Seat number (in numbers): 381043

Seat number (in words): Three lakh eighty-one thousand and forty-three

Semester: 1(October 2020)

Name of the Course: Family Law I

Q 1. (b)

Answer:

Prenuptial agreement essentially refers to a contract between both the parties before
marriage stating the fair division of money, property or assets at the time of divorce or death. It
also lays down clearly what the couple intend to do at the time of marriage or after it. It also
has other benefits such as protecting a person from his/her partners debt loan, preventing one’s
business or estate from getting divided, ensuring spousal support in terms of monthly
maintenance or alimony, guaranteeing remarriage rights and taking care of child support and
custody issues. Free consent and honest declaration of individual assets and liabilities is
required.

Referring to the law relating to prenuptial agreements in Australia:

Prenuptial agreements also known as the binding financial agreements, became enforceable in
Australia in 2000 with the enforceability of the Family Law Amendment Act, 2000. Particular
provisions related to the oversight to be given to such agreements by family lawyers were
stated in Part VIIIA of the Family Law Act. For such an agreement to be binding, it must be in
writing signed by both parties, the original should be given to one party and a copy to the
other, the extent of any spousal maintenance should be stated, and both the parties having
received independent legal services should be stated along with a certificate annexed by the
lawyers in this respect. Such an agreement will not be binding if obtained by fraud, under
duress, by mistake or by undue influence, if there is an impracticability for all or part of the
agreement to be carried out, if there has been a material change in the care of a child which
leads to hardship, if a party engages in an unconscionable conduct when making the agreement
whereby one spouse is at a disadvantage and the agreement is contrary to good conscience.

Looking at the case of Thorne v Kennedy (2017) HCA 49:

In this case, the husband and wife who married had a large age difference. Ms Thorne was 36
years old when she married Mr Kennedy, who was 67 years old at the time.

Prior to the marriage, there was also a huge wealth disparity between the parties. At the time of
the marriage, Ms Thorne had no significant assets, but Mr Kennedy had assets valued between
$18 and $24 million.

Ms Thorne was living abroad at the time and the couple met online in 2006. Ms. Thorne arrived
in Australia in February 2007, seven months after meeting Mr. Kennedy. The wedding date was
selected for September 30, 2007 later that year.

Mr Kennedy drew out a prenuptial agreement and warned Ms Thorne that if she did not sign it,
the wedding would be cancelled. On September 19, 2007, 11 days before the wedding, he gave
Ms Thorne this agreement for the first time. He took her to see a lawyer the next day so she
could get legal guidance on the deal. Ms Thorne's family had already come to Australia for the
wedding, and all of the wedding preparations had been completed.

When considering Mr Kennedy's riches, the solicitor who advised Ms Thorne on the agreement
stated that the sum Ms Thorne would get on the dissolution of the marriage was "pitiously
small." She also encouraged her not to sign the contract, telling Ms Thorne that it was the worst
of its kind she had ever seen. She also stated that Ms Thorne appeared to be "under severe
stress" as she prepared for the wedding, and that she appeared to have been placed in a
position where the agreement had to be signed in order for the wedding to go, regardless of
whether it was fair.

Despite legal advice that it was not in her best interests, Ms Thorne signed the agreement four
days before the wedding day. She also signed another agreement following her marriage to Mr.
Kennedy, which had similar stipulations.

The prenuptial agreement's enforceability was called into doubt after the marriage ended. A trial
judge in the Family Court first evaluated whether Ms Thorne signed the agreement under
duress, undue influence, or as a result of unconscionable conduct. The deal was reached under
pressure and unfair coercion, according to this court. Mr Kennedy took his case to the Full
Family Court, where his appeal was upheld and the trial judge's decision was overturned. Ms
Thorne then took the case to the High Court, where she was determined to be correct. The
contract was deemed to be voidable by the majority because it was entered into as a result of
undue influence and unconscionable conduct. The remaining judges found that there had been
unconscionable conduct but not undue influence. It could be said that the poor behaviour of Mr
Kennedy caused the agreement to be voidable.

There are issues that arise when a marital agreement entered outside Australia does not
conform in every respect to the provisions of the Australian Family Law will be enforceable in
Australia. This creates momentously important issues when spouses who are parties to a non-
Australian prenuptial or a post-nuptial agreement relocate to Australia or if one spouse is of
Australian Nationality or there exists another basis for the family court of Australia to have
jurisdiction over a potential divorce case.

Referring to the law relating to prenuptial agreements in India:

In the Indian Society with a gradual shift towards a society that places more emphasis on
individual freedoms and choices, the concept of prenuptial agreements is gaining popularity
although the legal validity of such agreements is still not clear.

Indian Contract Act, 1872:

Despite meeting the essentials of Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which states that
all agreements are contracts if they are made by a free will of the parties competent to contract
for a lawful consideration, and with a lawful object and are not expressly declared to be void.
Courts can legally decline the enforceability of those contracts that are found to be violating the
public policy under Section 23 of the Indian Contracts Act, 1872, which hereby states that the
consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless the court regards it as opposed to
public policy thereby stating such agreements to be void.
Special Marriage Act, 1954:

If a marriage is legally solemnized under this act, a prenuptial agreement is considered to be

legally binding if it is provided with relevant documents to the registrar.

Divorce Act, 1869:

Section 40 of the Divorce act is the only section that clearly deals with prenuptial agreements.
This section states that before passing a rule on the termination of the marriage, the District
Court will examine the existence of prenuptial or post-nuptial agreements. The state of Goa, the
only state with a Uniform Civil Code permits prenuptial agreements under family law for the
purpose of distribution of land.

Case Laws:

1. Mohammed Khan v Mst. Shamali (1971):

In this case, a prenuptial arrangement was entered between the couple where the partner had
agreed to reside in his father in-law's home, and forgetting to do as such he would have to pay
a measure of money as use towards the wedding expenditure. It additionally guaranteed that
inability to fulfill this measure at last results in divorce. For a long time, the spouse fled and
wouldn't fulfill the conjugal standards. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir decided that it
didn't struggle with public arrangement nor with Muslim rule. The Court then, at that point,
acknowledged the agreement's legitimateness.

2. Sunita Devendra Deshprabhu v Sita Devendra Deshprabhu (2016):

A prenuptial arrangement was signed in May 1951 by Raghunath Deshprabhu and Sita
Deshprabhu, refering to provisions concerning the allocation of properties. Raghunath
Deshprabhu died in November 1987. Sita Deshprabhu died subsequent to filing a suit. In the
feeling of the arrangement, it was held that there were no past rights. The course of action
between the pair was presented that they had settled on the wealth splitting plan. The High
Court of Mumbai then, at that point, tracked down the prenuptial consent to settle before the
restricting gatherings on the distribution of properties.

It can be thereby said that, though Australia does have a law for prenuptial agreements it does
not have a specific provision for marriages related to the people who do not belong to Australian
Nationalities or if one of the spouses does belong to an Australian Nationality. Whereas India
does not have a clear law related to prenuptial agreements, it does have provisions for
maintenance and alimony relating to Special Marriage Act and Foreign Marriage Act, causing
less of an issue.
Q 2. (a)

Answer:

Divorce under Hindu Personal Law:

Divorce under the Hindu personal law is recognized under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which
applies as per Section 2 of the Act to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms
or developments, to any person who is a Buddhist, Jain or Sikh by religion, to any other person
domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew
by religion. 

Section 13 of the Act provides for the dissolution of the marriage or divorce, for which either
spouse can file an application before the appropriate court for granting a decree.

As the question demands, grounds relating to dissolution of marriage for a wife only . There
are then some specific grounds which are available to a wife who may seek a decree of
divorce on the ground that:

1. That the husband already married another woman, who was alive at the time the
application for divorce, is filed.

2. Divorce can also be sought by the wife if the husband is guilty of rape, bestiality or
sodomy. 

3. Where a decree for maintenance was passed in favour of the wife and there is no
cohabitation between them for a period of one year or more. 

4. Where the marriage of the wife took place when she was below the age of 15 years
(consummated or not), and where she repudiated the marriage before attaining the age
of 18 years.

Divorce under Muslim Personal Law:

The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, under Section 2 states that

notwithstanding any custom or usages in matters of dissolution of marriage, where the parties
are Muslims will be governed by the Shariat or the Muslim Personal Law.

Divorce by wife:

The divorce by wife can be categorized under three categories:

I. Khula

II. Talaaq-i-tafweez
III. By Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

1. Khula:

• The word khula, in its original sense means "to draw" or "dig up" or "to take off"
such as taking off one's clothes or garments. It is said that the spouses are like clothes
to each other and when they take khula each takes off his or her clothes, i.e., they get
rid of each other.

• In law it is said is to signify an agreement between the spouses for dissolving a

connubial union in lieu of compensation paid by the wife to her husband out of her
property. Although consideration for Khula is essential, the actual release of the dower
or delivery of property constituting the consideration is not a condition precedent for
the validity of the khula. Once the husband gives his consent, it results in an
irrevocable divorce.

• Fatwai-i-Alamgiri lays down that ―when married parties disagree and are apprehensive
that they cannot observe the bounds prescribed by the divine laws, that is, can not
perform the duties imposed on them by the conjugal relationship, the woman can
release herself from the tie by giving up some property in return in consideration of
which, the husband is to give her, a khula; and when they have done this, a talaq-ul-
bian would take place.

• The husband has no power of cancelling the 'khula' on the ground that the
consideration has not been paid. The consideration can be anything, usually it is
mahr, the whole or part of it. But it may be any property though not illusory.

• No particular form is required. Proposal may be made either by the use of the use of
the word ―khula or by the expressions conveying the sense of sale and purchase.
Acceptance must be made at the same meting. If a wife says, ―Give me a khul in
exchange of my dower and the husband replies, ―I do, a valid dissolution of
marriage comes into effect.

2. Talaaq-i-tafweez

Talaq-i-tafweez or delegated divorce is recognised among both, Shias and Sunnis.

• The Muslim husband is free to delegate his power of pronouncing divorce to his wife
or any other person. He may delegate the power absolutely or conditionally,
temporarily or permanently. A permanent delegation of power is revocable but a
temporary delegation of power is not.

• This delegation must be made distinctly in favour of the person to whom the
power is delegated, and the purpose of delegation must be clearly stated.

• The power of talaaq may be delegated to his wife and as Faizee observes, "this form
 of delegated divorce is perhaps the most potent weapon in the hands of a Muslim
wife to obtain freedom without the intervention of any court and is now beginning to
be fairly common in India.

• In Sainuddin v. Latifunnessa there was an agreement between husband and wife

under which, the husband delegated to the wife, his own power of giving three talaqs in
the event of his marrying a second wife without the permission of the first. The husband
took second wife without the permission of the first. Accordingly, the first wife gave
herself three talaqs under the authority of the tafweez. The court held that as the
event upon the happening of which, the wife was given the authority to divorce herself
was valid under Muslim law, and since that event has happened, the divorce by the wife
was effective and the marriage must dissolve.

3. Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939:

• It became law on 17th March 1939, and ever since, it has been hailed as one of
the most progressive enactments passed by the legislature within recent yeas.

• It achieved two objects: It restored to Muslim wives, an important right accorded to

them by the Shariat, and it treated all Muslims alike.

• Under the act, 9 grounds have been provided under which a Muslim wife may
obtain a decree for dissolution of her marriage.

• A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the
dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the following grounds, namely—
1. That the whereabouts of the husband have not been known for a period of four years;
2. That the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a
period of two years;
3. That the husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of seven years or
upwards;
4. That the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable cause, his marital
obligations for a period of three years;
5. That the husband was impotent at the time of the marriage and continues to be so;
6. That the husband has been insane for a period of two years or, is suffering from
leprosy or a virulent venereal disease;
7. That she, having been given in marriage by her father or other guardian before she
attained the age of fifteen years, repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of
eighteen years; provided that the marriage has not been consummated;
8. That the husband treats her with cruelty, that is to say, -
o habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruelty of conduct even
 if such conduct does not amount to physical ill-treatment, or
o associates with women of evil repute or leads an infamous life, or
o attempts to force her to lead an immoral life, or
o disposes of her property or prevents her in exercising her legal rights over it, or
o obstructs her in the observance of her religious profession or practice, or
o if he has more wives than one, does not treat her equitably in accordance with
the injunctions of the Quran;

9. On any other ground which is recognized as valid for the dissolution of marriages
under Muslim law.

Thus, these are the grounds relating to dissolution of marriage for a wife only in both the Hindu
Personal Law as well as the Muslim Personal Law.

Q 3. (a)

Answer:
The phrase "live in relationship" refers to a situation in which two individuals get together
and decide to reside with one another for a lengthy or permanent period of time without
marrying.
There have been several debates on how maintenance would be handled in a live-in
relationship.
According, to the laws in India, live-in relationships have been granted legal recognition
although they are not very well accepted in the Indian society. Through the case of Indra
Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, AIR 2014 SC 309 there were parameters laid down which would
make it easier to define the terms in a live-in relationship. The court gave detailed guidelines
basing it on the factual and legal position. Those guidelines were as follows:

1) Duration of period of relationship

2) Pooling of resources

3) Domestic arrangements

4) Sexual relationship

5) Children

6) Socialising in public

7) Intention and conduct of the parties

In the case of Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar, 2010 AIR SCW 6497, the court considered
whether a man and a woman's living together would enhance the presumption of a legitimate
marriage between them. It also addressed the question of whether the term "wife" in Section
125 of the CrPC, 1973 should be read to include unmarried women. The court ruled that the
spouses' simple wish to love each other as husband and wife was insufficient. It is argued that
the status of marriage cannot be conferred or taken away only on the basis of intention. There
is likewise no reason to believe that the term "wife" in Section 125 of the Code should be read
to encompass a woman who is not legally married.
However, in cases where a man has lived with a woman for a long time, even though they may
not have met the legal requirements for a valid marriage, the relationship can be considered a
"way of marriage," and the woman is eligible for maintenance, the law will be enforced in its
true spirit and essence. Furthermore, the court stated in regard to Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 that the Act itself gives a very broad meaning to the word
"domestic partnerships," taking it outside the generally defined boundaries of a married
connection in the nature of marriage. As a result, a woman in a live-in relationship is entitled to
all of the provisions of the Act.
The key issue of female non-maintenance in a live-in relationship was addressed, which is
considered domestic abuse under the P.W.D.V.A., 2005.
The court did observe, however, that a marriage-like bond remains despite disagreements or
disruptions, even if they do not reside in the same house as required by law. A live-in
relationship, unlike a legal marriage, is entirely voluntary. When one of the partners decides not
to live together any longer, the relationship ends.
Cohabiting with a married person is not considered a true relationship, according to the court. A
party would be a polygamist or concubine in an adulterous relationship. When a person
engages into a relationship with another knowing he is married, the legal consequences of a
true marriage do not apply.
Since as a result, it was decided that a woman in a live-in relationship can only seek
maintenance under the P.W.D.V.A., 2005 if one of the parties is not married or has a living
husband, or if one of them is having an unfaithful relationship, as this would render the alliance
void.

Q 4. (b)

Answer:
A custom, to be valid, must be observed continuously for a very long time without any
interruption. Further, a practice must be supported not only for a very long time, but it must
also be supported by the opinion of the general public and morality. However, every custom
need not become law. For example, the Hindu Marriages Act, 1955 prohibits marriages which
are within the prohibited degrees of relationship. However, the Act still permits marriages within
the prohibited degree of relationship if there is a proven custom within a certain community.

Custom can simply be explained as those long-established practices or unwritten rules

which have acquired binding or obligatory character.

In ancient societies, custom was considered as one of the most important sources of law; In
fact, it was considered as the real source of law. With the passage of time and the advent of
modern civilization, the importance of custom as a source of law diminished and other sources
such as judicial precedents and legislation gained importance.
Customs change and differ from land to land. One country might think that bigamy is right, but
the other might think that it is ethically and morally wrong which will derive the development of
bigamy laws in these countries.

Judicial pronouncements make precedents. Precedents are also a source of law. Many laws
are developed based on past judicial pronouncements. These lay down principles and legal
stances on the areas which were abstract in nature in the past. Judicial precedents help in
clearing the grey areas of law and converting them in legally viable sources of law.

Origin of Customs:
Regarding the origin of customs there are different and divergent views. Historical jurists of
Germany say that they originate from the common consciousness of people. Some say that
man’s nature of imitation is the main cause of origin of customs. There is a series of reputed
jurists who assert that judicial decisions are the basis of customs.

Nature of custom: It must be of a judicial nature with legal references and relations. A
practice with no legal backing cannot be formed a source of law. It shall not be called a legal
custom.

Nature of Judicial Pronouncements: They must be in the light with valid legal acumen. It
should not be arbitrary. It is based on the changing environment and nature of the society and
people. It is used to cover up the grey areas and convert them into valid legal frames.

Types of Customs:

1. Customs with Sanction: These are enforceable by law. These are called legal customs
in the developed jurisprudential way. They are absolute in nature. According to the
theory, they are negative in its operation as they make some consequences illegitimate.
For ex: If the marriage is not done with proper customary guidelines, it is considered
void. Obligatory enforcement is the key aspect here.

2. Customs without sanction: These are not enforceable by law as they are mere
customs that are not relevant at a larger extent. They still have importance in the society
and in the conduct of the people. These kinds of customs are non-obligatory in nature
and are followed because of public opinion. They are social norms. For ex: how to dress
for a particular event and place, respecting the elders, etc. These are followed by people
to have social inclusion in the society. If someone does not follow these, they might be
off point in terms of the societal standards. Social pressures guide many of these
customs.

Types of Judicial Pronouncements:

1. Original and Declaratory: Original means the development and enactment of new laws
from the previous judgments. Declaratory means the applicability of the previous
judgments and their concepts.
 2. Authoritative and Absolute: The precedents are a mandate to follow in every case of
same nature whether the current judge agrees with it or not, they must follow it.

Relevance and Importance of Judicial pronouncements:

The primary job of the courts was to provide justice but as the legal system developed, they
had the power to influence legislations and create legally binding precedents. It is of paramount
importance that the judges create and have precedents to render and develop a holistic legal
system.

Essentials of a valid custom: It should be prevalent and reasonable with a continuance factor
with sheer certainty and no arbitrariness. It should carry the legal nature and uphold it without
any opposition from the parties of interest.

1) Antiquity – A custom to be recognized as law must be proved to be in existence from

the time immemorial, time whereof the memory of man is not contrary. In ancient Hindu
law additionally, the antiquity was one in all the necessity for the popularity of custom,
Immemorial custom is transcendental law. The law in India at present is that antiquity is
important for the recognition of a custom.

2) Continuance: The second essential of a custom is that it must have been practiced

endlessly. Continuity doesn’t mean that should not be operating all the time. There
should always be available in terms of availability of custom to deal with rule of conduct.
It means that if possession for a few times is disturbed, however the claim to enjoy the
custom is not abandoned, the custom continues.

3) Peaceable enjoyment: The custom must have been enjoyed peaceably. If a custom is

relevant for a long time in a law court, or otherwise, it negatives the presumption that it
originated by consent as most of the customs naturally might need originated.

4) Obligatory force: The custom should have an obligatory force. It must have been
supported by the general public opinion and enjoyed as a matter of right.

5) Certainty: A custom be certain. A custom that is obscure or indefinite cannot be

recognized. It is more a rule of evidence than anything else. The court must be satisfied
by a clear proof that custom exists as a matter of truth, or as a legal presumption of fact.

6) Consistency: The customs which ever are prevailed should not come in conflict with
other established customs. They should maintain consistency among the other customs.
Therefore, one custom cannot be set in opposition to other custom.
Thus, we can draw various inferences from the above study relating to judicial pronouncements
and customs as a source of law with keepingh in mind the various aspects; origin, nature,
relevance, importance and essentials of valid custom.

Q 5. (b)

Answer:

In India, homosexuality has a long history. Sexual practises between women are depicted as
discoveries of a feminine universe where sexuality was centred on pleasure and fertility in
ancient writings like the Rig-Veda, which dates back to 1500 BC, as well as sculptures and
relics. Some historical evidences of same-sex relationships include descriptions of homosexual
activities in the Kamasutra, Harems of young boys held by Muslim Nawabs and Hindu
Aristocrats, male homosexuality in Medieval Muslim history, and evidences of sodomy in Tantric
rites.
This is a religious rather than a political discussion. Many individuals, particularly in India, are
opposed to it, claiming that it is unnatural, vulgar, and immoral. The reasons of those who
oppose it are founded on religion and natural law beliefs. They are not considered natural by
some since they do not produce children.
The much-debated Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, was ruled partially
unconstitutional in Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. Vs. Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal)
no. 76 of 2016. The court stated that regardless of how minor the LGBT part is, they have the
right to privacy, which includes physical intimacy. Their choice of spouse may be different, but
that does not imply they will face legal consequences. Section-377 infringes on their human
dignity and freedom of choice, thereby infringing on their right to privacy, which is protected
under Article 21.
Because our Constitution is liberal, the right to choose will never be absolute. As a result, the
principal of choice has been subjected to various limitations. The right to choose a partner for
intimate relations, on the other hand, is a wholly personal choice that cannot be regulated.
Section-377 of the Indian Penal Code, on the other hand, inhibits the freedom of the LGBT
community to choose a sexual partner and is thus illogical and arbitrary.
The reasons for imposing justifiable restrictions on the basic freedom of expression include
public order, decency, and morality. Any act of affection performed in public by members of the
LGBT community does not disrupt public order or moral standards unless it is appropriate and
not vulgar. Section-377, on the other hand, is unlawful because it fails to meet the
proportionality standards and violates the LGBT community's basic right to free speech.

The Supreme Court decided that section-377 is unconstitutional because it breaches Articles 14,
15, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution, overturning the ruling in Suresh Koushal and
Others vs. Naz Foundation and Others. It further said that section-377 will only apply to
non-consensual sexual activities done against adults or minors.
However, only same sex relationships are legalized without legalizing the homosexual marriage.
Petitions are still running in the Apex Court regarding the same but it is uncertain what holds in
the future for such marriages.
To sum up, Homosexuality is not an offence; it is simply a means of pursuing happiness, a
means of achieving sexual bliss or desire, in my perspective. Apart from blind prejudice, there
seems to be no reason why two homosexual individuals cannot marry in a civil ceremony that
would grant them the same rights and protections as heterosexual couples. Marriage is a
symbol of love and commitment. How does it harm or ruin the principles of marriage if two men
or two women desire to display their commitment? It certainly illustrates it, in my opinion.

Q6
Answer:

First, let’s discuss the grounds for dissolution of marriage as mentioned in the Divorce Act,
1869.
Grounds for dissolution of marriage-

1. Adultery

2. Apostasy

3. Unsound minf for 2 years

4. Suffering from any communicable Venereal Disease for two years

5. Presumption of death(7 years)

6. Willful refusal to consummation

7. Non compliance with decree of Restitution of Conjugal Rights(2 years or upwards)

8. Desertion(2 years)

9. Cruelty so as to cause reasonable apprehension

10.Additional grounds to wife- Rape, sodomy and bestiality- The word ‘rape’ literally means a
forcible seizure and ravishment of a woman without her consent. The words ‘sodomy’ and
‘bestiality’ are usually known as unnatural offences. The term ‘sodomy’ as it is understood in the
courts, is non coital corral copulation with a member of same sex or opposite sex.

As it is mentioned in the question that Helen cohabited with John Thomas who was married to a
Christian lady, who was alive at that time. In order to legalize the relationship Helen and John
converted their religion to Islam. Thus, we see that, Helen and John converted to Islam only for
the purpose of getting married and so that John can marry again and not with a bonafide
intention.

CASE LAW:
Lily Thomas v Union of India[2000]- In this case, two Hindus, Gc Ghosh and Sushmita
Ghosh were married according to Hindu rites and were living happily for over 8 years. GC Ghosh
then married one Ms. Vanita Gupta who already had two children. For legalizing the second
marriage, he embraced Islam. The husband told his first wife that she should agree to her
divorce otherwise, she will have to put up with the second wife. He insisted his wife on several
occasions to get a divorce by mutual agreement otherwise, she would be compelled to live with
his second wife. The husband converted to Islam solely for the purpose of re-marrying and was
having no real faith in Islam. He even changed his name to Mohd. Karim Ghazi. He does not
practice the Muslim rites as prescribed nor has he changed his name or religion and other
official documents. The case went to the Supreme Court and it was held that a marriage just
cannot be dissolved on the ground that the husband has converted his religion to a different
one. Moreover, it was held that marriage contracted by converting to Islam while the first one is
subsisting will invite penal action under different provisions of the Indian Penal Code.

CONCLUSION:

With the above-mentioned case law we can see that this case of Helen and John is quite
identical to the above mentioned one. Thus, we can say that John cannot marry Helen by just
converting to Islam because he does not have a bonafide intention behind this and if this
marriage is contracted while the first one is subsisting by mere conversion to Islam, it will invite
penal action against him.