Asian Journal of Political Science

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasi20

Ascent of the dragon: China’s growing role in

global affairs

Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi & Adam Saud

To cite this article: Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi & Adam Saud (2021): Ascent of the
dragon: China’s growing role in global affairs, Asian Journal of Political Science, DOI:
10.1080/02185377.2021.1915171

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2021.1915171

Published online: 17 Apr 2021.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 101

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rasi20
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2021.1915171

Ascent of the dragon: China’s growing role in global affairs

Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi and Adam Saud
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences (H&SS), Bahria University, Islamabad, Pakistan

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
In contemporary times, the highly debated issue in geopolitics is the Rise of China; Great Power
rapid rise of China as a potential Superpower. In merely, three competition; Sino-American
decades China’s economy has transformed into the second-biggest relations; BRI; geopolitics;
geo-economics
economy in the world, it has the largest conventional force of the
globe, it is now creating international institutes like the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank to provide a just and balanced
alternate economic regime to the US-led liberal order, and it is using
its geo-economic might through multi-trillion projects like the Belt
and Road Initiative to project its geopolitical influence globally. This
paper explains how and when for the first time China came into the
limelight as a Major Power. It evaluates China’s economic rise;
whether it is in a position to become the new economic hub? It
assesses the military capabilities of China; does it meet the threshold
of a Great Power? It analyses the geostrategic policies adopted by
China, especially vis-à-vis the all-important South and East China
Seas. Lastly, it determines if China can establish itself as the
hegemon in the Eastern hemisphere?

Introduction
Since the United States (US) established itself as a Great Power there have been a few
states to challenge its dominance, like Japan and the Soviet Union (USSR). However,
both these states, in the long run, were unable to compete with the US might. Neverthe-
less, in the last decade, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as a new con-
tender in international politics contesting the US global hegemony. With each passing
day, China is now dominantly asserting itself into geopolitics, but more importantly, it
is mounting a serious challenge to the US-led liberal economic order.
Historically, China has always been a force to reckon with. Even in its imperial ages
(221 B.C–1912)1; China wielded enormous political power and economic might.
However, the Chinese faced tremendous hardships and were greatly humiliated during
China’s dark ages, commonly known as the Century of Humiliation.2 During this era,
not only China lost its territory to other states; the Russian Empire annexed some
lands of Manchuria, and the Japanese liberated Korea as well as took control of
Taiwan, but also the state’s administration was not even in control of its territory, as a
result of subsequent power struggles amongst the leaders (Rafatjoo, 2020). Consequently;
in this era, the socio-economic conditions of China were at the lowest point in the history
of the Chinese civilization.

CONTACT Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi saadz93@hotmail.com

© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 S. M. S. ZAIDI AND ADAM SAUD

However, China’s fate dramatically changed with the Communist Revolution (1949),
spearheaded by Mao Zedong. In the initial years, after the establishment of the PRC,
Mao’s policies such as land reforms and the Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), bared fruit
as the industrial production of China increased by 19% per annum and a 9% annual
increase was witnessed in the workers’ income (Mack, 2019). However, Mao’s succeeding
socio-economic policies’, like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution
(1966–1977) were a complete disaster, as they caused the deaths of approximately 20–
48 million people and 2 million people respectively (Phillips, 2016; Szczepanski, 2019).
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor, by abandoning the ideological structures of
the past, communism, and reforming the Chinese economy as per the internationally
recognized and followed capitalist system propelled the Chinese nation to greatness.
Not only the Chinese economy witnessed an economic growth in double digits for
more than three decades, but also millions of Chinese were pulled out of poverty and
into the middle-class (Denmark, 2018). Furthermore, the secret negotiations that
Henry Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State, started with China in 1971 materialized
in 1979 when Jimmy Carter, the then US President, formally recognized the PRC;
severing normal ties with Taiwan (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). Also, the 1971s
US–China covert negotiations paved the way for China to become a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1972.
Under President Hu Jintao, China consolidated its position as an upcoming econ-
omic power by maintaining a GDP growth rate of around 10% a year, for a decade,
2002–2012 (Orlik, 2012). Furthermore, China forwent its famous ‘Tao guang yang
hui’3 policy—maintaining a low profile while continuously working on its nation-
building—and adapted a much more assertive foreign policy. Now, China openly cri-
ticized the US for 2008s economic crisis, it rejected the Copenhagen climate agree-
ment and did not give in to the US demands for further imposing harsher sanctions
against Iran (Bennholed, 2010). Also, after not using force, for many decades, in
both the East and South China Seas, China, in the last years of Hu’s administration,
started vehemently asserting its sovereignty over the disputed marine territories
(Zhao, 2012).
In contemporary times, China’s President, Xi Jinping, by putting forward the
Chinese Dream; to transform China into a global Superpower by 2049, China’s
100th anniversary, foretold the world that sooner rather than later China will
emerge as a dominant political player, even to the extent that it would be able to
remodel the balance of power (Welle, 2017). For this very purpose, President Xi
has initiated projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); to connect
China with Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa via land and maritime
routes, to enhance trade and stimulate economic growth (Council on Foreign
Relations, 2020a). In addition, to solidify China’s position as an economic giant, it
created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Also, now, China has
forgone its pacifist behaviour, especially when it comes to safeguard its national
interests; therefore, China proactively engaged in the US initiated trade-wars, it
kept the US from militarily intervening in both Iran and North Korea, and by
gaining control of islands and artificially creating more and more islands in
both the East and South China seas, it has reaffirmed its claim to these disputed
waters.
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 3

The giant awakens: China’s economic might

The French emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, almost two hundred years ago said, ‘let China
sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world’ (Allison, 2017, p. 3). Now, in the
twenty-first century, his words are coming true like a prophecy, as China is shaking
the world, especially with its ever-growing economic might.
At first, China was looked at with contempt from the world as lazy poppy users, but all
that changed with the Communist Revolution (1949). After the revolution, Mao Zedong
worked tirelessly to bring out the Chinese nation from the Century of Humiliation. Mao
devised a communist, centrally planned, economic system for China. Consequently,
China established large communes, greatly limited its imports, and the concept of
state-owned enterprises was adopted while industrializing. Following Mao’s economic
model, the GDP of China grew at a rate of 4.4% per annum from 1953 to 1978 (Maddi-
son, 2007). However, the successive policies of Mao; the Great Leap Forward and the Cul-
tural Revolution proved to be catastrophic, as they not only adversely affected the
Chinese economy, but also incurred the deaths of millions of Chinese (Dikötter, 2010).
In 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese economy was rejuve-
nated when it was somewhat transformed as per the free market ideas of the West.
Now, farmers were given proprietary rights to the land they cultivated, and they could
even sell a fixed portion of their harvest in the open market (Zhang, 1996). The state
encouraged the citizens to start businesses. Also, in order to boost exports and attract
foreign investment; Special Economic Zones (SEZ) were created (Zhang, 1996). More-
over, in stages, economic policymaking, especially trade policymaking, was decentralized.
On many products, state price controls were removed. Lastly, in 1980, China began to
participate in the global economic system, as it became a member of important inter-
national financial institutes, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank (Bretton Woods Project, 2011). Jim Yong Kim, President of the World
Bank, recently said that Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms; promoting the role of
self-regulating market while reducing the control of the state over economic matters,
bared tremendous fruits as in merely 40 years, China was able to lift over 800
million of its citizens out of poverty and increase its per capita income 25 times
(World Bank, n.d.).
In 2001, China finally became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO); a
step that significantly increased China’s export, as its exports grew nearly by 30% per
annum from 200 to 2007 (Orlik, 2012). From this point onwards, China rapidly rose
to the status of one of the world’s biggest economic powers. In 2007, China became
the largest holder of the US debt, overtaking Japan, at approximately $600 billion
(Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). Shortly after, in 2010, China overtook Japan and
became the second-biggest economy of the world, behind the US (Barboza, 2010).
While the Credit Crunch Crisis (2008) adversely affected the economies of states
across the globe, especially the developed world, the Chinese economy remained
largely unaffected; whatever minute adverse effects the global recession caused were
redeemed in no time. As, in just a year, late 2009, the Chinese GDP growth recovered
to its former double-digit glory, recording a growth of 11.4% that year (Wen & Wu,
2014). On the contrary, even though the US and leading European states reacted to
the global financial meltdown way before China, their GDP growth did not recover
4 S. M. S. ZAIDI AND ADAM SAUD

until late 2011 to the pre-crisis state (Bivens, 2016). Shockingly, since 2008s economic
turmoil, the GDP growth rate of these developed countries has significantly declined,
even as much as below 10% of their expected long-run trends (Bivens, 2016). Also,
regardless of the economic crisis and declining demand for Chinese goods, the industrial
production of China almost doubled between 2007 and 2013, whereas the US, the Euro-
pean Union and Japan have experienced a decline in industrial growth by 1%, 9.3% and
17.1%, respectively (Ross, 2013).
Finally, the world acknowledged China as a formidable economic power after witnes-
sing how China effectively and efficiently handled 2008s global financial meltdown. The
Chinese leadership shrewdly cashed in this situation, they made it evident to the world
that the prevailing US-led liberal economic order was inherently flawed, as it largely safe-
guarded the interests of the US, in particular, and the West general. Furthermore, China
strengthened its case regarding the existing economic regime to be biased by citing old
traditions, such as since the World Bank’s creation, only American nationals have
been appointed as its President, IMF’s Managing Director has always been a European,
and the Western economies have always been favoured while establishing voting and
quota shares of all economic institutes (Ayres, 2017).
Consequently, in 2012, during the fourth Summit of BRICS, held in New Dehli, China
successfully lobbied its fellow member states to set up a joint working group to explore
the possibility of establishing a New Development Bank (NDB) (New Development
Bank, n.d.). In the proceeding BRICS summit in Durban, 2013, after reviewing the
joint-working group’s report, all BRICS leaders agreed in principle to establish the
NDB (New Development Bank, n.d.). Thus, in 2014, during the 6th BRICS Sumit held
in Fortaleza, an agreement was concluded and the NDB was established, which gave
equal voting rights to its members, unlike the World Bank (Islam, 2014). Also, the Con-
tingent Reserves Arrangement; a $100 billion fund to provide emergency lending in the
case of a liquidity crisis, was created as an institutional substitute to the IMF (Steil &
Walker, 2014). The NDB strategy is devoted to mobilize resources for infrastructure
and sustainable development projects in BRICS nations in particular, and in emerging
economies as well as developing states in general (New Development Bank, n.d.);
which means a global geopolitical power projection of member states, including
China. However, this initiative was limited due to the Sino-India rivalry, and by the
regime change in Brazil, as under President Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil aligned itself with
President Trump’s international policies.
In 2015, China further stunned the world by establishing the Asian Investment and
Infrastructure Bank (AIIB). After repeated demands by China for a bigger stake in the
World Bank and the US constantly turning them down, China had no other option
but to create an international economic institution that would promote and safeguard
its interests and more importantly the interests of all those states that were poorly
treated by the US-led international institutions. As expected, the US opposed the creation
of AIIB, as it considered it to be an unwanted intrusion in the multilateral financial
system; also it feared that the AIIB would give funds/loans to states that are in violation
of the Washington Consensus.4 Therefore, the US forbade its allies to be a member of the
AIIB. However, to its surprise, 87 countries including some of its key and most trusted
allies; Great Britain, Australia, South Korea, became members of the bank (Curran,
2018). China’s successful global multilateral initiatives, such as the NDB and the AIIB,
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 5

clearly depicts the faith and trust the world puts in China as an economic hub; indeed
paving the way for China to once again transform as a major global power.
Furthermore, in 2013, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China announced the BRI, which
is considered to be the most ambitious infrastructural development project ever. It is also
termed to be the New Silk Road, as it will connect more than 70 states, accounting for
approximately 62% of the population of the globe, spread across Europe, Asia, Latin
America, Africa, and Oceania (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020a). China will be
investing approximately $4–8 trillion on this project (Council on Foreign Relations,
2020a). Through the BRI, where China will be getting access to markets of more than
65 states; its trade will be greatly facilitated, as the transport time and cost of import-
ing/exporting goods will significantly be reduced. For instance, using the traditional
sea routes it took more than 44 days to import/export goods from China to England,
while it took only 7 days using the railway track laid between Urumqi, China and Man-
chester, England (Lu et al., 2018). In addition, the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) will be pro-
moted as an international currency, as most of the capital raised for BRI projects will be
achieved through issuing bonds in Renminbi, which will, in turn, encourage its use in
global economic centers (Kynge, 2015). One of the most important fundamental attri-
butes of a Superpower is it to have access to all of the key regions of the world and mul-
tiple markets; both of which will be possible for China as the BRI is materialized.
The US and its European allies see the BRI with suspicion. They term China to be
using the BRI to induce debt-trap diplomacy—a strategy adopted by an economic
power to deliberately lend money to such developing countries, which it knows will be
unable to repay on time, with the sole intent to later translate into geopolitical
influence (Chellaney, 2017). The Western claim regarding the real motive of the BRI
gained strength when China got the operating rights for Hambantota Port, Srilanka,
for 99 years, when the cost of the project exceeded to such an extent, that Srilanka
had no other option but to give up Hambantota’s control in exchange for a direly
needed bailout package (Stacey, 2017). Also, after Mahathir Mohamed, the then Malay-
sian Prime Minister, not only canceled $23 billion worth BRI projects, but also warned
China against propagating a new kind of colonialism; the debt trap argument further
gained credibility (Hornby, 2018). However, top Chinese officials term this ever-
growing criticism, opposition and hostility towards BRI to be nothing more than a
ploy adopted by the US-led western coalition to hamper the much-feared rise of
China. These Chinese claims dispelling debt trap allegations are strengthened in a
recent report published by the Lowy Institute where leading experts conclude that up
till now as far as irrefutebale evidence is concerned, indeed, China has not been
engaged in problematic debt practices to justify accusations of debt trap diplomacy
(Roland et al., 2019).
The BRI is a clear indicator of China’s global ambitions. Though China has time and
again reiterated the BRI to be benign development and investment projects, which are
economically beneficial for all the parties, there exist clear strategic manifestations
which outrightly contradict Chinese claims (Bhattacharya et al., 2019). For instance, in
2017, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, located at the horns of
Africa; and now China is consolidating its influence in the Port of Doraleh. Coupled
together, China will be in a position to greatly restrict the US ability to operate in the
region. Furthermore, China gained control of the port of Hambantota, which may
6 S. M. S. ZAIDI AND ADAM SAUD

turn out to be a strategic nightmare for India, as a great number of its shipping must go
through Colombo to reach Indian ports; thus, creating a virtual logistical choke point.
Also, China, most likely, controlling the port of Haifa, despite the several US attempts
to sway Israel’s decision, gives China a clear strategic edge in the Mediterranean, as no
longer the US navy will favour Haifa to get repairs (Bhattacharya et al., 2019).
Moreover, even before President Trump took office, he publicly raised concerns
regarding China’s unfair trading practices and how they are adversely affecting the US
economy. Consequently, in 2017, the US conducted an inquiry into China’s trade prac-
tices, which led to the initiation of the trade-wars between the two mighty economic
powers (Zaidi & Saud, 2020b). By imposing a 30% tariff on washing machines and
solar panels, President Trump started the trade-wars in February 2018 (Zheng, 2018).
Later, in March, the US government specifically levied 25% tariffs on $50 billion of
imports from China, particularly electronics (Zheng, 2018). However, China did not
give in to the US demands, but by imposing $50 billion tariffs on 128 American products
including soybeans, fruit, wine and pork retaliated, a move the US did not expect (Zheng,
2018). To date, both sides have imposed hefty tariffs on each other; the US has imposed
tariffs worth $250 billion on imports from China, whereas China has implemented $130
billion tariffs on imports from the US (Yong, 2019).
China’s equally aggressive posture while retaliating US attacks to sabotage its exports,
gave a clear signal to the world that now neither the US, nor the west, could dictate terms
to China. However, quite interestingly, China did not oversell itself while retaliating in
the trade-wars. Neither did it cut off trade ties with the US, nor did it over aggressively
slap sanctions on US products. As the US is one of the most important markets of China;
in 2018, China exported goods worth $539.5 billion to the US, up 6.7% ($34 billion) from
2017, and up 59.7% from 2008 (Office of the United States Trade Representative, n.d.).
In contemporary times, China is using geo-economics to project its power globally,
especially to somehow forge a favourable balance of power in the prevailing global
system. China quite shrewdly is using its large trading web, with over one hundred
countries, to safeguard its geo-political interests (Blackwill & Harris, 2016). For instance,
China by just reducing the import of Japanese cars clearly signalled its disapproval of
Japan’s security policies. China by using its economic carrot and stick approach; reward-
ing allies with investments and trade deals while sanctioning, withholding investment
from anyone who does not tow the Chinese line, is increasing its sphere of influence
with each passing day.
The US status as the economic hegemon of the world is no longer certain or safe. As
China, the world’s second-largest economy of approximately $14 trillion, with a stagger-
ing growth rate of 7–7.5% per year, is forecasted to surpass the US by 2030, and become
the biggest economy of the world (China Banking News, 2018; O’Brien, 2017). In 2014, in
regards to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), the economy of China has already surpassed
that of the US (Bird, 2014). Furthermore, the US’s socio-economic model has stopped
delivering for the majority of its citizens. Over the past 30 years, amongst developed
societies, the US is the only one where the average income of the bottom 50% of the
population has gone down (Kishore, 2020). On the contrary, during the same period,
the living standards and quality of life of the citizens of China have reached such great
levels never experienced before in Chinese history, even during its mighty imperial
ages (Kishore, 2020). Hence, in the coming years, China will most definitely give the
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 7

US a really tough time on the economic front, which will, in turn, raise serious questions
on the future viability of the already challenged unipolar moment.

China’s military buildup: meeting the ‘superpower standards’?

The Chinese never forgot Mao Zedong’s famous saying, ‘political power grows out of the
barrel of a gun’; thus, soon after achieving macro-economic stability, China started trans-
lating its economic power into military might (Wei, 2012).
Since modern-day China’s creation (1949), one of its primary objectives was to regain
its former glory; become a Superpower. Therefore, while primarily focusing upon estab-
lishing its economy, China slowly and gradually started building up its military capabili-
ties. From 1978 to 1987, the average annual increase in China’s GDP was 14.1%, while its
defense expenditure only increased by 3.5% (Ministry of National Defense The People’s
Republic of China, n.d.). In the proceeding decade, 1988–1997, where China’s GDP
increased by approximately 20.7% per annum, its defense expenditure increased by
14.5% annually (Ministry of National Defense The People’s Republic of China, n.d.).
In the succeeding decade, 1998–2007, the average annual increase in China’s GDP was
12.5%, while its defense expenditure increased by 15.9% (Ministry of National Defense
The People’s Republic of China, n.d.) (Figure 1).
As per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report, in 2019,
the military expenditure of China was $266.4 billion, representing 13% of 2019s total
military spending of the world. China had the second-biggest military budget, behind
the US; though, the US budget was almost three folds more than China’s (ChinaPower
Project, 2020).
Today, in terms of numbers, China has the biggest military across the globe, with
approximately 2.1 million active soldiers (Global Fire Power, n.d.). Nevertheless, in con-
temporary times, a huge force does not necessarily reflect unmatchable strength, as it
used to be back in the mid-twentieth century. Now, the quality of the forces, based
upon the sophistication of offensive/defensive technology, readily available as well as
accurate actionable intelligence, and unique combat skill set, is what determines the

Figure 1. Official Defense Budget of China (2003–2018). Source: Ministry of National Defense the
People’s Republic of China.
8 S. M. S. ZAIDI AND ADAM SAUD

power of an army. In this regard, China has substantially developed its military arsenal,
though still lags behind modern world military standards.
Realizing that China’s military is lagging in these fields, in 2015, President Xi Jinping,
initiated comprehensive military reforms, focusing upon not only radically downsizing
China’s ground forces, but also providing a more comprehensive strategic deterrence
and significantly increase its capability to triumph in wars (Kokoshin, 2016). Resultantly,
China has forsaken its traditional approach of warfare based upon using several plat-
forms, while adopting the US doctrine of technology-oriented approach to warfare;
thus, is developing armed drones and advancing networking capabilities.
If a comparison is drawn between the military might of the US and that of China, then
indeed China lags far behind. However, drawing such a comparison is unjust, especially
keeping in mind the fact that China has just started focusing upon its military; whereas,
the US established its military dominance almost 200 years ago, after successfully enfor-
cing the Monroe Doctrine (1823). The noteworthy thing regarding China’s military
buildup is its consistent rapid pace, especially in the last decade.
From an army heavily relying upon its personnel strength and it being a nuclear
power, China is now considered to be a technologically advanced military, especially
in the domains of Artificial Intelligence and Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD)
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2020b). Furthermore, recognizing that a strong navy is
almost a pre-requisite in order to qualify as a Superpower, China has been rapidly
strengthening its naval capabilities. In 2016, China commissioned 18 ships, whereas 5
were commissioned by the US Navy (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020b). In 2017,
the RAND Corporation reported that the ship quality of the Chinese navy has also
greatly improved; more than 70% of its fleet was now considered modern (Heginbotham,
2015). China’s naval modernization priorities include, inducting more nuclear-submar-
ines and aircraft carriers. Currently, China has two aircraft carriers, but by 2022 another
will be added to its naval fleet (Heginbotham, 2015). Lastly, in 2017, in Djibouti,
China established its first overseas naval base (Blanchard, 2017). Undoubtedly, China
has now transformed itself as a force to reckon with particularly in Asia, and generally
across the globe.
Where China’s military buildup is deemed necessary in order to safeguard the socio-
economic interests of rapidly growing China; it has instigated an unintentional arms race
in the region. For instance, in 2006, Vietnam’s defense budget was $1.3 billion, whereas it
increased by 258% to $4.6 billion in 2015 (Abuza & Nhat Anh, 2016). Furthermore, Sin-
gapore, a country historically having a defense budget around 3–4% of its GDP, had a
military budget of $14.76 billion in 2018, accounting for 18% of its budget (Brimelow,
2018). In addition, in 2005, almost after six decades of having barred itself from main-
taining a proper military force constitutionally (Article 9 of the postwar-Japanese consti-
tution); Japan not only amended its constitution allowing it to build a conventional
military offensive/defensive force, but also announced a comprehensive military doctrine
which included Japan developing ballistic missile technology (Stratfor, 2015). This unin-
tended arms race incurred by Chinese military buildup sheds light on how serious the
regional states perceive China’s military buildup.
While developing its military power, China strictly follows the dictates of defensive
realism; a state must always develop its military power in proportionality to its economic
power, enough for its security (Lobell, 2010). As excessive military power accumulation
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 9

by a state only creates a sense of insecurity among competing states; provoking hostile
alliances against that state in order to bring it down (Lobell, 2010). China has repeatedly
stated that it is developing its military capabilities solely to protect its territory and
people, while strictly abiding by the concept of peaceful development (Council on
Foreign Relations, 2009). A policy clearly stated in the whitepaper of 2019, China will
‘never threaten any other state or seek any sphere of influence’, and it has a no-first-
use nuclear policy (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020b). Negating any claims put
forward by many security analysts predicting China to use offensive military measures
to resolve territorial disputes; leading to war. While propagating the idea of China to
be a trustworthy military power of the future, which shall ensure global/regional peace
and stability.

Chinese regional dominance: a steppingstone towards global hegemony?

The unintended arms race between China and South-East Asian states, which started as a
result of China’s defensive military buildup, has intensified tensions in the region. The
practical manifestation of the arms race can be witnessed in both, East and South
China seas; where China is fighting tooth and nail over territorial claims to both seas.
Interestingly, China did ratify the United Nations Convention on Laws of Seas
(UNCLOS) in 1996. However, when it comes to the East and South China seas, it
claims sovereignty on the basis of the historic nine-dash line, which completely
negates the UNCLOS set principles;
the waters coming within 12 nautical miles from the coastal line of a country comes within
the territorial waters or the marginal zone of that coastal country, whereas 200 nautical miles
of sea from the coastal line of a state comes within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of
the coastal state. (United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea, n.d.)

Furthermore, the official map of China represents the nine-dash line as China’s
national border, and the Chinese officials generally refer to the East and South China
seas as Chinese territory (Yang & Li, 2016). In 2012, the Commander of China’s navy
stated the South China Sea as the maritime territory of China, as well as termed the
nine-dash line to be the intermittent boundary of China in both, East and South
China seas. Thus, justifying the recent actions of China in both the seas in order to
ensure the effective jurisdiction of China (O’Rourke, 2018).
On the issue of the Spratly Islands, which are situated within the South China Sea,
China advocates that since the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), the Chinese have been con-
ducting fishing activities around the Spratly Islands, and for the first time during the
Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) the Spratly Islands came under China’s jurisdiction
(Chang, 1991). Thus, China most definitely has irrefutable sovereignty over these
islands. In 2009, both Malaysia and Vietnam petitioned the United Nations Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLOS) to increase their respective continental
shelf, but China opposed their claim by submitting a map that included the nine-dash
line, asserting its sovereignty over the islands as well as over the adjacent waters
(Korkut & Kang, 2017).
In the South China Sea, on territorial claims, China is also in conflict with six other
states; Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan, most of which
10 S. M. S. ZAIDI AND ADAM SAUD

are treaty allies of the US (O’Rourke, 2021). This in addition to the heavy militarization of
the region has greatly amplified the US interests in the region. As most of the states in the
region are very small as compared to continent-sized China; the majority have opted to
bandwagon with the US. The US in order to safeguard the interests of its allies in the
South China Sea has begun patrolling the waters, while has deployed considerable
forces around the all-important Strait of Malacca (O’Rourke, 2021).
The US initiatives in the South China Sea, in turn, have induced claustrophobic feel-
ings for China. As the majority of China’s hydrocarbon supplies pass through the
Malacca Straits, the Indian Ocean. If the US decides to close the Malacca Straits for
the ships of China, the Chinese economy would come to a halt. Thus, it is of great
concern for China and has given more credence to the hawks in Beijing. Resultantly,
China was forced to adopt a more dominant stance on the nine-dash line and consider-
ably increase its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, while also deploying long-range
missiles on its shores to keep the US ships at bay. All the aforementioned steps taken
by China are to ensure its sovereignty over the waters of the South China Sea and safe-
guard its economic interests, China has no imperial ambitions whatsoever; a stance time
and again reiterated by high-level officials.
The second major territorial dispute China faces is with Japan, over territorial claims
of Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, situated in the East China sea. Lately, China on this particular
maritime territorial dispute has also been far more assertive than before. China claims
maritime rights by advocating that the continental shelf is a natural extension of the
mainland of China, past 200 nautical miles to the center of the Okinawa Trough (Valen-
cia, 2007). China argues that it has developed all its oil and gas projects within its con-
tinental shelf; thus, there exists no dispute whatsoever. In December 2012, China
formally submitted its case to extend its continental shelf past 200 nautical miles,
ranging to the Okinawa Trough to the UNCLOS (China Submits East China Sea
islands Row to UN, 1012). To resolve the conflict, Japan proposed to equally divide
the rights of the conflicting EEZ; though, Beijing rejected Japan’s proposal (Valencia,
2007). Additionally, China also increased its military flights nearby the Diaoyu/
Senkaku and the Miyako Strait, which Chinese strategist regards to be an important
passage through the chain of islands.
Nonetheless, the most important area of conflict for most Chinese remains Taiwan.5
To date, China still considers Taiwan to be its renegade province; thus, repeatedly states
that it will incorporate it back into mainland China (Mainland Affairs Council, 2017).
This is also a big bone of contention among China and the US, as the US is a major
ally of Taiwan and has extended its security umbrella to Taiwan—provided that
Taiwan does not declare independence. Furthermore, China has stated clearly that if
the Taiwanese declare independence, it will attack Taiwan. Even though the annual
trade between China and Taiwan is more than $181.76 billion, and countless daily
flights between the two, still China has armed its cost lines with guns capable of targeting
Taiwan and any ships patrolling within 1000 miles of the Chinese mainland (Council on
Foreign Relations, 2020c).
In the past few decades, the primary goal of the US has been to maintain the status of
the global hegemon and prohibit the rise of a regional hegemon in the Eastern hemi-
sphere; which is why it has been actively engaging with China in the South and East
China seas. Now, China views this US presence in the region as a hostile attempt to
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 11

curb its rise, in turn, which has forced the Chinese to become aggressive. The Chinese
have even become intolerable on minor issues, towards which in the past they may
have taken a lax stance.
According to Professor John J. Mearsheimer, the objective of every dominant state is
to somehow maximize its stake in the global political system, particularly powerful states,
which generally start by pursuing regional hegemony, then later ascend to seeking the
status of global hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2003). For this very purpose, China is seen fol-
lowing the footsteps of the US. As the US pushed British forces out of the Caribbean, took
control of that region, and enforced the Monroe Doctrine. Similarly, the Chinese regard
the South China Sea to be under their influence; thus, wish to force the US out of this
region. Later, once China consolidates its power within Asia, it will undoubtedly want
global hegemony; thus, clash/compete with the US.
In order to further solidify its geopolitical position within the region, China, in
2001, established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Where the SCO’s
primary goal is to promote socio-economic, political and security cooperation
amongst member states, it too calls for the establishment of a democratic, fair
and rational new international political and economic order (The Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, n.d.). Hence, clearly showcasing the Chinese ambitions
to drastically transform the geo-economic and geopolitical world order, while pro-
jecting itself as a responsible Great Power. The SCO has also helped China
strengthen its ties with Russia; which favours it to compete with the European
Union (EU). In addition, after the conclusion of the much-awaited Regional Com-
prehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)6—arguably the biggest free trade agree-
ment in history as it makes up a third of the world’s population and accounts
for 29% of global GDP (Petri & Plummer, 2020)—especially without the presence
of both India and the US as members; China will most likely command the regional
integration process mainly due to its mighty economic power and geopolitical per-
formance in the Eastern hemisphere. Thus, meaning that the success of RCEP will
cement China’s position as the hegemon in the Eastern hemisphere and act as a
launching pad towards global hegemony.
However, China needs to address key geopolitical challenges vis-à-vis Chinese
national integration; Hong Kong, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Uighurs residing in the Xin-
jiang region, as these four problems represent difficult obstacles for China to achieve
global legitimacy, a pre-requisite for regional hegemony, let alone a substantial claim
to the world’s throne. The socio-political turmoil in Hong Kong reached its zenith in
July 2019 over the longstanding issue of ‘one country two systems’, a principle under
which China has ruled an autonomous Honk Kong since 1997 (Davis & Hui, 2019).
Another conflictive political arena for China is Tibet’s autonomy, where multinational
pluralism and religious freedom are serious challenges to China’s abilities to maintain
national unity (Rudd, 2018). In the Xinjiang province, Uighurs are facing religious
and ethnic segregation and the Inner Mongolia region poses a frontier problem. All of
these cases represent a conflict between China’s Great Power will and the new inter-
national order premise that sustains China’s in its foreign policy practices. Furthermore,
Beijing also perceives Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia to be a set of core security
interests; Tibet being a key factor in the Chinese perceptions vis-à-vis strategic relation-
ship with India, Xinjiang being China’s gateway to a perceived increasingly hostile
12 S. M. S. ZAIDI AND ADAM SAUD

Islamic world, and inner Mongolia being a continuing source of strategic anxiety
between China and Russia (Rudd, 2018).
To conclude, up till now, the US ruling elite wrongly presumes that the ongoing US–
China rivalry to be a rerun of the Cold War. Thus, the predictions they make vis-à-vis the
outcome of the hostile rivalry; victory of liberty-loving US as it uproots the Chinese dic-
tatorship is flawed. After objectively analysing the ground realities, Kishore Mahbubani
does agree to the relevance of a Cold War analogy, though with reversed roles, that is,
America being the stubborn, ideological and systemically challenged Superpower,
whereas China turning out to be the flexible, pragmatic and strategically smart rival
(Kishore, 2020). As Mahbubani puts it ‘America is behaving like the Soviet Union,
and China is behaving like America’ (Kishore, 2020, p. 86). As the US has not been
able to develop a coherent strategy vis-à-vis resurgent China, as it did while competing
against the Soviet Union in the very beginning of the Cold War in the form of George
Kennan’s Containment Strategy, in the longer run, the US will surely be unable to
deter the rise of China.

Conclusion
In contemporary times, China has entered a new phase in history, as for the first time
since the Century of Humiliation, China is dominating geo-economically and geopoliti-
cally. Under President Xi, China has defined its national interests clearly and is pursuing
them proactively, utilizing all means and resources in hand (Clover & Hornby, 2018).
President Xi is hellbent on achieving the Chinese dream; transforming China into a
Superpower by 2050, the year that shall mark China’s 100th anniversary as an indepen-
dent state (Chai & Chai, 2013).
Indeed, the story of China’s economic growth is unprecedented. In merely four
decades, China transformed itself as one of the leading economic powers. Predominantly
after 2008s financial meltdown, China has been dominating the geo-economic affairs of
the world. From creating new economic institutions, like NDB and AIIB, to regulate the
world economy justly, to launching BRI, a multi-trillion-dollar project which will
connect China to Europe, Asia and Africa, China is rapidly consolidating its position
as an economic hub, while the US is direly trying to rejuvenate and sustain its economy.
Lately, China has been greatly assertive within the region, especially regarding territor-
ial claims. Most of the states that China has a territorial dispute with, if not all, are allies of
the US. The US not only supports their claims, but also to safeguards them against per-
ceived Chinese aggression by maintaining heavy military deployments, predominantly
naval, within the region. This was a great cause of concern for the Chinese. To safeguard
its interests, lately, China has heavily deployed its military as well as started offensive
maneuvers to gain the upper hand in the region, putting the US and its allies on the back-
foot. Many political experts believe China’s regional dominance to be a steppingstone to
the pursuit of global hegemony.
Traditionally, a state having tremendous economic power, unmatchable military
strength, and which dominates the security, political and socio-economic agenda in
the international system is termed as a Great Power (Machain et al., 2017; Zakaria,
1999). In contemporary times, China indeed wields tremendous economic might;
however, neither does it possess unmatchable military strength—the US still is miles
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 13

ahead militarily—nor does it dominate the agenda-setting of socio-economic, political

and security global institutions. Thus, China has a lot of catching up to do to meet the
pre-requisites to be a Great Power, let alone be able to compete with the US, displace
and replace it as the sole global hegemon (Zaidi & Saud, 2020a). For realists, relative mili-
tary power advantage over other states in the international system is a key attribute of
Great Power (Copeland, 2000; Machain et al., 2017), whereas economy and demographic
qualities—latent power—are factors used primarily to strengthen military capabilities
(Overfield & Tallis, 2020). As per the realist definition too, China is nowhere near the
ballpark to compete for the title of Great Power, as it greatly lags militarily, its economic
might is nothing more than a resource to solidify its military capabilities.
On the other hand, regional powers differ from Great Powers as while they exert great
influence and incredible power over their geographic region and serve as the de facto
regional leader/hegemon; they are either not willing or able to project power on a
global scale (Buzan & Waever, 2003). China, undoubtedly, fulfills all the parameters of
a regional power/hegemon, as when it comes to the geopolitics of South-East Asia, in par-
ticular, and Asia, in general, China dominates majority matters, if not all, and ensures
favourable outcomes. Furthermore, in the post-Cold War era, it is more relevant to
focus upon regional powers, as global powers are less interested in regional affairs
(Buzan & Waever, 2003; Volgy et al., 2011). Hence, the spotlight on the rise of China
and due to the fact that it resides in a region of great geostrategic and geopolitical impor-
tance. If China is successful in legitimizing itself as the hegemon of the easter-hemi-
sphere; then the next logical step will be staking a claim for global hegemony.

Notes
1. China, for the very first time, in 221 BC, was unified under the Qin Dynasty. The imperial
era of China consists of several succeeding dynasties, Han, Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan and Ming,
which continued until the end of the Qing Dynasty, 1912.
2. The Century of Humiliation began when the British defeated the Chinese in the first Opium
War (1839–1842) and ended with Mao Zedong’s communist revolution.
3. The phrase ‘Tao guang yang hui’ meaning while keeping a low profile and accomplishing set
goals, explains the Chinese foreign policy between 1978 and 2008. In this era, China’s par-
ticipation in global politics was negligible. China solely focused upon strengthening its
socio-economic conditions without drawing too much public attention.
4. The Washington Consensus is a set of broadly free market economic ideas, such as free
markets, free trade, floating exchange rates and macroeconomic stability, put forward by
the United States supported by the European Union and international institutes like the
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organization.
5. After the communist revolution (1949), the Chinese Nationalist, led by Kai Shek, fled to
Taiwan, an island located next to mainland China, and formed his own régime there. For
many years Kai Shek’s government was recognized as the original Chinese government
by many states, including the US, rather than the government of mainland China. It was
not until the early 1970s, when Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China made it possible
for the western states, in general, and the US, in particular, to recognize the People’s Repub-
lic of China as mainland China.
6. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a free trade agreement
signed by 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and 5 regional
partners; Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and Republic of Korea, on 15 November
2020.
14 S. M. S. ZAIDI AND ADAM SAUD

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors
Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi is a Ph.D. (International Relations) scholar at Bahria University Isla-
mabad, Pakistan. He also holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences (Majoring in International Relations)
and a MS/MPhil (International Relations) from Bahria University Islamabad, Pakistan. In
addition, he completed a Masters in Political Science from the University of Sargodha, Pakistan.
His research interest includes; Great Power Competition, Foreign Policy Analysis, and US-China
relations.
Professor Dr. Adam Saud is currently serving as the Dean, Faculty of Humanities and Social
Sciences, Bahria University, Islamabad, Pakistan, and is also the Principal of Bahria Humanities
and Social Sciences School (BH3S), Islamabad Campus. He holds a Masters in Political Science
from the University of Peshawar, Pakistan; MPhil International Relations and Ph.D. International
Relations from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. His research interest includes;
Foreign Policy Analysis, Rise of China and Central Asia.

ORCID
Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0252-0240
Adam Saud http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8606-9874

References
Abuza, Z., & Nhat Anh, N. (2016, October 28). Vietnam’s military modernization. The Diplomat.
Retrieved June 2, 2019, from https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/vietnams-military-
modernization/
Allison, G. (2017). Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides’s trap? United
States of America: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Retrieved July 9, 2019, from https://www.
amazon.com/Destined-War-America-Escape-Thucydidess-ebook/dp/B01IAS9FZY
Ayres, A. (2017). How the BRICS Got Here. In: Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved May 5,
2019, from https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/how-brics-got-here
Barboza, D. (2010, August 15). China passes Japan to Become No. 2 Economy. The New York
Times. Retrieved May 4, 2019 from https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/
16yuan.html
Bennholed, K. (2010, January 26). As China rises, conflict with west rises too. The New York Times.
Retrieved April 28, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/business/global/27yuan.
html
Bhattacharya, A., Dollar, D., Doshi, R., Jones, B., Kharas, H., Solis, M., Stromseth, J. (2019, April).
China’s Belt and Road: The new geopolitics of global infrastructure development (B. Jones,
Interviewer) [Personal communication].
Bird, M. (2014, October 8). China just overtook the US as the World’s Largest Economy. Business
Insider. Retrieved May 9, 2019, from https://www.businessinsider.com/china-overtakes-us-as-
worlds-largest-economy-2014-10
Bivens, J. (2016, August 11). Why is Recovery Taking So Long - and Who is to Blame?. Retrieved
January 21, 2021, from https://files.epi.org/pdf/110211.pdf
Blackwill, A. R. D., & Harris, J. M. (2016). War by other means: Geoeconomics and statecraft.
Belknap Press.
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 15

Blanchard, B. (2017, August 1). China formally opens first overseas military base in Djibouti.
Reuters. Retrieved May 25, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti-idUSKB
N1AH3E3
Bretton Woods Project. (2011). China and the World Bank. Retrieved May 3, 2019, from https://
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2011/09/art-568894/
Brimelow, B. (2018, April 8). How a Tiny City-State Became a Military Powerhouse in Southeast
Asia. Business Insider. Retrieved June 2, 2019, from https://www.businessinsider.com/
singapore-military-best-air-force-navy-southeast-asia-2018-4
Buzan, B., & Waever, O. (2003). Regions and powers: The structure of international security.
Cambridge University Press.
Chai, W., & Chai, M. (2013). The meaning of Xi Jinping’s Chinese dream. American Journal of
Chinese Studies, 20(2), 95–97. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44289022
Chang, T.-K. (1991). China’s claim of sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands: A Historical
and Legal Perspective. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 23. https://
heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/cwrint23&id=407&div=&collection=
Chellaney, B. (2017). China’s debt-trap diplomacy. Project Syndicate. Retrieved January 21, 2021,
from https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-
brahma-chellaney-2017-01
China Banking News. (2018). China’s GDP could be world’s largest by 2030, credit growth still too
fast: IMF. Retrieved May 9, 2019, from http://www.chinabankingnews.com/2018/07/29/chinas-
gdp-worlds-largest-2030-credit-growth-still-fast-imf/
ChinaPower Project. (2020, May 22). What does China really spend on its military? Retrieved May
25, 2020, from http://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/
China Submits East China Sea islands Row to UN. (1012). Retrieved June 8, 2019, from https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20730880
Clover, C., & Hornby, L. (2018, March 20). Xi Jinping Promises More Assertive Chinese Foreign
Policy. Financial Times. Retrieved June 22, 2019, from https://www.ft.com/content/ad0bda86-
2be9-11e8-9b4b-bc4b9f08f381
Copeland, D. C. (2000). The Origins of Major War. Cornell University Press. Retrieved January 30,
2021, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt28546d
Council on Foreign Relations. (2009). China’s military power. Retrieved May 31, 2019, from
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-military-power
Council on Foreign Relations. (2020a). China’s massive belt and road initiative. Retrieved April 30,
2019, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative
Council on Foreign Relations. (2020b). China’s modernizing military. Retrieved May 25, 2020,
from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military
Council on Foreign Relations. (2020c). China-Taiwan relations. Retrieved June 8, 2019, from
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations
Council on Foreign Relations. (n.d.). Timeline: U.S. relations with China 1949—2018. Retrieved
April 27, 2019, from https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china
Curran, E. (2018, February 28). The AIIB: China’s World Bank. Retrieved May 5, 2019, from
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/chinas-world-bank
Davis, M. C., & Hui, V. T. (2019, August 5). Will China crush the protests in Hong Kong? Why
Beijing doesn’t need to send in the troops. Retrieved January 27, 2021, from https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-08-05/will-china-crush-protests-hong-kong
Denmark, A. (2018, December 19). 40 years ago, Deng Xiaoping Changed China—and the World.
Washington Post. Retrieved April 27, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2018/12/19/40-years-ago-deng-xiaoping-changed-china-and-the-world/
Dikötter, F. (2010, December 15). Mao’s great leap to famine. The New York Times. Retrieved May
1, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/opinion/16iht-eddikotter16.html
Global Fire Power. (n.d.). 2019 China military strength. Retrieved June 1, 2019, from https://www.
globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=china
Heginbotham, E. (2015). The U.S.-China Military scorecard: Forces, geography, and the evolving
balance of power, 1996-2017. RAND.
16 S. M. S. ZAIDI AND ADAM SAUD

Hornby, L. (2018, August 8). Mahathir Mohamad warns against ‘new colonialism’ during China
visit. Financial Times. Retrieved May 7, 2019, from https://www.ft.com/content/7566599e-
a443-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b
Islam, A. (2014, July 20). BRICS Bank: A challenge to World Bank, IMF? The Financial Express.
Kishore, M. (2020). Has China won? The Chinese challenge to American primacy. PublicAffairs.
Retrieved January 21, 2021, from https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/kishore-
mahbubani/has-china-won/9781541768123/
Kokoshin, A. A. (2016). 2015 military reform in the People’s Republic of China. Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/
default/files/files/publication/Military%20Reform%20China%20-%20web2.pdf
Korkut, E., & Kang, W. H. (2017). China’s nine dash line claim in light of the ruling by the per-
manent court of arbitration (12 July 2016). International Affairs, 40. https://heinonline.org/
HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/pensalfaw5&div=17&id=&page=
Kynge, J. (2015, November 30). ‘One belt, one road’ set to turbocharge renminbi usage. Financial
Times. Retrieved May 7, 2019, from https://www.ft.com/content/6f105c2a-7f02-11e5-98fb-
5a6d4728f74e
Lobell, S. E. (2010). Structural realism/offensive and defensive realism. International Studies.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.304
Lu, H., Rohr, C., Hafner, M., &, Knack, A. (2018). China Belt and Road Initiative: Measuring the
Impact of Improving Transportation Connectivity on Trade in the Region. RAND Corporation.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2600/RR2625/RAND_
RR2625.pdf
Machain, C. M., Kaye, R., & Oestman, J. (2017). Great power and foreign policy. Oxford Research
Encyclopedia of Politics, 20 pp. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.432
Mack, L. (2019). Chinese history: First five-year plan (1953-57). Retrieved April 26, 2019, from
https://www.thoughtco.com/chinese-history-first-five-year-plan-1953-57-688002
Maddison, A. (2007). Chinese economic performance in the long run. 2nd ed, rev.updated: 960-2030
A.D. Development Centre studies. Paris: Development Centre of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development.
Mainland Affairs Council. (2017). Beijing Claims: ‘Taiwan is a Province of China’ 35 Cases
(November 15, 1971–August 31, 2000). Retrieved January 22, 2021, from https://www.mac.
gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=8A319E37A32E01EA&sms=2413CFE1BCE87E0E&s=
2192DF8B63973EEB&Create=1
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2003). The tragedy of great power politics. W. W. Norton.
Ministry of National Defense The People’s Republic of China. (n.d.). Defense Expenditure.
Retrieved May 26, 2019, from http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/Expenditure/index.htm
New Development Bank. (n.d.). New Development Bank—History. Retrieved January 26, 2021,
from https://www.ndb.int/about-us/essence/history/
O’Brien, F. (2017, December 26). China to Overtake U.S. Economy by 2032 as Asian Might Builds.
Retrieved May 9, 2019, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-26/china-to-
overtake-u-s-economy-by-2032-as-asian-might-builds
Office of the United States Trade Representative. (n.d.). The People’s Republic of China: US-China
Trade Facts. Retrieved May 9, 2019, from https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-
taiwan/peoples-republic-china
Orlik, T. (2012). Charting China’s economy: 10 years under Hu. WSJ. Retrieved April 28, 2019,
from https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/11/16/charting-chinas-economy-10-years-
under-hu-jintao/
O’Rourke, R. (2018, August 1). China’s Actions in South and East China Seas: Implications for U.S.
Interests—Background and Issues for Congress. R42784. Congressional Research Service. https://
china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/crs-2018-china-in-south-china-sea.pdf
O’Rourke, R. (2021, March 3). U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas:
Background and Issues for Congress. R42784. Congressional Research Service
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 17

Overfield, C., & Tallis, J. (2020, January). Great Power Relations: What Makes Powers Great and
Why Do They Compete? Center for Naval Analyses. Available at: https://www.cna.org/CNA_
files/PDF/DIM-2019-U-021755-1Rev.pdf
Petri, P. A., & Plummer, M. (2020). RCEP: A new trade agreement that will shape global econ-
omics and politics. Brookings. Retrieved January 27, 2021, from https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/16/rcep-a-new-trade-agreement-that-will-shape-global-
economics-and-politics/
Phillips, T. (2016, May 5). The Cultural Revolution: All you Need to Know About China’s Political
Convulsion. The Guardian. Retrieved April 26, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-
political-convulsion
Rafatjoo, A. (2020). A Century of humiliation. In C. Krosinsky (Ed.), Modern China: Financial
Cooperation for solving sustainability challenges (pp. 75–79). Springer International
Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39204-8_6
Roland, R., Dayant, A., & Pryke, J. (2019, October 21). Ocean of Debt? Belt and Road and Debt
Diplomacy in the Pacific. Lowy Institute. Retrieved January 21, 2021, from https://www.
lowyinstitute.org/publications/ocean-debt-belt-and-road-and-debt-diplomacy-pacific
Ross, J. (2013). China has Overtaken the US to Become the World’s Largest Industrial Producer.
In: Key Trends in Globalisation. Retrieved May 4, 2019, from https://ablog.typepad.com/
keytrendsinglobalisation/2013/09/china-has-overtaken-the-us.html
Rudd, K. (2018, May 10). How Xi Jinping Views the World: The Core Interests That Shape China’s
Behavior. Retrieved January 27, 2021, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-
05-10/how-xi-jinping-views-world
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization. (n.d.). About SCO. Retrieved January 27, 2021, from
http://eng.sectsco.org/about_sco/
Stacey, K. (2017, December 11). China signs 99-year lease on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port.
Financial Times. Retrieved May 7, 2019, from https://www.ft.com/content/e150ef0c-de37-
11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c
Steil, B., & Walker, D. (2014). Is the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement a Substitute for the
IMF? Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved May 5, 2019, from https://www.cfr.org/blog/brics-
contingent-reserve-arrangement-substitute-imf
Stratfor. (2015). A Chronology of Japan’s Remilitarization. Retrieved June 7, 2019, from https://
worldview.stratfor.com/article/chronology-japans-remilitarization
Szczepanski, K. (2019). Mao’s Catastrophic Great Leap Forward in China. Retrieved April 26, 2019,
from https://www.thoughtco.com/the-great-leap-forward-195154
United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea. (n.d.). Retrieved June 7, 2019, from https://
www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm
Valencia, M. J. (2007). The East China Sea dispute: Context, claims, issues, and possible solutions.
Asian Perspective, 31(1), 127–167. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2007.0031
Volgy, T., Corbetta, R., Grant, K., &, Baird, R. (2011). Major powers and the quest for status in
international politics: Global and regional perspectives. Evolutionary Processes in World
Politics. Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230119314
Wei, W. (2012). ‘Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun’: Mao and the Red Army. A
Military History of China, pp. 229–248.
Welle, D. (2017). ‘The Chinese Dream’ and Xi Jinping’s power politics. Retrieved April 30, 2019,
from https://www.dw.com/en/the-chinese-dream-and-xi-jinpings-power-politics/a-41941966
Wen, Y., & Wu, J. (2014). Withstanding Great Recession like China. Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, Working Papers 2014(007). https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2014.007
World Bank. (n.d.). World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim’s Remarks at the Opening
Ceremony of the First China International Import Expo. Retrieved May 3, 2019, from http://
www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2018/11/05/world-bank-group-president-jim-yong-
kims-remarks-at-the-opening-ceremony-of-the-first-china-international-import-expo
18 S. M. S. ZAIDI AND ADAM SAUD

Yang, F., & Li, M. (2016). Comparing China’s claims and policies in the East and South China Seas:
Implications for regional security. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 3(2), 135–
156. https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797016645451
Yong, C. (2019, May 6). Tit-for-tat: Timeline of US-China Trade Dispute. The Straits Times.
Retrieved May 9, 2019, from https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/tit-for-tat-
timeline-of-us-china-trade-dispute
Zaidi, S. M. S., & Saud, A. (2020a). Future of US-China relations: Conflict, competition or
cooperation? Asian Social Science, 16(7), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v16n7p1
Zaidi, S. M. S., & Saud, A. (2020b). President Trump’s China policy: An offensive realist strategy?
Journal of Peace, Development & Communication, 04(1), 107–121. https://doi.org/10.36968/
JPDC-V04-I01-06
Zakaria, F. (1999). From wealth to power: The unusual origins of America’s world role. Retrieved
January 30, 2021, from https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691010359/from-
wealth-to-power.
Zhang, W.-W. (1996). Ideology and economic reform under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1993. Routledge.
Zhao, S. (2012). Hu Jintao’s Foreign Policy Legacy. E-International Relations. Retrieved April 28,
2019, from https://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/08/hu-jintaos-foreign-policy-legacy/
Zheng, S. (2018, December 2). The US-China trade war: From first shots to a Truce. South China
Morning Post. Retrieved May 9, 2019, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/
article/2176016/us-china-trade-war-first-shots-truce