Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

The Strategic Logic of Women in Jihadi

Organizations

Hamoon Khelghat-Doost

To cite this article: Hamoon Khelghat-Doost (2018): The Strategic Logic of Women in Jihadi
Organizations, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1430656

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1430656

Accepted author version posted online: 19

Jan 2018.

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The Strategic Logic of Women in Jihadi Organizations

By: Hamoon Khelghat-Doost

Abstract

Despite the traditional restrictive views of Islamic jurisprudence on women‟s social

activities, the level of women‟s incorporation into jihadi organizations is growing

rapidly in both numbers and roles. This article argues that this increase reflects a

strategic logic –jihadi groups integrate women to enhance organizational success. The

article develops a typology of jihadi organizations: operation-based and state

building and argues that the strategic logic of women in operation-based

organizations lays in the tactical advantages women provide them. However, for state

building jihadi groups, the strategic logic of women is geared towards addressing the

challenges facing a functioning state.

Keywords: strategic logic, women, typology, state-building jihadi organizations,

operation-based jihadi organizations, failed states

Corresponding Address:

Department of Political Science,

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences,

National University of Singapore,

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AS1, Level 4, 11 Arts Link,

Singapore 10016

Email: hamoon@u.nus.edu

Introduction

The increasing trend of women‟s engagement with jihadi groups around the globe fueled debates

on women‟s incorporation into jihadi organizations. The relationship between women and

violent, non-state actors1 such as jihadi organizations is viewed by many scholars as an

exploitative relationship in favor of the masculine structure of these groups. Several academics

including Peterson (1992),2 Kaufman-Osborn (2005)3 and Eisenstein (2004)4 argue that women

are traditionally assumed to be “pure, maternal, emotional, innocent and peace-loving.”5 Such

assumption makes women fall victim to institutions with violent modus operandi. As war and

violence are considered masculine phenomena, women are assumed to be cowed into

victimization. This approach is in line with a dominant body of literature in international

relations which views women as more peace oriented than men.6

Contrary to men who are described as rushing to commit violence in wars, Elshtain depicts

women as beautiful souls searching for peace.7 Shapiro and Mahajan conclude that the vast

disapproval of US interventions in the World War II, Korea and Vietnam by women proves their

peace-seeking nature in comparison to men.8 A group of other scholars such as Miller is of the

opinion that a combination of different socio-economic experiences makes more women pacifists

than men.9 These approaches to studying women‟s association with conflict is also evident in

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researching the roles of women in jihadi organizations. Sahliyeh and Deng conclude in their

work on the role of women in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that “Palestinian women are more

likely to support the peace process with Israel and therefore are less likely to engage in

violence.”10 The social restrictions on women‟s participation in social activities set by the

conservative interpretation of the Islamic jurisprudence combined with traditional cultural value

systems are argued to be the main reasons for the assumption that the level of women‟s

incorporation into jihadi organizations is low.

However, surprisingly, despite the traditional restrictive views of Islamic jurisprudence on

women‟s social activities, the level of women‟s incorporation into jihadi organizations11 is

growing rapidly in both numbers and roles. Up to 10 percent of those who joined the Islamic

State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from Western countries are women.12 The increase in number is

not limited to western females only. Over 700 Tunisian women have joined jihadi organizations

in the past three years, together with hundreds of others from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria,

Malaysia and Indonesia.13 Jihadi establishments have also incorporated women in a wide range

of non-combat roles, including advocacy, radicalization, financing, money laundering and, to

some extent, planning of terrorist attacks.14

This article argues that the increasing incorporation of women and their diversity of roles reflects

a strategic logic15 –jihadi groups integrate more women to enhance organizational success.16 To

provide insight into the strategic logic of women in jihadi groups, the article develops a

typology, dividing these groups into operation-based and state building jihadi organizations.

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In his seminal book, Dying to Win, Robert Pape argues that the main objective of terrorist

organizations (including jihadi groups such as Al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam and the Haqqani

Network) is to “compel a target government to change policy, and most especially to cause

democratic states to withdraw forces from land the terrorist perceives as their national home-

land.”17 In an attempt to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, jihadi establishments have

strategically decided to incorporate women as utilizing them has proven effective in several

ways. The strategic logic of jihadi organizations in incorporating women to achieve these

objectives lay in the tactical advantages women provide them. These advantages include bigger

media publicity for jihadi organizations, higher rate of enemy casualties and, arousing less

suspicion than men in conducting violent operations.

However, the rise of a new breed of jihadi groups such as ISIS, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and Jaish

al-Fatah have changed the objectives of many like-minded jihadi organizations and the role of

women in these groups. Unlike jihadi organizations such as Al-Qaeda or Ansar al-Islam, groups

such as ISIS, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and Jaish al-Fatah has a clear objective to establish their

functioning states. These groups have successfully achieved their goal in Syria, Iraq and parts of

Libya. The new jihadi groups, have therefore morphed beyond mere militant entities into the

realm of state building. With their metamorphosis, the strategic logic of women has evolved

from tactical combat advantages (such as suicide bombing) to those necessary to administer a

state. Dying is no longer enough to win. Women are incorporated into these groups in a wide

range of off-combat roles including administrative offices, service and public goods provision

institutions, police force and propaganda establishments

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Through this classification the article firstly argues that the strategic logic of women among

operation-based jihadi organizations is based on utilizing women in tactical roles as a result of

the groups‟ objectives, organizational structure, and needs. Secondly, by using the conceptual

framework of fragile states, the article argues that as jihadi groups morph beyond operation-

based phase into state builders, their strategic logic of women transforms accordingly to address

the challenges facing a functioning state. It is important to note that the proposed typology is a

continuum and not binary. In this sense, jihadi organizations start as operation-based and if the

situation allows (such as being in a weak or failed state), some morph into state building phase.

Evidence also demonstrate that when holding a state is no longer feasible, state building jihadi

groups eventually step down into operation-based structure again.

The findings of this article are based on multiple personal field trips to Iraq, Turkey, Iran,

Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the borders of ISIS-controlled territories in Syria from July 2015 to

January 2017. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with male and female Iraqi and Syrian

refugees in the visited countries. They were asked about their experiences of living in a state

building jihadi organization and about the roles these organizations assigned women to. Several

security forces, researchers, academicians, government officials, social activists and journalists

were interviewed about how women‟s position in the ideology of jihadi organizations is framed

and what the differences are between these two types of organizations‟ approaches towards

recruiting women.

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Typology of Jihadi Organizations

For the purpose of this article, jihadi organizations are defined as salafi militant-religious

movements, within Sunni Islam, that claim to restore their own interpretation of the golden era of

the dawn of Islam by using violent means. As Gregory Roberts argues, typology aims “to

discover new relationships among the things so ordered, to generate hypotheses, to lead on to the

development of theories, and to identify areas for investigation.”18 The best way to assess the

efficiency of typologies of jihadi organizations is to study their ability to “explain the

characteristics of terror and the differences between various types of terror and terror

organizations in the past and present.”19 Studying the typologies of jihadi establishments is also

incapable of capturing the dynamics of women‟s incorporation into them and to provide

explanations for how the alarming growing trend of women‟s integration into these groups is

operationalized. Although, since the beginning of the new millennium, adopting a gendered

approach towards security studies has heightened momentum, the current typologies of jihadi

organizations are incapable of addressing the differences between these organizations in terms of

their approach towards women‟s incorporation and the variety of roles women are assigned

within these establishments.

For instance, the affiliation-based typology of militant organizations by the US Joint Chiefs of

Staff is entirely concentrated on how militant groups are allied with different governments.20 The

affiliation typology might be handy in identifying ties between the militant organizations and

different states, but it oversees the structural diversity among these establishments. As this

typology examines a group‟s affiliation with external supporters, it ignores the components

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within the organizations, including their ideologies, objectives, modus operandi, and women‟s

organizational roles. While the objective of a militant establishment has the main impact on its

behavioral pattern in terms of its approach towards women‟s incorporation and, their

organizational duties, this important factor does not appear in the affiliation typology.

Mishal and Rosenthal present the „dune typology‟ of jihadi establishments based on their

organizational behavioral patterns. „Dune-like organizations‟ do not follow any defined

organizational structure and are constantly reshaping due to the dynamics of the environments

they operate in.21 However, one of the main features of this typology is to study jihadi groups as

entities that adhere to global jihad as a replacement for an association with a particular territory.

While this typology is useful to study groups such as Al-Qaeda, in facing a new breed of jihadi

organizations such as ISIS with establishing territorial states as their main objective, it is

antiquated and unable to provide timely explanations for the behavioral patterns of these new

groups. These behavioral patterns consist of their recruitment, membership and, demographic

policies, including their approach to women‟s incorporation and their various assigned

organizational roles.

Boaz Ganor offers another general classification of terrorist organizations based on the variables

that restrain their activities. He summarizes these variables into two; motivation and, operational

capability during a particular period of time. Ganor later argues that when the motivation and

operational capabilities of a group exceed the „terror level threshold,‟ there is a greater chance

for an attack to happen.22 Squeezing all the different factors in shaping a group‟s behavior into

two single factors of motivation and operational capability ignores the complexity of each of

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these factors and the different impacts each of them may make. Ignoring the details in the

behavioral patterns of a particular group would not produce an accurate account of how an

organization acts. For the same reason, Ganor‟s classification is incapable of providing the

needed explanations for the difference in the behavior of jihadi establishments towards

incorporating women in both numbers and roles. This framework is more like a lens to study the

reasons for which terrorist organizations conduct attacks than studying their internal structure.

Another categorization of jihadi groups was developed by Glenn Robinson. It categorizes jihadi

organizations, based on their ideologies (national or transnational) and locus of violence

(national or transnational). Based on these two variables, jihadi groups are categorized into four

types: Traditional, Nationalist, Transnational, and Al-Qaeda franchised jihadi establishments.23

While the model addresses the ideology and locus of jihadi organizations, especially Al-Qaeda,

none of its categories is able to analyze the internal structure and objectives of the new breed of

jihadi organizations such as ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. These new groups that establish

functioning states as their main objective do not fit any of Robinson‟s antiquated categories.

As the current classifications of jihadi organizations are insufficient, they are unable to provide

an account for the current developments in the field, namely the rise of groups such as ISIS and

specifically the increasing trend of women‟s incorporation into jihadi establishments, in both

numbers and roles. To fill this gap in the literature, this article develops a new typology of jihadi

groups. By employing this typology, I expound the differences in jihadi groups‟ strategic logic of

women. The following chart demonstrates the proposed typology of jihadi organizations with a

few groups used as examples:

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Chart 1: Typology of Jihadi Organizations

Operation-based Jihadi Organizations

Operation-based jihadi organizations are those commonly known as Islamist terrorist groups. In

terms of ideology, they are salafi guerrilla movements for which violence is, first and foremost,

an act of divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand (jihad) or

imperative to achieve political goals.24 The main political objective of such organizations is to

remove western powers off Muslim lands and to fight local authorities or, as they call them,

“western puppets” and ultimately restore Islamic law.25 According to these groups, the only way

to revitalize the lost communal Islamic identity in these societies is to be in an armed struggle

against Western powers.26 While these groups believe that an Islamic state should ultimately be

established to run all Muslim societies, they are unclear on when to establish such a state, how it

would be structured, and how it would function.27 For instance, Al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-

Zawahiri, has repeatedly denounced ISIS‟s move for establishing an Islamic state and called it an

act of “sedition.”28 Some jihadi groups in this category include Al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network,

Jemaah Islamiya of Indonesia, Ansar al-Sunnah of Iraq, Lashkar-i Jhangvi of Pakistan, Ansar al-

Islam, Ahrar al-Sham of Syria, and Jaysh al Mujahideen of Iraq.

Since these organizations do not hold identified territories and are involved in guerrilla warfare,29

their internal structure is based on clandestine cellular networks, which minimize “damage due to

interdiction by counterinsurgents by limiting information distribution and interface with other

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members of the organization.”30 In such networks, the organization is divided into several cells

and a few members are assigned to each. Having such a clandestine cellular network structure

increases the organization‟s resilience and gives different units within the organization the

opportunity to act more autonomously, making it harder to be identified and cracked down upon

by authorities.31This arrangement proved efficient in keeping Al-Qaeda coherently functional in

the aftermath of several key members being targeted and killed, including Osama bin Laden and

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The fact that Al-Qaeda cells around the world survived and continued to

conduct operations after losing their important affiliates proves the effectiveness of the

clandestine cellular network structure. In such a structure, a geographical focal point is assigned

as the center of the network (i.e., tribal areas of Pakistan for Al Qaeda central), and the

transnational semi-independent cells in all other geographical areas would only coordinate their

actions with this focal point to get inspiration, justification, and guidance.32 The operation cells

within these jihadi organizations retreat to their hidden safe houses, or dismantle after an

operation.

In terms of operational approach, these organizations mostly rely on asymmetric guerrilla

warfare as weapons of the weak. Their operations use a wide variety of tactics and methods that

include aircraft hijacking, bomb attacks, car bombing, hostage-taking, assassination, kidnapping,

piracy, and the most well-known, suicide bombing. Using asymmetric warfare is justified by

these organizations as the only way to counter their well-equipped enemies.

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State Building Jihadi Organizations

In recent years, a new breed of transnational jihadi groups has morphed from operation-based

jihadi organizations. This article classifies them as „state building jihadi organizations‟ since they

use violent means to establish their “states” (i.e., caliphates). Unlike operation-based jihadi

groups, state building jihadi organizations claim to have a clear vision for establishing a state

upon forcing their enemies off their claimed lands, following their interpretation of traditional

structure of the caliphates during the golden age of Islam.33 These groups are those which have

officially declared the establishment of their states (caliphates) and have set up relevant

institutions with specialized objectives to administrate the societies they rule. These jihadi

organizations envision their state to “be a unified, transnational government ruling over the entire

Muslim community. It is to be governed pursuant to sharia and enforced by a supreme leader, the

caliph.”34 Therefore, this classification does not include jihadi organizations which have chosen

to join the formal political structure of the territories they operate in such as Hamas.

The internal structure of these groups is a combination of both hierarchical and network-based

models. Within their defined territories of governance, these organizations have formed a precise

hierarchical model, which encompasses a cabinet, different departments, and councils. For

instance, the governing structure of ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham are comprised of several

councils, including military, consultative, defense and intelligence, and judiciary.

These organizations also hold identifiable, yet fluid, geographical territories.35 This enables them

to set cities (i.e., Raqqa for ISIS and Idlib for Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) as their headquarters and to

establish a central authority over all of their units of operation throughout their territories. In

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their relationship with other jihadi groups however, state building jihadi organizations adapted

the network-based approach. In the case of ISIS for instance, all jihadi groups outside its

territories that pledge allegiance to it are given autonomy to operate and govern.

It is also essential to note that controlling territory is different from being influential in a specific

terrain. The Haqqani Network for instance is influential in Northern Pakistan, near the

southeastern border of Afghanistan however, by no means, it controls those areas. The group has

been successful in setting up its training camps in remote tribal places in that specific area but it

has no control in governing those zones. On the other hand, a group like ISIS was in full control

of its territories as it ruled them according to its laws and regulations which were being

implanted through its state institutions.

The typology may initially look inconsistent when studying jihadi organizations such as the

Taliban in Afghanistan. However, empirical evidence collected in fieldtrips in Afghanistan

demonstrate that the Taliban did not have a clear objective of establishing a state to begin with.

The group started its military advancement with the idea of restoring order throughout

Afghanistan and ending corruption. There is no evidence indicating intention of the organization

to establish a state in the initial stages of its military campaign.36 For this reason, upon seizing

power in Kabul, the organization suddenly found itself as the authority in charge of running the

country with no clear agenda.37 Even in the case of the Taliban, a gradual change of strategy

towards inclusion of more women can be observed closer to the end of their rule in Afghanistan.

The functional logic of running a state forced the Taliban to be more inclusive of women near

the end of their reign. This is also evident in the recent negotiations of the Taliban and Afghan

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women representatives in Norway in June 2015 where the Taliban recognized the right of

Afghan women to have access to education and employment.38

In terms of military tactics and strategies, state building jihadi organizations use a combination

of conventional and asymmetric warfare. These groups oversee defined territories and are well-

equipped with heavy armored vehicles and artillery. Therefore, when fighting rival groups, they

have repeatedly used conventional warfare strategies and equipment. However, in retaliating

against stronger enemies, these groups turn to asymmetric warfare, including suicide attacks.

This was evident in the clashes between ISIS and Iraqi forces in the Mosul operation.

Strategic Logic of Women in Operation-based Jihadi Organizations

Countering growing surveillance by official authorities, and prolonging the survivability of the

organization are the main reasons behind an operation-based jihadi organization for tactically

adopting a clandestine cellular network structure. The strategic logic of women in these

organizations is therefore shaped to support this structure.39 Security and counter-terrorism

policies and practices, in most counties in the Middle East and North Africa, are highly male-

dominant. Due to several religious and cultural reasons, most members of security forces are

comprised of males, which restricts proper implementation of security procedures on women at

check points or during public/house searches. Women are also believed to raise less suspicion

during an operation. For instance, from 2003 to 2011, over 50 suicide attacks were conducted by

female members of different jihadi organizations in Iraq, using this gap in security measures.40

To sustain the covert function and operation of the clandestine structure, women are incorporated

as tactical agents. Their integration enables jihadi groups to “response to logistical demands: the

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intensified crackdowns by government and the ability to escape detection more easily than

men.”41

Despite all the advantages women can provide for the clandestine structure of these

organizations, many of them have been still reluctant to incorporate women in widespread

capacities and roles. In areas where jihadi organizations maintain an active presence, the social

restrictions imposed on women, through the tropes of tradition and religion, are among the

primary reasons that contribute to the unwillingness of many operation-based jihadi

organizations to incorporate women into their structure. Maintaining women‟s sexual purity is

the backbone of these restrictions. To do so, a Muslim woman should always be accompanied by

a male mahram (either her husband or a relative in the prohibited degree of marriage) in public

or, even in private, in the presence of other men. However, with the clandestine nature of these

groups and the conditions in which they conduct their operations on the ground, women would

more than likely be left in the illicit company of non-mahram males.42 To avoid such sinful

situations, operation-based jihadi organizations are reluctant to incorporate more women into

their structure.

For the same reason, even with all of their potential advantages, women are generally believed to

be selected last by these jihadi organizations.43 Besides conducting suicide attacks, the

responsibilities assigned to women in operation based jihadi organizations such as Al-Qaeda are

limited to duties that support male jihadists. These roles cover a range of non-combat related

activities, such as being mothers to the next generation of jihadists, exchanging messages

between cells, fundraising, cooking, sewing uniforms, and providing shelter. The range of

tactical roles women play in operation-based jihadi organizations can be divided into two main

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categories: combat tactical roles and non-combat tactical roles. Women‟s non-combat roles in

these groups are mostly extensions of women‟s daily social and private lives. The following

chart demonstrate some of the roles assigned to women in the discussed categories.

Chart 2: Women in Operation-based Jihadi Organizations

Combat Tactical Roles

Suicide Bomber: Using women as suicide bombers is probably the most noted role of jihadi

women by media, public, and scholarly literature. The average number of casualties resulting

from individual attacks operated by women is 8.4, versus 5.3 killed per male attack implying
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superior effectiveness in female attacks. Due to the social restrictions, women make less

suspicion, are better able to hide explosives, and are subjected to less thorough security

measures.45 Female bombers also make nearly eight times the amount of media attention than

men.46 This ultimately helps the organization to further justify its cause and also to pressure the

occupying force to withdraw.

Groups, such as Ansar al-Sunnah of Iraq, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and the Black Widows, are among

jihadi organizations that utilize women as suicide bombers.47 For example, Ansar al-Sunnah

recruited dozens of Iraqi women and trained them to become suicide bombers. Nearly 30 of

those women had conducted their suicide missions, mostly against the Shi‟a population in Iraq.48

In another incidence in February 2005, Al-Qaeda in Iraq took responsibility for a deadly suicide

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attack on Amman's Radisson SAS Hotel in Jordan. Among the attackers was Sajida Mubarak

Atrous al-Rishawi, who failed to detonate her explosive belt and was captured by the Jordanian

security forces.49

Women as Cover: In several incidents such as those within the Palestinian territory, Iraq, and

Syria, women accompanied male jihadist suicide bombers as cover, in the assumption that

looking like an innocent couple would be less likely to raise the suspicions of security forces. In

Muslim countries, where honor is still an important social code of contact for females, women

are less likely to be subjected to thorough searches as opposed to men.50 The suicide attacker,

who detonated his explosive belt in February 2004 in the Kurdish city of Erbil, which resulted in

killing 109 people and injuring over 200 others, was being accompanied by a woman for the

purpose of avoiding the suspicion of security forces.51

Non-combat Tactical Roles

The socio-religious restrictions protecting women‟s sexual purity and the clandestine cellular

networks structure of operation-based jihadi organizations have pushed women in these groups

into adopting more off-combat roles which do not require them to mix with the opposite sex.

These off-combat roles are mostly supporting duties and are believed, by these groups, to be a

closer match to the peaceful and non-violent nature of women as mothers, sisters, daughters, and

wives of Muslim men.52

Financing Jihadi Organizations: The use of hawala is a mechanism in which women are

involved in funding jihadi organizations.53 The hawala system is in operation out of the official

banking system and therefore tracking the amounts and the identities of senders and receivers is

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very difficult. In this system, no physical cash is moved and it is mostly a paperless procedure

based on a trusted network established among different agents around the world. During the US

invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda was heavily dependent on hawala system for financing its

activities. To reduce suspicion, Al-Qaeda was using its female members as the receivers of the

funds sent to them from abroad. It was like these women were receiving living allowances from

their relatives who were working in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. Women‟s

contributions include opening bank accounts under maiden names, raising money through charity

events around the world, and circulating cash among different jihadi cells.54

Messengers: In this capacity, women are given the responsibility to distribute messages secretly

among different cells‟ members at various levels of the organization. Women‟s ability to pass

enemy checkpoints without being searched as thoroughly as men have turned them into ideal

messengers for jihadists. During the intifada (Palestinian uprising against Israelis), women from

various militant groups, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, were smuggling brochures and

flyers to storekeepers and residents of different neighborhoods to organize mass demonstrations

against the Israeli security authorities.55 According to Kurdish Regional Government, Ansar al-

Sunnah also widely uses women to exchange messages among its cells‟ members in Iraq.56

Logistical Support: The clandestine cellular structure of operation-based jihadi organizations

cause women‟s roles to be mostly extensions of their everyday lives. Many jihadi organizations

assign their female sympathizers to roles which fulfill the expectation these groups have of

women including domestic supporting roles such as providing safe havens, food, medical care,

and clothes for guerrillas.57 According to Peshmerga forces in Iraq, jihadi organizations, such as

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Ansar al-Islam, have turned several of their supporters‟ homes into safe houses. These houses are

used by the group as a place to hold meetings, to hide its members, and for its wounded fighters

to be treated. The wives and daughters of the house owners are primarily those taking care of

these issues. In the presence of a mahram, these women provide the jihadi fighters with food,

basic medical treatment, laundry, and tailoring services. They also frequently visit the families of

the detainees and those who lost their family members in jihadi operations to give them moral

support.58

Recruiters and Advocates: Several jihadi organizations use women as recruiters to “attract new

logisticians, financiers, suicide bombers, or guerilla fighters into the organization.”59 The most

important duty of the recruiters and advocates is to maintain the link between the organization

and its grassroots supporters. Groups, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, reportedly use

female recruiters to attract women into joining the organization, by advocating the ideological

goals and vision of the organization among women.60 The process of recruitment or advocacy

happens in different places. According to an Iraqi female refugee in Iraq's Debaga refugee camp,

due to social and religious restrictions, men are denied access to women‟s gatherings and circles,

so female advocates of Ansar al-Islam in the Diyala province in Iraq periodically attended

women‟s gatherings in different neighborhoods to find potential new members.61 Due to social

and religious restrictions, men have restricted access to women‟s gatherings and circles, so

women are ideal recruiters to find new members among their own gender. Recruiting more

women assist jihadi organizations to achieve their objectives by expanding their number of

members and influence. Having more women in the organization can guarantee the increase the

number of future generation fighters as well.

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Strategic Logic of Women in State Building Jihadi Organizations

Contrary to the vague vision of a borderless world administrated by jihadists as advertised

by most operation-based jihadi organizations,62 the main objective of state building groups in

Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Nigeria and, Libya is to embrace a new vision for a society governed by

a strict interpretation of sharia law.63 These groups are no longer just militant establishments but

groups in control of states, and this ultimately shapes their strategic logic of women which

extends beyond viewing women in secondary or combat tactical roles. Along with the Weberian

view of state, the approach of these organizations towards state building process is rooted in the

functional logic of the ability to “lay down the law and be recognized as the legitimate coercive

force in a defined territory.”64

Their logic of women is therefore connected to their need for addressing the challenges facing a

functioning state including gaining legitimacy, putting the state‟s socio-political framework into

practice (public goods and service provision), and helping to increase their chances of survival

(security). While state building jihadi organizations such as ISIS are brutal towards non-Muslim

women, and a vast majority of Muslim women, who do not act in accordance with the

organizations‟ interpretation of Islam, these groups have a grand strategy to incorporate a group

of Muslim women to establish and strengthen their visional caliphates.65

As state building jihadi organizations have morphed beyond mere operation-based organizations

to establish their functioning states, they view women as being necessary to their growth and

sustainability.66 Women are symbolically vital in defining the collectivity and boundaries of a

nation or a state. Their roles in biological reproduction and as active players in transmitting

socio-cultural values to the next generation make them the signifiers o ethnic/national

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differences.67 As women make up approximately half of the populace, they are needed for

prolonging the survivability of the state. Women are often incorporated into different „gender-

segregated parallel institutions‟, including healthcare, education, police forces, military, and the

tax collection department by ISIS and in smaller scales by the newly made states of Jabhat Fateh

al-Sham and Jaish al-Fatah.68 These gender-segregated parallel institutions are units within

almost all existing institutions which are administrated by women to address women‟s affairs

only. For example, education and healthcare centers in territories governed by state building

jihadi organizations are segregated by gender to have only women personnel offer services to

women. Using this mechanism, state building jihadi organizations have reduced intermixing

between opposite sexes and have therefore solved the mahram issue that operation-based jihadi

organizations face in incorporating more women.69

Administrating a functioning state has driven state building organizations towards being

relatively more pragmatic in incorporating women. Therefore, besides the tactical roles

traditionally assigned by operation-based jihadi organizations to women, state building groups

offer women a relatively wider range of opportunities to be a part of their state building process.

An important factor to consider in studying state building jihadi organizations‟ strategic logic of

women is that such groups appear to establish their states (caliphates) in fragile states. These

states provide the necessary environment for jihadi organizations to operate and grow.70 As an

alternative to a fragile state, state building jihadi groups provide the security, order, and services

needed by people in that specific territory. For this reason, state building jihadi organizations

would be better understood through the framework of fragile states.

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This framework provides indicators – the absence of which might signal the shift of a

functioning state to a fragile one. By applying these indicators into state building jihadi

organizations, it is possible to find an explanation for their strategic logic of women compared to

that of operation-based jihadi groups. By assigning women to a wider range of roles, state

building jihadi organizations address the challenges facing a fragile state by providing a

functional alternative to the otherwise undesirable chaos associated with fragile states.

States become fragile when they are drowned in internal violence and become incapable of

delivering public and political goods for their inhabitants.71 This includes the state‟s loss of

credibility and legitimacy among its citizens. For the purpose of this article, a fragile state is

therefore defined as “a state that cannot provide the most basic of goods, services, and security to

its citizens at even minimum levels and has lost the ability to control its internal affairs.”72

In practice, the notion of manipulating a fragile state as a fertile ground to establish an Islamic

state was known in detail to jihadi organizations such as ISIS for many years. In 2004, a

document titled the Management of Savagery was published online by an author under the

pseudonym of Abu Bakr Naji. The document offered a comprehensive plan for how a jihadi

group could violently seize land and establish its own Islamic state.73 This plan of action echoed

in later academic works on fragile states including Charles Call‟s. Groups such as ISIS and

Jabhat Fateh al-Sham seem to follow Abu Bakr Naji‟s instructions closely in establishing their

caliphates.

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This article adopts Call‟s model of state failure,74 using the three “gaps” (indicators) of

legitimacy, service and public goods provision, and security. Call argues the existence of these

gaps will turn a state into a fragile one. Based on empirical data this article explains the essential

role of women in addressing these gaps and, therefore, the strategic logic of the state building

jihadi organization in incorporating women. The following chart demonstrates the roles assigned

to women in state building jihadi organizations:

Chart 3: Women in State Building Jihadi Organizations

Legitimacy

States and organizations in control of administrating a territory require social support from both

men and women to maintain a certain degree of legitimacy and control. Therefore, legitimacy

rests predominantly on “processes of popular participation and the inclusion of sidelined social

groups.”75 The ways women contribute to state building jihadi organizations‟ legitimacy are as

follows:

Hijrah: In the absence of conventional means of political participation (such as elections or

political parties) to obtain legitimacy, state building jihadi organizations try to strengthen their

legitimacy of ruling by convincing Muslims (including women) around the world to make hijrah

(migration) to their territories. By convincing an ever-growing number of women to make hijrah

to their territories, state building jihadi organizations legitimize their alternative social order,

against the so-called hegemonic secular social order, that is based on women‟s emancipation.

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The new social order offered by state building jihadi organizations is based on gender

segregation. By establishing gender segregated parallel institutions, state building jihadi

organizations provide religious justification for ideologically convinced women to participate

more actively in social affairs, while keeping their high level of jihadi ideological commitments.

The Arabic word, hijrah, originally referred to the migration of Prophet Muhammad from Mecca

to Medina in 622 CE to establish the first Islamic state. Encouraging Muslims to make hijrah is

at the heart of state building jihadi groups‟ grand plan for establishing their Islamic states. In

2014, the ISIS Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, made a public call for all Muslims around the

world (including women) to make hijrah to the ISIS caliphate to help establishing its institutions,

economy, and infrastructures.76 The call to hijrah was followed by Jaish al-Fatah in July 2015

through a video message demanding all Muslims around the world to make hijrah to its

territories in Syria. The call was well received by thousands of Muslim women around the world.

Since the calls for making hijrah by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and Jaish al-Fatah are more recent

than that of ISIS, and both organizations are at the early stages of establishing their institutions,

the number of foreign women who joined these two groups is still lower than the number of ISIS

women. However, Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service indicates a growing number

of jihadi women joining Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.77

Making hijrah to the states established by jihadi organizations is claimed by these groups to

provide women with the opportunity to take control of their own lives, free themselves from

parental control, and escape societies which marginalize them for their religious beliefs.78 In a

three-layer structure, hijrah first allows women to gain control of their lives by making an

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informed decision to join jihadi organizations. This is reflected in the Twitter messages of

several women who made hijrah to the IS caliphate, including a Dutch girl, Oum Haarith. For

instance, in a Twitter message on May 2015, she explained, “Even if they would bring bricks or

gold or silver to my house every day, I wouldn‟t have stayed in Bilad al-Kufr (the land of

infidels). Start making Hijrah!!!.”79

In the second level, women, many of whom live in religious and traditionally conservative

families, find the opportunity to break parental control, claiming their independence and

freedom. Hoda Muthana‟s case is an example of such behavior. A 22-year-old girl from

Alabama, USA, fled her controlling family to Syria in November 2014. She repeatedly denied

the calls made by her parents to go back home.80

In the third level, by making hijrah, women who feel socially and culturally alienated81 in

western countries for their strong Islamist views and practices find themselves among

likeminded sisters and in an environment conducive to their interpretation of religion. 82 The

Islamic states established by jihadi organizations claim to provide opportunity for these women

to escape from a society where being an equal citizen requires abandoning the duties of one‟s

religion.83 This can be traced in Twitter messages posted by several ISIS female members,

including a Scottish woman named Umm Layth, who in 2014, praised the kinship she had never

felt before with her fellow sisters and brothers in the Islamic State.84

The states established by these jihadi organizations also claim to provide the platform needed for

ideologically “repressed” Muslim women around the world to play a part in creating a new

generation of believers, and a state in which practicing their radical ideological beliefs are

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recognized and protected. Thousands of women from all around the world heeded the call for

migration. This high rate of migration has provided these organizations with a demonstration of

popular support and eventually legitimacy.

Motherhood and Family: Portraying women as symbols of the state, with their capacity for

reproduction at the center of the argument, plays a vital role in the relationship between women

and state building process. Motherhood, therefore, is crucial in connecting women to the concept

of nation and state building, especially among conservative groups such as Nazis, nationalist

movements such as those in Serbia and Basque, and religious extremist groups such as jihadi

organizations. Women contribute greatly to the population policies of any newly established

state including those founded by jihadi groups. Women are essential to the growth of the state by

giving birth to the next generation, of both males and females, who will be inhabitants of the

Islamic states made by jihadi organizations.85

Statistics indicate over 31,000 pregnant women live in the ISIS caliphate alone.86 Several

thousands of pregnant women live in territories of other state building jihadi organizations.

Unlike most reports, which emphasize the importance of women giving birth to boys rather than

girls, the data collected for this article indicate that state building jihadi organizations have a

long-term strategy for girls as well. Jihadi organizations need men to fight on the front lines;

however, as states, these organizations also need the next generation of ideologically committed

girls to administrate the women‟s related institutions and to provide services for female

inhabitants. In a document circulated by ISIS in 2015 entitled Women in the Islamic State:

Manifesto and Case Study, the group declares “the greatness of her (a woman) position, the

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purpose of her existence is the Divine duty of motherhood.”87 The same document narrates the

hadith (words of Prophet Muhammad) of “Paradise is under the mother's feet”88 to emphasize

the importance of motherhood. While identifying motherhood and family as the main

responsibilities of women, the same document permits women to participate in jihad, education,

and the healthcare system. However, primary data indicate women‟s roles in state building jihadi

organizations go beyond these three sectors.

Through motherhood, women also contribute greatly to strengthening the collective identity of

the ummah (global Muslim community) promoted by jihadi organizations. Therefore, women‟s

image as the bearers of new members of the nation becomes more prominent. Within this

argument, women as reproducers become the indicator for marking the territory and identity of

the collectivity. Women are considered not only as the biological reproducers, but also as agents

for transmitting a certain form of ideological heritage to the next generation. In propaganda

documents such as Dabiq magazine, ISIS refers to an ideologically committed mother as

“mother of lion cubs (the next generation of committed jihadi fighters)”. To define the

terminology, the magazine explains that “she is the teacher of generations and the producer of

men.”89

Muslim women from all around the world are gathered in the territories, governed by jihadi

organizations, to shape the supra-nationalist next generation of ummah, which is claimed to

operate beyond personal race, ethnicity, culture, and nationality. Only through ideologically

committed women, who have gone through the education system of these jihadi organizations,

can these Islamic states “bring up and educate, protect and care for the next generation to

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come.”90 Motherhood is highly praised by many women throughout the territories of state

building jihadi organizations. This is evident in numerous messages posted on social media by

these women. A migrant woman with the account name of Tubalilghuraba on Tumblr once

posted, “We are created to be mothers and wives - as much as the western society has warped

your views on this with a hidden feminist mentality. It is beautiful to raise the future Mujahideen

[jihadi fighters] of Shaam [Syria].”91

Advocacy and Recruitment: Living in the age of information and rise of social media, state

building jihadi organizations found the golden opportunity to reach their potential recruits and

supporters around the globe. To illustrate the states administrated by jihadi organizations as ideal

destinations for “real” Muslim women, and to convince and prepare them to make hijrah, jihadi

organizations‟ female advocates and recruiters play a significant role as the windows to the states

run by these groups. Female advocates of these organizations could be easily spotted on all social

media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and online chatrooms. Jihadi

organizations‟ advocates and recruiters take advantage of the identity crises, social

marginalization, depression, emotional disturbances, and need for attention among many women

around the world to introduce the states run by jihadi organizations as oases in which women

will be loved and respected by Muslim peers who care about them.

Apart from adopting women with social and psychological complexities, jihadi organizations‟

advocates and recruiters also attempt to incorporate many women through ideological

conviction. Women feeling marginalized for their ultra conservative views in western and

secular societies are among the main targets for these recruiters. Convincing women to make

hijrah to the Islamic states eventually sends non-Muslim societies a strong message that the

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Islamic alternative social order established by these jihadi organizations can essentially make

women abandon their “emancipated” positions in their home countries. This ultimately generates

the legitimacy these organizations need to rule their populace.

Service and Public Goods Provision

Service and public goods provision gap exists “where the institutions of a state are incapable of

delivering minimal public goods and services to the population.”92 To fill this gap, women are

incorporated by state building jihadi organizations in a wide range of gender-segregated service

and public goods provision professions, including education, charity works, housing, and

healthcare. By incorporating women, these jihadi organizations try to materialize their vision for

establishing a functioning state.

Simultaneously, survival is at the heart of every political organization.93 To keep the

organization‟s coherence against other rival groups and to prevent decline, organizations should

review their ideologies and strategies to provide timely incentives for their existing members not

to desert and for their prospective members to join. These incentives are directly related to the

personal needs of the prospective members “to belong to a group, to acquire social status and

reputation, to find comradeship or excitement, or to gain material benefits.”94 State building

jihadi organizations provide the above incentives for women through incorporating them into

their various gender-segregated parallel institutions. Apart from the financial benefits women

gain through working in these institutions, being part of such institutions would also bring about

relatively higher social status for the incorporated women, compared to those who are not a part

of these institutions. Some of the professions in which women are incorporated are as follows:

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Teachers and Educators: The main objective of state building jihadi originations to educate

girls was to ensure the upbringing of a loyal generation of jihadi citizens to take over women‟s

relates institutions, to become ideologically devoted mothers of the next generation of jihadists,

and to perform their duties as wives to jihadi fighters. To achieve these goals, state building

jihadi organizations paid special attention to their education system.95 Many schools were still up

and running within territories of state building jihadi organizations. According to a 36-year-old

female former resident of Raqqa, when ISIS took control of the city, schools were not shut down

but students were segregated according to their gender. Female teachers previously working at

schools could continue working under ISIS, but with new rules and regulations, including

observing a strict dress code imposed by the group. This includes a long, black colored robe,

which should cover the woman‟s entire body.96 Female dress code was a tool by which jihadi

organizations could extend their control over women. Jihadi organizations claim that imposing

dress code on women would protect the moral values of a purified Muslim society by controlling

women‟s sinful sexual power.

Schools in territories of state building jihadi organizations in Syria and Iraq were more than mere

learning institutions for jihadi organizations. There have been incidents in which female teachers

at secondary schools have played the matchmaker role in marrying their students to both local

and foreign fighters.97 Schools were also used as a means to spy personal lives of students and

their parents. Female teachers were requested to indirectly ask their students to observe their

parents‟ behavior at home and report it to the school principals if they found any illicit behavior

of their parents against sharia law including; not observing the dress code outside home, not

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performing the daily prayers, drinking alcohol, sheltering non-Muslims and, watching western

TV channels.98

By providing their version of education for girls, jihadi organizations were also bringing up the

next generation of their female cadres to occupy positions related to women affairs. Ideologically

convinced and equipped with practical knowledge, these women could provide the necessary

services for the female half of the populace.

Doctors and Nurses: The healthcare system is one of the essential services to which state

building jihadi organizations pay special attention. Several studies have been conducted on the

linkages between an effective healthcare system and the popular support for the state. Kruk et al.

argue that restoring a functioning healthcare system has the highest impact on the legitimacy and

popular support of a new state in the aftermath of violent political conflict.99

For the same reason, in early 2015 for instance, ISIS introduced its Islamic State Healthcare

System (ISHS). The same pattern of gender segregation in the education system is implemented

in ISHS. A 42-year-old female Iraqi refugee explained that a section within Mosul general

hospital was allocated to female patients to visit female doctors and nurses. ISIS has forced all

female doctors and nurses to wear long black robes under their white coats. Only behind closed

doors could a female doctor remove her face veil to give a checkup. Female doctors were also

banned from attend night shifts at hospitals.100

Just like the education system, the healthcare systems of state building jihadi organizations

aimed for objectives beyond their conventional scope of offering medical services to citizens.

Controlling and regulating women‟s social behaviors according to their interpretation of the

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Islamic jurisprudence was one of the other goals of the healthcare systems in territories of state

building jihadi organizations. Female doctors and nurses were asked to spy on their colleagues

and patients. In close cooperation with jihadi female police brigades and also other jihadi

agencies including the Marriage Bureau, doctors and nurses were also acting as matchmakers

between their patients and male jihadi fighters.101

Tax Collectors: Another important aspect of state building jihadi organizations‟ function is their

approach towards financing their states. The Syrian and Iraqi oil fields were the main sources of

income for ISIS, and to a smaller scale Jaish al-Fatah and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, generating

millions of dollars per month. However, upon intensified air raids by the Western coalition and

Russia in mid-2015, ISIS‟s oil income dropped significantly, therefore the organization increased

taxation sharply in 2015.102

To manage and sustain the flow of tax money, ISIS tax authority set up a detailed system of tax

collection by using a network of agents who were known as “tax collectors.” Like other

institutions within jihadi organizations territories, tax authority was also gender segregated. Tax

officers were not able of dealing with issues related to their opposite sex. Similar to their male

counterparts, ISIS female tax collectors were sent by the tax authority to the work places of

women in different sectors to collect income taxes and zakat. Like other institutions where

women are incorporated in, female tax collectors were required to observe the black robe and

face veil dress code.

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According to a 47-year-old former resident of Raqqa, upon capturing the city, ISIS set up its tax

authority in Raqqa‟s Credit Bank building. The female tax collectors were calculating each

person‟s income tax according to her salary and were demanding her to pay the tax by cash on

spot. If the tax payee did not have the amount ready, she was advised by the officers to make the

payment by the end of the day at the female counter of the tax authority building in town. Upon

paying the tax on spot, the female tax collectors were issuing an official receipt of payment with

an official stamp of the tax authority.103 A 29-year-old Syrian refugee stated upon visiting the

ISIS tax authority in Raqqa to pay his business taxes, he noticed a room with a closed door,

assigned by the group, for women to pay their taxes. The process, according to him, was run by

ISIS female tax collectors.104

Integration Officers: State building jihadi organizations were providing free accommodations,

utilities, and services for their members. To provide these services to female members, several

women were recruited to facilitate the arrangements. According to a 36-year-old Syrian refugee,

single women who arrive in ISIS territory from abroad are being sent to ISIS-owned houses

called, maqars.105 Taking them from the borders, accommodating them in maqars, and looking

after their needs are all taken care of by ISIS female integration officers. ISIS assigned women to

maqars according to their nationalities and it is normally the case that the officers assigned to the

newcomers are also from the same country.106

According to a 45-year-old former resident of Raqqa, maqars are mostly located in the main

cities of ISIS territory. Upon passing borders into ISIS territory, single migrant women were

meeting their female integration officers and were taken to the cities where their maqars are

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located. These female officers were conducting the first briefing for the newcomers. They were

teaching them about the basics of living under sharia law, including the dress code, codes of

conduct on streets, and neighborhood orientation. The female officers were also in command of

maintaining the services offered in maqars, including household materials, food and cooking

equipment, and other inquiries made by the residents of maqars.107

Facilitating the integration of female migrants into different state institutions and service sectors

was ensuring the state does not run out of ideologically committed women who can provide

services to their kinds. Under integration officers‟ supervision, jihadi groups could be assured of

the proper implementation of their birth and family policies including marriage and producing

more kids. This could sustain the growth of an ideologically convinced generation needed to

administrate these states.

Other Roles: There are also several other roles women are assigned to by state building jihadi

organizations. Although these roles are comparatively less significant, empirical evidence

suggests they exist. A 31-year-old former resident of Mosul stated that the elderly house near his

place in Mosul was not shut down upon the fall of Mosul. Instead, ISIS separated male and

female elderly people into two buildings and forbid male and female caretakers from spending

time together. He mentioned female caretakers were only allowed to provide services to the

female elderly patients.108

Matchmaking is another practice conducted by several women throughout the territories of state

building jihadi organizations. Several female members of hisbah, housing and sheltering officers,

school teachers, and nurses closely cooperate with ISIS authorities on this matter. A 34-year-old

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former resident of Raqqa noted that female housing and shelter officers are very much involved

in introducing single women to male jihadists and vise-versa. They introduce women to male

jihadi candidates under the surveillance of the ISIS Marriage Affairs Department.109

Security

The security gap is a situation in which “states do not provide minimal levels of security in the

face of organized armed groups.”110 This possibility is higher among weak or failed states where

the central government (for various reasons, including civil war or foreign occupation) cannot

provide the security needed for its citizens. In such an environment, state building jihadi

organizations with military capabilities, can effectively fill the security gap. To do so, women are

incorporated by these organizations in both policing and military capacities.

By using females in security positions, state building jihadi organizations have countered the

potential threats put upon them by women. Since, according to sharia law, male security forces

are unable to enforce their authority over women in terms of security needs, such as body

searches and interrogations, female security forces would play a significant role in filling this

shortcoming and to extend the groups‟ control over the whole populace. Female security forces

ensure proper execution of state building jihadi organizations‟ strict moral codes regarding

women in public spaces, including dress code and relations between opposite sexes. The security

capacities in which women are incorporated in by state building jihadi organizations are as

follows:

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Police Force: Shortly after the establishment of ISIS caliphate, the organization announced the

formation of the al-Khansaa Brigade, a female only moral police force, to observe the codes of

conduct under sharia law. Several Syrian and Iraqi refugees confirmed seeing armed women

covered in black robes patrolling the streets of Raqqa, Mosul, Fallujah, Tell Abyed, Tell Afar,

Manbij, and Jarablus, either in cars or on foot. The al-Khansaa Brigade is operating under the

Security Council of ISIS, which is in control of the internal policing.

A 44-year-old former resident of Raqqa emphasized that al-Khansaa has a separate facility in the

city for its own members. This is to prevent them from mixing with their male jihadi

counterparts. Al-Khansaa members take the women who have broken the sharia law to their

facility in Raqqa. Women who wear a tight abaya (long black dress), are not accompanied by a

male mahram in public, smoke cigarettes, drink and eat publicly during the fasting month,

commit adultery, commit acts of a homosexual nature, or wear bright nail polish will be arrested

by al-Khansaa members and will be punished in accordance with sharia law.111 The same type of

all-woman police brigade is set up by Jaish al-Fatah in its territories in Idlib, Syria. A 35-year-

old female refugee from Idlib stated that Jaish al-Fatah has already asked women in Idlib to

observe the Islamic dress code, and its all-woman police brigade patrols the streets to ensure the

implementation of this order.112

Military Forces: Women‟s involvement in front line duties is argued to be relatively new for

state building jihadi organizations. Although official records indicate there has been no

confirmed trace of female combatants within these organizations until May 2016,113 a couple of

suicide bombing attacks in Northern Iraq since 2014 are claimed to have been conducted by ISIS

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female members. It is confirmed by Kurdish military personnel that ISIS has used female suicide

bombers for attacking Kurdish forces at least twice in 2015.114115 In May 2016, an ISIS female

suicide bomber also conducted a deadly attack in the Shi‟a district of al-Shaab in the Iraqi capital

city, Baghdad.116

A 38-year-old Syrian refugee in Gaziantep, Turkey told the author that her female cousin in Idlib

was approached by an unknown woman in a female gathering and was asked if she would like to

sacrifice her life in the path of Allah by joining a group of martyrdom-seeking women who

would like to defend Jabhat Fateh al-Sham against the crusaders and the infidels.117 A 41-year-

old female former resident of Mosul also confirmed the intention of ISIS to set up female

military battalions to defend Mosul against the Iraqi army and the Shia militia.118

The military behavior of state building jihadi organizations can be used as an indicator for their

shift towards becoming operation-based groups again. As long as state building jihadi

organizations are successful in fighting their enemies on the ground and expanding their

territories, they can keep their level of legitimacy high among their supporters. Upon facing

survival threat and when holding to their self-proclaimed states is not feasible, these groups step

down to once again become operation-based organizations. This is a strategic move for survival

and to stay relevant as a jihadi organization. This is evident in the case of ISIS and its military

behavior including its utilization of women. The organization was confidently expanding its

territories throughout 2014 and early 2015 however, upon facing survival threats, significant

military defeats, and losing territories (from mid-2015); like an operation-based organization,

ISIS started a wide range of terrorist attacks in western countries especially France, Belgium, the

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United Kingdom, and Germany. ISIS has officially requested its supporters around the world to

stop making hijrah to Syria and Iraq and instead, to stay concealed at their home countries up

until ISIS leaders make „the signal‟ to attack.119

The failed Paris bombing plot in September 2016 by an ISIS all female cell was one of the

incidents which rang the bell for the important role of women in ISIS‟s new military doctrine as

an operation-based jihadi group. Women are now utilized by ISIS (which is becoming more and

more like an operation-based group) for the same tactical reasons they are being used by

operation-based jihadi organizations.

Conclusion

Using primary data and by developing a new typology of jihadi organizations, the article argues

that the increasing incorporation of women and their diversity of roles reflects a strategic logic –

jihadi groups integrate more women to enhance organizational success. By dividing these groups

into operation-based and state building jihadi organizations, this article applies a comparative

approach to explain why, and how, jihadi groups differ from each other in incorporating women.

The findings of this research affects scholars‟ essential perception on women and their

relationship with jihadi organizations.

In his seminal book, Dying to Win, Robert Pape argues that the main objective of terrorist

organizations (groups such as Al-Qaeda which are categorized in this article as operation-based

jihadi organizations) is to “compel a target government to change policy, and most especially to

cause democratic states to withdraw forces from land the terrorist perceives as their national

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home-land.”120 In an attempt to achieve the abovementioned objectives, jihadi establishments

have strategically decided to incorporate women as utilizing them has proven effective in several

ways. The strategic logic of jihadi organizations in incorporating women to achieve the above-

mentioned objectives lays in the tactical advantages women provide them. These advantages

include bigger media publicity for jihadi organization, higher rate in enemy‟s casualties and,

arousing less suspicion than men in conducting violent operations.

However, the rise of a new breed of jihadi groups such as ISIS, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and Jaish

al-Fatah (state-building jihadi organizations) have changed not only the objectives of many

likeminded jihadi organizations but the role of women in these groups. Unlike jihadi

organizations such as Al-Qaeda or Ansar al-Islam, these new groups have a clear objective to

establish their functioning states. These groups have successfully achieved their goal in

territories such as Syria, Iraq and parts of Libya. These new jihadi groups, have therefore

morphed beyond mere militant entities into the realm of state building. With their

metamorphosis, their strategic logic of women have evolved as well from tactical combat

advantages (such as suicide bombing) to those necessary to administer a state.

Dying is therefore no longer enough to win; women are now incorporated into these groups in a

wide range of off-combat roles including administrative offices, service and public goods

provision institutions, police force and propaganda establishments. The integration of women

with diverse roles into jihadi establishments such as ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham helps them

address the functional challenges facing a failed or a weak state in which these groups have

established their states while providing a practical alternative to the otherwise undesirable chaos

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associated with weak or failed states. However, upon facing survival threats and when holding to

the state is no longer feasible, state-building jihadi organizations such as ISIS once again step

down into becoming operation-based groups. This is evident in the current situation of ISIS. By

becoming an operation-based group again, ISIS‟s strategic logic of women is changed as well to

tactical utilization of them.

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Charts

This document contains three charts:

1) The following chart demonstrates the proposed typology of jihadi organizations with a

few groups used as examples:

Jihadi Organizations

Operation-Based State Building

Al-Qaeda ISIS

Ansar al-
ISIS Franchises
Sunnah

The Haqqani Jabhad Fatah

Network al-Sham

Chart 1: Typology of Jihadi Organizations

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2) The following chart demonstrates some of the roles assigned to women in operation-

based jihadi organizations:

Women in Operation-based Jihadi

Organizations

Combat Tactical Roles Non-combat Tactical Roles

Suicide Bombers Messengers

Financing
Cover for Male
Fighters

Logistical
Support

Recruiters

Chart 2: Women in Operation-based Jihadi Organizations

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3) The following chart demonstrate some of the roles assigned to women in state building

jihadi organizations:

Women in State Building Jihadi Organizations

Service and Public Good

Legitimacy Security
Provision

Hijrah Teachers and Police Force

Educators

Motherhood and
Family Military Force
Doctors and Nurses

Recruitment and
Advocacy
Tax Collectors

Integration Officers

Chart 3: Women in State Building Jihadi Organizations

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1
For the purpose of this article, a violent non-state actor is defined as “an organization that uses illegal violence (i.e.
force not officially approved of by the state) to reach its goals.” See: Rajeev Chaudhry. "Violent Non-State Actors:
Contours, Challenges and Consequences." CLAWS Journal. Winter 2013: 167.
2
Spike Peterson. "Security and Sovereign States: Shat is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?." Gendered States:
Feminist (re) visions of international relations theory 32 (1992).
3
Timothy Kaufman-Osborn. "Gender Trouble at Abu Ghraib?" Politics & Gender, no. 04 (2005): 597-619.
4
Zillah Eisenstein. Against Empire: Feminisms, Racism and the West. Zed Books, 2004
5
Caron E. Gentry and Laura Sjoberg. Beyond Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Thinking about Women's Violence in
Global Politics. Zed Books Ltd., 2015: 2.
6
See: Alison Jaggar. “Feminist ethics: Projects, problems, prospects”. In C. Card (ed.), Feminist Ethics, Lawrence,
KS: University Press of Kansas, (1991) and, Pamela Johnston Conover and Virginia Sapiro. "Gender, feminist
consciousness, and war." American Journal of Political Science (1993): 1079-1099.
7
Jean Bethke Elshtain. Women and war. University of Chicago Press, 1987
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Robert Y. Shapiro and Harpreet Mahajan. "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from
the 1960s to the 1980s." Public Opinion Quarterly 50, no. 1 (1986): 42-61.
9
Jean Baker Miller. Toward a New Psychology of Women. Beacon Press, 2012.
10
Emile Sahliyeh and Zixian Deng. "The Determinants of Palestinians' Attitudes Toward Peace with Israel."
International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003): 701.
11
In this article, I use the term „incorporation‟ in a holistic way to address all forms of affiliation, including
recruitment, attraction, participation, voluntary joining in, cooperation, and involvement in all possible
organizational related roles (combat and non-combat) and organizational levels.
12
Ahmad Charai and Joseph Braude. "Ten Percent of Western Recruits to ISIS are Women." The National Interest,
accessed November 12, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ten-percent-western-recruits-isis-are-women-
11334.
13
“Foreign Fighters an Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” Soufan Group,
accessed January 8, 2017, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.
14
Unaeash Rahmah. "The Role of Women of the Islamic State in the Dynamics of Terrorism in Indonesia." Middle
East Institute, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/role-women-islamic-state-dynamics-
terrorism-indonesia.
15
Strategic logic is a long term rational plan of action to achieve certain organizational objectives.
16
I use Etzioni‟s definition of organizational success as “how effective an organization is in achieving the outcomes
the organization intends to produce.” See: Amitia Etzioni. Modern Organizations. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1964).
17
Robert Pape. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Random House, 2005; 27.
18
Geoffrey K. Roberts. A Dictionary of Political Analysis. Longman, 1971: 216.
19
Boaz Ganor. "Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect." Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 281.
20
US Department of State, “Joint Pub 3-07.2” Antiterrorism, (2010).
21
Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal. "Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist
Organizations." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 4 (2005): 275-293.
22
Boaz Ganor. "Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect." Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008).
23
Glenn E. Robinson. "Jihadi information strategy: Sources, opportunities and vulnerabilities." Information Strategy
and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice (2007): 86-112.
24
Bruce Hoffman. "“Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by A Religious Imperative." Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, No. 4 (1995): 272.

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25
Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley. "Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by A Radical
Islamic Group That Remains Nonviolent." Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 2 (2006): 315-334.
26
Jeffrey Haynes. "Al Qaeda: Ideology and Action." Critical Review of International Social and Political
Philosophy, no. 2 (2005): 177-191
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Daniel Byman. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know.
Oxford University Press, USA, 2015.
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James Meek. "Al Qaeda Leader Al-Zawahiri Declares War on ISIS 'Caliph' Al-Baghdadi." ABC News. September
10, 2015. Accessed July 23, 2017. http://abcnews.go.com/International/al-qaeda-leader-al-zawahirideclares-war-
isis/story?id=33656684.
29
Guerrilla warfare is a “type of warfare fought by irregulars in fast-moving, small-scale actions against orthodox
military and police forces.” See: Robert Asprey. "Guerrilla warfare." Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed July 19,
2016, https://global.britannica.com/topic/guerrilla-warfare.
30
Derek Jones. “Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks:
The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations.” No. JSOU-12-3. Joint Special Operations, University of
MacDill, 2012: 39.
31
David Tucker. "Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom is Wrong." Homeland
Security Affairs, No. 2 (2008).
32
Edward Newman. "Failed States and International Order: Constructing A Post-Westphalian
World." Contemporary security policy, No. 3 (2009): 421-443.
33
State-building jihadi groups claim to revitalize the tradition of the caliphate. How and which traditional structure
of caliphate these organizations follow is disputed as the structures of the Umayyad, early Abbasid and later
Abbasid caliphates differed from each other in important ways. Therefore, these group‟s claim for revitalizing the
caliphate is ambiguous and subject to their interpretation.
34
Jay Sekulow and Jordan Sekulow. Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can't Ignore. Simon and Schuster, 2015: 17.
35
The size of territory ruled by these groups does not affect their self-claimed statehood. In this case, they are
similar to internationally recognized states in the world which range from small city-states such as Monaco to those
massive in size including Russia or Canada.
36
Halim Kousary. In-person Interview with Author. Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS). Kabul,
Afghanistan. September 8, 2015.
37
Nematullah Elahi. In-person Interview with Author. Women & Children Legal Research Foundation. Kabul,
Afghanistan. September 6, 2015.
38
"Unofficial Negotiations with the Taliban over Women's Rights in Norway." [In Persian: Goftogooye ghaire rasmi
ba Taliban dar morede ghoghooghe zanan dar Norway]. Deutsche Welle, accessed December 18, 2016,
http://www.dw.com/fa-af/a-18496520.
39
Derek Jones (see note 30).
40
Courthney Martin. "(Female) Suicide Bombers." The Huffington Post, accessed January 5, 2017,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/courtney-e-martin-/female-suicide-bombers_b_116773.html.
41
Cindy D. Ness. "In the name of the cause: Women's work in secular and religious terrorism." Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 28, no. 5 (2005): 357.
42
Nelly Lahoud. "The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis‟ Exclusion of Women From Jihad." Terrorism and Political
Violence, No. 5 (2014): 780-802.
43
Alisa Stack-O'Connor. Picked Last: Women and Terrorism. National Defense University, Washington DC,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2007.
44
Lindsey O'Rourke. "What's Special About Female Suicide Terrorism?" Security Studies, No. 4 (2009): 687.
45
Lindsey O‟Rourke (see note 44): 689.
46
, Debra D. Zedalis. Female Suicide Bombers. The Minerva Group, Inc., 2004.
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Mia Bloom. "Female suicide Bombers: A Global Trend." Daedalus, No. 1 (2007): 94-102.
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Mahdi Younis. In-person Interview with Author. Makhmur, Iraq. July 12, 2016.
49
Lamiat Sabin. "Who is Sajida Mubarak Atrous Al-Rishawi, The Female Suicide Bomber at the Heart of 'ISIS'
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bomber-at-the-heart-of-isis-prisoner-swap-10000572.html.

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50
Lindsey O‟Rourke (see note 44).
51
Mahdi Younis (see note 48).
52
Sebastian Gorka. Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War. Regnery Publishing, 2016.
53
Hawala is “a traditional system of transferring money used in Arab countries and South Asia, whereby the money
is paid to an agent who then instructs an associate in the relevant country or area to pay the final recipient.” See:
Nisha Taneja and Isha Dayal, eds. India-Pakistan Trade Normalisation: The Unfinished Economic Agenda.
Springer, 2016: 250.
54
Paula Broadwell. "The Growing Role of Women in Terrorism." Boston.com. December 12, 2006. Accessed July
11, 2016.
http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/12/12/the_growing_role_of_women_in_t
errorism/.
55
Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly. Women as Terrorists: Mothers, Recruiters, and Martyrs: Mothers, Recruiters, and
Martyrs. ABC-CLIO, 2009.
56
Kurdish Regional Government Officer (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Erbil, Iraq, July 13,
2016.
57
Margaret Gonzalez-Perez. Women and Terrorism: Female Activity in Domestic and International Terror Groups.
Routledge, 2008.
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14, 2016.
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Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly (see note 55): 39.
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Kim Cragin, and Sara A. Daly (see note 55).
61
Female Iraqi Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with author. Debaga Refugee Camp, Iraq. July 13,
2016.
62
Thanassis Cambanis. "The surprising appeal of ISIS." The Boston Globe. June 29, 2014. Accessed November 23,
2015. https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/06/28/the-surprising
appealisis/l9YwC0GVPQ3i4eBXt1o0hI/amp.html.
63
Carolyn Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford, and Ross Frenett. Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS.
2015.
64
Andrew A. Merz. "Coercion, Cash-crops and Culture from Insurgency to Proto-state in Asia's Opium Belt." PhD
thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2008: 3.
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Frank Gardner. "The Crucial Role of Women within Islamic State." BBC, accessed March 7, 2016.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33985441.
66
Lydia Smith. "ISIS: The 'Central' Role of Women in Forming the Next Jihadist Generation." International
Business Times, accessed November 11, 2016. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-central-role-women-forming-next-
jihadist-generation-1521058.
67
Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis. Woman-Nation-State. Springer, 1989.
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Frank Gardner. (see note 65).
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Hamoon Khelghat-Doost. "Women of the Caliphate: The Mechanism for Women's Incorporation into the Islamic
State (IS)." Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2017).
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James A. Piazza. "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational
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Robert I. Rotberg, ed. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton University Press, 2010.
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Joshua Adam Freeman. "Fixing the Failed: An Investigation of Terrorist Organizations and State Building
Capabilities," University of Southern Mississippi, 2015: 2.
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Jack Jenkins. "The Book That Really Explains ISIS." Think Progress. September 10, 2014. Accessed August 11,
2015. https://thinkprogress.org/the-book-that-really-explains-isis-hint-its-not-the-qur-an-f76a42e9a9a7.
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Charles T. Call. "Beyond the „Failed State‟: Toward Conceptual Alternatives." European Journal of International
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Charles T. Call. (see note 74): 314.
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"ISIS Leader Calls on Muslims to 'Build Islamic State.'" BBC, accessed November 19, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28116846.

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77
Martijn Koning, Aysha Navest and Annelies Moors. "European Brides in the Islamic State." Sapiens, accessed
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Katharina Kneip. "Female Jihad–Women in the ISIS." Politikon 29 (2016).
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For example, women with headscarves in France are banned from attending schools and from attending some
public events, such as entering opera houses.
82
Islamism (or Political Islam) is an ideology that believes that Islam must lead the social and political, as well as
the personal life, of a believer (Sheri Berman. "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society." Perspectives on Politics,
No. 2 (2003); 258).
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85
Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith. "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon.”
Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015.
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Charlie Winter. “Women of the Islamic State A manifesto on women by the Al-Khanssaa Brigade.” Quilliam
Foundation, accessed December 12, 2016: 18, https://therinjfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/women-of-the-
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Charlie Winter. (See note 87): 18.
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Al-Muhajirāh, U.B. (2015). A Brief Interview with Umm Bashīr al-Muhajirāh. Dabiq. Issue 7, From Hypocrisy to
Apostasy, the Extinction of the Grayzone, al-Hayat Media Center, February. pp. 50-51. Accessed:
http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/islamic-state-dabiq-magazine-issue-7-from-hypocrisy-
toapostasy.pdf
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Charlie Winter. (See note 74): 18.
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Tubalilghuraba. "Diary of a Muhajirah." Tubmlr, ccessed June 26, 2016,
http://maryamaisha.tumblr.com/post/123719129046/diary-of-a-muhajirah.
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Charles T. Call. (see note 74): 306.
93
Martha Crenshaw. "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." The Journal of
Strategic Studies, No. 4 (1987): 13-31.
94
Martha Crenshaw. (See note 93): 19.
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Noman Benotman and Nikita Malik. (See note 86).
96
Female Syrian Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Sanliurfa, Turkey. May 25, 2016.
97
Female Iraqi Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Debaga Refugee Camp, Iraq. July 13,
2016.
98
Female Syrian Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Gaziantep, Turkey. May 24, 2016.
99
Margaret Kruk, Lynn Freedman, Grace Anglin, and Ronald Waldman. 2010. “Rebuilding Health Systems to
Improve Health and Promote State building in Post-Conflict Countries: A Theoretical Framework and Research
Agenda.” Social Science & Medicine 70 (1): 89–97.
100
Female Iraqi Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Debaga Refugee Camp, Iraq. July
13, 2016.
101
Female Syrian Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Istanbul, Turkey. May 16, 2016.
102
"Islamic State's Income Drops 30 Percent on Lower Oil, Tax Revenue: IHS." Reuters, accessed November 12,
2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-syria-islamic-sta-idUSKCN0XF0D5.
103
Male Syrian Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Gaziantep, Turkey. May 24, 2016.
104
Male Syrian Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Kilis, Turkey. May 18, 2016.
105
Maqars are shelters which state building jihadi organizations temporarily accommodate their female new
members. These houses are mostly belonging to people who have fled the cities.
106
Male Syrian Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Kilis, Turkey. May 19, 2016.

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107
Female Syrian Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Istanbul, Turkey. May 16, 2016.
108
Male Iraqi Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Erbil, Iraq. July 11, 2016.
109
Female Syrian Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Istanbul, Turkey. May 15, 2016.
110
Charles T. Call. (See note 74): 307.
111
Male Syrian Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Kilis, Turkey. May 19, 2016.
112
Female Syrian Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Antakya, Turkey. May 15, 2016.
113
Lizzie Dearden. "Baghdad attacks." Independent, accessed March 12, 2017,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/baghdad-attacks-market-blast-car-suicide-bombing-in-iraq-
capital-isis-victims-a7033436.html.
114
Mahdi Younis. (see note 48).
115
Sayed Hassan Hussain. In-person Interview with Author. Baqerat, Iraq, July 12, 2016.
116
Lizzie Dearden. (see note 113).
117
Female Syrian Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Gaziantep, Turkey. May 21, 2016.
118
Female Iraqi Refugee (Identity protected). In-person Interview with Author. Erbil, Iraq. July 16, 2016.
119
Rukmini Callimachi. "Not „Lone Wolves‟ After All: How ISIS Guides World‟s Terror Plots From Afar." The
New York Times, accessed March 11, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/asia/isis-messaging-app-
terror-plot.html.
120
Pape, Robert. Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. Random House, 2005: 27.

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