The Western New Guinea Problem

Author(s): L. Metzemaekers
Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Jun., 1951), pp. 131-142
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
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 The WesternNew Guinea
Problem
L. Metzemaekers

THE obviousfactthatany conflict arisingbetweenan Asian and a

Western
W country must, in the light of thepresentworldsituation,
constitutea problemoffar-reaching significancelendsgreatimportance
to the Netherlands-Indonesian controversy over the futurepolitical
statusof WesternNew Guinea. The conflictis an outgrowthof the
four-year strugglebetweenthe two countrieswhich ended with the
relinquishment of Dutch sovereignty overIndonesiain December1949.
The Netherlands-Indonesian Round Table Conferenceat The Hague,
which precededthe transfer of sovereignty, failedto agreeon thefu-
turestatusof WesternNew Guinea, sincethe Indonesiandelegation
was unwillingto returnhome withouthavingsecuredDutch recogni-
tion of its claim to the territory,
while the Netherlandsgovernment
could not accordsuch recognition withoutriskingrejectionby Parlia-
mentof the entireRound Table Conferenceagreement. Accordingly,
the attemptto reacha solutionof thedeadlockwas postponedforone
year, althoughneithercountrywas particularlysanguine over the
likelihoodof achievinga settlement by negotiation.Since the failure
of the New Guinea Conference, held at The Hague in the following
December,the basic situationhas remainedunchanged: Indonesia
disputesthe legalityof Dutch sovereignty overWesternNew Guinea,
to
which it seeks incorporate within its own territories.

The controversy concernsthatpart of the island of New Guinea

lying west of the 141st meridian-an area some thirteen timeslarger
thanHolland. Like AustralianNew Guinea to theeast of it,thisarea
is verywarm,humid and, as far as is known,not especiallyfertile.
Mostofthecountry is coveredwithtropicalrainforests
which,although
valuableforconserving thesoil,presenttremendousobstaclesto human
exploitationof the land. The wild, largelymountainousinteriorhas
a heavyrainfallwhichincreaseswiththealtitude.The coastalareasare

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 PacificAflairs
notoriously malarial.Thus far,the low-lyingplain on the southcoast,
aroundthesettlement ofMerauke,is theonlyrelatively extensiveregion
thathas been foundsuitableforpermanentfarming,but even there
large-scaleirrigation projects,indispensableforthe cultivationof such
staplecropsas paddy,have not been undertakenbecauseof a lack of
availablecapital.
The onlysizableWestern-owned companyoperatingin theterritory
is the NederlandseNieuw Guinea Petroleummaatschappij, associated
withShell and StandardVacuum interests, whichhas beenproducing
oil at the extremewestof the island (Sorong). Its outputin 1950 was
onlysome300,000tons,and futureprospectsare uncertain.The entire
area of 260,000 squaremilesis servedby onlyi6o milesof automobile
roads,fiveairfieldsand one good harbor.The Netherlands has recently
appropriated 24 millionguildersfornew housing for Europeans and
fordevelopingtheharborofHollandiaand certainairfields.
The area as a whole has not been nearlysufficiently exploredon a
scientificbasis to providea reliableestimateof its natural resources.
Whetherit offerswide possibilities foreconomicexploitation remains
to be seen.The equippingand dispatchof scientific expeditionsto de-
terminethesepossibilities shouldbe the firstconcernof any govern-
mentinterested in exploitingthe naturalresourcesof the territory.
The indigenous inhabitants-Papuans-are of the same ethnic
stockas thePapuansof AustralianNew Guinea.Certaingroupson the
westcoastand on theRadja Empatislandshave beenmuchinfluenced
by theirIndonesianneighborson adjacentislands.At one time,New
Guinea came withinthe culturalorbitof Asia; in the fourteenth cen-
turyit probablyhad contactswith East Java, and in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centurieswiththe Moluccas,specifically the kingdoms
ofTidoreand Ternate,Djailolo and Batjan.Few tracesofsuchcultural
influencesremain today,however,and in the past half-century the
Asian elementin Papuan lifehas diminished.Westerninfluences, too,
are verysuperficial, of Dutch missionaries
despitetheactivities and the
decadesofDutchadministration oftheareaas a partoftheNetherlands
East Indies.Postwardevelopments have tendedto place New Guinea
as a wholein a Pacificratherthanin an Asianframework.
The Papuan populationof the islandpresentsmarkedculturaldi-
versity-toa fargreaterdegreethando thepopulationsof Javaor the
otherislandsof Indonesia.In the case of Java,for instance,certain
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 The WesternNew Guinea Problem
typicalfeaturesare commonto all of the different groupsconstituting
the 45 millioninhabitants to dis-
of thatisland,but it is verydifficult
coversuch commoncharacteristics in Papuan culture.The Dutch eth-
nologistGerald Held has recentlyreferred to thislack of a common
denominator as the mostuniversalfeatureof Papuan culture,and has
notedthe"improvising genius"ofthepeople.1The structure ofPapuan
societyis fundamentally differentfromtheIndonesianor theMelane-
sian.2Like the land itself,thepopulationof WesternNew Guinea has
been littlestudiedby trainedscientists. The only reliableanthropo-
logicalinquiriesthathavebeenpublishedconcerntwoisolatedgroups-
the Marindanimof Vogelkop Peninsulaon the southcoast and the
Waropenin the northwest. As forthe mountainpeoples,not enough
is known about themto affordeven a generalpictureof theirsocial
structure.Speakinggenerally, however,it can be said thatmuchof the
populationhas becomesufficiently dislodgedfromits traditionalbase
throughthe influenceof the Christianmissionsto be receptiveto
Westerninfluences.3 Yet thesehave not given rise to new cultural
forms.

XVHEN Japancapitulatedin 1945, veryfew Netherlanders had any

notionthatDutch sovereignty overIndonesiamightsoon end. Among
those few,probablynone envisagedthe possibilityof a transferof
sovereigntythatwould excludeWesternNew Guinea. This territory
had beenpartof theNetherlandsIndiessincei828, althoughsustained
contactbetweenDutch and Papuans did not begin untilthe present
century,at which time the Netherlandsturnedits attentionto the
administration of the island.The resultingpenetration
effectedmany
social changes among the coastal population.As securityincreased,
numerousIndonesians,particularly fromneighboringAmboina and
theKey Islands,enteredNew Guineaas teachers, minoradministrative
and bird-of-paradise
officials whilethecommercialpossibilities
hunters,
attractedChinesesettlers.Thus threepopulationstratatook shape: a
verythintop layerof Europeans,mainlyin government or missionary

1 G. J.Held, De Papua als CultuurImprovisator,

The Hague, I95I.
2 In his classification GeorgeMurdockcalls thePapuan a cultureapart.
of all humancultures,
Murdock,SocialStructure, New York,I949.
3 The populationof WesternNew Guinea is usuallyestimated at one million,althoughonly
267,447 personshave been countedby the government. Of these,about i6o,ooo are Christians.

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 PacificAflairs
work; a widermiddle layerof teachers,lesserofficials and tradersof
Indonesianor Chineseorigin;and a largePapuan elementat thebase-
withpractically no intermixture amongthethree.The initialdisparity
betweenthe Indonesiansand the Papuans remainedand, becauseof
racial and class differences,therearosea mutualhostility whichis not
foundelsewherein IndonesiawherePapuan groupslive.In fact,such
pro-Indonesian sentiments as existamongthePapuansof New Guinea
have originatedmainlywiththoseof theirpeoplewho have livedout-
sideof New Guinea.
The idea of separatingNew Guinea fromthe restof Indonesia
probablybeganwiththedesireofmanymembersoftheIndo-European
(Eurasian) community immediately aftertheoutbreakof theNether-
lands-Indonesianconflictto migrateto that island. Advocatingthe
designation ofNew Guineaas a territory forIndo-Europeansettlement,
theyurgedthatit be excludedfromall negotiations on the futureof
Indonesia.Many Dutch politicians-particularly thoseopposedto any
transferof sovereignty to Indonesia-werewon overby thisargument
and finallycompelledtheNetherlandsgovernment to reservetheNew
Guineaquestionforseparatenegotiation withIndonesia.
The New Guinea policy of the Netherlandsgovernment has re-
mainedmoreor less constantsincetheLinggadjatiAgreementof No-
vember1946. It considersthat,notwithstanding the emergenceof an
independentIndonesia,maintenanceof Dutch sovereignty overNew
Guinea is in the interestboth of Holland and of the autochthonous
population,whichhas nothingin commonwiththecitizensofthenew
Republic.The latter,it holds,cannotreasonablyclaim thisterritory,
which is in no respect-geographically, culturallyor eco-
ethnically,
nomically-a partof Indonesia.To transfer controloverNew Guinea
would be to abandon a historicalresponsibility-preparation of the
Papuansforeventualautonomy-andto consignthepeopleofWestern
New Guineato obliviononcemore.Indonesiaalreadyhas enoughprob-
lems to deal within any case,and lacks the capitaland thepersonnel
to developNew Guineaproperly. Holland has grantedtheIndonesians'
rightto self-determination; it mustnow do as muchforthePapuans.
But sincetheseare not yetable to look afterthemselves, it is morally
incumbenton Holland to continueits taskof educatingand training
the Papuans foranotherhalf-century. No othercountryhas so much
rightto sovereignty overthisterritory
as Holland,whichcannotbe held

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 New GuineaProblem
The Western
responsible forthebackwardstateof thepopulation. Moreover, con-
tinuation ofNetherlands rulewillencourage Dutchinvestors toaccept
the graverisksinvolvedin developing and exploiting New Guinea
underthe extremely conditions
difficult prevailing there.The fore-
going statement-necessarily couchedin generalterms-doesnot,
however, representtheviewsof all Dutchpoliticalcamps.The im-
portantLaborPartyexplicitly rejectsa continuation of Dutchsover-
eigntyin itspresent form,and wouldbe prepared undercertain con-
ditions-if, forexample, protection ofDutchbusiness and missionary
enterprise wereguaranteed-to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia.
The Indonesian viewis,ofcourse, quitedifferent.Indonesians reject
thethesisthatNew Guineais a separate country and thePapuansa
separatepeople;on thecontrary, theyregardthelatteras constituting
an intrinsicpartofIndonesia. In anycase,Indonesia doesnotconsider
ethnicdifferences amongthepopulation to be particularlyrelevant to
thequestion ofwhereitspolitical border is tolie.Afterall,itcanrefer
to manyWestern Europeannationalboundaries thatdisregard ethnic
and culturalfrontiers. Moreover, in rebuttal of theDutchargument,
whichis shapedprimarily bywhatis assumedto be theneedsofthe
Papuanpopulation, IndonesiapointsoutthatHollandis in no position
to preparethispeopleforimmediate politicalindependence and that,
although Indonesiacannotdo so either, thesameistrueoftherelation-
shipofthegovernment to numerous territoriesandpopulation groups
within thepresent-day Republic ofIndonesia.
Eversincethebeginning oftheconflict between them, Hollandand
Indonesiahavedisagreed overhow the"rightof self-determination"
of a nationshouldbe interpreted in termsof international law. The
Indonesiannationalists have insistedthatthereis one Indonesian
people.Hollandhas takentheposition thatit is properto speakonly
of "theIndonesian peoples", who, under Dutchleadership, becamea
politicalentity butwho,culturally and traditionally speaking, do not
constitute anythinglikea singlenationin theWestern Europeansense
oftheterm.Indonesia hasarguedthat,according tothestipulationsof
theUnitedNationsCharter, theright ofself-determination shouldapply
to"theIndonesian nation"as a whole.Hollandhasheldthatthisright
shouldbeextended tothevarious "peoples" ofIndonesia.
In theyearsbefore therecent worldwar,Western NewGuineawas
by no meansexcludedfromthescopeof the Indonesian nationalist
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 PacificAflairs
slogan"One people,one country, one language".In itsconstantefforts
to emphasizethe separatisttendenciesof the Indonesianpeople,Hol-
land has-intentionallyor not-failed to understandthe basic objec-
tivesofIndonesiannationalism. Thus,beforethetransfer ofsovereignty,
it triedto imposeitsinterpretation on
of therightofself-determination
Indonesiaby,amongotherthings,creatingseparate"constituent" states
withina federalsystem(the United Statesof Indonesia),whichdis-
appearedwithinsix monthsafterthetransfer. The same interpretation
influencesthe Dutch attitudetowardNew Guinea, which is all the
firmerbecauseof the experiencejust mentioned.The Dutch believed
thattheywereoffering the "peoplesof Indonesia"an opportunity for
self-determinationbymoreor lessforcinga federalformofgovernment
on the country, but failedto realize thatin doing thistheyin effect
compelledthe Indonesiannationalists to repudiatethe whole scheme.
In consequence,theconstituent stateswerewipedout. Holland is now
tryingto preventa repetition of thisdevelopmentin respectof New
Guinea.
On itspart,Indonesia,declaringthatNew Guineahas alwaysbeen
an intrinsic partof the formerNetherlandsIndies,asks whyHolland
should not relinquishit along with the rest of the formercolony.
WesternNew Guinea is now theonlypartof theformerNetherlands
Indies thathas not yetgained independence, and the new Republic
of Indonesiahas repeatedly declaredthatit cannotbe regardedas com-
pleteuntilthatparthas beenunitedwithit.4

THE of sovereignty,
Charterof transfer signedin Amsterdambythe
and Netherlands
Indonesian delegations 27, I949, states:
on December
"Withregard totheresidency
ofNewGuinea, itisdecided:
"(a) In viewofthefactthatit hasnotbeenpossible toreconciletheviews
oftheparties on New Guinea,whichremain in dispute,
therefore
"(b) In viewofthedesirabilityoftheRoundTableConference concluding
on2 November
successfully 1949,
"(c) In viewofthelimited
research thathasbeenundertaken andcompleted
withrespecttotheprobleminvolved inthequestionofNewGuinea,
"(d) In viewoftheheavytaskswithwhichtheUnionpartners willinitially
beconfronted,and
"(e) In viewofthededicationofthepartiestotheprincipleofresolvingby
4 In one of his manyspeecheson thesubject,PresidentSukarnosaid: "The fightforfreedom
will not end untilour [New Guinea] brothers, too, have been admittedto Indonesiaand have
thereby and politicalfreedom."
acquiredfullcitizenship

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 The WesternNew Guinea Problem
peacefuland reasonablemeansany differencesthatmayhereafterarisebe-
tweenthem,
"That thestatusquo of theresidencyof New Guineashallbe maintained,
withthestipulation
thatwithina yearfromthedateoftransferofsovereignty
to theRepublicoftheUnitedStatesofIndonesiathequestionofthepolitical
statusof New Guineashallbe determinedthrough negotiations
betweenthe
Republicof theUnitedStatesof Indonesiaand theKingdomof theNether-
lands."
In a subsequentexchangeof lettersit was emphasizedthatthe words
"the statusquo shall be maintained"should be understoodto mean
"throughcontinuing underthegovernment of theNetherlands".
In the courseof thenextyearit becameclearthata solutionto the
New Guineaproblemwouldbe extremely ifnotimpossible,
difficult, to
achieve.At thefirstconference ofDutchand Indonesianministers, held
at Jakartain Marchi950, a Netherlands-Indonesian commission was ap-
pointedto drafta reportforsubmission to theNew Guineaconference
thatwas contemplated in theCharteroftransfer. The jointcommission
visitedthedisputedterritory and held conversations withthenativein-
habitantsin severalplaces,with the resultthat the Indonesianand
Dutch membersarrivedat completelydifferent conclusionsregarding
thewishesof thepopulation.Insteadof a jointreport,thecommission
producedtwobulkyvolumes,one bytheDutchmembersand theother
by the Indonesians,and the views of the two countriesremainedas
firmlyopposedas before.
It was againstthisbackgroundthatthe New Guinea Conference
openedat The Hague in Decemberi950. Earlyin theproceedings the
Indonesiandelegation,statingthatWesternNew Guinea was Indo-
nesianterritoryand suggestingthatits transfer to Indonesiabe post-
poned untilJulyI, i95i, proposedthatthe interimperiodbe used for
draftinga separateinstrument of transferwhich would guarantee
continuedfreedomofoperationto Dutchbusinessand missionary enter-
prisesthere.
The Netherlandsdelegationrejectedthis proposal,suggestingin-
stead a continuationof Dutch sovereignty over New Guinea, while
notingHolland's readinessto form a jointcouncilwithIndonesiaon
the patternof the "Conferenceof Ministers"of theNetherlandsIndo-
nesianUnion.This councilwoulddecideadministrative policyforNew
Guinea,but its decisionswould be valid onlyif unanimous;in other
cases, the Dutch administration, which would continueto function,

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 PacificAfairs
would have a freehand.When theIndonesiansrefusedto considerthis
plan, the Netherlandsproposedthatsovereignty overNew Guinea be
vestedin the NetherlandsIndonesianUnion or, if thisshouldprove
unacceptable, thatresortshouldbe had to theUnitedNationsforassist-
ance in reaching a solutionto theproblem.In rejecting thefirstscheme,
Indonesiapointedout thatacceptanceofit would imply thatHolland's
relationshipwithNew Guinea was similarto theIndonesian,although
in facttheDutch attitudetowardtheareawas whollycolonialwhereas
in Indonesianeyestheterritory was a partof thehomeland.No official
replywas made to the proposalconcerningpossiblerecourseto third-
partymediationofthedispute.
When the conferencebrokeup on December26, i950, the Indo-
nesian delegationannouncedthatits countrywould regardthe con-
tinuationof Dutch sovereignty overNew Guinea thereafter as illegal.
In addition, the Indonesian government appointed a commission to
determine what sectionsof theRound Table Conferenceagreement of
DecemberI949 shouldbe denouncedand how the Union treatywith
the Netherlandscould be convertedinto a standardinternational
treaty.Thus, in protestagainstthe continuanceof Dutch sovereignty
overNew Guinea,Indonesiawishedto severtheUnion relationship.
There has been a noticeabledeterioration in subsequentrelations
betweenthe two countries. The commission submitted
has itsfindings
to the Indonesiangovernment, but theyhave not yetbeen published.
The new Indonesiancabinetwhichhas meanwhilecome intopower
will probablyseek to initiatenegotiations withthe Netherlandssoon
regardingan over-allrevisionof the Round Table Conferenceagree-
mentsand abandonmentof the Union relationship.Holland is not
likelyto opposereplacement of the Union by a standardinternational
treaty, but the questionof whatprovisionsof the existingagreements
are to be incorporated in thenew treatywill doubtlessrequirelongand
laboriousnegotiations.

NEXT to Indonesiaand the Netherlands,Australiais undoubtedly

the power mostinterested in the dispositionof New Guinea,whose
importance
strategic was drivenhometo theDominionduringthelast
war. Moreover,Australiagovernsone largepartoftheislandas a trust
and anotheras a possession.Australiahas withoutquestion
territory
done farmoreby way of exploringand developingtheeasternpartof
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 The WesternNew Guinea Problem
New Guinea thanHolland has done in thewestern.5 This differenceis
probablyattributable to thefactthatAustraliahas had to concernitself
while the Netherlandscon-
with no othersizable overseasterritories,
centratedmostof itsattention and activities
in theeconomicand social
fieldson otherpartsof itsformercolonialempire.It maybe expected
thatin futuretheNetherlands-ifit getsthechance-will do moreto
developWesternNew Guinea; but whetherit will be able to do this
alone, withoutlarge-scalefinancialassistancefromabroad,is at least
questionable.
The policyof AustraliaregardingWesternNew Guinea was ex-
plainedby Mr. P. C. Spender,theMinisterof ExternalAffairs and Ex-
in a statement
ternalTerritories, to thepressduringhisvisitto Holland
in August ig5o,6 since which timetherehas been no change in that
5 The economicbackwardness of WesternNew Guinea may be seen fromthe factthatthe
totalforeigntradeof the territoryin theperiod1934-36 was worthonlysome 6oo,ooo guilders.
For an accountof Australianpolicyand programsin the easternsectionof the island,see
JamesMcAuley,"Defenceand Developmentin AustralianNew Guinea",PacificAflairs,Decem-
ber I950, pp. 37I-80.
6 SincetheSpenderstatement summedup all of thearguments supportingtheAustralianatti-
tude,it meritsquotation:
"The AustralianGovernment does not considerthatIndonesiahas any valid claim to
Dutch New Guinea,the futureof whichis of supremeand vital importanceto the Aus-
tralianpeople.
"On behalfof the AustralianGovernment, I have, whilstI have been at The Hague,
expressedthis view to the Government of The Netherlands. The High Commissioner for
Indonesiahas seen me and I have communicated to him thesame opinion.It is properthat
this should be done as in the discussionspresently to be commencedbetweenthe Dutch
and Indonesians,Australiawill not be a party.It is important, thatwe shouldat
therefore,
thisstagemakeour viewsplain to theworldas well as to thetwopartiesat thisConference.
"The whole of New Guinea, includingDutch New Guinea,is not in any way geo-
graphically partof Indonesia.If it belongsto any specialgeographicalarea, thenit belongs
to thatpartof the worldwhichmayfairlybe describedas theAustralianContinental Group.
A greatdeal of misunderstanding existsin some partsof the worldas to the natureof the
issue on Dutch New Guinea and as to the factsrelevantto that issue. It is convenient,
therefore,thatsome of the moreimportant as I believethatthe
factsbe stated,particularly
futureof the people of Dutch New Guinea,numbering overa millionhumanbeings,may
perhapstend to be forgotten in the clouds of disputation. These facts,togetherwith my
comments, maybe statedshortly as follows:-
"I. The people of Dutch New Guinea are the same people as inhabitAustralianNew
Guineaand Australian Papua.
"2. The people therefore of the whole of the mainlandof New Guinea are of the
one race.
"3. They are approximately of the same degreeof social development, withthe same
generalethnicbackground, customsand traditions.
"Dutch New Guineais accordingly an integralpartof New Guineaas a whole.
"4. The territoryand the peopleof New Guineaare neithergeographically nor racially
partof Indonesia.
"5. Itspeoplehaveno racialaffinity withthepeoplesofIndonesia.

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 PacificAfFairs
policy.As this and otherstatements by Mr. Spenderhad indicated,
Australiais opposedto anychangein thepoliticalstatusquo ofWestern
New Guinea.On theotherhand,theAustralians haverepeatedly urged
closercooperationbetweenHolland and Australiain the development
ofNew Guineaas a whole.DuringtheNetherlands-Indonesian negotia-
tions in December i950, the AustralianAmbassadorin Holland in-
formedthe Netherlandsof his government's willingnessto extendthe
latterfinancialaid in the developmentof WesternNew Guinea,and
made,particularreferencetojointdevelopmentofnativewelfareservices.
The Netherlands government was not,however,in a positionto discuss
thisofferin view of itsdisputewithIndonesiaand of thenecessity for
circumspection as long as relationsremainedstrained.A transfer of
sovereignty over WesternNew Guinea to Indonesiawould lead to
"Accordingly were sovereignty over thesepeople to be transferred by one Government
to another,the only difference for the indigenousor nativepeople of Dutch New Guinea
would be thattheywould come underthe rule of anotherpowerbutnot undertheruleof
theirown people.
"It hardlyseemsconsistent withmodernideas thata millionpeople,who have not yet
reachedthe stage of politicalconsciousness and maturity, shouldbe transferred fromone
nation'ssovereignty to thatof anotherwithouttheirwill havingbeen ascertainedor being
ascertainable.Their futureshould only be determinedwhen theyare able whichcannot
be fora numberof years-to speakpolitically forthemselves. It willrequirelongadministra-
tiveexperienceand resourcesof scientific skilland personnelto enablethepeoplesof Dutch
New Guineato be graduallyled to theconceptsof democratic self-government.
"In the view of the AustralianGovernment, thereis no substancein any claim that
becauseDutch New Guineawas formerly administered as partof thecolonialadministration
of the Dutch Government that [sic] it shouldtherefore in the eventswhichhave happened
belong to the Republicof Indonesia.Such a claim has neitherreasonnor merit,and is
whollyirrelevant.
"Australiahas a deep attachment to the people of AustralianNew Guinea,an attach-
whichwas cementedduringthe Japanesewar when theyfoughtand suffered and
together
succouredone another.If the claim of Indonesiato Dutch New Guinea wereconcededto
any degreeat all, it would be but a matterof time,no matterhow genuinemay be assur-
ances to the contrary, when the claim will be pushed furtherso as to includethe trust
territoryof AustralianNew Guineaand itspeople.
"Experiencehas shown to Australianshow strategically vital to Australiandefenceis
the mainlandof New Guinea.I have pointedout beforethatwe cannotalterour geography
whichforall timemakesthisarea of supremeconsequenceto Australia.Quiteapartfromits
militaryand strategicsignificance, one cannot disregardthe ever-increasing Communist
pressurein Asia. Communismhas not got any footholdyet in AustralianNew Guinea.
Australiais determined in so faras it can to ensurethatit willnot.
"It hardlyneeds statingthat Australiahas no othermotivesor aspirationsthan the
interestsof the people of New Guinea,and its own securitywhichis also theirs.We have
no desireto interferein thepurelydomesticaffairs ofanyothernation.
"The futureof Dutch New Guinea does not,however,merelytouchand concernthe
internalaffairsof othernations-it is one whichdirectlybearsupon the inarticulate mass
of the nativepeopleof Dutch New Guineawho are unabledirectly on
to expressthemselves
thisdisputeand uponvitalsecurity considerations forAustralia."

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 The WesternNew Guinea Problem
with Australiaand mightwell cause considerable
seriousdifficulties
unrestin theSouthPacificarea.
Unlike Australia,theUnitedStateshas thusfarcarefully refrained
frommakingany statement in supportof eitherpartyto the conflict.
The Departmentof Statemerelyemphasized,at the startof theNew
Guinea Conferencein Decemberi950, thatforthepresenttheUnited
Stateswould preferto see the controversysettledby thetwo countries
involvedand withoutreference to a broaderarbitralframework.
GreatBritain,too,has takena strictlyneutralposition.An offerby
theBritishAmbassadorat The Hague to attemptinformally, on behalf
of his government,to bringthepartiesclosertogether was rejectedby
bothofthem.

IN summary, possibilities
itcan be saidthat,althoughthedevelopment
of WesternNew Guinea have notbeenadequatelyexplored,it maybe
assumedthatsuch a largearea possessescertainexploitablenaturalre-
sourceswhich could be developedif sufficient capitalwere available.
The territorycan have littleattractionforprivateinvestment, however,
as long as its politicalstatusis uncertain,which is to say thatrapid
developmentcannotbe anticipateduntil the presentpoliticalcontro-
versyhas beenresolved.
Yet theprospectsfora politicalsolutionare unfavorable. Indonesia
continuesto lay claimto theterritory; everypoliticalpartyand group
in theRepublicwholeheartedly supportsthegovernment in thisclaim.
ManyIndonesiansmaynotbe quitecertainwhereNew Guinea is,but
all of them,thanksto therepeateddeclarations of theirPresident,be-
lievethatcontroloverit is vitalto the welfareof the new state.Such
unanimityof opinion regardingthe expressedpolicyof the govern-
mentis lackingin Holland, where,as alreadynoted,theLabor Party
favorsa transferof sovereignty overWesternNew Guineato Indonesia
on certainconditions. UndertheDutch constitution, anychangein the
statusof New Guinea requiresthe approvalof two-thirds of themem-
bersof Parliament, a majorityof whichcannotbe musteredat present
for any proposedsolutionwhatever,so that for the time being the
Netherlandsgovernment is powerlessto breakthedeadlock.
Whateverthemeritsof thearguments pro and con,thecontroversy
quite clearlycan be onlyharmfulto the disputedterritory and its in-
habitants.The politicaldesiresof thePapuans can hardlybe adduced
I4'

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 PacificAffairs
foror againsteitherof the two standpoints, sincethemajorityof this
archaicpeople has no politicalconsciousness whatever.It is clearalso
thatHolland is confronted witha choiceoftakingpositivestepstoward
theestablishment of a soundrelationship withIndonesiaor ofretaining
possessionof New Guinea. Choice of the lattercoursewould almost
certainlyspell a gradualbut definiteend to Dutch financialand eco-
nomicinterests in Indonesia.Moreover,Holland is too weak and too
hard hit by the loss of Indonesiato undertakelarge-scaleexploitation
and development oftheterritory forthetimebeing.
It would seemthat,giventheexistingsituation, somesortof settle-
menton an international basis is mostlikely.This could conceivably
taketheformofDutchtrusteeship fora limitedperiod,underthesuper-
visionof a councilin which all of the countriesconcernedwould be
represented. But, in view of the attitudesof Indonesiaand Holland,
both of which stronglyoppose it, such a solutionwill be extremely
to attain.
difficult
Anotherdanger-perhapsthe most seriousin the presentworld
situation-isthatin the processof seekingan international solutiona
deep riftmay be createdbetweenthe countriesof SoutheastAsia and
thoseWesterncountriesthathave immediateinterests in the Pacific.
Such a riftcould,amongotherthings,seriously impedefurther progress
towarda Pacificpact designedto stemCommunistpenetration in the
area as a whole.It is, nonetheless, questionablewhetherinternational
interventionin theNew Guineaproblemcan be avoidedin thelongrun.

The Hague,May I95I

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