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THE CHARACTER OP THE GERMAN FREIKORPS IN THE BALTIC
The Iron D ivision In Latvia, 1919

by
Mlohael D a n v ille Sterling Dowling )

Presented in Partial Fulfillm ent of the

Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts
Thé Committee on Degrees in History
Harvard College
Cambridge, Massachusetts
March 27, 1959
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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION.............. ........................................................................ 1
CHAPTER I The Background and Character of the
F relkorns.............................................................. 8
CHAPTER II The F irst Campaign, January-March
1 9 1 9 . . . . . . ............................................................ 20
CHAPTER I I I "Mutiny and "Putaoh"..................................... 29
CHAPTER IV The Capture o f Riga andC iy il W a r ...... Al
CHAPTER V The Russo-German A llia n c e ............................... 5*
CHAPTER VI C o n c l u s i o n ............. ............................ 68
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE............ . . . ....... ........................................ 73
BIBLIOGRAPHY.......... .... . .............................................. 76
APPENDIX A Maps................................................................................... A1
APPENDIX B Photographs................................ *................................ Pi
 INTRODUCTION

The end o f the f i r s t world war marked the end o f the

n in eteen th century In Europe. Comolete as t h is change was
in B rita in and France, i t was even more apparent in eastern
and c e n tr a l Europe. The A ustrian Empire vanished, lea v in g
only i t s problems behind. Im perial R ussia had ceased to
e x is t , save in the a sp ir a tio n s o f the few o z a r lst White
R ussians s t i l l fig h tin g va in ly to overthrow the B olsh evik s.
In Germany, the Emperor's ab d ication had d ecap itated
the 0b r lg k e lts 3ta a t r w hile the rapid d isso lu tio n and co lla p se
o f the Im perial Army l e f t the new government w ith no b a sis
o f power from which to h a lt the leftw ard d r if t o f the German
r e v o lu tio n .
The German Im perial Army in the west had remained more
or le s s In ta ct u n til i t was marched back across the German
fr o n tie r , when in d iv id u a l u n its began to d isin te g r a te at the
f i r s t breath o f the r e v o lu tio n .
In the e a s t, the c o lla p se o f the Army came e a r lie r , and
was much more com plete. The troops l e f t to occupy the area
held under the B rest-L ito vsk trea ty had been the scrapings
o f the German manpower b a r r e l, s o ld ie r s c la s s if ie d u n fit
fo r combat fo r reasons o f age and i l l h e a lth . In some
ca se s, the manpower shortage had been made up by co n scrip tin g
 - 2 -

French A lsa tia n s and P o le s. I t was an army o f o ld , tir e d ,

d isco n ten ted men. The o f fic e r s were, lik e th e ir men, those
c la s s if ie d u n fit fo r combat. The o f f i c i a l d u ties o f the
occupation o ffe red many op p o rtu n ities for corruption; few
were w asted . As s r e s u lt , the o f fic e r s were in no p o sitio n
to enforce d is c ip lin e or encourage the m ilita ry v ir tu e s
among the men. Even b efore the a r m istice, d is c ip lin e was
t e r r ib le . D rafts o f replacem ents fo r the w estern fr o n t, es­
p e c ia lly a fte r the lo s s e s in August at Cambrai, freq u en tly
m utinied or d eserted en m asse.
When the war ended, the Army in the ea st f e l l ap art.
The S o ld ie r 's C ouncils took over the vast m ajority o f u n its;
g en era lly lack in g in the experience necessary to supply and
tran sp ort large b od ies o f men, they com plicated the lo g i s t ic
problems o f the withdrawal Immensely, because o f shortage
o f r a tio n s and tran sp ort, and an xiety to get home as soon as
p o s s ib le , many in d iv id u a l so ld ie r s and sm all u n its tr ie d to
make th e ir own way home. This was an extrem ely dangerous
undertaking, sin ce p a rtisa n bands, armed w ith weapons l e f t
behind in the Russian r e tr e a t, had sprung up in the rear
a rea s. Very l i t t l e resista n ce was o ffe red to the S o v iets
when they began to put p ressu re on the r e tr e a t. In fa c t,
the S o ld ie r 's C ouncils are freq u en tly accused o f s e llin g
th e ir arms and equipment to them. In order to provide some
minimum secu rity again st the S o v ie ts, and to p ro tect the
lin e s o f communication from the p a r tisa n s, the Army Command
 - 3 -

was forced to r e c r u it volu n teer u n ite from among the troops,

o ffe r in g such in c e n tiv e s as double pay. These were the fo re­
runners o f the F relk orp s. D esp ite th e ir e f f o r t s , the inner
d isin te g r a tio n o f the Army continued, and as new governments
sprang up before and behind them, the problems o f the eva­
cuation m u ltip lie d . A fter having to fig h t i t s way through
Poland, the Army arrived at the German fr o n tie r a disorgan ized
ra b b le.
The A llie s had envisaged a slow and ord erly evacuation
o f the B rest-L lto vsk te r r ito r y , and under the terms o f
A r tic le 12 o f the arm istice agreem ent, the German adm inistra­
tio n o f the area was to continue u n t il the in te r n a l situ a ­
tio n s o f the new n a tio n a l s ta te s was c la r if ie d . This delay
was p a r tic u la r ly n ecessary in the case o f the former Russian
B a ltic P rovin ces, which had d eclared them selves the n atio n a l
rep u b lics o f E sthonia, L ith u an ia, and L a tv ia.
E sthonia and L atvia had been ruled for seven hundred
years by the B a lts, a com pletely German and landowning upper
c la s s , and by a predom inantly German middle c la s s . The
B a lts had been v a ssa ls o f the R ussian Crown. T heir Industry
and e ffic ie n c y had made the B a ltic one o f the r ic h e st p arts
o f R u ssia, and they had been one o f the a b le st groups in the
Im perial m ilita r y and c i v i l s e r v ic e . Because o f th e ir oath
o f f e a lt y , many o f them had fought for R ussia again st Germany
in the World War. The second la r g e st middle c la s s group had
been Jew ish, w hile the n a tiv e Esths and L etts had, w ith
only a few excep tion s been excluded from alm ost every oc­
cupation except a g r ic u ltu r a l and in d u str ia l la b or. These
working c la s s e s , the L e tts in p a r tic u la r , were extrem ely
pro-com m unist. Most o f the younger L ett p easants had
Joined the Red Army or become C heklsts a fte r the rev o lu tio n .
T rotsk y's bodyguard, in fa c t, was a b a tta lllo n o f L ett Guard
The new p r o v isio n a l government o f L atvia, beaded by
Karl Ulm anis, a former p ro fesso r at the U n iversity o f
Nebraska, ’w as based on the very sm all group o f middle c la s s
L e tts . I t was s lig h tly to the l e f t o f cen ter, antl-commun-
1s t , but a lso r a d ic a lly a n ti-B a lt, anti-German, and a n ti-
Jew ish. As a r e s u lt , i t denied i t s e l f the support o f the
two major non-communist groups in the country, and the only
croups which had had any ex ten siv e ad m in istra tiv e exper­
ie n c e . Had the German Army continued I t s ad m inistration o f
the country, the A llie s might have persuaded Ulmanis to
take some o f the most able B a lts in to the government, and
to g iv e them some assurance o f le g a l p ro tectio n o f th e ir
c i v i l and property r ig h ts , thus e sta b lish in g a sound b a sis
fo r a v ia b le , dem ocratic government.
However, as the Germans r e tr e a ted , w ith the Red Army
c lo se on th e ir h e e ls , the Ulmanis government fle d the
country. The B a lts, in on e ffo r t to provide fo r th e ir own
d efense again st the S o v ie ts, h a s tily organized the B alt
Landeswehr. a m ilitia composed p rim arily o f B a lts, but in -
 - 5 -

oluding w hite R ussians and L e tts, o ffic e r e d by B a lts who

had served in the Russian and German armies during the war.
However, th is force was num erically fa r too sm all and in ­
adequately train ed to cope w ith the advancing Red Army,
In an e ffo r t to r a ise more troop s, the B a lts, led by
the e ld e r Baron von M an teu ffel, concluded an agreement w ith
Hindenburg under which a th ird o f a l l the B alt e s ta te s
would be given as settlem en t land to German troops who v o l­
unteered to fig h t in d efen se o f L a tv ia , On December 20,
Ulmanis concluded a sim ila r agreement w ith Dr, August
W innig, the German O lv il R ep resen tative in the area, which
o ffe r e d Latvian c itiz e n s h ip as w e ll as land to German v o l­
u n teers ,
In stip u la tin g the co n d itio n s o f A r tic le 12, the
A llie s had ob viou sly concluded that the Germans, though
strong enough to m aintain the sta tu s quo in the B a ltic ,
were not strong enough to In te r fe r e w ith the even tu al e s ­
tablishm ent o f a s e r ie s o f sm all, anti-German as w ell as
a n ti-S o v ie t, n a tio n a l s ta te s in Eastern Europe. Though in
a few months, the Germans in the B a ltic were to have become
strong enough to se r io u sly threaten the new balance o f
power e sta b lish e d by the A m e s , in the w in ter o f 1918-1919
the German governmentT~as w e ll as the Army-p-was stru g g lin g
fo r I t s own su r v iv a l.
 - 6 -

The revo lu tion in Germany continued to d r if t towards

the l e f t . The s tr e e ts swarmed w ith hungry p r o le ta r ia n s,
d e se r te r s, a g ita to r s and the armed red s a ilo r s who, as in
S t. P etersburg, seemed to be the shock troops o f the revo­
lu tio n . Ebert had asked the Army to disarm and d isp erse
the s a ilo r s ; the Array had been unable to do s o . A red revo­
lu tio n seemed In e v ita b le . The extreme l e f t co n tro lled the
means o f tran sp orta tion and communication, and could have
created a Red Army overn igh t. There appeared to be no armed
force on the r ig h t which could have opposed i t .
Two th in g s caused the f a ilu r e o f the rev o lu tio n ; the
Inadequacy o f the lead ersh ip o f the extreme l e f t , and the
form ation o f the F relk orps.
On the day, early in January 1919, when the revo lu tion
should have taken p la ce, when one word would have been
enough to s ta r t i t , the lea d ers o f the l e f t d elib era ted and
d elayed . An enormous crowd w aited in the s tr e e ts o f B erlin
for the sig n a l to b egin . As the day went on, the crowd got
co ld , tir e d , hungry— and went home.
Some o f the f ir s t Frelkorps troops arrived in B erlin
a few days la t e r . Their b ru ta l and thorough rep ression
wiped out whatever stren gth the l e f t s t i l l had. During the
week b efore the n a tio n a l e le c tio n s , the Frelkorps disarmed
the s a ilo r s , m ethod ically combed the working quarters o f the
c ity fo r sto ck p iled weapons, and murddred Rosa Luxemburg
and Karl L iebknecht.
 - 7 -

German Frelkorns troops subsequently succeeded In push­

ing the Soviets out o f the B a ltic , ^hen, d esp ite the e ffo r ts
o f the German government to make them withdraw, they nearly
succeeded in reversing the eastern European arrangements
o f the treaty o f V er sa illes by concluding an a llia n ce with
the White Russians. An a llia n ce with Russia had led to the
rejuvenation of P russia a century e a r lie r . This one fa ile d
in it s purpose, hot only because i t was backed by in s u ffi­
c ie n t“ strength, biit because the German government and people
were tinw illin g to support I t ,
 CHAPTER I
The Background ana Character o f the Frelkorp,e

What so rt o f men were th e se , who were able to sup­

p ress an apparently in e v ita b le rev o lu tio n , and in the f o l­
low ing months, w ith alm ost no support from the German gov­
ernment or p eop le, to so n early overturn the balance o f
power in eastern Europe?
They-began th e ir post-w ar careers as m ercenaries, the
h ired troops o f the O ffic e r Corps and o f the con servative
fa c tio n in the government. During the course o f the
co u n ter-rev olu tio n they e sta b lish e d for them selves a repu­
ta tio n fo r extreme b r u ta lity , p o lit ic a l extremism, and a
sort o f romantic ir r a tio n a lism .
However, a fte r the f i r s t b a ttle s again st the commun­
i s t s in Germany, and a fte r the i n i t i a l engagements along
the eastern fr o n tie r , the Frelkorps began to act independ- .
e n tly o f th e ir paym asters, and by the end o f the Frelkorp_g
p erio d , during the underground warfare a g ain st the French,
and the S e p a r a tists in the Rhineland., th e ir a c t iv it ie s had
assumed the nature o f a- crusade. Some o f the Frelfcorps-
kampfer, A lbert Leo S ch lageter in p a r tic u la r , were apotheo­
siz e d by the extreme rig h t during the la te r tw en ties. The
 - 9 -

Frelkoroskampfer In the B a ltic came to consider th eselves

as the successors ©f T orek1s v o lu n te e r s. General Maercker,
who set up 1he f ir s t o f the Freikoros in, December 1918, in
h is f ir s t speech t© h is troops invoked the s p ir it o f 18-12,
1
and compared him self, to Major von Lutzow at B reslau.
I think i t i s clea r thatrthe Frelkorpskampfer were
something: more than counter-revolutibnary m ercenaries.
Moreover, d esp ite th e ir b ru ta lity and rowdy ism, they were
also something more than merely the p redecessors o f the v
N azis in German p o lit ie s . They were an extraordinary group
o f in d iv id u a ls, imbued w ith-outdated, nineteenth-century
va lu es, who reacted to the problems o f the early tw en tieth
century in an extraordinary manner.
Robert W aite, who has w ritten the only work in English
©n, the F relkorps. says that
the generation to which the Frelkorpskampfer
belonged— the generation born in the 1890* s—
p a rticip a ted in two experiences which were to
have a tremendous e f fe c t upon h is subsequent
care eh" a is a volu n teer. ' The f ir s t o f these was
the pre-war youth movement; the second, World
War I .
JLat us take f ir s t the youth movement. ^ I t .was a move-*2

1 . Maercker, Vom Relohsheer zur Reichswehr, p . fcg

ouoted in J . ' Berioi«t-Mfichln- H istory o f the German Army
Since the A rm istice. Zurich. 1939, V ol. I , p . 115.
2 Robert W aite, "Vanguard to Nazism.'Cambridge, 1952,
p . 17.
 - 10 «

ment based e s s e n tia lly upon m iddle c la s s you th s, those boys

and young men who had. the time and resou rces to spend th e ir
summers and week-ends wandering about the cou n trysid e. While
there was a lib e r a l sp rin k lin g o f academ icians among the
W andervogel. i t was not by any means an in t e lle c t u a l move­
ment. I t s p r in c ip a l lite r a r y spokesman and prophet was
Stefan George. I t was an extrem ely ^Irration al" movement,
alm ost com pletely d edicated to a ctio n , any a c tio n , so long
as i t was sp ectacu lar and "heroic" in scope. The Wandervogel
drew th e ir s p ir itu a l and in t e lle c t u a l nourishment from
N ie tz sc h e , from rath er vague thoughts o f the n ation and the
race, from the woods around them, and from s ile n t communion
w ith th e ir fe llo w s around the cam pfire.
Four p o in ts should be made about the Wandervogel which
are important as regards th e ir in flu en ce on the Frelkorpskamp—
f e r . The f ir s t i s th a t, coupled w ith , or as an adjunct of
th e ir ir r a tio n a lit y , was a to ta l " g o a l-le ssn e ss." In the
Frelkorpskam pfer th is "goal-lessneB s" became a contempt for
id e o lo g y . "The men o f the Frelkorps were not driven by an
id ea they were driven by th e ir awareness o f the d a n g e r ....
This was the f in e s t c h a r a c te r is tic o f the men of the F rg l-
.... 3
korps. they were free o f any id eo log y." 3

3. Ernst von Salomon, Die G esta lt des deutsohen F rel-

korpskam pfers, in Das Buch vom deutschen Freikorpskam pfer,
B e r lin , 1938, p . 11.
 - 11 -

Second is the bourgeois background o f the W andervögelr

and the fa c t th a t, lik e the Freikorps movement which f o l­
lowed, i t was in te n se ly a n t i- lib e r a l and a n ti-b o u r g e o is. !i
"The youth movement was above a l l the r e v o lt o f d iscon ten ted
bourgeois youth a g a in st a lib e r a l bourgeois so c ie ty and a l l
k
i t s works." Some clu e to the background o f th is sentim ent
i s given by Ernst Junger in d escrib in g h is reactio n to h is
f i r s t days at the fron t in World War I , "A long p eriod of
law and order, such as our generation had behind i t , pro­
duces a r e a l craving fo r the ab n orm a l...." This s p ir it o f
r e v o lt, and "craving fo r the abnormal" was to survive the
war and make the average Wandervögel p e c u lia r ly su sc e p tib le
to the a ttr a c tio n s o f the Freikorps l i f e and to the B a ltic
m ystique
Third was the Wandervögel* s devotion to the Fiihrer-
p r in g ip . This id e a l, o f a group o f men u n ited and d irected
in a great endeavor by the ch arism atic p erso n a lity and domi­
nant w i ll o f one lea d er, was to ch a ra cterize the r e la tio n ­
ship between the Freikorpskäm pfer and h is commander. The
id e a l was rein fo rced by the fa c t that the terms o f r e c r u it­
ment and d is c ip lin e in the F reik orp sf lik e those o f the Lands-
k n ech ter were so fr e e and easy th at only the p erson al domi­
nance o f the lea d er could m aintain order and d is c ip lin e in

. k . W aite, o p .c l t . r p . 18.
5. Ernst Jünger, Storm o f S t e e l. Garden C ity, N .Y .,
1929, P. 28.
 - 12 -

th e Freikorps « n it .
F in a lly , the Wandervögel were in te n se ly and rom anti­
c a lly p a t r io tic . Jünger d escrib es the f e e lin g s o f h ie
gen eration at the beginning o f the war in th ese words:
We had grown up in a m ateria l age, and in each one
o f us there was the yearning fo r a great exper­
ien ce such as we had never k n o w n .... We had l e f t
le c tu r e room, classroom , and bench behind u s. We
had been welded by a few weeks tra in in g in to a
corporate mass in sp ired by the enthusiasm o f one
thought— to carry forward the German id e a ls o f
•70.
6
The id e a lis t ic Frelkom skam pfer f e l t them selves In sp ired by
more or le s s sim ila r f e e lin g s , and con sidered It th e ir task
to r e a sse r t th ese id e a ls in a n ation which no lon ger b eliev ed
in them.
The war had an immense and obvious e ffe c t upon the
youth o f both sid e s who survived i t . The s ig n ific a n t li t e r a ­
ture o f the p eriod , such as A ll Quiet on the Western Front,
and Journey1s End, shows that fo r the va st m ajority o f the
p a r tic ip a n ts, the war d isc r e d ite d the world and the id ea s
which had, in a sen se, caused i t . However, fo r the hard
core o f the romantic p a tr io ts and for some o f the p r o fe s­
sio n a l so ld ie r s and o f f ic e r s , the war came to have an en­
t ir e ly d iffe r e n t meaning. Returning to G erm an y 0n a h o sp ita l
tra in during the la s t days o f the war, a fte r h is tw en tieth
wound, Junger summed up the experience in th ese words:6

6 . I b id ., p . 1.
 - 13 -

Hardened as sca rcely another generation ever was

in f ir e and flam e, we could go in to l i f e as though
from the a n v il; in to fr ie n d sh ip , lo v e , p o l it i c s ,
p r o fe ssio n s, in to a l l th a t d estin y had in s to r e .
I t i s not every gen eration th at is so favored.
7
When the men who f e l t as Jünger did returned from the
fr o n t, they found a r e a lity which had alm ost no r e la tio n to
the Germany which they had l e f t four years b efo re, the
Germany o f th e ir id e a ls . They found a n ation in a sta te o f
open, o c c a sio n a lly bloody r e v o lu tio n . The vo cal elem ents
in German s o c ie ty , the l e f t , had r e je c te d the Army and na­
tio n a lism , O ffic e r s and e n lis te d men both, i f they continued
to wear th e ir e p a u le tte s and cap-badges, symbols o f the
anclen regim p. were in con stan t danger o f having them torn
o f f by the revo lu tion a ry mobs which wandered about the
s tr e e ts o f the la rge c i t i e s . Ernst von Salomon, who was a
cadet at the tim e, d escrib es th is happening to him. He had
been surrounded by a mob, le d by an enormous s a ilo r wearing
a red cockade, which in clud ed sev era l women and a bourgeois
in a bow ler h a t. " . . . I thought only o f my e p a u le tte s. Every­
th in g depended on my e p a u le tte s— my honor— how absurd, what
could p o ssib ly depend on them? E verything depended on them,
and I reached fo r my p is t o l. Suddenly the s a ilo r 's f i s t h it
8
me in the middle o f the f a c e .78 Another source d escrib es
the exp erien ces o f two o f fic e r s who had la te r become

7 . I b id . . p . 282.
8 . Ernst von Salomon, P ie G eächteten. G ütersloh, 1930,
p. 1 3 .’
 - 14 -

Fyelkoroekagrpfer in the B a ltic .

Both o ffic e r s had had a hard tim e sin ce leavin g
France. One had had h is ep a u lettes torn o f f in
the s tr e e t! emd the oth er had been thrown into
the stockade by the S o ld ie r 's Council o f h is
garriso n . Both were glad to have 'escaped' from
Germany, which to them had become a 'P ig -s ty .'
9
These o ffic e r s and young men could ob viou sly fin d no
place for them selves in a Germany which seemed to deny and
degradé everything th at was precious to them, ^heir reac­
tion tended to be a revu lsion against what they considered
the weakness and treason o f "the November government, and
d isg u st at’ the p a s s iv ity and in a ctio n o f the b ourgeois. They
thus is o la te d them selves from German so c ie ty , and w aited for
some means o f rea ssertin g the o ld order.
The Freikorps age E stab lished
in the chaos o f VorkerM and S o ld ie r 's C ouncils, armed
red s a ilo r s , and revolutionary mobs which was Germany in
December 1918, the moderate S ocial Democrats, led by Ebert,
were attem pting to con solid ate the gains o f the November
revolu tion and to prevent the revo lu tion from d r iftin g fur­
th er to the l e f t . On December 23*4, armed sa ilo r s surroun­
ded the Chancellory; Ebert was forced to recognize the im­
p o s s ib ilit y o f re str a in in g the revolu tion w ith only the
rather p assive b ou rgeoisie as a b a sis of power, and asked

9. Erich B a lia , Landsknechte Würden V ir'. B erlin , 1932,

p . 27.
 - 15 -

the Army's a ssista n c e . To the consternation o f the high com­

mand, the remnants o f the Im perial Army proved incapable and
in some oases u n w illin g to suppress the revolu tion by fo rce.
Gustave Noshe, who had fo r c e fu lly restrain ed the revolu tion
in K ie l, was h u rried ly made M inister of D efense, with the
express task o f crea tin g a p o lle e force fo r the government.
The model for such a p o lic e force had been proposed to the
High Command, by General Maereker. Volunteer u n its were to
be formed, armed w ith the Im perial Army's equipment, and
recru ited from those veterans o f the war who were s t i l l mo­
tiv a te d by pre-war lo y a lt ie s . Nbske and the Army accepted
Maereker's proposal almost im m ediately. "Like those organic
bodies which emit before dying liv in g c e lls entrusted w ith
ensuring the con tin u ation of the s p e c ie s ...w e .. .see the
Im perial Army give b irth to a s e r ie s o f l i t t l e autonomous
10
u n its , d estin ed to take up i t s su ccession ."
Those ex-Wandervogel and p r o fe ssio n a l so ld iers who had
been seeking some means o f a c tiv e ly expressing th eir d is­
ta ste for the revolu tion rushed to Join the Frelkorps.
U nfortunately, these were not the only men who had been
unable to fin d a p lace for them selves in Germany Immediately
a fte r the war. The q u a s i-o ffic ia l sta tu s o f the Frelkoros
made them a p erfect base o f op eration s for every sort of
crim in al, crank, confidence man, p r o fite e r , or any other

10. Benoist.~M4ohint o o .c l t . . p . 122.

 - 16
. -

person who Blight have le g a l or e o c la l d ifflô tà ltle s in c i v i l

l i f e . These men were to give the Freikorpg a rather un­
savory reputation in the fo llo w in g Months,
I t was easy for these men to "escape" in to the Freikorpg
because the urgency o f the situ a tio n , and the need for troop s,
forced Hoshe to encourage in d iv id u a l commanders to r a ise
th e ir own u n its . There was thus a wide va riety in type and
q u ality o f u n its, and the terms o f recruitm ent tended to be
extrem ely casu a l. The a lleg ia n ce o f the men was in ev ita b ly
d irected towards th e ir commander, rather than towards the
governm ent,! This made i t almost im possible for e ith e r the
government or the Army to impose any real cen tra lized con­
tr o l over the F relkorns. Within a m atter o f months, th is
lack o f con trol over i t s troops was t© cause the government
frequent embarrassment, and w ithin a year, the Frelhorns
began to c o n stitu te a th reat to the government i t s e l f .
The Frelhoros had o r ig in a lly bean esta b lish ed to con­
t r o l the dom estic situ ation ,,. However, the volunteer system
proved so su ccessfu l a means o f r a isin g troops that the
government soon began recru itin g volu n teers for the defense
o f the east again st the P oles and the B olsh eviks. Whereas
the f ir s t Frelkorns to be set up, sueh as Maeroker's Volun­
te e r R ifle s and the Ehrhardt and Lcwenfeld Marine Brigades,
had been composed o f p ro fessio n a l so ld ie r s, prim arily non­
commissioned o f fic e r s , the*,new« form ations fo r the defense
 - 17 -

o f the e a st a ttr a c te d a more romantic and id e a lis t ic type

o f volu n teer, aid included many more stu d en ts. They con­
sid ered them selves the; h e ir s , not only o f the youths of
1812, "but o f the Teutonic K nights, and began to r e fe r to
them selves as the "R eiter gen* Oaten." The troops th a t
fought in the B a ltic , who were subsequently dubbed
Baltlkiim er by the German p ress, developed in to a d is t in c t
type as compared to the r e s t o f the Frelkoroskam pfer.
They were in alm ost constant combat again st one enemy or
another fo r alm ost an e n tir e year, whereas the "domestic"
F relkorps engaged in sp orad ic, in term itten t a c tio n s. The
Bpl tlkiimar were Just as b ru ta l as the "domestic" u n its , but
they were fig h tin g again st a foreig n enemy, in a region w ith
a long tr a d itio n o f savage, b ru ta l w arfare, surrounded by a
fo r e ig n , h o s t ile population; the "domestic" u n its on the
other hand, were fig h tin g on th e ir own te r r ito r y a g ain st
th e ir fello w countrymen. Quite a few o f the Baltlkiim er
intended to s e t t le on the land o ffe red them by the Hinden-
burg-M anteuffel and Ulmanis-W innlg agreem ents. One can
assume that they were attem pting to "escape" from Germany,
and to s ta r t a new l i f e in the B a ltic . F in a lly , and per­
haps most Im portant, the Baltlkiim er were the only
Frelkoroskam pfer to have frequent and d ir e c t con tact w ith
the E h ten te. Ag a r e s u lt , they thought o f +h e lr stru g gle
in in te r n a tio n a l rath er than n a tio n a l term s.
 - 18 -

One In d ication o f the la rger scope o f , the fig h tin g In

the B a ltic i s the government's choice of commander o f the
German troops in the B a ltic . General Count Rudiger von der
Golta r e fe r s to h im self in h is memoirs as "the p o lit ic a l
general," vhloh fee v a s. He had led the German troops sent
to a s s is t M arshall Mannerheim in the F innish O lv il War, and
had been e ffe c tiv e in Finland prim arily as a r e su lt of h is
p o lit ic a l, rather than m ilita r y , a c t iv it ie s . One o f h is
main r e s p o n s ib ilitie s in the B a ltic vas to a ct as p o lit ic a l
spokesman for the government and for h is troop s. Unfortu­
n a te ly , he proved to be more o f a general than a p o litic ia n .
Speaking o f the problem o f ?lead ership in the confused condi­
tio n s in the B a ltic , he says, fA vara heart and a cool m in d -
reasonable and demanding— before danger and death rely upon
11
God and duty—Prussian!sm i That vas my solu tio n in 1919."
The ta c tic a l commander o f the f ir s t German troops in
the area vas a remarkable man, Major J o sef B lso h o ff. An
experienced p ro fessio n a l so ld ie r , he had fought on a l l fron ts
o f the var, and had fought against irreg u la r n ativ e troops
ip German Southvest A frica . At tim es an Incredibly ru th less
man, he could also be extrem ely p olish ed and gra cefu l on
occasion , and sometimes demonstrated an urbanity remarkable
in a p r o fe ssio n a l so ld ie r . In addition to h is iron v l l l and

11. Graf Rudiger von der G olts, Ala P o lltlsc h e r General

1m P etenf 2nd e d ., L eip sig , 1936, P. laoT
 - 19 -

marked m ilita ry a b ilit y , he had a f la ir for words and for

the dramatic gestu re, which ensured h is personal domination
o f h is rather im pressionable Landsknechte. Like most of h is
troops, he had no use for the Weimar government, and i t was
he even tu ally took the r e sp o n sib ility for disobeying
the government18 orders to withdraw from the B a ltic ,
The story o f the Baltlkumer begins w ith th is man, for
i t was he who f ir s t set out to organize a defense o f the
German p o sitio n in the B a ltic , in the w inter o f 1918-1919.
 CHAPTER II
The F irst Campaignf January-Msrch 1919
When h is regiment was d issolved in December, Major
B ischoff went to Königsberg, reported to General Hoffmann,
and asked for a Job. Hoffmann sent him to ; Libau, to help
organize the rearguard o f the retreatin g Eighth Army.
B ischoff arrived in Libau on the fifte e n th pf January.
In Libau I t s e l f , he found three German b a tta lio n s, a ll but
one of them so lacking in d isc ip lin e as to be u se le ss. A
few m iles east o f the c ity the "Iron Brigade," a group of
volunteers from the Eighth Army, and the Balt Landeswehr
were slowly retreatin g before the Red Army,
The Eighth Army had d isin tegra ted in the same manner,
and for the same reasons, as the rest o f tbe German armies
ip the east* Soviet pressure was, however, much stronger in
the B a ltic than elsew here. Some of the best u n its of the
Red Army, composed prim arily o f L etts, wpre committed on the
B a ltic fro n t. Libau and Riga were the most valuable ports
in the B a ltic , p a rticu la rly Libau, which was the only port in
northern Russia which was open a ll year, and the Soviets were
n atu rally anxious to control them. The Germane had been

1. Hie Times o f London, March 27, 1919, p. 12.

 - 21 -

force d to evacuate Riga early In January, d esp ite a request

2
by the B r itish that they hold the c it y . They had continued
to retr e a t across the length o f Oourland, harassed by L ett
p a r tisa n s who had sprung up in th e ir re a r . Some o f these
hands had been organized by the S o v ie ts, who c a p ita liz e d
upon the h o s t ilit y between the L etts and the B a lts, and
upon the h o s t ilit y created by the behavior o f the German oc­
cupy ins? troops towards the L e tts, These p a rtisa n s who had
not been organized by the S o v ie ts were peasants who had par­
tic ip a te d in the alm ost in e v ita b le jacq u eries again st the
B a ltic e s ta te s , and had then become b rigan d s. These groups
were to become a constant featu re of war in the B a ltic ,
When B isc h o ff arrived in the B a ltic , the bulk o f the
Array had been evacuated by ship from Libau, lea v in g only
the Iron D iv isio n , the B alt Landeswehr. and a handful o f
other troops to h old a p o sitio n in Courland which was in ­
tended to cover the East Prussian border.
The p o lit ic a l situ a tio n was equally d iscou ragin g. The
German government was Just being formed at Weimar at th is
tim e. The P ro v isio n a l Government o f L atvia had fle d the
country, and even in e x ile , was d ivid ed on the question of
what p o sitio n the B a lts were to have in the new s ta te . The
B r itish were the dominant Entente power in the area, and
the m ainstay o f the new governm ent. However, the B r itish
were, and were to remain, in d e c is iv e as to the degree to 2

2 . I b id .. January 3, 1919, t>. 7; January 7, 1919, p . 7.

 - 22 -

which they were w illin g to intervene again st the Bolshe­

vik s in the area. Since thé P rovision al Government o f Latvia
could dispose o f only two b a tta lio n s o f L ett troops in addi­
tio n to the B a lts, the E nglish relu cta n tly asked the Germans
to assume r e sp o n sib ility for clea rin g the country o f the
B olsh evik s. However, they were never to g iv e the Germans
any support, p o lit ic a l oh m ilita r y , for th is task .
The Germans Take the O ffensive
B isch o ff im m ediately set about h is assignm ent. The
day a fte r h is a r r iv a l,; the commander to the Tron Brigade,
who was also commander of a ll the a n ti—B olshevik troops in
the area, f e l l i l l , and B isch o ff was assigned to replace
him. Demonstrating the fero cio u s energy for which he was
to become famous, he succeeded in organizing a sta b le de­
fen siv e perim eter along the Windau r iv e r , some seventy
kilom eters east o f Libau.
In the few days o f r e la tiv e q u iet whieh follow ed,
B isch o ff reorganized h is troops in to a force b etter adapted
to B a ltic w arfare. The in flu en ce o f the S o ld ie r ' s Council
was decreased as much as p o ssib le among the troops already
In the area, and reinforcem ents from Germany, m ostly sm all
Frelkoros u n its , who seemed under th e ir in flu en ce were
strip p ed o f th e ir equipment and sent back to Germany along
with any oth er •‘u n desirab les."
T a c tic a lly , two major changes had to be made. The
S oviets were num erically c ite r io r to the German fo ree, but
the rev o lu tio n had dem oralized th e ir o f f ic e r s , and the Soviet
u n ite were badly le d . The Germans thus had a chance o f ach iev­
in g t a c t ic a l su p erio rity i f th e ir fo rces could b e concentra­
ted a g a in st sin g le Soviet p o s itio n s , and used in such a man­
ner as to d isru p t the morale o f the Red tro o p s. B lsch o ff
accord in gly d ivid ed h ie fo r c e s, as much as p o s s ib le , in to
sm all, m obile, h ea v ily armed groups, w ith a high concentra­
tio n o f machine guns per group. Machine guns, lig h t a r t il­
le r y , and the troops them selves were to be transported by
s le d . These sm all u n ite were to operate sem i-indeoendently
over a w ide, deeo fr o n t, con cen tratin g on S oviet p o sitio n s
in C annse-like e n c ir c lin g a c tio n s.
Secondly, most o f the troops were used to fig h tin g in
tren ch es, w ith th e ir flan k s covered by adjacent u n its . This
type o f fig h tin g was im p ossible in the B a ltic , where both
sid e s operated w ith com pletely open fla n k s. T0 give the
trooos a chance to get used to th is indeoendent, exposed
type o f w arfare, sm all sle d borne u n its were sent out to
operate again st the p a r tisa n s, and to o ro tect the B alt
e s ta te s , i f n ecessary , again st J eco u erjes. Later in the month,
o ffe n siv e o a tr o l a ctio n s a g a in st the S oviet lin e s were in­
s titu t e d .
In the meantime, the B8i t Landeswehr was given a much
needed period o f d r il l and sm all arms tr a in in g . The fa c t
that th ese men were fig h tin g for what they considered th e ir
homeland, and that th e ir frien d s and r e la tiv e s in the S o v iet-
 « 0 $ -

held areas ware being executed d a lly , gave them an Incen­

tiv e which soon made them the b eet troops at B ie c h o ff's
d is p o s a l.
On February 1, General von der G0l t z appeared in Llbau.
The Weimar government had in stru cted him to p ro tect the E sst
Prussian border, u sin g the German troops s t i l l in the B a ltic
and the 1 , G ard e-R eserve-D lvislon f which was then being
formed in Germany. In ad d ition to h is m ilita r y d u tie s, he
was to be m ilita r y governor o f the Libau area, and to act
as a sort o f p o lit ic a l spokesman to rep resen ta tiv es o f the
Latvian government and to the members o f the A llie d m ili­
tary commissions w^lch were beginning to arriv e in the
B a lt ic . Dr. Burchardt, August W innig's su ccessor as c i v i l
rep resen ta tiv e in the area, rap idly came under the in flu en ce
o f h ie p e r so n a lity . This lack o f any c le a r -c u t p o lit ic a l
co n tro l over m ilita r y a c t iv it ie s was to lea d to trou b le here,
as i t had in Germany,
G eneral von der G oltz did not look upon h is commission
as lim itin g him to the d efen se o f East P ru ssia ,n o r did he
con sider th a t the d efea t o f the B olshevik fo rces in the B a ltio
was in the in te r e s t o f the A llie s and o f the P ro v isio n a l
Government o f L atvia a lo n e. Convinced that the future of
Germany lay in a c lo se a llia n c e with a “W hite“ R ussia, he
en visaged a lin k up o f the German fo rces in the B a ltic w ith
G eneral Y udenitch's White Russian fo rces on the Petrograd
fr o n t, follow ed by a combined atta ck on the cen ters o f S oviet
 - 23 -

power. Any White Russian government r e su ltin g from a German-

a s s is te d m ilita ry v icto ry over, the S ov iets would In evitab ly
f a l l under strong Overman p o lit ic a l and economic in flu en ce.
Such an a llia n c e would also to ta lly destroy the balance of.
power then being arranged at V e r sa ille s,
In hip contention th a t.th e best d efen se o f East Prussia
la y in taking the o ffe n siv e and pushing the B olsheviks out
o f Courland, von der G oltz was suoported by h is immediate
m ilita ry su p eriors, Army High Command North. However, he did
pot have the complete support o f the Weimar government, npr
o f the Supreme Commander o f the Army, General Groener. This
was to cause trouble la te r .
The S oviets had sustained considerable lo sse s in January,
and in early February brought th e ir o ffe n siv e to a h a lt.
Documents captured la te r revealed that they were gathering
th eir fo rces for a concerted drive to the sea, intended to
push" the Germans out "or IIIbah. As T h eir o ffe n siv e operations
dim inished, the Germans exoanded th e ir own o a tro l operations
io company* strength ra id s^ th u s' extending th e ir ‘front east
and northeastw ards. The culm ination o f th is' se r ie s o f raid s
was the"capture o f the port of Wlndau^ some forty kilom eters
to the horth, by the B a lt; UndesWehr on February 24th.
^hSse development s , and th e steady build-Up in strength
resulting from the f reorient- a r r iv a l o f new Frelkorpjg u n its,

and the a r r iv a l, la te in February o f the 1 . Cpr de-Re servg,-

D iv lslo n . encouraged von der S-oltz and Major B isch o ff to
 - 26 -

expand the* o ffe n s iv e . Xn a report d fted February 17th, ad­

dressed to ith e Chief, o f S tu ff o f Army High Command North,
General von Seekt, von. der G oltz had suggested,:that the
Windau front would be. d if f i c u l t , to hold against a concerted
Soviet attach , and that an advance to the Aa River was
fe a s ib le , and would r e su lt In a much sh orter, more d efen sib le
front* He now repeated, jfc|tl,e su ggestion , p oin tin g out that
the capture o f Windau« resu lted in an even longer front3 along
the Windau R iver, and that an advance was Im perative.
General von Seekt' agreed, and, promised to cover ¡the, rig h t
flank o f the operation w ith a u n it under, h is command in
L ithuania, at Sohaulen, Apparently von der C olts did not
ask fo r ,th e agreement of the Weimar government to the advance.
The h eav iest re sista n c e was expected to .b e from the
righ t and cen ter o f the German front Von der G oltz accord­
in g ly placed the 1 . G arde-Beserve-D lvislon on the rig h t; the
Iron Brigade, now the Iron D iv isio n , in the cen ter, attack­
in g on a narrow fro n t so as to achieve the maximum impact;
and the B alt Landeswehr. rein forced w ith Frelkoros u n its and
a Buselan detachment under Prince Eleven, on the l e f t . The
German forces were to, attack in a d irect e a ste r ly d irectio n ,
the main, lin e o f advance being along the MuraJevo-Mitau 3

3. See map, Appendix A -l.

k . Büdlger von der G oltz, A ls P o litisc h e r Gen eral im
Osten *t)P. 90-95. I can fin d no mention o f the Weimar
government in th is passage, which d eals w ith preparations
fo r the advance.
 - 27 -

ra llw ay. The troops fig h tin g near the railw ay were to "be
supported "by an armored tr a in .
The attack began on March 3, and in the ea rly sta ges
went according to p la n . Each se c to r commander was allow ed
a great d eal o f i n it ia t i v e . B igch off d ivid ed h is fo rces
in to s ix m obile columns, each o f roughly b a tta lio n stren g th .
In the ea rly sta ges o f the advance, th is worked very w e ll,
However, by the m iddle o f March, the S o v iets had concentra­
ted a con siderab le force a str id e the r ig h t w in g's lin e of
advance. The rig h t was thus slowed down, w hile the l e f t and
cen ter continued to advance. Von der G oltz had intended the
strong rig h t wing to swing around behind Mitau to cut o f f the
Soviet r e tr e a t from the c it y . He now issu ed an order that
the advance was to slow down, to enable the fo rces on the
r ig h t to get in to p o s itio n . U n fortu nately, the B alt Landes-
wehr did not re c e iv e the order, and took Mitau by fro n ta l
atta ck on the 19th . This allow ed the S oviet garrison time
to r e tr e a t eastwards to H iga, taking with them as hostages
some three hundred B alt p riso n ers, in clu d in g women and
ch ild ren , whom they had not had time to execu te. Thbfce unable
to keep up the pace o f the march were shot on the way. Many
oth er B a lts were shot in p rison or on the s tr e e ts during the
5
S ov iet r e tr e a t.

5 . The Times o f London, March 27, 1919, p . 12.

 - 28 -

The Lwndeawehr had taken Mitau lay su rp rise, rather

than through strength . Their p o sitio n was thus gravely
endangered "by a Soviet counterattack during the next two
days, "but they were ahle to hold the c ity u n til the rest
o f the German force caught up to them. By the 23rd, the
Germans had taken up p o sitio n s along the Aa, and had gar­
risoned Mitau. The fig h tin g wa,s over for the time being.
The events o f the next few weeks were to be o f a pre­
dominantly p o litic a l nature.
 CHAPTER 111

"Mutiny" and "Putsch"

The events o f the next few weeks illu s t r a t e very clea rly
the rela tio n sh ip "between the Baltlkumer and the various other
groups in the B a ltic ,
A fter garrisonin g Mitau, the Germans tem porarily avoided
a l l o ffe n siv e engagements. From the German government's
point o f view, the troops had f u l f i lle d th e ir m ission; a
S oviet advance in to East P ru ssia was inconceivable as long
as the German troops held Mitau and Schaulen, in L ithuania.
The most I n flu e n tia l group among the Baltlkum er, those
o ffic e r s and men who were prim arily concerned over Germany's
m ilita ry and p o lit ic a l situ a tio n in the e a st, were relu c­
tant to advance further fo r a very d ifferen t reason. They
f e lt that i t would "be f o lly to comply w ith the w ishes o f the
A llie s and the Latvian government— that they recapture
Riga and the rest o f Latvia from the S o v iets— u n til th e ir
own p o sitio n and that o f the B a lts had been c la r if ie d . So
long as the S ov iets co n stitu ted a th rea t, the Germans were
in a p o sitio n to bargain.
On t h e o th e r hand, th o se t r o o p s who had J o in e d t h e
 -3 0 -

Baltlkum er because they honed to s e t t le on the land o ffered

"by the Ulmanis-W innig agreement were anxious to continue
the advance, r e a liz in g th at no land would be d istrib u ted
u n til the S o v iets were driven from the country.
This in d e c isio n , and the uncom fortable liv in g condi­
tio n s o f the troop s, caused a d e te r io ra tio n o f m orale. The
troops had been rushed in to th e ir p o sitio n s ou tsid e Mitau
as soor arsrthe c ity had been taken. I t was s t i l l q u ite cold ,
but the only a v a ila b le s h e lte r s , farmhouses and b a m s,
were under constant h arassin g f ir e from the S ov iet a r t ille r y ,
and the troops had to sleep in the open. The Iron D iv isio n
and the Landeswehr were both short o f su p p lie s, in clu d in g
o v erco a ts, and i t was im p ossible to give the troops a change
o f dry c lo th in g . The continuing num erical su p erio rity of
the S o v ie ts made i t im p ossible to bring more than one u n it
a t a time beck to the rear areas fo r r e st and re-equipm ent.
In ad d ition to th ese p h y sica l d iscom forts, the B alt
troops were becoming in c r e a sin g ly anxious about th e ir futu re
under a government dominated by Ulm anis. The B a lt N ation al
Committee, an organ ization rep resen tin g the o ld er, moderate
B a lts, had been tr y in g to ex tr a c t some agreement from the
Government guaranteeing them th e ir p ersonal freedom and
prooerty r ig h ts , and some degree o f rep resen ta tion in the
C abinet. T heir demand was based in p art upon the very rea l
con trib u tion the B a lts had made towards the defense of the
 -3 1

country, and they had made a rath er t a c t le s s comparison

"between th e ir own and U lm anis1 rea c tio n s to the S oviet
in v a sio n . As the weeks went by, Ulmanis refused to re­
tr e a t from h is a n ti-B a lt p o s itio n , e s p e c ia lly in regard
to h is a g r ic u ltu r a l p o lic y , which in volved d isp o ssessin g
the B alt lan dlord s and d istr ib u tin g the land to the L ett
p ea sa n ts. In the meantime, the a n ti-B a lt tenor o f the
L ett p ress in crea sed .
U n fortu nately, a tte n tio n was d iv erted from both o f
th ese very serio u s problems by d if f i c u l t i e s w ith the Libau
S o ld ie r 's C ouncil.
The A p ril 3 "Mutiny."
The W orker'8 and S o ld ie r 's C ouncils had continued the
leftw ard d r if t begun at the end o f the p reced in g year.
The power o f the extreme l e f t had been broken by the F rel-
Icoros Just before the e le c tio n s , but now, two months la t e r ,
i t was beginning to reco ver. The a llie d blockade was
s t i l l in fo rce, and co n d itio n s among the working c la sse s
had become worse, rather than b e tte r , sin ce the e le c t io n s .
That dangerous ten sion between the moderates and the ex­
tr e m ists o f rig h t and l e f t which was to ch a ra cterize German
p o lic ie s fo r the next ten years was already d evelop in g.
General von der G oltz, who in h is p erso n a lity and
methods so com pletely embodied the anclen regim ef was one
o f the few German gen era ls s t i l l in the p u b lic eye, and

rM
 -3 2 -

was the su b ject o f freouent a tta ck s by the German lib e r a l

p r e ss. When he began to have trou b le w ith the Libau
S o ld ie r 's C ouncil, von der G oltz assumed th at the S o ld ie r 's
Council was a c tin g as the agent of the organized l e f t , and
was engaged in a conspiracy to sabotage h is p la n s. he
f a ile d to r e a liz e th at every S o ld ie r 's C ouncil in the Ger­
man Army, whatever i t s p o l it i c a l view s, Was committed to
the same p o sitio n as that taken by the Libau C ouncil.
The demands which the Libau cou n cil p laced b efore von
der G oltz were p rim arily concerned with d isc ip lin a r y regu­
la tio n s , the o b lig a tio n to sa lu te o f f ic e r s , cou rts m artial
procedures, and so fo r th . As e le c te d rep resen ta tiv es o f
the s o ld ie r s , the C ouncils were forced to make th ese demands,
whatever the p ersonal op inion s o f the members may have been.
In ad d ition to these a c t iv it ie s ,t h e S o ld ie r 's C ornell had
e sta b lish e d con tact w ith working c la s s groups in Libau,
which in th is case were stro n gly p ro -S o v iet, and had helped
organize lo c a l Worker's C ou n cils. This was a p e r fe c tly
normal procedure, and i t would have been a very conserva­
tiv e S o ld ie r 's Council indeed which d id not a ct in t h is
manner.
During the h e c tic days o f the Windau p erim eter and
the advance on M itau, von der G oltz and B isch o ff had been
ab le to ju s tify th e ir rath er high-handed treatm ent of the
 - 33-

Soldi er' b Council by claim ing that m ilita ry n ecessity deman-

did firm d is c ip lin e . In the r e la tiv e ly q u iet period a fte r
Mi tan was takenj ’’the Council began to p ress i t s demands.
General von der C o lts refused to give in . The Soldier*s
Council had np choice but to be equally firm . F in a lly , on
A pril 3, the S o ld ie r 's Council and some o f i t s adherents,
a l l carrying weapons, assembled in front o f von der G oats'
headquarters. Von der G oltz assumed that they were going to
arrest him, even though they made no overt move to do so ,
Hq quickly sent several o ffic e r s to g e t h elp , and began to
ta lk to the so ld ie r s in a c o n c ilia to r y manner, hoping to
gain tim e. In a few m inutes, a company o f troops lo y a l to
von der G oltz appeared, and d isp ersed the S o ld ier's Council
at gunpoint* A fter th is threat to use force against them,
von der G oltz succeeded in o f f ic ia lly d isso lv in g the
S o ld ie r 's Council and.enforcing a s tr ic te r set o f d iscip lin a ry
r e g u la tio n s.
, Although these events had no repercussions in .th e B a ltic ,
they were very important in regard to von der G oltz'. future
r e la tio n s w ifh the government. By forcefully^ and p u b licly
d isso lv in g one o f the b asic in s titu tio n s o f the November
revo lu tion , upon which the new regime was founded, von der
G oltz aroused the righteous anger of a l l the S ocial Demo­
crats in Germany. The Baltlkumer had already been q u ite
unpopular among the l e f t , but von der G oltz' action ensured
 -3 ^ -

that in the futu re, the troops In the B a ltic would never
be given the s lig h te s t support or sympathy by the S ocial
Democrats in the government.
The "Putsch" o f A p ril 1 6 .
In the meantime, r e la tio n s between the Bal t s and Ulmanis
fa ile d to Improve, The moderate Bal t s were unable to g et
any reply at a l l from Ulmanis in regard to th e ir demands.
In the middle o f A p ril, the Stosstruppe b a tta lio n o f
the Landeswehr. commanded by Hans von H an teuffel, an able,
2
tw en ty -fiv e year o ld hero o f the World War, was brought bach
to Libau fo r r e st and re-equipm ent. This was perhaps the crack
u n it o f the Landeswehr. and i t s o ffic e r s were a l l young,
en ergetic Balt noblemen. The b a tta lio n had5been in the
thick o f the fig h tin g sin ce December, and deserved the
r e st as much as any other u n it in the B a ltic . However, von
der G oltz admits that he hoped that the presence o f these
p a rticu la r troops in Libau would encourage the Clmani*
cabinet to at le a s t draft a rep ly to the B alt N ational Com-
3
m ittee*s demands.
On A pril 16, the b a tta lio n was conducting a routine 23

2 . He had been one o f the few B alts to fig h t for

Germany in the World War , and had won the pour le m erite.
Im perial Germany's h ig h est d ecoration.
3. von der G oltz, op . c l t .. p . H I .
 -3 5 -

tra in ln g maneuver ne&r the 'building that housed the Lat­

vian government* At the conclusion of th e ir maneuver,
in stea d o f marching hack to th e ir barracks, the troops
moved in to the government b u ild in g and arrested as many
m in isters as they could fin d . Several members o f the
cab in et, in clud in g Ulmanis, succeeded in escaping and
taking refuge in the A llie d m issions or on B r itish ships
in the harbor.
Almost sim ultaneously, the P fe iffe r or F relk om s. a
W estphalian u n it, attacked and disarmed the L ettish troops
guarfling the Naval harbor, and then ransacked th e ir bar­
racks B lsoh off su ggests th a t th ese troops were rescuing
4
a German o f fic e r I lle g a lly Imprisoned by the L e tts. An
American who was in Llbau at the time wrote in h is diary
that the skirm ish may have concerned the p roprletorehlp of
some old Russian m ilita ry su p p lies stored in the harbor.
F in a lly , there is also the obvious p o s s ib ilit y that P fe iffe r
was a ctin g in conjunction w ith the young B a lts. Whatever
the cause of the c o n fiio t may have been, i t e ffe c tiv e ly nul­
l i f i e d what l i t t l e m ilita ry force the government had at i t s
d isp o sa l, and no open resista n ce was o ffered to the B a lts.
U nfortunately, the coup very nearly p recip ita ted a*5

A. B lsc h o ff, o p * o lt., p . 8 3 . f

5. Warwick Greene, The L etters o f Warwick Greene.
Richard Rale, e d ito r . Boston, 1931* «
 -3 6 -

6
c i v i l war, which would have been d isa stro u s fo r a l l p a r tie s
concerned, Including the A llie s . Some B alt and German
s o ld ie r s were sniped at by L etts in Libau and Mltau, and
sev era l B a lt e s ta te s were p illa g e d and burned. However,
sin ce the remnants o f the Latvian government Issu ed a pro­
clam ation asking the p opulation to remain p ea cefu l, von der
G oltz im m ediately p u lled troops out o f the front to p o lic e
the rear area s, and a c iv il war was averted , fo r the time
b ein g .
In sev era l In terview s w ith the A llie d com m issioners
a fte r the P u tsch , von der G oltz m aintained that the coup
was the unprem editated actio n o f a group o f "youthful h ot-
beads ." The young B a lts them selves m aintained that they
had merely wished to save the country from " in terio r b o l­
shevism"; by th e ir standards, such a danger did e x i s t .
Although the Ulmanls government was "Green," rath er than
"Red" in com plexion, i t s a g r ic u ltu r a l p o lic ie s would have
d isp o ssessed the B a lts as e f fe c t iv e ly as those o f the
S o v ie ts. The Times o f London reported the coup as being
the work o f the B a ltic Barons and the urban S o c ia l Democrats
7
who had fa ile d to gain rep resen ta tion in the government.

6. Robert H ale, The B a ltic P rov in ces. tJ.S. 66th Congress,

1 st S essio n , Senate Documents, v o l. 15 (Washington, 1919)
pi; 119. This i s the b est account o f the ev en ts in th is
Chapter.
7 . The Times o f London, A p ril 21, 1919, p . 9.
 -37-

One o f the most p eréep tlve and unbiased observers o f these

even ts, Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene, the head o f the
American M ission in the B a ltic , adopted a sim ilar view.
Part o f h is télégra p h ié report to the American Peace Dele­
gation in P aris follow s?
I b eliev e coup d*etat was executed, w ith con­
nivance and a ssista n c e old er B alts and Germans,
by young B a lts, who had fought e x c e lle n tly again st
bolshevism at the fr o n t» .., v
Deposed P rovision al Government was in h eren tly
very weak. I t fa ile d to include B alt and Jewish
rep resen tation , and so had th e ir in ten se h o s t ilit y .
This fa ilu re was a m is ta k e ....
For moment, people are q u ie t. They look west­
ward fo r h elp , or eastward from B olsh evism .. . .In
proportion as th e ir hope o f help from west d ie s,
they w ill turn Red.
8
Whatever the background o f the coup may have been, i t s
e ffe c t was to make the A llie s acu tely m istru stfu l o f German
a ctio n s In the fu tu re, and to reawaken the h o s t ilit y ^of the
S o c ia lis t p ress in Germany, which accused von der GoIts of
engaging in "B a ron sp oiltlk . "
The Needra Cabinet
The ooup c erta in ly gave a d e fin ite im pression o f spon­
ta n e ity . No government seems to have been arranged or
planned by the B a lts fo r the takeover; no w e ll organized
conspiracy would .have committed t h is . However, w ithin a

8. Greene, op.olt.. pp. 100-101.

 -38-

a few days, a rath er shadowy “Committee o f Security" made

i t s e x iste n c e , though not i t s membership, known. This Com­
m ittee asked C olonel B allod , commander o f the L e ttish
troops at the fr o n t, and Prince L ieven, the White R ussian,
to head a government "by m ilita r y d ir e c to r a te . Both r e -
9
fu sed , supposedly under A llie d p ressu re. The Committee
then made an unknown B alt named Barkowsky temporary d ic ta to r .
On A p ril 26, Barkowsky announced the appointment o f a
new c a b in et, under the orem iership o f P astor Andreas Needra.
Needra was in Riga at the tim e, and did not learn o f the
appointment fo r several days. Though he had had l i t t l e ad­
m in istr a tiv e exp erien ce, he seems to have been fa r more
su ited to n atio n a l lea d ersh ip than the d e sp o tic , p etty
Uim anis. He wag a L e tt, one o f the lead in g in t e lle c t u a l
lig h t s o f the country, and a lead er o f the moderate group
in L ettish a f f a ir s . Hie two sons were fig h tin g at the
fr o n t, in C olonel B a llo d 1s b a tta lio n . At the time o f the
S oviet in v a sio n , when Uimanis and h is cab in et had fle d the
country, Needra had rep eated ly risk ed h is l i f e by making
freouent tr ip s in to S oviet h eld R iga, d isg u ised as a
beggar, in order to organize a n ti-B o lsh ev ik propaganda.
The f i r s t Needra cab inet wqs unacceptable to the
Uimanis group, and sin ce i t had no real popular support,

9. Hale, op.clt.. pp. 17-18.

 -3 9 -

l t never governed.
On May 1, Lieutenant C olonel G-reene sent a le t t e r to
Needra stiggestln g that the only p r a c tic a l so lu tio n to the
impasse would he a cabinet, headed by L i^ an is, which in c lu ­
ded rep resen ta tion fo r those groups which had not been
in clu d ed in the p reviou s government, the moderate L e tts ,
the B a lts, the Jews, and the S o cia l Democrats, He frankly
adm itted that th is could be a temporary so lu tio n at b e s t,
and would only be in the nature of a p o l it i c a l truce con-
10
eluded in order to end the war s u c c e s s fu lly .
This le t t e r became the b a s is for n e g o tia tio n s between
the Ulmanis and Needra groups. However, i t soon became ev i­
dent that no agreement would be reached, the p rin cip a l
p o in ts in dispute being the nature o f a prooosed p o l it i c a l
amnesty fo r those who had p a r tic ip a te d in the coup. and the
s e le c tio n o f a M in ister of the In te r io r , a p o sitio n which
was Important because o f i t s con trol o f agrarian reform
p o lic y .
On May 6 the A llie d com m issioners h eld a m eeting, at
the end o f which they informed both p a r tie s that i f an,
agreement were not reached by m idnight o f the seventh, a l l
r e la tio n s , in clu d in g food shipm ents, would be severed w ith
both p a r tie s . The A llie s extended th is d ead lin e by 12
hours, but no agreement was reached.

10. I b id ., pp. 20-21.

 -4 0 -

F inal ly , on May 10, Needra announced the establishm ent

o f a cab in et made up of six moderate L etts and four B a lts,
excluding the ul»an i8 group e n tir e ly . With no real popular
support, I t had no hope o f becoming a permanent government,
but Needra hoped that i t would survive long enough to cap­
ture Riga, and su c c e ssfu lly end the war.
 CHAPTER IV
The Capture o f Riga and C iv il War

Now that th e ir p o lit ic a l base wBs tem porarily secure,

the B alts were very anxious to resume the o ffe n siv e and
drive the B olsheviks out o f R iga. The Needra fa ctio n o f
the L etts was sure to give them a l l the support in th e ir
power. The area s t i l l in S oviet hands, ea st of the Aa
R iver, was the most populous and econom ically important
part o f the country. No anti-communist government could
hope to endure as long as th is area remained the p o te n tia l
base o f another S oviet o ffe n siv e , thus providing encourage­
ment to the pro-communist working c la sse s in western Latvia*
However, the lead ersh ip o f the German troops was by
no means as eager to resume the o ffe n siv e . The A llie s had
reacted to the recent Putseh. and to the suspected German
r o le In i t , by en largin g the s ta ff s o f th e ir m issions in
the B a ltic , and by asking for the r e c a ll o f General von der
d o lts . The German government refu sed , but offered In stea d
to r e c a ll a l l the German troops in the B a ltic , which o ffe r
the A llie s d eclin ed . ' This made i t p a in fu lly clea r that

1. von der Goltz, op.olt.. pp. 117— 118,

 -4 2 -

the Germans were in the B a ltic only on sufferance, ana that

as the need for German m ilitary support dim inished, German
in flu en ce, and with i t the opportunity to achieve German
aims in the area, dim inished lik e w ise .
Furthermore, there w^s considerable doubt on the part
o f the German government as to whether a new o ffen siv e was
p o litic a lly d efensible at.home. With Mitau and Sehaulen
in German hands, the German fro n tier ws s secure, and cap­
turing Riga could not be termed a defensive operation.
Although the Mitau operation had been m ilita r ily support­
ab le, since i t both shortened the front and contributed
to the defense of East P russia, i t had s t i l l drawn sharp
c r itic ism from the s o c ia lis t press in Germany, As events
were to prove, an attack upon Riga would be considered
"B aronspoiltIk" by the rad ical l e f t .
Shortly a fte r the Putsch, von der G olts went to B erlin .
P ossibly being in B erlin for a w h ile gave him a larger view
o f the B a ltic situ a tio n , or perhaps rumors of the terms of
the V e r sa ille s treaty convinced him that Germany should do
more than stand pat in the B a ltic . Whatever the cause may
have been, he changed h is mind about resuming the offen ­
siv e . In h is memoirs, he says that in a conversation with
an un-named Foreign O ffice o f f ic ia l, he had suggested that
a fte r taking Riga, the German troops could lin k up w ith
the EfthenIans and e a s ily clear Livonia of the S o v iets.
"Then, reinforced with Just a few d iv isio n s, one would he
in a p o sitio n to take Petrograd, thus winning a p o sitio n
in the east from whioh one could e ffe c t a considerable
2
change in the V er sa illes treaty." He also says that the
o f f ic ia l was d e fin ite ly in terested , hut wns dropped fro»
the Foreign O ffice soon afterw ards. During the same tr ip ,
von der (Jolts discussed the Riga problem w ith Erzberger,
and w„s to ld that i t was "an in tern al a ffa ir of L atvia's."
For some reason, von der (Jolts came to the conclusion that
the government would lik e to have Riga taken, but was un­
w illin g to assume r e sp o n sib ility for i t . He accordingly
cabled h is ch ief of s t a f f and Major F letsch er, the commander
o f the Landeswehr. that- the German troops could not take
Riga themselves* but could cover ah o ffen siv e staged by the
B a ltic LanflftBwehr. which were le g a lly Latvian troops.
However, a t the same time that von der (Jolts was
drawing these conclusions as to the government's in ten tio n s,
the government wps sending peace fe e le r s to the S ov iets.
B isch off says that on A pril 18 the Iron D ivision was asked
to relay, a radio message to Riga, asking for a Soviet rep­
resen tative to meet an emissary o f the German government
at the Eckau bridge east of Mitau, to discuss the exchange

2 . IM d .. p . 118.
3. Ib id ., p . U S ,
 -4 4 -

4
o f p riso n ers. Although there was no r e p ly , the German rep­
re se n ta tiv e did appear. One can only conclude from these
con trad ictio n s that e ith e r von der G olt* was tryin g to
force the issu e by p resen tin g the government and the A llie s
with a f a it accom pli, or that two fa ctio n s were working
again st each other in the government. Both explanations are
p o ssib le and in ch aracter.
The Entente had long been anxious to have Riga cap­
tured. Just before the Putsch. Lieutenant Colonel Greene
had v is ite d B iseh o ff in M itau. B iseh o ff says that during
the v i s i t , the follow in g conversation took p la ce.
Obviously at the behest of the Entente commis­
sio n e rs. he asked i f we were in a p o sitio n to
take R iga. I answered 'y e s .' ’Then why don *%
you do it * ' 'Because i t would be a seriou s mis­
take .p o lit ic a lly ^ .. 'But humanity demands it'.
B iseh o ff then exp lain s h is p o sitio n by saying that as
long as the A llie s continued to blockade Germany, and were
attem pting to impose a p u n itive peace upon her, they were
in no p o sitio n to ask German troops to carry out th e ir own
d esig n s, p a r tic u la r ly in the name o f "humanity." A lso, he
adm its, "why should we run the r is k o f making ou rselves
superfluous by another victory?"

4. B iseh o ff, o o .c lt . . V .8 9 . Both sid es had been in

the h ab it o f shooting a l l p riso n ers, and i t is u n lik ely
that there were any l e f t a liv e to exchange.
 -* 3 -
What A llie d pressure had been unable to do, pressure
from tha troops succeeded in doing. The Putsch had a l­
ien ated the Uimanis group com pletely. I f the troops were
to get thp!r land at a l l , i t would hare to be from the
Needra government or from the B a lts. In e ith e r case, they
would have to a s s is t the B a its in capturing Riga. B isch o ff
was relu cta n tly persuaded to approve an advance, provided
von der G oltz agreed.
Once the p o lit ic a l fa cto rs had reached th is stage,
the pace o f events began to a c c e le r a te . On May 10, the
day the Needra government w©s formed, B isch o ff was informed
that the I . G arde-R eserve-D ivision would have to be with­
drawn from the B a ltic and sent to the P olish fr o n tie r . I t
was expected that the P oles would attack Germany imme­
d ia te ly i f the V e r sa ille s treaty was refu sed , /which a t the
time s t i l l seemed p o s s ib le , at le a s t to the Army High Com­
mand. Any operation against Riga would have to be carried
out before i t was withdrawn, as i t appeared very dangerous
to advance without adeauate reserves and w ith the righ t
flan k , in clud in g the v it a l Sehaulen-Mltau railw ay, exposed.
On the same day, May 10, an order arrived from the
government forbidding the German troops to advance beyond
th e ir present p o s itio n s . From a le g a l point o f view , i t
was already too la t e to sta r t the o ffe n siv e . However, on
May 17, Major F letsehep informed B isch o ff that he had re­
ceived perm ission from Army Command North for the Iron
 .4 6 -

D ivision to take part in the o ffe n siv e , provided I t con-

sealed i t s role and appeared to be doing nothing more than
covering the Landeswehr*s fla n k . On the same day, Ton der
S o ltz 1 cable arrived from B erlin , and preparations were
h a s tily begun.
Because over h a lf o f the I . G arde-R eserve-Plvlelon had
already been p u lled out by th is tim e, the burden o f the
advance r e a lly would rest upon the Landeswehr. who would
have to advance through the T irul swamp, which lay to the
north o f the Mitau-Rlga highway. Dense fo r e s ts , which
extended a considerable d istan ce southwards from the high-
way, combined w ith the swamp, made a fro n ta l attack seem
the height o f f o l l y . $he highway and the railw ay, whieh
ran alon gside i t , could be held by a very sm all fo r c e . The
only s e n s ib le way o f attack in g Riga would have been by a
large e n c ir c lin g movement from the south; w ith the Z* G-arde-
Re serve—D ivision weakened, th is was im p ossible, and B isch off
and F letsch er were forced in to a fro n ta l advance upon the
c it y .
The actu al marching orders were given to the in d ivid u al
u n it commanders v erb a lly , so that in the event the A llie s
complained about the extent of German p a r tic ip a tio n , the
blame could be thrust upon the tro p commanders or even
the troops them selves. The o ffe n siv e was to begin sh ortly
a fte r midnight on May 22. The p o lit ic a l preparation had
 -4 7 -

been, i f anything, even »ore Inadequate than the prepara­

tion for the Mltan o ffe n siv e, and revealed In a glaring
lig h t that lack o f eo-operation and sympathy hetween the
p o litic a l and m ilitary leadership which had proved d isas­
trous so often before In German h isto r y . As a resu lt of
th is lack o f preparation* the capture o f Riga, though a
m ilita ry success, was t© prove a p o litic a l d isa ster.
The Advance
Due to an extraordinary amount o f lu ck , everything
went more smoothly and rapidly than anyone could have ex­
pected. The Iron D ivision , s p lit into four columns, moved
up the highway and railroad . Several armored oars and an
armored train led the attack, and ea sily d ealt with the
scant resistan ce offered by the S o v iets. As no further
opposition appeared, the tempo of the march increased.
Meanwhile, the Landeswehr was advancing along a narrow
strip o f land between the northern edge of the swamp and
Lake B abit, using a p a r tia lly passable corduroy road la id
down by the Germans in the World War. As soon as they
reached the dry land east o f the swamp, von M anteuffel's
Stosstrupoe and the von Medem F relkoros. a German u n it,
moved in to the van and began a forced march towards Riga,
Bypassing or simply racing through a ll opp osition , they
reached the Buna bridge, on the o u tsk irts o f Riga, early
In the afternoon. The rap id ity o f th e ir march had placed
them behind the Soviet defender« ojf the p ity , and the f ir s t
few squads of the Stosstruppe were able to race across the
bridge and e sta b lish a "beaehead" at the eastern end before
being pinned down by Soviet f ir e . Lieutenant Albert
B.
S ch lageter was able to get a sm all a r t ille r y p iece across
the bridge, and succeeded in sile n c in g the Soviet snipers*
As soon as the bridge wps securely in German hands, von
M anteuffel took the surlrivors o f h is u n it and galloped in to
the c it y to open up thé p riso n s. He was h ille d almost imme­
d ia te ly by a sn ip er1s b u lle t , '* \
!The presence o f even a sm all group o f the enemy in
th e ir rear so demoralised the Red troops facin g the iron
D ivision and LandeÉwehr that they offered no su b sta n tia l
r e sista n c e , and most o f the German and B alt troops had
occupied the c ity by n ig h t fa ll. As soon as communications
were r eesta b lish ed , the reason for the r e la tiv e lack o f
op p osition on the part o f the S o v iets was d iscovered . The
bulk of the S oviet force had been moved south, preparatory
to a large sca le attack on the German lin e o f communica­
tio n w ith East P ru ssia, the Mitau Schaulen railw ay. The
remaining elem ents o f the i , G arde-R eserve-D ivision, under

6 , Who was letter to become the "Horst Wessel" of the

Freikoros movement, a fte r beirig executed by the French for
terrorism in the Ruhr.
Graf Yore*, had contained th is v a stly superior force at
Batisic, That n ig h t, when news of the lo s s o f Riga reached
them, the S oviets r e trea ted .
The C iv il War
Even though t^p A llie d commisslonere were certa in ly ,
aware o f the extent of German p a rticip a tio n in the attack ,
which was also accu rately reported in the world p ress, the
German High Command in s is te d th a t the fic tlp n o f n eu tra lity
he m aintained, p o ssib ly because o f the p o lit ic a l situ ation ^
in Germany, p o ssib ly even at the suggestion o f the A llie s«
The German troops were forbidden t^.oceupy any o f the te r r i­
tory ea st o f the J a gelsee, a sm all lake a few k ilom eters
ea st o f R iga. An e x c e lle n t system of permanent f o r t ific a ­
tio n s had been b u ilt here during the World War, and the

7 , The B r itish government seems to, have adopted the

German sto ry , as 1 think the follow in g exchange in P arlia­
ment Lillu
ieus t.tr aCommander
te s : . German
Kenworthy asked whether _ troops
under General von der Gplt* and Baron M anteuffel have re­
entered Riga; and what step s t r ill be taken to compel the
German fo rces tp withdraw to th e ir own country.
Mr. Harmsworth (Parliam entary TJnder-Secretary for For­
eign A ffa ir s) According to a report received from H. M.
R epresentative at Libau dated 24th May, Riga has been occu­
p ied by the B alts who were supported on th e ir flank by a
German cavalry (s ic ) d iv is io n . As regards the second part
o f the Honorable and g a lla n t member's question, I under­
stand' that the m atter has been under consideration of the
rep resen ta tives o f the a llie d powers in P aris with a view
to the adoption of the necessary m easures.
[continued^
 -5 0 -

German lin e s were te be set up h ere. A lso, the German troops

were in stru cted to stay out Of Riga and out o f sig h t. Gen­
era l von der G olts p rofessed h im self u n w illin g to stop at
Riga, and unable to keep troops out o f town. With the
S o v iets in f u ll r e tr e a tt he considered i t a cardinal m ilita ry
sin not to pursue and harass thè®, The baggage tra in s o f the
Iron D ivision had to pass through Riga to supply the troops
on the J a g e lse e . and the transport troops behaved very
badly indeed. The in stru ctio n not to pursue the enemy was
circumvented by a d ecision to defend the Jagelsee perim eter
“o ffe n siv e ly ," sending out sm all mixed German-Bait detach­
ments to harass th e,;ienemy. These u n its went as far south as
F rled rloh stad t, and a large B alt detachment went as far north­
ea st ae Wenden. The Esthonlan f ie ld commander was asked to
se t a demarcation lin e in the v ic in ity o f Wenden to separate
the operations o f h is own fo rces and the German-Bait troop s.
Though the Esths had been even more h o s t ile towards
the Germans than tha L etts, th e ir r e la tio n s w ith von der
G olts, conducted through an Esthonlan rep resen ta tive to the
Gouvernment Libau. had h eretofore been sa tisfa c to r y , though

[foo tn o te 7, continued!
C ol. Wedgwood! I s i t not a f a c t that the A llie s are
emoloying Germans to fig h t the Bolsheviks?
Mr. Harmsworth! I must have n o t ic e .. . .
The Parliamentary D ebates. S eries V, v o l. 116, March 19-
June 6, London, 1919. Column 1384.
 -5 1 -

not very co r d ia l. However, for some reason, German and

Balt troops on leave in Wenden were arrested by the
Ssthonians and membera of the "L ettish Northern Corps."
A fter the Needra government had been set up, Ulmanis had
fle d to Reval. In the interven in g weeks, he had, w ith
Esthonian a ssista n c e , set up th is eorps as"his p rivate
army. I t was commanded by a Colonel Semitan, and was com­
posed o f Livonian con scrip ts and L ettish d eserters from
the Red Army.
The Landeawehr attem pted to recover the prisoners by
fo r c e , and in the i n i t i a l engagement succeeded in taking
Wenden, but had to'withdraw a fte r a strong L ett-E sthonian
counterattack. I t was obvious that they were up again st a
more form idable opponent than thé Red Army. The L etts
were happy to have a chance to fig h t again st B a lts, and
fought very w e ll, with; the same courage and determ ination
that had made them the b est troops in the Red Army. The
Eeths were very w ell armed with B r itish equipment, and were
le d , in p art, by B r itish o ffic e r s and non-commissioned
o f f ic e r s .
A fter the Wenden skirmish¿ both sid es agreed'to an
arm istice on June 11 which set up a n eu tral zone around
Wenden. U nfortunately, i f no settlem ent ws s agreed upon,
the a rm istice was to expire on June 20.
 -5 2 -

Since no agreement seemed lik e ly , P astor Needra asked

the Germans for h e lp , B isc h o ff agreed im m ediately; von der
G-oltz agreed a ls o , but w ith the reservation that the German
troops must fig h t as “vo lu n teers," not as Germans. Needra
im m ediately granted Latvian c itiz e n sh ip to a l l members o f
the Iron D iv isio n fo r a fou rteen day p erio d .
In the event o f new h o s t i l i t i e s , the Landeswehr was to
take Wenden by fr o n ta l a tta ck , w hile the Germans were to
a tta ck the L ett-E sthonian fo rces In th e ir northern fla n k .
No settlem en t wa s concluded, and on the morning o f the
2 1 st, the Landeswehr attack ed Wenden. The German column had
been d elayed , and then, much to th e ir su r p r ise , had been
stopped short by the E sth on ian s. L eft to them selves in an
unsupported fr o n ta l a tta ck , the Ba lt s took serio u s lo s s e s ,
and were forced to withdraw.
The B a lts and Germans retrea ted rap id ly back to Riga,
under constant p ressu re from the enemy. The retrea t was so
h u rried th a t they re tr e a te d p ast the J a g elsee p o s itio n s,
which could have been h eld e a s ily , and attem pted to se t up
th e ir d efen ses in the o u tsk ir ts o f Riga I t s e l f . During
the r e tr e a t, the Riga waterworks, which la y w e ll to the
ea st o f the c it y , f e l l in to the hands o f the Egthonlans,
who promptly cut o f f the defenders' water supply. The
^sthonian and L ett a r t ille r y then subjected the c ity to
heavy s h e llin g , and the B a its and Germans began to w ith­
draw.
 -5 3 -

At th is p o in t, Lieutenant Colonel Greene, the American

in tervened, o ffe r in g a face-savin g truce to end the c iv il
war. Both sid es accepted g la d ly , and signed i t on July 3.
The Germans withdrew to S t. O lai, h a lf way back to Mltau,
and the Eeths withdrew to Hinzenberg, an equal distan ce
east o f Biga. General Gough, the B r itish commissioner,
undertook the adm inistration o f Riga, which was promptly
occupied by Colonel Semitan and Ulmanls.
With Cimanis in p ossessio n o f the c a p ita l, the Needra
government Was forced to resign , and i t s members fle d the
country sh ortly afterw ards to escape a death sentence for
treason . The B alt Landeswehr was incorporated in to
Ulmanis' army, and placed under the command o f a Soots
o f fic e r , Major Alexander, who had been on General Gough1s
sta ff.
r The German-Bait plans had come to naught. The Ger­
mans wire to make one more desperate attempt to regain
th e ir p o sitio n in the B a ltic , but they had already f a ile d .
 CHAPTER V

The Russo-German A lliance

"Though i t appeared, during the f i r s t days o f July, that
the German p o sitio n in Latvia had colla p sed com pletely, they
s t i l l had one la s t cahd to p la y . As i s so often true in the
ease o f a desperate gamble, the stak es, and with them the
scope o f the e n tire op eration , increased immensely.
During the preceding months, the p o s s ib ilit y o f a
Russo-German rapprochement had been con stan tly p resen t. The
words "Torek," and "Tauroggen* appear frequ en tly in personal
accounts o f the p eriod . Though fo r most o f the Baltlkum.gr
th is had remained at b est a vague p o s s ib ilit y , von der G oltz,
and, to an extent Major B iseh o ff, had long been advocating
the f e a s ib ilit y and d e s ir a b ility of in creasin g the .scope o f
the Baltlkum ers 1 operations tc include an advance in to Russia
proper in conjunction w ith the W hites. At the tim e, i t was
considered q u ite p o ssib le th a t the capture o f Petrograd and
Moscow would r e su lt in the co lla p se o f the B olshevik regim e.
Such « rapprochement had not been p o ssib le u n til the

l i Times o f London. March 27, 1919, P .„12, Column

"With the occupation o f Petrograd and Moscow, Lenin s
regime would co lla p se lik e a house' of cards.
 -5 5 -

early summer o f 1919. The only White commander in north­

west R ussia, General Yudeniteh, was counting h eavily upon
B r itish aid in the form o f arms, ammunition, and medical
and other su p p lies, and as a r e s u lt based h is p o lic ie s upon
2
the E n tente's w ish es. So long as a su ccessfu l conclusion
to the German plans in Latvia seemed p o ssib le , and i t looked
as i f the German troops might g et th e ir land, they would not
have been w illin g t© fig h t fo r any purpose la rger than the
one which had brought them to the B a ltic in the f i r s t p la ee.
F im lly , so long a s the Blockade continued, and the terms
o f the peace treaty remained u n se ttle d , the German govern­
ment could not rtarmlt the Baltlkum er to engage in a c tiv i­
t ie s which might annoy the A llie s .
By la te Ju ly, th is situ a tio n had changed almost com­
p le t e ly . o*The B r itish had not d e liv e r e d the promised su p plies
to Yudeniteh, and h is army was short o f ammunition,^badly
cloth ed , and had alm ost no m edieal su p p lies at a l l . This
was in sharp con trast to the wealth of equipment supplied

2. H ale, op . e l t .. pp. 3 ^- 3 6 ; His commander, Admiral

Koltehak, bad been promised aid by M essrs. Clemenceau,
George, W ilson, Orlando, and S alonJl, upon condition that
he in s t itu t e a c o n stitu tio n a l democracy in R u ssia. In a
telegram dated June 4, 1919, Koltchak promised to do t h i s , •
but he never received any real a ssista n ce from the A llied
in terven tion ary forces in retu rn .
3 E, L. Woodward and R. B u tler. Documents on B r itish
Foreign P o licy . 1919-1939. S eries I , V01 . I I I . London, 199-9.
Document #33. A d escrip tion o f the situ a tio n o f Y udenitch's army
la te r that year can be found in Greene, o p .c lt . . pp. 190-197.
 -5 6 -

to Uie Esthonians, In whose territo ry Xudenitch was operat­

ing, and to the German equipped Russian troops In Latvia,
Prince Lieven's detachment and Oolonel Beimondt's Abtellung
Graf K eller, who were b etter equipped than the German troops
them selves. The Russians therefore began to doubt the ad­
v is a b ility o f relyin g upon the A llie s , and by the end of the
summer, began to favor an a llia n ce with the Germans.
The p o s s ib ility o f a sa tisfa c to r y settlem ent of the
German troops' claim s upon the Latvian government had be­
come n on -existen t when Ulmanis returned to power. This was
confirmed on August k, when Ulmanis form ally denied the
v a lid ity of the German claim s, basing h is p o sitio n on ar­
t ic le s 292 and 293 o f the V er sa illes trea ty . The troops
could thus get th eir land only from an a llie d White Russia
which once again con trolled the B a ltic provinces. In what
seems to have been an honest e ffo r t to avoid trouble,
Blachoff had tr ie d to get the German government, which had
endorsed the Baltllrumers1 terms of recruitm ent, to compen­
sate them with land in Germany, and to promise that no
BaltIhiimer would be refused the right to work by a S ocial
Democratic trades union a fte r h is return to Germany.
N either promise was forthcoming. The troops thus had nothing
to gain by returning to a hungry and unemployed existen ce in

1*. Woodward and Uutler, op.clt .Y~Doc. #8&.

 -5 7 -

Germany, and everything to gain i f they fought for the Rus-

aians.
At the same time, in one of these contradictions which
characterize government p olicy during th is p eriod , the gov­
ernment did, probably under pressure from Noslce, agree not
to in terfere w ith the supply and financing of a Russo—
German army, provided i t was carried out by p rivate concerns
in Germany. Had the government kept i t s word in regard to
th is , the B a ltic a ffa ir might have ended somewhat d iffe r e n tly .
Bennondt
ih e Russo-German rapprochement was arranged with Colonel
Prince Pavel M ikhailovich Avaloff-Bermondt, the most color­
fu l of a ll the leaders o f the B a ltic adventure. When the
revolution broke out, he had been a Major in the Im perial
Russian cavalry. His background was obscure, though there
was a rumor current in the B a ltic that he had been seen con­
ducting a brass band in S t. Petersburg before the war. He
claimed the t i t l e o f Prince A-raioff as a resu lt o f adoption
by an u ncle. Whatever h is background may have been, or per­
haps because of i t , he was by p erson ality and Appearance
admirably su ited to lead troops of the Baltlkiimer type.
Hig thin, aquiline featu res were accentuated by a magnificent
black mustache. His habitual dress was a flowing Circassian

5. See photograph, Appendix B.

 -5 8 -

tu n ic , which had sewn-in b a n d o liers, the cross o f S t. George,

and a black astrakhan h a t. He went everywhere on horseback,
probably because he was a b it sh o rt. Most im portant o f a l l ,
as fa r as B ieeh o ff and von der G oltz were concerned, he was
a m onarchist and a lif e - lo n g Germanophile. He had l i t t l e
m ilita r y Judgment or te c h n ic a l a b ilit y , b u t B igch off hoped
to overcome th is shortcom ing by assig n in g capable German
s t a f f o f fic e r s to a s s is t him,
Bermondt f i r s t appeared in the B a ltic at the end of May,
in command o f the A b tellu g Graf K e lle r , a u n it made up o f
R ussians who had been p riso n ers o f war in Germany. I t had
been organized and financed by a group o f White R ussians in
B e r lin , w ith fin a n c ia l help from the German government.
This group la te r came to be c a lle d the Wes t Russian govern­
ment. At th is tim e, Bermondt was th e o r e tic a lly under General
X udenitch's command, as was P rince L leven.
On July 4, as the Germans were r e tr e a tin g from Riga,
Bermondt'8 c h ie f o f s t a f f , a C olonel Tchaikowsky, appeared
at B ls c h o ff's command p ost and suggested th a t in the fu tu re
the Germans and R ussians combine th e ir fo r c e s, p o ssib ly under
the Russian f la g . B lso h o ff accepted alm ost im m ediately, and
q u ie tly broached the p ro p o sitio n to h is troop s, who receiv ed
i t e n th u s ia s tic a lly . G eneral von der G oltz a lso thought the
id ea sound, but advised w a itin g fo r a more su ita b le moment,
and suggested that the venture would be receiv ed le s s co ld ly
 -5 9 -

by the A llie s i f Bermondt, ra th er than B isc h o ff, was made

nominal commander o f the Joint fo r c e . He h im se lf had too
many enemies in B erlin and among "the A l lie s t and would only
compromise the venture by len d in g h is name to i t .
The German government had already prom ised not to in te r ­
fere w ith the supplying o f th e Joint fo r c e . During the next
few weeks, as rumors o f the inform al agreement reached Ger­
many. a flo o d o f Russian and German vo lu n teers arrived in
6
the B a ltic .
When General Kudenitch heard o f th e agreem ent, he imme­
d ia te ly ordered Bermondt and Lieven to leave L atvia and Join
him at Narva. Lieven com plied, though somewhat r e g r e tfu lly .
Bermondt decided to take h is chances w ith the Reimans, and
p ro fessed h im self unable to eomoly w ith the order, and
named h im self commander in c h ie f o f a l l Russian troop s in the
Western B a ltic . He had l i t t l e d if fic u lty in doing t h is ,
sin ce L ieven*s departure meant th at h is own A btellung Graf
K e lle r was the only Russian u n it in the area.
The only d if f ic u lt y which arose during th is p eriod was
the f a ilu r e o f r ig h t is t groups in Germany to provide as much
7
fin a n c ia l support as had been exp ected . At th is time,

6. Woodward and B u tler, o o .c l t .. #*s 31, ^2, ^3.

7. In h is memoirs, Bermondt a lso mentions a la rg e sum
from the Im perial treasu ry which was to have been put at h is
d isp o sa l, but which, w h ile in the custody o f a certa in Russian
sen ator, m ysteriou sly vanished.
 -6 o -

Bermondt's troops were being p aid by the German government

out o f funds set asid e for the Grenzschutz O st. and these
funds could be expected to be withdrawn at any tim e. Ber-
mondt solved th is problem by p r in tin g h is own "Bermondt
R u b les,“ which were besed upon the valu e o f the te r r ito r y
which he expected to reoapture from the S o v ie ts. T his te r ­
r ito r y was accepted as v a lid in the area c o n tr o lle d by h is
tro o p s, ^t i s not r e a lly su rp risin g that t h is was so, fo r
h is orosp ects seemed q u ite good. Very l i t t l e stood between
h is rapidly growing army and P etrograd.
The A llie d R eaction
The A llie s had considered the German th rea t in the
B a ltic ended a fte r the d isa str o u s c i v i l war, and had begun
to arrange fo r th e ir evacuation in a le is u r e ly manner, Now
they suddenly found th e ir en tire eastern European p o lic y
threatened w ith bankruptcy. No cordon sa n lta lr e o f sm all
rep u b lics could hope to c o -e x is t w ith a Russo-German a l l i ­
ance, as even ts twenty yea rs la te r were to p rove. At the
same tim e, the A llie s found th a t they had no ready means of
p reven tin g i t . The mutiny o f the French troops sent to
fig h t in southern R u ssia, and the clamor in England fo r the
return o f the B r itish troops from Archangel, showed th a t i t
would be im p ossible to commit Entente troops in the B a ltic .
The L atvians and E sthonians, who had seemed such e ffe c tiv e
p artn ers a few weeks b efo re, appeared to be Involved in a
 -61-

b it te r dispute over the con trol o f Walk, a railroad Junc­

tion on the Latvian-Esthonian border. An E nglish sugges­
tion that the P olish army* attack Bermondt was greeted w ith
horror by the Lithuanians, who f e lt certain that once a
P olish army crossed th eir border* fo r any reason w hatsoever,
i t would never le a v e .
Thé only means a t the A llie s 1 d isp o sa l of g e ttin g the
Germans out of the B a ltic was to put diplom atic pressure
upon the German government, which they promptly d id . -The
government ordered the immediate withdrawal o f the Iron
D iv isio n . On August 23 ,sth e d iv is io n 's 2nd B attalion was on
the tr a in , ready to leave Mitau, when B isch o ff appeared on the
platform . Instead o f making the expected farew ell speech,
he ordered the tr a in unloaded, an act of open disobedience
to the government. That n ight the Ju b ilan t'troop s held a
to rch lig h t parade In fron t o f B isc h o ff's quarters. By d is­
obeying the government' s ord ers, B isch o ff broke a l l t ie s
between h ie troops and the government.
throughout September, the Germans busied them selves
w ith c o lle c tin g the su p p lies and m unitions necessary for
th e ir contem plated drive to Petrograd. This ta sk was made
d if f ic u lt by the clo sin g o f thé German Border on September
5 to a ll su p p lies and reinforcem ents d estin ed for the Russo-
German army. However, they did continue to g et su p p lies
through underground ch an n els.
Entente p o lic y was at t h is point only beginning to
 -62-

r e fle o t the serio u sn ess o f the s itu a tio n . The se r ie s o f

demands sent to the German government to force the w ith­
drawal o f the German troops In creased in frequency and
s tiffe n e d in ton e. The " B altic S itu a tio n ," so lon g neg­
le c te d , became one o f the primary item s on the agenda of
the A llie d Supreme Council in P a r is. The German government,
which had no means a t i t s d isp o sa l w ith which to con trol
the B altlkum ersr was forced to d ecla re them outlaw s; oth er­
w ise, i t would have been a party to a v io la tio n o f the
V e r sa ille s tr e a ty . However, the A llie s seemed alm ost cer­
ta in to impose "certain severe measures o f an economic
character" upon Germany to fo rce a withdrawal from the B a ltic ,
8
and the Supreme Council agreed to do so on September 27th .
On August 26, in conference w ith rep resen ta tiv es o f
the Russo-German, L atvian, E sthonian, and Lithuanian arm ies,
Gough's deputy, General March, had o u tlin ed a Joint a n ti-
B olshevik o ffe n s iv e , which was to begin on September 15.
The Germans considered th is a de fa c to reco gn ition o f th e ir
s ta tu s . General March apparently considered the o ffe n siv e
ad visab le on two g r o u n d s;fir st, that i t would be im p ossible
to evacuate the Germans in the immediate fu tu re, and th at
the p o l it i c a l situ a tio n in L atvia thus n e c e ssita te d some
means o f d is tr a c tin g the Germans' a tte n tio n from the Lat­
vian government, and second, that the Bermondt en terp rise

8. Woodward and Butler, o p .clt.. #'s 110,111

 -63-

was more lik e ly to succeed than Y udentich’ s, and was th ere-

9
fo re more deserving: o f support. This agreement was d is ­
avowed hy the -A llies sh o rtly th e r e a fte r . In f a c t , by early
O ctober, a B r itis h Foreign O ffice memorandum sta ted that
"It can, in f a c t, be said that i t would be b e tte r th a t P etro-
grad should not be captured at a l l than i t should be captured
10
by the Germans."
Berraondt and B isc h o ff, m eanwhile, had begun to plan and
prepare fo r th e ir own o ffe n s iv e . The b est means o f supply­
in g ah atta ck on P etrograd, which la y roughly two hundred
m iles n orth east o f M itau, was by the W ilna-Dunaburg-Petrograd
ra ilr o a d , which la y in te r r ito r y h eld by the Lithuanian and
Latvian governm ents. The a lte r n a tiv e was a sin g le track
lin e which le d from Mitau to Jakobstadt, and in te r se c te d
the Duneburg-Petrograd lin e at R o sltten , a town in S oviet
held te r r ito r y . In e ith e r c a se , op eration s again st P etro­
grad could be conducted only w ith the consent o f the Latvian
governm ent. This consent was not forthcom ing, and r e la tio n s
between the L e ttish troops and the Germans worsened, w ith

9. I b id ., # ' s 71, 72, and a lso #85 and i t s apoendices,

which i s a much lon ger report from C olonel T a lle n ts, the
B r itis h Foreign O ffice reo r esen ta tiv e in R iga, to Earl Curzon,
which illu s t r a t e s very w e ll the gen eral confusion on the part
o f the B r itish as. to Bermondt's r e a l In te n tio n s.
10. I b id . . # ’125, n . 1^2, a lso # 87. Shortly th e e r e a fte r ,
Yudenitch attack ed Petrograd w ith a to ta lly inadequate fo rce,
and a fte r some i n i t i a l su c c e sse s, was a n n ih ila te d .
 -6 4 -

many in fr a c tio n s o f the arm istice and v io la tio n s o f the

n eu tra l zone hy both s id e s . The L etts were arming as
rap idly as o o s s ib le , most o f th e ir equipment coming from
the E ntente, but some o f i t purchased in Germany through
p riv a te sou rces, but shipped to L atvia w ith the perm ission
o f the government.
E arly in O ctober, In fr a c tio n s o f the arm istice in ­
creased in scope and v io le n c e . On October 5» under A llie d
p ressu re, the German government announced that there would
be a one y e a r p rison sentence imposed on anyone who gave
any a ssista n c e w hatsoever to the B a ltlk ftaers. The fo llo w ­
ing day, the Iron Div is io n form ally en ro lled under the
Russian f la g . Two days la te r , a c tiv e h o s t i l i t i e s broke
out between the L etts and Bermondt's tro o p s.
In order to p rotect th e ir lin e s o f communication e a s t­
wards, the Russo-Germans had to e sta b lish some form o f
d efen siv e lin e on th e ir l e f t fron t and fla n k . The only
n atu ral o b sta c le in the area which would p ro tect them from
atta ck from the L etts was the Diina r iv e r . A ccordingly, the
Russo-Germans se t out to retak e R iga. As had been the
case sev era l months e a r lie r , a fr o n ta l a tta ck , w ith a l l i t s
d i f f i c u l t i e s , was the only course open to B ig c h o ff. Very
much the came order o f b a ttle as had been employed e a r lie r
was used th is tim e. The Iron D iv isio n advanced along the
 -6 5 -
11
Mltau Riga highway, between the swamps, the German Legion,
which had a lso gone over to the R u ssian s, advanced on the
rig h t flan k south o f the swamp, and Bermondt' s A btellung
Graf K eller fought on the l e f t fla n k , moving along the
coast north o f the swamp. However, the p reviou s attack had
been again st p o s itio n s denuded o f troop s fo r the Soviet
o ffe n s iv e in the south; th is time the Germans were faced by
a very determ ined and num erically strong opponent. I t took
them fo r ty -e ig h t hours o f con stan t and b it t e r fig h tin g , for
every isla n d in the swamp and fo r every sand dune, b efore
they were able to occupy Thorenisberg, a suburb o f Riga on
the l e f t bank of the Duna, on the afternoon o f October 10*
In one o f the few p o lit ic a lly sound d e c isio n s taken
by the Baltlkuraer. B isch o ff and Bermondt decided to h a lt
th e ir advance in Thorensberg, and sent a note to Ulmanis
s ta tin g th at they had no d esire to overthrow h is government
(most o f which had withdrawn to Wenden), but merely wished
to secure th e ir advance eastw ards. They thus had no d esire
to capture Riga i t s e l f , and would be amenable to an arm is­
t ic e . Himanis made no rep ly , and on tfye 1 3 th , the L etts
began a s e r ie s o f counter atta ck s which the Germans had
great d if f ic u lt y in co n ta in in g .

11. A conglom eration o f Frelkorps commanded by Naval

Captain S iew ert, which had, u n t il then, confined i t s ac­
t i v i t i e s to L ithuania.
 Although the Russo-German fo rces were outwardly s t i l l
in a good p o s itio n , In r e a lity th e ir situ a tio n was very
s e r io u s. The absence o f adequate su p p lies from Germany
was beginning to take e f f e c t , and some u n its ran out o f
ammunition on the 10th . On the 1 5 th , the L etts were able
to e ffe c t a cro ssin g in the north, again st the R ussians,
and rap idly began to r o ll up the Russo-German le f t fla n k .
They were given con sid erab le a ssista n c e in th is actio n by
B r itish and French d estro y ers.
With th e ir rear threaten ed , the Iron D iv isio n was
forced to r e tr e a t. Short of ammunition, and w ith almost
no w in ter c lo th in g , the Germans retrea ted slow ly back to
M itau. Several o f th e ir cou n terattacks were su c c e ssfu l,
but they had su sta in ed so many lo s s e s , in combat, from
pneumonia and p le u r is y , and from d e se r tio n s, that they
were u n ab le-to fo llo w them up. On November 12, the Iron
D iv isio n and what was l e f t o f the A btellung Graf K eller
set up a d efen siv e p erim lter around M itau. They were able
to hold th is p o sitio n for a few days, but on the 19th the
L etts began a very strong a tta c k . On the 20th, Major
B ise h o ff eabled the German Army High Command that he was
p la cin g the Iron D iv isio n back under th e ir command. At
the same tim e, he ordered the r e tr e a t from M itau. F ight­
in g e l l the way, the d iv isio n withdrew to the Schaulen-
Murajevo r a ilro a d , and as tr a in s became a v a ila b le , were
 -6 7 -

tran sp ort e& back to East P ru ssia . The s t a f f o f the d iv is ­

ion crossed over the border in to East P ru ssia on December
12. A fter alm ost a year o f hard and sometimes b r illia n t
fig h tin g , the wR ltt gen 1 Oaten" hfd come to a b it te r and
dism al end
 CHAPTER VI

Conclusion
A fter crossin g the fr o n tie r , the Iron D ivision was quar­
tered fo r a few weeks in East P ru ssia. A r ig h tis t group had
asked Blscho'ff to keOo the d iv isio n togeth er u n til January,
when i t might be needed' fob a r ig h tis t coup. The coup
fa ile d to 1take p la d e, and”the diVi sion slow ly demobil­
iz e d , i t s members l e f t to fend for them selves in the fan tas­
t ic world o f Germany in th ef early *tw enties-. "-In h is auto­
biographical' Die G eachteten. Ernst von Salomon d escrib es
what might have been the ty p ic a l p o st-B a ltic career of a
veteran o f the Iron D iv isio n .
When the d iv isio n returned to Germany, von Salomon was
w ith the "E isem er Bchar B erthold. " a Frelkorps organized
by Captain Berthold, the Wohld War I fly in g a ee. On the
march back in to Germany, B arthold's u n it had the m isfortune
to be quartered fo r a night In Harburg when that c ity erup­
ted in one o f the sporadic revo lu tion s which were sd common
a t'th e tim e. ’The lo c a l Relchswehr garrison revolted
against i t s o f fic e r s , locked them up, and d istrib u ted the
g a rriso n 's arms among the lo c a l workers. B arthold's troops,
who had spent the n ight in the lo e a l Gymnasium, woke up t©
fin d the b u ild in g surrounded by a h a s tily organized Red
M ilitia . They fought u n til th e ir ammunition ran ou t, and
then surrendered. Berthold and a few o f h is o ffic e r s tr ie d
to escape by a back entrance to the sch ool, but ran in to
an angry mob as soon as¿they reached the s tr e e t. Recog­
n iz in g him by the Pour le M érite at h is c o lla r , the mob
l i t e r a lly tore Berthold to p ieces and shot the oth er o f f i­
c e r s. The rest o f B erthold1s troops were locked up in a
barn fo r the fiipfrt. Von Salomon managed to bribe h is way
ou t, and even tu ally managed|to get back to h is home in
Hamburg.
A fter overcoming the depression which was the in e v i­
tab le reaetlon to the conclusion o f such an even tfu l year,
von Salomon began looking for a Job. I f he admitted to
having been a Baltlküm er. he was refused employment, and
he was fir e d from several Jobs as soon as h ie employers
or the unions discovered that he had been in the B a ltic .
He in e v ita b ly turned to b e e r -h a ll p o lit ic s , but lik e many
o f the Frelkorpskamnfer. he could find nothing in common
w ith the p o lit ic a l p osturin gs o f the conservative bourgeoisie
and the N ational S o c ia lis ts , and turned to terrorism in­
stea d . At f ir s t th is was confined to b eer-h a ll brawls with
the lo c a l communists and a cts o f v io len ce agalnstt the oc­
cupying French troop s, tu t he was soon taking part in the
underground war against the French in the Ruhr. Eventually
he Joined Captain Ehrhardt's Organization Consul, and par-
 -70-

tic ip a te d In Rathenau's a ssa ssin a tio n , for which he went to

p riso n . He was relea sed from prison sh ortly befpre the
N azis came to power. His la s t p o lit ic a l act was to help
h is Id o l, Captain Ehrhardt, f le e the country a fte r "the
1
night o f the long k nives,"
This was a more or le s s ty p ic a l p o st-B a ltic career,
w ith the exception that most o f the Baltlkum er, Instead o f
Joining purely te r r o r is tic groups lik e the O rganization
Consulr Joined conservative p ara-m illtary organ ization s such
as the Stahlhelm or the S. A. Some went Into the "Black,
Helohswehr." D espite the s lig h tly d iffe r e n t paths they
took, a l l the Baltlküm er had In common a sense o f iso la tio n
from the so ciety in which they liv e d .
They had a l l had th is fe e lin g o f Iso la tio n and a lien a ­
tion when they f ir s t went to the B a ltic , The even ts o f the
follow in g year, in steady su ccession , served to oonfirm th is
fe e lin g . The d isso lu tio n o f the S o ld ie r 's Council was per­
haps the f ir s t open break w ith p o st-rev o lu tio n Germany. The
behavior o f the ülmanis government, and the Libau Putsch
confirmed them in th e ir contempt for democratic in s titu tio n s
and procedures. The A llie d attem pt to make use o f two
d ia m etrica lly opposed groups in the B a ltic , the B alts and
Germans and the n a tio n a list p o litic ia n s ty p ifie d by ülmanis,

1 , von Salomon, Die G eaohteten. G irtersloh , 1930, P. 186 f f .

 -71-

le a in e v ita b ly to the c iv il war, and served to compound the

Baltlkum er'a hatred o f both the A llie s and the Democracies
they were try in g to e s ta b lis h . The v a c illa tin g p o lic ie s o f
the German government lo s t whatever lo y a lty they may have
had fo r i t , and le d f ir s t to a muntiny again st i t , and
f in a lly to severance o f a l l le g a l t ie s w ith Germany, when
they e n r o lle d tinder the Russian f la g . The b it t e r and
traum atic fa ilu r e o f the Russo-German en terp rise served to
harden and emphasize th ese fe e lin g s .
These men considered them selves r e v o lu tio n a r ie s. How­
ever, th e ir s was a revo lu tion o f a ctiv ism . They had no
r e a l g o a l, no Id eology, for rea c tio n per se i s not an id eo lo g y ,
and lik e every oth er group in Germany, th ey had no rea l
le a d e r . Had there been a man o f L enin's or T rotsk y's sta tu re
at th e ir head, the h isto r y o f Germany might have been radi­
c a lly d iffe r e n t.
Though they were at h eart r e v o lu tio n a r ie s, they need
not have become such a d estru ctiv e force in German so c ie ty
a fte r th e ir retu rn . I t was the task se t fo r them by the
Weimar Republic and the A llie s , as w e ll as th e ir own back­
grounds, which turned them a g a in st German so c ie ty in the
'tw e n tie s. However, the lea d ers o f the Frelkorpskampfer
did not o u tliv e the so c ie ty which they helped to d esto ry .
As Robert W aite's Vanguard to Nazism e sta b lish e d , very few
o f them survived the 193^ purge.
 -7 2 -

A p o ssib le epitaph for the Frelkorpskampfer might be

H itle r 's commen on * the night o f the long knives"*
They are permanent rev o lu tio n a ries, who In
1918 had . . . lo s t a l l inner contact w ith
the human s o c ia l order . . . men who found
th e ir p rofession o f fa ith in n ih ilis m ....
?
Though th is was q u ite true, I think a more su ita b le
epitaph i s to be found in von Salomon's d escrip tion o f h is
reaction to the incorporation of Ehrhardt1s II Mar in e—Brigade.
the la s t of the F relkoros. in to the SS:
What a w ealth o f s p ir it had been se n se le ssly
squandered! What eager devotion had been crim i­
n a lly wasted!
3

S p irit and devotion were two elements which were notably

lack in g In the Weimar Republic, except in the cases o f a few
outstanding men. One o f the traged ies o f the Republic was
i t s fa ilu r e to capture the minds and im aginations o f the
Frelkornskampfer.

2 . H itle r 's speech to the R eichstag, July i j , quoted In

W aite, o n .o lt ., p . 281.
* 3 . von Salomon, The Answers. London, 195^, P. 26 ^.
 -73-

B ibliograp h ical Note

As a r u le , the N a zi's e ffo r t to incorporate the P rel-
koros legend in to th e ir own mythology makes Freikorpe
m aterial w ritten during the Nazi period u n relia b le, u n less
read very c r it ic a lly , and I have avoided these sources as
much as p o s s ib le . There are two major exceptions tp t h is .
General von der (Jolts' Melne Sendung in Finland und lm
Baltlkum was w ritten immediately a fte r h is return from the
B a ltic , and has a s lig h t overtone o f h y ste r ia . I have
th erefore used h is A ls P o lltlsc h e r General lm Oaten, which
i s Improved by f ifte e n y ea r's p e rsp ectiv e. The tfazi in flu ­
ence in the la te r e d itio n can be discounted, J , think by
c r it ic a l reading, B isc h o ff's Die L etzte Front was w ritten
before and a fte r the M achtererelfung. However, P iso h o ff's
background as g p ro fessio n a l so ld ier, prevented: him fro®
stra yin g beyond anything but an accurate, d eta iled , stra ig h t­
forward account of h is a c t iv it ie s .
, There are„three autobiographical n ovels included in the
primary sources, E rloh*B alld's Landsknechts Wurden Wlrl.

Edwin Dwinger's Die Letzten R e ite r , and von Salomon's Die

G gachteten. A ll three are as accurate as more formal
accounts, and a ll three w riters are among the more percep­
t iv e , reasonable, and moderate p a rticip a n ts in the B a ltic
 -7 4 -

ep isode. B ella was one ©f B iseh o ff's b attalion commanders.

He had not organized h is own F relkoros. but was given a
b atta lio n by B igchoff, and he thus brings a unique point of
view to h is d escrip tion s of B isohoff and the Freljcorps
commanders.
Warwick (Jreene i s one of the most in terestin g p erson ali­
t ie s in the B a ltic during h is period. A Bostonian, he had
interrupted h is undergraduate career at Harvard to serve as
a seaman in the Spanish-Amerioan War. While at Harvard, he
was famous for the ex cessiv e speed at which he drove h is
¡‘souped-up" Stanley steamer, which he had f it t e d with an
extra b o ile r . A fter graduating from Harvard Law School, he
became le g a l secretary to the Governor-General of the
P h ilip p in es, and tra v elled exten sively in the Far E ast.
During the War, he worked for the Red Cross in Europe, and
was given a commission in the Army Flying Corps when
America entered the War. He was a member of the A llied
Peace Commission, and h is d escrip tion s of the people and
events at V e r sa ille s, as w ell as h is d escrip tion s of
Germany and eastern Europe immediately a fte r the War, though
flo r id , are extremely in terestin g reading.
The m ajority of the secondary sources do not provide
mueh inform ation. Tha Frelkoros episode in the B a ltic was
an aberration from the main currents o f postwar German
h isto ry , and as such i s not treated very exten sively in the
more general works.
 -7 5 -

An exception to th is is the D arstellungen aus den

Nachkr 1egskampfen deutscher Trutroen und Frelkorps s e r ie s ,

which was compiled hy the h is to r ic a l sectio n of the OKW.

They are "based upon documents and notes c o lle c te d by von
Salomon, who turned them over to the H eeresarohly a fte r
the June purge, when he learned that the intended to con­
f is c a te and destroy them, prim arily because o f the u n fla t­
terin g d escrip tio n s o f H itle r given by Frelkorpa p a r tic i­
pants in the 1923 Putsch, Though extrem ely d e ta ile d and
accu rate, they seem, as von Salomon says, *to describe
events which took place on the moon."
During the la te r months o f the B a ltic ep isod e, the
Times o f London gave fa ir ly exten sive coverage to the events
in L a tv ia. However, these rep orts are from Times corres­
pondents in Copenhagen, Stockholm, arid H elsin g fo rs. As a
r e s u lt, they are frequently garbled second arid th ird hand
accounts.
F in a lly , the Woodward and B u tler c o lle c tio n o f Foreign
O ffice documents is in valu ab le, as i t in clu d es reports from
B ritish m issions a l l over the B a ltic and eastern Europe, as
w ell as correspondence from B erlin and V e r sa ille s.

1. von Salomon, The Answers, p ♦ 189.

 -7 6 -

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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General
Snyder, Louis L ., F ifty Ma.lor Documents of the Twentieth.
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Great B ritain
Woodward, E. L, and B utler, R. e d s .. Documents on B ritish
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 -7 7 -

(Bibliography, Cont. j
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Heydebreek, Peter won, Wir Wehrwplf e : Errlnerungen elnej,
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 -78-

(Bibliography, Cont .)

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Benoist-M eohin, J ., History of the Gorman Army Since the
A rm istice, tra n sla ted by E. R. Taylor, Zurich, 1939.
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 -79-

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A rticles ln P eriodicals
Brehm. Bruno, "Die Illu sio n der Zwanziger Jahre," Der
¿nronalsch« Osten. Nr. 5, * Jahrgang, M unich,«ay,
1958.
 -8 0 -
(Blbliography, Cont.)

A rticles and P eriodicals (Cont.)

Hartmann, Georg Heinrieh, "Aus aen Erinnerungen eines
F reiw illiger aer Baltischen Lanaeswehr." Deutsche
Revuer January, 1921, b6 Jahrgang, Stuttgart, 1921.
Larson, Lawrence R ., "T erritorial Problems of the B altic
Basin," U niversity of I llin o is B u lletin . December 30,
1918.
Paravane, (pseu a.), "With the B a ltic Iquaaron 1918-1920,"
The Fortnightly Review. CIX, Lonaon, May 2, 1921.
V igilans (pseua.), "Germany's Designs in the B altic Lanas,"
National Review. Lonaon, January, 1920.

Newspapers
The Time8. Lonaon, 1919.