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Signalling
MSST 030209-01
Train Protection and Warning
System Overlaid on Existing
Mechanical Train Stop System
Engineering Standard
Version: 1
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
Approval
Amendment Record
Approving Manager: Standards Development Manager Approval Date: 27/07/2012 Next Review Date: 27/04/2015
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
Table of Contents
1 Purpose .................................................................................................................4
2 Scope.....................................................................................................................4
3 Background...........................................................................................................4
4 Abbreviation..........................................................................................................4
5 Definitions .............................................................................................................5
10 Requirements........................................................................................................7
10.1 Safety and Environmental ................................................................................. 7
10.2 Functionality Table............................................................................................ 7
10.3 Design Requirements ....................................................................................... 7
10.4 Installation......................................................................................................... 9
10.5 Indicative Installation....................................................................................... 10
10.6 Documentation................................................................................................ 11
11 Appendices .........................................................................................................11
Appendix 1 - Responsibilities .......................................................................................... 12
Appendix 2 - Explanatory Notes...................................................................................... 13
Approving Manager: Standards Development Manager Approval Date: 27/07/2012 Next Review Date: 27/04/2015
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
1 Purpose
1.1 To define the functional requirements for the design, construction and installation of the
Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) as an overlaid protection system on the
mechanical train stop system for the metropolitan railway.
2 Scope
2.1 This standard applies to the design, construction and installation of TPWS as an overlaid
protection system on the mechanical train stop system for the metropolitan railway.
2.2 This standard does not apply to new track or signalling installations where both the
mechanical train stop and TPWS are being designed, constructed and installed as new
systems. In these circumstances the functionalities of both the mechanical train stop and
TPWS are to be provided fully in accordance with the provisions applicable to each
independent system.
3 Background
3.1 TPWS is designed to reduce the likelihood and consequences of a Signal Passed At
Danger (SPAD), by initiating, in certain circumstances, an automatic brake application on
the train.
3.2 It is also able to reduce the consequence of a train exceeding an authorised speed. The
objective of TPWS is to intervene in the control of a train when there is evidence in the form
of a signal being passed at danger without authority or excess speed, that the train is not
being driven appropriately.
3.3 It is not the intention that TPWS should have any effect on the normal operation of a train.
4 Abbreviation
CBI Computer Based Interlocking
OSS Over Speed Sensor functionality of the TPWS.
SPAD Signal Passed At Danger
TPWS Train protection and warning system as fitted to regional rolling stock and
installed at certain regional locations.
TSS Train Stop Sensor functionality of the TPWS.
TSSPR Train Stop System Proving Relay
TSSVR Train Stop System Relay
UPS Uninterruptible power supply
VRIOGS Victorian Rail Industry Operators Group Standards
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
5 Definitions
Shall Is used as the descriptive word to express a requirement that is
mandatory to achieve conformance to the standard.
Should Is used as the descriptive word to express a requirement that is
recommended in order to achieve compliance to the standard. Should
can also be used if a requirement is a design goal but not a mandatory
requirement.
Infrastructure Is defined as the meaning in the Franchise Agreement.
Lease
6.1 General
6.1.1 TPWS shall be designed constructed and installed in accordance with this Standard
and relevant MTM standards and Australian Standards and codes of practice.
6.1.2 The provisions of the VRIOGS detailing the design, construction and installation of
TPWS do not apply to the installation of TPWS as an overlaid system on the
mechanical train stop system.
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
7 Related Documents
L1-CHE-PRO-001 Standard Waiver Procedure
L1-ASY-PRO-001 Engineering Change Procedure
L1-CHE-PRO-004 Type Approval Procedure
L1-NAM-PRO-004 Signalling Design Technical Review Procedure
L0-SQE-PLA-005 Environmental Management Plan
1994 Book of Rules & Regulations
8 Policy Framework
8.1 The management of errant metropolitan trains that exceed their limit of movement authority
on the metropolitan trains is performed by the mechanical train stop system. It is required
that a similar functionality be provided for regional trains within the metropolitan railway
network where it is assessed by risk analysis that the fitment of the TPWS will protect
against impact between trains.
8.2 The TPWS installation is to be based on providing the highest level of reliable operation to
protect against errant TPWS fitted trains.
8.3 The TPWS installation is to be overlaid on the mechanical train stop system without the
mechanical train stop being fully redesigned and reconstructed to accommodate it.
8.4 Where new materials, equipment or systems are to be introduced with the design and
construction of the TPWS installation, the materials, equipment or systems shall be subject
to MTM Type Approval and Engineering Change processes on the metropolitan train
network.
9 TPWS Principles
9.1 With the design, construction and installation of the TPWS the following principles are to
apply.
9.1.1 The integrity of the train stop system must not be compromised in any way.
9.1.2 The operational functionality of the signalling system is to be maintained.
Specifically the operation of low speed signals shall be available as applies prior to
the installation of TPWS.
9.1.3 The TPWS must function as specified in so far as is practical at the particular
installation.
9.1.4 Only the Train Stop Sensor (TSS) functionality of the TPWS will be overlaid in train
stop territory.
9.1.5 Consequence of a train exceeding an authorised speed is not been considered in
this standard and hence, Over Speed Sensor (OSS) functionality is not used.
9.1.6 Failures of the mechanical train stop system must protect errant train movements as
is currently the case.
9.1.7 A failure of the TPWS must be as safe as practical within the limits of superimposing
it on the mechanical train stop system.
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
9.1.8 Indications of the failure of TSS are to be provided and may be integrated into the
existing circuitry.
9.1.9 The signal protecting a location is to be termed the TSS1 signal in the case where
two TSS are to be provided.
9.1.10 In the case where two TSS are to be provided then the signal in the rear of a TSS1
signal is to be termed the TSS2 signal.
10 Requirements
Signal Aspect TSS “armed” and TSS “armed” and TSS “dis-armed” TSS “dis-armed”
Condition Trainstop “raised” Trainstop and Trainstop and Trainstop
“lowered” “raised” “lowered”
Proceed Signal put back Signal put back Signal put back OK
to danger to danger to danger
Stop OK Signal in rear put Signal in rear put Signal in rear put
back to danger back to danger. back to danger
10.2.2 Due to failure of mechanical trainstop or TSS, when signal put back to danger or
signal in rear put back to danger then TSS will be “armed” and Trainstop will be
“raised”.
10.2.3 With a loss of power to the signal system the TPWS will be inoperative but the train
stops will be raised.
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
10.3.2 Design shall be submitted to MTM for engineering review in accordance with MTM
Signalling Design Technical Review Procedure L1-NAM-PRO-001.
10.3.3 It is proposed that the TPWS TSS installation be as simple as possible whilst
protecting the integrity of its operation.
10.3.4 TPWS TSS will be installed at nominated signal based on an assessment to be
carried out in accordance with VRIOGS 012.0.2 – Signalling Principles – Signal
Enforcement. There can be two scenarios for the fitment of TPWS TSS:
10.3.4.1 Scenario-1: where only one TSS may be required at nominated signal as
per the assessment for protecting the overrun.
10.3.4.2 Scenario-2: where TSS and OSS may be required to be fitted as per the
assessment for protecting of overrun. In this case TPWS TSS will also be
installed at the signal in the rear of the nominated signal in lieu of OSS
fitment and named as TSS1 and TSS2. These two TSS will be installed
and work as a pair for protecting the overrun.
10.3.5 Proving of mechanical trainstops and TPWS on to existing signalling system
requirements is to be in accordance with the following:
10.3.5.1 Signalling circuit design to be in accordance with VRIOGS 012.0.2 section
5.2 and VRIOGS 012.1 section 6.10.4.
10.3.5.2 It should be noted that proving of the TPWS trainstop sensor (TSS) when
the signal is in stop position and proving of the TPWS trainstop sensor
(TSS) when the signal is in proceed position are different as stated in
VRIOGS 012.0.2 section 5.2 and VRIOGS 012.1 section 6.10.4.
10.3.6 Relay Requirements
10.3.6.1 The proving of TPWS functionality is to be achieved through a Relay.
10.3.6.2 The Proving relay is required to be slow to drop for at least 200 ms, in
order to not indicate a failure during the changeover of signal aspects.
10.3.6.3 To achieve this a BR934A relay shall be used. Where no 50 V d.c. supply
is available, for instance in SSI areas, a BR966F7 or equivalent twin relay
shall be used.
10.3.6.4 Where possible this relay shall be located in the same apparatus case as
the TPWS baseplates, or in the same suite of apparatus cases as the
TPWS trackside enclosure containing the TPWS modules from which it is
driven.
10.3.6.5 The name of TPWS proving relays shall be TSSPR for TSS proving relay.
TPWS controls relay shall be named as TSSVR for TSS control relay.
10.3.7 Cabling Requirements
10.3.7.1 Tail cables for TSS TPWS transmitter loops shall be terminated, where
possible, directly into the apparatus case containing the TPWS control
modules.
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
10.3.7.2 When the TPWS control modules are housed on baseplates within an
existing signalling lineside apparatus case or relay room, the trackside
feeder cable and transmitter loop tail cable shall be terminated on the
outgoing cable links and screened twisted pair cable run internally via the
cable trunking to the baseplate termination.
10.3.7.3 The maximum length of the trackside feeder cable system (including the
tail cable) for correct loop operation is 200 metres in electrified area.
10.3.8 Indication Requirements
10.3.8.1 There are two different general approaches to the reporting of TPWS
failures i.e., “retro-fitment TPWS failure reporting” and “re-signalling
TPWS failure reporting”. The most appropriate way for retro-fitment failure
reporting uses the existing signal red lamp out indication, whereas re-
signalling TPWS failure reporting uses a new, dedicated TPWS indication
on the Signaller’s display system. It is preferable to have all indications
within a signal box the same. There are, however, circumstances where
this is not practicable.
10.3.8.2 The re-signalling and retro-fitment TPWS failure reporting methods shall
not be inter-mixed on the same section of a signalling panel or Signaller’s
workstation. It is however acceptable to have different reporting methods
on adjacent workstations within the same signalling centre or adjacent
sections of the same signalling panel. Each situation shall be considered
on its own merits and a suitable risk assessment performed. A decision
on which TPWS failure reporting method is used should be made at the
scheme plan production stage of a re-signalling scheme.
10.3.9 Power Requirements
10.3.9.1 There will be an intervention in the existing signalling system due to
fitment of TPWS in the metropolitan territory.
10.3.9.2 In the case of retro-fitment each individual location up to the main
transformer source power calculation is to be done for understanding of
additional power requirement.
10.3.9.3 Power calculation should be made at the scheme plan production stage.
10.4 Installation
10.4.1 The installation of the TSS shall not degrade the functionality of the existing
mechanical train stop system.
10.4.2 The integrity of the mechanical train stop protection system shall not be modified
with the introduction of TSS at selected signals.
10.4.3 Existing operational restrictions, speeds, overlaps etc. will not be addressed by the
fitment of TSS.
10.4.4 TSS will be proven to the mechanical train stop circuitry to indicate that it is
functioning correctly. Separate indication of TSS failure is not required if the failure
is indicated in the mechanical train stop logic and conveyed to the signalman or
signal maintenance staff as a failure of the mechanical train stop system.
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
10.4.5 Signals fitted with TSS shall be identified by a notice fitted to the mast of the signal.
The notice shall be of one design and used consistently where TSS is installed.
10.4.6 The installation shall be designed and constructed in accordance with good practice
and the applicable manufacturer’s instructions and codes.
10.4.7 The 110V supply to the signals TSS1 and TSS2 may be from the one transformer
but shall be on independent circuits with independent fuse protection.
10.4.8 Uninterruptible power supplies are not required for TPWS.
10.4.9 It is intended that the installation minimize cable runs and that the installation of the
TSS at each signal be a stand alone installation using the logic of the existing
mechanical train stop system for control.
Signal
Overlap End
10.5.2 The diagram below provides the indicative installation for TPWS TSS which is
required to also be installed at the signal in the rear of the nominated signal
Signal
Overlap End
Figure 2: Indicative Installation for TPSS TSS required in Rear of Nominated Signal
10.5.3 The location “X” in advance of nominated signal has been assessed by risk
assessment to be protected by the TPWS.
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
10.6 Documentation
10.6.1 The general provisions for the development and recording of documentation for
signalling works apply to the design, construction, installation and commissioning of
the TSS.
10.6.2 The control tables for the signals fitted with TSS are to be updated to record the
functionality.
10.6.3 The installation of TSS1 and TSS2 at existing signals within the metropolitan rail
network shall be indicated on the appropriate Signalling Diagram. A unique symbol
shall be devised to indicate the presence of a TSS and shall be used consistently
with each installation.
10.6.4 In the case of retro-fitment the following drawings as a minimum to be altered
10.6.4.1 Signalling Arrangement plan
10.6.4.2 Control Tables
10.6.4.3 Bonding Plan
10.6.4.4 Signalling Diagram (Litho)
10.6.4.5 Cable Running Plan
10.6.4.6 Location circuits
10.6.4.7 Power Distribution Plan (if transformer/power system require to be
altered)
10.6.4.8 Interlocking circuits or CBI data
10.6.4.9 Indication panel
11 Appendices
Appendix 1 – Responsibilities
Appendix 2 – Explanatory Notes
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
Appendix 1 - Responsibilities
A1.1 The persons nominated in the following table shall be responsible for the TPWS installation.
Functional
Responsible Person Responsibilities Comments
Area/Activity
Project Manager
Delivery of the TPWS
Design and installation to scope,
Construction Works schedule, quality and
cost
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SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
Approving Manager: Standards Development Manager Approval Date: 27/07/2012 Next Review Date: 27/04/2015
PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 13 of 14
SIGNALLING STANDARD
TRAIN PROTECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM OVERLAID
ON EXISTING MECHANICAL TRAIN STOP SYSTEM
MSST 030209-01
Version: 1 Effective from: 27 July 2012
L1-SDD-STD-001
A2.4.2 The provision of an UPS is not included in the scope of works to over lay the TPWS
on the mechanical train stop system. To do so will require the procurement of the
UPS and at each location, the provision of a new and separate monitoring system.
A2.4.3 For the UPS to be effective it has to be serviced and monitored and in failure mode
be attended to immediately. A time delay between detection of a failure and
attention for remediation is inevitable.
A2.5 Failure of TPWS
A2.5.1 Where possible, the monitoring of the TPWS within the mechanical train stop
system is to be done using the existing logic of the train stop system to minimize
the installation costs. Failures of the TPWS will be interpreted as failure of the
signalling system comprising both the mechanical train stop system and TPWS
which the signal maintainer will address.
A2.5.2 The project funds do not provide for separate diagnostics with cables and
indications set uniquely for TPWS.
A2.6 Outcomes
A2.6.1 The installation of TPWS as described has the following outcomes:
a. Locations identified as being at risk are protected;
b. Installation costs are contained;
c. The number of locations that can be addressed within the allocated funding is
maximized;
d. Failures of the TPWS are detected in the signalling system;
e. The effects of device failures and a loss of power are mitigated with the TSS
installation;
f. Only a device failure or a loss of power simultaneously as a train approaches
the location remains as a risk.
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