In contrast to the idea of responsibility as involving finding fault and individual liability, Iris Marion Young develops a forward-looking

model which she argues is more appropriate. She draws on the idea that participation via
institutions sometimes produces injustice, so we have particular responsibilities to address injustice. We share responsibility for remedying injustice but we may have different degrees and kinds of responsibility. She offers
different parameters of reasoning that can help individuals and organizations decide what might make the most sense for them to do in efforts to remedy injustice, given that there are so many injustices, whereas time and
resources are limited. Using the case study of the global apparel industry she illustrates how the fact that we are positioned differently can entail varying but important responsibilities for all who participate in activities that
sustain sweatshops. There are at least four parameters that agents can use in their reasoning:

1. Power: we have different levels of influence and capacities to change processes. We should focus on those areas where we have greater capacities to change worrisome structural processes. This might mean focusing on a
few key players who have both greater capacity to make changes themselves and to influence others.
2. Privilege: some people have more privilege than others in relation to structures. So middle-class clothing consumers have more discretionary income, choice and ability to absorb costs—they can change their clothing
purchasing practices more easily than those who earn minimum wage, have little discretionary income, and little ability to absorb further costs.
3. Interest: All who have an interest in changing oppressive structures have responsibilities in connection with remedying these. This entails that “victims” too have important responsibilities since they have a great interest
in eliminating oppression. In a nuanced analysis she argues that they might have responsibilities in certain contexts, such as to speak out about the harsh conditions in which they work. They must take some responsibility
for resisting and challenging the structures. Without their participation the need for reforms may be rationalized away or reforms may not take the required form. These obligations may not always exist, especially when
the costs of resistance would require extraordinary sacrifices.
4. Collective ability: In some cases we already have collective organization capacities and resources that are well established. Sometimes it just makes good practical sense to draw on these. So, for instance, sometimes
student associations, faith-based organizations, unions, or stockholder groups already exercise significant power in being able to coordinate like-minded members who are willing to take certain actions. She encourages us
to harness organizational resources where doing so would prove effective.

In summary, Young encourages us to think about how we can best take responsibility for reducing structural injustice by reflecting on these four parameters—different positions of power, privilege, interest and collective
ability.

David Miller offers a tremendously influential connection theory of responsibility that also discusses our remedial responsibilities. There are six ways in which we can be connected to someone, P, who needs help and so be
held remedially responsible for assisting. These connections give rise to six ways in which remedial responsibility can be identified. We might be morally responsible for P’s condition; we might be outcome or causally
responsible for P’s condition; we might have had no causal role in their condition but have benefited from it; we might have capacity to assist P; or we might be connected to P through ties of community.[4]

In the global justice literature there are also important concerns about the distribution of responsibilities among collective and individual agents. Prominently, can we hold nations responsible for global injustices or remedying
such injustices? This raises important questions about collective responsibility that are well treated elsewhere in this encyclopedia (see the entry on collective responsibility.

9.3 Authority in the Global Domain: Do We Need a World State to Secure Global Justice?

Is it possible to have global justice in the absence of a world state? Hobbes argues that this is not possible since there is no global authority that can secure and enforce the requirements of justice. He presents the classic so-
called realist case, which is highly influential in international politics, such that there is a state of nature in the international realm. All states compete in pursuing their own advantage and since there is no global authority there
can be no justice in international affairs.

Others are more optimistic. Since we already have a high level of interaction among states, organizations and other agents, this has generated various norms and expectations about appropriate conduct which guide behavior in
the international sphere (Beitz 1999). Moreover, we have a strong interest in co-operation when this is necessary to deal practically with a range of problems that have global reach. Global governance is concerned with how we
manage interests affecting the residents of more than one state in the absence of a world state. There is already a high level of co-operation among a variety of networks, organizations and other groups of interested parties at the
sub-state level, and this is powerfully influencing the redesign of best practice norms in particular domains (Anne-Marie Slaughter 2004).

Other change agents that can and have exercised considerable reform pressures include global social movements, such as the anti-sweatshop movement, the fair trade movement, and other ethical consumption movements.
Global activism has been an important source of incremental change. These simple examples show that much more is possible in the absence of a world state than realists acknowledge.

For more on issues of world government, see the entry world government, which provides extended treatment of this issue.

10. The Contribution to Public Policy

Philosophers are contributing in important ways to discussions of global justice policy issues. As illustrations, in this entry we have canvassed several institutional reform proposals for addressing global injustices which have
enjoyed widespread attention, both within the academy and beyond. These include Thomas Pogge’s Health Impact Fund proposal (Section 8) along with his proposal for a Global Resources Dividend (Section 9.1), Christian
Barry and Sanjay Reddy’s Just Linkage Proposal to help improve working conditions (Section 4), and Allan Buchanan and Robert Keohane’s institutional innovations to secure accountability in the use of military force
(Section 3.2). There is also the innovative work of Leif Wenar concerning proposals for clean trade (Section 9.1).