s supporters were harassed. He also revealed that prior to the
ambush incident, there was never an instance that he was threatened by the group of
31
Mayor Tawan-tawan. He just presumed that Atty. Umpa’s supporters were being
harassed by the people of Mayor Tawan-tawan because others were already
harassed.37

Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were victims of the
ambush, to be credible, categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and consistent,
coupled with their positive identification of the appellants as among the perpetrators of
the crime and their lack of ill-motive to falsely testify against them, vis-à-vis the defense
of denial and alibi proffered by the latter, the trial court rendered its Decision on 30
September 2005 finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder
with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder and imposing upon them
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the aforesaid trial court’s
Decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered

finding herein appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
murder, and the Court hereby sentences them to suffer the indivisible prison term of
reclusion perpetua; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the late PO3 Dela Cruz the
amount of ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of ₱ 50,000.00 for and by
way of civil indemnity ex delicto; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the late T/Sgt.
Dacoco the sum of ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages plus ₱ 50,000.00 for and by way of
civil indemnity ex delicto; and to pay, jointly and severally, Ex-Mayor Johnny
Tawantawan the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees, and the costs of
suit.

The Armalite rifle with defaced serial number, the hand grenade and the Garand pouch
are hereby ordered turned-over to the Firearm and Explosive Unit of the PNP
Headquarters, Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, for proper disposition as
authorized by law.

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of the appellantsshall be credited to

them and deducted from their prison term provided they comply with the requirements
of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant Wenceslao was arrested on 29
August 2001 and detained since then up to the present. While appellant Ricardo was
arrested on 20 December 2001 and detained since then up to the present.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the part of
the prosecution to prosecute the case against the other accused who remain at-large,
as soon as said accused are apprehended.38 [Emphasis supplied].

Unperturbed, appellants separately appealed the aforesaid trial court’s Decision to the
Court of Appeals via Notice of Appeal,39 and, thereafter, submitted their respective
appeal briefs.

In his brief, appellant Wenceslao assigned the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE

PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE AND NOT ORCHESTRATED LIES
INTENDED TO FALSELY IMPUTE THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO APPELLANT
WENCESLAO;
32
 II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES OF

PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE HONEST INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR AND
TRIVIAL POINTS;

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANTS WENCESLAO AND

RICARDO] FAILED TO CAST ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES AND THAT THESE WITNESSES HAD NO IMPROPER AND
NEFARIOUS MOTIVE IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE APPELLANTS;

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE TESTIMONY OF THE MILITARY

MEN WHO ARE NEUTRAL, IMPARTIAL AND OBJECTIVE WITNESSES;

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANT WENCESLAO

ABSCONDED AND IN IMPUTING MALICE ON THE ACT OF [APPELLANT
WENCESLAO] IN TEMPORARILY LEAVING HIS RESIDENCE;

VI.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WENCESLAO OF THE

CRIME CHARGED BASED ON TESTIMONIES WHICH ARE OF DOUBTFUL
VERACITY;

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF

[APPELLANT WENCESLAO] BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE WHICH ARE NOT
APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.40

While appellant Ricardo, in his brief, raised this lone assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT RICARDO

DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.41

On 18 June 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision affirming
appellants’ conviction of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals held that the
evidence on record disclosed that the alleged inconsistencies pointed to by appellant
Wenceslao refer only to minor matters. The same did not damage the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly that of PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and
Mayor Tawan-tawan. Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial points serve to
strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime. Moreover, since
the prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants in open court as among the
perpetrators of the ambush, the same must prevail over the alleged inconsistencies, as
well as the defense of denial and alibi interposed by the appellants. Denial is a
negative and self-serving assertion that cannot overcome the victim’s affirmative,
33
categorical and convincing testimony. In the same way, for alibi to prosper, it must be
established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was impossible for the
accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and not merely
assert that he was somewhere else. As in the present case, the trial court took judicial
notice of the distance of seven (7) kilometers between Salvador, Lanao del Norte,
where appellants reside, and San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush
incident took place. Appellants, therefore, could not successfully invoke alibi as a
defense because it was not physically impossible for them to have been at the scene
of the crime.42 The Court of Appeals then decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the separate APPEALS are DENIED, and
the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED. 43

Still undaunted, appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the Court of Appeals to
this Court via Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution44 dated 19 November 2008, the Court required the parties to

simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. In lieu
thereof, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation 45 stating that it will no
longer file a supplement to its Consolidated Appellee’s Brief 46 dated 14 December 2006
there being no transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the
appellate court’s Decision was rendered.

Appellants, on the other hand, filed their separate Supplemental Briefs, 47 which were a
mere rehash of the arguments already discussed in their respective Appellant’s
Briefs48 submitted before the appellate court. In his Supplemental Brief, appellant
Wenceslao reiterates that: the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible
errors when they decided a question of substance which is not in accord with
established facts and the applicable laws.49 He, once again, enumerated the following
errors committed by the appellate court, thus:

I.

The court a quo and the Court of Appeals gravely erred when they ruled that the
inconsistencies committed by the prosecution witnesses are on minor and trivial
points when these inconsistencies are indicative of the innocence of appellant
Wenceslao;

II.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider as indicative of
innocence of appellant Wenceslao the fact that the authorities did not include in
the police report the name of appellant Wenceslao and did not arrest him
immediately after the ambush, or within a couple of months from the date of the
ambush;

III.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they
deliberately refused or failed to consider and appreciate the testimonies of the
military officers who are neutral, impartial, and objective witnesses;

IV.
34
 Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals miserably failed to consider the
evidence for the defense despite the clear and unmistakable proof of their
honesty and integrity;

V.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals clearly and deliberately misinterpreted
the facts and misapplied the laws regarding "flight" as an alleged indication of
guilt;

VI.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted appellant Wenceslaobased on
jurisprudence on "alibi" which are not applicable in the case at bar 50 [Emphasis
and italicized omitted].

Appellant Wenceslao contends that a thorough perusal of the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses would show these are tainted with glaring inconsistencies, which
are badges of lies and dishonesty, thus, casting doubts on their credibility.

The inconsistencies referred to by appellant Wenceslao are as follows: (1) whether

PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were already with Mayor Tawan-tawan from Salvador,
Lanao del Norte, to Tubod, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa, or they merely hitched a
ride in Mayor Tawan-tawan’s vehicle on their way home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte;
(2) if so, the place where PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni hitched a ride in Mayor Tawan-
tawan’s vehicle; (3) the officer from whom PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni got
permission in order to go home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (4) PFC Angni allegedly
knew appellant Wenceslao prior to the ambush incident on 5 June 2001 and he even
saw appellant Wenceslao as among the perpetrators of the ambush, yet, he did not
mention the name of the former in his affidavit; (5) Mayor Tawan-tawan should have
mentioned the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the
ambush incident when he reported the same to SPO4 Medrano; (6) SPO4 Medrano
should have included the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he
transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the PNP and should have immediately
caused his arrest if he truly participated in the ambush incident; (7) it would no longer
be necessary to discharge Samuel and to make him as state witness if the victims of
the ambush incident, indeed, saw the perpetrators of the crime; and (8) if appellant
Wenceslao was one of the ambushers, Samuel would not have failed to mention the
former in his sworn statement.

Appellant Wenceslao believes that the afore-enumerated inconsistencies only proved

that he has no participation in the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions.
The declaration of his innocence is thus called for.

Appellant Wenceslao further imputes ill-motive and malice on the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in testifying against him. The motive was to remove him, being
the only non-Muslim leader, in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, who has
the courage to challenge the reign of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his clan. It was also an
act of revenge against him for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the 1998 elections.
As to Samuel’s motive, appellant Wenceslao claims that it was for self-preservation,
freedom, leniency and some other consideration. Evidently, after Samuel’s testimony,
the latter was released from jail.

35
Appellant Wenceslao maintains that he was not at the ambush site on 5 June 2001 as
can be gleaned from the testimonies of M/Sgt. Cudilla and Sgt. Garsuta.

Lastly, appellant Wenceslao argues that his flight was not an indication of guilt. He
justified his temporary absence from his residence by stating that it was because of the
traumatic experience of his wife, who had no peace of mind since their house was
riddled with bullets by lawless elements without any cause.

With all the foregoing, the resolution of this appeal hinges primarily on the
determination of credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

Time and again, this Court held that when the issues revolve on matters of credibility of
witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling
the truth.51 Moreover, credibility, to state what is axiomatic, is the sole province of the
trial court. In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case, the trial court's findings on the matter of credibility of
witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.52 A careful perusal of the records of this case
revealed that none of these circumstances is attendant herein.

The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the factual findings of the trial court places
this case under the rule that factual findings are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal to this Court. No reason has been given by appellants to deviate
from the factual findings arrived at by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

In the present case, most of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC
Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan, were victims of the 5 June
2001 ambush incident. As such, they actually witnessed what exactly happened on
that fateful day, especially Macasuba and PFC Angni, who vividly saw appellant
Wenceslao on the right side of the road and in a squatting position firing at them with
his M-16 armalite rifle. Macasuba and PFC Angni, having seated behind the driver and
on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, respectively, both
facing the right side of the road, were in such a position to see without any obstruction
how appellant Wenceslao rained bullets on their vehicle with his M-16 armalite rifle
while they were traversing the road of San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, on their way
home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Macasuba was also able to identify appellant
Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the
perpetrators of the ambush.

It bears stressing that the ambush happened at around 3:00 p.m., in broad daylight,
such that it would not be impossible for Macasuba and PFC Angni to have seen and
identified their assailants, particularly appellant Wenceslao, who was once chief of
Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), then municipal councilor and twice elected vice-
mayor of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, i.e., 1992 and 1995 elections, and appellant
Ricardo, who is a resident of Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. 53

36
The aforesaid assertions of Macasuba and PFC Angni were equally confirmed by
Samuel, an accused-turned-state-witness, who, in his testimony before the open court,
narrated how appellants and their co-accused, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr.,
Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao, brought him in the waiting shed in
Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte; assembled themselves in a diamond
position on both sides of the road; surreptitiously waited for the vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group; and executed the ambush from the moment the
vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group passed by the aforesaid waiting
shed.

Samuel was in an advantageous position to substantiate the identities of the appellants

and their co-accused as the perpetrators of the ambush because he was near the
scene of the crime, i.e., merely five (5) meters away therefrom. This is aside from the
fact that appellants and their co-accused were the very same people who brought him
to the site of the ambush. Appellants and their co-accused likewise stayed for a long
period of time in the house of Samuel’s aunt prior to the ambush incident and Samuel
is very well-acquainted with these people for he himself resided therein. 54

Given the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that prosecution witnesses,
Macasuba, PFC Angni and Samuel, have firmly established the identities of appellants
as the perpetrators of the ambush. In addition, their testimonies on who and how the
crime was committed were characterized by the trial court as simple and candid. Even
their answers to questions were simple, straightforward and categorical. Such
simplicity and candidness in their testimonies only prove that they were telling the truth,
thus, strengthening their credibility as witnesses.

Now, as regards the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant Wenceslao that allegedly
cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, this Court finds them
frivolous, trivial, minor, irrelevant and have nothing to do with the essential elements of
the crime charged, i.e., double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder. In the same manner, they do not detract from the fact that Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group, which includes PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni, were
ambushed by appellants and their co-accused on 5 June 2001 while on board the
yellow pick-up service vehicle as it passed by the waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte. And, said ambush resulted in the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and
T/Sgt. Dacoco and injuries to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito.

It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to minor details or

collateral matters do not affect his or her credibility as these variations are in fact
indicative of truth and show that the witness was not coached to fabricate or dissemble.
An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground
to reverse a conviction.55

Similarly, PFC Angni and Samuel’s failure to name appellant Wenceslao in their
affidavits/sworn statements as one of the ambushers does not necessarily render their
testimonies implausible and unworthy of belief.

Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court
do not necessarily discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is
oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the
witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given
37
during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements,
which are usually incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons. More so, because
of the partial and innocent suggestions, or for want of specific inquiries. In addition, an
extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statement, hence, omissions
and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution
witnesses’ direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to their
extrajudicial statements.56 Similarly, the failure of a witness to immediately disclose the
name of the culprit does not necessarily impair his or her credibility. 57

A meticulous perusal of Samuel’s sworn statement reveals that he categorically

mentioned therein the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. In his
sworn statement, Samuel specifically stated that during the ambush, he saw appellant
Wenceslao at the other side of the road, just a few meters away from the bridge, who,
at that time armed with an M-16 rifle, was likewise firing towards the group of Mayor
Tawan-tawan.58

Above all, both PFC Angni and Samuel positively identified appellant Wenceslao in
open court as one of those responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group.59 Such open court declaration is much stronger than their affidavits/sworn
statements.

Mayor Tawan-tawan’s failure to disclose to SPO4 Medrano the name of appellant

Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the ambush and SPO4 Medrano’s failure to
include the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he transmitted to the
Provincial Police Office of the PNP would not inure to appellant Wenceslao’s benefit.

As can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes, when Mayor Tawan-
tawan and SPO4 Medrano met at the scene of the crime, the former immediately told
the latter that appellant Wenceslao was one of the ambushers. 60 This belied the claim
of appellant Wenceslao that Mayor Tawan-tawan did not tell SPO4 Medrano that he
(appellant Wenceslao) was among the ambushers. Also, SPO4 Medrano provided an
explanation61 for his failure to state in his Spot Reports the name of appellant
Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. And, even granting that his explanation would
not have been satisfactory, still, SPO4 Medrano’s failure to mention appellant
Wenceslao’s name in his Spot Reports was not fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
More especially because appellant Wenceslao was positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

Even the discharge of Samuel to become state witness does not negate the fact that
prosecution witnesses, Macasuba and PFC Angni, indeed, saw appellants as among
the perpetrators of the crime. To note, appellants were not the only persons accused of
the crime; they were many including Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido,
Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao. In order to give justice to the victims of the
ambush, especially those who have died by reason thereof, all persons responsible
therefor must be penalized. Since Samuel knew all those who have participated in the
ambush incident, his testimony as to the other accused in this case is material to
strengthen the case of the prosecution against them. Unfortunately, the other accused
in this case remained at large until now.

As aptly observed by the trial court, thus:

38
x x x The Court is convinced without equivocation on the veracity of the testimonies of
the prosecution eyewitnesses who are all in one pointing to herein appellant
Wenceslao as one of those who participated in the ambush, and on the veracity of the
testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses – Macasuba and Samuel – to the
effect that appellant Ricardo was among the people who perpetrated the said ambush.

The testimonies of these witnesses were simple and candid. The simplicity and
candidness of their testimonies only prove that they were telling the truth. Their
answers to questions were simple, straightforward and categorical; spontaneous, frank
and consistent. Thus, a witness who testifies categorically, spontaneously, frankly and
consistently is a credible witness.62

Appellant Wenceslao’s allegations of ill-motive and malice on the part of prosecution

witnesses, including Samuel, have no leg to stand on.

The records are bereft of any evidence to substantiate the claim of appellant
Wenceslao that the motive of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against him was to
remove him as the only non-Muslim leader in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, and that it was an act of revenge for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the
1998 elections. Appellant Wenceslao failed to present an iota of evidence to support
his aforesaid allegations. As properly stated by the Court of Appeals, "mere allegation
or claim is not proof. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegation." Also, it
must be emphasized that during the 1998 elections, it was Mayor Tawan-tawan who
won the mayoralty position. It is, therefore, highly implausible for Mayor Tawan-tawan,
who emerged as the victor, to take revenge against the losing candidate, appellant
Wenceslao. As such, appellant Wenceslao failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses. It is settled that where the defense fails to prove that
witnesses are moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so
moved and their testimonies are therefore entitled to full weight and credit. 63

To repeat, most of the prosecution witnesses are victims of the ambush. Being the
aggrieved parties, they all desire justice for what had happened to them, thus, it is
unnatural for them to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprits. Otherwise
stated, it is very unlikely for these prosecution witnesses to implicate an innocent
person to the crime. It has been correctly observed that the natural interest of
witnesses, who are relatives of the victims, more so, the victims themselves, in
securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other
than the culprits, for otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity. 64

Contrary to appellant Wenceslao’s assertion, this Court is convince that his and
appellant Ricardo’s flight from the scene of the crime immediately after the ambush is
an evidence of their guilt. It is noteworthy that after the ambush incident, appellant
Wenceslao immediately left his residence and moved to his father’s house, then to his
son’s house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and lastly to Katipa, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental, where he was arrested. Appellant Ricardo did the same thing.
From his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, he transferred to his
parents-in-law’s house, then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and
thereafter, moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, until he was arrested on
20 December 2001. If appellants were truly innocent of the crime charged, they would
not go into hiding rather they would face their accusers to clear their names. Courts go
by the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are
as bold as a lion."65
39
Appellants’ respective explanations regarding their flight fail to persuade this Court. It
bears emphasis that after the alleged strafing of appellant Wenceslao’s house, all he
did is to move from one place to another instead of having it investigated by the
authorities. Until now, the alleged strafing of his house remains a mystery. If that
strafing incident truly happened, he would be much eager to know who caused it in
order to penalize the author thereof. Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was
allegedly afraid of being persecuted for being one of the supporters of Mayor Tawan-
tawan’s political rival. His fear, however, was more imaginary than real. The aforesaid
claim of appellant Ricardo was uncorroborated, hence, cannot be given any
considerable weight.

In light of the clear, positive and straightforward testimonies of prosecution witnesses,

coupled with their positive identification of appellants as among the perpetrators of the
ambush, appellants’ defense of denial and alibi cannot prosper.

As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that appellants committed the crime.66 For alibi to prosper, the requirements
of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that appellants were
somewhere else when the crime happened. They must also demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the
scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. 67 Unless substantiated by
clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of
any weight in law.68 A mere denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and
constitutes self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.69

In this case, both appellants claimed that they were just in their respective houses in
Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, when the ambush incident happened and they
have no involvement whatsoever in the commission thereof.

To corroborate appellant Wenceslao’s testimony, the defense presented Armida,

Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are appellant Wenceslao’s wife, nephew and niece,
respectively. This Court, however, cannot give credence to the testimonies of these
defense witnesses. Being appellant Wenceslao’s relatives, their testimonies are
rendered suspect because the former’s relationship to them makes it likely that they
would freely perjure themselves for his sake. The defense of alibi may not prosper if it
is established mainly by the appellant himself and his relatives, and not by credible
persons.70 This Court further quote with conformity the observation made by the trial
court, viz:

FURTHER, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for herein appellant

Wenceslao were shattered by the testimony of Rudy, another witness for appellant
Wenceslao, who categorically told the Court that during the time he and his
companions Jacob Pepito and a certain Romy were in the house of appellant
Wenceslao in the afternoon of 5 June 2001, there was no unusual incident that took
place, as well as no unusual incident that happened when they left the house of
appellant Wenceslao at about 2:45 in the afternoon.

The foregoing testimony of Rudy clearly imparts that the visit of Rudy and his
companions to the house of appellant Wenceslao, if any, happened on another date.
40
This will be so because if appellant Wenceslao and his closely related witnesses are
telling the truth that Jacob Pepito, Rudy and Romy were in the house of appellant
Wenceslao talking about the said election returns during that fateful afternoon, then
definitely, Rudy should have had known of the ambush incident, said incident being
spreaded throughout or shall we say, "the talk of the town" that afternoon of 5 June
2001.

If the ambush incident occurred on the day Rudy and his companions visited appellant
Wenceslao, then, no doubt that Rudywill tell the Court about it. But his testimony was
otherwise.71 [Emphasis supplied].

In the same breath, appellant Ricardo’s defense of denial and alibi cannot be given any
evidentiary value as it was unsubstantiated. Appellant Ricardo never presented any
witness to support his claim that he was simply inside their house attending to his wife
and children during the time that the ambush incident happened. This Court reiterates
that mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving
assertion that deserves no weight in law. Between the categorical and positive
assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused
which are uncorroborated by reliable and independent evidence, the former
indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight. 72

Withal, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the scene of the
crime in the afternoon of 5 June 2001. As observed by the trial court and the appellate
court, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where both appellants’ reside, is only
about seven (7) kilometers away from San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the
ambush took place.73

All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that,
indeed, appellants were among the perpetrators of the ambush against Mayor Tawan-
tawan and his group. Prosecution witnesses’ categorical, positive and straightforward
testimonies, coupled with their positive identification of appellants as among the
perpetrators of the crime, prevail over appellants’ defense of bare denial and alibi.

As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate court, convicted
appellants of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
murder. This Court believes, however, that appellants should be convicted not of a
complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts
of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims in this case were not the
result of a single act but of several acts of the appellants, thus, making Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code inapplicable.

Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group with bullets discharged from their firearms when the
said vehicle passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, resulted in the death of two
security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua
to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

41
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.

xxxx

5. With evident premeditation. [Emphasis supplied].

Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the commission of the
crime. Time and again, this Court, in a plethora of cases, has consistently held that
there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make. There are two (2) conditions that must concur for treachery
to exist, to wit: (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution
was deliberately and consciously adopted. "The essence of treachery is that the attack
is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording
the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape." 74

The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did not allow the
hapless victims, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any opportunity to put up a
decent defense. The attack was executed by appellants and their-co-accused in such a
vicious manner as to make the defense virtually impossible. Under the circumstances,
it is very apparent that appellants had murder in their hearts when they waylaid their
unwary victims.75 Thus, as to the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco,
appellants should be held liable for murder.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, cannot be

appreciated as it is deemed absorbed in treachery. 76

Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident

premeditation, the circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated. To prove this
aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time, between the determination
to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.77 None of these elements could be gathered from
the evidence on record.

As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito,
although they were injured during the ambush and were all hospitalized, except for
Macasuba, it was not mentioned that their injuries and wounds were mortal or fatal
such that without the timely medical assistance accorded to them, they would have
died.78 However, it does not necessarily follow that the crimes committed against the
aforenamed victims were simply less serious physical injuries. Also, even though
Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun did not sustain any injury during the ambush, it does not
mean that no crime has been committed against them. The latter were just fortunate
enough not to have sustained any injury on the occasion thereof. Since appellants
were motivated by the same intent to kill, thus, as to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC
Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun, appellants should be held
guilty of attempted murder.

42
What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. Its resolution would determine whether the conviction of
appellants must be for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7)
counts of attempted murder or of the complex crime of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder.

The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which explicitly states that:79

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. [Emphasis supplied].

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of
the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only
one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as
compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is
when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule
governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes.80

Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances
present in this case do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.

From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of the
victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants and their
co-accused. To note, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets
on the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two security
escorts died while five (5) of them were wounded and injured. The victims sustained
gunshot wounds in different parts of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that
more than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the
vehicle of the victims. As held in People v. Valdez, 81 each act by each gunman pulling
the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different
persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex
crime.82

Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but several
individual and distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code would not apply for it speaks only of a "single act."

There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code despite the fact that several acts were performed by several accused in the
commission of the crime resulting to the death and/or injuries to their victims.

In People v. Lawas,83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their leader,
Lawas, simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50
persons died. It was there held that the killing was the result of a single impulse as
there was no intent on the part of the accused to fire at each and every victim
separately and distinctly from each other.
43
If the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a
single offense. However, "single criminal impulse" was not the only consideration in
applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in the said case because there was
therein no evidence at all showing the identity or number of persons killed by each
accused. There was also no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing, thus, collective
criminal responsibility could not be imputed upon the accused. Since it was impossible
to ascertain the number of persons killed by each of them, this Court was "forced" to
find all the accused guilty of only one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding
each of them responsible for 50 deaths.84

Significantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as this Court held
in People v. Remollino,85 the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the general
rule.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to
pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally
liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct
proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of
the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who
inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability,
because the act of one is the act of all.86

The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged conspiracy,
among others. Although the trial court did not directly state that a conspiracy existed,
such may be inferred from the concerted actions of the appellants and their co-
accused, to wit: (1) appellants and their co-accused brought Samuel to a waiting shed
located on the left side of the road where the yellow pick-up service vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group would pass; (2) appellants and their co-accused,
thereafter, assembled themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously waited
for the aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the moment the yellow pick-up
service vehicle passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened
fire and rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing and wounding of the victims; (4)
immediately, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of Samuel’s aunt
to get their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused;
and (6) appellants and their co-accused fled.

Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of the

appellants and their co-accused. Clearly, their acts were coordinated. They were
synchronized in their approach to riddle with bullets the vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. They were motivated by a single criminal impulse ─ to kill
the victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is implied when the accused persons had a
common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active
cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is
sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility. 87

With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-accused
had assumed joint criminal responsibility ─ the act of one is the act of all. The
ascertainment of who among them actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims
already becomes immaterial. Collective responsibility replaced individual responsibility.
44
The Lawas doctrine, premised on the impossibility of determining who killed whom,
cannot, to repeat, be applied.

Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos,88 People v. Abella,89 People v. Garcia90 and

People v. Pincalin,91 this Court also applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code even
though several acts were performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime.

In People v. De los Santos,92 a prison riot occurred for two consecutive days inside the
national penitentiary between the members of two gangs, i.e., Sigue-Sigue Sputnik and
Oxo. As a result, nine (9) inmates were killed. Fourteen (14) inmates were then
convicted for the crime of multiple murder. The existence of conspiracy in the
commission of the crime was duly proven. There was, however, no discussion why the
accused were convicted of a complex crime instead of separate crimes.

In a similar case of People v. Abella,93 involving the massacre of certain prisoners in

the Davao Penal Colony and a reprise of a similar riot that occurred in the national
penitentiary on 16 February 1958 (subject of De los Santos), all the accused were also
convicted for the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.
Conspiracy likewise attended the commission of the crime. This Court applied the
ruling in De los Santos and elucidated that the ruling in the said case is predicated on
the theory that "when for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an
offense, various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one
offense," a complex one. The Lawas doctrine was equally applied although conspiracy
had been duly proven. This Court then stated that where a conspiracy animates
several persons with a single purpose "their individual acts in pursuance of that
purpose are looked upon as a single act – the act of execution – giving rise to a
complex offense. The felonious agreement produces a sole and solidary liability: each
confederate forms but a part of a single being." 94

People v. Garcia95 and People v. Pincalin96 have the same factual background as De

los Santos and Abella. They were the third and fourth cases, respectively, of prison
riots resulting to the killing of convicts by fellow convicts while inside the national
penitentiary. In Garcia, the accused were convicted for the complex crime of multiple
murder and double attempted murder, while in Pincalin the accused were convicted for
the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. In both cases, this Court
found conspiracy to have attended the commission of the crime.

In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and Pincalin, this Court,
gave the same justification as in Abella: that both cases were covered by the rule that
"when for the attainment of a single purpose, which constitutes an offense various acts
are executed, such acts must be considered as only one offense, a complex one."
Correspondingly, "where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose,
their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act,
the act of execution, giving rise to a complex offense. Various acts committed under
one criminal impulse may constitute a single complex offense. 97

We however found no intention by this Court to establish as doctrine, contrary to

Lawas, that Article 48 is applicable even in cases where several acts were performed
by the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. In Pincalin, this
Court has already clarified that: nonetheless, this Court further held that "in other cases
where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving
45
prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as
separate offenses, as opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some decided
cases."98

De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions to the general
rule stated in Article 48 which exceptions were drawn by the peculiar circumstance of
the cases.

It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad, 99 this Court, once again, applied Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code although the circumstances of the case were not the
same as in Lawas, De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, where this Court
departed from the general rule.

In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused unleashed a volley of

shots at the jeepney boarded by the victims. Miraculously, all passengers, except
Rolando Tugadi (Rolando), survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries.
Conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. Accused were convicted for the
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder. We there held that the case
comes within the purview of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Citing Lawas and
Abella, it was pronounced that although several independent acts were performed by
the accused, it was not possible to determine who among them actually killed Rolando;
and that there was no evidence that the accused intended to fire at each and every
one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On the premise that the
evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi’s group as a
whole, we repeated that where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single
purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a
single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense. 100

The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is incorrect.

The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus:
where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving
prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as
separate offenses. Since in Sanidad, the killings did not involve prisoners or it was not
a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As such, Abella would not apply.

To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed
by each accused. Since conspiracy was not proven therein, joint criminal responsibility
could not be attributed to the accused. Each accused could not be held liable for
separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence showing the number of persons
actually killed by each of them.

Proven conspiracy could have overcome the difficulty.

Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as though
each one performed the act of each one of the conspirators. Each one is criminally
responsible for each one of the deaths and injuries of the several victims. The severalty
of the acts prevents the application of Article 48. The applicability of Article 48 depends
upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional phrase "a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies." This is not an original reading of the law. In
People v. Hon. Pineda,101 the Court already recognized the "deeply rooted x x x
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
46
separate and distinct crimes." As we observed in People v. Tabaco, 102 clarifying the
applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, this Court further stated in Hon.
Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, x x x there must be singularity of
criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." 103

With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the separate crimes of two
(2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder.

As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed for
the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed upon appellants is reclusion
perpetua for each count, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 63 104 of the Revised Penal
Code.105

Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The penalty
prescribed by law for murder, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death, should be reduced by
two degrees, conformably to Article 51106 of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph
2, Article 61,107 in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is
prision mayor. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the same
should be imposed in its medium period pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 64 108 of the
Revised Penal Code.109 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the case of
attempted murder, the maximum shall be taken from the medium period of prision
mayor, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, while the minimum shall be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, the
range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. This Court, therefore, imposed upon
the appellants the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count of
attempted murder.

As to damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be
awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages.110

Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a result of a crime,
the heirs of the deceased are entitled to be indemnified for the death of the victim
without need of any evidence or proof thereof. Moral damages like civil indemnity, is
also mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder. 111 Therefore, the trial court and
the appellate court properly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 and
moral damages also in the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 to the heirs of each deceased
victims.

Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case,
treachery may no longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance since it was
already taken as a qualifying circumstance in the murder, and abuse of superior
strength which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary damages was already
absorbed in the treachery.112 However, in People v. Combate,113 this Court still awards
exemplary damages despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance to deter similar
conduct and to serve as an example for public good. Thus, to deter future similar
transgressions, the Court finds that an award of ₱ 30,000.00 as exemplary damages in

47
favor of the heirs of each deceased victims is proper. 114 The said amount is in
conformity with this Court’s ruling in People v. Gutierrez. 115

Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts covering the
expenditures for the wake, coffin, burial and other expenses for the death of the
victims. In lieu thereof, temperate damages may be recovered where it has been
shown that the victim’s family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof
cannot be proved with certainty as provided for under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code.116 In this case, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the deceased victims suffered
pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved with certainty. Thus, this
Court similarly awards ₱ 25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of each
deceased victims.117

The surviving victims, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito, are
also entitled to moral, temperate and exemplary damages.

Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the wounds inflicted upon
the aforesaid victims would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety,
moral shock, and similar injuries.118 It is only justifiable to grant them moral damages in
the amount of ₱ 40,000.00 each in conformity with this Court’s ruling in People v.
Mokammad.119

The award of ₱ 25,000.00 each as temperate damages to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC

Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito is also in order. It is beyond doubt that these victims
were hospitalized and spent money for their medication. As to Macasuba, although he
was not confined in a hospital, it cannot be gainsaid that he also spent for the
treatment of the minor injuries he sustained by reason of the ambush. However, they
all failed to present any receipt therefor. Nevertheless, it could not be denied that they
suffered pecuniary loss; thus, it is only prudent to award temperate damages in the
amount of ₱ 25,000.00 to each of them.1âwphi1

The award of exemplary damages is also in order. Thus, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC
Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito are awarded exemplary damages in the amount of ₱
30,000.00 to conform to current jurisprudence. 120

This Court likewise affirms the award of ₱ 50,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees, as well
as costs of the suit, in favor of Mayor Tawan-tawan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

HC No. 00246 dated 18 June 2008 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows: (1) appellants are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder thereby imposing
upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count; (2) appellants are also
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of attempted murder thereby
imposing upon them the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count;
(3) other than the civil indemnity and moral damages already awarded by the trial court
and the appellate court, appellants are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
exemplary and temperate damages in the amount of ₱ 30,000.00 and ₱ 25,000.00,
respectively, to the heirs of each deceased victims; and (4) appellants are also directed
to pay, jointly and severally, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito the amount of ₱ 40,000.00 each as moral damages, ₱ 25,000.00 each as
temperate damages and ₱ 30,000.00 each as exemplary damages.

48
Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195523               June 5, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ERNESTO GANI y TUPAS, Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On appeal before the Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
January 26, 2010, in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00423, which affirmed with modification
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental,
Branch 61, dated January 11, 2005 in Criminal Case No. 97-1917, finding herein
appellant Ernesto Gani y Tupas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.

In an Information dated May 5, 1997, appellant was indicted before the RTC of Negros
Occidental, Kabankalan City for the crime of rape, to wit:

The undersigned 1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Officer-in-Charge, on the basis of

a criminal complaint signed by LETICIA G. ALINGASA, for and in behalf of AAA, her
niece, a minor, 5 years old, accuses ERNESTO GANI alias "Botyok" of the crime of
Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of February 1997, in the Municipality of Cauayan,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being her uncle, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of AAA against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

On August 25, 1998, appellant, duly assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of "not
guilty" to the offense charged.4

After pre-trial,5 trial on the merits ensured.

The facts, as established by the prosecution, are as follows:

In the afternoon of February 21, 1997, the victim, AAA, who was then only five (5)
years old, was harvesting vegetables with her elder brother at Sitio Bayogbayog,
Barangay Bulata, Cauayan, Negros Occidental. 6 The siblings were practically left as
orphans, because their father was then in prison, and eventually died there, and their
mother was living with another man.7 While they were busy with their work, appellant,
who is their uncle, arrived carrying a knife.8 Appellant is the younger brother of their
father.9 Subsequently, he instructed AAA's brother to go home ahead. 10 After the latter
left, appellant approached AAA and, right then and there, removed her underwear,
placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. 11 After having
49
sexual intercourse with AAA, appellant drew out his knife and slashed her vagina
causing her serious injury.12 Thereafter, appellant left.13 AAA then went home and
recounted her ordeal to her grandmother.14 AAA was then brought to the health center
for first aid treatment and later to Bacolod City for further medical care. 15 Subsequently,
AAA's aunt, Leticia Alingasa filed, in her behalf, a Criminal Complaint 16 against
appellant.

Appellant interposed the defense of alibi claiming that he was in Quezon City at the
time that AAA was raped.17 He pointed to his brother-inlaw, Ermelo Alingasa, as the
one who committed the rape.

In its Decision dated January 11, 2005, the RTC found the version of the prosecution
credible and, accordingly, rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Ernesto Gani y Tupas alias "Botyok," GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his niece AAA, five
years of age and being the uncle of said victim, a relationship within the third civil
degree of consanguinity hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH. He is also ordered to pay the victim the sum of ₱75,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and the costs.

It is ordered that accused be immediately remitted to the National Penitentiary.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC held that the victim's categorical, spontaneous and candid narration of how
the appellant raped her deserves full faith and credence; the victim's testimony was
corroborated by the findings of the medico-legal officer who examined and treated her;
the defense failed to prove ill motive on the part of the victim and of appellant's sister,
who stood as prosecution witness, when they testified against him; appellant's act of
fleeing to Guimaras Island after the crime was reported to the authorities is an
indication of guilt; and, appellant's defense of denial and alibi could not overcome the
evidence of the prosecution which established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Aggrieved by the trial court's decision, appellant appealed his conviction to the
CA.20 Appellant filed his Brief,21 while appellee did not.

On January 26, 2010, the CA promulgated its Decision affirming the findings of the
RTC, but modified the penalty imposed and the amount of moral damages awarded.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 11, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, in Criminal Case
No. 97-1917 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

As modified, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

qualified rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. Accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

50
SO ORDERED.22

On February 10, 2010, appellant filed his Notice of Appeal 23 of the CA Decision.

On March 14, 2011, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs if they so desired.24

Appellee filed its own Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Supplemental Brief
contending that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the elements
of the crime charged and that the issue raised by appellant in his brief was already
passed upon by the CA in its assailed Decision.

Appellant, on the other hand, through counsel, filed a Manifestation in Lieu of

Supplemental Brief stating that he is re-pleading and adopting all the arguments raised
in the Appellant's Brief filed with the CA, since they squarely and sufficiently refute all
the arguments raised by appellee in their own brief.

Thus, the lone assignment of error in appellant's brief, dated March 21, 2007, is now
deemed adopted in this present appeal:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE

CRIMES (sic) CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.25

In his Brief, appellant basically questions the credibility of the private complainant. He
contends that the latter failed to amply explain why she previously accused another
person as the culprit and who was even detained by reason of such accusation; and,
that if appellant was the actual perpetrator of the crime, why was he not immediately
taken into custody and indicted.

The appeal lacks merit.

The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the RTC’s factual findings, as affirmed by
the CA.1âwphi1 It is doctrinally settled that factual findings of the trial court, especially
on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal.26 More importantly, this Court’s assessment of the records of
the case indicates no reversible error committed by the lower courts. AAA’s testimony
that she was raped by her uncle on February 21, 1997, around 1 o’clock in the
afternoon is worthy of belief as it was clear, consistent and spontaneously given. There
is no compelling reason to disbelieve AAA’s declaration given that she was only five (5)
years old when she was ravished and eight (8) years old when she testified in court. It
has long been established that the testimony of a rape victim, especially a child of
tender years, is given full weight and credit. 27

The Court also upholds the rulings of the RTC and the CA that appellant's defense of
alibi deserves scant consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is
easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. 28 To merit approbation, the appellant must
adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs
criminis at the time when the crime was committed, such that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. 29 In
this case, appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
crime scene on February 21, 1997. His token defense, during his direct examination,
that he was in Quezon City when the victim was raped is hardly credible because he
51
failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime when
it was committed. On the contrary, he admitted, when he was cross-examined, that he
was, in fact, in the same locality (Sitio Bayogbayog, Barangay Bulata) when AAA was
raped.30

At any rate, settled is the rule that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant. 31 Positive
identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over a denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law.32 They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 33

As to appellant's defense of frame-up, this Court quotes with approval the disquisition
of the CA on the matter, to wit:

BBB, private complainant's elder sister testified on direct examination that it was their
grandmother, mother of accused-appellant, who reported the incident to the police
authorities. The grandmother pointed to one Ermelo Alingasa as the person
responsible for the crime so that her son, herein accused, could evade the crime of
rape. Witness, BBB, was not able to confront her grandmother regarding the incident
because the latter ran away and went to Guimaras as did the accused-appellant.

When BBB was presented on the witness stand, accused-appellant neither challenged
the truthfulness of the foregoing testimony nor did he question her credibility.

xxxx

Verily, WE find appellant's argument that he was being framed presumably due to a
family conflict as a flimsy excuse. It is highly improbable that AAA would accuse
appellant, her own uncle at that, of so serious a crime as rape, if it were not the truth. In
any case, revenge or feud has never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the
testimony of a complainant for rape, especially a minor, who remained steadfast in her
testimony that she was raped.

x x x x.34

It is settled that the defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this
Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. 35 In order to
prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proved by the accused with clear and
convincing evidence.36

In the case under consideration, appellant failed to present any clear and convincing
proof that AAA was moved by hatred or revenge, or that she was influenced by her
aunt to implicate appellant. Thus, appellant’s bare allegation of frame-up must fail.

Given the foregoing, the CA correctly affirmed appellant’s conviction for qualified
rape.1âwphi1 Both the minority of the victim and her relationship to appellant were
sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution. Such offense was
punishable by death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and the trial court
correctly imposed such penalty. However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No.
9346 (RA 9346), which became effective on June 30, 2006 after the promulgation of
the RTC Decision and which prohibits the imposition of death penalty, the CA correctly
52
modified the judgment of the RTC by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
CA, nonetheless, should have indicated that appellant is not eligible for parole, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 337 of RA 9346.

As to appellant's civil liability, the CA correctly ordered appellant's payment to AAA of

the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages.
However, to conform to prevailing jurisprudence, the award of ₱25,000.00, as
exemplary damages, is increased to ₱30,000.00 due to the attendance of the
qualifying circumstances of minority of AAA and the relationship between her and
appellant.38

In addition, appellant is liable to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision. 39

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal of Ernesto Gani y Tupas is
DISMISSED. The Decision dated January 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR-HC No. 00423 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) that
appellant is not eligible for parole; (2) that the award of exemplary damages is
INCREASED to ₱30,000.00; and (3) that appellant is further ORDERED to pay interest
on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date
of finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181042, November 26, 2012

Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. 181042

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181042, November 26, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SAMIN ZAKARIA Y
MAKASULAY AND JOANA ZAKARIA Y SILUNGAN, ACCUSED. SAMIN ZAKARIA Y
MAKASULAY, ACCUSED -APPELLANT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited drugs and related
items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the evidence to be presented against
the accused. Their observance is the key to the successful prosecution of illegal possession or
illegal sale of dangerous drugs.[1]

On appeal is the decision promulgated on April 11, 2007,[2]  whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01781,[3] affirmed the conviction of both accused for violation
of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) the
53
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 154, in Pasig City handed down through its decision
rendered on August 26, 2005.[4]

Antecedents

The following information charged the two accused as follows:

On or about January 7, 2005, in Taguig, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-accused, in conspiracy with one another, not being lawfully
authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away
to PO2 Luisito L. Aninias, a police poseur buyer, three (3) pieces heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet bag containing the following:

a) (EXH “A-1”) – 4.84 grams

b) (EXH “A-2”) – 4.73 grams
c) (EXH “A-3”) – 24.66 grams
with a total weight of thirty four point twenty three (34.23 grams) of white crystalline
substance, which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.

Contrary to Law.[5]

On January 27, 2005, each of the accused pleaded not guilty.[6]

During the pre-trial, the Prosecution dispensed with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Donna
Villa P. Huelgas after the accused admitted the existence of the Forensic Chemist Report.[7]

At the trial, the State presented only two witnesses, namely: PO2 Luisito Aninias and PO3
Ronald Valdez; while the Defense had only the accused themselves as its witnesses.

Version of the Prosecution

PO2 Aninias declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on January 6, 2005, a confidential informant went
to the CALABARZON Regional Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in
Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna and informed Chief Supt. Abe Lemos that he had
entered into a drug deal for 35 grams of shabu worth P98,000.00 with alias Danny
and alias Joana to take place at 287 Tamayo Compound on Caliraya Drive, in Taguig City.
[8]
 Thereafter, Chief Supt. Lemos tasked Insp. Julius Ceasar Ablang to form a team for a buy-
bust operation. The team was made up of PO2 Aninias as poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Gerry
Abalos, SPO1 Miguel Lapitan, SPO1 Norman Jesus Platon, PO3 Ronald Valdez, PO3 Sherwin
Bulan, and PO3 Danilo Leona as the other team members.[9]  Insp. Ablang gave a P500.00 bill
to PO2 Aninias to serve as the buy-bust money. PO2 Aninias wrote his initials “LLA” on the
P500.00 bill,[10] and then placed the marked bill on the bundle of boodle money that seemingly
amounted to P98,000.00. He put the boodle money in a white window envelope.[11]

At about 3:00 p.m. of January 6, 2005, PO2 Aninias, PO3 Valdez and the confidential
informant surveyed the target area in order to confirm if drug activities were taking place there.
PO2 Aninias observed there about ten persons going in and out of the target area. The persons
were thin and looked haggard, and had deep set eyes and protruding cheeks. About 30 minutes
54
later, PO2 Aninias and his companions left the target area and returned to the Regional Office
to report their observations.[12]

In the morning of January 7, 2005, the confidential informant contacted Danny to tell him that
he had a buyer. They agreed to have the deal at the target area.[13] Insp. Ablang prepared a pre-
operation report,[14] and coordinated with the PDEA National Office.[15]

Using a Toyota Revo and a Mitsubishi Adventure, the buy-bust team arrived at the target area at
around 1:45 p.m. of January 7, 2005.  PO2 Aninias drove the Revo, with the confidential
informant on board. The rest of the team rode on the Adventure.  PO2 Aninias parked the Revo
some 10 meters away from the target area, while the other driver parked the Adventure about 50
meters from the Revo. The confidential informant then called Danny and told him that he and
the buyer were already in the vicinity, but Danny advised them to wait for the shabu to be
prepared.  At about 2:00 p.m., PO2 Aninias moved the Revo closer to the target area. Not long
after, Danny arrived. The confidential informant, whom Danny personally knew, motioned to
Danny to get on board the Revo. Once Danny got in the Revo, the confidential informant
introduced PO2 Aninias to Danny as the buyer of shabu.  Danny asked PO2 Aninias about the
money. PO2 Aninias showed to Danny the white window envelope containing the P500.00 bill
and boodle money.  Saying that the shabu was with his wife, Danny then got out of the Revo to
fetch her.[16]

After nearly 15 minutes, Danny returned with a woman. The confidential informant requested
the two to board the Revo. Danny introduced the woman to PO2 Aninias as his wife Joana. 
Danny again asked for the money. PO2 Aninias once more flashed the white window envelope
to Danny and asked to see the shabu.  Danny pulled three sachets containing white crystalline
substance from his pocket and handed the sachets to PO2 Aninias, who turned over the white
window envelope to Joana and forthwith made a missed call to PO3 Valdez. The missed call
was the pre-arranged signal indicating that the transaction was consummated.  As Danny was
about to count the money in the envelope, PO2 Aninias drew and pointed his gun at Danny and
Joana. The rest of the team, who had meanwhile rushed towards the Revo as soon as PO3
Valdez received PO2 Aninias’ missed call, quickly arrested the two suspects.

PO2 Aninias immediately placed his initials on the three sachets received from Danny, while 
PO3 Valdez recovered the boodle money from Joana.[17] The team then brought Danny and
Joana to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation.[18]  Danny was identified as Samin
Zakaria y Makasulay and Joana as Joana Zakaria y Silungan.

Bearing the Request for a Laboratory Examination prepared by Chief Supt. Lemos,[19] PO2
Aninias turned over the seized sachets and their contents to the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory, where Forensic Chemist Sr. Insp. Donna Villa Huelgas conducted qualitative and
quantitative examinations on the contents. The examinations yielded positive results for the
presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.  Forensic Chemist Huelgas
issued Chemistry Report No. D-0031-05 dated January 8, 2005,[20] as follows:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, each containing white crystalline substance
with the following markings (with signature) and net weights:

55
A (EXH “A-1” LLA 07 Jan ’05) – 4.84 grams
B (EXH “A-2” LLA 07 Jan ’05) – 4.73 grams
C (EXH “A-3” LLA 07 Jan ’05) – 24.66 grams
xxxx

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of dangerous drug/s on the above-mentioned specimen

xxxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on specimen A,B and C gave POSITIVE result to the tests
for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[21]

xxxx

A certificate of inventory[22] was issued by the PDEA Regional Office and was signed by Insp.
Ablang, Bell Desolo of Abante-Tonite, and Victor Penid, an official of Barangay Mapayapa.

PO3 Valdez corroborated PO2 Aninias’ account of the conduct of the surveillance and buy-bust
operation. PO3 Valdez said that during the operation he received the missed call from PO2
Aninias and immediately rushed towards the Revo to assist in the arrest of the two suspects.
[23]
 He attested that he recovered the marked money from Joana.[24]

Version of the Defense

The Defense gave a different story.

Joana said that at about 12:00 noon on January 7, 2005, she left to fetch her five-year old child,
Jornea, from school on board a tricycle;[25] that on her return home with her child at around 1:00
p.m., she immediately noticed that the door to their house had been detached and that at least
eight men in civilian clothes were inside their house;[26]  that she saw Samin, her husband, lying
face down on the floor of their bedroom, and one of the men was stepping on her husband’s
head;[27] that Samin’s cousins, Benson Pam and Saudi, were in the sala, also lying face down on
the floor about three meters from where her husband was;[28] that the men brought the couple to
Camp Vicente Lim; that on the way to Camp Vicente Lim on board a white Revo driven by
PO2 Aninias, PO3 Valdez demanded P100,000.00 in exchange for their release;[29] and that she
answered that they could not give P100,000.00 because they did not have money due to her
husband being only a tricycle driver.[30]

Joana recalled that she and her husband were detained for a while in a small room in Camp
Vicente Lim before being shown by PO2 Aninias plastic sachets containing shabu that had
been supposedly recovered from them; and that she protested and argued that they were not
selling shabu.[31]

56
Samin corroborated Joana’s recollection. He stated that on January 7, 2005, he and his cousins,
Saudi and Benson Pam, went to worship in the mosque and returned to his house at around
12:50 p.m. to rest;[32] that while he was resting in the bedroom, two men in civilian attire barged
in and ordered him to lie face down on the floor; that one of them put his foot on his nape;
[33]
 and that he came to know later on that his cousins, who were themselves resting in the sala,
had also been ordered to lie face down by other men who had entered his house.[34]

Samin asserted that he saw the sachets of shabu for the first time only when PO2 Aninias
showed them to him in Camp Vicente Lim;[35] and that one of the men whom he could no longer
identify demanded P100,000.00 as settlement of the case against them.[36]

On August 26, 2005, the RTC convicted both accused, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding both the accused
SAMIN ZAKARIA y Makasulay and his wife JOANA ZAKARIA y Silungan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (illegal sale of dangerous drugs) and
they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT.  Each of them is
also ordered to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS.

The illegal substance subject of the information is directed to be delivered forthwith to the
PDEA for its immediate disposition.

Considering the penalty imposed by the Court, the commitment of the accused Samin Zakaria
and Joana Zakaria to the New Bilibid Prison and Correctional Institution for Women,
respectively, is ordered.

SO ORDERED.[37]

On appeal, the accused assigned the following errors, to wit:

I.  The trial court committed grave error in considering that the group of PO2 Aninias who are
assigned at the Philippine Drug Agency, Regional Office, Calabarzon Camp Vicente Lim failed
to observed (sic) strictly the provision of RA 9165 – the procedure in the obtaining seized
prohibited and regulated drugs.

II.  The trial court gravely erred in disregarding the fact that police officers merely informed the
accused of their constitutional rights only without elaborating what are their constitutional
rights.

III. The trial court gravely erred in not considering that minor inconsistencies of accused do not
affect their credibility.[38]

On April 11, 2007, the CA affirmed the conviction, viz:

57
After carefully going over the evidence on record, we find absolutely no reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court and its decision finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense as charged in the information.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[39]

Only Samin filed a timely notice of appeal,[40]  resulting in the decision of the CA becoming
final and executory as to Joana. The CA issued a partial entry of judgment on May 11, 2007.[41]

Issues

Samin insists that the members of the buy-bust team did not fully explain to him his
constitutional rights; that the State did not establish the origin of the seized dangerous drugs and
did not prove that the chain of custody had been observed; and that his guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt.

The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that Samin was properly
convicted because his guilt for the crime charged was sufficiently established; that the State
proved the identities of the sellers and the buyer, the object and the consideration; that the State
further proved the delivery of the shabu and the payment for the shabu; that there was no doubt
that the sachets of shabu came from Samin and Joana, considering that PO2 Aninias proved that
the shabu had not been planted but had been in the possession of the accused at the time of the
buy-bust operation; that PO2 Aninias marked the confiscated items, prepared the certificate of
inventory, and personally brought the shabu to the Regional Crime Laboratory with the request
for examination; that the chain of custody was not broken; that the supposed failure to inform
the accused of their constitutional rights was immaterial considering that no admission or
confession had been taken from them; and that the credibility of the Defense witnesses was best
addressed by the RTC as the trial court, which found that their inconsistencies affected their
credibility because they concerned material points.

Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.

In every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the presentation of the seized
dangerous drugs as evidence in court is indispensable.[42] It is essential that the identity of the
dangerous drugs be established beyond doubt. What is more, the fact that the dangerous drugs
bought during the buy-bust operation are the same dangerous drugs offered in court should be
established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[43]

Moreover, to discharge its overall duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the State bears the burden of proving the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime. The
Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the corpus
delicti either when the dangerous drugs are missing, or when there are substantial gaps in the
chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts on the authenticity of the
evidence ultimately presented in court.[44] That proof of the corpus delicti depends on a gapless
showing of the chain of custody. As the Court has pointed out in People v. Belocura:[45]

58
xxx. The chain-of-custody requirement applied xxx by virtue of the universal need to
competently and sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. It is basic under the Rules of
Court, indeed, that evidence, to be relevant, must throw light upon, or have a logical relation to,
the facts in issue to be established by one party or disproved by the other.[46]  The test of
relevancy is whether an item of evidence will have any value, as determined by logic and
experience, in proving the proposition for which it is offered, or whether it would reasonably
and actually tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in issue, or corroborate other relevant
evidence. The test is satisfied if there is some logical connection either directly or by inference
between the fact offered and the fact to be proved.[47]

To ensure the establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of Republic Act No. 9165
provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous

Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.

xxxx

Section 21 (a) of Article II, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
9165, states:

xxxx

(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items

59
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items;

xxxx

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure
is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as
reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from
the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting”
or contamination of evidence.[48] A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody
imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.

The records show that the buy-bust team did not observe the mandatory procedures under
Republic Act No.  9165 and its IRR.  Although PO2 Aninias supposedly marked the
confiscated shabu with his initials immediately upon seizure, he did not do so in the presence of
the accused or of their representatives and any representative from the media and Department of
Justice (DOJ), or any elected public official. If he had, he would have readily stated so in court.
In fact, both PO2 Aninias and PO3 Valdez themselves revealed that no media or DOJ
representative, or elected public official was present during the buy-bust operation and at the
time of the recovery of the evidence at the target area.  Instead, the media were only around in
the PDEA regional headquarters.[49]

The certificate of inventory, although signed by a media representative and a barangay official,

[50]
 was nonetheless discredited by PO2 Aninias’ admission that only the confidential informant
and the members of the buy-bust team were present at the time of the recovery of the sachets
of shabu from Samin. Verily, although PO2 Aninias declared having personally seen the media
representative and the barangay official affixing their signatures on the certificate of inventory,
he gave no indication at all that the certificate had been signed in the presence of the accused or
of their representative.

Another serious lapse committed was that the buy-bust team did not take any photographs of
the sachets of shabu upon their seizure. The photographs were intended by the law as another
means to confirm the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs.

The last paragraph of Section 21 (a) of the IRR, supra, contains a saving proviso to the effect
that “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.”
But in order for the saving proviso to apply, the Prosecution must first recognize and explain
the lapse or lapses in procedure committed by the arresting lawmen.[51] That did not happen
here, because the Prosecution neither recognized nor explained the lapses. Even conceding, for
instance, that the PDEA Regional Office contacted and informed the media about the buy-bust
operation, we wonder why the media representative or the barangay official did not witness the
actual marking of the evidence and why the representative and barangay official signed the
certificate of inventory sans the presence of the accused or his representatives. In that respect,
the Prosecution offered no explanation at all.

60
Even if we are now to disregard the frame-up defense of Samin, the Prosecution’s failure to
recognize and to explain to the trial court the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the
requirements for preserving the chain of custody left the identity of the shabu ultimately
presented as evidence in court suspect and ambiguous. The suspiciousness and ambiguity
irreparably broke the chain of custody required under Republic Act No. 9165, which was fatal
to the cause of the Prosecution. Indeed, the chain of custody was crucial in establishing the link
between the shabu confiscated from the accused and the evidence presented to the court for its
appreciation. The Court has pointed out in Malillin v. People:[52]

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of
the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when
the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition
at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.
The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering—without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule.

Under the circumstances, the corpus delicti was not credibly proved because the Prosecution
did not establish an unbroken chain of custody, resulting in rendering the seizure and
confiscation of the shabu open to doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence
should not pass judicial scrutiny.[53]

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on

April 11, 2007; ACQUITS accused SAMIN  ZAKARIA  y  MAKASULAY of the violation
of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 charged in the information; DIRECTS the immediate
release from detention of accused SAMIN  ZAKARIA  y  MAKASULAY, unless he is also
detained for some other lawful cause; and ORDERS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
to implement this decision and to report his action hereon to this Court within ten days from
receipt hereof. No pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188902               February 16, 2011

61
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO LOPEZ y CABAL, Appellant.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

This is an appeal from the 12 May 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03199. The 12 May 2009 Decision affirmed with modification the 15
February 2008 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 73, Malabon City (trial court), finding accused-appellant Roberto Lopez y Cabal
(Lopez) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals also ordered Lopez to pay the
heirs of the victim Prudencio Melendres (Melendres) as follows: ₱50,000 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, ₱33,000 as actual damages and ₱200,000 for
loss of earning capacity.

On 10 August 2006, Lopez was charged with the murder of Melendres.

Lopez pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.

During the trial, prosecution witness Leo Acibar (Acibar) testified that on 31 July 2006
at about 8:30 a.m., he saw Melendres buying cigarettes from a store when Lopez
suddenly appeared and shot Melendres from behind with a caliber .38 revolver, hitting
him on the right side of the head. Acibar added that Lopez again shot Melendres on
the chest and on the lower abdomen. Lopez then fled from the scene. Acibar
immediately reported the incident to the barangay authorities.

Ma. Liberty Francisco Melendres (Liberty), Melendres’ wife, testified as to the civil
liability of Lopez. Liberty presented receipts to show that she spent ₱33,000 for the
burial and the interment and ₱7,500 for the wake. 3 She also presented a certification
from Tanod Publishing, Inc. (Tanod Publishing), Melendres’ employer, as to his
monthly salary range,4 honoraria and transportation allowance. 5 She also sought to
recover moral damages.

For the defense, Lopez maintained his innocence and claimed that he was working on
Jaime Domingo’s (Domingo) house on 31 July 2006.

Domingo testified that Lopez worked for him from 26 to 31 July 2006 to repair the
pipelines in his house. However, on cross-examination, Domingo said that Lopez
worked for him only until 30 July 2006.6

Maritess Padilla (Padilla) also testified that she saw two hooded men with guns tucked
in their waist draw their guns and shoot Melendres. Padilla said the first assailant was
dark-skinned and stood about five feet five inches, while the second assailant was only
about four feet eleven inches. Padilla stated that Lopez was not one of the assailants
and that she would be able to identify the assailants if she saw them again.

On 15 February 2008, the trial court rendered its decision finding Lopez guilty of
murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court
also ordered Lopez to pay the heirs of Melendres as follows: ₱50,000 as death

62
indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, ₱40,000 as actual damages and ₱7,570 per
month for six months as lost income.

Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lopez insisted that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lopez also questioned the monetary awards
made by the trial court.

In its 12 May 2009 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied Lopez’s appeal and affirmed
with modification the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals said that Acibar’s
failure to accurately describe Lopez as the perpetrator did not affect his credibility.
Moreover, no ill motive can be attributed to Acibar to conclude that he would falsely
testify against Lopez. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the trial court that the
testimonies of the defense witnesses were vague. The Court of Appeals added that
Lopez’s alibi is a weak defense and can easily be fabricated.

On the award of damages, the Court of Appeals reduced the award of actual damages
from ₱40,000 to ₱33,000, the latter amount having been substantiated by receipts. As
to the loss of income, the Court of Appeals

noted that there was no accurate way to determine Melendres’ earnings since the
certification issued by Tanod Publishing did not reflect a fixed amount but only a salary
range. However, the Court of Appeals held that the heirs of Melendres are still entitled
to a reasonable amount as a result of Melendres’ loss of earning capacity and deemed
it proper to increase the award from ₱45,420 to ₱200,000.1avvphi1

Hence, this petition.

We find the petition without merit. When the trial court’s factual findings are affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, such findings are generally conclusive and binding upon the
Court.7 Moreover, where the credibility of the witness is in question, the findings of the
trial court are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, and generally will not be
disturbed on appeal, unless there is a clear showing that the trial court overlooked,
misappreciated, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that would have affected the outcome of the case. 8 The rationale for this rule is that the
trial court has the advantage of observing first-hand the demeanor, behavior, and
manner of the witness on the stand and, thus, is in a better position to determine the
witness’ credibility.9

However, we modify the award for loss of earning capacity. The rule is that
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning
capacity.10 In this case, Liberty presented a certification from Tanod Publishing which
showed that Melendres was a photo correspondent for Tanod Newspaper and that "his
monthly salary ranges from ₱1,780 to ₱3,570 on per story basis." 11 Liberty presented
another certification from Tanod Publishing which showed that Melendres received the
total amount of ₱24,990 representing payment of honoraria and transportation
allowance from 1 January to 31 July 2006.12 The Court notes that the defense did not
object when the prosecution presented these documents before the trial court. The rule
is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by
the court in arriving at its judgment.13 It was also established that at the time of his
death, Melendres was 41 years old.14

63
Thus, Melendres’ net earning capacity can be derived from two sources: (1) his
monthly salary15 and (2) his honorarium and transportation allowance. 16 Loss of earning
capacity is computed as follows:

Net Earning
Capacity = Life expectancy x Gross Annual Income – Living Expenses

= [2/3 (80 – age at death)] x GAI – [50% of GAI]

= [2/3 (80 – 41)] x ₱74,94017 – ₱37,470

= [2/3 (39)] x ₱37,470

= 26 x ₱37,470

Net Earning
Capacity = ₱974,220

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 12 May 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals finding

accused-appellant Roberto Lopez y Cabal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Roberto Lopez y Cabal is ordered to
pay the heirs of Prudencio Melendres the amount of ₱974,220 for loss of earning
capacity.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181249               March 14, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BAIDA SALAK y BANGKULAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated February 21, 2007 and Resolution 2 dated July 3,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01740, which affirmed the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103, of Quezon City in Criminal
Case No. Q-01-100879. The RTC found Baida Salak y Bangkulas guilty of illegal sale
of a regulated drug in violation of Section 15, 4 Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425
or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.5

The Information dated May 25, 2001 filed against appellant reads:

That on or about the 23rd day of May, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true names, identities
and personal circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping
each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug, did, then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell or offer for
sale 305.4604 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is a regulated
drug.

64
CONTRARY TO LAW.6

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.

On September 25, 2001, following the failure of prosecution witnesses to attend

scheduled hearings for the fifth consecutive time despite the issuance of subpoenas,
the trial court orally ordered the provisional dismissal of the case. 7 Shortly after the
order was given, however, the prosecution witnesses from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Special Investigators Edgardo Kawada, Sr. and Raoul Manguerra,
arrived. Hence, the order was recalled.8 Trial then ensued.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: NBI Special Investigator Kawada, who
acted as the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, and Supervising Agent
Dominador Villanueva III, who acted as backup during the NBI operation. Their version
of facts is as follows:

In the morning of May 23, 2001, the NBI Special Task Force (STF) received
information from one of their assets that a certain "Baida" is engaged in
selling shabu at Litex Market in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. Immediately,
NBI-STF agents formed a team composed of Atty. Cesar Bacani, Supervising Agents
Rommel Vallejo and Dominador Villanueva III, Special Investigators Raoul Manguerra,
Job Gayas, Charlemagne Veloso, Eric Isidro, Eduardo Villa, Rolan Fernandez and
Edgardo Kawada, Sr. to conduct a surveillance operation. 9 A briefing was held at
around 12:00 noon10 before the team proceeded to Litex Market. At 2:00 p.m., they
arrived thereat.11

There, the NBI agents waited in strategic locations so they could see their asset while
the latter talked with appellant. After a brief conversation with appellant, the asset
informed the NBI team that appellant was in possession of shabu and was willing to
make a transaction.12 Thus, a clearance to conduct a buy-bust operation was issued by
the Chief of the NBI-STF, Atty. Max Salvador, and a poseur-buyer was designated in
the person of Special Investigator Kawada.

The asset then told appellant that he has a buyer. Appellant instructed the asset to go
to Greenwich Pizza Parlor in Fairview, Quezon City with the buyer. 13 As instructed, the
asset and Kawada, followed by the rest of the team, drove to Greenwich Pizza, but
appellant later called the asset on the latter’s cellular phone and instructed the latter to
go instead to McDonald’s restaurant, which was just across Greenwich Pizza. Kawada
and the asset obliged.14 After an hour, appellant arrived, accompanied by two men,
whom she later introduced to Kawada and the asset as her husband, Karim Salak, and
a certain Boy Life.15

The asset introduced Kawada to appellant and the two discussed the terms of the
transaction. Kawada agreed to pay ₱60,000 per 100 grams of shabu, or a total of
₱180,000 for the 300 grams which appellant will supply. Kawada suggested that the
exchange be made at the parking lot of Ever Gotesco Mall along Commonwealth
Avenue, but appellant insisted that the venue be at Litex Market. 16 Kawada agreed so
appellant boarded his vehicle with the NBI asset, and the three proceeded to Litex
Market.

Upon arriving at Litex Market, appellant alighted and left to retrieve the drugs. She
returned 30 minutes later, followed by Karim and Boy Life, this time carrying a plastic
bag. Appellant entered Kawada’s car, while her two companions stood guard outside. 17
65
Inside the car, appellant showed Kawada three small heat-sealed plastic sachets
packed inside a bigger plastic bag. Appellant gave the plastic bag containing the three
heat-sealed sachets to Kawada who, in turn, gave ₱180,000 in genuine bills 18 to the
former. The money was mixed with three one-hundred peso bills earlier marked with
"ECK 5/23/01"19 representing Kawada’s initials and the date of the entrapment
operation. While appellant was busy counting the money, Kawada identified himself as
an NBI operative and arrested appellant. Meanwhile, outside Kawada’s vehicle,
appellant’s two male companions, perhaps sensing that something was amiss,
instantly took off and mingled with the crowd at Litex Market as other NBI agents
rushed towards the location of Kawada’s vehicle. 20

Appellant was brought to the NBI office,21 while the three heat-sealed plastic sachets,
marked as "REM 1," "REM 2," and "REM 3," were submitted by NBI Agent Raoul
Manguerra, upon Kawada’s endorsement, to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division for
chemical analysis at 7:15 in the morning of the following day, May 24, 2001. 22

A Certification23 dated May 24, 2001 was issued by NBI Forensic Chemist II Juliet
Gelacio-Mahilum stating that the white substance contained in the three heat-sealed
plastic sachets, marked "REM 1," "REM 2" and "REM 3," with a total weight of
305.4604 grams, yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,
a regulated drug.24

The defense, for its part, denied the charges and presented the following version of
facts:

In the morning of May 23, 2001, while appellant and her husband Zaldy Pinorac were
busy tending their stall at Manggahan Market in Commonwealth Avenue corner Litex
Road, Quezon City, an acquaintance named Mila arrived. Mila was accompanied by
two companions, one of whom was introduced as Aminola Kawada. The group talked
to Zaldy while appellant busied herself in their store. Thereafter, Zaldy asked appellant
if she could accompany Mila’s group to McDonald’s in Fairview as Mila’s group wanted
to buy VCD from Boy Life,25 who, according to appellant, is her second cousin and
whose real name is Karim Salak.26 Appellant complied.

At McDonald’s restaurant, appellant found Boy Life already waiting for them as Zaldy
notified Boy Life over the phone. Appellant introduced Mila’s group to Boy Life, and
was asked to order some food. Appellant ate with the group and thereafter excused
herself and returned to their store.27

At the store, Zaldy told her that Boy Life called him on the cell phone and disclosed
that he sold 100 grams of shabu to Mila and her companions. Appellant claims that she
got angry with Zaldy for putting her in such a precarious situation. 28

Around seven o’clock that evening, Boy Life dropped by appellant’s store, but appellant
ignored him. An hour later, she heard a gunfire. She looked outside her store and saw
Boy Life being chased by two men. When the men failed to apprehend Boy Life, they
went to her stall accompanied by Aminola Kawada. Aminola Kawada’s group grabbed
Zaldy, but Zaldy resisted and ran. He was chased by Aminola Kawada’s group but the
latter also failed to arrest him so they returned to appellant’s store and forcibly took her.
Mangayao Angne, a fellow vendor who tried to intervene and help appellant, was also
arrested. They were both brought to the NBI office in Taft Avenue, Manila, 29 but Angne
was released the following day.30

66
Zaldy testified that he returned to their store almost an hour after the incident and
learned from his fellow vendors that his wife and Angne were arrested. On May 24,
2001, he received a call from Aminola Kawada demanding information about Boy Life’s
whereabouts. Kawada also allegedly asked for ₱300,000 in exchange for his wife’s
release, but when he told Aminola that he does not have that much money, Aminola
reduced the amount to ₱100,000.31

Two more witnesses, Mangrose Ampaso and Macapintal Angne corroborated

appellant’s testimony. Both men also own market stalls at Litex Market and claimed
that they were present near the vicinity of appellant’s store when the NBI operatives
nabbed her on the night of May 23, 2001.

On October 11, 2001, the defense filed a motion requesting for a quantitative or purity
analysis on the shabu specimen allegedly confiscated from the appellant. 32 The RTC
granted the said motion and directed NBI Forensic Chemist Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum to
conduct the necessary tests.33 A Certification, albeit dated August 1, 2001, was
thereafter issued by NBI Forensic Chemist Gelacio-Mahilum stating:

THIS CERTIFIES that representative samples taken from DD-01-480 specimen

marked "REM-1", "REM-2" and "REM-3", when subjected to quantitative analysis using
HIGH PRESSURE LIQUID CHROMATOGRAPHY (HPLC) gave the following result:

xxxx

NET WEIGHT % PURITY

"REM-1" = 114.5932 grams 84.38%
"REM-2" = 97.0434 grams 95.90%
"REM-3" = 93.8238 grams 83.71%

Total Net weight of specimen = 305.4604 grams

Average % Purity = 87.99%34

On February 18, 2002, the RTC promulgated its decision finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the trial
court’s decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding BAIDA SALAK OR SADAK,

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the sale of methylamphetahmine (sic)
hydrochloride or shabu weighing 305.4604 grams[,] in violation of RA 6425 as charged,
and she is sentenced to suffer a jail term of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. Cost versus accused.

SO ORDERED.35

Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA, but the CA affirmed the RTC decision in
toto.36 The CA also denied appellant’s motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.37 Hence this appeal.

Appellant alleges that:

67
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME
CHARGED WHEN THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS WAS
VIOLATED; AND

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE

EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO COMPLY WITH
THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED BY LAW FOR A CONVICTION AND
WHEN THE EVIDENCES OF THE PROSECUTION WERE INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO COMMON HUMAN EXPERIENCE.38

The appeal lacks merit.

Appellant assails the continuation of the trial against her notwithstanding the order of
provisional dismissal earlier issued by the trial court following the repeated failure of
the prosecution witnesses to attend scheduled hearings. Specifically, appellant argues
that the case should not have been revived without the proper motion from the
prosecution.

Appellant’s contention is without merit. A careful perusal of the records shows that the
provisional dismissal, which was declared in open court by the judge on September 25,
2001, was never reduced into writing after Special Investigators Kawada and
Manguerra appeared at the last minute of the said hearing. 39 Moreover, it appears that
the said issue was brought up by appellant’s counsel in the next hearing and was
settled when the trial court judge issued an order, again in open court, recalling and
setting aside the September 25, 2001 order provisionally dismissing the case. 40

It bears emphasizing that an oral order has no juridical existence until and unless it had
been reduced into writing and promulgated, i.e. delivered by the judge to the clerk of
court for filing, release to the parties and implementation. 41 In fact, even if it had been
written and promulgated, or even if it had already been properly served on the parties,
it is still plainly within the power of the judge to recall it and set it aside because every
court has the inherent power, among others, to amend and control its process and
orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. 42

Appellant likewise faults the trial court in convicting her despite the prosecution’s
alleged failure to establish the integrity of the shabu confiscated from her and
presented in court. She points out that the NBI-STF team did not comply with the
requirement that a physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated drugs be
taken,43 as provided in Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as
amended by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990. Neither did the
prosecution present the buy-bust money. These shortcomings, according to her, create
reasonable doubt.

The Office of the Solicitor General, meanwhile, counters that the failure of the NBI-STF
operatives to comply with the documentation and reportorial requirement, even if true,
does not affect the actual conduct and regularity of the buy-bust operation itself
because of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions which
should be upheld here in the absence of evidence militating against its application. 44

Appellant’s assertion fails.

Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Dangerous

Drugs Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990 reads:
68
Subject: Amendment of Board Regulation No. 7, series of 1974, prescribing the
procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments,
apparatuses, and articles specially designed for the use thereof.

xxxx

SECTION 1. All prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses and articles
specially designed for the use thereof when unlawfully used or found in the possession
of any person not authorized to have control and disposition of the same, or when
found secreted or abandoned, shall be seized or confiscated by any national, provincial
or local law enforcement agency. Any apprehending team having initial custody and
control of said drugs and[/or] paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure or
confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence
of the accused, if there be any, and/or his representative, who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Thereafter the seized drugs
and paraphernalia shall be immediately brought to a properly equipped government
laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination.

The apprehending team shall: (a) within forty-eight (48) hours from the seizure inform
the Dangerous Drugs Board by telegram of said seizure, the nature and quantity
thereof, and who has present custody of the same, and (b) submit to the Board a copy
of the mission investigation report within fifteen (15) days from completion of the
investigation.45

The records do not show that the NBI-STF team complied with the aforementioned
procedure.1awphil Nevertheless, such failure is insufficient ground to acquit appellant.

In People v. Gonzaga,46 wherein the very same issue was raised, we explained that:

While it appears that the buy-bust team failed to comply strictly with the procedure
outlined above, the same does not overturn the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duty. A violation of the regulation is a matter strictly between the
Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the
prosecution of the criminal case since the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a
prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established
and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the arresting officers’ inability to
conform to the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.

Further, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a

showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. 47

Moreover, non-compliance with the said regulation is not fatal to the prosecution as it
does not render appellant’s arrest illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized drugs as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of herein appellant.48

A thorough review of the records of this case shows that despite the NBI-STF’s non-
compliance with said regulation, the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
drugs was nonetheless preserved. Evidence shows that the three heat-sealed plastic
sachets of shabu, after being confiscated from appellant on the night

69
of May 23, 2001, were duly marked by poseur-buyer Kawada as "REM-1," "REM-2"
and "REM-3" using his own codename.49 That same night, at the NBI-STF office,
Kawada prepared the disposition form with file number DD-010480 indicating the
transmittal of the same three heat-sealed sachets of shabu for laboratory examination.
The said disposition form was duly noted by NBI-STF Chief Atty. Max Salvador. 50 The
following day, the confiscated drugs including the disposition form Kawada prepared,
were delivered and submitted by Agent Raoul Manguerra to the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Division at 7:15 in the morning and were duly received by NBI Forensic
Chemist Gelacio-Mahilum.51 As indicated in her Certification dated May 24, 2001, the
three plastic sachets marked "REM-1," "REM-2," and "REM-3" were still heat-sealed
when she received them. She also certified that the three sachets have a total weight
of 305.4604 grams and gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.52 When presented during the trial, these specimens were also positively
identified by Kawada as the very same sachets which were handed to him by the
appellant.53

It is also worthy to note that appellant never alleged that the drugs presented during
the trial have been tampered with. Neither did appellant challenge the admissibility of
the seized items when these were formally offered as evidence. In the course of the
trial, the seized shabu were duly marked, made the subject of examination and cross-
examination, and eventually offered as evidence, yet at no instance did the appellant
manifest or even hint that there were lapses in the safekeeping of the seized items as
to affect their admissibility, integrity and evidentiary value. It was only during her appeal
that she raised the issue of non-compliance with the said regulation. Settled is the rule
that objections to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state
in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the
first time on appeal.54

It should also be noted that appellant failed to present evidence to show that the NBI-
STF team was impelled by improper motives to testify against her. She merely gave
the bare assertion that she was arrested by the NBI operatives to be used as leverage
in pressuring her husband to divulge the whereabouts of alias Boy Life.

It must be stressed that the shabu confiscated from appellant weighed 305.4604 grams

with 87.99% average purity. To the Court, the difficulty and enormous risk of obtaining
such huge amount of regulated drugs, with a street value of at least ₱180,000, only for
the purpose of incriminating and extorting money from an individual who was not
shown to be of good financial standing and business importance, renders the
allegation highly improbable.55 If the NBI-STF operatives indeed wanted to frame-up
appellant and extort money from her or her relatives, a small quantity of shabu would
have been sufficient to cause her arrest.

Finally, as to appellant’s argument that she should have been acquitted since the
prosecution failed to present the buy-bust money used during the operation, again, the
argument is without merit. Failure to present the buy-bust money is not indispensable
in drug cases since it is merely corroborative evidence, and the absence thereof does
not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution provided the sale of dangerous
drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before
the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in
the buy-bust operation.56

70
In crimes involving the sale of illegal drugs, two essential elements must be satisfied:
(1) identities of the buyer, the seller, the object and the consideration, and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. 57 These elements were satisfactorily
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through testimonial, documentary
and object evidence presented during the trial.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 21, 2007 and
Resolution dated July 3, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01740,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103, of Quezon City in
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100879 is AFFIRMED.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

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