THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1 - The Micropolitics of Partnering

After recognizing same-sex cohabitation since 2001, in 2010 Portugal became the 8th country worldwide, and
the 6th in Europe, to allow same-sex marriage (Santos, 2013). Spain has had an inclusive marriage law since
2005 ascribing full equality to spouses regardless of sexual orientation (Pichardo, 2011). In Italy marriage is still
strictly heteronormative and same-sex cohabitation is not legally recognized (Bertone et al, 2003; Saraceno,
2003; Trappolin, 2008). None of the countries considers new forms of conjugality, including ‘living apart
together’ (LATs) and polyamorous relationships. Hence, partnering across Southern Europe has acquired
different status, opportunities and impossibilities.

2 - The Micropolitics of Parenting 

Two major value-discourses are often employed in Southern European countries when debating issues
concerning same-sex parenthood – ‘the family’ value-discourse and ‘the child’ value-discourse –, both of which
tend to disregard the notion of family that the LGBT movement demands (Santos, 2012). In short, these value-
discourses stem from a heteronormative representation of family, based on assumptions about the biological
complementarity of men and women, who are expected to be couples, monogamous and have children together
(Roseneil et al, 2013). These are entrenched cultural values discursively expressed by key social actors (e.g. the
clergy, politicians, teachers, journalists, etc.) who, in so doing, contribute towards reinforcing these values as
dominant assumptions. In relation to issues of parenting, the three countries under analysis present different
legal frameworks, including prohibitive laws in Italy and Portugal, on the one hand, and unrestricted same-sex
adoption and recent changes in assisted conception in Spain, on the other hand (Roseneil et al., 2012).

3 - The Micropolitics of Friendship

One of the most passionate debates in the current sociology of personal lives is the one between proponents of
the individualisation theory (Bauman, 2003; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim; 2002)  and those who offer an
opposing theory of relationality (Roseneil and Budgeon, 2004), who nonetheless agree with individualisation
theorists on one crucial point: we are experiencing an unprecedented shift in the sphere of personal lives, in
which ‘choice’ seems important. In this debate, the role of friendship acquires a central place.
The sort of willing – ‘confluent’, Giddens (1992) would say – relationship that ‘modern’ friends have, and what
this has to say about issues of citizenship, care and choice, is so different from previous models that authors
such as Weeks et al. (2001) suggest that a ‘friendship ethics’ is the ideal guiding principle behind many sexual
relationships in present times. In their study of friendship, Roseneil and Budgeon have concluded that “there
was a high degree of reliance on friends […], particularly for the provision of care and support in everyday life,
to the extent that it could be said that friendship operated as an ethical practice for many” (2004: 146). The
centrality of friendship is even more striking when considering the personal lives of lesbians, gay men,
bisexuals and transgendered people (Nardi, 1992). Friends as family further contributes towards destabilizing
the heterosexual/ homosexual binary (Roseneil, 2002, 2004), to the extent that it challenges heteronormative
expectations about who belongs to the most intimate domestic space and who does not.

Source: https://www.ces.uc.pt/intimate/index.php?id=10437&id_lingua=2&pag=10447
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1- Sexual orientation and gender identity in international law
In 1992, in Toonen v Australia[1], the Human Rights Committee found that the anti sodomy law of Tasmania
was violative of provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.(ICCPR) The Committee
found that Tasmania’s sodomy law violates the right to privacy in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The Committee also explicitly observed that ‘the reference to “sex” in articles 2, paragraph 1,
and 26 is to be taken as including sexual orientation.’ This brief finding, (without any further explanation) in
effect read the reference to sex in the equality (Article 2) and non-discrimination clauses (Article 26) of the
ICCPR as inclusive of ‘sexual orientation’.
While the concept of sexual orientation was first articulated in international law in 1992, it took longer for the
concept of gender identity to be recognized. In fact as late as 2003 when Brazil proposed a resolution at the then
Commission on Human Rights on ‘Human rights and sexual orientation’, the resolution ‘expressed deep
concern at the occurrence of violations of human rights in the world against persons on the grounds of their
sexual orientation.’[2] (Italics added) Gender identity was wholly absent from the framework of international
human rights law.

2- What do the notions of sexual orientation and gender identity enable?

To understand the breadth of what the terms sexual orientation and gender identity could encompass it would be
useful to go back to the definitions of the two terms embodied in the Yogyakarta Principles: ‘sexual orientation’
refers ‘to each person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and
sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more than one gender. ‘gender
identity’ to refer to each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may
not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if
freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means) and other
expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms. The Yogyakarta Principles filled a crucial gap
as even though international law used these concepts it never defined them. For example, Toonen used the term
‘sexual orientation’ without quite clarifying what it meant. The fact that the Yogyakarta Principles defined these
terms was eagerly seized upon by jurisdictions around the world.

3- Limitation of a Sexual Rights framing for SOGI issues

The SOGI framing is sometimes critiqued as not being inclusive enough and the concept of a sexuality mandate
or a sexual rights mandate is put forward as a more inclusive framework. This again needs to be tested more
closely. The strength of a sexual rights mandate is that it provides a framework under which a host of issues can
come together. It could include comprehensive sexuality education, sex workers rights, LGBTI rights and
abortion rights. As such it offers the alluring prospect of an even broader tent which can encompass a diverse
range of issues.
While it is important that a sexual rights mandate be established as a way of taking forward struggles to which
most progressive groups are committed to, it would be a mistake to see the sexual rights framework as being
adequate to answer the concerns of the range of sub groups on whose behalf it claims to speak on.
Looking at it from the point of view of the struggles around sexual orientation and gender identity, a sexual
rights framing leaves out some aspects to which a SOGI framework is more sensitive to. To highlight just two
immediate concerns.
A sexual rights framework removes from the equation the dynamic equilibrium between sexual and orientation.
As noted above, the Yogyakarta definition of sexual orientation allows for the interplay between the ‘sexual’
and the question of identity and personhood. In a narrower sexual rights framework, the depth which the
concept of identity and personhood yields is sacrificed for the breadth that a sexual rights framework may
achieve. A sexual rights framing also does disservice to the notion of gender identity. As noted above, people
are targeted by both the state and civil society on grounds of their gender expression which may or may not
have anything to do with their sexuality. To frame concerns around gender identity in terms of sexual rights is
reductive as the complex interplay of gender expression and identity, may have little or nothing to do with a
sexual rights framework.
Source: http://arc-international.net/global-advocacy/human-rights-council/sexual-orientation-and-gender-
identity-a-necessary-conceptual-framework-for-advancing-rights/