Socrates, Plato, and Piety

Author(s): C. Emlyn-Jones
Source: Mediterranean Studies , 1990, Vol. 2, Greece & the Mediterranean (1990), pp. 21-
28
Published by: Penn State University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41163976

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 2

Socrates, Plato, and Piety

C. Emlyn-Jones

In examining the moral and religious values of a pre-Christian

Mediterranean society like Classical Athens, significant insights may be
gained from the study of a particular type of cultural crisis-a situation in
which a personal, intellectually conceived worldview clashes head-on with
the less conceptually coherent but nonetheless deeply held traditions of the
state. Such a crisis was the trial and condemnation of the philosopher
Socrates in 399 B.C. on a charge on impiety.
The word "piety," with its Latin root and Romano-Christian associations,
is the rather inappropriate, though conventional translation of the Ancient
Greek eusebeia, meaning a suitably reverent attitude towards groups or
institutions demanding respect, and, in particular, religious institutions. A
satisfactory relationship between mortals and the gods was considered to
be essential for the prosperity not only of individuals but also of the
community as a whole. So, in the Classical Greek city-state, piety had a
strongly legal aspect, with penalties for those found guilty ofasebeia (impiety),
which involved offending the gods in some way, for example, by desecrating
temples and other holy places, violating rules for cults and festivals, or
making fun of religious practices.1 In fifth-century Athens the law against
impiety appears to have been very general in its provision, leaving individual
prosecutors free to add the details, and juries to interpret the law, as they
saw fit.2 In the case of Socrates, the public suit (graph) or asebeia was filled
out by one of his prosecutors, Meletos, as follows: "Socrates is guilty of
not acknowledging the gods which the city acknowledges, but other new
divinities; and he is guilty of corrupting the youth. The penalty demanded
is death."3
Over the years there has been a great deal of speculation about the
motives of the prosecutors and, perhaps more to the point, what exactly
Socrates did or was alleged to have done, to justify such a charge, or, at

^.J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 1974), p.
247.

2D.M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London, 1978), pp. 199 ff.
3Recorded by Diogenes Laertius, II, 40.

21

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22 GREECE & THE MEDITERRANEAN

least, to make it stick.4 T

two recent substantial con
the late I.F. Stone, a book
outside the scholarly worl
partnership of Thomas B
basically that the prosecu
strongly anti-democratic
in the aftermath of the c
Wars (404 B.C.), and an oli
of the democracy. And th
to condemn a man whose
no real interest in acquitt
the political basis of the cha
Socratic literature, and, in
oration) by the sophist P
too, are to be seen as ans
version of Socrates' trial sp
than not, presents a Socr
his desire to convince the
There is no reconciling
available, choosing betw
attention to the one thin
clearly regard the actual
Stone, because it was a fr
declared by the restored
and Smith, because the te
to his real activities and p
the political angle out of
Smith's contention and, i
aspect of the charge itse
attitude may have been t
in his trial, to have been
There are, of course, ser
given with minor variatio
a writer of the Roman E
claiming that the charge w
served as a public record
Socrates himself appears

4See M. I. Filey, "Socrates and A

5London, 1988. See the review b
7-13, 1988), p. 1104.
Oxford, 1989.
7Diogenes Laertius, ibid., quot

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 which predates his death is comedy,
(423 B.C.), in which Socrates is por
phrontisterion (think-shop) peddlin
moting atheism and, in particular
"making the weaker argument def
associated with itinerant teachers
Socrates is usually dismissed as a com
which goes back to Plato that in h
in scientific speculation.8 Aristoph
but plausible association in the po
sophists: odd references in later play
through to The Frogs in 405 B.C
appearance, threadbare clothing an
eye as a popular target for comic h
professor. The second major sourc
Xenophon, was in Asia Minor on a
trial and wrote perhaps twenty ye
Socrates' trial speech is therefore s
of the sources of his Memorabilia
conversations with Socrates, infor
and others, or maybe largely fictitio
the essence of his revered teacher.
out, in trying to demonstrate Socr
succeeds rather too well.10 His conve
ble target for an impiety prosecut
Meletos have had against a man wh
(law or custom) of the state?10 Co
controversially?
It is in Plato's account of Socrate
the most significant evidence for
speech rests, at first sight, on no
(although Plato does tell us that, u
trial).11 But Plato's Socrates is a m
the first few minutes of the Apolog
oratorical conventions (whichever
the speech), Socrates disclaims any
has not previously in his life been
"skill" will be to tell the truth.12 B

8Plato, Phaedo, 96 a 6 ff.

9aThc Paradox of Socrates,** in G. Vlastos,
pp. 1-21.
10Xenophon, Memorabilia, I, 3, 1; IV, 3, 16.
"Plato, Apology, 38 b 6.
12Ibid., 17 b 4-5.

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24 GREECE & THE MEDITERRANEAN

reveals that things are not

claiming, like all good orat
operates a clever argumenta
is based on popular prejudi
he emphasizes his associatio
in the heavens) and with n
It seems to me that, in ta
"setting up" an improbable ve
In cross-questioning his pr
has no difficulty in trappin
of course, contradicts the ch
gods, but believing in the g
Meletos is as easily tied up in
of Plato's Socrates. But, of co
does not necessarily prove th
disposed of his version of t
the real reason for the trial.
once asked the Delphic ora
and the answer came back
explains that he felt bound
activity of going round At
he concluded that the god
that he knew he knew not
had illusions of knowledge
referring literally to me, b
wisest man is he who, like
wisdom, and that, in compa
So, in place of the false pi
sophist, we now have a tru
ignorant follower of the go
of pious devotion to the go
as, by implication, comma
throughout his life to devo
about their fundamental b
"duty to the god," Socrates
his activity as a mission w
conventional framework of
relationship with the gods.
to stop him is itself impiou
to knowledge are cleverly co

13Ibid., 26 d 6-e2.
14Ibid., 27 a5-6.
15Ibid., 23 a 5-b4.

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albeit implied, redefinition of pie
cards forced on them: to convict,
to believe the Aristophanic picture or
ing with a divine command. The of
nevertheless has the effect of exclu
a good (i.e. skilled) orator, Socrate
and forecloses on a number of oth
of these.
Plato's Socrates discusses the nature
which reads like one of the investiga
of the god, although, of course, w
exact relationship of Euthyphro to
have conducted. All we can say for
it early in Plato's oeuvre. The dramat
and a self-styled religious expert,
Basileos in the Agora. Socrates is ab
of his case before the Archon Basil
who presided over religious affairs
Archon Basileus as he is (rather con
for murder (murder in Ancient G
Despite the problems in his case, E
Tightness of his action, which lea
question him as the expert who w
Euthyphro soon gets into deep wa
"what the gods love" is shown by S
because the gods can all be shown t
the case with things which canno
values. And even if one adjusts th
problem, so as to read "what all th
a complex argument to demonstrate
does not constitute the essence of
elsewhere; "the gods love someth
because the gods love it." Socrates nex
god/mortal relationship: in reply t
a therapeia (service) rendered by m
be a professional service (i.e. docto
knowledge of the provider (morta
that of slave to master; in the empor
itself is humorously disrespectful
one-sided because what could gods
desire? "Well, our honor and estee
is dear to the gods." The argument h

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 26 GREECE & THE MEDITERRANEAN

retires, with Socrates' repr

ears.16
Euthyphro has a dual focus-on the one hand it is a typical early Socratic
dialogue in which Socrates claims ignorance in order to try to reach a
definition of a particular moral value, and again, fairly typically, the conversa-
tion ends in aporia, failure. On the other hand, Euthyphro's content, as well
as the dramatic context, binds it closely to the trial either as a historical
demonstration of a Socrates who cares about piety or as a retrospective
vindication of him by Plato. There has been a tendency to reject the
essentially negative aspects of this dialogue as either the spreading of
confusion as a contrived educational technique (what Henry Teloh calls
"kicking sand in the student's face")17 or as actually implying, though not
stating, positive conclusions about piety and the gods.18 But what the
dialogue actually says, as opposed to what we might wish to read into it,
comprises a sustained attack, from a number of different directions, on the
validity of the gods as a central focus of piety. Despite his apparent status
as an eccentric or religious fanatic, Euthyphro's attempted définition of
piety as "what the gods love" corresponds closely with conventional wisdom,19
and it is the intellectual inadequacy of this wisdom that Socrates ruthlessly
exposes. The idea of the gods as the object of piety is seen as lacking
coherence, since the relationship eludes definition.
But is it realistic to suppose that the Athenians were likely to have
taken great exception to all this? Greek religion lacked a strongly dogmatic
basis; the profusion of myths and legends inherited from the past left much
room for speculation and interpretation. As the social organization of
religion at Athens in the fifth century clearly demonstrates, there was no
professional priesthood and orthodoxy seems to have been much more
concerned with correct observance than belief. Criticism and even ridicule
of the gods in tragedy and comedy was tolerated-even if the latter was to
some extent a privileged area of license.20 Skepticism about the existence
and nature of the gods can be found in the sophists, for example Protagoras,
and their anthropomorphic basis had been forcefully questioned as long
ago as Xenophanes, in the late sixth or early fifth century.21 The evidence
for the prosecution of intellectuals such as Protagoras and Anaxagoras on

16Euthyphro and The Apology are translated in The Last Days of Socrates, by H. Tredennick
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1989; repr. of 1969 ed).
17 Socratic Education in Plato's Dialogues (Notre Dame, 1986), p. 56.
18See especially, M. McPherran, "Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro,n JHPh 23 (1985):
283-309.

19See Dover, ibid.

^MacDowell, op. cit., p. 200.
21For Protagoras, see K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers (Oxford, 1971),
p. 126; for Xenophanes, ibid., p. 22.

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 a charge of impiety, following a m
late and may be attributable to incor
and elsewhere.22 All we know for cer
legislation suggests that it was focu
prosecution arising from the muti
Eleusinian Mysteries incident on t
B.C. in which Alkibiades was believ
Let us, however, return to Socra
to have done: Xenophon, for wh
Socrates' religious conformity; we are
at home and at the altars of the st
of unorthodox religious practice conc
spirit which functioned at interval
Xenophon certainly assumes that the
and Plato's Euthyphro seems to believ
ignores this suggestion;25 it also s
daimonion to the idea of "new divin
To return for a moment to Euthyp
skepticism in an intellectual conv
on which to hang a prosecution. Bu
dialogue, if we ignore Socrates' ir
questioning of the traditional bas
mortals, and of the logic behind th
Platonic dialogues have Socrates, in
values and attitudes of Athens' citizens. Whatever Plato's contribution to
the style of these conversations, evidence from Aristotle (in his early years
a member of Plato's Academy) suggests that the ethical basis and especially
the search for definitions, should be seen as a contribution of Socrates rather
than Plato.26 In the Apology, as I mentioned earlier, Socrates claims this
search as his sacred duty, a mission entrusted to him by the god at Delphi.
If the early dialogues of Plato reflect in any way the activity of the historical
Socrates, we have in them a systematic contemporary critique of Athens
and its institutions carried out in the name of piety, "duty to the god." It
may be that this systematic taking apart of the structure of conventional
religion in the name of religion over many years rendered Socrates' conversa-
tions no longer harmless and led the Athenians, perhaps uniquely, to
prosecute a fellow citizen for what he said rather than what he did.

22See especially, K.J. Dover, *The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society," Talanta
7 (1976): 24-54.
23Thucydides, VI, 27 ff.
2AMemorabilia, I, 1, 2.
25Euthyphro, 3 b 5 ff.
26Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1078 b 17-19; 1086 b 2-5.

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28 GREECE & THE MEDITERRANEAN

The
trial and death of Soc
until our
own time, of the m
hending state. Modern scho
welcome the intellectual r
even the religious skeptici
recognize and discuss as a
therefore a tendency to
maintains, in the Apology,
he was saying, but irritat
prosecution; he claims that
twenty years previously as

They complain that there

who fills young people's h
what he does, and what he
answer, not knowing wha
their confusion, they fa
philosopher: that he teach
and below the earth, and to
argument defeat the stron
admit the truth: which is t
to knowledge when they a
for their own reputation,
and provided with a plaus
me, these people have bee
past their violent denunci

From one point of view

be fair. As modern scholar
but, in this case our prefere
mating the Athenian popul
of religion but of the popu
B.C., Socrates' relentless qu
his apparently exclusive cl
too well. An Athenian ju
agenda in order to see Soc
values of the polis, sanctio
be, by the immortal gods.

21 Apology, 23 dl-еЗ, tr. H. Tred

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