82 Book Reviews / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 78-99

Logos: Rational argument in ancient rhetoric, ed. Jonathan Powell (BICS Supple-
ment 96; London 2007)

The six papers collected here were originally presentations at a 2005 one-day
colloquium held at Royal Holloway, University of London. In his editorial intro-
duction, Jonathan Powell explains the colloquium’s purpose succinctly. The study
of rhetoric has traditionally been divided into ethos, pathos, and logos. ‘Character’
and ‘the passions’ in rhetoric have been hot topics for many years; logical argu-
ment has generally been neglected. We scholars of rhetoric, Powell argues, should
do a better job of covering this part of our field. In the process, we might dispel
the perception that rhetoric is synonymous with deception or irrationality. We
might also do a service to the field of classics by showing, in this climate of height-
ened concern for ‘learning outcomes’ and ‘aims and objectives,’ that the study of
classical antiquity can encompass ‘the ultimate “transferable skill” ’ (8).
The contributors to the volume do a fine job of showing how rational argumen-
tation in classical rhetoric and oratory can be better appreciated. Chapters are
arranged in the chronological order of topics. Two deal with Athenian oratory,
two with Cicero, and two concern the teaching of classical rhetoric in later epochs,
namely, the Renaissance and the present.
Michael Gagarin (“Rational argument in early Athenian oratory”) considers
two old but still influential ideas about forensic speaking in the time of Antiphon:
first, the Platonic notion that oratory was little more than flattery and emotional
appeals; second, the thesis, once argued by Solmsen, that Antiphon’s oratory cen-
ters on forms of automatic proof, such as the oath-swearing and the testimony of
slaves taken under torture (the basanos). Gagarin examines Antiphon 1 (On the
Stepmother) as well as the First Tetralogy as counterexamples. In these, he finds that
references to oaths and basanos are bound up in rational arguments. For example,
in Antiphon 1, the opponent’s refusal to submit slaves to interrogation permits the
logical inference that he has something to hide.
Christos Kremmydas (‘Logical argumentation in Demosthenes’ Against Leptines’)
examines Demosthenes’ attack on a law that would have abolished the tax-exempt
status traditionally awarded to distinguished citizens and their families. For many
readers, especially those who know him mainly for his feud with Aeschines and his
campaign against Philip, Demosthenes’ passion is among the most salient features
of his oratory. Kremmydas thus makes an interesting point by showing that this
speech, which marked the beginning the orator’s political career, is primarily a
work of logical argumentation.
The two chapters treating Cicero both happen to focus on Pro Milone, and both
address ways in which that speech is exceptional, or appears to be exceptional,
compared Cicero’s other works. Jacob Wisse (‘The riddle of the Pro Milone’) con-

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI: 10.1163/187254708X397450

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 Book Reviews / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3 (2009) 78-99 83

siders Cicero’s unusually close adherence to the rules of handbooks in this speech,
and concludes that it is a conscious strategy, intended to give the semblance of
rationality to a bad case. Lynn Fortheringham (‘Having your cake and eating it’)
deals with ways Cicero manages to combine the speech’s two seemingly incompat-
ible lines of argument; specifically, that Milo killed Clodius in self-defense, and
that killing Clodius was a noble action in any case. Both chapters are perhaps not
so much about Cicero’s use of rational argument as his efforts to conceal irratio-
nality; then again, if Cicero tried hard to give the impression of arguing logically,
it strongly suggests that logical argument was what his audience expected. Overall,
both will likely be received as useful contributions to ongoing debates surround-
ing Pro Milone.
The final two chapters will perhaps have the broadest appeal. Peter Mack (‘Rheto-
ric and dialectic in the Renaissance’) approaches the volume’s theme from a post
Classical perspective. Is rhetoric at odds with rationality? Certainly not for the
Renaissance humanists, who viewed Aristotle’s Topics as a rhetorical manual and
taught dialectic as a technique of rhetorical invention. I learned a great deal from
this chapter, and I suspect many classicists, including specialists in rhetoric, will
enjoy reading it as a concise primer on rhetorical education in the Renaissance.
Malcolm Heath (“Teaching rhetorical argument today”) gives an entertaining
account of teaching argumentation through classical rhetoric, particularly stasis
theory (classification of disputes), as explained in Hermogenes’ On Issues. (Heath’s
expert summary of Hermogenes is enough make this chapter a valuable resource.)
Teaching stasis theory, Heath argues, shows that it was and is indeed a practical
and efficient system for generating arguments. He also makes it sound like a
lot of fun, and readers who teach rhetoric will perhaps find themselves contem-
plating what it would take to create a similar course. I wonder if he would con-
sider writing a textbook along the lines of Bruce Frier’s Casebook in the Roman Law
of Delict.
In sum, this is a fine collection. It will be of greatest interest to those studying
(or teaching) rhetoric, though it is accessible to any professional scholar or advanced
student, thanks to clear writing, ample quotations where appropriate, and transla-
tions of all Greek and Latin.

Michael de Brauw
North Central College, Naperville, Illinois
debrauw.michael@gmail.com

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