STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Cases for 2/2/2022

1. Caltex Philippines Inc. vs. Palomar, L-19650, September 29, 1966
2. Allarde vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103578 January 29, 1993
3. People vs Amigo, G.R. No. 116719 January 18, 1996
4. Songco et al vs National Labor Relations Commission, GR Nos. 50999-5100,
March 23, 1990
5. Re: Request Of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the special
allowance for judges be included in the computation of his retirement benefits,
A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1868: August 13, 2004

G.R. No. L-19650             September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL

FACTS:

In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for participants to estimate the actual

number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.Participants were

neither required consideration nor to pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products were also required to be made. Entry

forms were to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can would be provided for the

deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the

transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for

the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery provisions of the Revised

Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated

the provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor.

Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest violated the prohibitive provisions of

the Postal Law.

Issue:

Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

HELD:

The Postal Law does not allow “any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or

personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".

The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a “lottery” nor a “gift enterprise” but rather

a gratuitous distribution of property by chance, which the law does not prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all

schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs,

etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize;

and third, chance. The contest in question, lacking the element of “consideration”, cannot be deemed a lottery. The

rules of the contest made no mention of a valuable consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the

chance to draw a prize. The term “gift enterprise” also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there

is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open

to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

By virtue of noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element

of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other

meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith . Hence, if lottery is

prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly,

there is not in the law the slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift

enterprise" therein included.

Allarde v. CoA
G.R. No. 103578
January 29, 1993
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:

DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE:

This case is about the extra allowance that Judge Allarde receives(d)
from the Municipality of Muntinlupa.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Rodolfo T. Allarde (Allarde) was the presiding Judge of Branch 80,
Metropolitan Trail Court in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He had resigned and it
was accepted January 13, 1997. He applied for retirement which the
Supreme Court (SC) approved on July 11, 1989
In addition to Allarde's retirement pay, GSIS included P240,000
representing the 5 year lump sum of his P4,000 allowance from the
Municipality of Muntinlupa. This was to be charged to the Municipality of
Muntinlupa in pursuance of Batas Pambansa Blg. 866, which was subject to
the availability of funds.
The Metro Manila Authority had received news regarding this and had
denied Allarde of this benefit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Allarde filled a his claim on the Commission of Audit (CoA), which the
CoA denied on. Allarde filed a memorandum/motion for reconsideration of
the decision but CoA reiterated it's deny on his claim. He then again filed a
second reconsideration which met the same fate, hence this petition for
review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Allowance provided by the Municipality of
Muntinlupa is included in his retirement pay.
RULING
Petition is
DENIED
Under Sec. 3 RA No. 910 as amended by PD No. 1438
"Sec. 3. Upon retirement, a justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, or
a judge of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, Agrarian Relations, Tax
Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, city or municipal court, or any other court
hereafter established shall be automatically entitled to a lump sum of five years’
gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly
aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances he was receiving on
the date of his retirement; Provided, however, that if the reason for the retirement be
any permanent disability contracted during his incumbency in office and prior to the
date of retirement he shall receive only a gratuity equivalent to ten years’ salary and
allowances aforementioned with no further annuity payable monthly during the rest of
the retiree’s natural life."
cralaw virtua1aw library

CONSTRUCTION - Where the law is clear and categorical, then there is only
room for implementation
It is clear that allowances that may be included must be either
transportation, living and representation allowance
. Allarde failed to prove
that the allowance he received from the Municipality of Muntinlupa was
either of this provided, thus cannot be considered as retirement gratituity.
The Solicitor General added that such allowances does not constitute
an integral part of the judges remuneration for it
MAY or MAY NOT
be given
by the local government and is dependent on the liberality of the matter.
Since the retirement law was not intended to deal unequally and
unfairly with the judges, it would be unfair for Judges of the same rank if
these allowances are mandatory since different municipalities have different
economic capacities. Some Judges may receive more while others may
receive less.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the
Commission on Audit, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED
SO ORDERED.

The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee

Vs.
Patricio Amigo alias "Bebot," Accused-Appellant

G.R. No. 116719, January 18, 1996

Facts:

On December 29, 1989 at around 1:00 Pm, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera
back home, with his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two
year old son. An accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw
being driven by one Virgillio Abogado, with Abogado was the accused, Patricio Amigo alias
"Bebot". The collision caused slight damage to the right bumper of the Tamaraw.

While Abogado and Benito were having a verbal confrontation, Patricio approached Benito
asking the latter to leave the incident as it was only a minor incident. However, Benito said
that Patricio should not interfere, which made Patricio irritated and caused the latter to stab
Benito, rendering the victim into a critical condition which later caused his death due to a
sepsis infection that has already circulated in his body.

Patricio Amigo was charged initially with Frustrated murder, but was modified to the crime of
murder to which he was convicted with a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-Appellant
claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harch as a penalty and pleads
for sympathy.

Issue:

Whether or Not the penalty imposed upon the accused "Reclusion Perpetua" be modified or
reduced by virtue of Section 19 (1) of Article III of the Constitution which prohibits the
imposition of death penalty.
Held:

No. The Supreme Court hold that Article III, Section 19 (1) does not change the penalty
periods prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only in so far as it
prohibits the imposition of death penalty. The range of the medium and minimum penalties
remain the same.

Thus, a person originally subject to death penalty and another who committed the murder
without the attendance of any modifying circumstances will now be both punishable with the
same medium period although the former is conceitedly more guilty than the latter. But that
is the will of the constitution and the duty of the court is to apply the law, disregarding the
sympathy or pity for an accused. Dura Lex Sed Lex.

Songco, et al. vs. National Labor

Relations Commission
FACTS: Zuelig filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of Songco,
and others, on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. During the hearing,
the parties agreed that the sole issue to be resolved was the basis of the separation pay
due. The salesmen received monthly salaries of at least P400.00 and commission for
every sale they made.

The Collective Bargaining Agreements between Zuelig and the union of which Songco,
et al. were members contained the following provision: "Any employee who is
separated from employment due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off, not
due to the fault of said employee, shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity
in an amount equivalent to one (1) month's salary per year of service."

The Labor Arbiter ordered Zuelig to pay Songco et al., separation pay equivalent to their
one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service
with the company.

The National Labor Relations Commission sustained the Arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included
in the monthly salary of Songco, et al. for the purpose of computing their separation
pay.

RULING:

In the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of
the basic salary of the employee, but also of the transportation and emergency living
allowances.

Even if the commissions were in the form of incentives or encouragement, so that the
salesman would be inspired to put a little more industry on jobs particularly assigned to
them, still these commissions are direct remunerations for services rendered which
contributed to the increase of income of the employee. Commission is the recompense
compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustee, receiver, factor,
broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his
transactions or on the profit to the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman and
the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate that
commissions are part of Songco, et al's wage or salary.

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that some salesmen do not receive any basic
salary, but depend on commissions and allowances or commissions alone, although an
employer-employee relationships exists.

If the opposite view is adopted, i.e., that commissions do not form part of the wage or
salary, then in effect, we will be saying that this kind of salesmen do not receive any
salary and, therefore, not entitled to separation pay in the event of discharge from
employment. This narrow interpretation is not in accord with the liberal spirit of the labor
laws, and considering the purpose of separation pay which is, to alleviate the difficulties
which confront a dismissed employee thrown to the streets to face the harsh necessities
of life.
In Soriano vs. NLRC (155 SCRA 124), we held that the commissions also claimed by
the employee (override commission plus net deposit incentive) are not properly
includible in such base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual market
transactions attributable to the petitioner [salesman]. Since the commissions in the
present case were earned by actual transactions attributable to Song, et al., these
should be included in their separation pay. In the computation thereof, what should be
taken into account is the average commission earned during their last year of
employment.

Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% of the special allowance for
judges be includedin the computation of his retirement benefits; Callejo Sr., J.,
AM No. RTJ-04-1868I.

The Facts:

In his letter dated May 26, 2004 addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Judge
Tito G. Gustilo requested that, considering his retirement is “barely one month from
November 2004,” the second tranche of the Special Allowance granted to judges under
the Republic Act No. 9227 included in the computation of his retirement benefits. In
support thereof, Judge Gustilo points out that “in the past, Judges who retire in October
are included in the grant of the December 13th month pay, invoking the “liberal policy”
of the Court in granting benefits to the underpaid Trial Court Judges.”

To recall, Rep. Act No. 9227 granting additional compensation in the form of Special
Allowance to judges took effect in November 11, 2003. The special allowances shall be
equivalent to 100% of the basic monthly salary specified for their respective salary
grades to be implemented uniformly in 4 years in such sums or amounts equivalent to
25% of the basic salaries of the positions covered thereof. Subsequent implementation
shall be in such sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can be supported by
the funding source specified in Section 3 thereof. It is likewise reiterated that for
purposes of computing the retirement benefits, only the special allowance actually
received and that which accrued at the time of retirement shall be included.

II. The Issue:

Whether or not the Court can adopt a liberal stance in interpreting the retirement laws in
favor of retiree Judge Gustilo.

III. The Ruling:

No. The court denied Judge Gustilo's request for the inclusion of the second 25% of the
special allowance in the computation of his retirement benefits because Sec 5 of Rep.
Act No. 9227 is quite clear and unambiguous which, in plain reading, shows that only
the allowances “actually received” and the tranche or tranches “already received and
implemented,” upon date of retirement, shall be included in the computation of the
retirement benefits. As such, there is no room for interpretation but only simple
application of the law.