Russia and the formation of

the Romanian national state

1821-1878

This book has a double emphasis: It examines the role played by tsarist Russia
in the formation of an independent Romanian national state, and it discusses
the reaction of a Balkan nationality to the influence of a neighboring great
power that was both a protector and a menace. In the early nineteenth century
the centers of Romanian political life were the Danubian Principalities of
Moldavia and Wallachia, which were both under Ottoman rule but which
had separate, autonomous administrations. Although welcoming Russian aid
against the Ottoman Empire, the Romanian leadership at the same time feared
that the Russian government would use its military power to establish a firm
control over the Principalities or would annex Romanian lands, as indeed
occurred in 1812. Here this difficult relationship is examined in detail as it
developed during the century in connection with the major events leading to
the international acceptance of Romanian independence in 1878. The con-
flicts that arose in this period, in particular the issues of political domination
and the possession of Bessarabia, have remained disturbing elements in the
relations of the two states.
Russia and the formation of
the Romanian national state
1821-1878
BARBARA JELAVICH

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE
LONDON NEW YORK NEW ROCHELLE
MELBOURNE SYDNEY
PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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© Cambridge University Press 1984

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1984

First paperback edition 2004

A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Jelavich, Barbara, 1923-
Russia and the formation of the Romanian national
state, 1821-1878.
Bibliography: p.
1. Romania - Politics and government - 1821-1866.
2. Romania-Politics and government- 1866-1914.
3. Romania - Foreign relations - Soviet Union. 4. Soviet
Union - Foreign relations - Romania. I. Title.
DR242.J44 1984 949.8'01 82-23578

ISBN 0 52125318 7 hardback

ISBN 0 521 52251 X paperback
 Contents

List of maps and illustrations Page vii

Preface ix

Introduction: The establishment of Russian influence in the

Danubian Principalities 1
I The Russian protectorate 16
Toward a Russian protectorate: the Greek revolution, Tudor
Vladimirescu, and the Russo-Turkish War 21
The protectorate established 31
The resistance to the protectorate: the national opposition
and the revolutions of 1848 39
The protectorate renewed, 1849-1854 50
The Romanian emigration 52
The Crimean War 55
II T h e European guardianship 61
The Romanian question at the Paris conference 66
The implementation of the congress decisions: the double
election of Alexander Cuza 71
III T h e Cuza era, 1859-1866 101
The recognition of the double election 102
The administrative and legislative union of the
Principalities 109
Revolutionary Europe 122
The Dedicated Monasteries 130
 Contents
The coup d'e'tat of 1864 142
The overthrow of Cuza 146

IV Prince Charles, 1866-1871 153

The provisional government 153
The accession of a foreign prince 164
The first years of Charles's reign, 1866-1869 1*79
T h e crisis of 1870-1871 198

V Prince Charles, 1871-1878: the Eastern crisis 215

The Catargiu government: the first period 215
The St. Petersburg agency 219
The commercial conventions 221
The first phase of the Eastern crisis: Romanian neutrality 227
Toward a Russian agreement 241
War and independence 259
The Congress of Berlin 277
The implementation of the Treaty of Berlin 286

Conclusion 292

Notes 301

Bibliography 335
Index 346

VI
 Maps and illustrations

MAPS

The Ottoman Balkans, 1815 page 18

The Danubian Principalities, 1859 99

Between pages 148 6- i^p

ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAP

Alexander Cuza
Prince Charles
Nicholas I
Alexander II
A contemporary American map of the military operations
in the summer of 1877.

Vll
 Preface

The purpose of this narrative is twofold: on the one hand, to examine

the role played by tsarist Russia in the formation of an independent
Romanian state, and on the other, to study the reaction of a Balkan
nationality to the influence of a neighboring great power that was both
a protector and a menace. The period of emphasis is the years from
1821, when a revolt with both Romanian and Greek leadership oc-
curred in the Danubian Principalities, to 1878, when Romanian inde-
pendence was accepted by the powers in the Treaty of Berlin. All of
the events pertaining to Russian-Romanian relations do not receive
equal attention; the weight is placed on those episodes that were crucial
to the formation of the modern Romanian state and its leadership: the
establishment of the Russian protectorate, the revolution of 1848, the
reorganization of the Principalities after 1856, the double election of
Alexander Cuza and his subsequent unification of the administrations
and legislatures of the Principalities, the advent of Charles of Hohen-
zollern-Sigmaringen in 1866, and, finally, the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878.
The relationship of Russia and the Romanian Principalities involved
far more than the issues common in diplomatic history. The conserva-
tive nature of Russian autocracy and the basically liberal stance of the
Romanian national leadership after 1848 made political ideology a
major cause of friction. The Russian government was always deeply
concerned about the political institutions established in the Principali-
ties. In addition, two related questions, the revolutionary movements
and the status of Orthodox institutions, played a major role in the mu-
tual relationship. The Russian government throughout the nineteenth
century was repeatedly troubled by the fact that the Principalities
were a center of revolutionary agitation, both national and liberal,
IX
 Preface
which involved dangers for Russian interests. At the same time Russian
officials watched diligently over the interests of the Orthodox church
not only in the Romanian lands, but throughout the Balkans. The pro-
tection of Orthodoxy was regarded as a religious duty as well as a good
policy for the securing of Russian influence in the peninsula.
Less attention is devoted to economic and social issues, except as they
relate to diplomatic, political, and ideological questions. In the period
under study Russia and the Principalities had parallel, but not com-
petitive, economies. Both were agricultural, and large estates worked
by peasant labor prevailed. Their social structures were also similar.
In both, the landed aristocracy held absolute social, economic, and po-
litical preponderance. The Romanian peasants were enserfed until
the middle of the eighteenth century, the Russian until the 1860s. That
decade witnessed land reforms in both areas. The large estates were
divided, with a part of the land given to the peasants in return for re-
demption payments. Because both regions were exporters of grain,
there was some limited competition for markets between Russian and
Romanian producers, but this condition never caused major conflicts
like those that arose, for instance, between Romania and the Habsburg
Monarchy over similar issues.
Both governments were in theory under autocratic rule, either by
tsar or by sultan. In fact, in each the predominating influence was exerted
by landowners or those connected with landed interests. As the nine-
teenth century progressed, other educated groups in both societies - the
government officials, army officers, merchants, lawyers, writers, and
teachers - played an ever-increasing role in politics. Because neither re-
gion had an industrial economy, workers and capitalists, with their
unique interests and problems, had little influence. In the Principalities,
where commerce tended to be in the hands of those of a non-Romanian
background, including Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Germans, busi-
nessmen were not major participants in political life, although there
were important exceptions. In both Russia and the Principalities the
peasantry, the overwhelming majority of the population, was effectively
excluded from political affairs. They had almost as little actual repre-
sentation under the Romanian constitutional system as under the Rus-
sian autocratic institutions.
In terms of power, whether political or military, Russia and the Prin-
cipalities were entirely unequal. By the beginning of the eighteenth
century Russia was a great European power with a vast national territory
and a strong army; the Romanian Principalities of Moldavia and
Wallachia were weak states under Ottoman control. However, although
they were a part of this Muslim empire, they did enjoy, at least in theory,
 Preface
certain rights that separated them from the rest of the sultan's domains.
In contrast to other Balkan lands, they were never Turkish pashaliks.
Thus Ottoman administrators did not directly govern Romanian lands.
Instead the Principalities were entrusted to native princes, often called
hospodars in the diplomatic correspondence of the day. Their power in
turn rested on the support of a native aristocracy, the boyars, who con-
trolled local administration. Despite the fact that they enjoyed internal
autonomy, the Principalities were under Ottoman jurisdiction as far as
foreign policy and military matters were concerned. In their relation-
ship with the Porte (a term regularly used in diplomatic correspondence,
along with Sublime Porte, to refer to the Ottoman government), the
position of the provinces varied over time. A low point was reached in
the eighteenth century. In addition to submitting to the suzerain powers
of the sultan, the Principalities were required to pay a large tribute as
well as certain taxes and gifts, and the Ottoman authorities had the right
of preemption over Romanian agricultural products. Constantinople
in the eighteenth century was provisioned from these rich lands.
This narrative deals mainly with events in Moldavia and Wallachia.
Although a predominantly Romanian population lived in Transylvania
and Bukovina, under Habsburg rule, and in Bessarabia, under Russian
control after 1812, the affairs of these regions only marginally affected
Russian relations with the Romanian political center, that is, with the
Danubian Principalities. Therefore developments in these areas are
discussed only as they became important in international relations or
played a major role in the Romanian national movement.
At this time both Russia and the Principalities, as Orthodox states,
used the Julian rather than the Gregorian calendar. Therefore double
dates are usually given. It is, unfortunately, at times difficult to deter-
mine which system was used in a particular document. A Russian or
Romanian writing from Paris, for instance, might employ either style.
When doubt exists, the date on the document cited is used. Otherwise,
all single dates are in the new style.
Some difficulties are also to be encountered in the spelling of proper
names. Many Russian and Romanian diplomats, for instance, used
French versions of their names. In this text the form that is in common
use today has generally been adopted. Some first names have been
anglicized; others remain in their national spelling. Geographic place
names are usually in the form commonly used in diplomatic histories
and in the documentation. It is thus, for instance, Jassy, not Ia§i, and
Plevna, not Pleven. A completely standard and uniform system is an
impossibility.
This narrative is based primarily on Russian and Romanian diplo-
xi
 Preface
matic documentation, material that is listed in the Bibliography. Be-
cause of the great amount of writing on diplomatic history and in
particular on the "Eastern Question," that is, on the international con-
troversies caused by the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the notes are of
necessity limited to a citation of documents and the major works in Rus-
sian and Romanian used in the preparation of this book. Only some of
the many valuable works in other languages have been included. Similar
limitations have been placed on the Bibliography.
The author wishes to thank Professors Keith Hitchins, University of
Illinois; Frederick Kellogg, University of Arizona; and Paul E. Michel-
son, Huntington College, for their comments on the manuscript. Her
husband, Charles Jelavich, as usual, had a major part in the preparation
of the book. She would also like to acknowledge her deep gratitude for
the assistance given her in her research in the archives and libraries
in Romania. As before, she would like to thank Serge Giers for allowing
her to use the papers of his grandfather. The preparation of this study
was aided immensely by a fellowship from the American Council of
Learned Societies, which allowed the author the time necessary for
research and writing, and by research grants from the Office of Research
and Advanced Studies, Indiana University, which covered, in particular,
copying and microfilm expenses.
The author is also indebted to Debbie Chase, who typed the final
manuscript; to Lin Maria Riotto, who prepared the index; and especially
to Janis Bolster, whose expert editorial comments added much to the
final text.

xn
Alexander Cuza
Prince Charles
 Nicholas I

Alexander II
 VKlsm SD H.KVHA.
TO ILLUSTfUTt THC MOVEMENTS OF THE R l i W A N S IMMEDIATELY APTtft THC P * M * W OF THE OANU0C
Hu»*.an Troops I • - ?rMm ~**™*». „ , Turlii»h Troop* «•

fhr t*<tangle* jf.cn n art them cf lary* SoaU Map* JTF •

A contemporary American map of the military operations in the summer of 1877. F. V. Greene, Report on
the Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-1878: Atlas (New York: Appleton, 1879).
 Introduction:
the establishment of Russian influence in the
Danubian Principalities

Although Russian influence over political life in the Principalities did

not become firmly established until the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji in
1774, Russian actions were already playing an important role in their
internal development at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The
main direction of the policy of Peter the Great was toward the Baltic
rather than the Black Sea, but he had early in his career also shown an
interest in expansion southward toward the Black Sea and, in particu-
lar, in the acquisition of Azov. The entire question of Russian rela-
tions with the Ottoman Empire became especially acute when in 1709,
after his defeat at Poltava, Charles XII of Sweden fled to Constanti-
nople and there, with French assistance, attempted to stir the Porte into
action. His efforts met with success, and in 1711 the Ottoman Empire
declared war on Russia.
Within the Principalities the Russian victory over the Swedish king
made a deep impression. The temptation was strong to enter into rela-
tions with the Russian court in an attempt to break the Ottoman control
over the Principalities. Accordingly, both Constantine Brincoveanu, the
prince of Wallachia, and Dimitrie Cantemir, the ruler of Moldavia,
opened negotiations with Peter. In April 1711 Cantemir and Peter con-
cluded the Treaty of Luck. This pact of mutual assistance placed
Moldavia under Russian political control; the terms stated that Cante-
mir, the boyars, and all of the Romanian population would henceforth
be considered the Russian ruler's faithful subjects. Other sections of the
treaty guaranteed Cantemir's personal and political future. Engaged in
a struggle with the boyars, the prince used his Russian connection to
strengthen his own position. The terms of the treaty thus declared that
"all the state power will rest in the hands of the prince," that the no-
 Introduction
bility and the subject population should submit to his orders, and that
the cities should be regarded as "his own property." Should the new
allies lose the war, Cantemir was to emigrate to Russia, where he and
his family would be supported in a proper manner by the Russian
treasury.1
After a similar understanding had been reached with Brincoveanu,
Peter launched in June 1711 an ambitious Balkan campaign. In a pat-
tern that was to be a standard feature of Russian policy during the next
two centuries, he called upon the Ottoman Balkan Christians to rise
in his support. The Russian armies crossed the Pruth River and ad-
vanced as far as Jassy. Although Cantemir fulfilled his alliance obliga-
tions, Brincoveanu remained passive. In July, when the Russian troops
were surrounded, Peter was forced to make a treaty with the Ottoman
Empire that contained highly unfavorable terms. Cantemir, who was
placed in a dangerous situation, left with the Russian army. He sub-
sequently lived in St. Petersburg, where he pursued a highly productive
literary career. In accordance with the promises in the previous treaty,
he received from the Russian government fifty villages and fifty thousand
serfs, together with two houses in the Russian capital. His family and
his descendants were subsequently to hold prominent positions in Rus-
sian service. Brincoveanu remained on the Wallachian throne until
1714, when he and his four sons were executed for suspected treasonous
relations with the Habsburg Monarchy.
The Russian defeat had enormous political consequences for the
Principalities and resulted in a severe restriction of their autono-
mous position. Since the Ottoman government no longer trusted
the native boyars, it henceforth appointed the princes only from among
the ranks of the Phanariot Greeks. This group derived its name from
the Phanar, or Lighthouse, district of Constantinople, which was not
only the residence of the Orthodox patriarch, but also the home of many
Greek or Hellenized families who had come to be closely associated
with the Ottoman administration. Although those of Greek background
predominated, some were of Italian, Romanian, or other ancestry. Often
extremely wealthy, they had won their power and riches through their
service to the Porte and through exploiting the economic opportunities
to be gained by this association. Since at this time the highest positions
in the Ottoman administration went to those with the money to pur-
chase them, the Phanariot Greeks were in an advantageous situation.
For over a century they were thus able to control some of the major
posts in the Principalities. They were also deeply involved in other as-
pects of Ottoman foreign affairs and internal administration.
 Introduction
The Phanariot period is usually pictured as the worst in modern
Romanian history. Although the Porte did not divide the Romanian
lands into pashaliks or send in regular troops to occupy the land, it
did place the provinces under extreme fiscal pressure.2 Undergoing a
century of internal economic decline, domestic political chaos, and
repeated defeat on the battlefield, the Ottoman government regarded
the relatively rich Principalities as excellent sources of tax revenues and
food supplies for the army and the population of Constantinople. The
Phanariot princes became the agents of the Porte for the collection of
these prizes. Some were indeed responsible for important reforms, but
the majority represented the interests of the central government more
than those of the people whom they ruled. This situation also resulted
from the conditions under which they governed. Themselves the victims
of the Ottoman system, the Phanariot princes held office but a short
time. They thus did not have the opportunity to become closely ac-
quainted with or to identify their interests with those of the Principali-
ties, although they often became large property owners in the region.
Naturally, the native boyars, belonging to the formerly dominating
class, deeply resented the power and influence of the new princes, de-
spite the fact that they usually cooperated closely with them. The temp-
tation for certain groups of boyars to look for assistance to foreign
courts, in particular Vienna and St. Petersburg, was accordingly strong.
After the defeat of Peter, the Habsburg Monarchy stood in the fore-
front of the European powers from whom dissident boyars might
expect aid against the Porte. Some of these men were willing to accept
Habsburg suzerainty over the Principalities as long as the boyar domi-
nation of local government was retained. In 1718, when Austria gained
Oltenia and the Banat in the Treaty of Passarowitz, they were able to
experience the consequences of Habsburg rule directly. At first the
region was allowed a measure of autonomy, with boyar control retained.
The administration was in the hands of a council under the ban, or gov-
ernor, George Cantacuzino. However, at this time the Austrian court
had other objectives in mind for Oltenia. With the intention of convert-
ing the new possession into a major grain-producing area to supply the
imperial army, the Habsburg officials were more interested in establish-
ing a centralized, efficient administration than in protecting the interests
of the Romanian aristocrats. The introduction of imperial institutions
both reduced the political power of the boyars and increased the obli-
gations of the peasants who worked the land. Habsburg rule thus lost
much of its attraction as an alternative to Ottoman suzerainty. More-
over, throughout the century the Habsburg government was especially
 Introduction
interested in expansion directly southward into the lands of the western
half of the Balkan peninsula. It therefore had less need to win the sup-
port of, or to make promises to, the Romanian leadership.
In contrast to the Habsburg Monarchy, the Russian government
recognized the prime strategic importance of the Romanian lands in its
continuing struggle with the Porte. Throughout the period of this
narrative the Russian leaders, tsars and officials alike, were fully aware
of the role that the Principalities would play in their conflicts with the
Ottoman Empire, both as staging areas for campaigns against Constan-
tinople and as a source of agricultural supplies for the army. In 1736
the continuing Russian pressure against the Khanate of the Crimea, an
Ottoman tributary state, and the lands north of the Black Sea led to the
outbreak of further hostilities. Austria joined the conflict in 1737.3 Al-
though the initial Russian campaign was conducted in the steppe zone
and the Crimea, in 1739 an army under the command of General Miin-
nich entered Jassy. The Moldavian boyars once again welcomed foreign
intervention, but their hopes were disappointed. First, Austria was
forced to make a peace in September 1739 in which it surrendered most
of the gains of the Treaty of Passarowitz, including Oltenia. The Rus-
sian government, after signing a similar agreement, withdrew from the
Romanian lands and kept finally only the city of Azov. For the next
thirty years, from 1739 to 1768, the Principalities enjoyed a period of
peace. At this time, during the reigns of Constantine Mavrocordat in
both Wallachia and Moldavia, reforms were introduced in both prin-
cipalities. Since the measures affected the privileged position of the
boyars, in particular their relations with the peasants, this group be-
came even more hostile to the Phanariot princes and more willing to
look abroad for assistance against the Ottoman-sponsored regime.
With the accession of Catherine the Great in 1762, Russian policy
became more adventurous and aggressive, especially in regard to Poland
and the Ottoman lands north of the Black Sea. In 1768 the Porte de-
clared war as a result of Russian encroachments in Poland, and once
more Russian armies entered the Principalities. At the same time a fleet
was sent from the Baltic to the eastern Mediterranean to challenge the
Ottoman navy. Since the Russian forces were almost uniformly victori-
ous, the hopes of the native boyars were again high. The political status
they preferred was the establishment of two independent principalities,
but under the protection of one or more of the great powers - Russia,
Austria, or even Prussia. The question of annexation by Russia, with
the maintenance of internal autonomy, although discussed, was an
unrealistic alternative. All of the European states at this time were
extremely apprehensive about the Russian intentions. In fact, the
 Introduction
Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji of 1774, which brought peace, was con-
cluded under great-power pressure to prevent Russia from making even
wider gains at Ottoman expense. The first partition of Poland, in 1772,
was arranged in part as a diversion to hinder Catherine from making
further demands on the Porte.
Even with these limitations, the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji was
a major triumph for Russia, and it is a landmark in the Russian ad-
vance to the south and west. Its terms gave Russia lands between the
Bug and the Dnieper rivers, formerly in the possession of the Khanate
of the Crimea. The latter state was declared independent, a condition
that left it open to eventual Russian annexation. Russia also gained
important commercial privileges. Its ships were allowed the right of
free navigation in the Black Sea, which had previously been closed to
non-Ottoman shipping, and through the Straits into the Mediterranean.
The Russian government could now appoint consuls in Ottoman
cities, and it was to enjoy commercial rights there similar to those which
had been previously granted to France and Britain. In the highly con-
troversial Article 7 Russia received what was later interpreted by its
diplomats as the right to speak in behalf of the Orthodox population
of the Ottoman Empire. The presence of Russian shipping in the Black
Sea and the official representation in Jassy and Bucharest were, of
course, to be of great significance for the future, but even more impor-
tant was Article 16, which related directly to the Principalities and
gave Russia the right to oversee Romanian internal life. Of the ten
points, the most significant was the last, which stated: "The Porte like-
wise permits that, according as circumstances of the two principalities
may require, the ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia .. . may speak
in their favor, and promises to listen to them with the attention that
is due to friendly and respected Powers/'4 In other sections of this
article the Ottoman government granted amnesty to those who fought
with Russia, gave assurances of tax relief, allowed those who wished to
emigrate to Russia to do so, and agreed in no way to obstruct the free
exercise of religion or the building and repairing of churches. The
princes were also permitted to send official representatives to Constan-
tinople to defend their interests.
Although this treaty brought undoubted benefits to the Principali-
ties, Moldavia in the same period was forced to accept the Habsburg
Monarchy's annexation of Bukovina, which was claimed as a reward
for theoretical services rendered in the conclusion of the peace. Unable
to hinder the cession, because of its military vulnerability, the Porte
accepted the action in 1775.
The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, in officially recognizing Russian
 Introduction
rights of intervention, gave the great northern power a major voice in
all subsequent political changes in the Principalities.5 In the ensuing
years the Russian statesmen made full use of their privileges, both to
extend Romanian autonomous rights and also to tie the provinces
closer to their interests. With Russian encouragement the Porte next
proceeded to make a series of declarations and agreements that defined
the obligations of the Principalities to the Porte and gave certain politi-
cal guarantees. The most important of these were the Hatti Sherif of
1774, the Sened of 1783, and the Hatti Sherif of 1784. In these the pay-
ments due the Porte from the provinces received closer definition, and
the already existing exclusion of Muslims as residents or property
owners in the Principalities was reconfirmed. Russian influence was
also strengthened. The Porte agreed that the princes were not to be
removed arbitrarily and that depositions would be carried out only in
agreement with Russia. When the Porte in 1786 dismissed Alexander
Mavrocordat in Moldavia without consulting St. Petersburg, the Rus-
sian representative in Constantinople immediately protested the action
as a violation of treaties.
In addition to the strengthening of its position in the Principalities,
the Russian government was concerned with exploiting other gains
made in the treaty. In 1779 the Treaty of Ainali Kavak, which was fol-
lowed by another agreement in 1783, gave Russia additional commer-
cial rights. Much attention was directed toward developing the newly
annexed territory, including the Crimea, which became a part of the
Russian Empire in 1783. Colonists were brought in not only from
Russia, but from other lands, in particular from the German states.
Efforts were also made to build up Russian naval power; Kherson be-
came the major base, and construction of a Black Sea fleet was begun.
The Russian colonization of the former Ottoman lands and the estab-
lishment of a naval presence in the Black Sea profoundly altered the
power balance in the area.
Despite the enormous gains of the previous years, Catherine was
not content. As long as Maria Theresa remained empress of Austria,
Catherine could not tempt her into an alliance aimed at further ad-
vances at the expense of the Porte. After Maria Theresa's death, when
Joseph II proved easier to influence, the Russian empress proceeded
to propose nothing less than the full partition of the Ottoman posses-
sions in Europe, as well as the distribution of some of the Asiatic lands
of the sultan. In an exchange of letters in 1782 Joseph and Catherine
agreed upon a division: Austria was to obtain Oltenia, a part of Serbia,
Bosnia, and Hercegovina; Istria and Dalmatia, then in Venetian pos-
session, were also assigned to Vienna, with their former owner re-
6
 Introduction
ceiving compensation with Crete, Cyprus, and the Peloponnesus. France,
which had yet to be approached with the scheme, was allowed Syria
and Egypt. The Russian share was to be the largest of all. Two areas,
the lands between the Bug and Dniester rivers and territory in the
Caucasus, were to be annexed directly. Two puppet kingdoms were
then to be established. The first, a revived Greek-Byzantine state, was
to include Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Greek territories. Catherine's
grandson, Constantine, was the intended ruler, but with the provision
that the state should never be united with Russia. The second kingdom,
composed of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, was to be named
Dacia and placed under an Orthodox prince. It was rumored that Cath-
erine's favorite, Gregory Potemkin, who had done a great deal to build
up southern Russia, was a possible candidate.
Obviously such wide aims could be achieved only after a crushing
military victory. In September 1787 Russia again went to war with
the Porte; Austria joined in February 1788. Both governments sent
armies into the Principalities. Russian war aims in this campaign
were set in November 1787. Despite Catherine's ambitious schemes, the
principal objective was the acquisition of the land between the Bug
and the Dniester. The establishment of an independent buffer state,
comprising Wallachia and Moldavia, was also foreseen. The war, how-
ever, did not proceed as expected. The allies found their efforts dis-
tracted by the subsequent events in Western Europe connected with
the French Revolution; Austria was compelled to make peace in Au-
gust 1791 because of the dangers in that region. Moreover, in the
previous year Joseph II had died; his successor, Leopold I, was more
cautious.
Events were also not proceeding well for the Russian government.
Although the gifted general Alexander Vasil'evich Suvorov was able
to win impressive victories in the Principalities, the international sit-
uation became increasingly unfavorable for Russia. In 1788 Sweden
declared war, an action that prevented the sending of a Russian fleet
to the Mediterranean. In addition, the attitude of the other great pow-
ers to the Russian efforts was becoming increasingly hostile. Therefore,
in the Treaty of Jassy, concluded in 1792, the Russian government
contented itself with the acquisition of the territory between the Bug
and the Dniester. This agreement, like those preceding, had a great
significance for the Principalities. Russia was now a neighbor of Mol-
davia. Moreover, Article 4 stated that the Porte would abide by the
provisions of the previous agreement, and the arrangements concern-
ing taxes, emigration, and amnesty were reaffirmed.6
The Porte was, of course, well aware of the dangers of the increasing
 Introduction
Russian rights in regard to the Principalities. The Ottoman officials
had also witnessed the dubious loyalties of the Romanian boyars. In
1792 and 1793 attempts were made to win the support of this group
by a series of declarations and promises concerning the provinces and
their unique privileges. Unfortunately for the Porte, the internal weak-
ness of the state and the continuing pressure of the great powers lim-
ited its ability to assure a stable and acceptable administration. In fact,
during the rule of Constantine Hangerli, prince of Wallachia from
1797 to 1799, Phanariot rule probably reached its lowest point. Not
only was the Porte unable to retain the loyalty of its Romanian sub-
jects, but Russian interference continued unabated.
Although a period of relative tranquility followed the conclusion
of the Treaty of Jassy, Catherine did not abandon her previous objec-
tives in regard to the Principalities. The primary Russian attention,
however, was focused on the Polish question and the conclusion of the
final partitions of 1793 and 1795. From 1792 to 1796 the Russian agents
in the Principalities concentrated their efforts on winning adherents
among the boyar families and maintaining and consolidating their
predominant influence.7 At this time the center of Russian activities
was Jassy, where the consulate-general was located.
The Russian officials were particularly concerned with assuring that
the princes were in their camp. In this endeavor they soon faced com-
petition, not only from the Porte, but from France. Although Sultan
Selim III wished to maintain the peace, he also continued the tradi-
tional Ottoman policy of close ties with France. Deeply concerned about
his military weakness, he embarked upon a period of military reform
for which he depended on French advisers and support. From their
advantageous position in Constantinople, the French diplomats wished
to extend their influence into the Principalities. In 1796 a temporary
agent was dispatched to Bucharest; in 1797 regular representatives
were appointed for the Principalities. They joined the Russian agents,
who had held office since 1782, and the Austrians, who arrived in 1783;
British representation was not established until 1803. From the Rus-
sian viewpoint, the French presence introduced a disturbing element.
Like their Russian colleagues, the French consuls attempted to play be-
tween the factions in Romanian politics and to set up their own party of
clients and supporters.
The French actions caused annoyance and anxiety in St. Petersburg
for other reasons too. The Russian government was well aware that
the French agents in the Principalities could keep a close eye on Rus-
sian military preparations across the border. French advisers to the
sultan were involved in the strengthening of the Ottoman fortifications
. 8
 Introduction
in the area, in particular the strongholds of Bender, Ismail, and Akker-
man. The Polish situation was also a consideration. With the defeat
of the national forces, bands of Polish rebels crossed into Moldavia.
Not only were these groups ferociously anti-Russian, but they also
formed a center for the dissemination of French revolutionary ideas
and propaganda. The Russian officials feared their possible influence
within Russia and the role that they could play in support of France
in this strategically sensitive area.
Because of these additional considerations the Russian government
continued to keep a close watch on Romanian affairs; it remained par-
ticularly concerned about the attitude of the princes and the possible
attraction of France for them. These apprehensions led the Russian dip-
lomats to insist on the replacement in 1795 of the prince of Moldavia,
Michael Sutu, with Alexander Callimachi, who henceforth acted in
the Russian interest. Similarly, in 1796 in Wallachia, Alexander Mo-
ruzi was replaced by the apparently more ardent Russian partisan Al-
exander Ipsilanti.
Despite the declared aim of good relations with the Porte, Catherine
began diplomatic preparations for a more active policy. In an agree-
ment negotiated in 1794, Austria and Russia decided that the Prin-
cipalities should be united to form an independent state under Russian
control. In 1795 Britain adhered to this pact; a favorable attitude could
also be expected from Prussia. Further Russian campaigns against the
Porte, however, were hindered by the death of Catherine in 1796. Her
son and successor, Paul, reacted against what he considered the overly
aggressive and expansionistic activities of his mother. He preferred
an accommodation with the Porte to further territorial gains at Otto-
man expense. Adopting a policy of maintaining the empire, rather than
partitioning it among the powers, he sought to establish Russia in-
stead of France as the government with the principal influence in the
sultan's councils. Russian political predominance in Constantinople
and the support of the territorial integrity of the empire were to be-
come henceforth a standard alternative policy for the Russian diplomats
should a program of partition seem unfeasible or dangerous.
In the 1790s European diplomacy was dominated by the ambitious
schemes of Napoleon. The Russian position in Constantinople was
immensely strengthened when in 1798 Napoleon launched an attack
on Egypt; on the way he picked up the Ottoman possessions of the
Ionian Islands and Malta. France, not Russia, had become the princi-
pal danger to the Porte. In September 1798, for thefirsttime, a Russian
fleet sailed through the Bosphorus and anchored outside Constanti-
nople.8 An alliance agreement negotiated in 1799 contained a secret
 Introduction
clause permitting the Russian fleet to pass freely in and out of the
Straits; Britain subsequently adhered to this treaty. A joint Russian-
Ottoman operation was next launched against the French-held Ionian
Islands, which quickly fell before this assault. Since Russia was an
ally of the Ottoman Empire and a supporter of its territorial integrity,
Russian officials in the Principalities of necessity adopted a passive
policy. Even during the unfortunate period of Hangerli's rule, when
conditions were extremely bad, no move was made in the Romanian
interest.
In March 1801 Paul was murdered; he was succeeded by his son,
Alexander I. At the end of his reign Paul was in the process of break-
ing with his allies and entering into negotiations with France. His
successor, while not pursuing this policy, did favor a position of neu-
trality. In October Russia made peace with France, and in the follow-
ing year Britain and the Ottoman Empire reached similar agreements
with Paris. The Porte was to be spared further fighting until 1806.
During this period a bitter battle for supreme influence was fought
out in Constantinople among the representatives of Russia, France,
and Britain. Undergoing a process of internal dissolution that was ac-
companied by the rise of strong local military leaders, the Porte tended
to follow the dictates of the power that appeared to have the greatest
military resources at the moment. Meanwhile, the attention of Europe
had shifted from the Near East and Mediterranean to Central Europe,
where the great battles for Continental predominance were being
fought.
For Russia too the main concerns centered on Europe proper. How-
ever, its government continued to pursue certain definite aims in the
Principalities. Following a policy of expansion in Georgia and the
settlement of the southern steppelands, the Russian government wished
to assure that a stable situation existed in the region and that friendly
regimes held power in the Principalities. French activity, in particular,
continued to cause concern. The blocking of foreign intrigues and the
winning of as many partisans as possible from among the Romanian
boyars remained standard Russian objectives. The annexation of the
Principalities, or their reduction to the position of Russian vassals,
also continued to be considered.
From 1796 to 1801, as we have seen, Russian activities remained cir-
cumscribed. After this date new considerations led to a change of
policy. By this time the Porte had lost control over large sections of
its lands in the Balkans, Asia Minor, and North Africa to local notables,
the ayans, who organized their own military forces, set up personal
regimes in their districts, and successfully defied the central authority.
10
 Introduction
Unable to assemble the military force needed to subdue these rebels,
the Ottoman government attempted to pit one against another. Pas-
vanoglu Osman Pasha, with his center in the city of Vidin, was among
the most successful of the ayans. He was able to organize a dangerous
band of bandits, political dissenters, and rebellious janissaries. Usually
at odds with the central government, he fed and paid his followers by
organizing raids on the surrounding Bulgarian, Serbian, and Wal-
lachian lands. His actions were particularly devastating for Wallachia,
which had no local force of sufficient strength to counter these attacks.
Boyars, peasants, merchants, and clerics alike were forced to flee to
Transylvania. Some boyars favored calling in Russian troops, since
the Ottoman army could not handle the situation. Although the ques-
tion was a matter of negotiation between Russia and the Porte, the
latter naturally hesitated to accept Russian military aid that might lead
to a further weakening of Ottoman control in the Principalities.
Nevertheless, the Russian government was able to use the oppor-
tunity to increase its treaty rights. Under Russian pressure the Otto-
man Empire in 1802 issued a hatti sherif that confirmed the former
privileges and immunities of the Principalities and offered further
advantages both to the inhabitants and to the Russian government.
The term of office of the prince was set at seven years; he could not be
deposed unless he was proved guilty of a crime and then only with Rus-
sian concurrence. Article 4 gave explicit recognition to the Russian
influence in the domestic affairs of both Principalities: "The hospodars
will take into consideration the representations that the Russian envoy
will make to them."9
Other parts of this document, together with additional acts issued
in 1802 and 1803, enlarged and defined the provisions of the previous
hatti sherifs and the Sened of 1783, The rights at this point enjoyed by
Russia caused concern among contemporary statesmen. The Habsburg
minister, Prince Clemens von Metternich, considered that the Porte
had for all practical purposes surrendered its suzerainty over the Prin-
cipalities. The French ambassador at Constantinople, General Brune,
observed that "the protection over the Wallachians and Moldavians al-
lowed by the treaties to Russia has become a sovereignty, almost with-
out disguise/'10
The lull in military activity among the great powers in the Mediter-
ranean and the Balkans came to an end in 1805 when France and Rus-
sia resumed the war. A Russian naval squadron was once again active
in the Adriatic. As before, the allegiance of the Porte was important
to both belligerents. Because of its own military impotence, the Otto-
man government tended to side with the power that it saw as the ulti-
11
 Introduction
mate victor. In August 1806, probably as a result of French suggestions,
the Porte removed the Russian candidates Ipsilanti and Moruzi and
replaced them with Alecu Sutu and Scarlat Callimachi. Since the
action was carried through without consultation with Russia, it was in
violation of the previous treaties. Although the Porte very soon re-
gretted its decision and restored the former princes, Russian troops were
sent into the Principalities in November. In December 1806 the Porte
declared war despite the extremely unfavorable military situation
that it faced.
The Ottoman difficulties were compounded when in 1807 France
and Russia signed the Treaty of Tilsit, thus depriving the Porte
of the hope of French assistance. Moreover, the agreement dealt di-
rectly with the Ottoman Empire's problems and contained provisions
potentially disastrous for that government. Alexander I and Napoleon
agreed that France should attempt to mediate between the Porte and
Russia. Should this effort fail, the two signatory powers would discuss
a division of the Ottoman Empire. During a meeting at Erfurt in
1808, when no agreement or armistice had been achieved, Napoleon
and Alexander decided that Russia should annex the Principalities,
but they did not consider further partition plans. Meanwhile, the Otto-
man position continued to deteriorate. In 1804 a revolt had broken out
in Serbia, which the Ottoman army was unable to crush. In 1807 a rebel-
lion in Constantinople resulted in the deposition of Selim III and his
replacement, first by Mustafa IV, and then by Mahmud II. The pro-
vincial ayans still defied the central power. After 1807 negotiations
continued between the Russian and Ottoman representatives over pos-
sible peace conditions. They failed to reach a successful conclusion
largely because of the Ottoman refusal to abandon the Principalities.
From 1806, when their armies entered the Principalities, until 1812,
when a peace agreement was finally signed, Russian officials adminis-
tered both Moldavia and Wallachia. During this occupation they
worked principally through the divans and their boyar partisans.
Their main concern was assuring supplies to the army, which not only
was in occupation of the Principalities, but was waging a war against
the Porte. At first the Russian government relied primarily on Con-
stantine Ipsilanti, who had been ruler of Moldavia from 1799 to
1801 and of Wallachia from 1802 to 1806, and who in 1807 was ap-
pointed prince of Wallachia. His loyalty to Russia seemed assured.
He had previously called for Russian intervention against Pasvanoglu;
in 1806 he had encouraged the Russian government to invade. At that
time he had offered assurances that the provinces could provide both
financial and military assistance and that there would be no difficulty in
12
 Introduction
finding provisions for the Russian troops. These promises could not
be fulfilled. Once in the Principalities the Russian authorities found
it extremely difficult to obtain adequate supplies in this impoverished
region. They also had to deal with opposition from those boyars who
disliked Ipsilanti and the Russian occupation. The situation was made
worse by the intrigues of the Russian military commanders, who in-
volved themselves in the social and political life of the region. In Au-
gust 1807 Ipsilanti was removed from office and sent to Russia, but he
was given an estate near Moscow as a reward for his services.
The administration of the Principalities was next placed in the hands
of a Russian official, Sergei S. Kushnikov, assisted by a group of Russian
clerks and officials. Their major immediate problem was securing sup-
plies for the army. If sufficient food and materiel could not be provided
through official channels, the army simply seized what it wanted. This
situation was bound to create a great deal of animosity among the peas-
antry, who were directly affected by these actions. The burden of sup-
porting a Russian army and administration at this time, as in the
past and the future, was extremely heavy. Moreover, both provinces
had been impoverished by the previous extortionate methods of gov-
ernment and taxation, and Wallachia had suffered from the repeated
raids of Pasvanoglu. On top of these problems, the cost of the Russian
occupation was to prove devastating. One study of this question con-
tains this description:
A Russian source states that in 1808 the income of Wallachia was 2,737,809
lei, of which 1,969,968 lei were spent for the maintenance of the army. In 1809
Wallachia contributed a similar percentage of her income to the Russians. In
Moldavia, the 1809 income was 2,561,866 lei, of which 1,569,720 lei was spent
on the army. Moldavia contributed an even greater percentage of its income
to the Russians in 1811. Romanian sources indicate that during the war more
than half of the Principalities' income went to supply the Russian army . . . By
the end of 1809 almost all of the working cattle and wagons in the Principalities
were being used to move supplies for the army. 11

In addition to the friction caused by problems of military supply, the

administration of the region proved frustrating for conscientious Rus-
sian officials, who attempted to introduce orderly methods into the
Principalities. Where previously government business had tended to
be conducted orally and informally, the Russian representatives pre-
ferred written records and formal procedures. Individual officials also
continued to involve themselves in local politics and often on opposite
sides. In March 1810 Kushnikov was replaced by V. I. Krasno-
Milashevich.
Meanwhile, negotiations continued between the Ottoman Empire and
13
 Introduction
Russia. The principal stumbling block to peace was the status of the
Principalities. At first the Russian government sought control of both
provinces; in 1811 the demand was reduced to Moldavia. Russian rela-
tions with France were by this time in a process of swift decline. With
the increasing probability that war with France would again break out,
the Russian representatives were more willing to make concessions to
the Porte. The chief issue in the negotiations remained the line of the
new boundary: the Porte wished to draw it at the Pruth; Russia insisted
on the Sereth. Finally, in May 1812, the two powers signed the Treaty
of Bucharest.12 Among the articles affecting the interests of the Prin-
cipalities, the most important was the cession to Russia of the territory
between the Dniester and the Pruth, which came to be known as
Bessarabia. Since the border ran along the Kilia Channel of the Danube
Delta, Russia became a riparian power of that river. The treaty also
reconfirmed the previous privileges granted to the Principalities, in-
cluding those which gave the Russian government predominant in-
fluence. After the negotiation of the treaty the Russian troops were
withdrawn from the Principalities and sent home to meet the French
invasion. The Ottoman government was not happy with the agree-
ment: the chief negotiators were beheaded.
Neither the Porte nor the Principalities were directly involved in
the great campaigns that resulted in the final defeat of Napoleon. Nor
were Ottoman or Balkan problems the subject of negotiation at the
Congress of Vienna. For the Principalities the Treaty of Bucharest was
to inaugurate a period of relative peace. Nevertheless, most of the major
political problems remained to be settled. The rule of the Phanariot
princes still caused deep resentment; it could also be expected that the
Porte would, where possible, attempt to undermine Russian influence
in the region. The major issue of which power should predominate had
not yet been conclusively settled.
The eighteenth century was thus, as we have seen, a period of almost
continual conflict for the Principalities. In an age of rapid expansion
the Russian government correctly assessed the enormous strategic sig-
nificance of the provinces. In turn, at least some sections of the Ro-
manian aristocratic leadership recognized that the Russian court was
the best source of support against the Ottoman suzerain. Both bene-
fited from the relationship thus established. Russian armies did use the
Principalities as a staging area and a source of supplies in their cam-
paigns against the Porte. In return, and largely because of Russian
pressure, the Principalities received from the Porte a further confirma-
tion and a more exact definition of their privileges. However, at the
same time the Ottoman government was forced to grant to the Russian
14
 Introduction
government special rights of intervention in the internal affairs of the
Principalities. Thus, as Ottoman influence weakened, that of Russia
increased proportionately.
In addition to the military aspects of the problem, the Russian gov-
ernment had other objectives in the Principalities, ones that varied with
the circumstances of the moment. At times the Russian officials and
their boyar partisans thought of a full annexation of one or both of the
provinces; the erection of puppet states, such as Catherine's kingdom of
Dacia, was also considered. Toward the end of the century another
alternative, Russian domination of the Ottoman government, became
a possibility. In this case the Russian diplomats preferred the mainte-
nance of Ottoman integrity and thus full Turkish control over the Prin-
cipalities. At no time was the establishment of a truly independent
Romanian political unit a matter of serious consideration. By 1812
a sort of compromise had been reached. Russia annexed directly only
Bessarabia. Although puppet kingdoms were not formed, Russia gained
a position of political domination through the treaty provisions that
allowed its officials to intervene in the internal affairs of the Princi-
palities and to act as a kind of intermediary in relations between the
Porte and its Romanian subjects.
As far as the Romanian leadership was concerned, there was as yet,
of course, no true national government. The Phanariot princes, except
under unusual circumstances, acted as agents of the Porte. The boyars,
whose ranks were weakened by internal divisions, were as much inter-
ested in maintaining their privileged social and economic position as
they were in resisting foreign control. In their opposition to Phanariot
rule and Ottoman fiscal exactions, many were indeed willing to turn
to Russia, as well as to the Habsburg Empire and France. Because of
its geographic position, Russia offered the best hope of effective assis-
tance against Constantinople. Nevertheless, Russian power and prestige
themselves constituted a danger. The next half century was to demon-
strate the difficulties in the relationship and to show whether the Prin-
cipalities could accept Russian backing against the Ottoman suzerain
and retain at least a degree of political autonomy.
 CHAPTER I

The Russian protectorate

With the establishment of peace in 1815 the Russian government had

occasion to be well satisfied with European conditions. After the men-
ace of French aggression and French-supported revolutionary upheaval
was suppressed, Russia emerged as the predominant Continental mili-
tary power. Joined in close alignment with the Habsburg Monarchy
and Prussia, a combination usually referred to as the Holy Alliance,
the Russian government was a part of the most important European
alliance system. With the acquisition of the major share of Poland, it
also had no more territorial claims in the West. Weary of war and revo-
lutionary upheaval, and with few pressing foreign policy objectives,
Russia became the principal supporter of the status quo in European
politics.
Russia's relations with the Ottoman Empire could be viewed with
similar satisfaction. If the Porte kept its treaty obligations, the Russian
government was in a position to dominate the internal politics of the
Principalities and to play a major role in the relations of the Ottoman
government with its Orthodox subjects. During the eighteenth century,
as we have seen, Russia waged repeated campaigns with the aim of at-
taining certain territorial objectives. This direction of policy was, at
least temporarily, to be reversed. The Russian government now wished
to maintain the status quo in the Near East as well as in Europe. With
the achievement of the Pruth boundary, the Russian leaders recognized
that they had little more to gain by an aggressive policy in either area.
The desire to maintain the conditions of 1815 went beyond the ter-
ritorial settlement reached at the Congress of Vienna. In addition, Tsar
Alexander I was to become deeply concerned about the maintenance
of the conservative regimes in power after the defeat of Napoleon. For
16
 The Russian protectorate
Russia, as for other European states, the long period of the wars of the
French Revolution and Napoleon had involved not only the threat
of French Continental domination, but also that of the overthrow of
established governments and their replacement by revolutionary re-
gimes. However, it is important to emphasize that Alexander, despite
his support of the suppression of revolts after 1815, was not against
political reform if it were carried through by regular means. Following
the principles of enlightened despotism, he favored the introduction
of orderly administrative procedures and just legal systems in states
suffering from the evils of corruption and misgovernment, but these
measures were to be introduced from above by the legitimate authori-
ties. He also was not against constitutional government: he was, after
all, a constitutional monarch at least in theory in the Congress King-
dom, established after 1815 in the Russian-dominated Polish lands.
What he was to combat with intensity was the overthrow of legitimate
governments by force and violence. With these convictions he was able
to work well with Metternich, who shared a similar outlook. When
revolutionary movements broke out first in the German and Italian
states and then in Spain, Portugal, and South America, the conserva-
tive monarchies - Russia, the Habsburg Empire, and Prussia - together
adopted a policy calling for armed intervention by outside states in
support of legitimate governments.
Although these policies were followed with relative consistency
in Western and Central Europe, some adjustments had to be made
in the Russian attitude toward events in the Ottoman lands. Russia
usually backed Serbian demands for increased autonomy despite
the revolts of 1804 and 1815. Moreover, as we have seen, Russia had
acquired certain treaty rights in regard to the Balkan Christians, in
particular in the treaties of Kuchuk Kainardji and Bucharest, which
had to be upheld. In addition, Orthodoxy was a basic element in the
Russian conservative ideology, and the interests of the church had
to be defended. Thus the revolt of an Orthodox Balkan people, even
though it might be against the "legitimate monarch," the sultan, might
present the Russian leaders with difficult choices.
The Russian support of Orthodoxy also involved another aspect,
which was to be important for Romanian affairs. The Russian govern-
ment and Russian church dignitaries naturally wished to remain in
close touch with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the chief repre-
sentative of the Balkan Christians. In the eighteenth century this office,
like the Danubian Principalities, came to be dominated by Phanariot
Greeks, who used their position to extend their control over all of the
ecclesiastical establishments in those parts of the Balkans under direct
17
 Russia and the Romanian national state

RUSSIA

Odessa
«

50' 100

MEDITERRANEAN

The Ottoman Balkans, 1815

18
 The Russian protectorate
Ottoman rule. The Greek influence over Orthodox affairs in the Prin-
cipalities was also strong. Most important was the control of the so-
called Dedicated Monasteries, whose lands embraced about an eleventh
of the territory of the provinces. Despite the fact that the Patriarchate
was a part of the Ottoman administrative system, and that it was ex-
tremely corrupt, the Russian government gave it immense support
throughout the century. The aim was to preserve as far as possible the
unity of the Balkan Christians under this organization. Although the
Russian officials would have liked to obtain a position of dominance
in the councils of the church, this aim was never achieved. In fact, the
Patriarchate was usually able to exploit Russian power for its own
goals; it was never a tool in Russian hands.
In the Principalities the situation after 1812 continued to be bleak.
Both provinces had been devastated by the war and foreign occupation.
Moreover, under the new princes, loan Caragea in Wallachia and Scar-
lat Callimachi in Moldavia, the population was to undergo a period of
extreme fiscal oppression. Both rulers had been forced to pay a high
price in bribes for their positions, and they wished to recoup their ex-
penditures. The resultant increase in taxes and other payments was
naturally passed on down to the peasantry. Caragea's misrule was so
flagrant that he was finally forced to flee to Pisa in 1818. His replace-
ment, Alecu Sutu, arrived with a suite of eighty relatives and eight
hundred other retainers, including an Albanian guard.
The Phanariot system was thus still firmly in place. However, by the
1820s a situation had developed that was fast becoming unendurable
for both the native boyar and the dependent peasant. As in the previous
century change would have to come through boyar leadership; the
small middle class of merchants and artisans contributed only a few
political leaders. The great majority of the peasants, although no
longer enserfed, had no political power and were forced to make high
payments both to the state and to the landholders. Their grievances
were primarily social and economic and were directed against the bo-
yars. They were more concerned with gaining changes in the agrarian
relationships and in securing a free title to their land than with prob-
lems of Ottoman suzerainty, Phanariot domination, or Russian in-
tervention.
With this social and economic situation, it is understandable why
political power lay, and was to remain, in the hands of a relatively
small minority. The boyars themselves were divided by their personal
interests, and, of course, by the size of their estates and their compara-
tive wealth. Those who held their rank because they belonged to an-
cient families felt superior to those who were enobled because of state
19
 Russia and the Romanian national state
service or for similar reasons. Many members of this class were well
educated. They kept in touch with events in Europe, and they were
well aware of contemporary ideological trends. During the Phanariot
period they had, as could be expected, divided into factions, and they
fought for influence and power. Primarily interested in maintaining
their own privileges in landholding and local administrative control,
they seldom concerned themselves with peasant problems.
The corruption and injustice of Phanariot rule had, as we have
seen, caused extreme dissatisfaction. The Greek princes were correctly
regarded primarily as Ottoman agents, and they were blamed for the
draining of Romanian resources for Ottoman benefit. Although they
developed no set program or ideology, as did the reformers of 1848,
many boyars did seek radical changes in the government of the Prin-
cipalities. First and foremost, they demanded an end to the Phanariot
regime. They wished to control their own administration, and they
wanted native princes. They were divided on the powers to be assigned
to their ruler; some wished him to be subordinate to a boyars' council.
Most obvious was the need for the establishment of a just administra-
tive system and the assurance of law and order throughout the provinces.
The chaotic financial situation also had to be confronted. Unlike later
leaders, the boyars of this generation were not nationalists in the
modern sense. Nevertheless, they desired to have each principality run
its own affairs, and they assumed a basic unity and similarity between
Wallachia and Moldavia. They did not regard each other as foreigners,
but as members of the same family, sharing a common language and
past history.
The boyar attitude toward Russia had remained ambivalent. Russian
support was indeed sought against Ottoman rule during the eighteenth
century. When, however, it appeared that Russia might seek to annex
the provinces, the attitude changed. Under Ottoman rule the Princi-
palities did indeed enjoy a special position; they were not Turkish
pashaliks. An increase of Russian influence, even if not a direct annex-
ation, might result in an even further reduction of the boyar's role in
his government. Moreover, after 1815 there was no sign that the Russian
leaders were greatly dissatisfied with Phanariot rule. They recognized
the necessity of political and economic reform in both provinces, but in
this period Greek influence was strong in St. Petersburg. Many Greek
nationals had entered Russian service. The Russian carrying trade
in the Black Sea was in Greek hands. The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji
had given Greek ships the right to fly the Russian flag. Therefore,
should issues involving the Greek influence in the Principalities come
into question, the Russian attitude could not be predicted beforehand.
20
 The Russian protectorate
TOWARD A RUSSIAN PROTECTORATE: THE GREEK
REVOLUTION, TUDOR VLADIMIRESCU, AND
THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR
By the beginning of the 1820s, despite the urgent need for reform, it was
clear that some radical event would have to occur to alter the basic
conditions in the Principalities. There appeared little chance that the
necessary changes would be made by the regimes in power. An entirely
new situation was created, however, not because of Romanian initia-
tives, but because of the activities of Greek leaders intent on securing
independence from Ottoman rule. Their precipitation of a revolution
both in the Principalities and in Greece was to open once again the
dangerous issue of the Eastern Question and to force another Russian
intervention in the affairs of the peninsula.
The Greek revolution of 1821 had its origins in multiple and com-
plex developments, but for the Principalities the major role was played
by the Phanariots and by a secret organization, the Filiki Etairia
(Friendly Society). Organized in 1814 by three Greek merchants, it had
as its objective the freeing of Greek lands from Ottoman control. The
organization made a slow start, but in 1818 it moved its headquarters
to Constantinople and by 1820 it had enrolled hundreds of members,
both in the Greek-inhabited territories and in the Principalities. Al-
though the movement had Greek liberation as its primary aim, attempts
were made to involve other Balkan peoples, including the Serbs, Bul-
garians, and Romanians, in a united uprising. Even more important
than the gaining of Balkan Christian adherents, however, was the task
of attracting Russian support. From the beginning the leaders of the
society understood that it was essential that they win not just passive
Russian acquiescence, but active armed intervention. That assistance
would come from St. Petersburg seemed to some an obvious assumption.
Certainly, in the past Russia had aided resistance to Ottoman rule;
before each invasion of Ottoman territory the Russians, like the Aus-
trians, had called upon the Balkan people to revolt. In order to attract
members to the organization, the Etairia usually let it be understood
that Russia stood behind the movement. The apparent link with the
Orthodox great power was one of the major strengths of the entire un-
dertaking.
The Etairia had another apparent advantage. Russia had at this time
two foreign ministers. The first, Karl Vasilevich Nesselrode, was a
Rhineland German, but the second, Ioannis Capodistrias, was a Greek
from Corfu with a strong interest in Greek causes. He had entered
Russian service in 1809 and had risen rapidly thereafter. Although a
21
 Russia and the Romanian national state
strong nationalist, he in fact was convinced that Greek interests would
be better served by a concentration on education and moral awakening
than by an emphasis on revolutionary activity. To the Etairia he seemed,
nevertheless, an ideal leader. He was approached by members of the
organization in both 1817 and 1820. When he refused to head the move-
ment, the position was taken by Alexander Ipsilanti, who was similarly
of Greek ancestry and in the Russian service. The son of the pro-Russian
former hospodar Constantine Ipsilanti, Alexander had been educated
in Russia; he was a general in the Russian army and an aide-de-camp
of the tsar. Although the question of Russian official involvement in
the conspiracy has been much debated, it appears that the tsar was
aware of the existence of the society, but not of its specific plans. Capo-
distrias probably knew more; he certainly gave strong warnings to his
Greek acquaintances not to provoke disturbances in the hope that Rus-
sia would intervene. The general European situation was not at all
propitious for the renewal of a Russian advance in the Balkans; the tsar
was strongly against revolutionary activity. The Etairia, however,
appears not to have taken the realities of the diplomatic situation into
serious consideration.
Despite the fact that the society could gain no open official encourage-
ment, it continued to use the Russian name freely. Plans for an uprising
proceeded, and in 1820 it was decided that there should be simultaneous
revolts in the Peloponnesus and the Principalities.1 Despite the wide-
spread Romanian resentment of Greek influence, the provinces offered
certain advantages as centers for rebellion. The Etairia had been able
to gain many recruits from among the boyars of Greek background, al-
though not from among the native Romanians. The prince of Moldavia,
Michael Sutu, was a member. Alecu Sutu, the ruler of Wallachia, had
not joined, but by 1821 he appeared close to death. The Russian consuls
in Jassy and Bucharest, Andrei Pisani and Alexander Pini, maintained
a neutral attitude. Moreover, the provinces had an excellent strategic
location. Despite the lack of official Russian support, Bessarabia was a
center for the organization of the movement. Men and supplies were
assembled there and elsewhere in the Black Sea territories. Moreover,
the idea persisted that once the revolt commenced, the Russian govern-
ment would be forced to send an army into the Principalities both to
prevent the Ottoman government from crushing an Orthodox move-
ment and in reaction to the expected atrocities. The Etairia could
count too on the military support of princes' guards and volunteer
forces.
Assistance was also expected from another quarter. The Etairia had
come to an understanding with a Romanian leader, Tudor Vladimires-
22
 The Russian protectorate
cu, who headed a native Romanian movement, although one whose
aims differed radically from those of the Greek conspiracy.2 Born in a
family of free peasants, Vladimirescu had risen to the rank and position
of a boyar. Formerly a commander of the pandours, a Romanian militia
organized during the previous wars, he had fought with the Russian
troops and had received a decoration. Vladimirescu was, in fact, the
first to move. He came to an agreement with the agents of the Etairia
and with members of the provisional government in Bucharest who
were in charge during the illness and death of Sutu. In January 1821
he departed from Bucharest for Oltenia, where he organized an uprising
among the peasants. He was able to join together a formidable force
of pandours, peasants, and other volunteers, which was called the Peo-
ple's Assembly. In a declaration issued at Pade§ on January 23/February
4, he addressed the peasants in fiery words that had little to do with
the Greek movement or even with the Romanian grievances against
the Porte:
Brothers living in Wallachia, whatever your nationality, no law prevents a man
to meet evil with evil . . . How long shall we suffer the dragons that swallow us
alive, those above us, both clergy and politicians, to suck our blood? How
long shall we be enslaved? . . . Neither God nor the sultan approves of such
treatment of their faithful. Therefore, brothers, come all of you and deal out
evil to bring evil to an end.3
This clear call to revolution received an immediate response. Peas-
ants attacked the property of the landowners and burned and looted
their houses. Despite stern warnings from Vladimirescu, his followers
engaged in violent and lawless actions. It should be emphasized that this
revolt was directed against the prevailing social and economic condi-
tions, not against Ottoman rule. Vladimirescu sent frequent messages to
the Porte giving assurances that the uprising was against the abuses of
the Phanariot regime and that the peasants sought only the restoration
of "old rights" that they had lost. He called upon the Ottoman officials
to investigate the situation. Victorious in the countryside, he and his
followers next marched to Bucharest.
Meanwhile, Ipsilanti was putting his plans into action. On February
221 March 6, wearing a Russian army uniform, he crossed from Bes-
sarabia into Moldavia, accompanied by a few followers. There the
Etairia members joined him, and they were able to take over the gov-
ernment in Jassy with little difficulty. Ipsilanti continually assured his
supporters that the Russian army was right behind him. Once estab-
lished in power, he and the Moldavian boyars sent a petition to the tsar.
They could not have chosen a worse moment. Alexander I was at that
time attending the Congress of Laibach, which had been called to deal
 Russia and the Romanian national state
with the revolutionary movement in the Italian peninsula. In a period
of strong conservatism, deeply disturbed by the European events, Alex-
ander was unlikely to approve a similar event in an adjacent region.
However, because communications were poor, the Russian reaction
was slow in coming. Thus in the first weeks Ipsilanti's claim to Russian
backing was not disputed. The Russian consuls took no action. Al-
though instructions were sent to Pini in Bucharest in early March
denouncing Vladimirescu's actions and stripping him of his Russian
decoration, he did not learn of this until the end of the month. Per-
suaded by the Etairia's promises of Russian backing, he too had assured
his followers of the tsar's support. Alexander's repudiation of Ipsilanti
was also not known in Bucharest until the end of March. The tsar's
reaction to the events in the Principalities left no doubt about the Rus-
sian position. A circular dispatch, sent by Nesselrode in March, clearly
reflected the imperial disfavor. The conspiracy of Tudor Vladimirescu,
who was described as "an obscure adventurer at the head of some irregu-
lar troops," was to be treated with speed and firmness:
Always frank and loyal in his policy, the emperor, from the time that he learned
of the insurrection of Vladimirescu, made haste to notify the Porte that this
individual, who had formerly been decorated with the cross of St. Vladimir,
had been removed from the list of the knights of that order, and that His
Majesty would observe with pleasure if the Turkish government without the
least delay would take the most appropriate measures to reestablish calm in
the Principalities.
The dispatch added that Alexander strongly disapproved of Ipsilanti's
actions, "that his conduct is entirely contrary to the wishes and inten-
tions of His Imperial Majesty and that, removed from the registers of
the army, with the prohibition of ever returning to Russia, he could
count neither on any aid nor even on any sign of interest... as long as
he misleads his compatriots and brings them to inevitable misfor-
tunes."4
With this unequivocal Russian stand, neither Vladimirescu nor
Ipsilanti could hope for success. Moreover, it soon became clear that
the two men had opposing objectives. On March 1/13 Ipsilanti, with a
force of only a few thousand untrained and undisciplined volunteers,
left Moldavia for Wallachia; at the end of that month Vladimirescu,
with about eight thousand men, arrived at the outskirts of Bucharest.
Of the two forces, the Romanian was obviously the stronger. Both
armies were facing grave dangers. Russian aid had been refused; a
Russian army under generals Wittgenstein and Kiselev stood watch on
the border, but remained neutral. With Russian approval, Ottoman
troops had entered the Principalities in May. In this situation the com-
24
 The Russian protectorate
manders decided to retreat to Oltenia and the mountains. The difference
between the movements was becoming increasingly evident. Vladi-
mirescu never abandoned his attempts to reach an understanding with
the Porte; his aim was an improvement of peasant conditions in the
Principalities, not Greek liberation. Although he had the larger army,
he had alienated many of his followers, in particular when he executed
some of his commanders for looting. Taking advantage of defections
in Vladimirescu's ranks, the Etairia attempted to assume command of
his forces. He was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered on May 21 /June
2. Although the Greek commanders were successful in taking over the
army, it in fact began to dissolve. Defections had already begun when
the peasant volunteers realized that a true social revolution was not
likely to be accomplished. With the death of their commander, many
simply went home. The ill-organized and undisciplined army of the
Etairia was finally crushed at the battle of Draga§ani on June 7 / 19. At
the end of the month the last Greek forces were annihilated at Sculeni
on the Pruth.
Meanwhile, the character of the Greek revolution had changed. At
the beginning of April a revolt had broken out in the Peloponnesus,
which was to have far wider repercussions than the disaster in the Prin-
cipalities. Faced with such widespread rebellion, the Ottoman govern-
ment was forced to take immediate action. Larger military forces were
sent into the Principalities. Other, more drastic, measures were then im-
plemented against the Christian population in both the Greek and
Romanian lands, and these altered the attitude of the Russian govern-
ment. After the victory of the Etairia in Moldavia in March, its ad-
herents had massacred part of the Turkish population in Jassy and
Galatz. Similar atrocities accompanied the outbreak of the revolt in
the Peloponnesus. The reaction of the Porte was equally violent. Not
only were reprisals taken against Christian civilians, but on Easter eve
the patriarch of Constantinople and some of his bishops were killed.
When news of these events reached St. Petersburg, Alexander I felt
obligated to take some steps in support of his fellow Orthodox Chris-
tians.
Although the Russian government at this point spoke out in defense
of both the Greeks and the Romanians, it did not alter its attitude
toward the revolutionary movements as such. As before, it considered
any actions taken by the Ottoman authorities against the participants
in the revolt justified. What were denounced were the widely reported
atrocities committed against Christian populations who were not ac-
tively engaged in rebellious activity. A circular dispatch of July 1821
made this distinction clear. It condemned the measures taken "not
25
 Russia and the Romanian national state
against the insurgents but against the entire Greek nation" and con-
tinued:
The emperor is fully justified in demanding that the Turkish government
protect the exercise of the Christian religion, the persons of its ministers, the
inviolability of its temples, and that it not at all carry devastation and death
into the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and that for the inhabitants
of these countries, as well as for those of the isles of the Archipelago and the
rest of Greece, it observe a just and constant distinction between innocence
and crime.5
In addition, the Russian government was determined to maintain
its rights under the treaties. In August the Russian representative in
Constantinople, Gregory Aleksandrovich Stroganov, was recalled from
his post. The questions in dispute concerned not only those involved
in the Greek uprising, but also the evacuation of Ottoman troops from
the Principalities and the nomination of the princes. By this date all
of the great powers had become involved in the new and dangerous
situation in the Balkans.
The Ottoman army remained in occupation of Wallachia and Mol-
davia for sixteen months. Throughout this period the Principalities
were once more under the heavy burden of supplying the needs of an
army of occupation. Domestic affairs were also in a state of turmoil. Dur-
ing the peasant revolt and after the entrance of the Ottoman troops, a
mass migration of thousands of boyars and merchants into Transyl-
vania had occurred. Many of those who had been involved with the
Etairia feared retribution. Bra§ov and Sibiu were the center for the
refugees, some of whom remained out of the country as late as 1826.
In May 1822 an agreement was reached among the powers, and the Ot-
toman troops began to leave the Principalities, with the last departing
in September.
The failure of the Greek revolt had beneficial consequences for the
native boyars, who were finally able to gain their chief objective. Since
the Porte could no longer trust its Greek officials, the period of Phana-
riot rule came to an end. In April 1822 a six-man delegation from Mol-
davia under the leadership of Ion Sturdza and a similar one of seven
members from Wallachia under Gregory Ghica went to Constantinople
with a common program. Both groups sought the appointment of na-
tive princes, the formation of a Romanian armed force to replace the
previous princes' guard, the restriction of officeholding to Romanians,
the right to petition the Porte for the redress of grievances, and other
similar measures. Most of these desires were granted in a firman. With
the appointment of Sturdza and Ghica to head their respective princi-
palities, the Phanariot era came to a formal end.
26
 The Russian protectorate
Although the actions of the Porte met most of the Romanian re-
quests and gave evidence of an Ottoman desire for reconciliation, the
Russian government refused to accept these measures. The Porte had
made its decisions without consulting Russia; the princes had been
named without the consent of the tsar. The terms of treaties had thus
been broken, a condition that the tsar and his government would not
accept. The Russian officials, nevertheless, did not at this time go further
than issuing protests.
With a new regime in power, life in the Principalities could return
to normal. Some measures were taken against the peasants who had
revolted under Vladimirescu's leadership. However, although villages
were disarmed and attempts were made to collect the taxes and labor
obligations that were due from the period of the rebellion, the entire
matter was handled with relative moderation. During this time the
Principalities' financial condition had deteriorated further. The Otto-
man occupation had cost fifteen million piasters, and the provinces owed
the Porte large sums in tribute and other payments. In political affairs
the major change to be noted was that the official positions were now
entirely in the hands of native boyars.
Meanwhile, the European diplomats continued to be concerned
about the ramifications of the Greek revolt. A stalemate between the
Ottoman army and the revolutionary forces was broken in 1825 when
the sultan called in Mehmed Ali, the pasha of Egypt. His son Ibrahim,
a brilliant general, led the Egyptian forces. His victories changed the
balance of power in the Mediterranean. Recognizing the dangers in
the situation, the three powers principally affected, Britain, France,
and Russia, came to an understanding. After 1825 Russian policy was
decided by a new tsar, Nicholas I, who was to pursue a more active
policy in Eastern affairs. In 1826 Russia and Britain agreed to cooperate
and act as mediators to attempt to establish an autonomous Greek state;
France joined them in 1827. The Greek question was thus made the
common concern of these powers. Each received the assurance that its
alliance partners would not use the new Eastern crisis to gain dispro-
portionate advantages.
Although its actions were thus limited in Greek questions, the Rus-
sian government was free to pursue unhampered the negotiations with
the Porte that involved other matters. In 1826 Mahmud II was in a
dangerous domestic situation. Not only had he been unable to crush
the Greek revolt, but he was about to take major steps to reform the
Ottoman military forces. Thus, when the Russian government delivered
a virtual ultimatum in March, the Porte was forced to agree to negotia-
tions on the issues in dispute between the two countries. The Conven-
27
 Russia and the Romanian national state
tion of Akkerman, signed on September 25/October 7, dealt with the
Asiatic frontiers, the status of Serbia, and similar problems, as well as
with the affairs of the Principalities. The most important provisions
concerning the Romanian lands were incorporated into a Separate Act,
which reaffirmed the previous arrangements and strengthened the Rus-
sian right of intervention and supervision. The princes were to be
elected from among the native boyars by the divans, the traditional
councils, associated with the hospodars and composed of the most in-
fluential men; the choice was to be confirmed by both courts. They
were to serve for seven years, and they could be reelected. They could
only be deposed for crimes and with the approval of the two powers.
The Hatti Sherif of 1802 was reconfirmed. The divans were to handle
matters of taxation; freedom of commerce was guaranteed except in rela-
tion to the supplies due to the Porte. Most significant for the future was
the stipulation that administrative reform should be undertaken:
The disorders of the last years in Moldavia and Wallachia having caused the
most severe injury to order in the different branches of the internal administra-
tion, the hospodars shall be bound with the least possible delay, together with
the respective divans, to take the necessary measures to improve the conditions
of the Principalities confided to their care, and those measures shall form the
subject of a general regulation for each province, which shall be put immedi-
ately into execution.6
The Convention of Akkerman did not remain long in effect. Mahmud
II was soon to face a major foreign crisis. After the Ottoman govern-
ment refused to accept allied mediation, a joint French-British-Russian
squadron was organized for duty in the Mediterranean, the task of
which was to prevent supplies from reaching the Egyptian army that
was operating in the Peloponnesus. In October 1827 tn * s f°rce anni-
hilated a Turkish-Egyptian fleet anchored in the harbor of Navarino.
The Duke of Wellington, at the head of the British government, was
shocked by this unexpected occurrence and withdrew from the coopera-
tive effort. The British influence would thus not be available as a re-
straint on Russia in the next months. As might be expected, a violent
reaction occurred in Constantinople; in December the sultan declared
a "Holy War" on Russia and the Convention of Akkerman was de-
nounced. The first belligerent act, however, did not take place until
April 1828, when Russian armies once again entered the Principalities.
The Russian occupation, under General Wittgenstein, proceeded
with great speed; there were, of course, no Ottoman troops in the
country.7 The Principalities faced another extended and difficult period
of military occupation. As before, the Russian command took full con-
trol of the country. The princes Ghica and Sturdza, who had cooperated
28
 The Russian protectorate
with the Porte, were deposed. Count F. P. Pahlen was appointed to
head the two divans and given full power over the civil government.
He was, however, himself under the authority of the commander of
the army of occupation. The familiar problems arose at once. The first
interest of the Russian authorities was, of course, the conduct of the
war. The Russian command had arrived on the scene with optimistic
hopes about the supplies that could be acquired in the country. The
Russian officials were soon involved in bitter conflicts with both the
Romanian peasants and the boyars over questions of requisitioning
and mode of payment. As usual, the population was expected to provide
housing for the Russian troops and transport for war materiel. The
Russian officials were also determined to collect the regular taxes.
As long as Pahlen remained in charge of the civil administration,
concern for the interests of the Principalities was shown. He wished
equitable arrangements to be worked out. He was, however, replaced
in January 1829 by the much tougher and more exacting General P. F.
Zheltukhin, who placed first emphasis on fulfilling the needs of the
military forces. During this period the Russian authorities were in full
control of the country. The regular Romanian officials remained in
office, but they could do little more than carry out the Russian direc-
tives. As in previous wars, the Russian army made use of some Ro-
manian fighters, with the pandours again playing a major role.
The harshness of the Russian attitude in the Principalities reflected
in part the difficulties of the war. This campaign was not to result in
an easy victory. The fighting was brought to an end in September
1829, but the moderation of the terms of the peace reflected Russia's
fear that the other powers might intervene and a realization of the basic
weakness of its military position. Supplies were short and the army
was far from its base.
In considering what terms they wished to impose upon the Ottoman
government, the Russian statesmen had to consider some real limita-
tions on their position. They were already bound by the agreements of
1826 and 1827 w * t n Britain and France, which set limits on large acqui-
sitions of territory. Moreover, they had to weigh carefully the advisa-
bility of severely weakening, or even destroying, the Ottoman Empire.
Russian military power was not sufficient, at this time or later, to impose
a unilateral settlement. If large territorial gains were made, the other
powers would have to be compensated. Austria as well as France and
Britain would expect equivalent acquisitions. With these considerations
in mind the Russian government adopted a policy that was to be main-
tained to the 1850s. Instead of seeking the destruction or partition of the
Ottoman Empire, the Russian statesmen decided that the state should
29
 Russia and the Romanian national state
be maintained, but as a weak power under Russian influence. The
terms of the Treaty of Adrianople of September 1829 reflected this atti-
tude. Russia made only minor gains of territory, chiefly in Asia but also
including the Danube Delta. An indemnity of 11.5 million ducats was
levied, though the sum was later reduced. The Ottoman government
agreed to recognize Greek autonomy and to allow more privileges to
Serbia.8
Russia's decision concerning its attitude toward the Ottoman Empire
naturally affected the provisions of the peace in regard to the Princi-
palities. Except for the acquisition of the Danube Delta, Russia took
no more Romanian territory. Instead the peace terms reaffirmed and
strengthened the rights that Russia had gained in the Hatti Sherif of
1802 and the Convention of Akkerman. Article 5 dealt with this ques-
tion:
The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia having been in consequence of
a Capitulation placed under the Suzerainty of the Sublime Porte, and Russia
having guaranteed their prosperity, it is understood that they shall preserve
all the privileges and immunities which have been granted to them either by
their Capitulations, or by the Treaties concluded between the two Empires,
or by the Hatti-sherifs promulgated at different times. In consequence whereof,
they shall enjoy free exercise of their Worship, perfect security, an independent
national Government, and full liberty of Commerce.9
Other sections of the treaty lessened the economic controls of Otto-
man suzerainty and reduced the payments that could be collected. Most
advantageous was the termination of the Ottoman right of preemption:
The Sublime Porte, animated by the sincere desire of insuring to the two Prin-
cipalities all the welfare of which they are susceptible, and being informed of
the abuses and annoyances to which they were subjected on account of the
supplies required for the consumption of Constantinople, the provisioning of
the Fortresses situated upon the Danube, and the requisitions of the Arsenal,
fully and entirely relinquishes in their favour its right in this respect.10
Although a set annual tribute was still to be collected, the Principalities
were required to make only a few other payments, such as the gift of-
fered at the accession of each prince, who was now to be chosen for life.
Other provisions reflected the Russian desire to accent sharply the
division between the Principalities and the rest of the empire. The
boundary was to be the thalweg of the Danube; the fortified towns of
Turnu Severin, Giurgiu, and Braila, which had been under Turkish con-
trol, were to be returned to Wallachia, and their Muslim inhabitants
were to sell their property within eighteen months. No Ottoman for-
tifications were to be allowed in the Principalities; "no Mussulman can
ever establish his residence, and . . . the only Mohametans who can be
30
 The Russian protectorate
admitted therein are merchants provided with firmans, whose object
in repairing thither is to purchase, on their own account in the Prin-
cipalities, the goods necessary for the consumption of Constantinople,
or other articles."11 The line of division at the Danube was further em-
phasized by the fact that a quarantine was to be established along the
river. The Principalities were allowed to organize a militia to handle
the quarantine as well as to provide border guards and to preserve law
and order.
The Treaty of Adrianople brought to a close a process that com-
menced with the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji. By 1829 the Ottoman
government for all practical purposes was excluded from effective in-
fluence in either Wallachia or Moldavia; it had little more than the
right to confirm the nomination of the princes and to collect a fixed
tribute. Russia, the recognized protecting power, exerted the real au-
thority. Henceforth, the governments of the two Principalities were to
consider the continued Ottoman suzerainty as only a minor burden.
Instead they were to find themselves under constant pressure from the
Russian government and its representatives in Bucharest and Jassy.
Although in many instances the Russian actions were to the ultimate
benefit of the inhabitants, the conditions of the protectorate and the
regular interference were bitterly resented.

T H E PROTECTORATE ESTABLISHED

With the war successfully concluded the Russian government could

proceed with the program of political reform in the Principalities al-
ready enunciated in the Convention of Akkerman.12 According to the
peace terms the Russian army was to remain in occupation of the Prin-
cipalities until the Ottoman war indemnity was paid. With an armed
force on the scene and with a recognized right of protection, the Russian
authorities could introduce any regime they wished. They had certainly
every interest in assuring prosperity and tranquility in this dependent
area. The region was an important military outpost, which could serve
as a base against Constantinople and as a source of supplies should war
break out again. The strategic position in regard to the Habsburg
Empire and the Danube River was also of significance. A friendly ad-
ministration and a contented population could be of immense advantage
in the future.
Not only did the Russian government have every desire to create
favorable conditions in the area, but it had the services of an excellent
administrator, General Paul Dmitrievich Kiselev, who replaced Zheltu-
khin in November 1829 and remained in office until April 1834. An ex-
 Russia and the Romanian national state
tremely able man of enlightened political views, Kiselev was well suited
to give expression to the Russian determination to endow the Princi-
palities with an efficient and modern system. Immediately upon assum-
ing his post, he went to work to solve the obvious problems. The occu-
pation had caused devastation in the land even though fighting had not
taken place in the provinces themselves. To ease the severe food short-
ages, Kiselev imported supplies from Odessa. He also organized a
quarantine to deal with pressing health problems, in particular the
prevalence of cholera. Among his first acts was the formation of a
militia composed of regular, salaried soldiers. His chief contribution,
however, was his supervision of the drafting of new administrative
statutes for both Principalities.
Already, in June 1829, committees had been established in each
principality to consider political reforms. They consisted of four
members, two named by the divans and two by Zheltukhin, who met
under the chairmanship of the Russian consul-general, Matei Leovich
Minciaky (Minchaki). Most of their work was completed during the
period when Kiselev was in charge. The general was both president of
the divans and the chief of staff of the Russian army corps in occupation
of the country; he thus held the highest civil and military positions. In
contrast to his predecessor, who alienated the Romanian boyars by his
brusque manners, Kiselev was a tactful and conciliatory diplomat. Al-
though he favored Russian annexation of the Principalities, his views
were not generally known. Despite his personal opinion, he worked
within the framework of his instructions and attempted to establish
as good an administrative system as possible, with the hope that it
would serve to join the provinces closely to Russia.
By April 1830 the two committees had completed their work. The
texts of their proposed administrative regulations were somewhat al-
tered by Kiselev before being forwarded to St. Petersburg, where a
commission examined them and made some additional changes. They
were then returned to the Principalities and there considered by two
special assemblies, which were given only limited rights to amend
them. The first assembly, presided over by Kiselev, was held in Wal-
lachia in March 1831; it was composed of fifty-four members chosen
chiefly from the wealthy boyars. After it had finished its work in April,
Kiselev proceeded to Jassy, where he headed a similar assembly. The
Russian authorities faced more opposition in Moldavia, where the pre-
vious annexation of Bessarabia was in the boyars' minds. The docu-
ments, known collectively as the Organic Statutes, were promulgated
in Wallachia in July 1831 and in Moldavia in January 1832. The texts
were similar but not identical.13
 The Russian protectorate
The new statutes thus were the product of a Russian initiative, drawn
up under the close supervision of Russian officials, and put into practice
during a Russian occupation. They were, nevertheless, a real step for-
ward in Romanian political development. The governments of the
Principalities were henceforth to be conducted on the basis of legal
documents, which were introduced for the express purpose of assuring
an orderly, modern administrative system. The documents cannot be
described as true constitutions; they were instead detailed administra-
tive regulations for the government of each Principality. Their pro-
visions met most of the demands that had been set forth by the boyars in
their petitions to the Russian court and the Porte in the previous years.
They assured that this class would retain its predominant position in
the state, a result fully consonant with the desires of the conservative
Russian regime. Its aim was a stable, prosperous government, not a
change in social relationships. The establishment of parallel sets of
regulations in the two principalities was to aid in the accomplish-
ment of their eventual unification, an event that was foreseen at this
time.
The Organic Statutes provided for a centralized state system and the
separation of the executive and legislative powers. The executive
branch was to be headed by a prince, who was to be elected for life by
a special assembly of high boyars. The legislature, consisting of thirty-
five members in Moldavia and forty-two in Wallachia, was also com-
posed of members of this class. The assemblies could pass laws, but the
prince had a veto right. The prince could also prorogue the assemblies,
although he could not dissolve them without the permission of the
Ottoman Empire and Russia. The assemblies voted the budget, but
they could not force the prince out of office. They could, however,
appeal over the head of the ruler directly to the Ottoman and Russian
courts. The possibility of Russian interference was thus assured all
along the line.
The new charters offered great benefits to the boyars, who used
this opportunity to make gains at the expense of the peasants. With
the end of the Ottoman right of preemption on Romanian products,
and with the growing demand from the West, the landowners saw the op-
portunity to make greater profits from their estates. It was obviously to
their interest to gain control of as much land as possible and to assure
themselves of a steady supply of labor. In the Organic Statutes they were
able to have themselves designated for the first time as the actual own-
ers of the land; the peasants were allotted only the right to the use of
two-thirds of each estate. During this period the labor obligations were
increased and peasants were required to give six months' notice before
 Russia and the Romanian national state
leaving the land. Kiselev, incidentally, did not approve of the agrarian
measures.
In January 1834 Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Conven-
tion of St. Petersburg. The Porte accepted the Organic Statutes, and
the annual tribute was set at three million piasters. The two powers
further decided that as an exception they, not the assemblies, would
name the first princes, and that their terms would be limited to seven
years. The Russian candidates, Alexander Ghica in Wallachia and
Michael Sturdza in Moldavia, thus assumed office. After Kiselev and
the Russian army of occupation departed, the consuls, P. I. Riickmann
(Rikman) in Bucharest and Timkovskii in Jassy, represented the Rus-
sian interests.
During this period the Russian government was actively pursuing
the policy of close cooperation with the Porte that was adopted after
the Treaty of Adrianople. An opportunity to strengthen further the ties
with Constantinople came in 1831. Mehmed Ali, who had given loyal
support during the Greek revolution, rebelled against his suzerain
power, and he was able to win decisive victories over the Turkish army.
In a desperate situation, Mahmud II turned to the European powers,
but only Russia would help him. In July 1833 Russia and the Porte
concluded the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelesi, which ranks with Kuchuk
Kainardji and Adrianople in significance. Ostensibly a treaty of mutual
defense, the agreement in effect placed the Ottoman Empire in a rela-
tionship of dependence on St. Petersburg. Russian soldiers and sailors
were sent to the Straits area to aid the new ally. As long as this advan-
tageous situation could be maintained in Constantinople, the Russian
diplomats had no wish to weaken or endanger Ottoman interests.
In order to improve its position in the Near East even further, the
Russian government in September 1833 concluded the Treaty of Miin-
chengratz with the Habsburg Empire. In this understanding the two sig-
natories agreed that they would cooperate to support the Ottoman
Empire and to oppose Mehmed Ali. Should their efforts fail, and should
that state collapse, they would work together to establish an alternate
arrangement. These two agreements had a great significance for the
Principalities. Their immediate neighbors, the Habsburg Empire, the
Ottoman Empire, and Russia, were now on excellent terms, and they
all favored the maintenance of the status quo, a condition that included
Russian predominance in the Principalities. Until some event should
occur that would break this combination, there was little chance that
Romanian political conditions could be changed. Neither Britain nor
France had the ability to influence events in the Principalities, and
their policies too favored Russian control in the area.
34
 The Russian protectorate
The Russian decision to come to an agreement with Austria on Near
Eastern questions was in conformity with the general tightening of re-
lations among the conservative powers that occurred as a result of events
in Western and Central Europe. In the early 1830s another round of
revolutions took place, including a major revolt against Russian rule
in the Polish territories. This rebellion proved exceedingly difficult to
crush, and its consequences were to have a long-term effect on Russian
foreign policy. After the failure of the movement a massive emigration
from Poland took place, and many of its members organized revolu-
tionary centers in their new homelands. The most effective leader among
this group was Prince Adam Czartoryski, who had been Russian for-
eign minister in the reign of Alexander I.14 With an office in Paris that
functioned like a government-in-exile, he conducted negotiations with
heads of state and dispatched agents all over Europe. A radical wing
of the Polish emigration was also active; it cooperated with the Young
Europe movement and was attracted to carbonari tactics. The great
national enemy of the Polish groups, right and left alike, was tsarist
Russia. Wherever they went, they carried with them their intense dis-
like of this conservative power, which held the majority of the Polish
lands under its sway.
Polish emigrants were henceforth to have much influence in the
Principalities. Some settled in the region. A large number fled into the
Ottoman Empire, where they entered state service. From this base they
worked to reconcile the Romanians and the Ottoman officials and to
join them in a common front against Russia. Within the Romanian
lands the Polish leaders were naturally received with sympathy by those
who opposed the Russian protectorate. The Polish representatives in
turn recognized the value of establishing a base in the Principalities,
in particular in Moldavia, because of its strategic location in relation
to the Russian-dominated Polish territories. The Russian government,
well aware of these activities and their potential danger, continually
put pressure on Romanian officials to restrain Polish exile groups.
The predominant Russian position in the Principalities was main-
tained until 1854, but not without great difficulty and a major crisis
in 1848. One problem that the Russsian officials faced was their lack of
a firm base of support among the population at large. Russian rule was
soon identified with the Organic Statutes and the control of the govern-
ment by the great boyar families. Yet even the men who benefited by
these conditions did not become reliable Russian partisans. The princes
regularly got in touch with the agents of other powers; the boyars them-
selves were split into hostile factions. Individuals supported the Russian
position only when it suited their personal interests. Moreover, although
35
 Russia and the Romanian national state
the Organic Statutes represented progress, they did not introduce the
representative government that some members of the educated classes
came increasingly to favor. When the Russian officials insisted on the
maintenance of the statutes virtually intact, those who sought more
liberal institutions naturally saw Russia as the chief hindrance to fur-
ther progress.
Nevertheless, despite the many problems that arose, the Russian offi-
cials assigned to the Principalities did attempt to carry through their
task of protecting Russian interests and assuring good government in
the region. As individuals they established close relations with the
wealthy boyar families, many of whose members had been in the Russian
service. Cosmopolitan, well educated, and experienced, the Russian rep-
resentatives shared with the Romanian aristocracy a knowledge of the
French language and a similar political outlook.
A good description of life in the Principalities and the relations of
Russian officials with the Romanian boyars from the Russian point of
view is given in the memoirs of Nicholas Karlovich Giers, who became
Russian foreign minister in 1882, but whose first post in the diplomatic
service was in the consulate in Jassy. Giers showed his complete aware-
ness of the Russian position in the country and the system his government
wished to maintain. He described the Organic Statutes as "a gift from
Russia" and commented: "Our consuls were instructed to make sure that
the regulations were strictly adhered to. This political aspect of their du-
ties was of great importance and gave them an exceptional position in
the Principalities." He recognized the powerlessness of the suzerain and
noted that "the vassal dependence [of the Principalities] upon the
Porte was so weak that it was reduced merely to the paying of tribute.
The Turks did not dare to interfere in questions of internal adminis-
tration in Moldavia and Wallachia." 15
With the departure of the Russian armies, the newly appointed
princes took over the administration of the country. Ghica and Sturdza
faced many similar problems. The chief immediate difficulty was the
bad economic situation in the provinces and the heavy payments that
were due. During the Russian occupation the tribute had not been
paid; the back installments were still owing. Additional obligations
were the traditional gifts that had to be made at the time of the investi-
ture of the princes and the expenses left over from Kiselev's administra-
tion, which, of course, the Principalities were supposed to pay. In ad-
dition, serious political controversies soon arose. In both provinces a
similar division of interest was to emerge. Under the rule of the Organic
Statutes three centers of influence were established - the princes, the
assemblies, and the Russian consulates. Any combination was possible
36
 The Russian protectorate
among them. Usually the assemblies and the princes came into conflict,
and both appealed for support to the Russian representatives, who then
had the task of acting as final arbiters. This position gave the consulates
a great deal of influence, but it also drew them into even relatively
minor conflicts.
From the Russian point of view, Wallachia proved the more trouble-
some province. The prince, Alexander Ghica, was a brother of a former
ruler, Gregory Ghica. He had worked with Kiselev, and the Russian
government considered him a reliable supporter. Once in office he pro-
ceeded to make many enemies by his methods of administration, which
included appointing his two brothers as ministers. The consul-general
in Bucharest, Riickmann, worked with him, but a major issue that
arose, involving Russian influence, caused friction between the con-
sulate and the Wallachian government. Riickmann was given the diffi-
cult task of securing the acceptance of a so-called Additional Article to
the Organic Statutes, one that the Russian government claimed had been
"left out" of the original version. This highly controversial provision
made the approval of both Russia and the Ottoman Empire necessary
for any change in the statutes. This further limitation on the political
rights of the Principalities was strongly resented, but, as Giers com-
mented, "It was considered necessary to keep Moldo-Wallachian politi-
cal independence within definite bounds."16 Although Ghica acceded
to the Russian demands, the Wallachian assembly, by then opposed to
the prince, refused to accept the article. This obdurate attitude resulted
in the dissolution of the assembly and the election of another, which
proved similarly stubborn. The Russian government finally met the
problem by persuading the Porte to issue a firman in May 1838 that
forced the acceptance of the provision.
The mood of the assembly remained hostile to the prince. Elections
held in 1841 strengthened the ranks of his opponents. Meanwhile, in
the previous year a new Russian consul-general had been appointed.
Like his predecessor, I. A. Dashkov was soon drawn deeply into the con-
flict between the prince and the legislature.17 The assembly drew up a
petition against the ruler, as it had the right to do, and the document
was presented to both the Russian and Ottoman governments, which
then sent commissioners to investigate the situation. What then hap-
pened is described in the Giers memoirs as follows:
One can imagine the intrigues that brought about the appearance of these
political inspectors. The Turkish commissioner, as is customary, took full ad-
vantage of the situation, and made a fortune by taking bribes from the hospo-
dar as well as from each of the candidates for the office of prince by promising
each individual the support of the Porte. While our representative, listening

37
 Russia and the Romanian national state
to anybody and everybody, tried to form a fair opinion on the state of affairs,
he was deceived, being unfamiliar with both the region and the people.
In this situation the opposition triumphed, and Ghica was deposed in
October with the approval of both the Ottoman and the Russian gov-
ernments. Giers disapproved, believing that "the kind and noble" Dash-
kov had been too much influenced by his friend George Bibescu.
Although the Ghica administration had been bad, Giers commented
that nothing better could be "expected of his opponents, trained in
the school of political intrigue, as were all the boyars of that time -
intrigue of which you can receive a true conception only in the East."18
In December 1842 a specially elected assembly chose a candidate
favored by Dashkov - Bibescu. One of the richest boyars in the country,
he was well educated and he had studied law in Paris. Although he
had been part of the opposition to Ghica in the assembly, that body
turned against him as strongly as it had against his predecessor. Some
legitimate grievances existed, but the basic problem remained that
neither in Wallachia nor in Moldavia would the great boyars accept
the authority of one of their number. Each individually sought the
office for himself and fought against whoever held it.
Soon a new issue involving Russian influence became the center of
the conflict between the prince and the assembly. The quarrel this
time concerned the question of concessions given to a Russian engineer,
Trandafilov, to explore the country and exploit the mineral resources
he discovered. The opposition became so intense that Bibescu finally
obtained the approval of Russia and the Porte to dissolve the assembly.
He then governed the country by decree for two years. The next as-
sembly, elected in 1846, was packed with his supporters. Despite the
continual controversies, some advances were made in this period. A law
on naturalization passed in 1847 m a de it easy for a Moldavian to be-
come a Wallachian citizen. A customs union, a matter of great impor-
tance for the future, was agreed upon in Wallachia in 1846 and in
Moldavia in 1847. I* carQ e into effect in 1848.
Conditions were relatively more tranquil in Moldavia, where a clever
prince ruled. Michael Sturdza, thirty-nine years old at the time of his
appointment, was a practical, enterprising, and strong ruler, but also
crafty and corrupt. Although he sought relations with the other powers,
he took great care not to antagonize the Russian government. He se-
cured the acceptance of the Additional Article without difficulty. He was
also responsible for many important internal advances; during his
reign roads, bridges, and hospitals were built and the postal service
was improved. Like his colleague in Wallachia, Sturdza faced the con-
stant opposition of boyars who were jealous of his position or who dis-
38
 The Russian protectorate
liked his policies. His rule was also identified with the Organic Statutes
and the Russian domination. Those who opposed the system and the
protecting powers naturally sought his removal.

T H E RESISTANCE TO THE PROTECTORATE:

THE NATIONAL OPPOSITION AND
THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1 8 4 8

By the 1840s the Russian government had gained a large number of

enemies in the Principalities. The obvious position of dominance, to-
gether with the often crude and demeaning manner in which it was en-
forced, rankled. The identification of the Organic Statutes with Russian
rule damaged the regimes based on these documents. The unwillingness
of the Russian officials to accept basic modifications in the system and
their insistence on approving any changes whatsoever caused further
feelings of grievance. Moreover, Russian rule, as has been emphasized,
maintained the domination of a class and a political and social system.
Opposition to boyar preeminence or to the unrepresentative character
of the state institutions could only reflect on the protector.
Meanwhile, although the Russian government continued to attempt
to preserve the status quo, life in the Principalities was changing. In
his memoirs Giers made particular reference to the contrast between the
older generation, who usually wore the national costume, and the youth,
who followed the latest Paris fashions - differences that also reflected
evolving attitudes. The change, Giers believed, had begun during the
administration of Kiselev.19 Certainly, during the years of the protec-
torate, Romanians were, as in the past, in touch with and aware of the
political, social, and cultural events in Central and Western Europe.
The attitude of the privileged youth, the sons of the boyars, was to be-
come particularly important for the transmission of radical ideas into
the Principalities. Since no institutions of higher education were avail-
able in the Principalities, students had to go abroad for university-level
training. The great majority went to Paris, although some attended
universities in Vienna or the German states. Few were attracted to St.
Petersburg. Paris, of course, was the center for the propagation of the
liberal-national revolutionary doctrines of the age, ideals that were to
prove immensely attractive to young Romanians and applicable to the
conditions in their country.20
The Russian government was well aware of the situation. During the
reign of Nicholas I, France, despite the relatively conservative regimes
of, first, the Bourbon restoration, and second, Louis Philippe, was re-
garded with extreme suspicion as the harborer of dangerous revolution-
39
 Russia and the Romanian national state
ary movements. In foreign relations too France was regarded as the chief
Russian adversary. The influence that students educated in Paris
could have on the Russian protectorate was recognized. In November
1846 Nesselrode instructed Dashkov to try to persuade Romanian stu-
dents to attend universities in countries "where public instruction is
under the control of governments that profess monarchical and con-
servative principles." If the authorities in the Principalities could not
stop students from going to Paris, they should at least "discourage that
tendency by encouraging in contrast studies made in Russia, Austria
and Prussia." Subventions could enable needy students to go to these
countries, and when they finished their education, "they could be given
preference in advantageous employment in the teaching career as in the
other branches of public service."21
Despite the Russian awareness of the problem, Romanian students
and intellectuals made Paris their spiritual center. Most of the major
political leaders for the future congregated there, including Nicholas
and Radu Golescu, C. A. Rosetti, Ion and Dumitru Bratianu, Nicholas
Balcescu, and Alexander loan Cuza. Michael Kogalniceanu, in contrast,
studied in Berlin. Their constant discussions and debates concerning
the conditions in their country did not result in the formulation of a
single program, but they did share certain conceptions common to the
liberal-national revolutionary programs of the time. In general, they
agreed that a constitutional regime should be introduced into the Prin-
cipalities, one including representative institutions that would widen
the base of the government to bring in the educated, property-owning
section of society. They approved of the principle of equality before
the law and in the assessment of taxes. They also sought provisions to
guarantee civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, the press, and as-
sembly. Their major problem was to be the resolution of the land and
peasant question. Since the majority, as sons of landholders, benefited
from the existing social conditions, many proved reluctant to espouse
doctrines that might cause them personal losses. Thus few of the pro-
posals were democratic. The open and free participation in national
politics of the great peasant majority was not a goal of the major revo-
lutionary programs. All, of course, wished to change the government of
the Principalities to eliminate the Russian influence and to alter, or
dispense with, the Organic Statutes.
Perhaps more important than the generally liberal cast of the Ro-
manian revolutionary ideology was its national direction. Certainly, as
far as the Russian position in the Principalities was concerned, it was
this aspect which was to have the deepest and most negative results.
The Romanian intellectuals were fully aware of and deeply humiliated
40
 The Russian protectorate
by the implications of the Russian protectorate. In Paris they came un-
der the influence of the ideas of romantic nationalism, including revolu-
tionary concepts of national liberation. Like others in the romantic age,
they became greatly interested in the origins of their people and in
classical civilization. With their emphasis on the Roman and Dacian
heritage of the Romanian people, they naturally tended to have an
attitude toward Russia divergent from that of many in the older gen-
eration, some of whom saw Russia as an Orthodox brother and a useful
balance to Ottoman control. In contrast, the Latin background of the
Romanian nationality appeared to link the Romanian people, not with
the Slavs, but with the French and the Italians. Moreover, like other
revolutionaries of the period, the Romanians looked at tsarist Russia as
the embodiment of political and social backwardness; France, in con-
trast, symbolized progress, reason, and beauty. Educated in Western
countries and deeply convinced of the validity of the revolutionary
ideals, the emerging Romanian leaders were to reject the Orthodox,
Ottoman legacy with its Russian ties and to stress their Roman and
Dacian origins and the Latin basis of their language. The national pro-
gram was exceedingly broad. The emphasis was on the ending of both
Russian and Ottoman political control in Moldavia and Wallachia and
the unification of these Principalities. Some, however, looked forward
to the full union of what they regarded as the rightful Romanian lands,
including not only these two provinces, but also Bukovina, Transyl-
vania, and Bessarabia; Habsburg possessions, as well as Russian and
Ottoman interests, were thus involved.
The most effective leadership of the movement against Russian pro-
tection and the regime of the Organic Statutes was in the hands of the
revolutionary youth both within and without the Principalities. The
boyars' opposition to the princes has been described. Their internal
jealousies, however, prevented the organization of a strong opposition.
The new leaders had the advantage of a single ideology, and they used
European examples of revolutionary strategy. Most important was the
formation of various societies, either secret or public. Within the Prin-
cipalities literary societies could meet openly. Others were secret and
remained in close touch with similar organizations abroad. All re-
cruited members from those who opposed the protectorate, the regimes
in power, and, in particular, the close association with autocratic,
backward, Orthodox Russia. The strong anti-Russian attitude, the
"tendency toward ingratitude," as the Russian consul in Jassy at this
time, Karl Evstafevich Kotesbu, expressed it, was well known to the
Russian government. In a memorandum to Nesselrode, Kotsebu com-
mented on the "spirit hostile to Russia that wins over the masses, exalts
 Russia and the Romanian national state
their imagination, and turns them away from the horizon of their natu-
ral destiny in order to lose them in the shadow of an ideal hope."22
The Russian agents were particularly apprehensive about the obvious
links between the Romanian revolutionaries and the Polish movement.
In 1846 a revolt broke out in Cracow, which was under Habsburg con-
trol. The failure of this action did nothing to quell the intensity of
Polish feeling or to limit the intrigues of the emigrants. The Russian
officials remained concerned in particular with the activities of those
connected with Czartoryski. The obvious sympathy with which the
French government regarded Polish actions and the assistance that
French diplomats offered were similarly observed with distaste.
In February 1848 the fall of the government of Louis Philippe marked
the commencement of a revolutionary wave that swept through Europe.
Italy, the German states, and the Habsburg Monarchy were the scenes
of revolts that succeeded in overturning the governments in power. The
Principalities too were caught up in these events. The first crisis occurred
in Moldavia, where on March 27/April 8 a large crowd, consisting
chiefly of townspeople, liberal boyars, and those who opposed the
Sturdza regime, assembled in the St. Petersburg Hotel. Speeches attack-
ing the prince were made, and a committee was appointed to draw up a
petition. This document, which reflected the standard liberal program,
was submitted to Sturdza, who not only rejected it but proceeded to
arrest about three hundred of the participants in the demonstration.
Many were subsequently sent to prison or into exile. This firm reaction
ended revolutionary activity in that principality.23
The course of events in Wallachia was to be quite different. Here the
revolution had the services of talented leaders, some of whom were to
exert the predominant influence on Romanian political life for the
next four decades. Two of these, Ion Ghica and C. A. Rosetti, were in
Bucharest already, but they waited for the return of some of their
friends who were abroad, notably Nicholas Balcescu and Ion Bratianu.
They were joined by the Golescu brothers. In one of the first moves
Ghica was sent to Constantinople to reassure the Ottoman government
on the aims of the revolt. As in the time of Tudor Vladimirescu, the
leaders tried to secure at least the neutrality of the suzerain power
through assurances that the position of the Porte in the Principalities
would not be affected. In Constantinople the efforts of Ghica were sup-
ported by the Polish emigres and the French and British embassies.
The Wallachian revolution was formally announced at Islaz on
June 9/21, at which time a proclamation was read that included a
twenty-two-point program of reform. The clear objective of the rebel-
 The Russian protectorate
lion was the end of Russian protection and the overthrow of the regime
based on the Organic Statutes. The revolutionary forces won an almost
immediate victory. In Bucharest Bibescu agreed to sign the Islaz Proc-
lamation, but he soon lost his nerve, abdicated, and left for Transyl-
vania. A government was then set up with Metropolitan Neofit at its
head. Despite this bloodless victory, the revolution had certain obvious
weaknesses. It did not have, for instance, an armed force at its command.
Vladimirescu, it will be remembered, had organized the People's As-
sembly. In June Colonel George Magheru was entrusted with the for-
mation of a national guard; he subsequently left for Oltenia to set up a
camp.
The many domestic difficulties faced by the revolutionary leaders
and the friction among them certainly weakened the movement, but
for the ultimate success or failure of the effort the reaction of the Rus-
sian and Ottoman governments would be the determining factor.
Obviously, the revolutionary regime could not assemble the forces
needed to resist an Ottoman or Russian occupation. Although there
was some hope for an understanding with Constantinople, the Ro-
manian leaders could not expect anything but enmity from Russia. The
entire revolutionary effort was directed against Russian control and the
government that Russia sponsored. Moreover, the Wallachian move-
ment was but a small part of the Europe-wide changes that threatened
to disturb the balance of power and to endanger Russian security.
The events of 1848 caused extreme anxiety to Nicholas I. Although
known for his highly conservative views, he had been willing to accept
some liberal reforms under certain circumstances. He was a constitu-
tional ruler in Poland until 1830; in 1844 he had accepted the constitu-
tional government established in Greece even though it had been
brought about by revolutionary action. Some regarded the Organic
Statutes as constitutions of a sort. In general, the tsar, like his predeces-
sor, was willing to accept political reform as long as it was introduced
through legal procedures and preferably under the sponsorship of
a legitimate ruler. He was, however, strongly opposed to revolutionary
activity such as that which won such astounding victories in 1848.
Although he held these principles, Nicholas did not particularly
regret the fall of the July Monarchy; he had never liked Louis Philippe's
regime. The subsequent victory of the revolutionary forces in Vienna
and Berlin in March, however, was an entirely different matter. Russia
had lost the support of its closest allies, and the entire Central European
area had been opened to revolutionary influences. The Russian govern-
ment was, nevertheless, paralyzed. In fear of a similar uprising in its

43
 Russia and the Romanian national state
Polish territories and unprepared for military intervention on a wide
scale, the tsar could only wait, observe the course of events, and strength-
en his armed forces.
The policy of abstention adopted toward the revolt in Western and
Central Europe was not to be applied to the Principalities. From the
beginning the Russian government made it clear that the situation there
was quite different. The Romanian revolutionary movement had as a
main objective the removal of Russian control. It also represented the
first truly national manifestation in the region. Previous revolts had
been rooted either in peasant social and economic grievances or in the
conspiracies of the boyars against the regimes in power. In contrast, the
Wallachian rebellion not only was specifically anti-Russian in direc-
tion, but was part of a great European movement whose success
would alter the balance of power on the Continent and perhaps lead
to similar internal disorders in Russia itself.
Even before the outbreak of revolutionary activity in the Principali-
ties, the Russian government had made its attitude known. In an in-
struction of March 16/28 to Kotsebu, Nesselrode wrote that although
Russia would not intervene in European countries unless requested,
this policy did not apply to the Ottoman lands under Russian protec-
tion. There political changes would not be tolerated, and force would
be the response to attempts to change political conditions. These de-
cisions were communicated to the hospodars, and the determination
to intervene if necessary was made clear. Sturdza's prompt suppression
of the agitation in Jassy made such action unnecessary. Nevertheless,
the tsar did take certain steps. In April he sent General Alexander
Osipovich Duhamel, an aide-de-camp, to the Principalities to report on
the situation. At the same time he concentrated his Fifteenth Division in
Bessarabia. Duhamel visited both capitals, where he discussed the situa-
tion with the leading political figures and emphasized the Russian de-
termination not to allow political changes.
In addition to taking these measures, the Russian government re-
mained in contact with the Porte, which in May dispatched its own
special commissioner, Talaat Effendi. The Ottoman envoy, like his
Russian counterpart, warned that the political organization established
by the Organic Statutes must remain unaltered. Thus both the Russian
and the Ottoman governments had made their attitudes known before
the outbreak of the Wallachian revolution.
The provisional government in Bucharest therefore had good reason
to fear immediate Russian military action. On June 12/24, even be-
fore Bibescu abdicated, Kotsebu strongly protested the breaking of the

44
 The Russian protectorate
Organic Statutes, and he announced his departure. He told the French
representative that he did not know what the tsar would decide, but
he believed that sufficient motives for intervention existed. Duhamel,
who was still in Bucharest, withdrew to Bessarabia.
The decision to initiate a military occupation was in fact made not
by Nicholas I, but by Duhamel, who had been given the power to call
in a special military unit organized for that purpose. Considerable con-
fusion, including counterorders by the tsar, accompanied the action,
but Russian troops did enter Moldavia on June 25/July 7. They first
marched to Jassy, where their objective was to assure that a revolt
similar to that in Wallachia did not take place in Moldavia. The oc-
cupation of Moldavia, where the revolutionary danger was now mini-
mal, should have been the first step to a similar action in Wallachia.
Expecting such an occurrence, the members of the provisional govern-
ment, in a moment of panic, fled to the mountains on June 28/July 10.
A new regime was established, but it was immediately overthrown by a
popular reaction. The revolutionary leaders then returned to Bucha-
rest, where they were given a three-month respite from further outside
dangers.
Although Russian troops were stationed in Moldavia, Nicholas I
regretted Duhamel's decision. He believed that the cooperation of the
Ottoman government should have been first obtained. Not only did
he wish to end the occupation of Moldavia as soon as possible, but he
did not at first foresee intervention in Wallachia. The decision to act
in concert with the Porte was communicated to the Russian represen-
tatives in Constantinople, who initiated discussions with Ottoman offi-
cials concerning the question of possible joint action. The Russian
attitude at this time was stated in a circular dispatch of July 19/31,
which declared that the previous occupation of Moldavia was designed
to prevent the spread of revolutionary activities from Wallachia. The
Russian government had no intention of interfering in the affairs of
other states, but it was determined to maintain its treaty rights in the
Principalities, whose obligations to both Russia and the Porte were
stressed. The document declared that the objective of the Wallachian
revolutionaries was to set up,

under the name of a Daco-Roman kingdom, a new separate and independent

state, for the formation of which they will come to an agreement with their
brothers from Moldavia, Bukovina, Transylvania and Bessarabia. The realiza-
tion of such a plan, if it is allowed to happen, wTould lead to serious conse-
quences. Should, in the name of an alleged nationality, whose origin is lost
in the night of the ages, the Moldo-Wallachians come sometime to separate

45
 Russia and the Romanian national state
from Turkey, in pursuance of the same principle, under the influence of the
same desire, one would soon see Bulgaria, Rumelia, all of the races with di-
verse languages that make up the Ottoman Empire, aspire also to emancipate
themselves, in order each to form a separate state.
The dispatch concluded with the assurance that the Russian interven-
tion in Moldavia was not a precedent for similar action in Europe, since
the Russian rights in the East "are based on treaties that do not exist in
the West."24
Faced with the apparent danger of an immediate Russian interven-
tion, the revolutionary government in Wallachia suffered from the
extreme disadvantage that it could expect assistance from no outside
European power. Although the new regime did send emissaries abroad,
it was soon obvious that their efforts would be in vain. France, the coun-
try to which the Romanian leadership felt its closest attachment, was
faced with grave internal problems of its own. The French government
expressed its sympathy and advised the Wallachians not to provoke a
Russian intervention by extreme actions. Even less success was gained
in Britain, where the government, for considerations of general policy,
could not become involved in the events of the region. Prussia and the
Habsburg Monarchy, of course, were in the midst of a domestic revo-
lutionary crisis.
In these dangerous circumstances the Wallachian revolutionary lead-
ers had no alternative but to turn to the Porte. Regarding Ottoman
suzerainty as a lesser evil and recognizing the common interest in the
removal of Russian predominance, they made a great effort to gain the
acceptance of the Porte for their actions. In Constantinople Ion Ghica,
the representative of the revolutionary government, continued to assure
the Ottoman officials of Romanian loyalty and to promise that no mea-
sures would be taken that would lessen the sultan's authority. Should
an intervention be necessary, the Romanian leaders preferred that it be
carried out by the Ottoman army alone, rather than by a joint action
with Russia.
The Ottoman government found itself in a most uncomfortable posi-
tion. The Turkish statesmen were, of course, delighted with the success
of a movement directed against Russian predominance in the Principali-
ties, although they, of course, were against revolutionary activities in
principle. The opportunity might be exploited to remove Russian con-
trol from the provinces. The military weakness of the Porte, however,
prevented it from acting to achieve such an objective. In fact, it soon
came under strong pressure to take actions that would in fact result in
the reestablishment of Russian influence. The ambassador, Vladimir
Pavlovich Titov, and the other Russian representatives urged the Porte
 The Russian protectorate
to join with St. Petersburg in crushing this revolutionary disturbance.
Because of the problems that it faced in Central Europe at the time, the
Russian government at first wished the Ottoman army to deal with the
crisis in Bucharest.
Under conflicting pressures, the Porte finally sent a new commissioner,
Suleiman Pasha, to investigate the situation. Should he need it, he had
at his service an army of twenty thousand under the command of Omer
Pasha. Suleiman arrived in Giurgiu on July 19/31. Entering into nego-
tiations with the Wallachian leaders, he was able to obtain changes in
the government, but it was still dominated by those who had been
prominent in the revolution. When the conciliatory nature of Sulei-
man's actions became obvious, the Russian government objected strong-
ly. The Ottoman envoy had negotiated with the revolutionary leaders
and had agreed to some of their requests. The Russian officials, in
contrast, wanted a complete change of government, a full disavowal of
the revolutionary acts, and a punishment of the conspirators. The old
order of the Organic Statutes was to be restored intact. Although the
Ottoman government attempted to justify Suleiman's actions, it agreed
that more drastic changes would have to be made. One of the leading
statesmen of the empire, Fuad Pasha, was thus sent to Wallachia. He
proceeded to Galatz, where, during his days in the quarantine, he con-
sulted with Duhamel and with some Romanian leaders.
Meanwhile, an atmosphere of increasing tension was apparent in
Bucharest; rumors of an impending occupation spread. With the pop-
ulation in a state of agitation and excitement, incidents could be ex-
pected to occur. A mob in Bucharest burned a copy of the Organic
Statutes, and a small monument erected in honor of Kiselev was de-
stroyed. Many peasants arrived from the countryside. With so much
combustible material at hand, some demonstrations were inevitable.
On September 13/25 Fuad entered the country together with the Otto-
man troops. Acts of violence, the most notable being a clash with a
group of firemen resulting in about two hundred casualties on each
side, accompanied the occupation.
Once in Bucharest Fuad called together the leading boyars. He read
to them a firman dissolving the previous government and naming Con-
stantine Cantacuzino, a Russian candidate, as the single regent. The
former conditions had thus been brought back with little bloodshed.
Faced with overwhelming military might, the Wallachian revolution-
aries could not resist, although there was some disagreement on the
question. The volunteer camp in the mountains, under the direction of
Magheru, was disbanded. Without a military force of their own the
revolutionary leaders could only surrender.
47
 Russia and the Romanian national state
Despite the Ottoman action, carried through under pressure from
Russia, that government was not satisfied. There were fears that the
Ottoman commissioner would not show sufficient enthusiasm in uncov-
ering any remaining revolutionary actions. Moreover, a proper attitude
of contrition was not apparent in Bucharest. Other justifications for
action also existed. Some conservative boyars, fearing a resurgence of
the revolutionary movement, were requesting assistance. The concur-
rent victory of the Hungarian revolution and events in the Habsburg
Empire made the control of Wallachia of increased strategic signifi-
cance. The political situation in the province had to be kept under firm
control. In addition, Nicholas I was now prepared to move against the
revolutionary danger both in Central Europe and in the Principalities.
With 250,000 soldiers ready to march, he had the means to intervene de-
cisively in both areas.
The Russian intervention did not please the Porte, which saw no
need for the action. When Fuad arrived in Bucharest on September
13/25, Duhamel informed him of the imminent arrival of a Russian
army under the command of General Alexander Nikolaevich Liiders.25
Fuad, although without official instructions on the matter, opposed the
Russian intervention, arguing that order was fully restored and further
military action was not necessary. The danger of incidents should Rus-
sian and Turkish troops occupy the city together was also stressed.
Nevertheless, on September 16/28 the Russian army entered Bucharest.
The Russian official pronouncements emphasized cooperation with the
Porte, although no prior agreement had in fact been made. Once the
Russian army crossed the Wallachian frontier, it became obvious once
again that Russia, not the Ottoman Empire, was the state that in fact
controlled Wallachia. General Liiders, working with Duhamel and
Kotsebu, dominated the Cantacuzino administration; Fuad played a
distinctly secondary role.
The Russian occupation was carried out without the least sign of
resistance. Peaceful conditions had been reestablished before the ar-
rival of the Russian army. Moreover, the administration in office had
Russian approval. With the major steps taken toward assuring stable
government, the Russian officials could turn to the task of arresting and
punishing those who had taken part in the revolt. The Russian officials,
in contrast to the Ottoman, placed emphasis on the apprehension of
former revolutionaries. They also wished to make sure that the admin-
istration was purged of those who had taken office during the period of
the revolt. Although the Russian measures were often harsh, there was
certainly no reign of terror. In fact, in comparison to what happened to
revolutionary leaders in other areas, for instance in Transylvania in
48
 The Russian protectorate
1849, the treatment was mild. Some of those apprehended served prison
sentences; others lost their government offices or had property con-
fiscated. Of course, after the failure of the revolution those most deeply
implicated in it fled abroad. There they continued their political activi-
ties and, as shall be seen, caused great concern to the Russian officials.
However, only a decade later the majority of those involved in the
movement were back in the Principalities and engaged in their former
occupations. Meanwhile, the revolutionary ideals and goals remained
alive among the exiles.
Despite the relative moderation of the occupation, the new inter-
vention caused extreme bitterness. Although the Russian declarations
emphasized that the intention was to rescue the majority of the nation
from the misdeeds of a minority, the fact remained that the revolution-
ary leadership had commanded the support of most of the population.
The Russian actions were thus viewed as yet another attempt to sup-
press the true wishes of the people. This difficult situation was com-
pounded by the presence of the army of occupation and the numerous
problems that we have seen in previous similar episodes. Once again
complaints were made that the Russian soldiers were taking supplies
and not paying for them. Difficulties were met in connection with the
requisitioning of housing and transport. The occupation was also a
major financial burden for the state. The entire cost of the undertaking
was charged to the Principalities, with the sum divided between them.
To meet the immediate problem of payment, the tsar "magnanimously"
granted a loan of 300,000 rubles.26 The Ottoman government, in con-
trast, did not charge the cost of the occupation to the provinces, and its
officials paid for supplies.
The major Russian objectives were achieved during the first months,
and thereafter the affairs of the Principalities assumed a secondary po-
sition in Russian policy. In June 1849, answering an appeal from the
young emperor Franz Joseph, Nicholas I sent his armies into Transyl-
vania. After the suppression of the Hungarian revolution and the failure
of similar movements throughout Central Europe, the tsar could regard
the European scene with satisfaction.
Despite their limited extent and ultimate failure, the events of 1848
were to leave a lasting imprint on Romanian political development.
As we shall see, the revolutionary movement was to provide the national
leadership for the next four decades. The future relationship with Rus-
sia was similarly shaped by this episode. It was clear that the program
of the Organic Statutes represented the furthest limit that the Russian
government would allow for political reform. Although Russian back-
ing had previously aided the Principalities in resisting the claims of the
49
 Russia and the Romanian national state
Porte, the Russian protectorship by the middle of the century had be-
come as burdensome as the former Ottoman control. Autocratic Russia,
holding Polish lands, could not be expected to be sympathetic to the
liberal, national ideals of the most advanced and effective element in
Romanian political life.

T H E PROTECTORATE RENEWED, 1849-1854

After the suppression of the revolutionary government in Wallachia and
the occupation of both provinces, the Russian authorities were next
faced with the problem of setting up governments that would serve
their interests. In April 1849 General Grabbe was sent to Constantinople
to negotiate a new agreement, and in May the protecting power and the
suzerain signed yet another treaty regulating the status of the Princi-
palities. The Convention of Balta Liman marked the high point of the
Russian domination. The princes were henceforth to be named by
Russia and the Porte, rather than elected by native assemblies. Their
terms of office were reduced from life to seven years. The boyar assem-
blies were replaced by smaller councils, known again as divans, whose
members were to be chosen by the princes. In addition, commissions
were to be set up whose function would be to revise the Organic Statutes.
Their work was to be examined by the Ottoman government, which
would then consult with Russia.27 If the changes were approved, the
Porte would issue the necessary proclamations. Barbu §tirbei, the broth-
er of Bibescu, was named the ruler of Wallachia; Gregory A. Ghica was
appointed for Moldavia.
The new arrangements did nothing at all to improve political con-
ditions or to calm the general dissatisfaction. The revolution had indeed
been suppressed, but liberals and conservatives alike wanted an end
to the Russian intervention. Moreover, it was difficult to establish stable
administrations. No sooner had the new princes been named than they
became the targets of attack by the boyar factions who had lost out by
the nominations. The previous bitter struggles over political offices
continued, and the disaffected parties once again addressed appeals to
the Russian consulates. Although all groups complained about Rus-
sian interference in principle, few, as in the past, were adverse to call-
ing for Russian aid to defend their individual interests. The official
Russian attitude to expressions of dissatisfaction was given in a Nessel-
rode instruction of 1851 to the consulates in the Principalities:
We have certainly not had the hope of setting up in the Principalities gov-
ernments secure from every reproach, from every complaint. What we had in
view two years ago was to reestablish in these provinces the tranquility that
5°
 The Russian protectorate
was profoundly troubled by some audacious agitators and to place at the head
of their new administration men who were the most generally considered as
competent and honest. Until this time the princes §tirbei and Ghica have
justified the choice of the two courts that gave them their votes and it will not
be on the basis of vague grievances or to satisfy personal rivalries that we will
change our opinion in their regard, or that we will consent to modify the
clauses of the Convention of Balta Liman.28
Despite the support given the princes, the Russian officials continued
to report on the prevalent corruption and misgovernment. There were
attempts to improve the situation. Nominations were made for com-
missions that were to revise the Organic Statutes, and they began their
work. It is interesting to note that the man in charge of military ad-
ministration, General Duhamel, was, like his predecessor, Kiselev, con-
cerned about the condition of the peasants. In 1849, lXi regard to the
nominations for the commissions, he wrote:

Since it is a question of improving the situation of the farmer, and since this
result can be obtained only by concessions on the part of the landlords, I be-
lieve that it is necessary, as far as possible, to place on the committees of re-
vision individuals who have compassion for the miseries of the people and who
by their social position have it in their power to take the initiative toward
some indispensable sacrifices.29

Duhamel also recognized the political helplessness of the peasant.

Writing in 1851, he described how the agents of the landholders came
to understandings with the lower officials, who were able to place such
pressure on the peasants that many, in despair, emigrated to other
Ottoman lands or to Transylvania. 30 Despite such Russian official con-
cern, the regulations adopted in 1851 concerning agrarian relations in
both Principalities in fact worsened the peasants' relative position.
Even though the necessity for reform was recognized, and indeed some
changes were introduced, the Russian officials were limited in their
choice of actions. The fear of revolutionary ferment far outweighed
any convictions that the political system had to be changed. The con-
sulates had in the past regularly reported on the feelings that remained
from the revolutionary period. 31 Both princes were warned by the Rus-
sian authorities to remain on guard against subversive activities and to
keep a close watch over correspondence carried on between individuals
in the provinces and those in the emigration. The Russian consuls
were fully aware of the activities of the exiles and their influence in the
country. On September 21/October 3, 1851 the Russian consul in Buch-
arest, Khaltchinskii, reported to Nesselrode on the continuing problems
in regard to the emigrants: "Besides the incendiary writing that is sent
back into the country, the numerous Wallachian travelers who this year

51
 Russia and the Romanian national state
visited Paris and London brought back on their return the inspirations
of their exiled compatriots and they kept alive an agitation of spirits
that deserves an added vigilance on the part of the two hospodars." 32
Before the termination of the occupation in 1851, the Russian officials
took the occasion to warn about what could happen should disturbances
again break out. In a declaration designed to appear in the official
journals of the Principalities, the Russian authorities made it clear
that they were prepared for another intervention.33 In his instructions
to his consuls Nesselrode also emphasized that Russia intended to main-
tain its influence and its rights under the treaties. Should "the revolu-
tionary spirit again raise its head" and should the princes be unable to
handle the situation, the army corps stationed in Bessarabia would
march in "to reestablish order and to deliver the guilty to a severe
justice."34
With this Russian determination it did indeed appear as if the goals
of the revolutionary movement had little hope of success, at least in the
immediate future. Indeed, in the years following the crushing of the
revolt, the international situation too appeared extremely dark for the
Romanian revolutionaries, as well as for their Polish, Hungarian, Ger-
man, and Italian counterparts. The conservative forces had triumphed
throughout Central Europe. The Convention of Balta Liman had
tightened the Russian hold on the Principalities, and few expected
that the tsarist government would soon consent to modifications in its
strong position. In this bleak scene only one encouraging sign remained.
As we have seen, the revolutionaries had been greatly influenced by
their French connections. The single major success of 1848 had been
achieved in Paris with the victory of Louis Napoleon. The experiences
of the revolutionary year had shown the Romanians as well as the
Italians that they could not hope to achieve their national goals without
great-power assistance. In the next years Louis Napoleon was to prove a
valuable ally and a supporter of the national movements.

T H E ROMANIAN EMIGRATION

The political activities of the Romanian emigration were to have a

major importance not only in winning support for the national cause,
but also for future Russian relations with the Principalities.35 Although
most of those who had participated in the revolutionary events in
Moldavia were soon able to resume their former lives, none of the major
Wallachian leaders could return. Moreover, the Wallachian govern-
ment, as we have seen, took measures to attempt to prevent any cor-
respondence or contact between them and their friends and relations
 The Russian protectorate
in the Principality. During this period of exile they continued their
political activities from various centers, including England, the Otto-
man Empire, Greece, and Switzerland, although Paris remained the
center. At first, the factionalism and ideological division that had been
apparent during the revolutionary period continued. Separated by
personal feelings and lacking a common social and political goal, they
could not rally around a single leader or program. In fact, the one
major objective that won universal approval was the destruction of the
Russian protectorate. In other matters there was considerable differ-
ence of opinion. Some, for instance, sought complete independence,
whereas others favored a continuation of the association with the Otto-
man Empire. Similar disagreements existed over the form of government
to be established in the future and the great powers that should be
sought as friends and allies. Vienna and Berlin had their partisans, as
well as Paris.
France, nevertheless, continued to offer the chief attraction. Many of
the emigres simply returned to their former associations and activities.
Two organizations, the Romanian Democratic Committee and the Asso-
ciation of Romanian Students, were formed under the leadership of
men who not only had been prominent in the revolution, but were to
play major roles in the future, such as C. A. Rosetti, Dumitru and Ion
C. Bratianu, Alexander Golescu, George Cretulescu, and others. The
majority supported a radical program, including the unification of all
of the Romanian lands, full independence from both Russian and Otto-
man control, a republican government, and social equality. The out-
standing theoretician, N. Balcescu, died in 1852.
At first, the emigres' closest connections were with French intellec-
tuals, such as Edgar Quinet, Jules Michelet, and A. de Lamartine, and
with socialist circles. They also, naturally, were close to other exile
groups, notably the Poles. Some became associated with radical move-
ments, in particular with Mazzini and his European Democratic Com-
mittee. These activities did not endear them to French official circles,
especially as the government of Louis Napoleon moved to the right.
Their radical programs made them even more suspect after Napoleon's
coup d'etat of December 1851. In June 1853 Ion Bratianu was arrested in
connection with a plot to assassinate Napoleon. Although he was cleared
of the major charge, he was condemned to three years' detention for his
other activities.
The change of atmosphere in Paris forced the exiles to face realities.
The retention of their more radical social and political ideals could
obviously lead to a complete disaster. Moreover, these were the issues
that had been the chief cause of dissension within the emigre ranks pre-
53
 Russia and the Romanian national state
viously. Faced with this situation, the Romanian leadership wisely ac-
cepted the necessity of circumscribing the national program. The em-
phasis was shifted to the securing of limited goals: the removal of the
Russian protectorate, the unification of Moldavia and Wallachia, and
the appointment of a foreign prince. The more radical aspects of the rev-
olutionary program were abandoned; national unification was limited to
the two Principalities, with the question of Transylvania, Bukovina,
and Bessarabia left for the future. Some former radicals, such as the
Bratianu brothers, were to move quite noticeably to the right.
The basis was thus set for winning the support of the French ruler,
who took the title of Emperor Napoleon III in 1852. Already a firm
adherent of the national idea, he added the Romanian cause to his
previous Polish and Italian enthusiasms. This French connection was
certainly a logical association for the Romanian nationalists. With their
emphasis on their Daco-Roman origins and their Latinity, an alliance
with the strongest Latin great power was advisable. Moreover, the at-
tention given to the common cultural association won the Romanians
supporters among French intellectuals oi a romantic-nationalist bent.
The Latin linguistic bond had a particularly great attraction here. For
instance, Quinet wrote: "The first qualification (titre) of the Ro-
manians, the most striking, is incontestably their language. It is their
true mark of nobility amid the barbarians." In the same vein he con-
tinued: "The Romanians say to the West: 'Restore to us our rightful
place (droit de cite) in the family of Latin peoples. We are yours, al-
though surrounded by barbarians. Rescue us from this captivity.' " 36
The cultural superiority repeatedly emphasized in the declarations of
both the Romanian and the French romantic nationalists, of course, di-
rectly reflected on the Russian position in the Principalities. The deep
conviction of Latin superiority over the surrounding Slavic people, in
particular the Russians, was to be an abiding attribute of Romanian na-
tionalism. Previously, Russian and conservative Romanian leaders had
emphasized the cultural advantages of their Orthodox civilization over
that of the "barbarian" Muslim conquerors. Now French-oriented
Romanian liberals were to use the same vocabulary to attack the Rus-
sian protectorate.
Although the major emphasis of the Romanian effort was directed
toward gaining French support, attempts were also made to win British
approval. Here the major work was carried out by D. Bratianu, who
lived in London from 1851 to 1857. In 1851 the Philo-Romanian So-
ciety was formed among sympathizers with the Romanian cause. In
Britain the arguments used were those which would have most appeal
to local interests, including the iniquity of the Russian protectorate and
54
 The Russian protectorate
the opportunities for commercial gain that would be opened once the
Russian control over the lower Danube was lifted. Despite the fact that
the Romanian arguments fitted well into the growing anti-Russian
sentiment, they did not convince the influential British statesmen, such
as Lord Palmerston. Although the ending of the protectorate did be-
come part of the British peace objectives during the Crimean War,
the restoral of Ottoman authority, rather than the establishment of a
strong Romanian national unit, was the goal of the British leadership.
Nevertheless, the Romanian emigres in both Britain and France by
1854 had accomplished much toward educating influential public opin-
ion about conditions in the Principalities. Placing great emphasis on
publicity and propaganda, they wrote books, pamphlets, and articles for
journals and newspapers. They also organized countless public meetings
and made efforts to convert prominent public figures to their cause.
Although they disagreed among themselves on the details of the political
program they wished introduced into the Principalities, the majority
continued to share the general beliefs held by European liberals in the
middle of the nineteenth century. They supported constitutional gov-
ernment, with the principal power held by the legislative bodies. As we
have seen, their first goal was the establishment of an independent na-
tional state. Although they had no formal organization, they did in a
sense form a political party, and in subsequent sections the designation
"Liberal Party" will be used to refer to this group. In the same manner,
their opposition will be called the Conservatives or the Conservative
Party, although again the term covers many varying political opinions.
Here the name will be used to refer to those who opposed radical politi-
cal change, who wished to preserve historic institutions, and who de-
sired to limit popular participation in the government. Conservatives
also usually preferred to allow the executive branch to exert the major
power in the government.
With the failure of the revolution the Conservative influences were
predominant in the Principalities. Despite their undoubted success in
winning foreign partisans, the Liberals could not really hope to attain
their goals unless some event should occur that would end the over-
whelming Russian military and political influence in the Principalities.
It was thus most fortunate for the Romanian national leadership that
such an unexpected occurrence was soon to take place.

T H E CRIMEAN WAR

At mid-century the Russian government appeared to have won tri-

umphs everywhere. Its Holy Alliance partners, Prussia and the Habs-
55
 Russia and the Romanian national state
burg Monarchy, once again enjoyed stable, conservative governments.
Although Louis Napoleon, whose regime represented revolutionary
principles, held office, France appeared diplomatically isolated. In addi-
tion, Nicholas I believed that he had an understanding with Britain
and that he would work with this power in Eastern affairs. Although
the Russian government still favored the maintenance of the status
quo in the Near East, the dangers that could arise from future upheavals
in this sensitive area were recognized. In conversations in January 1853,
the tsar presented to the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir Hamil-
ton Seymour, a plan for a possible future partition of Ottoman territory.
At this time Nicholas I declared his continued interest in holding a
protectorate over Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia. The Principalities
were thus seen as a permanent part of the Russian sphere of control.
This extremely favorable Russian position was about to collapse.
Although the origins and events of the Crimean War are not a part of
this narrative, it is interesting to note that the conflict came about largely
over the interpretation of the treaties that gave Russia a special position
in relation to the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire, the same
agreements that had so influenced the fate of the Principalities in the
past.37 Moreover, the first belligerent action leading to the outbreak of
hostilities involved the Principalities. In July 1853, scarcely two years
after their previous departure, Russian troops again crossed the Pruth.
In October the Ottoman Empire declared war; France and Britain
did not join in until March 1854.
The Principalities were thus once again under military occupation.
During the first weeks the princes §tirbei and Ghica were caught be-
tween two opposing pressures. On the one hand, the Russian officials
demanded that they break relations with the Porte and refuse to pay
the tribute; on the other, the Ottoman government, backed by Britain,
pressed them to obey the directives of the suzerain power, end all
communications with the Russian authorities, and leave their posts. In
October they did indeed abandon their offices and depart for Vienna.
The Russian officials then took over the government. General Andreus
F. Budberg, in command of the Russian forces, like Kiselev before him,
assumed the title of president plenipotentiary. The divans, established
as a result of the Convention of Balta Liman, remained, but their mem-
bers were appointed from among the Russian partisans.
The Russian occupation was of short duration - from July 1853 to
August 1854. The familiar problems recurred; the securing of housing,
transportation, and supplies caused tension between the military au-
thorities and the population. The Russian administration carefully
enforced the censorship regulations, and public meetings were pro-
56
 The Russian protectorate
hibited: the memories of 1848 were still fresh. As before, the Russian
officials sought to attract local support for their war against the Otto-
man Empire. Although their cause awakened much enthusiasm in
other parts of the Ottoman territories, particularly among the Slavic
and Greek inhabitants, they won few adherents in the Principalities.
In fact, largely because of the events of 1848, many had sympathies
favoring the Porte, feelings that were strengthened once France and
Britain entered the war.
The political situation in the provinces was soon, however, to change
radically. In June 1854 the Habsburg Monarchy concluded an agree-
ment with the Porte and then turned to St. Petersburg with the demand
that the Russian armies evacuate the provinces. Because of its weak
military position, the Russian government was forced to comply. Aus-
trian and Ottoman forces then took their place.38 Omer Pasha was once
again in Bucharest. Assurances were given that the joint occupation
was only temporary and that the previous conditions would be restored
after the war; Ghica and §tirbei returned to resume their offices.
Despite the declarations and the Russian withdrawal, the Romanian
nationalists were not happy about the new situation. They remained
deeply suspicious of Austrian and Ottoman intentions. They certainly
had no desire to exchange Habsburg for Russian domination. More-
over, bitter feelings were aroused when the Habsburg authorities had
to deal with the problems that had caused so much ill will during pre-
vious Russian occupations. Conflicts arose over the requisitioning of
supplies and housing and matters of local internal administration. Like
their Russian counterparts, the Habsburg authorities were able to gain
the support of some conservative Romanians, but they could not win
the allegiance of any sizable groups among the population.
The Habsburg occupation had one great advantage: it prevented the
Principalities from becoming a battlefield. The Romanian lands thus
did not suffer from the devastation of a war fought among the great
powers. Although the Principalities were neutralized, their ultimate
fate was a matter of constant concern to the diplomats. Throughout
the war Vienna remained the center of continual negotiations. In
August 1854 the European allies and the Habsburg government agreed
upon a set of conditions, known as the Vienna Four Points, which were
designed to serve as the basis for peace. After the allied victories in the
Crimea and the fall of Sebastopol, the cession of Bessarabian land ad-
jacent to the Danube and the neutralization and demilitarization of the
Black Sea were added as concrete demands. Obviously, these points had
great significance for the future of the Principalities. In January 1856
the Russian government, after suffering a defeat in the Crimea and
57
 Russia and the Romanian national state
receiving a Habsburg ultimatum, accepted a strengthened version of
these terms.
The Congress of Paris, called to formulate the final peace terms,
opened on February 13/25, 1856. Each nation was represented by two
plenipotentiaries: Count K. F. Buol-Schauenstein and Count J. A. von
Hiibner for Austria; Count Alexander Walewski and Baron Francois A.
Bourqueney for France; the Earl of Clarendon and Earl Henry R. C.
Cowley for Britain; Prince Aleksei Fedorovich Orlov and Baron Filip
Ivanovich Brunnow for Russia; Count Camillo de Cavour and the Mar-
quis de Villamarina for Sardinia; Ali Pasha and Mehmed Djemil Bey
for the Ottoman Empire. The Prussian delegates, Otto von Manteuffel
and Maximilian von Hatzfeldt, were admitted only later in the sessions.
Although Napoleon III was not personally in attendance - no rulers
were - he was able to exert a great deal of influence and to decide the
policy of the French representatives on a day-by-day basis. His sympa-
thetic attitude was an immense aid to the Romanian position. The final
terms of the treaty were based on the points previously discussed. For
Russia the most damaging clauses were those concerned with the Black
Sea and the Danube. The Black Sea was declared neutralized and de-
militarized; neither Russia nor the Ottoman Empire was to maintain a
fleet on its waters or naval arsenals on its shores. The Straits remained,
as before, closed to warships of all powers. In addition, Russia was
compelled to surrender to Moldavia three districts of southern Bes-
sarabia, a cession which meant that this state was no longer a Danubian
riparian power. The river as a whole was placed under international
control, and the delta was returned to the Ottoman Empire. Among the
other provisions of particular significance for the Principalities was
the ending of the Russian protectorate. The Romanians, as well as the
Serbs, were placed under a joint European guarantee. The specific pro-
visions made for the future organization of the Principalities, which
caused much controversy, will be discussed in detail subsequently.
These terms, deeply humiliating for Russia, were to have an enor-
mously liberating effect in the Danubian lands. Most important was the
termination of the Russian protectorate. The period of the Organic
Statutes and Russian domination had been of great significance for
Romanian national development. On the positive side, certain Rus-
sian actions had undoubtedly been to the Romanian benefit. The estab-
lishment of the protectorate as well as earlier Russian interventions had
indeed greatly weakened the bonds between the Principalities and the
Porte. Previously, during the period of Phanariot rule, the suzerain
state had often transgressed the autonomous rights of the provinces. The
Russian treaties with the Ottoman Empire placed definite limits on

58
 The Russian protectorate
Ottoman interference: the relationship between the vassal and the
suzerain power was defined; the tribute and other payments were set;
an end was made to the Ottoman right of preemption in the purchase of
Romanian agricultural products; and, in addition, an Ottoman occupa-
tion of Romanian territory, unless under unusual circumstances, was
made almost impossible and Muslims were prevented from buying prop-
erty or establishing permanent residences. The Organic Regulations had
also provided the provinces with a better political system than they had
enjoyed previously. The administration introduced at this time was
progressive for the time and the place.
The negative aspects, were, however, to take precedence as time
passed. The protectorate did represent great-power domination. As
such, it became a symbol of national oppression. Russia thus became
the state that drew the chief focus of nationalist hatred. In comparison,
Ottoman influence appeared relatively benign; the Turkish ability to
compel obedience was extremely limited. Moreover, although the Or-
ganic Statutes had once represented progress, this element was largely
negated by the subsequent Russian refusal to consider changes in the
political system. As a result, those who sought a further evolution in
political development were forced into the opposition. The intellectuals
and educated youth, deeply influenced by contemporary European
thought, were to be particularly effective in combating Russian influ-
ence. Attracted by Western liberal-national doctrine, they came to share
the common feeling of the European revolutionary that autocratic
Russia was the great enemy of humanity and progress. This conviction,
of course, was intensified by the Russian role in the suppression of
the revolutions of 1848.
In addition to the specific terms of the treaty, other aspects of the
Crimean War crisis were to have an equally beneficial effect on Ro-
manian affairs. Before 1853 the Russian position in Europe had been
immensely strengthened by the fact that it was a member of the strong-
est Continental coalition, the Holy Alliance, which included Prussia
and the Habsburg Empire. The diplomatic maneuvering during the
war, particularly the support given by the monarchy to Russia's ad-
versaries, resulted in the breaking of the alignment. In 1855 Nicholas I
died. His son, Alexander II, thus came to the throne at a time of military
defeat and diplomatic isolation. After the war he appointed as foreign
minister Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov, who had previously been
ambassador in Vienna. He shared with the tsar a feeling of disgust and
anger at what they felt had been a Habsburg betrayal and a failure to
return the support that had been given against the Hungarian revolu-
tion in 1849. For the next several years they were to show themselves de-

59
 Russia and the Romanian national state
lighted to cooperate in diplomatic combinations that would weaken
and humiliate their former ally. They thus welcomed the opportunity
that arose at this time to work with France, the power that the previous
tsar had regarded as the chief menace to the Russian position in Europe.
The rapprochement between Russia and France, now the patron of the
Romanian cause, was to set the stage for a major advance in the na-
tional program.

60
 CHAPTER II

The European guardianship

The Treaty of Paris opened a new era in European diplomacy, one

that was to be characterized by victories for the German and Italian,
as well as for the Romanian, national movements. Since there was as
yet no representative Romanian administration, the fate of the country
lay primarily in the hands of the great powers. The decisions were to
be made no longer by one power, in collaboration with the Porte, but
by a concert of the seven signatories of the treaty. The rivalry among
these governments was to be a great advantage for the Romanian lead-
ership over the next years.1
The Crimean disaster compelled a change of policy in the Russian
relationship with the Principalities, as well as in other areas of inter-
national relations. The humiliation of the defeat and the dangers that
had arisen during the war forced the Russian government to consider
radically different courses of action. Alexander II regarded the treaty
as a national humiliation and a stain on his personal honor. The break-
ing of the terms of the agreement that were damaging to Russia thus
had first priority for the future. Four aspects of the settlement, in par-
ticular, had profoundly altered the Russian diplomatic position in the
Near East: the neutralization of the Black Sea, the cession of the three
districts of southern Bessarabia, the loss of a special position in relation
to Constantinople, and the assumption by the powers of additional
guarantees for the Porte.
Of these provisions the Russian government was most immediately
concerned with the limitations on its activity in the Black Sea. The
neutralization hampered its ability to exert pressure on Constantinople
and was bound to affect any future moves in the Balkans or the Cau-
casus. Even worse, the Russian southern shores were now vulnerable to
61
 Russia and the Romanian national state
attack from British, French, and Ottoman navies, which could operate
from the straits or the eastern Mediterranean. Should the Crimean
coalition hold in peacetime, Russia would face a permanent threat.
This section of the treaty deeply influenced the attitude held toward
other powers, and its removal became the major aim of Russian policy
in the next years.
The second provision that the Russian leaders were most anxious
to change concerned the Bessarabian territory. At issue was not only
the strategic value of the lands, but the question of Russian prestige.
Like other monarchs, the tsar regarded any loss of territory, of his
"patrimony," as a personal affront to his honor. His determination to
regain this land was bound to affect his relations with the successive
governments of the Principalities. As far as the loss of exclusive control
over the provinces was concerned, this matter appears to have caused
less regret. Despite the treaty, the common frontier and the continued
interest in all of the Orthodox people made it inevitable that the Rus-
sian government would remain deeply involved in Romanian affairs.
Treaty stipulations could not change this situation. In the immediate
postwar period the major Russian concern was to assure that the pro-
tectorate was not replaced by an exclusively Habsburg influence or an
increase of Ottoman control.
The unfortunate outcome of the war forced the Russian government
to revise its relationship with the Ottoman Empire. As we have seen,
in the previous thirty years Russian diplomacy in the area had moved
in two directions. After the signing of the treaties of Adrianople and
Unkiar Iskelesi it had followed a policy of working with, but also dom-
inating, the Porte. As long as the Russian representatives held the pre-
dominant influence in the councils of the sultan, they had a natural
interest in protecting the territorial integrity of the empire. This ob-
jective was seen in particular in the 1830s, when assistance was offered
against the threat from Egypt. The conclusion of the Convention of
Balta Liman marked a high point in this policy of collaboration. After
the Crimean defeat it was naturally to be expected that Britain and
France, not Russia, would have the primary influence in Constanti-
nople. Since this fact was recognized, Gorchakov in his instructions to
the Russian representative, Apollinarii Petrovich Butenev, empha-
sized that he should seek not a special position, but "parity" with the
other powers. Efforts should be made to assure that no single state ob-
tained a controlling position.
Parallel with the previous policy of cooperation with the Porte had
been that of the protection of Orthodox Christianity. The Russian
rights in this regard had been most clearly defined in relation to the
62
 The European guardianship
Serbs and Romanians, but Russian statesmen certainly felt that they had
a unique relationship with and obligations toward all the members of
their faith. The attempt by Prince Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov to
obtain a clear statement of Russian rights in this regard had been a
major cause for the outbreak of the Crimean War. The fear of the pow-
ers, Britain in particular, that Russia would continue to use its links
with the Orthodox to exert control in the empire was reflected in the
peace settlement. Guarantees for the independence and territorial in-
tegrity of the Ottoman Empire were given in Article 7 of the treaty and
in a special agreement signed by Britain, Austria, and France in April.
In addition, Article 9 of the treaty prohibited the powers from inter-
fering "either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty
the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the Internal Administration of his
Empire."2
Despite the endeavors of the victors, the Russian government had no
intention of abandoning what were regarded as its "permanent inter-
ests" in the East. Among these, and in the most prominent place, con-
tinued to be the Orthodox church and the fate of the Christian na-
tionalities. Russian concern over these people could, of course, not be
expressed without some form of "interference" in the internal affairs of
the empire. The Russian awareness of the link between religion and
politics and the determination to pursue past policies was well expressed
in an instruction sent to Butenev in July 1856. The future relations
with the Orthodox church were discussed here. Because of the impor-
tance of this subject for the Principalities, the text will be quoted at
length. Attempts had been made by Russia's adversaries, the memo-
randum stated, to persuade the clergy and the Orthodox populations
of the East
that the only aim of our [the Russian] intercessions in favor of the church
was political domination; that we were intending to bring the church and the
populations under our influence with a view to conquest.
We do not need to say that this is not so. It is true that our political interests
are, as they have always been and as they will not cease to be in the Orient,
by the nature of the conditions themselves, tightly linked to those of Ortho-
doxy. Our adversaries know this perfectly. When they combat the church of the
East, as well as when they pretend to protect it in order to better procure means
of fighting it, it is not only from zeal for Catholic and Protestant propaganda,
but also and above all with arriere-pensee against our influence.
Since the wars of Empress Catherine, the Orient has gone through a period
of transition. Our great interest for ourselves is that it be able to emerge one
day without losing the principal element of preservation and homogeneity
that dwells there, living and powerful, for centuries, despite the vicissitudes to
which it is a prey, despite the diversity of the races subjugated by the Ottoman
conquest. It is an interest of the first order for us to have in our immediate

63
 Russia and the Romanian national state
neighborhood populations that are attached to us by the ties of the faith that
brought Greece back to life and that will bring about progressively under our
eyes the resurrection of the Slav and Romanian nationalities.
We do not hesitate to repeat that our interest in favor of our co-religionists
of the East should not at all be concealed. It is based on two perfectly avowable
principles: that of an intimate religious union and that of the conservation of
the Ottoman Empire according to the sense of the Treaty of Paris.3
Nevertheless, despite the determination to continue certain past poli-
cies that was expressed, the defeat did compel some radical, if tempo-
rary, alterations in policy - domestic as well as foreign. The Crimean
disaster had shown not only Russia's military weakness, but the eco-
nomic and social backwardness of the society. Since the necessity of
reform was clearly recognized, the Russian leaders were well aware that
the major national attention would have to be concentrated on internal
problems. Russia could no longer play the role of the gendarme of
Europe and the main prop of the conservative order. Gorchakov thus
adopted what he characterized as the policy of recueillement: Russia
would turn into itself and place its major emphasis on internal reform.
For the moment an aggressive active role in foreign policy would have
to be abandoned. Neither in European affairs nor in issues connected
with the Eastern Question could the Russian state maintain a predomi-
nant position until its military establishment was strengthened. The
great reforms of the 1860s included a thorough reorganization of the
army.
Despite this negative approach, the Russian government in the next
years was to have certain specific foreign policy aims. The first, as we
have seen, was the breaking of the Treaty of Paris, or parts of it, should
the opportunity arise. Like all defeated powers, Russia was to await
the first moment possible to overturn an unacceptable settlement. More-
over, the Russian leaders after the experience of the war remained
acutely conscious of the danger of isolation, particularly during a peri-
od of internal reform. The war had shown the vulnerability of the
state when it was forced to face Europe alone. A major Russian goal
in international affairs thus became to split the Crimean alliance and
to win one of the partners as its own ally. Unfortunately, among these
powers the possibilities of securing a friend and supporter were ex-
tremely limited. Prussia, of course, had not participated in the war; its
neutral attitude had been regarded as favorable. However, the Russian
government did not believe that Prussia was strong enough to provide
major assistance in a time of crisis. A Russian-Prussian alliance was not
considered an adequate counterweight to the combination of states
that had won the Crimean War.
Moreover, two of these powers had to be immediately eliminated as
 The European guardianship
possible close associates - Britain and Austria. Britain remained the
chief adversary, with interests in conflict with Russia's all over the
map, but in particular in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans.
Both the former foreign minister, Nesselrode, and Gorchakov consid-
ered this state the major challenge to St. Petersburg. Relations with
the Habsburg Monarchy were similarly sensitive. After the war the Rus-
sian leaders felt a great animosity toward this power. In the next years
a strong note of reprisal and revenge can be seen in their attitude toward
Vienna. The Russian statesman and the tsar felt personally betrayed by
the Habsburg actions, and they certainly wished to see their former
conservative ally paid back for its desertion.
The elimination of these states left only France as a possible partner.
The choice of this power as an ally would, of course, signify a complete
reversal of former attitudes and the abandonment of ideology as a
prime consideration of foreign policy. Despite his increasingly conserva-
tive internal direction, Napoleon III did stand for significant changes
in the map of Europe and he did support the use of revolutionary means
for the accomplishment of national goals. However, the Russian leaders
had, in fact, no real choice. If they wished to break the Crimean front,
the weak point lay in Paris. Even during the war some connections had
been maintained with France. It was also obvious that the two sea
powers, Britain and France, were keen rivals in many areas.
With a French alignment, the Russian attitude toward revolutionary
change in the Balkans was thus modified. Until 1877, when Russia
finally went to war with the Ottoman Empire on the issue, the Russian
government was often tempted to support Balkan national movements
not only because of the traditional sympathy for the Orthodox sub-
jects of the sultan, but also because of the possibility that independent
and autonomous Balkan states might provide useful allies. During the
next twenty years some Russian diplomats were to consider that an
alliance of Russia with the Orthodox people, particularly the Slavs,
would be more satisfactory than any European partnership, and that
they would provide a sufficient counterweight to threats from other
powers. This willingness to support national revolt did not in any
manner mean that the tsarist government had lost its apprehension over
revolutionary activities whose aim was the abolition of monarchical
regimes and the establishment of democratic parliamentary systems. As
shall be shown, great care was taken in the assessment of each movement.
Russian policy after the Crimean War was thus essentially defensive.
Prime emphasis was placed on internal reform. The association with
France was to avoid diplomatic isolation, and for the future the first
objective was to be the breaking of the peace provisions. In Eastern
65
 Russia and the Romanian national state
affairs there was continued interest in the Orthodox population and in
achieving a parity of influence in Constantinople. In this total picture
the affairs of the Principalities had but a minor place. Here too the Rus-
sian government aimed at assuring itself an equal influence with the
other powers; exclusive Habsburg control was particularly feared. At
some time Russia also intended to take back the Bessarabian districts.
As far as Romanian internal development was concerned, the value of
the regime of the Organic Statutes was defended, but the need for fur-
ther reforms was recognized. As to their exact extent, this decision was
to be made on the basis of the demands of Russia's general European
policy, in particular the alliance with France.

T H E ROMANIAN QUESTION AT THE

PARIS CONFERENCE

Even before the end of the Crimean War it had become apparent that
important changes would be made in the internal administration of
the Principalities. The abolition of the Russian protectorate was one
of the Vienna Four Points; the issue had played an important role in
the preliminary conference held in Vienna in 1855. As in the case of
Greece in the 1820s, the great powers assumed that they would make
the final decisions on the form of government to be given the Princi-
palities; the question was simply what that should be. Obviously, the
regime of the Organic Statutes, closely identified with Russian domina-
tion, had to be brought to an end. Even the Russian government recog-
nized that major changes would have to be made here. Before any
reforms could be introduced, the basic issue had to be met: should
Moldavia and Wallachia remain separate states, or should they be
united, perhaps under a foreign prince, in accordance with the clear
wishes of the active political elements in each principality?
On this issue the powers fell into two distinct and opposing camps.
The Ottoman Empire naturally feared any settlement that would
weaken its hold on these lands, feeble as it was. Not only did the Porte
wish to keep the area as a buffer against Russia, but the question in-
volved Ottoman prestige. At this time the Ottoman state was in a
period of internal reform whose aim was the modernization and
strengthening of the state. Following French examples, the direction
was toward centralization and the tightening of the hold of the gov-
ernment on the provinces. Certainly, a true federal solution was never
seriously considered. The union of the Principalities was thus opposed
because of its probable effect on the Romanian relationship with the

66
 The European guardianship
Porte and the inevitable influence that it would exert on the other
Christian people of the empire. Further autonomous rights for the
Romanians would lead to immediate, similar demands by others.
The Ottoman stand was strongly supported by the Habsburg Empire.
As previously, this government's position was determined by its concern
for the more than two million Habsburg Romanians who would un-
doubtedly be attracted to Bucharest should it become the capital of a
vital, successful Romanian national state. Moreover, another considera-
tion had arisen. With the end of the Russian protectorate the mon-
archy had an opportunity to assert its political and economic prepon-
derance. During the occupation measures had been taken to strengthen
the ties of the provinces with their western neighbor. Roads had been
built, the most important of which ran from Bra§ov to Bucharest to
Braila. The navigation of the Danube had been improved, and the Aus-
trian intention to dominate that waterway was made clear during the
peace negotiations. Telegraphic communications were opened between
Jassy and Bucharest. Plans were also developed for building a railroad
network that would connect the provinces with the lands of the mon-
archy. Unlike Russia, the Habsburg Empire could offer economic ad-
vantages to the Principalities both as a supplier of manufactured goods
and as a market for Romanian agricultural products and raw materials.
Already, full use had been made of the privileges gained through the
capitulations and consular jurisdiction. It was clear that a weak govern-
ment and two separate Principalities would be more accessible to con-
trol from Vienna in both a political and an economic sense.
Along with the Habsburg Empire, Britain stood as a strong defender
of Ottoman integrity, including the continued control of the Princi-
palities. Britain had fought the Crimean War to maintain, not to weaken
further, the Ottoman Empire. Although Austria was perhaps the
chief benefactor of the removal of the Russian protectorate, Britain had
a similar interest in securing the permanent blocking of Russian south-
ward expansion at the Pruth. The return of the Danube Delta to Otto-
man rule was certainly an aid to British commerce. The government
also had a major interest in the establishment of stable regimes in the
Principalities. At this time and later, British statesmen were to give
much verbal support to the idea of constitutional government, particu-
larly in regard to the affairs of Western and Central Europe, but they
never allowed these principles to hamper their policy in the Ottoman
lands or, of course, in the Asian and African territories under their
control. The prime British concern at this time was to be whether the
provinces united would form a better barrier against Russia, as France

67
 Russia and the Romanian national state
argued, or whether the move would simply further weaken the Ottoman
Empire and diminish its ability to function as a buffer. If union would
indeed promote British interests, then the government would welcome
the opportunity to respect the "wishes of the people." Certainly, Britain
would not be reluctant to aid movements that were to the detriment
of Russia. A firm British decision was not made until July 1856.
The French position, in contrast, was clear. Napoleon III henceforth
was to be the strongest advocate for the Romanian nationalists, al-
though individual French interests were never sacrificed. His support of
the idea of union and a foreign prince was made clear during the peace
negotiations. Although he always subordinated Romanian interests to
those of the Italians, he did, when there was no other conflict, usually
promote the Romanian national idea. Indeed, France had nothing to
lose and much to gain from the establishment of a strong Romanian
state. It was obvious that the Romanian liberal leadership found its
true inspiration in Paris. A liberal-national victory in Bucharest would
assure France a firm outpost for the defense of its interests in Eastern
Europe.
The political balance was to be decisive for the attitude Russia took
toward the Romanian question. Although the Russian government
never did adopt a firm, open, unwavering position, the advantages to
be gained by acting in collusion with France were too obvious. The issue
was one, and about the only one, over which France and Britain could
be divided. Russia's general need for an ally thus outweighed the ob-
vious disadvantages of the establishment of a national political unit on
the lower Danube. It was obviously preferable, as it had always been,
to have two weak principalities that could be more easily controlled.
Similarly, the dangers to the Russian autocracy presented by a neigh-
boring state with a liberal government remained as before. The pre-
eminent position that France would enjoy in a united Romania was
also fully realized. Nevertheless, Russia's desire to break the Crimean al-
liance and to gain a partner for its own policy overrode these negative
considerations. Moreover, support for the nationalist position in Ro-
manian affairs had the major advantage of also serving to thwart Habs-
burg policy. Should their own loss of predominant influence be in-
evitable, the Russian leaders were determined that they should not be
supplanted by the Habsburg adversaries. Because of these considera-
tions Russian policy during the next years was essentially to support the
French proposals, even when they underwent basic alterations.
The question of the future political organization of the Principali-
ties was discussed at the sixth meeting of the Paris conference on Feb-
ruary 25/March 8. At this time Walewski stated the French support for
68
 The European guardianship
union. Cowley concurred with his arguments. Ali, in rebuttal, replied
that the Principalities had been separated since ancient times and that
they had developed along different lines. The population, he claimed,
favored the division. Supporting the Ottoman stand, Buol also main-
tained that the provinces did not want union and that they had not
been consulted. The French position was backed by Orlov, who de-
clared that Russia favored unification as an aid to the prosperity of the
Principalities. Cavour also consistently seconded the French declara-
tions.
Because of this division among the powers, and because they did not
wish to delay the conclusion of the peace, the delegates on February
27/March 10 agreed to a Walewski proposal that the treaty contain
only a general statement concerning the political and administrative
regime to be established, leaving the details for a subsequent confer-
ence. A commission of Buol, Ali, and Bourqueney was named to draw
up this document. On two later days, February 29/March 12 and
March 2/14, the conference considered the text of the articles pro-
posed. The aim was to find a basis that all of the representatives could
accept and to postpone the actual decision on the future of the prov-
inces. The provisions were thus of necessity vague. It was agreed that
the wishes of the Romanian population "relative to the final organiza-
tion of the Principalities" would be determined through the instrumen-
tality of assemblies to be chosen in each Principality, which were to
represent "the interests of all classes of society."4 At the same time an
International Commission, composed of representatives of the guaran-
teeing powers and the Porte, was to be established in Bucharest. Its task
was to inquire into conditions in the Principalities and, taking into ac-
count the decisions of the assemblies, to make recommendations to the
powers concerning the future organization of the country. These pro-
posals would then be considered by a conference to be held in Paris,
where the final arrangements would be made. In this settlement the in-
terests of the powers and the Porte would be taken into consideration,
as well as the desires of the Principalities. The decisions of the con-
ference were to be expressed in a convention; the Porte would then issue
a hatti sherif to put these into effect. This procedure, which in no way
settled the major Romanian issues, signified the powers' recognition
of the difficulty of securing an agreement on the problem among the
members of the Crimean coalition.
The question of the Principalities was dealt with in Articles 20
through 27 of the Treaty of Paris. In addition to the provisions already
discussed, the agreement stated that no power had the right of exclusive
intervention in the Principalities, which were to be the collective con-
69
 Russia and the Romanian national state
cern of the signatory powers. The provinces were to "continue to en-
joy, under the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte and under the European
guarantee, the privileges and immunities which they possess," and to
have an independent and national administration "as well as full free-
dom of religion, of legislation, of commerce and of navigation."5 They
were also allowed to have an armed force for defense.
Extremely important for the future were the severe limitations
placed on the Ottoman right of military intervention. Article 27 stated:
"If the Internal Tranquillity of the Principalities should be menaced
or compromised, the Sublime Porte shall come to an understanding
with the other contracting powers in regard to the measures to be taken
for maintaining or reestablishing legal order. No armed intervention
can take place without previous agreement between those Powers."6
In practice, this condition made any Ottoman intervention most im-
probable, since it was very doubtful that such a "previous agreement"
could ever be obtained. Not only were the powers divided, but none of
the guarantors, because of their own public opinion, could easily con-
sent to an Ottoman suppression of a Romanian revolt. A joint action,
such as had occurred in 1848 by Russian and Ottoman troops, and in
1854 by Habsburg and Ottoman forces, was after 1856 more difficult to
contemplate. Thus, although the Principalities remained under Otto-
man sovereignty, the Porte had no adequate means of enforcing its de-
cisions. The European powers together, not just Russia alone, stood
between the Porte and its Romanian subjects.
This settlement and the new diplomatic alignments were to be of
enormous benefit to the Romanian national leadership. Certainly, the
substitution of a great-power protectorate for the former exclusive
Russian control was a great advantage. It was obvious that the guaran-
tors would seldom agree on a single course of action; the disputes among
them were to give the Romanian statesmen considerable latitude in
which to move. At the same time great-power jealousy could be used
to prevent any single country from again exerting real domination. Aus-
tria, although still in occupation, was soon to be forced to withdraw its
troops; the Porte had been effectively blocked from gaining the military
means to exert control over the Principalities or to enforce its rights as
the suzerain power. Moldavia, of course, had also gained by the annex-
ation of Bessarabian territory, although its acquisitions were but a small
section of the area to which the Romanian nationalists lay claim. As
far as the decisions of the powers on the international organization of
the country were concerned, their success or failure would be deter-
mined over the next years.

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 The European guardianship
T H E IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONGRESS
DECISIONS: THE DOUBLE ELECTION OF
ALEXANDER CUZA

Although the procedures to be followed had been established at the

congress, their implementation was to lead to continual controversy
and confusion. The steps to be taken had been set down clearly. A
firman was to be issued by the Porte, with the cooperation of the powers,
establishing the procedures for the elections to the assemblies, called
divans ad hoc, and determining who should vote. These bodies, once
elected, were to express their desires, which in turn would be considered
by the International Commission and transmitted to the powers, who
would then meet in Paris to make the final decisions. Although the gen-
eral lines of action were obvious, many details, in particular in connec-
tion with the franchise, remained unsettled. Moreover, the entire process
created a situation in which the animosities among individuals and
political groups would be given ample opportunity to express them-
selves. Added to these difficulties were the problems connected with the
sharp conflicts among the representatives of the guarantor powers and
their struggles to secure the victory of their candidates.
During the period of the protectorate the Russian predominance had
not been seriously challenged. However, after the Crimean War other
states saw the possibility of winning, if not control of Romanian politi-
cal life, at least the first position among the great powers. Austria, stand-
ing for conservative interests and Moldavian separatism, and France,
with its support of the liberal-national position, were the chief adver-
saries, but the representatives of all of the powers in both Jassy and
Bucharest entered into competition to influence events. In the same
manner individual Romanian politicians sought assistance from the
foreign consulates. Although there was much talk about the danger of
outside intervention, both the Romanians and the guarantor states
freely violated the principle in practice. Serious objections were made
usually only when one's opponent thereby gained an advantage. Few
took seriously the practicality of applying a rule of nonintervention
universally. The most extreme example of consular interference was
shown in the activities of the Austrian agent Godel de Lannoy and the
French representative Victor Place in Jassy. Burdened with the previous
military defeat and the legacy of 1848, Russia could not at first compete
on an equal basis with the Crimean victors, but it did have a number of
important and influential supporters, particularly in Moldavia.
Any conflicts that arose over the elections in the Principalities, ac-
 Russia and the Romanian national state
cording to the regulations, were to be referred to the representatives of
the powers in Constantinople and to the Porte. Here the situation was
complicated by the fact that a struggle for influence over the Ottoman
government was again taking place. Russia, of course, was temporarily
out of the race. Instead, Britain and France, the Crimean allies, fought
for first position. The situation was made worse by the deep personal
animosity between the ambassadors, Stratford de Redcliffe and Edouard
Antoine Thouvenel. The British representative's long tenure at the Ot-
toman capitol had evidently given him the feeling that he was something
like a Turkish minister. The two sides had their adherents within the
government. Reshid Pasha was regarded as a British partisan; Ali Pasha
and Fuad Pasha were considered friends of France. The Habsburg rep-
resentative, Anton von Prokesch-Osten, who had long years of experi-
ence in Ottoman affairs and who was the agent of a power that supported
Ottoman integrity, also had much influence. The two other powers in-
volved in Romanian affairs, Sardinia and Prussia, played relatively
minor roles in the contest. On the eve of the launching of their own
national unification movements, both states tended to support the na-
tional idea and to be anti-Habsburg. Their firm support of the French
position on Romanian issues meant that France had automatically
two supporters on every question.
Before the elections could be held, the Porte had to appoint the men
who would run the country until the final organization was decided.
Barbu §tirbei and Gregory A. Ghica were in office, but their terms of
seven years were coming to an end. According to the Organic Statutes
the Porte should have appointed a caimacamie (regency) of three mem-
bers. Instead, one man was named for each province. The office of
caimacam was of central importance in view of the coming elections.
This official could exert a controlling influence over the voting through
the Ministry of Interior and the judicial system, over which he would
have control. He could change officials, and he could interfere in court
decisions. In July 1856 the Porte chose Alexander Ghica, then sixty
years old, for Wallachia. This nomination was at first generally ap-
proved, but his actions soon alienated many. In Moldavia, T. Bal§, the
first appointment, died in March 1857, anc^ w a s followed by a very con-
troversial figure, Nicholas Vogoride. Vogoride was of Greek origin; he
had gained Moldavian citizenship only in 1846. He was married to a
Moldavian heiress of the Conachi family. Although his original nomina-
tion had been supported by Place, the consul soon turned against him.
Since his main links were to be with the Austrian consulate, both Vogo-
ride and his minister of interior, Costin Catargiu, soon came under
strong attack from nationalists, as well as from the French and Russian
72
 The European guardianship
consuls, for their pro-Habsburg sympathies and their obvious cor-
ruption.
Without a doubt, and as was attested by almost all contemporary
observers, union was the general desire of the politically involved sec-
tion of the Romanian population. The issue of the foreign prince was
clouded by skepticism whether the powers would allow such an appoint-
ment, but this idea too had general approval. The choice of a native
ruler, whether over a united state or in each principality, continued, as
in the past, to cause much controversy. As before, in each province every
major politician appeared to have the ambition to be prince. In Wal-
lachia the chief candidates were the caimacam, Alexander Ghica, and
the brothers §tirbei and Bibescu. At first the latter two cooperated
against their common rival. In Moldavia the major contest was between
Michael Sturdza and his son Gregory, who were separated by an intense
and irreconcilable hatred. All of these candidates, as well as those be-
longing either to the unionist or to the separatist camp, at this point pre-
pared for the elections. They organized committees and distributed
political literature. They also gave out bribes and attempted to assure
that officials sympathetic to their views would be in the right positions
during the elections. Fraud and the corruption of public officials was,
of course, as much a part of Romanian political life at this time as
previously.
The problem of corruption was greatest in Moldavia. Under the ad-
ministration of Gregory Ghica, the unionists had been in a better
position there than in Wallachia. In May 1856 a liberal press law had
been passed that allowed the continuing publication of Steaua Dundrii
(Star of the Danube) under the editorship of Michael Kogalniceanu.
This paper was to be the central organ of the unionist movement. On
May 25/June 6, nineteen Moldavian leaders met in Jassy to form the
the society "the Union/' The central committee of this organization in-
cluded the conservative landowners G. Sturdza, §. Cantacuzino, and
Peter Mavrogheni; their liberal counterparts D. Rallet and K. Rolla;
and, from the professional class, Kogalniceanu, A. Panu, and V. Malines-
cu. However, after the advent of the Bal§ administration, the separatists
gained the upper hand. The Moldavian government directed its efforts
toward suppressing the unionist movement and securing the election of
separatist candidates. The caimacam used his influence to dismiss offi-
cials who were for union and to replace them with his own men. The po-
lice and the courts were similarly employed to hamper unionist activity.
When Vogoride came to office, he continued this policy and retained
the Bal§ administration. At this time Austrian influence was predomi-
nant. The caimacams were in close touch with the Austrian consul and
73
 Russia and the Romanian national state
thus earned the extreme displeasure of Place and his Russian colleague,
Sergei Ivanovich Popov. The Moldavian regime was obviously follow-
ing policies approved and supported by the Habsburg Empire and the
Porte.
With these conditions Moldavia was the best hope of the supporters
of separatism, both within the Principalities and among the great pow-
ers. Since this issue was to remain important until the 1870s, the position
of those who opposed union should be reviewed. It is difficult to obtain
sufficient exact information on the members and programs of this group
because the overwhelming emphasis in Romanian historical writing
has been on the unionists and their activities. Although undoubtedly
the majority of the politically active citizens in the Principalites wanted
union, a significant minority saw it as damaging to their interests and
to their principality. In 1856 the exact political conditions that would
exist in a unified country were not clear. The Liberal Party, the main
carrier of the idea, contained among its members many who supported
radical political change, a republican form of government, and, even
more important, a solution of the land question to the advantage of the
peasant. Many great landowners in both provinces saw their position
challenged in two directions. They had previously always held the con-
trolling position in the political life of the state; they had elected the
princes, and this right had a practical and often commercial value. In
addition, their political influence had assured their domination of the
land and the peasantry. Many now feared, and with justification, that a
Liberal regime would introduce a new agrarian system that would re-
sult in the passing to peasant control of all or part of the lands of the
great estates.
For the Moldavians there were additional considerations. Moldavia
was the smaller of the two provinces in territory and population, and
Jassy was off the main trade routes. It was obvious that in a unified state
Bucharest, not Jassy, would be the capital. Since Romanian administra-
tive practice followed the French system of strong centralization, the
national government and the important public offices would be in that
city. Unification would mean that Moldavians would lose direct control
over their government and some important public offices. Thus, in ad-
dition to the conservative landowners, some officials and members of
the merchant and professional middle classes joined the separatists.
In Moldavia there were accordingly separatist organizations with their
own literature and propaganda. They were, however, never strong
enough to win the elections through strictly legal means, nor could they
compete with the Liberals in electoral tactics. The Vogoride regime was

74
 The European guardianship
forced to resort to fraud because the clear advantage was held by the
unionists.
Unlike Moldavia, Wallachia had no important separatist organiza-
tions. This province, nevertheless, had severe political problems. Here
the principal struggle centered on the issue of who would be prince.
Even those who favored a foreign candidate were involved because
most recognized that the great powers would probably block such a
solution. Moreover, the ranks of the unionists were split by strong dis-
agreements over policy as well as over individuals. The situation became
more acute with the return of the 1848 exiles, many of whom belonged
to the radical wing of the Liberal Party. Ion Balaceanu, a moderate,
came back in February 1855. In the spring of 1857 N. and §tefan
Golescu, C. A. Rosetti, and D. Bratianu followed; by July most of the
exiles had returned. Thereafter they took the lead of their party, to
the detriment of the moderates; they knew well how to conduct cam-
paigns and win popular support. They were regarded by some of the
representatives of the guarantor powers as dangerous radicals.
Despite the fears of the conservative governments, the Liberal pro-
gram during the elections was in fact moderate. Although there was
some talk of revolutionary action, particularly in the face of fraudulent
and illegal procedures by the caimacams, the concentration was on gain-
ing power through legal means and within the rules established by the
Treaty of Paris. The unionists knew that they could win if these were
enforced. Experienced politicians, they launched an active and aggres-
sive political campaign. Committees were organized to support the
unionist position. A regular correspondence had by this time been
established between Liberal groups in both provinces. A great emphasis
was placed on freedom of the press so that the national program could
be circulated. The Conservatives had no really competitive ideologi-
cal program and thus could not benefit to a similar extent from the
introduction and guarantee of civil liberties.
The political positions described hitherto were those held by the
landowners, the small middle class, and the clergy. The reaction of the
majority of the population, the peasantry, is not so clear. This subject is
difficult to treat because of the absence of critical analyses of peasant
awareness of national issues. All Liberal leaders claimed to speak for
"the people"; Conservatives too believed that their program was for
the best interests of the entire population. Certainly, Liberal politicians
were able to recruit large crowds for partisan demonstrations, but the
means by which this was done at times leave doubts about the true
convictions of those who participated in such actions. The true interest

75
 Russia and the Romanian national state
of the peasant lay, of course, less in political questions concerning the
organization of the state than in land reform. Because of this, the Lib-
eral Party, with its left wing that supported radical change, probably
best represented peasant concerns. There were, nevertheless, no major
Liberal spokesmen who had a peasant background, nor, of course, was
land reform a major item on the Liberal program at this time. The
Liberal Party was in no sense a peasant organization. Its attitude was
at the best paternal, at the worst condescending. One cynical observer
commented concerning its leadership: "It is only lawyers and professors
who preach that political combination"; they were men who wished to
bring about a miniature French Revolution that would give them po-
litical power and public office.7 Certainly, this aspect of the party was
to be shown in coming years when it enjoyed political predominance.
True peasant parties were not to come into existence until the next
century. At this time the majority of the people played only a passive
role in events that were, however, to create a situation to their ad-
vantage.
Meanwhile, the representatives of the great powers prepared to play
their assigned role in the proceedings that were intended to discover
"the wishes of the population." Russia was reduced to the level of the
other powers; it was one of seven guarantor states. Although general
policy had been set at the peace conference, many details still had to be
decided. Specific questions regarding the franchise and the duties of
both the divans and the International Commission had yet to be settled.
After the appointment of the caimacams, the next matter of importance
was the formulation of the firman that would set the rules for the elec-
tion. The representatives of the powers took an active part in this task,
with each pressing for decisions that would favor his government. A
major problem was the franchise. The treaty specified that all levels of
society should be represented, but it was assumed that the major in-
fluence should be retained by the propertied classes. France, supporting
the popular program of union, wished as wide a franchise as possible.
In contrast, the Habsburg Monarchy demanded a strict limitation on
the number of voters in order to give the advantage to the great land-
owners, who were more likely to be separatists. In the final version the
voting was by electoral college, with different procedures for the pro-
prietors, who kept their disproportionate representation, the middle
class, and the peasants. The voting for each group was held on separate
days; the representatives were to sit in the divans grouped by their col-
leges, and they were to present individual reports to the International
Commission.
As regards the subjects that could be considered by the divans, an
 The European guardianship
effort was made by the Habsburg government, backed by the Porte, to
force the exclusion of the question of union from the debates, since, it
was argued, the issue involved the rights of the sovereign power. The
French, supported by the Russians, insisted that the assemblies should
be completely free to express their wishes. Of course, the great powers
were under no obligation to accept the proposals presented by the
divans, which could only make recommendations: they were not con-
stituent assemblies, and they could not legislate.
The duties of the International Commission, set forth in Article 23
of the treaty, included the investigation of conditions in the Principali-
ties and the formulation of suggestions for their future organization.
The commission was also to supervise the elections and assure that they
were conducted fairly. The members assembled in Constantinople in
the fall of 1856;8 they included Sir Henry Bulwer for Britain, Rafaello
Benzi for Sardinia, Safvet Pasha for the Ottoman Empire, Baron E.
Richthofen for Prussia, and Charles A. Talleyrand-Perigord for France.
The Habsburg delegate, Baron Roller, was soon replaced by Liehmann
von Palmrode. The Russian commissioner, Constantine Mikhailovich
Basily (Bazili), was well prepared for his task by his considerable ex-
perience in Eastern affairs.9 Born in Constantinople, he came from a
Greek-Albanian family. His father had participated in the Greek
revolution and had been forced to flee to Russia, where he entered state
service. Basily's major post previously had been that of consul-general
at Beirut. His position on the commission made him the senior Russian
official in the Principalities. There he was assisted by Popov, the consul
in Jassy, and by E. R. Shchulepnikov, the vice-consul in Bucharest.
Despite the fact that the commission was formed so promptly, its
members did not arrive in Bucharest until March 1857. The delay was
occasioned by conflicts over the new Russian boundary and the conse-
quent postponement of the evacuation of the Habsburg army. Arrange-
ments also had to be made concerning the transfer of the three districts
of southern Bessarabia and the Danube Delta. The major disagreements
that arose over the drawing of the frontier involved the town of Bol-
grad and the possession of Serpent's Island, which had an important
strategic position at the mouth of the Danube. Finally, the points in dis-
pute were awarded to the Ottoman Empire in return for some minor
border rectifications in favor of Russia. The Habsburg army was with-
drawn by March 1857. The Russian government had been particularly
adamant that its commissioner should not proceed to Bucharest until
this evacuation had been accomplished.
The instructions issued to the Russian agents reflected the considera-
tions previously described. They were to cooperate with France and to

77
 Russia and the Romanian national state
insist on an equality of treatment with the other powers on all matters.
On the Romanian question the provisions of the treaty were to be
strictly followed. The Russian representatives were to maintain an atti-
tude of complete abstention in local affairs; they were to support no
party or candidate. They were to observe conditions, but take no initia-
tives, and report to their government on Romanian politics and public
opinion. On the vital questions of union and a foreign prince, they
were to express no views whatsoever - in favor either of the status quo
or of a radical change. T h e attitude to be maintained was clearly in-
dicated in an instruction from Basily to Popov, reflecting the orders
from St. Petersburg, sent in the summer of 1857 when the preparations
for elections were in progress:
The essential matter for us, even more, the only objective that we have in view,
is the free and frank expression of the wishes of the country. The question of
union, as every other political question, is for the moment outside the sphere
of our preoccupations. But if anyone uses any means whatsoever to influence
the expression of the wishes of the country in one sense or another, for or
against the idea of union, we should watch out for it with the same solicitude,
the same impartiality. One should not suppose us favorable to union because
we protest against the abuses brought into play in order to stifle that wish.10
The Russian government was also most eager to see the election
proceed in a correct and orderly fashion. T h e principal concern was
lest the radical elements cause disorders that would provide a pretext
for the powers, notably the Habsburg Empire and the Porte, to inter-
vene. The Russian agents were told to emphasize to the Romanians that
nothing would be more detrimental than to provide the occasion for a
collective intervention, or even to impose on the powers the obligation
to intervene.
The Russian government was fully informed of the general desire
for union and a foreign prince. Although Basily was personally con-
servative and distrustful of the "men of 1848," he made no attempt to
oppose their cause, and his reports reflected faithfully the national de-
sires. For instance, he wrote in April 1857 that Safvet had argued that
only about a thousand were unionist. Basily, in expressing his disagree-
ment, commented that certainly there were few leaders: the number
does not go beyond several hundred in this country, but that of the convinced
and the converted rises perhaps to a hundred thousand. I do not say that the
masses are aroused; the intellectual state of the masses in the Principalities is
known. But men capable of thinking and acting, the mass of the boyars and
the bourgeoise, are avowed partisans of union.11
The idea of union, Basily believed, was closely connected with that of a
foreign prince. Few thought that the system would work under a native
 The European guardianship
ruler, since he could not provide the necessary stability or prestige.
Basily, of course, followed his instructions to cooperate with Talley-
rand, whose government similarly supported free elections and the
right of the divans to express their opinions. However, by this time
the French agents were urging their partisans to work only for union,
since a foreign prince would arouse too much opposition among the
powers. The Sardinian and Prussian commissioners backed their French
and Russian colleagues. As previously, the Austrian and Ottoman rep-
resentatives took a strongly antiunionist stand. Their position was
strengthened exceedingly when the British adopted a similar attitude.
Although, as we have seen, the British representatives at the Congress
of Paris had sided with France on the question of union, they now aban-
doned this stand. For Britain the major consideration would always
be whether union would or would not be beneficial to British policy
in the Near East. The firm support of Ottoman integrity was, as before,
occasioned by the belief that the empire must be maintained as a bar-
rier against further Russian advances in the Balkans. The French gov-
ernment had previously argued that the United Principalities would
play a similar but even more effective role. However, after further con-
sideration, the British leaders came to a negative decision. In July
1856 Lord Palmerston commented: "The united principalities would
be a field for Russian intrigue and not a barrier against Russia."12
After this month the British representatives were instructed to oppose
union by all legal means. British policy therefore continued in the Cri-
mean tradition. The union was seen as a weakening of the Ottoman
Empire's control and thus of its ability to withstand Russian pressure.
The separation of the provinces appeared necessary to secure the British
objectives.
As we have seen, the best hope for the powers who opposed union lay
in Moldavia. If a negative return could be gained there, a unionist
majority in Wallachia would have no significance. Repeated protests
were delivered to the commissioners on the electoral proceedings. In
May all of them except Basily, who saw little to gain from the trip,
visited Jassy. Despite the continuing controversy, preparations for
the elections continued. In June the initial electoral lists for Mol-
davia were ready. Their composition assured a separatist victory. Al-
though many unionist sympathizers were inscribed, a majority for their
opponents was guaranteed. The names had been carefully selected. As
one Romanian historian wrote:
Of 2,000 great proprietors in Moldavia, they [the lists] contained the names of
only 350; of the 20,000 or more small proprietors, they had inscribed only
2,264. Among the electors of the cities one had found to register in the whole
79
 Russia and the Romanian national state
state of Moldavia only 11 persons who exercised the liberal professions. In all
the lists were comprised of [but] 4,658 electors of the upper classes instead of
40,000 which they should have contained.13
According to the firman, thirty days were to elapse before the elections
could be held. Unionist protests flooded the friendly consulates in
Jassy. In Constantinople, on French initiative, the four ambassadors on
June 13/25 delivered a note of protest to the Porte, warning that it
would not be in keeping "with the dignity of the commission . . . to
put itself in touch with a Divan, which will not be composed in a man-
ner to be able to pass for the true expression of the wishes and needs of
the country, and which will respond so badly to the intentions of the
Congress of Paris in that regard."14 In the commission Basily on June
20/July 2 proposed that Vogoride be censured, but the move was op-
posed by Bulwer, Liehmann, and Safvet.15
Caught between the opposing pressures of the powers, and itself
against union, the Porte hesitated. Finally, after a delay of eight days
in the scheduled date, the elections commenced on July 7/19 and
continued for three days. The Moldavian unionists, in protest against
the situation, simply stayed away from the polls. As a consequence, of
the 193 priests on the lists, only 17 voted; of the 465 electors chosen from
the great landowners, only 207 appeared.16 Thus the fraudulent elec-
toral procedures had not fulfilled the intentions of the separatist caima-
cam. Although the separatists did win the elections in a technical sense,
the divan chosen in this manner could not be regarded as a true expres-
sion of the wishes of the population.
An immediate international crisis followed. In Bucharest the four
commissioners announced their refusal to accept an assembly elected
under these circumstances. The meetings of the commission were sus-
pended, and attention was focused on Constantinople. There Thou-
venel, supported by his three colleagues, demanded the annulment of
the elections. Although the Porte refused to act on its own authority,
it did agree to delay the convening of the Moldavian divan until the
powers had come to an agreement. The lines were drawn: Britain and
Austria opposed an annulment; the other four powers demanded it.
With this division of France from Britain and Austria, a major Russian
aim - the breaking of the Crimean coalition - appeared to have been
achieved. Gorchakov made a great effort to impress on France the extent
of the Russian support. He directed Victor Petrovich Balabin, the Rus-
sian charge in Paris, to ask Walewski what
the French cabinet expects to do on this occasion. Our opinion is formed. But,
desiring to conserve a perfect accord with the French government, we will de-
lay the official and final announcement in order to come to an understanding
80
 The European guardianship
with it, for certainly its dignity is more at stake than ours. M. de Thouvenel
has been in the forefront of the entire discussion of this affair. The challenge
has been openly made by Lord Redcliffe and M. Prokesch, and the diplomats
as well as the public of Constantinople are watching to see who will prevail.
On such things local respect and rightful influence in the Orient depend in a
large part.17

Balabin was further instructed to assure Walewski of full Russian

support, and similar directions were sent to Butenev in Constantinople.
When the Porte did not annul the elections, the French, Russian, Prus-
sian, and Sardinian governments broke relations. Despite this apparent
shattering of the British-French entente of the previous years, the ex-
perienced Russian ambassador in Paris, Kiselev, who had already
played such a major role in Romanian affairs, had few illusions. On
June 24/July 6 he wrote to Gorchakov that he did not think that
Napoleon III would break his ties with Britain. His views were to prove
prophetic.18
Indeed, Napoleon III, for both external and internal policy, could
not afford to end the British alignment. Among the nationalities com-
peting for his favor, the Italians rather than the Romanians held his
major interest. He could not antagonize the greatest sea power and
hope to achieve a political success in the Italian peninsula. French
economic concerns also dictated cooperation with Britain. Moreover,
this part of the emperor's policy was not supported by other French
diplomats. For instance, despite his dislike of Redcliffe, Thouvenel
favored working with Britain. There was, in addition, a question
whether union was the best policy for France and whether a foreign
prince would not simply introduce more problems into the Romanian
situation.
As a result of these hesitations, the basis for a compromise was set.
A meeting held at Osborne in August was attended by Napoleon III,
Queen Victoria, and their principal ministers and ambassadors. An
understanding was reached in which Britain agreed to the French desire
for the annulment of the Moldavian elections; in return, France backed
down on the question of union. A British memorandum on the bargain
stated: "It is agreed to be desirable that the two Provinces should have
similar organic institutions, and that while retaining their separate
Governments, they should have a common system in regard to all mat-
ters civil and military to which such a community of system can ad-
vantageously be established/'19 This highly ambiguous wording was
open to many interpretations, but it was clear that Napoleon had
abandoned his support of union as well as the idea of the nomination
of a foreign prince. Moreover, both France and Britain had violated
81
 Russia and the Romanian national state
the spirit of the Treaty of Paris in that they had prejudged the question
of the future of the Principalities. Although previously neither power
had wished to limit the right of divans to discuss unification, they now
acted in a manner to assure that such an objective could not be put
into practice. The two powers in secret session decided the main issue on
which the election campaigns in the Principalities were based. How-
ever, because of the secrecy of the proceedings, only the British con-
cession on the annulment of the elections became immediately known.
It thus appeared on the surface as if Napoleon III had won a diplomatic
victory; his retreat on the major question remained concealed.
Not only did the French government reverse its position, but it did
not inform Russia about the shift. The Russian attitude, it will be
recalled, favored not union, but the assurance of the right of the Prin-
cipalities to express their wishes through free elections. The final de-
cision would be made by the representatives of the powers in confer-
ence after the proper procedures, as dictated by the treaty, had been
followed. The Osborne agreement, of course, meant that such a course
of action would not be adopted. Given the diplomatic balance of the
time, the major issue had already been settled. The holding of the elec-
tions was thus in fact a futile exercise.
Despite the French concessions, Walewski, in discussing the Osborne
meeting with Balabin, stated that Napoleon III had rejected British
attempts to negotiate separately. Rumors, however, soon reached St.
Petersburg from both British and Austrian sources that Napoleon had
renounced union. The concern that this ambiguous situation aroused
in St. Petersburg is reflected in the letters of Gorchakov to Balabin at
this time. In recounting a conversation with the French diplomat
Charles Baudin, Gorchakov wrote that he told him:
The newspapers . . . are full of allusions to the concessions that the Emperor
Napoleon made at Osborne, and they assume that the result was reached only
as a result of a compromise. Redcliffe has gone further. He expressly hinted
to the Porte that Emperor Napoleon had explicitly renounced union at Os-
borne. Austria supports the same version in less ostensible ways. Emperor Na-
poleon . . . had certainly the right to renounce union. We would not have been
justified in showing surprise about this subject, even less in raising any objec-
tion whatsoever. But then he should have told us and above all he should not
have instructed his minister to tell us the contrary. But, we have full confidence
in the loyalty of Emperor Napoleon, we do not call into question the perfect
accuracy of the communications that he has made to us.
In this letter Gorchakov also admitted that he believed that something
more had been conceded at Osborne than had been announced. If
this were true, it would be a warning for the future. It would be par-
ticularly bad, Gorchakov believed, if, at a time when a meeting was
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 The European guardianship
scheduled between Napoleon III and Alexander II, the French emperor
"concealed from us the knowledge of his acts bearing upon a question
on which we have given him the most loyal cooperation, and if, what
would be even worse and which I refuse to believe, the French govern-
ment has knowingly misled us on the significance of the engagements
made at Osborne."m
When the two rulers, accompanied by their foreign ministers, met
at Stuttgart on September 13 / 25, the question of the Principalities was
discussed, but the French statesmen maintained their silence on the
Osborne bargain. Gorchakov at this time repeated the Russian position
that no decision on union would be taken until the divans had made
their opinions known. On the question of a foreign prince, the Russian
minister declared that the tsar would not accept a ruler who was not
Orthodox and that he would also not allow a Russian prince to take the
position. Walewski gained the impression from these discussions that
Russia opposed union. The Russian desire to work with France and the
willingness to back any French proposal was, however, again repeated.
With France and Britain in basic agreement, the crisis over the Prin-
cipalities came to an end. The Habsburg government, if not the Rus-
sian, was informed of the settlement. Redcliffe and Prokesch together
advised the Porte to annul the Moldavian elections. Once this was
accomplished the four powers resumed their diplomatic relations with
the Ottoman Empire. The International Commission again carried on
its functions in Bucharest. Elections then proceeded in both provinces.
Those held on September 8/20 in Moldavia, on the basis of revised
lists and with the cooperation of Vogoride, returned a clear mandate
for union. Of the eighty-seven deputies elected, sixty-six were unionist,
six were separatist, and fifteen were peasants who would probably sup-
port union.21 The unionists also won in Wallachia, but the predomi-
nant aspect of that election was the split of the delegates into §tirbei
and Bibescu factions. Among the Liberals the victory went to the radi-
cals and the recently returned emigres, rather than to the moderates.22
Once called into session, the assemblies proceeded as could be ex-
pected. The Moldavian divan opened on September 22/October 4. On
October 7/19 it voted a program of five points, including union, a
foreign prince, autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty, a representative
government, and neutrality. The Wallachian deputies, meeting first
on September 30/October 12, adopted an almost identical program
on October 8/20. Autonomy, union, a foreign prince, and representa-
tive institutions were thus the clear wish of the Romanian people as
expressed by the divans. The powers had the answer to the question
they had originally asked. After adopting its program the Wallachian

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 Russia and the Romanian national state
assembly suspended its sessions until the great powers should come to
a decision on the demands. The Moldavian divan, in contrast, con-
tinued its discussions. The representatives did not limit their debates
to questions concerning future political institutions, but also dealt
with controversial social questions. At the beginning of 1858 the Otto-
man government declared both assemblies dissolved, since they had
accomplished their basic functions. The International Commission
then proceeded to draw up its report, which was completed on March
26/April 7. The wishes of the Romanian population had been deter-
mined; the powers now had to meet to reach a final decision.
During this period the instructions to the Russian agents remained
the same. They were to limit their statements to generalities, advise
moderation, and secure the execution of the regulations for the elections
as set down in the firman. Disorders that could lead to a military oc-
cupation had to be avoided. The second round of elections caused no
complaints as far as procedure was concerned. Vogoride, it was recog-
nized, acted in a correct manner. Despite the satisfaction with the con-
ditions of the election, Basily was most concerned about the radical
composition of the assemblies, whose membership he regarded as hav-
ing an anarchical spirit.23 He did not like the prominent position won
by the former leaders of the revolution of 1848, who, it will be re-
membered, had returned to Wallachia in 1857. They were obviously
popular with the electorate and they were able, he believed, to intimi-
date the moderates. At the time of their arrival he had expressed his
suspicions that the Porte, on British urging, had authorized their return
with the hope that they would cause so much disorder that a military
intervention would be justified. He was also extremely disturbed by the
debates in the Moldavian assembly and by the discussions of social
questions, in particular the relations of the peasants and the land-
owners.
Despite his concerns over these matters Basily in his reports to his
government expressed clearly the obvious desire of the Romanians for
union and a foreign prince. Sympathetic to the nationalist position,
Basily argued that union was not possible without a foreign prince, who
could provide the stability and strength needed by the country. The
dangers of an elective native prince had been demonstrated in the past.
The Russian agent advised his government not to oppose an idea which
is that "of the masses as well as the intelligent classes."24
With the completion of the work of the divans and the International
Commission, the final decision rested in the hands of the powers. The
Russian position on union and a foreign prince had to be clearly stated.
For the formulation of Russian policy in regard to the Principalities
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the important views were, of course, those of Alexander II, Gorchakov,
and Kiselev. The opinions of Kiselev, who was regarded as the main
Russian expert on the Principalities, had great influence. An exchange
of letters between Gorchakov and Kiselev, with the tsar's comments,
shows the ideas of these statesmen.25 This correspondence clearly re-
veals the concern felt over the political instability in the region and the
dangers to be faced should a representative government be established
in a state directly adjacent to Russia. The Principalities could become a
center of unrest and contribute to Polish rebellion. Certainly, in theory,
the separation of the provinces had many advantages for Russian
policy. Nevertheless, it was the opposing considerations that took
precedence. Obviously, a success of the separatists would serve only to
strengthen the influence of Austria, the Porte, and Britain at the expense
of Russia and France. Moreover, the Russian government did not want
to take a position contrary to that of France. It must be remembered
that the Osborne decisions were not known in St. Petersburg. Finally,
the Russian diplomats, in particular Kiselev, did not want to oppose
the wishes of the Romanian population without a good cause.
With this general agreement on union, there remained the problem
of how this solution could be implemented. Both Alexander II and
Kiselev opposed the nomination of a foreign prince. Any candidate
would necessarily come from a Western, non-Orthodox family, since
Russia could provide no suitable choices. He would probably be either
French or pro-French; in any case he would not be oriented toward
St. Petersburg. Under the circumstances the best alternative appeared
the nomination of a native prince to rule over the united provinces.
Kiselev wished him to be given a life or even a hereditary appointment.
It should be emphasized that the Russian diplomats considered that any
settlement reached at this time would be only temporary. The purpose
was to postpone a final regulation of the affairs of the provinces until
Russia had regained its military strength and could exert a stronger
influence. The Russian officials believed that the rivalry within the
Principalities would keep any government weak, a situation that was
considered an advantage to Russian policy. Union under a native
prince was thus favored as a temporary expedient. It would allow
Russia to stand by its declarations at the Paris conference of 1856; it
would win favor among the Romanians; and it would maintain good
relations with France. The Russian government also believed that the
majority of the powers would oppose a foreign prince.
The conference opened in May 1858 with the ambassadors of the
powers in Paris serving as the representatives for their countries: Hub-
ner for Austria, Hatzfeldt for Prussia, Villamarina for Sardinia, Cowley

85
 Russia and the Romanian national state
for Britain, and Kiselev for Russia.26 Fuad Pasha came from Constanti-
nople for his government. Walewski served as president of the confer-
ence, and again he was closely instructed by Napoleon III. The dele-
gates immediately decided on secrecy for their proceedings. During
the subsequent discussions Kiselev did not play a leading role on most
questions. Before the opening he had been informed of the Osborne
decisions by Walewski. He was surprised, and he did not think the
French alternate plan, which was soon to be introduced, would con-
tribute to the tranquility of the area.
During the discussions the main issue was, of course, the political
organization of the Principalities. However, the chief dispute was
to arise from the relatively minor issue of the flag. Of the powers
France was obviously in the most difficult position. Previously the
chief advocate of union and a foreign prince, the French govern-
ment had to back down on both issues. In the attempt to achieve a
solution as close to union as possible, Walewski sponsored a plan
that would have brought about a form of legislative unification. He
suggested that two hospodars and two assemblies be chosen, but that
a central commission with real powers be established, composed of nine
members from each assembly. This body would be empowered to make
laws of interest for both principalities. It would also approve the laws
passed by the separate assemblies and have a role in the preparation of
the budgets for both provinces. The reaction to this proposal was as
might be expected. Hiibner and Fuad opposed anything approaching
union; Kiselev stood by France. Cowley, while accepting some measures
to assimilate administrative institutions, believed that the French
plan went too far. The opposition finally triumphed. As will be shown,
a central commission did form part of the final agreement, but its
powers were limited.
Whereas agreement was reached on this point, the conference almost
broke up on the question of the commonflag.Although Austria and the
Ottoman Empire accepted the name "the United Principalities" when
on the British suggestion the words "of Moldavia and Wallachia" were
added, the flag was to be another matter. It was a question on which
the Habsburg Monarchy would not yield; such a symbol of Romanian
unity would have an effect on its Romanian population. During these
discussions both the Austrian and the French delegates threatened to
leave. Many alternatives were suggested; for instance, a crescent could
be added to the flag indicating Ottoman suzerainty. Both Walewski
and Kiselev objected to this; Kiselev indicated the problem of attach-
ing a Moslem emblem to the flag of a Christian country. Napoleon III,
who had yielded so much on the matter of the organization of the
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provinces, proved very stubborn on this issue. Hiibner too declared
that Austria would leave rather than back down. When consulted by
the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Gorchakov agreed to support
France, but believed that it might be well to yield on form. A sugges-
tion by Prussia that the two militias when united could use the same
standards, but separate flags, was also turned down. After long argu-
ments the matter was finally settled when Austria agreed that the two
separate flags would fly on two poles, but that a common blue pennant
could be attached to each.
Although Kiselev did not play the leading role in these debates, he
did take the initiative on the question of the autonomous rights of
the Principalities. It should first be mentioned that both France and
Russia were concerned about public opinion in the Principalities.
During the first meeting of the conference Walewski made a plea for
union and a foreign prince, although his government had already in
fact abandoned the idea and his new plan called for neither. Similarly,
Kiselev spoke in favor of the national solution despite the fact that his
declarations were outside his official instructions and he knew very well
that the powers would not accept this solution. In the conference
Kiselev introduced a memorandum whose objective was to define the
relationship among the Porte, the Principalities, and the guarantor
powers. His arguments had influence on the final agreement in that in
Article 2 the rights of the Principalities received a more precise defini-
tion. Moreover, again according to a Kiselev proposal, the payment for-
merly made to the Porte at the investiture of a prince was abolished
and the tribute increased. The sum was fixed at 1 million piasters for
Moldavia and 2 million piasters for Wallachia. In the conference Kis-
elev also argued that the Principalities should be allowed certain ad-
ditional rights. For instance, he proposed that the stipulations of
commercial treaties contracted between the powers and the Porte should
not apply to the Principalities without their consent. He also brought
up the question of consular jurisdiction and the Dedicated Monasteries.
The final convention, signed on August 7/19, was a document of
fifty articles, of which only the most significant for the future are sum-
marized here.27 The document established a government for the Prin-
cipalities with parallel but separate institutions: two governors, two as-
semblies, and two separate administrations. A Central Commission,
with limited functions, was to be composed of sixteen delegates, eight
from each principality, chosen by the prince from the assemblies or
from the ranks of the high officials. The commission could prepare
laws of a common interest to both provinces - for example, concerning
matters such as the tariff union, the post, and the telegraph. These
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
would then be submitted through the prince to the assemblies. The
commission was also to work on the codification of the laws and a re-
vision of the Organic Statutes. The regulations, except where they had
been replaced by the August convention, were thus recognized as being
still in force. The princes were to be elected for life by assemblies
chosen on a very restricted franchise; they were to be invested by the
sultan.
The Principalities remained, of course, under Ottoman suzerainty.
This relationship had been reduced to little more than a nominal
control of the foreign relations of the provinces and the payment of
tribute. As before, the Ottoman government had no means of enforc-
ing its decisions. Despite efforts to change the limitation, the Ottoman
armies, according to Article 8, could still enter the Principalities only
with the consent of the guarantor states.28 It was recognized that this
could be obtained only under highly unusual circumstances. The Rus-
sian government continued to react strongly on this question: matters
of Russian security would be involved if the Ottoman armies were able
to occupy the neighboring provinces easily.
For the future another section of the treaty was to have great sig-
nificance. Article 46 covered both civil rights and the peasant question.
All Moldavians and Wallachians were declared equal before the law,
in taxation, and in the right to hold public office in both provinces;
other individual liberties were guaranteed. In addition, Romanian
nationals "of all the Christian rites" were to "enjoy political rights
equally/' Similar conditions were to be extended to the other religions
by legislation in the future. These stipulations, while maintaining re-
strictions in particular on the Jews, did formally abolish previous
special privileges held by certain sectors of Romanian society. The final
section of this article dealt with the most controversial internal ques-
tion - peasant emancipation - and stated: "The revision of the law
which regulates the relations of the landlords with the farmers will be
undertaken without undue delay with a view to improving the condi-
tion of the peasants."29
The Russian government had every reason to be satisfied with the
agreement as a whole. As we have seen, union had been accepted
because it was believed to be the solution favored by France and by
most Romanians. Separation, however, still had its advantages. The
conference had also given the Russian delegate an opportunity to talk
about autonomy and even to speak in favor of union and a foreign
prince. Support had been ostentatiously given to France. Russia thus
received the settlement that conformed to its best interests, but its lead-

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ers could also claim credit for backing the position preferred by the
French government and the Principalities.
The terms now had to be applied, and here difficulties could obvious-
ly arise. Most important, the convention called for another round of
elections. Even though the franchise was still extremely limited, the
most active political group remained the Liberals, and among them,
the leaders were the men of 1848. The emigres had returned; the pre-
vious elections had shown their strength. The danger persisted that their
victory, even in separate principalities, would result in the establish-
ment of political units that could have a dangerous effect on conditions
within Russia. The Polish connection remained a source of extreme
anxiety. To avoid unfavorable complications, the Russian policy be-
came the strict enforcement of the treaty stipulations, which seemed
the best means of maintaining the status quo in the area and preventing
a complete radical victory. The Russian government was fully aware
that the Romanian nationalists had no sympathy for Russia or for the
past regime of the protectorate. The only Russian partisans were some
large landowners, from whose ranks the separatists usually came and
who had enjoyed a favorable position under the protectorate. The
higher clergy also had connections with Russian Orthodoxy. Both of
these elements in Romanian society were, however, declining in politi-
cal influence. Even in the church, the majority of the clergy were na-
tionalist in sympathy.
The closest ties between Russia and the Principalities lay, now as in
the past, in the relationship of members of the Russian and the Ro-
manian aristocracy. As we have seen, Romanians had won high posi-
tions in the Russian service. Further, some families were closely con-
nected by marriage. The period provides excellent examples. After the
tsar, Gorchakov was, of course, most influential in the formulation of
Russian policy in regard to the Principalities, and he certainly had in-
timate ties with the area. Not only was his sister married to George
Cantacuzino, a Moldavian large landowner, but his second son married
a daughter of Michael Sturdza. In addition, in September 1858 Nicho-
las Giers, who had been in the Principalities in the 1840s and 1850s,
returned as consul-general.30 In 1848 he had married George Can-
tacuzino's daughter, Olga, and thus Gorchakov was the uncle of Giers's
wife. There were other similar marriage alliances. In every case the re-
lationship was with those sections of Romanian society which were con-
servative, if not always separatist. The Russian diplomats, with some ex-
ceptions, were bound to see Romanian questions through the eyes of
those with whom they had the closest personal ties.
 Russia and the Romanian national state
After the convention was concluded Gorchakov sent to his agents a
general instruction on the attitude to be adopted toward the Principali-
ties. As was usual in his directives, the tone was lofty and the measures
advised were expressed in vague and cloudy terminology. The main
emphasis in his dispatch was that, though Russia did not seek domina-
tion or an exclusive interest in the provinces, great care was to be taken
to assure that no other state acquired this position. The Russian gov-
ernment wished the Principalities to keep the autonomous rights they
had gained and to remain a neutral country under great-power guar-
antee. For this a strict execution of the treaty stipulations was neces-
sary. Although the treaties had been framed in an anti-Russian sense,
they would guard against changes in an unfavorable direction. There-
fore the Russian agents should attempt to influence Romanian public
opinion and the political leaders to abide by the international agree-
ments. They should concentrate on consolidating the advantages they
had won. Particular warning should be given against disorders at the
time of the elections; these could bring foreign intervention. Dis-
turbances would show the powers that conditions in the Principalities
were unstable and that "their independent and national administra-
tion is not compatible with the existence of the Ottoman Empire."
The emphasis was thus to be on the maintenance of the political status
quo. Although the Russian role was not to be completely passive, Rus-
sian agents were instructed not to enter into intrigues. Russia had
"neither candidates to bring forward, nor individuals to protect." The
Russian government would support those who respected "the legally
established conditions with the aim of order, improvements and prog-
ress" in maintaining them.31
As far as the other powers were concerned, the Russian diplomats,
as before, were to watch with care both Austrian and Ottoman activi-
ties. The Habsburg Monarchy, it was stated, continued to base its dom-
ination on its economic influence and on the abuse of consular jurisdic-
tion. In relation to the Porte, the Russian consuls were to guard against
any Ottoman intervention that passed beyond the limits of the treaties,
such as an arbitrary interpretation of the election rules or interference
in the elections. Strong emphasis was placed on relations with France:
As for France, the entente established between that power and Russia and con-
secrated last year at Stuttgart by a loyal exchange of ideas and friendly assur-
ances between the two August Sovereign has principally taken shape in the re-
gion of the East. It has for a starting point the circular [dispatch] addressed by
the two governments to their agents in Turkey and which requires them to
avoid any struggle for influence between themselves, above all in religious
questions, and to proceed as mudi as possible in paths of complete accord. It
has developed in the diverse incidents which have arisen since then and today
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it is the gage for the maintenance of peace, the security of the Christian popula-
tions, and the political influence of the two governments in the East.32
The Russian representatives were further directed to cooperate closely
with their French colleagues.
These instructions, vague as they were, called for the maintenance
of the status quo established by the treaties, cooperation with France,
and enmity to Austria. This policy was, of course, a reflection of the
course of action adopted in all European affairs at the time. The Rus-
sian government did not want more crises to develop until its military
reorganization was complete; revenge against Vienna remained a con-
stant element in its plans. The dispatch, nevertheless, was open to
various interpretations concerning its implementation. In fact, the two
main Russian representatives in the Principalities, Giers in Bucharest
and Popov in Jassy, worked in directions that were different if not in
actual conflict.33 Giers gave his support to the moderate conservative
position and emphasized a strict adherence to the convention. He
worked closely with his French counterpart, Louis Beclard. In Jassy
Popov took a far more active position. Attracted to the unionist cause,
he became violently anti-Austrian and expressed an extreme dislike of
Michael Sturdza. He cooperated with his frankly and openly unionist
French colleague, Victor Place. Both diplomats were to be cautioned
by their governments on their attitude.
When the convention became known in the Principalities, few were
content. As Popov wrote: "The effect that it has produced here is not
very satisfactory; no one I know is satisfied with it; neither the friends
of the old system nor the so-called progressives, these because they had
counted on a more liberal constitution, the others because privileges
have been abolished."34
Although union remained the predominant desire of the politically
aware, the franchise established by the convention gave the advantage
to the Conservatives, if they remained together. The problem here was
that they could not. Since the Conservative program was essentially the
maintenance of the status quo, both politically and socially, there ex-
isted no real basis for organization for the achievement of a positive
goal. The right in Romanian politics thus splintered into factions
supporting a multitude of candidates for the hospodarship, all in bitter
enmity to each other. The Liberals, as we have seen, did have a definite
goal in union and a foreign prince. They were also closely connected
through political clubs, an active correspondence among the leaders in
both provinces, and a partisan press. They knew what they wanted,
and they had a framework of political organization far more developed
and sophisticated than their opponents. Their strength was in their
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
program; their weakness was the fact that they did not have a single
candidate in either principality around whom they could all gather as
the symbol of their cause. Like the Conservative, the Liberal camp was
divided into competitive factions backing individuals who were seeking
the top positions. There was also some disagreement on tactics. Since
the electoral laws seemed to preclude a victory through legal means,
some thought of revolutionary action. Others favored a declaration of
union and a foreign prince either within or without the new assemblies.
Finally, however, there was general agreement that it would be best to
work within the convention stipulations and to try to elect a unionist
assembly, even though it was recognized that it would be very difficult
under the circumstances.
Again, as in the previous elections, the question who would run the
interim government was of vital concern for both sides.35 As before,
the men in control could dominate the prefects and the courts and
have the final say on the composition of the electoral lists. In Paris
the powers had decided that the government would be in the hands of
new caimacamies made up of the three principal ministers of the last
reigning hospodars. The positions were taken in Wallachia by I. Manu,
E. Baleanu, and I. A. Filipescu; in Moldavia by A. Panu, Vasile Sturdza,
and §. Catargiu. This decision was bound to cause difficulties, since it
brought about a complete change of direction in both administrations.
The new regimes were the avowed opponents of their predecessors, and
mass dismissals of officials commenced at once. Moreover, it soon be-
came apparent that in both provinces the caimacamies were severely
divided within themselves. Two questions had to be solved at once.
First, would the caimacams resume their former ministerial posts?
This question had major significance because of the very important role
of the Ministry of Interior in any election. It was agreed that the former
positions would be retained. Second, would the caimacamie make de-
cisions by majority rule, or did all three members have to agree unani-
mously? This decision was to split in particular the Moldavian govern-
ment and to endanger the election. In fact, the major controversies
centered in this province.
As in the previous campaign a multitude of candidates emerged to
dispute the Moldavian hospodarship. The change of administration
was a particular blow to Vogoride, who nevertheless remained a candi-
date, along with Costin Catargiu, T. Bal§, V. Ghica, and others. The
chief rivals, however, were Michael Sturdza and his son Gregory. As
before, Michael Sturdza was the choice of most conservatives. Very
rich, he was willing to use his money to win the office. He had returned
to Moldavia after many years abroad, spent mostly in France. He at-

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tracted those who were against peasant reform and the separatists. At
this time he was also the preferred candidate of Austria and the Otto-
man Empire. In contrast, his son was less conservative; he favored grad-
ual reform, and he was not against union. Gregory Sturdza won the sup-
port of some unionists who did not like the social and political programs
associated with the more radical Liberals. The Russian agents opposed
his candidacy.
Dissensions marred the actions of the Moldavian caimacamie from
its inception. Of the members, Panu and Sturdza were inclined toward
union; §. Catargiu was a conservative who acted in the interest of the
separatists. Since it was decided that the caimacams would resume their
former offices, Catargiu controlled the vital Ministry of Interior. The
question of appointments came up at once. The two unionists wanted
an immediate widespread dismissal of the officials who had served under
the previous administration, whereas Catargiu was willing to keep the
Vogoride appointments. However, it had also been decided that within
the caimacamie decisions would be taken by majority rule. A situation
was thus created that could easily lead to a crisis in the government.
The break in the caimacamie came over two issues in particular.
By a two-to-one vote the control over the press was ended. Liberal pa-
pers were again able to publish, a distinct advantage for the unionists.
The major controversy, however, came over the question of appoint-
ments. The two majority members, proceeding with a cleanout of the
administration, soon quarreled sharply with Catargiu over the choice
of new prefects, who would be responsible for drawing up the election
lists and who were, of course, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Interior. Overruled in the voting, Catargiu left the meetings. His col-
leagues then went ahead and made the appointments themselves. Par-
ticularly controversial was their choice of A. Teriachi as director of the
Ministry of Interior, an act that was a direct challenge to their col-
league. In reply, Catargiu appealed to the Porte to intervene. The Otto-
man government acted through Afif Bey, who had been sent to Jassy to
communicate the firman on the election. Catargiu cooperated closely
not only with Afif, but also with the Austrian consul, Godel. The cai-
macams for their part would not negotiate with Afif, who they claimed
was an official Ottoman agent and whose real mission had ended with
the delivery of the firman. The telegraph office refused to accept his
cipher telegrams.
Having absolutely no means of enforcing its decisions, the Porte
turned to the other powers. On November 15/27 the ambassadors in
Constantinople met at the British embassy. They were in agreement
that the two caimacams should be warned about their actions and their

93
 Russia and the Romanian national state
attitude toward the Porte. Decisions could be made by the majority,
but special account should be taken in making appointments of the
opinion of the caimacam whose department was affected. The represen-
tatives also thought that the caimacams were exceeding their assigned
duties in some of the measures they had taken, for instance, in regard
to the press. This diplomatic intervention accomplished nothing. The
Ottoman government considered suspending the elections, but it re-
ceived no support from the powers. The recalling of the conference of
Paris was also discussed, but here again no agreement could be reached.
Austria felt reluctant to attend an international meeting in which it
would be in the minority.
As the election approached, the situation in Jassy continued to de-
teriorate. The two caimacams had been willing to change some of the
officials whom they had appointed, but Catargiu wanted all of his
choices to be accepted. Finally, the majority dismissed Catargiu. Even
though the election had thus been to a degree compromised in Mol-
davia, the situation was very favorable for the unionists. The caimacams
had interpreted the restrictive electoral rules in a manner that made
the maximum number eligible to vote. The larger the electorate, of
course, the more opportunity the unionists had to win.
The quarrel among the caimacams had deeply involved the foreign
consulates. As has been mentioned, Godel had again collaborated with
the separatists and had favored Catargiu. Victor Place energetically
backed the majority decisions. Although Popov had been instructed to
refrain from partisan activity, he enthusiastically supported his French
colleague's position. His particular villain became Michael Sturdza.
Aware that his instructions forbade him to take a partisan position, he
nevertheless argued that it was necessary
to defend legality and the rights of the country just as energetically as our
friends the French. I agree that we should avoid complications; but if the
Turko-Austrians all want them - and that is evident - what can we do? We
must accept the situation on a day to day basis. While waiting let us try to dis-
rupt their intrigues by the firmness of our attitude and the invariability of our
principals.36
Popov was chiefly concerned about Austrian activities. He queried
Giers whether it was proper that they should yield to Austria and
abandon the Russian role "of defenders of right, of autonomy and of
nationality."37
Popov's partisan stand aroused not only Austrian and Turkish dis-
pleasure, but also that of his superiors. Shortly before the election
Aleksei Borisovich Lobanov-Rostovskii, who was the Russian charge^
in Constantinople, wrote Giers:

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The Turks complain of the too dogmatic attitude of Popov; it is said that he
is completely under the influence of (sous la pantoufle de) Place. On the other
side, I received an indirect complaint from Michael Sturdza, who is equally dis-
appointed that Popov refutes him openly. Sturdza, according to the news that
one has here, appears to have little chance to succeed; that is true; but still that
is no reason to burn our ships completely in case he becomes hospodar. In his
report Popov lays stress above all on the immorality of Sturdza; but what has
that to do with us? These are certainly not models of virtue that one has before
one's eyes and that one looks for in the East; however that does not stop one
from carrying on business with the people in office and not rejecting those who
have a chance of coming to power. As to the relations of Popov with Place, it
seems to me that they can and should remain intimate, without our consul
seeing only through the perhaps too unionist glasses of his French colleague.38
Although the conflict within the caimacamie was not as serious in
Bucharest as in Jassy, Giers had to deal with many similar problems
in the Wallachian capital. The conservatives there also did not have a
candidate; their votes were divided among §tirbei, Bibescu, and A.
Ghica. As in Moldavia, the new caimacamie as its first act turned to
getting rid of officials appointed by its predecessor. Before leaving office
Ghica had made additional appointments from among his loyal sup-
porters and had raised many officers in rank. Once out of office, feeling
that his chances of victory were extremely diminished, he turned to the
left to try to make an alliance against the two strong Conservative
candidates. The caimacamie itself split in a manner similar to that in
Jassy, but the issues were quite different. Manu and Baleanu were
extreme conservatives; Filipescu, who was minister of justice, was a
moderate. The quarrel among the three centered on the question of
the qualifications for the franchise, with the majority attempting to
limit it as much as possible. A test came over an ordinance that would
have disqualified many members of the middle class, including the lead-
ing Liberal journalist C. A. Rosetti. When the matter was referred to
the courts, the judges, partisans of Ghica, declared the disqualification
void. Their decision was then approved by Filipescu. Despite the
caimacam's influence, the final voting list was very small. The unionists
were therefore in a much weaker position than in Moldavia.
In this quarrel, as well as in that in Moldavia, Giers took a moderate
position. He did not approve of the actions of the Moldavian caima-
camie; he disliked the mass dismissals and the attitude taken toward
Afif Bey. Nor did he accept the interpretation given the electoral law,
because it would have a "great effect on the composition of the future
Moldavian assembly in having enter into it elements which would not
possess the necessary guarantees of order and stability."39 He was thus in
opposition to Panu and Sturdza because he considered them too liberal.
In Wallachia he opposed Manu and Baleanu for the opposite reason:
95
 Russia and the Romanian national state
they were too conservative. Giers's attitude was shared by Beclard; both
held moderate conservative opinions. Beclard, in contrast to Place, dis-
trusted the Liberals, whom he saw as the equivalent of the Jacobins
during the French Revolution.40
Giers's position was thus the support of legality and the observation
of treaties. He wished a tranquil situation to be established and, if
possible, a reconciliation between the parties so that the elections would
not be endangered and the choice of the members of the assembly not
compromised through illegal procedures. The elections would then
have to be annulled, a possibility that, he wrote, "makes me shudder."41
Lobanov followed a similar policy in Constantinople. He did not want
the Porte to interfere in or postpone the elections. The Russian diplo-
mats also feared that disorders might break out at the time of the voting
or that the assemblies would again proclaim union and a foreign prince.
The first elections were held in Moldavia, where the unionists won
thirty-three out of fifty-five seats. The remaining twenty-two places
were divided between the adherents of Michael and Gregory Sturdza.
The Liberals were thus in control, but they could not agree on one
candidate. The names most often mentioned were Vasile Sturdza,
Costache Negri, Lascar Rosetti, Vasile Alecsandri, Lascar Catargiu,
and Peter Mavrogheni. Recognizing that a single name would have to
be selected, the unionists assembled in the Museum of Natural History to
choose their candidate. After much debate, they finally settled on
Alexander loan Cuza, whose name had not been previously considered.
Cuza, who was not at the meeting, was himself surprised at the choice.
When the assembly met on January 5/17, the unionists were able to
win a unanimous vote.
The elections for the Wallachian assembly took place between Jan-
uary 20/February 1 and January 22/February 3. Of the seventy-two
deputies elected, forty-six were conservatives. The liberals C. A. Rosetti,
Vasile Boerescu, and N. Golescu were, however, returned for Bucharest.
With around thirty votes, Bibescu appeared to have the best chance of
winning, but again family rivalry proved fatal. The brothers Bibescu
and §tirbei could not cooperate, and their partisans were willing to vote
with the Liberals rather than switch allegiance. The actions of the
caimacams in restricting the voting had already had a deep effect on
the Liberal leaders. Feeling that they could not win through the bal-
lot, they considered using revolutionary means. Although this action
was rejected, they did employ their superior organizing abilities to
assure mob support to gain their desires. Liberal agitators went among
the Bucharest city population and to outlying villages to stir up the in-
habitants against the Conservative deputies and the caimacams. They

96
 The European guardianship
thus gained a weapon that they could use against their political oppo-
sition. When the assembly opened on January 22/February 3, about
twenty thousand people gathered around the building where the meet-
ing was held.42 Through the three days of the session the Liberals held
control of the crowds; the galleries were also in the hands of their
supporters. It was soon clear that the police and the army could not be
counted on to act against this assembled population. But despite the
advantage thus gained, the Liberals were hampered by the fact that
they had no candidate.
On the night of January 23/February 4-January 24/February 5
the leaders assembled at the Hotel Concordia. During the long discus-
sions the name of Cuza was introduced. Although there had been
previously some talk about the possibility of a double election, this
alternative had been only one of many, taken seriously neither by the
Romanian politicians nor by the foreign representatives. Nevertheless,
it was adopted here as an obvious solution to the problem of the many
Liberal candidacies and the need to win the Conservative deputies by
something more than the threat of the crowds. The national idea and
union, of which Cuza would be the symbol, could be the unifying con-
cept. It must be remembered that many Conservatives were unionists;
their position had often been determined by local political and social
questions and not by opposition to an advance of the national cause.
In a secret session held on January 24/February 5 Boerescu proposed
the name of Cuza; subsequently all sixty-four votes went to this choice.
The double election of Alexander Cuza, perhaps the single major
event in the formation of the Romanian national state, was thus ac-
complished by a unanimous vote of both assemblies. Although a product
of Liberal political organization, the personal union undoubtedly had
wide support. The choice of a compromise candidate who had not
sought the position was perhaps the only possible solution in a cam-
paign where bitter personal rivalries over the office split both the
Conservative and the Liberal camps. In accepting Cuza the assemblies
were emphasizing the fact of union, rather than the man who occupied
the supreme position. He was, nevertheless, a good choice. He had both
administrative and military experience; moreover, he had done nothing
in the past either to arouse antagonism or to win fervent personal sup-
porters. His actions in the future, particularly in regard to the further-
ance of the national interests, would determine his popularity with
the electorate.
Cuza also had the great advantage of being a Romanian candidate.
As we have seen, the protecting powers had all interfered in some part
of the political process. In the weeks before the election, rumors

97
 Russia and the Romanian national state
abounded about which candidate had the support of one or more
guarantor states. Michael Sturdza was regarded as an Austrian man;
§tirbei as the favorite of France. Cuza, in contrast, had incurred no
obligations to any foreign power, and he had no domestic political
debts. He was a Liberal and a unionist, but he had no group or indi-
viduals behind him to whom he owed special favors.
Whether the new prince would be a help or a hindrance to the ac-
complishment of Russian policy in the Balkans was yet to be seen.
Since 1856 the Russian diplomats had been successful in securing the
modest goals set by their government. France had been gained as a
partner in diplomatic affairs, even if its link with Britain had not been
broken. Russian support of Romanian union and the increase of au-
tonomous rights was bound to win favorable opinions in the Princi-
palities and to counteract to some degree the unpopularity left from
the period of the protectorate. The aim of preventing Austria from re-
placing Russia as the major influence had also been achieved; in a
similar manner the Porte was blocked from gaining greater rights of
intervention. In the future the Russian government was to continue
in its policy of supporting the fulfillment of the treaty stipulations and
of maintaining the status quo. Cuza, of course, had broken the spirit
and perhaps the letter of the August convention by accepting the two
offices. However, as we have seen, the Russian leaders had previously
been willing to accept a personal union. Their attitude toward Cuza
would depend on his future actions.
From the Russian viewpoint there were bound to be many disturbing
aspects to Cuza's victory. Treaty stipulations had probably been ig-
nored. The second election had been accomplished by the use of crowds
and electoral tactics that would be open to question under any regime.
Moreover, the chief support for the action had come from radicals whose
political program was strongly opposed by the Russian government. Like
the other powers, Russia had to consider what its attitude should be
toward this new Balkan political disturbance.
 Boundary of Principalities
at the time of the union
5O0-150O meiers above
• sea level

Over 1500 meters above

sea level

CO

The Danubian Principalities, 1859

 CHAPTER III

The Cuza era, 1859-1866

The double election of Alexander Cuza, an action that was in opposition

to the clear intention of the protecting powers, was to bring a profound
change in the relationship of the Principalities and their guardians.
Although the alteration was not at once recognized, from this time
forward Romanian interests were to be represented by a national lead-
ership that rested usually on a strong domestic foundation. Moreover,
although Cuza and his successors were to face continual opposition
from various political opponents, neither these groups nor the princes
themselves were henceforth dependent upon the favor of the Porte or
another outside power. The change in the relationship with Constanti-
nople and St. Petersburg was particularly striking. The subservient posi-
tion of the former hospodars and caimacams contrasted sharply with the
relatively independent stance of the new prince. This condition was
brought about, at least in part, by the able and clever manner with
which Cuza usually handled the great powers.
The new prince, as we have seen, was not well known to the European
representatives.1 He had, nevertheless, previously enjoyed a moderately
successful career in public service and commerce. Born in March 1820
in a Moldavian boyar family, he had received an excellent secondary
and university education in France. While a student in Paris he moved
in the same circles as did the leaders of the revolutions of 1848 whom
we have met before, among others the Golescu brothers and Ion Ghica.
After the completion of his legal studies in 1839, Cuza lived in Galatz,
where he subsequently held judicial and administrative positions; he
also received a commission in the Moldavian militia. Actively involved
in the events of 1848 in Moldavia, he was imprisoned, but he soon es-
caped to spend a brief exile in Transylvania. Returning to Moldavia
101
 Russia and the Romanian national state
in 1849, he continued to hold judicial posts, and he was a prosperous
businessman. His military career also continued to advance. During
the Vogoride administration he rose quickly from second lieutenant to
major in three months, from March to May 1857. Although he was
elected to the Moldavian divan, he did not play an outstanding role in
the deliberations. In August 1858 he was promoted to the rank of col-
onel, and in October he was appointed the acting commander of the
army in Moldavia, a post that he was holding at the time of his election.
This military position, however, did not play a role in his candidacy.
Aged thirty-eight at this time, Cuza thus came to office with experience
in the judicial, administrative, and military aspects of state service. A
compromise candidate, he had at no time previously shown inordinate
ambition or a strong desire for political power.
Despite the moderation of his attitude, Cuza did have certain clear
ideas. He had been a forty-eighter, and he remained true to the basic
ideals of that movement. From the time of his election until his final
overthrow he continued to make it absolutely clear that he regarded
himself only as a temporary ruler. He recognized that the general desire
was not only for union, but also for a foreign prince. He repeatedly
uttered his willingness to retire should such an appointment become
possible. In addition to his liberal inclinations, he was extremely pro-
French and certainly sympathetic to any "latinizing" influences. His at-
tachment to and his genuine affection for France were to be repeatedly
demonstrated. He sought close connections with Napoleon III and saw
this ruler as the patron of Romanian nationalism.

T H E RECOGNITION OF THE DOUBLE ELECTION

The election of Cuza in both principalities, with the apparent violation

of the August convention, reopened the entire issue of the political
future of the country.2 As might be expected, the alignment of the
powers closely resembled that of the previous conference in Paris, with
France as the strongest supporter of Romanian national interests and
Austria and the Porte the principal antagonists. Although the Russian
government, as before, backed the French position, the earlier hesita-
tions and doubts reappeared. In their previous discussions of Romanian
affairs, the Russian diplomats had not shown as much concern over the
possibility of union with a native ruler as over such union with a foreign
prince, but they were nonetheless still the firm defenders of legality in
international relations. They recognized that a question of the inter-
pretation of the treaties was involved, and a conference of the protecting
powers would have to decide the matter.
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
Their first reaction to the event thus showed both a willingness to
accept it and a hesitancy on procedure. When Gorchakov received a
telegram from Giers, dated January 25/February 6, concerning the
Wallachian election, he noted on the form: "I do not find any reason
to protest against this double election." Kiselev and Baron A. F. Bud-
berg, at this time the Russian ambassador in Berlin, reacted in a similar
manner. Budberg considered it the least of the possible evils.3 However,
as in previous episodes involving the Principalities, the Russian govern-
ment adopted a waiting attitude. In a letter to Lobanov of January 26/
February 7 Gorchakov noted that in answer to a query from the French
government, "by order of the Emperor, I replied that we would not
raise any opposition, but that we will wait to learn the opinion of the
other courts/' Explaining his reaction to the question of legality, Gor-
chakov wrote:

Although the convention of August 7/19 does not anticipate explicitly the
eventuality of a double election, it is nevertheless contrary to the spirit of the
Treaty of March 18/30 [1856]. There is, besides, in the convention itself Ar-
ticle 3 which says: "The public powers will be entrusted in each principality
to a hospodar." The powers who wish to invalidate the Wallachian election
will take their stand, not without reason, on this Article 3 as well as on the
Treaty of Paris and we will never act against the law. We act the way we do
today because we do not believe it in our interests to set ourselves up as the
leader at the head of those who pursue the annulment of the Moldavian elec-
tion. Nothing more, nothing less.4

Soon, however, the Russian attitude became more positive. In a con-

versation with the Prussian representative in St. Petersburg, Karl von
Werther, Alexander II expressed his support of the recognition of the
double election, saying that "he had only the tranquility of those lands
in mind, since he himself did not take a further interest in union, for
it was, besides, a measure that had been designed during the war as an
anti-Russian institution."5 On February 9/21 Gorchakov wrote to
Lobanov that the event was now approved. "We support it," he wrote,
"as a measure of urgency, of advisability and of public order, and one
which does not affect the principle of the suzerainty of the Porte."6
As a result of this decision, the Russian position in the negotiations
over the recognition of the double election was similar to that adopted
on previous occasions; support was given to French initiatives in favor
of the Romanian position. Gorchakov instructed Lobanov to cooperate
with the French representative in Constantinople, at this time the
charge d'affaires, Count A. de Lallemande, and similar directions were
sent to the Russian agents in the Principalities. A common program
was thus adopted by the two powers. The aim was to obtain the recog-
103
 Russia and the Romanian national state
nition of the double election, but only for the reign of Cuza. No attempt
was to be made to assure the permanence of the union of the provinces
through a common ruler. Sardinia, as before, stood with France and
Russia on Romanian issues.
On the opposite side were, predictably, the Ottoman Empire, the
Habsburg Empire, and Britain. Fuad and Ali argued that the problem
could be best handled by a unanimous declaration by the protectors
condemning the proceedings as illegal. If not, the Ottoman leaders be-
lieved that a corps of twelve thousand troops, accompanied by repre-
sentatives of the powers, could enforce a return to the basis of the
treaties. Should the powers, however, decide to accept the double elec-
tion, the Ottoman government requested as compensation an alteration
of Article 27 of the Treaty of Paris that would facilitate its intervention
should further violations of agreements occur. As Ali told Lobanov:
"The entire question of the Principalities is in the right of interven-
tion."7 The Ottoman officials were thus willing to allow Cuza to remain
in office, but they sought assurances for the future. Their desire for
compensation received British support.
The chief opponent of allowing an expansion of Ottoman rights
of intervention remained the Russian government. Gorchakov sent
strong instructions to Lobanov to oppose any modifications in the ar-
ticle in question. Not only did Russia still intend to stand as the patron
of Balkan Christian interests as against the Porte, but the question had
certain immediate military implications. The Russian diplomats recog-
nized that the great power that dominated at any given moment in Con-
stantinople would also have control of the Ottoman military forces.
Since the Crimean victors were clearly more influential with the Porte
than Russia, it was sound policy to oppose a military compensation in-
volving the Principalities.
The attitude of all of the protectors was thus decided soon after the
double election. There was general agreement that the treaties had
been violated and that the Ottoman proposal for a conference should
be accepted. The opposition to the personal unification of the Princi-
palities expressed by the Porte was backed strongly by the Habsburg
Empire. That state, however, could not act effectively because of its
growing concern over the deteriorating situation in the Italian penin-
sula. Britain, although a firm upholder of Ottoman rights, was, as we
have seen, willing to accept a compromise that would give the Porte
some sort of compensation. The Ottoman Empire recognized the ex-
treme difficulty of enforcing any decision calling for new elections. The
French, Russian, and Sardinian position was support for the double
election and opposition to a modification of the limits on Ottoman
104
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
rights of intervention. Prussia in this period followed the British lead
in Eastern affairs.
Once again a conference of ambassadors met in Paris to deal with
the problems of the Principalities.8 In attendance were Hiibner for Aus-
tria, Cowley for Britain, Count Albert Pourtales for Prussia, Villama-
rina for Piedmont, Kiselev for Russia, Kostaki Musurus Pasha for the
Ottoman Empire, and Walewski for France. In the first meeting, held
on March 26/April 7, Musurus denounced the double election as a
violation of the treaties and called for the application of Article 27 of
the Treaty of Paris and Article 8 of the Convention of 1858. In the next
gathering, on April 1/13, after Hiibner had declared the Austrian sup-
port of the Ottoman position, the five representatives of the other
powers presented a counterproposal: The double election of Cuza, al-
though not in conformity with the August convention, was to be rec-
ognized as an exception. In addition, some attempt was to be made to
meet the Ottoman demand for a strengthening of its right of inter-
vention should further violations of the treaties occur.
The proceedings of the conference were at this point halted by the
outbreak of war in Italy. Two of the protecting powers, France and
Sardinia, were by the end of April fighting a third, the Habsburg Em-
pire. This conflict, which was settled by, first, the armistice of Villa-
franca on June 28/July 11 and, second, the Treaty of Zurich on Octo-
ber 29/November 10, naturally absorbed the principal attention of
Europe. Russia, although not involved directly in the hostilities, re-
mained in close touch with the events taking place and wished to be in
a position to influence the final peace negotiations. After it became clear
that the Porte would not accept the formula offered on April 1/13, the
entire question of the Principalities was postponed until the powers
could again assemble.
The delay in the announcement of the final decision had, as might be
expected, an unsettling effect on the affairs of the Principalities. Cuza
himself made clear his personal desire to advance the national cause
by every means possible. Soon after his election he proposed to the
friendly consuls, Popov and Place, further steps that he wished to take.
Among these were the summoning of the Wallachian and Moldavian
assemblies to Foqani and their union into a single body, the appoint-
ment of a common ministry for both provinces, and the uniting of the
militias. After strong warnings from both France and Russia, Cuza re-
frained from such radical actions, but the situation in the Principalities
remained dangerous. Both Popov and Giers were favorably impressed
by the new prince. After meeting Cuza in Bucharest Giers reported to
Lobanov:
105
 Russia and the Romanian national state
Since his arrival in Wallachia Prince Cuza has displayed great activity for the
maintenance of order and public tranquility which have been gravely compro-
mised by past events. His attitude inspires much confidence and one can hope
that he will know how to resist the influence of the parti exalte that wishes to
see him enter upon the road of dangerous reforms, incompatible with the
political situation of the country.9

Giers's personal reaction to the double election was similar to that

of his government, whose decisions he, of course, also influenced. He
recognized that the personal union both expressed the wishes of the
majority and violated the August convention. The problem, he stressed,
should be dealt with by the protectors and not by the Porte alone. He
did not think that new elections could be carried through without tur-
moil. In a report of February 21 /March 5 he expressed his "conviction
that the best if not the only means" of reestablishing regular conditions
and order in the country "would be the recognition of the double elec-
tion of Cuza. The pure and simple return to the dispositions of the
convention could be maintained, I fear, only with the assistance of a
foreign armed force."10
While the powers debated, Cuza proceeded to take what actions he
could. Since the Principalities were under Ottoman suzerainty, they
did not have regular agencies in other countries, with the exception,
of course, of their representation in Constantinople. After the elections,
special delegations were appointed by the assemblies to bring the re-
sults of the voting to the official attention of the Porte. The Moldavian
delegation was led by Costache Negri, the Wallachian by 1.1. Filipescu.
In addition, in order to present the Romanian position, special repre-
sentatives were sent to the courts of the protecting powers: Vasile
Alecsandri was dispatched to Paris, London, and Turin; Ludovic Steege
to Berlin and Vienna; and §tefan Golescu to Paris and Berlin. Prince
Obolenskii was the link with St. Petersburg.
Although Cuza did not attempt to introduce major changes at this
time, he did carry through the duties assigned to the princes by the
agreements. He therefore exercised the executive power in both prin-
cipalities, and he convened the Central Commission to meet at Focsani.
This body, which was composed of sixteen delegates chosen in equal
numbers from the two principalities, was to prove extremely radical in
its political direction. In a more controversial move, the prince estab-
lished a military camp near Ploe§ti, where he intended to concentrate
the militias of the two provinces, whose numbers he wished to bring to
twenty thousand.
The crisis in the Italian peninsula and the subsequent outbreak of
war, events that dominated the first part of his reign, presented both
106
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
dangers and opportunities for the prince. His great hope lay in France.
In discussing Romanian problems with Napoleon III, his emissary,
Alecsandri, appealed to the emperor in almost abject terms: "Sire . . .
Prince Alexander Jean is devoted to you body and soul; he wishes to
make of his country a little France and he hopes only in your magnani-
mous generosity in order to accomplish the task of the regeneration of
the Romanian nation." 11 Cuza's ambitions were clearly expressed in a
letter that he wrote to Alecsandri on April 13/25:

As a Romanian, I feel the need to raise my country in the eyes of the nations
and in its own esteem; as prince, I am convinced of the necessity of acting
vigorously and I have decided, for the happiness and the independence of my
people, to gain all the advantage possible from the events that are about to
take place. The time has come to awake from that torpor which made of us
an easy prize and an object of cupidity for our powerful neighbors. We have
decided to throw ourselves into the arena and to support to the limits of our
power the policy of France, which is that of our prosperity and our greatness.12
Cuza requested from his patron money, arms, and munitions. He also
wanted military advisers sent from France to assist him in building up
his army.
The major advantage that the Principalities gained from the war in
Italy was that, with their attention concentrated on that peninsula,
the powers did not want to precipitate a Balkan crisis. It was soon ob-
vious to all of the diplomats that the double election could not be re-
versed without a military intervention, and it appeared impossible to
gain an agreement among the powers in support of such an action. An
Ottoman occupation required the assent of all of the powers, an im-
possible condition. A joint intervention by the neighboring states,
Austria, Russia, and the Porte, was precluded by the Habsburg involve-
ment in Italy and Gorchakov's clear statement that his country would
not participate. The other protectors either would not or could not act.
Despite its stand in this matter and its prior approval of the French
involvement in Italy, the Russian government remained intensely ap-
prehensive about the war and its possible ramifications in areas where
its own vital interests were at stake. It was feared, and with full justifi-
cation, that France would enlist revolutionary and national elements
in Galicia and Hungary and use them against Vienna. Gorchakov was
also concerned that France might arrange an exchange with Austria of
Lombardy and Venetia for the two principalities. Writing to Michael
D. Gorchakov, the governor-general of Poland, the foreign minister told
of the danger of such an action and the necessity of a Russian concen-
tration of troops on the Moldavian frontier to prevent it. Rumors of
such an exchange were to recur frequently in the next years. T h e Rus-
107
 Russia and the Romanian national state
sian government always made it clear that such a bargain was not
acceptable and that it could be a casus belli.lz
Warnings were also issued in Bucharest. At the beginning of the war
Giers asked for and received assurances from Cuza that he would not
involve himself in revolutionary actions in neighboring lands, meaning,
of course, the Habsburg Empire. The Russian fears all had solid foun-
dations. Despite his assurances to the Russian agent, Cuza was to remain
in close touch with Italian, Polish, and Hungarian revolutionary lead-
ers not only at this time but throughout his reign. The repeated consid-
eration given by the French government to an exchange of territory
was, of course, not known to the prince.
Although the Paris conference was officially in recess during the war,
the Romanian problem remained a topic of diplomatic negotiation.
The five sponsoring powers continued to urge the Porte to accept their
compromise solution. Although their single firm supporter was out of
the picture, the Ottoman representatives maintained their previous
position. They would accept the double election for the reign of Cuza,
but only in return for compensation in the form of the strengthening
of their right of intervention. In these months the Russian government
continued to press the Porte to recognize the realities of the situation
and agree to the conference protocol. The war, Gorchakov warned, had
created dangers for the Ottoman government, which "finds itself in the
presence of an accumulation of combustible material with a fire in its
immediate neighborhood. It depends on it whether to fan the flame or to
stop its progress."14
Cuza received similar cautionary messages. In an instruction of May
2/14 Gorchakov told Giers to speak with the prince and make him un-
derstand that the Russian advice came from "a friend who wishes well
for the country within the limits" of the possible.
We understand that one listens attentively to insinuations from a source per-
haps equally benevolent, but less circumspect and careful, when it opens larger
horizons to the mind. That is human nature and we do not wish to blame Prince
Cuza, but we should call to his serious attention that in rushing into adven-
tures one risks compromising the advantages already acquired and that the
statesman should always avoid surrendering to the hazards of fortune a work
which can be completed gradually owing to the force of circumstances.15
Throughout the war and in the weeks after the armistice the Russian
warnings were repeated. Support would be given to the recognition of
the double election, but Cuza was to make no further moves in the
national direction. As Lobanov wrote to Giers in June: "For his part,
it is necessary that Cuza remain quiet; that is the condition sine qua non
of our protection."16
108
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
With the cessation of fighting in July and the Villafranca agreement,
the stage was set for unanimity among the powers. The question of the
recognition of the double election was settled at a single meeting held
in Paris on August 25 / September 6. Here the Ottoman Empire agreed
to confer the investiture on Cuza for the position of prince in both
provinces, but only as an exception. In the future the choice of a prince
would be made according to the stipulations of the August convention;
that is, two separate assemblies would be chosen to elect in theory differ-
ent rulers. The Porte's approval of the temporary arrangement was to
be expressed in two separate firmans. As a concession to the Ottoman
desire for compensation and a guarantee that no further infractions of
treaties occur, a very complicated formula was adopted that did little
more than allow the Porte to point out violations of the convention.
This long statement is quoted here in full because of its significance for
future diplomatic negotiations and as an example of the intricate ar-
rangements that the powers had to accept in order to find a settlement
to which all of the guarantor states could agree:
As the Signatory Powers of the Convention August 19 have resolved not to suf-
fer any infraction of the clauses of this Convention, the Sublime Porte, in the
case of a violation of this act in the Principalities, after having taken steps
[demarches] and requested the necessary information from the hospodarial
administration, shall bring this circumstance to the knowledge of the repre-
sentatives of the Protecting Powers at Constantinople: and, once the fact of
infraction is verified by them, the suzerain court shall send to the Principali-
ties a commissioner ad hoc, charged with requiring that the measure which
constituted the infraction should be withdrawn; the commissioner of the Sub-
lime Porte shall be accompanied by delegates of the representatives at Con-
stantinople, with whom he shall proceed in concert and in common accord. If
this demand is not granted . . . the commissioner of the Sublime Porte and the
delegates will signify to the hospodar that, having observed his refusal to obey
it, he will be advised of the coercive measures to be employed. In that case, the
Sublime Porte will come to an agreement without delay with the representatives
of the Protecting Powers on the measures to be taken.17
Although the minor concession given here soothed Ottoman feelings,
it was still in practice impossible for the Porte to undertake a military
action in the Principalities without the unanimous consent of the
protecting powers.

T H E ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE

UNION OF THE PRINCIPALITIES

While the great powers were debating in this desultory fashion, Cuza
was forced to deal with the difficulties of administering a country that
had one prince, but two assemblies and two administrations.18 From the
109
 Russia and the Romanian national state
beginning it was also apparent that the assemblies, the ministries, and
the Central Commission were working in entirely different political
directions. Fundamental to the problem was the limited franchise,
which assured that Conservative landowners would dominate the as-
semblies. These bodies were soon brought into conflict with the minis-
tries, which were in the hands of Cuza's Liberal supporters. At this
time, as in the past, the Liberals were the most active and vigorous
element in Romanian political life. The prince also had to meet the
opposition of the many powerful and ambitious individuals who either
disliked his policies or coveted his position.
For the first three years of his reign, Cuza, because of the stipu-
lations of the treaties and the insistence of the protectors, was com-
pelled at least to attempt to run a government on this basis. The result
was just short of complete political chaos. Between January 1859 and
January 1862 Moldavia had nine different ministries and Wallachia
eleven.19 The political confusion was, unfortunately, also accompanied
by a very difficult economic situation. A backward country, the United
Principalities lacked all of the prerequisites of a modern state, such as
adequate roads, good schools, and basic social services. To make mat-
ters worse, a world crisis in agriculture meant that Romanian farm
products, the basis of the economy, either could not find a market
or were sold at low prices. The poverty in the countryside put further
pressure on the government. Peasant unrest was shown in frequent
rioting and in other disturbances. It was quite clear that the problem
of regulating the relationship between the peasant and the landholder
had to be met. The treaties also called for a solution to this issue. How-
ever, it was apparent that measures to alleviate the sufferings of the
peasantry could not be taken without fundamental alterations in the
political system, and, in particular, in the electoral laws.
For the next years the prince had to turn his attention to interna-
tional relations; basic changes could not be made in the state structure
without the concurrence of the Porte and the powers. Political ques-
tions had to be solved before the economic and social evils could be
remedied. Unfortunately for Cuza, the protectors also had a stake in the
internal order of the provinces, and none wished to be faced with further
disturbances in the area. Even France and Sardinia, both of which gave
verbal encouragement to national advancement and constitutional
reform, were unwilling to risk their greater interests elsewhere to assist
Cuza. The Porte, the Habsburg Monarchy, and Britain, for different
reasons, all wished to preserve the status quo in both the domestic af-
fairs and the external relations of the Principalities. Of the protectors,
Russia took probably the most restrictive position as far as internal
110
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
political reform was concerned. Although Popov had previously sup-
ported the unionists, Giers and Gorchakov had been concerned with
their liberal doctrines. After the double election, the Russian agents
pressed Cuza strongly to rely upon the Conservatives and to appoint
them to his ministries. In October 1859, for instance, Giers reported to
Gorchakov that in his conversations with Cuza he "never ceased repeat-
ing to him that according to my opinion no combination would be able
to succeed without the predominant participation of the Conservatives
who enjoy the reputation that they owe to their social position, their ex-
perience in affairs and finally the majority in the chamber, with which
every constitutional government must necessarily reckon."20
Although Cuza did not dare adopt extreme measures, like the uniting
of the assemblies, he continued to move forward where he could. He
had, as we have seen, joined the two militias, and he summoned the
Central Commission to meet at Focsani. This body soon proved frac-
tious. Of the sixteen delegates, Cuza was entitled to appoint half and
the assemblies the rest. The commission thus expressed in its composi-
tion the basic split in the country: Cuza appointed Liberal delegates,
whereas the assemblies preferred Conservatives. As Giers feared, the
body immediately took up the issue of union and a foreign prince, sub-
jects that were outside its competence. Moreover, to the Russian dismay,
the leadership in this initiative came from the Conservatives under the
direction of G. Sturdza. Giers believed that their intention was to force
a concentration on political questions, so that all discussion on internal
reforms, in particular on the peasant problem, would be postponed.
He was most disturbed by the Conservative stand and believed that it
was motivated by "the disquiet that the reforming inclinations of the
parti avance inspires in them in the indecisive situation of the mo-
ment."21
In November, after the issue of the double election had been settled,
Giers received an unofficial draft of the constitution that had been pre-
pared by the Central Commission. A radical document, which com-
pletely ignored the directives of the protecting powers as expressed in
the August convention and the recent decisions, it called for the full
union of the country with the capital in Bucharest. The prince, although
restricted in his internal authority by the powers given the legislature,
was to have many of the attributes of the ruler of an independent coun-
try. He could, for instance, make agreements with foreign governments,
coin money, and confer national decorations. The administration and
the judiciary were to be organized on French models.
Presented with this document, which obviously would never receive
great-power approval, Cuza had to decide what to do. Facing a grave
111
 Russia and the Romanian national state
political crisis, he dissolved the Central Commission and both assem-
blies. The domestic conflicts of the first year of his reign had made it
abundantly clear to the prince and his collaborators that the system
was not working. The Principalities faced two major problems that
needed solution and that were interconnected. First, the administra-
tions and the assemblies would have to be united, and, second, the
franchise would have to be widened. The second measure not only
would give Cuza a Liberal base for his government, but also would
make possible a practical program of peasant reform. It was under-
stood that changes in the electoral laws would benefit the Liberals and
harm the Conservatives. Since the second question was highly contro-
versial, Cuza chose to emphasize first the question of union, an issue
that commanded the strong support of the majority from all factions
and parties.
In seeking a change in the political organization of the country, Cuza
wisely placed the emphasis on negotiations with the suzerain power.
The Principalities were represented in Constantinople by the extremely
able diplomat Costache Negri, who proceeded to initiate discussions
on the major Romanian problems with both the Porte and the ambas-
sadors of the protecting powers. In March i860 Negri was instructed to
inquire if objections would be made should the meetings of the Central
Commission be moved from Focsani to Bucharest. Emphasis was placed
on the difficulties of life in Foes, ani, which was far from both provincial
capitals. New elections had been held, and the commission as well as
the assemblies would soon convene. Once again the powers divided on
the regular lines, with France supporting the request and the Habsburg
Monarchy the major opponent. With this impasse, nothing could be
accomplished.
In June i860 Cuza made another attempt. He sent Negri a long
memorandum on the political conditions in the country and the diffi-
culties of governing with the organization established by the interna-
tional agreements.22 He called not only for a full unification of the
Principalities, but also for a revision of the electoral laws. Negri in-
formally circulated this document and discussed its content with the
Ottoman officials and others. As a result of their comments he advised
Cuza that the time was not propitious for action on the matter.
Indeed, in these years, even after the conclusion of the war in Italy,
the protecting powers were deeply engaged in other areas. In 1857-
1858 Britain had faced the Sepoy rebellion in India; from 1859 to 1862
a great deal of attention had to be devoted to administrative reform in
that colony. In the Far East, where Britain and France cooperated, the
two governments were engaged in a joint pressure on China; in i860
112
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
they joined forces in the occupation of Peking. In the Ottoman Empire,
the major conflict concerned the struggle of the Druses and the Mar-
onites in Syria. The French government sent an expeditionary force
into the area. For all of the powers, moreover, the Italian problem
continued to cause concern. The settlement after the war did not satisfy
the Italian nationalists. From May i860, when Garibaldi arrived in
Sicily, until March 1861, when the establishment of the Kingdom of
Italy was proclaimed, the European governments were principally in-
terested in events on that peninsula. The affairs of the Principalities
became matters of secondary importance.
In this difficult situation Cuza accomplished what he could without
arousing the ire of the protectors. He united his two military ministries
as well as the administration for the post, telegraph, customs, and
medical services for both provinces. The main offices were all located
in Bucharest. He also made this city his chief residence. At the same
time he continued to present the problems of the Principalities to the
foreign representatives. In September i860 he made an official visit to
Constantinople, where he was cordially received. He spoke with the
Ottoman officials and the ambassadors about the difficulties of govern-
ing a divided country and the wisdom of moving the Central Commis-
sion to Bucharest. When speaking with Lobanov he did not bring up
the question of a widening of the electoral law, since he was well aware
of the Russian interest in preserving Conservative influence. Lobanov
cautioned the prince not to diverge from legality.23
Returning to Bucharest, Cuza renewed his efforts to obtain further
concessions. The visit evidently made him feel more confident of the
attitude of the Porte. With his chief hopes still in Paris, he wrote a
letter to Napoleon III, enclosing his June memorandum.24 A copy was
also forwarded to Charles Felix de Lavalette, the French ambassador
in Constantinople. Cuza emphasized in particular his desire for union
and a revision of the August convention. The French reaction, though
not enthusiastic, was not discouraging. Thouvenel instructed Lavalette
to counsel the Romanians to follow a prudent policy, but to assure them
of French support in their efforts to obtain concessions from the Porte.
The French advice was that Cuza negotiate with the Porte and also try
to secure the summoning of yet another conference. The British gov-
ernment also favored this position.
Meanwhile, Russian policy was in the process of stiffening. Support
for the recognition of the double election had been given, as we have
seen, because the government wished to work with France and because
no better alternative presented itself. Cuza's subsequent behavior had
not proved reassuring. From the beginning it had been clear that he
 Russia and the Romanian national state
would base his foreign policy on the French connection and that he
would, when possible, press forward the liberal-national program of
unification and a foreign prince. His internal policies soon gained him
the enmity of the Conservatives, whom the Russians favored. His rela-
tions with the Russian consulate were also not close or intimate. As
early as July 1859 Giers wrote his wife: "Cuza is a scoundrel of the worst
kind - he promises everything and does nothing."25 The prince sent
his trusted delegates to the Western capitals - London, Paris, Turin,
Berlin, and Vienna, not to St. Petersburg - for advice and assistance.
The first permanent diplomatic agency was established in Paris in
September i860; a similar office was not opened in Russia until 1874.
This situation could be acceptable to the Russian government only as
long as its relations with France were good.
Aside from the diplomatic aspects, the Russian officials had other
worries in connection with the Principalities. There was extreme con-
cern lest the area become a center of revolutionary intrigue that would
have repercussions inside Russia as well as in other neighboring lands.
The Russian diplomats agreed that the August convention contained
serious flaws, but they hesitated to change it. They did not see what
they could gain by contributing to an increase of Cuza's prestige or
power. They also recognized that any reforms would only weaken their
position. For instance, it was clear that a widening of the franchise
would undermine the strength of the Conservatives, who best repre-
sented their interests in the provinces.
The other protecting powers were in a similar dilemma. They under-
stood the weakness of the prince's position and the pressure exerted
upon him from both the right and the left in his country. The British
government feared that if some concessions were not made, Cuza would
be ousted and the question of a foreign prince would at once arise. With
these considerations in mind, both the French and the British repre-
sentatives pressed the Porte to make some accommodation with the
prince. At the same time, all of the governments, including the French,
strongly urged Cuza not to present them with another fait accompli,
this time in the form of a unilateral proclamation of full union.
Meanwhile, another internal crisis was mounting. In April 1861 the
Moldavian assembly voted to meet with its counterpart in Bucharest to
discuss the peasant question, to which the Wallachian body agreed. This
decision, carried through with the support of both the Liberals and the
Conservatives, greatly disturbed the powers, who feared that the united
assemblies would simply declare union, with or without the assent of
the protectors. When Popov protested to Cuza that the action was a
violation of the convention, the prince replied that he could not oppose
114
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
the wishes of the nation. He had been elected on the hope of union; "he
was even the personification of that idea ... he was ready to take on him-
self the risk and to submit to all of the consequences of the act that was
going to take place."26 Although the joint session was in fact not held,
the obvious dissatisfaction and unrest in the Principalities convinced
the powers that something had to be done.
Finally, under French and British pressure, the Porte officially took
up the study of the questions raised by Cuza's requests. Its answer was
contained in a circular of April 19/May 1, in which the Ottoman gov-
ernment, recognizing that the Principalities could not be administered
as originally ordered, agreed that the ministries and the assemblies
could be united. The Central Commission was to be abolished. How-
ever, like the recognition of the dual governorship, this concession was
granted only for the reign of Cuza. The Porte declared that this limita-
tion was "the condition sine qua non" of its agreement. As far as the
revision of the electoral law was concerned, Cuza should draw up pro-
posals for reform and then submit them to the powers.27
Since these changes would involve an alteration of the treaties, the
approval of the protecting powers was once again needed. The French
position, of course, remained the same. This government would have
accepted permanent union and a foreign prince if that had been prac-
tical. The British too supported the Ottoman decision, but from differ-
ent motives. Primarily interested in assuring the maintenance of
Ottoman sovereignty over the Principalities, the British government
believed that it was wiser to accept this temporary solution rather than
risk another fait accompli, which would further damage Ottoman pres-
tige. Although the British backed the idea of restating the principle
of separation, Lord John Russell, the foreign secretary, believed that
the union, once granted, would be permanent. Prussia and Sardinia
supported the French and British position.
Despite the Ottoman acceptance, the Habsburg Empire remained op-
posed to any changes leading to a strengthening of Romanian national
rights. In a conversation with Lobanov on February 13/25, 1861, Pro-
kesch-Osten restated the basic Austrian problem: "There are under
Austrian domination around three millon Romanians; if union is
achieved, they will seek necessarily to unite with their compatriots of
Moldavia and Wallachia; it is thus for Austria a matter of its integrity
to oppose in the most absolute manner the union of the two Princi-
palities/'28 Johann Bernhard von Rechberg, the Habsburg foreign min-
ister, uttered a similar opinion: "It is evident that union would only
pave the way to the complete independence of Daco-Romania."29
Nevertheless, despite its strong opposition, the Habsburg government
 Russia and the Romanian national state
realized that it could do little to hinder the actions of the majority of
the powers. The defeat in Italy had drained its military capabilities
and damaged its prestige. Support was, however, given to attempts by
the Porte to place restrictions on, or make reservations concerning, the
concessions granted the Principalities.
Of all the powers, Russia was to prove the most active in attempting
at least to delay the implementation of the decisions granting full
union. The majority of the objections raised were well founded. Like
the British, the Russian diplomats did not believe that, once union had
been granted, it could later be denied. They were also apprehensive
that even if the powers accepted Cuza's requests, the action would lead
only to further demands. The next step would be the appointment of a
foreign prince. Lobanov expressed a common feeling when he com-
mented that "a foreign prince would be the complete independence of
Moldo-Wallachia, because no member of a sovereign house of Europe
would submit to the suzerainty of the Porte/' 30 In a later letter he dis-
cussed his reservations further:
What should this foreign prince be like, covered at present with the veil of the
unknown? I do not think anyone can say; the only thing that appears certain
to me is that, no matter who he is, he would not have any more the hesitations
of Cuza and he will enter resolutely in the path where the other ventured only
reluctantly. He would of necessity not be Orthodox, for it is not with us that
they will go to find him; he will be Catholic and he will accomplish the work of
the latinization of the country; with that he will raise the flag of Romanian,
Italian, revolutionary, etc., sympathies - and he would be able even more than
Cuza to count on the support of France.31
After the Porte had expressed its agreement, the problem of how to
register the opinion of the other powers remained. The convening of a
conference was made difficult because Victor Emmanuel I had been
recognized as king of Italy by only one state; the question of the status
of the Sardinian vote was thus at issue. Thouvenel made the wise sug-
gestion that each power should simply send its individual agreement
to the Porte, which could then issue a firman.32 Russia, however, re-
fused to accept this procedure, arguing that a conference was essential
because changes in the treaties were being made. In a circular dispatch
of July 12/24 Gorchakov stated the Russian belief that the granting of
"a temporary and limited union, such as the Porte intends it, would be
based on an illusion." Once the Principalities gained this concession,
it could not be denied later. Moreover, the administrative union was
only a step toward complete union and perhaps even toward the demand
for a foreign and hereditary prince. The Russian minister also stated
his objections to the manner in which the powers were meeting the suc-
116
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
cessive challenges from the Principalities and to the policy of expedi-
ency, which had "no other end than to put off questions without having
regard for a past which engages the dignity of the powers nor of the
future which is imprudently anticipated in burdening it with all the
charges of the present."33
Negotiations on the question were interrupted by the death of
Abdul Mejid in June and the succession of his brother, Abdul Aziz. In
July the Russian government modified its position to some extent. It
agreed that the question of union could be dealt with by a conference
of the ambassadors at Constantinople rather than at Paris. However,
it proposed that the question of franchise reform be discussed first.
Moreover, the status quo was to be maintained for three years. Isolated
in this position, the Russian government was soon to soften its atti-
tude.34 In late summer Cuza sent a delegation to visit Alexander II at
Livadia. Here the major problems were discussed, including the ques-
tion of the resettlement of Bulgarians who lived in the parts of Bes-
sarabia ceded in 1856 and the fate of the property of the Dedicated
Monasteries, a most sensitive question that will be discussed in detail
later. By September the Russian government had altered its attitude
on union; the question of a change in the electoral laws was dropped.
With general agreement achieved beforehand, the conference of
ambassadors, which opened in Constantinople on September 14/26,
was able to settle the matter with little difficulty. Once again the Porte
presented a demand for some sort of compensation in the form of in-
creased rights of intervention. It now wished to be designated as the
state that would enforce the decisions of the protecting powers should
further violations of the treaties take place. Should coercive actions be
adopted, then "these measures would be executed by the suzerain power
and . . . the guarantor powers would be represented with the com-
mander-in-chief by their respective delegate."35 As usual, the British
and Habsburg governments were sympathetic to the Ottoman position,
but the French and Russian remained firm on the question of inter-
vention.
With the acceptance of union by the guaranteeing powers, the Porte
could proceed with the formulation of the firman.36 In the text the
union was limited to the reign of Cuza. Should he die or be overthrown,
the provisions of the August convention would be applied; new assem-
blies would be chosen in each principality. When transmitting the
firman to the powers the Ottoman government attached a note saying
that if the throne became vacant, an Ottoman commissioner, accom-
panied by representatives of the powers, would be sent to the Princi-
palities to assure the carrying out of the stipulations of the agreement.
117
 Russia and the Romanian national state
Should violations take place, the commissioner would invoke the agree-
ment of September 1859. No mention was made of further consultations
among the powers or of obtaining their prior approval of Ottoman ac-
tions. All of the guarantors except Austria notified the Porte of their
reservations in this regard.37 The majority opinion was well expressed
in a British instruction of January 1/13, 1862.
Lately the Sultan has sanctioned the union of the Administrations and the
Legislatures of Moldavia and Wallachia. But . . . the sanction of the Sultan
is given only during the tenure of Prince Couza as Prince. Upon his death or
resignation, if it should happen that the two Principalities have been disap-
pointed in the fruits of Union and wish to be separate, the separation will take
place without convulsion. If on the other hand the effects of the Union have
been concord, order and prosperity, it is not to be supposed that the Sublime
Porte and the great Powers will oppose themselves to a renewal of Union in a
more permanent and regular form.38
Gorchakov had expressed the same opinion in October. He did not see
how the powers could later dissolve the union. If it worked, it would
be unjust to deprive the Principalities of the benefits.39
With the recognition by the powers of the double election and the
administrative and legislative unification of the Principalities, the ma-
jor steps in the establishment of the Romanian national state had been
accomplished. Although the union had been limited to the reign of
Cuza, the negotiations among the powers had clearly indicated that
there would be no opposition among the majority of the protectors
to a permanent continuation of the unification should it prove suc-
cessful. Since the world situation was not propitious for an advancement
toward the next goals, a foreign prince and independence, Romanian
attention should have turned to internal development and social re-
form. Although economically backward, the rich resources of the prov-
inces appeared to promise a prosperous future.40
Despite the fact that the official name of the state was still the United
Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, a Romania was in fact in
existence. Because of the significance of this achievement, it might be
well to examine briefly the condition of the country after the unifica-
tion. No major changes were to occur in the next twenty years. In the
1860s the two provinces had a combined area of 121,000 square kilo-
meters and a population of 4.6 million. Of these, 2.6 million lived in
Wallachia, with 140,000 in Bucharest. Moldavia had 2 million people,
with 70,000 in Jassy. The urban population totaled less than 18 per-
cent. As far as religion was concerned, 95 percent were Orthodox and 3
percent Jewish. The social divisions reflected the argicultural economy.
Of the three classes - the landowners or boyars, the middle class, and the
118
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
peasants - the latter were the overwhelming majority. In Moldavia
2 percent of the population belonged to the landowning class, 19 per-
cent to the middle class, and 70 percent to the peasantry. In Wallachia
the boyars represented 4 percent, the middle class 20 percent, and the
peasants 75 percent. Among these figures that of the middle class de-
serves further clarification. In the past native Romanians had not held
predominant positions in trade or commerce, which were traditionally
in the hands of those with another national background. In Wallachia
Greeks, Jews, Serbs, and Armenians predominated; in Moldavia the
Jews were the strongest element. The prominence of Greeks, Jews, and
Armenians in trade was common to the entire Ottoman Empire. Ro-
manians did, however, engage in these occupations, and they dominated
the government, military, and religious posts. The middle class, as the
figures show, was not strong; the majority were small merchants and
artisans. Of the 155,600 heads of families included in this classification,
three groups are important for Romanian political life: the 22,800
government officials, the 18,450 religious dignitaries, and, in particular,
the 838 in the free professions, including among others doctors, law-
yers, teachers, and engineers.
As has been noted, the treaties set a very tight limit on the number
of those who could vote. In 1858 the 2.6 million Wallachians were en-
titled to 2,482 votes and the 2 million Moldavians to 1,397. Because of
peculiarities of the system, perhaps only 700 could actually vote in
Moldavia and 1,000 in Wallachia. Political power was thus concen-
trated in the hands of a very small group. We shall see the same names
and the same families play the principal role in Romanian politics.
Although the term political party has been used throughout this
account, this term has designated what were at the best loose coalitions
of men with similar aims. With the establishment of regular institu-
tions, the parties came to have stronger organizations and better-defined
objectives. Nevertheless, as elsewhere in the Balkans, political power
still lay primarily in the hands of a few powerful men and their fol-
lowers. In the Principalities there was no significant break in political
alignment according to social or economic background. Almost all the
politicians were landowners or had firm connections with boyar inter-
ests. Some, like Cuza and Kogalniceanu, were involved in commerce.
In addition, members of the free professions, in particular government
officials, lawyers, and journalists, were, by the nature of their tasks,
able to exert disproportionate influence under the constitutional sys-
tem. The army officers, of course, because of their control of the armed
power of the state, could if they wished play the determining role in
any political crisis.
 Russia and the Romanian national state
In the first elections the restricted franchise had given the control
of the assemblies to the Conservatives. Although they were favored by
the Russian government, there is no evidence that this party was under
any sort of Russian influence. Its chief men were Barbu Catargiu, A.
Arsache, Dimitrie Ghica, Lascar Catargiu, G. §tirbei, G. Sturdza, and
Peter Mavrogheni. Satisfied with conditions as they were, they wished
to preserve the electoral system, and they certainly did not wish to
see social or political reforms introduced into the country. Lacking a
positive goal, they tended to break into competing factions and to
dissipate their political strength in personal rivalries and private quar-
rels. They did not like Cuza, but they accepted him, at least at first, as
the best of the available alternatives.
The Liberal Party, as has been repeatedly demonstrated, showed the
real initiative in Romanian politics. From their center in Wallachia,
the party's leaders, among them I. C. Bratianu, C. A. Rosetti, and the
Golescu brothers, remained devoted to the program of 1848 - including
a foreign prince and, eventually, full independence. In domestic affairs
they continued to support the classic liberal position. They wished the
state to be governed under a constitutional system that would give the
real power to the legislature and reduce the position of the prince to
that of a figurehead. They put a strong emphasis on guarantees of civil
liberties, in particular free speech, a free press, and the right of associa-
tion. Their principal newspaper, Romdnul, edited by Rosetti, was the
most widely circulated publication in the Principalities. Approximately
two thousand copies were printed. The party was also interested in
economic modernization and in an expansion of the state boundaries.
As far as the peasant question was concerned, their attitude remained,
as it had been in 1848, ambivalent. With the majority depending on
their positions as landholders, they were reluctant to accept economic
losses as a result of social reform.
In addition to the parties, certain individuals were able to exert a
great influence in Romanian politics. First in importance at this time
was Cuza himself. Although he has been described as a Liberal, he in
fact stood alone. A moderate, he worked with friends and close associ-
ates, but he never formed his own party. Associated with him were
Costache Negri, Vasile Alecsandri, Nicholas Cretulescu, M. C. Epurea-
nu, General Ion E. Florescu, Dimitrie Bolintineanu, Ion Strat, and
Michael Kogalniceanu, the last a man of particular importance in
this study. Educated primarily at the University of Berlin, Kogalniceanu
was moderate and balanced, but he was willing to lead in the introduc-
tion of new measures and to follow policies that caused members of
both parties, as well as the Russian consulates, deep concern. Among
120
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
other prominent leaders who had strong personal followings were Ion
Ghica, Dimitrie A. Sturdza, and A. G. Golescu.
For Cuza the unification brought both advantages and difficulties.
Whereas the national question had united the parties, the country now
had to deal with internal problems on which there was great disagree-
ment. After the approval of the Porte was received, the prince prorogued
the two assemblies and then directed them to reassemble in Bucharest
on January 24/February 5, 1862. As the first premier of the united
Romania, he appointed the Conservative Barbu Catargiu, hoping
thereby to gain the backing of his party. The major problem before the
new administration was clearly that of the peasant-landholder rela-
tionship; Article 46 of the August convention had directed that action
be taken on this matter. With the backing of his party, Catargiu intro-
duced a bill that would have granted the landholders full ownership
of their entire estates; the peasants would thereafter have to rent their
plots. The measure was strongly attacked by the left, in particular by
Kogalniceanu. On June 8/20 Catargiu was assassinated when leaving
the assembly. His death removed from the scene the one man who had
appeared capable of organizing and holding together the Conserva-
tives. His successor was a Cuza partisan, N. Cretulescu. By this time the
prince had abandoned his attempts to cooperate with the Conservatives.
He refused to ratify their agrarian law, and he prorogued the assembly.
Cuza's former problems thus remained. The executive and legisla-
tive branches of government were effectively blocking each other. More-
over, by the beginning of 1863 it became clear that personal opposition
to Cuza was strong among both the Liberals and the Conservatives. In
the first months of this year some members of both parties joined in
what was to be called "the monstrous coalition." The strength of this
group was shown when, after the reconvening of the assembly, its mem-
bers joined in a negative reply to the prince's address. They thereafter
demonstrated their influence by passing no-confidence votes against the
ministry and rejecting the budget. On March 2/14 Cuza prorogued the
assembly, and for nine months it remained in recess. On October 11/
23 the Cretulescu government resigned; Cuza next appointed Kogal-
niceanu as his principal minister. When the assembly reopened in
November, Kogalniceanu initiated an era of thoroughgoing reform
in Romanian political life.
The debates in the assemblies and the factional quarrels were fol-
lowed carefully, of course, by the foreign representatives. Giers, as
previously, strongly urged the prince to govern with the Conservatives,
advising him that "there would be nothing easier for him than to take
the direction of the Conservative Party by attaching it to him by a com-
121
 Russia and the Romanian national state
munity of interests." Such an alliance would be a guarantee of order
and prosperity and would counter the "revolutionary tendencies" that
had appeared in the assembly.41 T h e events of the next months did
nothing to allay his fears. He particularly regretted the disorganization
of the Conservatives after the assassination of Catargiu; Cuza's leader-
ship he characterized as "inconsistent and unskillful/' 42 When in No-
vember the prince discussed the situation with him, Giers expressed
his opinions with force and clarity, as is shown in his report of No-
vember 2/14, 1862:

I began by expressing to Prince Cuza my strong regrets that he had abandoned

the correct path adopted under the ministry of M. Barbu Catargiu, which made
his position unassailable in bringing him the cooperation of the assembly and
the support of the guarantor powers. His distrust and his hostility toward the
old boyars caused some intrigues . . . and his complaisance toward the party
of disorder could naturally only alienate from him the chamber, where the
Conservatives are in the majority, estrange the great powers in his regard, and
in the last analysis introduce anarchy into these lands because, after having
used it in bringing about the fall of their political enemies, the radicals be-
lieve themselves strong enough to seek to overthrow the government itself.43

Although the Russian diplomats were indeed concerned about the

internal organization of the Principalities, their attention of necessity
had to be directed toward the protection of their interests in the area.
Two questions, both connected with the apparently increasing radi-
calization of Romanian politics, continued to worry both the agents
in the Principalities and the leadership in St. Petersburg. As we have
seen, Russian policy since the beginning of the century had been deeply
concerned with two major issues - the struggle against revolutionary
conspiracies and the defense of Orthodoxy. T h e Cuza regime now ap-
peared to be challenging Russian interests in both areas. T h e close
links of the prince to Napoleon III and to revolutionary movements
were obvious to the Russian agents. Even more serious were the moves
that the Principalities took against the Dedicated Monasteries, religious
institutions that enjoyed full Russian patronage. T h e question of revo-
lutionary activity and the treatment of the monasteries became the main
concerns of the Russian government after 1859.

REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE

Much of Russia's lack of enthusiasm for the approval of full unification

came from that government's realization that its general policies were
not obtaining the desired results either in the Danubian region or in
Europe. T h e entente with France established after the Crimean War

122
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
had as its objective the securing of an ally during a period of retrench-
ment in foreign affairs and reform at home. Otherwise, basic Russian
aims had not changed. One of the fundamental principles of Russian
policy had been, as we have repeatedly seen, to combat revolutionary
conspiracies whose aim was the overthrow of established governments
and their replacement with radical regimes. Particular apprehension
was felt over Polish activities, representing either the right or the left
political orientations, because the accomplishment of their main objec-
tive, the reestablishment of an independent Polish state, involved Rus-
sian territorial integrity. Since the Hungarian underground activities
were so closely linked to the Polish and since the Hungarian leaders
after the events of 1849 were intensely anti-Russian, their revolutionary
organizations were also of interest to the Russian diplomats.
Unfortunately for Russia's interests, certain other aspects of tradi-
tional Russian policy led its representatives to support measures that
were not consistent with a clearly antirevolutionary stand. The Russian
government was obviously deeply involved in the defense of Orthodox
Christianity. The aim of its efforts had hitherto been the reform of the
Ottoman administration and an increase in the autonomous rights of
the Balkan nationalities. The breakup of the Ottoman Empire and
its division into independent states was not sought. Yet most Balkan
national movements, whether conservative or radical in leadership,
aimed at exactly this goal. The dilemma that faced Russia at the time
of the Greek revolt has been discussed. Even more difficult situations
were now to arise with the increasing activity among the South Slavs,
that is, among the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Montenegrins, directed at
improving their position within the empire. In addition, independent
Greece and autonomous Romania, despite their relatively favorable
positions, were not satisfied with their boundaries. Both adopted ir-
redentist policies for the future. All of the Balkan leaderships were de-
lighted to take support where they could find it. They were thus
willing, even eager, to link their efforts with those of other European
conspiratorial groups and to act in violation of their commitments
to the sultan and the great powers. Because of its reluctance to stand
against an Orthodox people or to support an Ottoman policy detrimen-
tal to their advancement, the Russian government at times found itself
condoning actions that violated its own principles concerning the de-
fense of legality in international relations. Even worse, some of its
policies in practice gave aid and comfort to the great European under-
ground movements, aimed at national emancipation and liberal re-
form, in which, of course, Polish and Hungarian revolutionaries played
a leading role.
123
 Russia and the Romanian national state
These contradictions in Russian attitudes had particular significance
for the Principalities. Situated on the lower Danube, a crossroads be-
tween Polish, Hungarian, Serbian, and Bulgarian lands, the provinces
were an obvious staging area for national conspiracies. Moldavia, with
its access to Galicia and Transylvania, was of particular importance to
the Polish and Hungarian movements. In addition, after the cession
of southern Bessarabia to Moldavia in 1856, Russian aid to Balkan
proteges had to pass through Romanian territory. Moreover, the very
loose surveillance that any Romanian regime was able to exert over its
educated and politically active citizens, combined with the liberal-
national sympathies of the Liberals, made the Principalities an ideal
center for revolutionary organization. The advantage taken of this
situation by the Poles in Moldavia has been mentioned; Bulgarian
conspiracies were already well organized along the Danube frontier.
Romanian interests were thus involved both with the cause of the Poles
and Hungarians, which the Russian government abhorred, and with
the goals of the Balkan Orthodox, which St. Petersburg felt, at the very
least, it could not openly oppose.
The alliance with France compounded the confusion of the Russian
leaders' policy toward national movements. The France of Napoleon
III, of course, stood sponsor to most of the contemporary national
movements, especially the Italian and the Polish, but also the Romanian
and Hungarian. Accordingly, Paris became the center of revolutionary
conspiracy, and these activities received official sanction. French agents
actively promoted Italian-Polish-Hungarian-Romanian cooperation in
common endeavors. Cuza, of course, fell well into these plans. Not only
did he actively seek French support, but as a man of 1848 he thoroughly
sympathized with the national objectives of his neighbors. He could
thus work enthusiastically with Italians and Hungarians against Habs-
burg rule, with Poles against Russian domination, and with Serbs and
Bulgarians against the Porte. All of these actions could have either
directly or indirectly threatening implications for tsarist Russia.
Between 1859 and 1863 a series of European crises, all involving
revolutionary movements, clearly illustrated the difficulties of the Rus-
sian alliance with France and demonstrated the central position of the
Principalities in political conspiracies. Although living in a region
peripheral to the main centers of stress, the Romanian leaders were in-
volved in the conspiracies connected with the unification of Italy, the
Serbian actions against the Porte, and, most significant, the Polish
revolt against Russia in 1863. All of these, of course, had deep implica-
tions for Russian-Romanian relations.44
The advantages that Cuza gained from the war in Italy in 1859 had
124
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
been great; by the time the conflict had terminated and the powers
could again turn to Romanian questions, it was really too late to change
the double election. Moreover, the Principalities could only gain by a
strengthening of Sardinia, a state that had previously supported the
Romanian national position. Cavour himself had been delighted by the
double election, since he believed that it assured him "of the support of
the governments of Moldavia and Wallachia."45 With Cuza in charge,
moreover, there would be less opposition to the use of these lands for
revolutionary organization. During the first years of the prince's reign,
therefore, the Principalities were drawn into the conspiracies involved
in the Italian unification movement, the link being primarily through
the activities of Hungarian emigres active in Sardinian service. These
men naturally regarded the Principalities as the obvious staging area for
their work in Transylvania and the Hungarian lands. Most active in
negotiations with the Romanian authorities were Generals G. Klapka
and S. Tiirr.
Although the terms of the Treaty of Zurich strengthened Sardinia's
position and gave it additional territory, they did not satisfy the Italian
nationalists. In May i860 Garibaldi landed in Sicily with a small force,
and once again the Italian question dominated European diplomacy;
the Principalities assumed a renewed strategic importance. In the fall
of i860 Cavour and the Hungarian revolutionary leader Lajos Kossuth
made plans to launch an attack on their common adversary, the Habs-
burg Monarchy, from three directions - Serbia, Moldavia, and northern
Italy. In preparation for such an action, Sardinia was to provide arms
for Hungarian forces organized outside Austria.
Meanwhile, Romanian lands had become a center of Hungarian ac-
tivity. In i860 Kogalniceanu was the premier of Moldavia.46 With his
knowledge and connivance, military camps were set up and arms depots
organized. The Hungarian emigres were housed and fed by the local
authorities. These actions were carried out primarily by Klapka and
Kogalniceanu, probably without the full knowledge of Cuza. The
prince, of course, had to be careful. He was never quite certain of the
extent of French involvement in the entire conspiracy. His relations
with the Sardinian government, however, were close, and he sent some
of his officers to train with its army.
The entire relationship of the Principalities, the Sardinians, and
the Hungarians produced a local crisis in December i860.47 At that
time five ships loaded with arms left Genoa, bound for Galatz. Two
arrived there and immediately started unloading. The consuls, and in
particular the Habsburg government, whose interests were primarily
affected, at once made it an international matter. The massive importa-
125
 Russia and the Romanian national state
tion of arms into the Danube port involved Ottoman regulations as
well as great-power interests. The Porte, the Habsburg Empire, Britain,
and Russia at once demanded that Cuza sequester the arms that had
arrived; the three other ships were stopped. Under pressure Cuza did
impound the guns that had not already been unloaded, but the problem
of what to do with the rest of the shipment remained. Finally, a British
vessel transported them to Constantinople, where the Ottoman authori-
ties evidently eventually returned them to Genoa.
At this time, it will be noted, the Russian government approved the
British, Ottoman, and Habsburg positions. In this issue the interests
of Russia were similar to those of the Habsburg Monarchy. The Italian-
Polish-Hungarian conspirators, with their links to France, endangered
Russian territorial integrity too, and they also had ties with similar
movements within Russia directed against the tsarist regime. Neverthe-
less, despite the clear evidence of the danger of using the Principalities
in conspiracies, in the next arms crisis, this time involving Serbia, Rus-
sia became a prime supporter of a contrary principle.
Although seldom an active inciter of Balkan uprisings, the Russian
government nevertheless felt compelled to intervene whenever such
events occurred. The years after the Crimean War witnessed such activ-
ity in other parts of the Balkan peninsula, as well as in the Principalities.
In October 1862 an army coup in Greece led to the ouster of King Othon
and his replacement by George I, a British candidate. For both the
Russian government and the Principalities, however, events in Serbia
were more significant. In December 1858 Prince Alexander Karadjor-
djevic was forced out of office and Milos Obrenovic returned for a second
reign. After his death in i860, he was succeeded by his son Michael,
who was to be an active and strong ruler. Like their counterparts in
the Principalities, the Serbian leaders wished to widen their rights of
autonomy. Their principal grievance at the time was the fact that Otto-
man troops still garrisoned six fortresses within their territory. In June
1862 a local disturbance resulted in the bombardment of Belgrade. In
order to strengthen its diplomatic position, the Serbian government
needed both foreign supporters and military supplies. An obvious source
of assistance was to be found in Russia, a protecting power that had
repeatedly declared its concern with Serbian affairs. Collaboration with
the government of the Principalities could also be of advantage to both
states. Cuza throughout his reign was in regular touch with Belgrade.
In 1862 measures of practical assistance given to Serbia involved the
Principalities in another international incident.
In November 1862 the British consul, John Green, reported that a
large convoy of arms had crossed the Russian frontier into the Princi-
126
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
48
palities. Although there was considerable confusion at first, it was
soon learned that these weapons were destined for Serbia. Since the de-
livery appeared far larger than what was necessary for the internal
needs of the state, the Ottoman, Habsburg, and British governments
demanded that the Principalities sequester the arms. It appeared that
they could only be intended for use against the Ottoman Empire. Un-
der strong pressure from these powers, Cuza during the next week used
every means to win enough time so that the shipment could cross safely
through the Principalities to its destination. He was aided by the fact
that the guarantors were not united on this question. France, Russia,
Prussia, and Sardinia, for different reasons, failed to protest. The Rus-
sian stand was particularly determined. Gorchakov argued that the
transfer of weapons was legal and that the Serbs needed the guns for
legitimate purposes. The Serbian position was, of course, identical.
The Russian diplomats also insisted that the Romanian officials could
not sequester weapons that belonged legally to Serbia. The successful
transport of arms across the Principalities and Cuza's resolute support
led to even closer relations between the Romanian and Serbian govern-
ments. In February 1863 a Serbian agency was opened in Bucharest; in
March a similar Romanian office was established in Belgrade.
Although no vital interests were at stake in either the Sardinian or
the Serbian arms deliveries, the next episode, involving the use of
Romanian territories by Polish revolutionaries, hit directly at sensitive
and vulnerable areas of Russian policy.49 Ever since the Polish revolu-
tion of 1830, the Principalities had served as a refuge for emigres from
Russian-controlled Polish lands. In addition, many former revolution-
aries lived in other parts of the Ottoman Empire or had entered Otto-
man state service. Throughout the empire committees to forward the
Polish cause were organized, the most effective of which were affiliated
with the Paris-based organization of Prince Adam Czartoryski. At his
death in July 1861 his son Ladislas continued his work. After his elec-
tion, Cuza kept in close touch with Polish agents. One of the most
prominent, Dr. Theophil Gliick, lived in Jassy and was the prince's per-
sonal physician. From Moldavia the Polish organizers maintained
contacts with their counterparts in Galicia and in other Polish-inhabited
lands.
The Polish cause aroused much enthusiasm within the Principalities;
it attracted support from both the left and the right in Romanian poli-
tics. In the country the police, the border guards, and the customs
officials all cooperated with the movement. The Principalities were,
of course, an ideal center for the collection of arms. Weapons were
brought in from the West, past Constantinople, and then up the Dan-
127
 Russia and the Romanian national state
ube to Braila and Galatz. The ships of the French Messageries Im-
periales, among others, were involved in this transport of arms. The
Russian consuls in the Principalities were fully aware of what was hap-
pening and also of the widespread sympathy in the Principalities for
the Polish cause.
In January 1863 a major revolution broke out in the Russian-
controlled Polish lands. Not only was the revolt exceedingly danger-
ous for Russia, but it opened enormous possibilities for other national
movements in Central and Eastern Europe. The situation was particu-
larly delicate for Cuza. Although France, Britain, and the Habsburg
Monarchy all assumed attitudes sympathetic to the Polish rebels, it
was not clear if they would take any action beyond the issuance of
formal diplomatic protests. The Hungarian and Italian leaders too
hoped that the situation would develop to their benefit.
The prince was thus caught between conflicting pressures. The Polish
revolutionary leadership wished to use Moldavian territory. Within
the Principalities there was great enthusiasm for cooperation, among
both the prince's partisans and his foes. Most of the Polish actions
could not be controlled; arms did pass through the country. However,
an incident finally occurred that was so open and blatant that Cuza
had to take action. In July 1863 a group of about two hundred Poles,
Turks, and Italians, led by Colonel Zygmunt Milkowski, who had as-
sembled at Tulcea, crossed into southern Bessarabia at Cahul. The Ro-
manian government obviously could not allow this force to march
into Russian territory, and at the city of Costangalia a Romanian unit
engaged it in combat. Casualties were suffered on both sides. The de-
feated Poles, imprisoned under very lenient conditions, were soon
released.
The attitude of the prince to the Polish crisis was clear; what lay in
the shadows were the sentiments of Napoleon III. Had the French
emperor been willing to fight for Poland, as he had for Sardinia, then
the Romanian leadership would have been eager to lend assistance.
In an effort to extract a clear response, Cuza wrote to Napoleon on
November 11, 1863:
It is without surprise that I have seen several organs of the French press, an-
ticipating events, enumerate the considerable advantages that the United Prin-
cipalities, chosen as a base of operation, would procure for a French army. I
have ascertained with satisfaction that this eventuality would be greeted with
general delight throughout the entire country . . . Sire, Romania, its resources,
its army, its prince, are at the orders of Your Imperial Majesty. Romania,
which would arise as one to repel a Russian or Austrian occupation, would
receive a French occupation with joy.50

128
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
In his reply of December 8/20 Napoleon declared himself touched
by the sentiments in the letter. However, by this time it was obvious
that no effective French aid would be given the Poles.51
The Polish uprising had a ruinous effect on Russian diplomacy. The
French entente was completely broken. Only Prussia had, in Russian
eyes, adopted a satisfactory attitude. Virtually isolated in Europe, the
Russian government henceforth was to look with even greater suspicion
on activities in neighboring lands that carried revolutionary implica-
tions. The Russian diplomats were fully aware of the Romanian senti-
ments. Despite the bitter Russian resentment of the Habsburg attitude
in the Crimean War, the interests of the two countries were obviously
closely bound in regard to national revolutionary conspiracies. In the
future the Russian attitude toward Romanian questions was to come to
resemble that adopted by the Habsburg Empire, Britain, and the Porte,
all of which wished to maintain the status quo in the area. As far as
Cuza personally was concerned, Gorchakov told the Austrian represen-
tative in St. Petersburg: "I leave to you Prince Cuza, who is only an ad-
venturer and will never be anything but a docile instrument in the
hands of the revolution."52
In the next years instructions were repeatedly sent out to the agents
in the Principalities to watch out for signs of revolutionary conspiracy.
In January 1864 Gorchakov wrote to G. G. Offenberg, who had replaced
Giers as consul in Bucharest, that he read with interest reports con-
cerning "the revolutionary intrigues in the United Principalities, above
all those which tend to spread abroad."53 In a letter to the ambassador
in Vienna, Gorchakov commented: "The moral situation of the United
Principalities becomes more intolerable from day to day. There is or-
ganized there, perhaps under a foreign influence, but in any case as a
result of the illusions and ambitious desires of the hospodar, a revolu-
tionary center, which would react inevitably upon the repose of the
neighboring states."54
An even stronger statement on the Principalities was contained in a
letter to the Russian representative in Constantinople, Evgenii Petro-
vich Novikov, of March 1864. Here Gorchakov wrote that the informa-
tion on revolutionary intrigues was of the highest interest, and even
the smallest details should be followed:

It is evident that the revolution wishes to make a supreme effort and that the
Polish, Hungarian, and Italian leaders are in agreement. I would assign to this
fact only a secondary value if the tolerance, not to say the encouragement, of
the French government, or of the agents who make use of its name, did not
give it a force that one cannot treat lightly.

129
 Russia and the Romanian national state
From the information that you sent us and from that which comes to us from
elsewhere, it is more than probable that one of the principal centers, doubly
dangerous because of its geographic position, is established in the United Prin-
cipalities, under the secret protection of Prince Cuza.55
The Russian anger at the prince, expressed in these dispatches, was
caused not only by his attitude on the question of revolutionary con-
spiracy, but on yet another matter of deep concern to Russian interests.
At the end of 1863 the Romanian government sequestered the lands of
the Dedicated Monasteries, an act that brought it into direct conflict
with Russian patronage of Eastern Orthodoxy.

T H E DEDICATED MONASTERIES

In the relationship between Russia and the Principalities no single

matter was to provide greater friction and controversy than the fate
of the Orthodox monasteries.56 Russia's involvement in this affair drew
its representatives deep into the religious controversies of the country
and placed them in the difficult position of standing as intermediaries
between the patriarchs and the Romanian government, backed by its
own ecclesiastics and public opinion.
The Orthodox church in the Principalities, as in the other Balkan
countries, was linked with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Separate
metropolitanates in Bucharest and Jassy were headed by metropolitans
whose nomination had to be approved by the patriarch. In both prov-
inces the monasteries played a particularly significant role in national
life because of the enormous tracts of land under their control. They
thus had economic and political as well as spiritual and religious
influence. The monasteries had been established under different con-
ditions, but one category, the Dedicated Monasteries, caused unique
problems. These institutions were "dedicated" to certain Holy Places,
such as the monasteries of Mt. Athos and Jerusalem, and to the Patri-
archates of Constantinople, Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch. These
institutions had come to depend on the Romanian income. All of the
Romanian monasteries were expected to provide social services, such
as hospitals, schools, and homes for the sick and the aged. Usually the
founders of the monasteries, or those who had made donations to them,
intended the income to be used primarily for charitable purposes. Even
in the case of the Dedicated Monasteries only a percentage of the in-
come, or the surplus, was evidently intended for the support of the Holy
Places. In both Principalities the monasteries controlled about a quarter
of the land, with the Dedicated Monasteries holding about 11 percent.
Although all monastery property was bound to be under attack in an
130
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
increasingly secular age, the Dedicated Monasteries were in a particu-
larly vulnerable position. Not only was a large percentage of their in-
come sent out of the country, but they were not under the control of
either the state or the church hierarchy of the Principalities. Instead
they were administered by superiors, called hegumens, who were ap-
pointed by the Holy Place to which the monastery was dedicated. They
were normally Greeks, and the services were in the Greek language.
Although dedications dated from as early as the seventeenth century,
the status of the institutions changed over the years. Their thoroughly
Greek nature was established in the eighteenth century in the Phana-
riot period. These monasteries had also at this time become closely
attached to the Russian interests. During the wars against the Ottoman
Empire they had served as centers of intelligence and sources of supply.
Like the other Romanian institutions under Phanariot rule, the mon-
asteries suffered from widespread corruption. The profits from the lands
went into the pockets of those who administered the funds; the churches
were not repaired, and the charitable works lapsed. The Holy Places
too suffered, since income that should have been sent to them ended in
private hands.
The major difficulties arose after the revolution of 1821 when the
hegumens, as a result of the Greek revolt, were forced to leave the
country. Although the Russian government insisted on their later re-
instatement, the special position of these institutions came increasingly
under attack. In this matter all elements of Romanian society stood to-
gether. The native clergy resented the privileged position of the foreign
monasteries; the peasants often worked under worse conditions on
church lands than on the private estates. Moreover, after the Treaty of
Adrianople removed the Ottoman control of the grain trade, the boyars
looked with covetous eyes on the rich lands of the church. In fact, it was
to be the great landowners who were to lead the movement against the
monasteries.
During their occupation of the Principalities after 1828 the Russian
officials were forced to deal with the problem. In acute financial distress,
the governments of the Principalities wanted to levy taxes or collect
contributions from the monasteries, as they had done in the past on an
irregular basis. The conflict of views between the governments and the
Greek clerics was made extremely clear at this time. The Romanian
position was that the lands had been given the monasteries to adminis-
ter under the stipulations stated in the original acts of donation. In
other words, the monasteries held in trust funds to be used for certain
purposes, usually charitable, with any surplus to be sent to the Holy
Places. The Greek clerics, in contrast, claimed a right of full ownership.
 Russia and the Romanian national state
They argued that some of the property had been given to them and that
they had purchased other sections. They therefore believed that they
alone should determine how their lands were administered and how
the money should be distributed. They strongly objected to paying any
taxes or to submitting themselves to state regulation. They also ex-
pected their institutions to be treated differently from the other mon-
asteries.
Kiselev faced this problem during his administration. A commission
was appointed, composed of delegates from the Principalities and the
Holy Places. In meetings held in 1832 and 1833 the clerics adamantly
upheld their position: the lands were the property of the Holy Places,
and the hegumens, who were not accountable to anyone, could act as
they wished. They recognized no obligations but the holding of religious
services in the chapels of the monasteries.
At this time the sympathy of the Russian officials, particularly Kis-
elev, lay with the Romanian arguments. They felt that the monasteries
should make some contributions to the state, which would go to the
support of local social services. They also expressed concern over the
administration of the property and the extreme corruption. It was
clear that a large part of the profits was being diverted into private
pockets; both the Principalities and the Holy Places were thus deprived
of needed funds. In order at least to attempt to limit corruption, it was
now proposed that the farming contracts for the monastery lands
should be awarded at public auction. The question of the monasteries
was dealt with in Article 363 of the Organic Regulation for Wallachia
and in Article 416 of that for Moldavia. In practical terms, the settle-
ment of the controversy was simply postponed.57
In 1843, under Russian sponsorship, another attempt was made to
meet the problem. The Russian officials again supported a program
that would have allowed the state to receive a fixed sum or a percentage
of the monastery income, which was to be devoted to charitable pur-
poses or to education.58 The farming contracts were to be let out for a
nine-year term and by public auction, with the leasing supervised by
representatives from the Greek clergy, the government of the Principali-
ties, and the Russian consulates. Although no general settlement was
reached at this time, the Patriarchate agreed to pay a fixed sum of a
million piasters a year for nine years; at the end of this period another
sum was to be agreed upon. Although Bibescu was dissatisfied with the
amount, Sturdza accepted 500,000 piasters for Moldavia.
In 1851 negotiations recommenced, with the Russian representatives
acting as intermediaries. Their aim continued to be to bring the two
sides together and to persuade the monasteries to make a financial
132
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
settlement. Attempts were made to calm the fears of the representa-
tives of the Holy Places and the patriarchs and to assure them that the
Russian proposals did not involve an infringement of their property
rights or their privileges. The Russian agents in the Principalities re-
mained sympathetic to the Romanian desire for a financial contribu-
tion, and they recognized the corruption in the administration of the
lands. In 1851 the consul in Bucharest, Khaltchinskii, reported:
If there were a counsel to give the Greek clergy, it would certainly be that of
being on guard, not against the government of the Principalities, which in
reality is not considering preventing the exercise of their rights, but against the
hegumens, against that crowd of greedy people who live at the expense of the
church and are interested in perpetuating the abuses.59
Although the system of awarding tax-farming contracts by public auc-
tion was introduced, it did not lessen the corruption. These matters
were often now handled between dishonest officials who took payments
from those who wanted the awards.
In the years preceding the Crimean War the Russian government
continued to try to gain an agreement acceptable to both sides; it did
not wish to impose a settlement. The negotiations were held in Con-
stantinople with Ottoman and Russian officials as well as representatives
from the religious institutions participating. The Russian position re-
mained favorable to the Principalities in that the monasteries were
urged to make contributions, in the form of either a block sum or a per-
centage of their income. The figure of a quarter of the revenues, or
65,000 ducats for both principalities, was named. The Russian represen-
tatives were very critical of the attitude of the Greek clergy, who sought
to avoid negotiations and who did not like public auctions or govern-
ment interference in their affairs. With a more realistic attitude, the
Russian government urged the Patriarchates to make an arrangement
under Russian sponsorship, which would assure their rights for the
future. Otherwise conditions might arise that would force them to
accept a far more drastic settlement. And that, of course, is exactly what
happened when the defeat in the Crimean War strongly affected the
ability of the Russian representatives to aid the Greek clergy.60
The religious question became a major issue when the powers were
discussing the reorganization of the Principalities. Not only the status
of the monasteries, but the entire relationship of the Romanian church
to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, came under review. The divans,
arguing that these were entirely internal issues, wished to decide them
without outside interference. The Romanian clergy itself was divided.
Deeply concerned with all Orthodox problems, the Russian govern-
ment desired to continue its role as mediator. Its position, however,
133
 Russia and the Romanian national state
shifted slightly. Since it was no longer the sole protector of the Princi-
palities, it tended to be more concerned about the rights of the Patri-
archates, institutions over which it enjoyed some influence. Moderation,
however, continued to be the main theme, as was indicated in an in-
struction sent to Popov in May 1857 W Easily, who, it will be remem-
bered, was the Russian representative on the International Commission:
"It is to the unity of which the center is at Constantinople that the
church of the East has owed its marvelous conservation through the
secular vicissitudes of the East. On the other hand, it is by respecting
the rights of nationality that the church of Constantinople has been
able to conserve its authority."61
The first serious problem concerning religious affairs in the post-
Crimean era arose in Moldavia and involved not only the monasteries,
but also the question of the establishment of an autocephalous church
organization. Like the other Balkan nationalities, the Romanians, in
advancing toward further internal autonomy, desired to loosen the
bonds with Constantinople. When Greece became independent, one
of the first acts of the government was the establishment of a national
church, despite the fact that the Patriarchate was Greek in language and
culture. Following the same path, the Moldavian authorities wished
to have an independent church and to make its administration a part
of the state apparatus. Once again the Russian government tried to
moderate between the Principalities and the Patriarchate. Basily ar-
gued for a compromise in which the Moldavian authorities would agree
not to interfere in questions involving dogma and rites and the Patri-
archate would not intervene in administrative and disciplinary affairs.
Although he tried to maintain a moderating central position, the Rus-
sian representative believed that the rights of the Moldavian church
were inherent in the nationality of its members. The Orthodox institu-
tions should remain together, but with full recognition of their national
individuality.
The entire question was a very delicate one for the Russian govern-
ment. Although it did favor the granting of more political autonomy
to the Christians under Ottoman rule, it did not want to break the
bonds of unity of the Orthodox Balkan people. A middle position thus
had to be found. As Basily expressed it:

We preach moderation to both sides. By encouraging the aspirations of na-

tionality with a view to ecclesiastical autonomy we can provoke fatal compli-
cations for the future peace of the church of the East, above all in the present
circumstances, and then we will see the natural enemies of the church of the
East use the awakening of nationalities, by all sorts of open and secret means,
in order to sow discord between them and to detach them from the common
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 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
center which has guaranteed for centuries the unity of faith among the Christian
nations of the East.62
Basily himself had to face this contradiction between the national
demands and the unity of the faith directly when the question of the
monasteries was debated in the International Commission. Basily and
Bulwer were entrusted with the task of drawing up a report on church
affairs, and the British representative at this point became the cham-
pion of the Romanian national position. His proposal was that the
right of ownership of the monasteries' property be conceded to the
Principalities, which would in turn surrender to the Holy Places a
quarter of the revenue; or, as an alternative, the Greek clergy should
give up claims on the lands in return for a fixed sum. T h e majority
on the commission - France, Britain, Prussia, Sardinia, and the Habs-
burg Empire - accepted the Romanian argument that the property of
the Dedicated Monasteries was intended principally to support local
pious works and "to contribute subsidiarily to the maintenance of the
convents of the Holy Places." 63
As the sole defender of the Patriarchates, Basily argued in defense of
the position that the land was the absolute property of the Greek clergy
and that the original documents would have to be examined to deter-
mine the status of the property in dispute. T h e disposition of these
possessions was anything but a trivial question for Eastern Orthodoxy.
As Basily explained in the meetings of the International Commission:
The Orthodox church in all of the East has its principal resource in the Prin-
cipalities. The ecclesiastical academy, the numerous schools, and the Greek and
Arab press, all of the recent establishments of the patriarchate of Jerusalem,
as well in Palestine as in Constantinople, the schools founded a few years ago
in Alexandria, in Cairo, and in several other localities are maintained by this
single revenue. The ancient patriarchal seat of Antioch, reduced to an ex-
treme misery and having only three to four million francs of diocesan revenue,
is, however, even able to maintain some schools through the revenue which it
receives from its two convents in Moldavia.64
In these discussions the Porte, also tending to support the patriarchs,
argued that the rights of the monasteries to the property had never
been contested by the princes. It had been argued only that the institu-
tions did not adhere to the conditions under which they had acquired
their lands. Moreover, some land had been given with no obligations
whatsoever attached, and other property had been purchased outright.
The Ottoman position was that the question could best be handled
by negotiations between the Principalities and the church, in which
the Porte would take some part. 65
After examining the differing viewpoints and the report of the In-
 Russia and the Romanian national state
ternational Commission, the conference of Paris of August 1858 adopted
a complicated formula that in practice simply postponed a settlement.
Protocol 13, which was to be the basis for subsequent negotiations,
stated:
The interested parties shall be invited to come to an understanding among
themselves by means of a compromise; in case they do not succeed in coming
to an understanding in a year's time, it will be settled by means of arbitration.
In case the arbiters do not succeed in coming to an understanding, they will
choose an over-arbiter. If, in turn, they find it impossible to agree on the choice
of this over-arbiter, the Sublime Porte will confer with the Protecting Powers
for the purpose of designating one.66
The problems connected with this solution became obvious soon after
the double election of Cuza, when the uncertainty regarding his posi-
tion made the initiation of discussions almost impossible. Hard pressed
for money, the Principalities could not be expected to overlook this
obvious source of funds. In the spring of 1859 the Wallachian govern-
ment announced that it intended to appropriate a quarter of the reve-
nues of the monasteries. When Giers sought an explanation, the
Wallachian secretary of state, S. Falcoianu, explained that a previous de-
cision was being carried out. Although Wallachia had refused the set-
tlement in 1844, the §tirbei administration had in 1855 determined to
collect a quarter of the revenues. Giers, of course, protested and urged
that an agreement be reached with the Greek clergy. The Russian con-
sul personally believed that the monasteries should make some pay-
ments in order to calm public opinion in the Principalities.67 The
Russian officials saw the danger of a major crisis arising that would
place the question again in the hands of the powers, who could not be
expected to be protective of Orthodox interests.
As in previous years, the Russian government regarded this question
as of major importance in its Eastern policy. On May 5/17, 1859, Gor-
chakov instructed Lobanov:
Repeat to our agents in the Danubian Principalities the order to oppose ener-
getically the despoiling of monastery property, an intention that is indicated
in your dispatch No. 58. Prince Cuza should not venture to deviate at all from
the decision contained in Protocol XIII of the conferences of Paris. Not only
would he put himself in contradiction with solemnly guaranteed rights, but he
would incur all the reproof of the powers, who have sanctioned the acts of
Paris and of whom the great majority are today disposed to agree to his double
election, [an act] that is already not in perfect accord with the thought that
has prevailed in the conferences with respect to the reorganization of the
Principalities.68
The official Russian position was now that the representatives of the
Principalities and the Greek clergy should at once commence nego-
136
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
tiations. The wisdom of a voluntary contribution was also expressed.
The situation became even worse in the summer when the Moldavian
government levied a payment of 45,000 ducats on the monasteries. This
amount, it claimed, represented the back payments due on the annual
12,500 previously received but suspended in the Vogoride administra-
tion. The levy greatly disturbed Giers, who recognized the depths of the
passions that could be aroused on the issue. The action, he wrote,
"which cannot be condemned enough, shows the capabilities of the ir-
religious sentiments of the Moldavians and the passionate partiality
that they will probably bring into the discussion on the conflict relative
to the property of the Greek monasteries."69
When it became obvious that the stipulations of Protocol 13 could
not immediately be fulfilled, the powers at the Paris conference in Sep-
tember 1859 agreed to delay by another year the time allowed for a
settlement by negotiation, with the new term commencing a month
after Cuza received his investiture.70 The matter remained the major
single question dominating Russian-Romanian relations in the next
year. Balabin, by then the Russian representative in Vienna, wrote Giers
that the issue was "unquestionably one of the most important that we
have up for consideration and on it will depend to a great extent our
relations with the government of the Principalities. No matter from
what individual or from what part it comes, enmity in that question
will not be forgotten." 71 Lobanov wrote in a similar vein: "This question
of the monastery property rightly preoccupies our ministry which sees
with regret the covetousness of the Moldo-Wallachian government and
its resolutely hostile attitude toward the Orthodox clergy."72
If the Russian government was under conflicting pressures, the posi-
tion of Cuza was even worse. Romanian opinion, including that of the
native ecclesiastical authorities, was strongly opposed to any nonna-
tional influences. This attitude was expressed also in the stipulations
of the constitution drawn up by the Central Commission, which de-
clared the Romanian church to be united with the ecumenical church
in dogma, but independent in canonical, spiritual, and disciplinary
matters. Similarly, the Greek clerics were not to administer property in
the Principalities.
Despite the strength of domestic opinion, Cuza was still bound by
Protocol 13, which the Porte in November 1859 requested that he
implement. Some disagreement occurred over where the negotiations
should take place. The patriarchs chose Constantinople, but finally
yielded to the preference of the Principalities for Bucharest. In January
i860 a Romanian invitation was issued, asking the Patriarchates and
the religious communities connected with the Dedicated Monasteries

137
 Russia and the Romanian national state
to choose representatives, who should bring with them the documents
pertaining to their claims.73 Although the Greek delegates were named
in March, those for the Principalities were not chosen until June. More-
over, no meetings were scheduled.74
Meanwhile, the governments of the Principalities continued to harass
the monasteries. In July i860 the powers in a collective note asked
the Porte to warn Cuza.75 Ali Pasha, transmitting the complaints, told
the prince that the guarantors wished the conditions in relation to the
monasteries to remain as they had been previously and wanted the
meetings among the delegates to begin. The representatives of the Holy
Places had written similar protests.76
Whereas the use of delaying tactics had previously been to the ad-
vantage of the Greek clergy, it was now clearly the best weapon in the
hands of the governments of the Principalities. The animosity against
the monasteries was particularly strong in Moldavia, where Kogalnicea-
nu headed the ministry. Cuza met the pressure from the powers by
setting dates for meetings and then postponing them. Finally, in the
middle of October, the representatives of the Holy Places announced
that the year allowed for negotiation had passed. Since no agreement
had been made, they wished to proceed to step two, that is, to arbitra-
tion. They declared that they had the necessary documents with them
and that the Principalities were violating the previous conditions regu-
lating tax farming.77 After consulting with the powers, Ali, at the end
of December i860, asked Cuza to send arbiters to Constantinople to
meet with the representatives of the patriarchs.78
For the next two years the entire question of the Dedicated Monas-
teries continued to be a matter of endless, fruitless, diplomatic corre-
spondence. As before, the Principalities drew out the discussions as
long as possible. Throughout 1861 their major concern was the achieve-
ment of administrative and legislative unification. The endeavor of the
Porte to initiate the arbitration section of Protocol 13 was, meanwhile,
successfully evaded. In 1862 a similar policy was followed. At the end
of the year, in November, Cuza sequestered the revenue of the monas-
teries and put it in the public treasury; in January 1863 the assembly
attempted to include this fund in the budget. The Porte, under con-
tinual pressure from the patriarchs, tried to intervene, but with no
success.
Meanwhile, the government of the newly united Principalities had
begun a major program of internal reform, many of whose measures
directly affected the religious establishments. Most important, in March
1863, the use of the Greek language in church services was forbidden.
In an effort to explain these and other actions taken against the monas-
138
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
teries, the government in June 1863 sent a long memorandum to the
protecting powers.79 They, in turn, reacted as they had in the past.
The Russian officials, concerned mainly about their Eastern interests,
stood for the implementation of Protocol 13. The Ottoman govern-
ment, having also an obligation to protect the interests of the Patri-
archate, wished the process of negotiation to continue as provided for
in the agreements. This position had the approval of Britain and the
Habsburg Monarchy. In opposition, France, backed by Italy, supported
the Romanian arguments that the religious question was an internal
affair of the Principalities. Finally, in December 1863, the Romanian
assembly cut the process of negotiation short and voted for the seculari-
zation of the lands of all of the monasteries. At the same time a pay-
ment of 51 million lei was offered as compensation to the Holy Places.
The Principalities were thus determined to meet the problem alone.
They had avoided negotiations and had handled the matter as a strictly
internal affair. They had, of course, also once again violated interna-
tional understandings.
The secularization of the monasteries and the complete disregard of
the wishes of the protecting powers, as might be expected, aroused deep
indignation in St. Petersburg. There was, however, little that could be
done. Action was hampered by the repercussions of the Polish revolt
and the fact that Russia had no allies on whom it could count in
Orthodox affairs. Forceful concerted moves were out of the question
because of the French support of the Romanian position. The frus-
trations over the question of the Dedicated Monasteries, together with
the anger felt over the Romanian attitude during the Polish revolt,
combined to turn the Russian statesmen completely against the prince.
They now wished his downfall. In a January 1864 letter to the Russian
representative in London, F. I. Brunnow, concerning a reunion of the
ambassadors at Constantinople to discuss the question of the Dedicated
Monasteries, Gorchakov wrote that, should the representatives wish
to examine, in addition to this problem,
modifications to introduce in the organization of the Principalities, the two
points on which from our part there would be no objections - rather the con-
trary - would be: a reprimand in the most severe terms of the conduct of Cuza,
even if that reprimand should lead to his dethronement - revocation of the
arrangement of the union of the Principalities and in this regard a return to
the former status quo, that is, a hospodar for each of the two provinces.80
The desire to secure the fall of Cuza was also reflected in a letter to
Karl von Knorring, the Russian representative in Vienna. Here the
prince was accused of using the resources taken from the monasteries
to build up the armament of the country in order to serve his "am-
139
 Russia and the Romanian national state
bitious and revolutionary views which none of the conservative powers
can approve and which menace at the same time the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire and the repose of the neighboring states." If his con-
duct led to his fall, the Russian government would certainly not op-
pose it. Gorchakov thought that fears, such as those held by the Porte,
that Cuza would be replaced by a foreign prince were "chimerical,"
since no conservative power would furnish a candidate and all would
oppose "an arrangement that would modify the status quo from top to
bottom."81
Although the Principalities had secularized all of the monastery
lands, the protecting powers were concerned only with those of the
Dedicated Monasteries, since their disposition was provided for in in-
ternational agreements. In the preceding pages the major role played
by Russia as the intermediary between the Greek clergy and the Ro-
manian officials has been emphasized. In this crisis, however, Russia
was in fact pushed aside.82 In the negotiations Britain, in the person of
the ambassador, Bulwer, became the defender of the patriarchs, a policy
that was also supported by the Habsburg Monarchy and the Porte. In
Eastern affairs Britain was a champion of Greek, if not necessarily
Orthodox, interests. France remained the principal spokesman for the
Principalities.
All of the powers, of course, were now acting in an anti-Russian
sense. The Orthodox institutions had been previously considered a
source of Russian influence; a removal of a large part of their income
would reduce their power, an advantage to French and Catholic in-
terests. The British support was given to demonstrate to the Greek-
dominated hierarchy that its real friends were in London, not St. Peters-
burg. The policy meshed with that adopted toward independent Greece,
which was a British client. Much to the indignation of the Russian em-
bassy, the important negotiations were handled between the Patri-
archate of Constantinople and the British embassy. The Russian rep-
resentatives were informed only after the decisions were taken.
The Russian position was thus difficult; the government did not have
the military or diplomatic strength to secure its desires. The basic
Russian program, however, did not differ too much from that of the
majority of the powers. The question was to be handled through a
conference, with Protocol 13 serving as the basis of discussion. The
Russian government was realistic enough to recognize that the prop-
erty would probably eventually have to be surrendered. The aim was
to gain as high an indemnity as possible. For this purpose the rights of
the clergy were to be defended until a satisfactory compromise could be
reached. Because of its historic stand, the Russian government could
140
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
not take the initiative in suggesting major concessions on the Greek
side; as Gorchakov wrote, "The representative of Russia should not
speak out to impose sacrifices on the church of the East." 83
In March Gorchakov received the British suggestions for a settle-
ment. These involved three points: first, Cuza should return the prop-
erty and the revenues to an international commission named by the
representatives of the protecting powers at Constantinople; second, a
careful investigation should be made and the value of the property
determined; and, third, the Principalities should pay an indemnity
equal to the entire value of the properties seized.84 The British gov-
ernment was also in contact with the French, which accepted this
program.
The solution adopted by the powers followed the British proposals.
Meeting in Constantinople in three sessions, held in May, the repre-
sentatives agreed to take Protocol 13 as their point of departure. 85
Since they recognized that its provisions had not been followed and that
the Romanian government had acted in violation of its obligations,
they declared the secularization decree null and void. They also repri-
manded the Romanian authorities for acting beyond their competence.
However, having thus acted, they then proceeded to lay the basis for
the acceptance of the Romanian desire to take the property in return
for an indemnity. The conference agreed to establish a commission
composed of representatives of the Porte and the other powers to study
the question and to set the value of the property. It was to meet in
Constantinople and to draw up a report that would serve as the basis
for further discussions. In the meantime, the revenues of the monas-
teries were to be placed in a special treasury under the surveillance
of the powers.
Although it could not express this opinion openly before the other
powers, the Russian government felt strongly that the representatives
of the Holy Places should negotiate an indemnity and not persist in
their negative attitude of refusing even to admit in principle that such
a solution could be reached. Gorchakov wrote to Novikov that he
should try to influence the Greek clergy: "The moment has come for
them to see the light . . . As for the warm sympathy of the emperor,
that cannot be placed in doubt, but it is clear that neither Our August
Master nor any of the sovereigns represented at the conference will
make war on Prince Cuza over that question."86
The Russian representatives continued thereafter, on the one hand,
to urge the Greek clergy to come to terms and, on the other, to attempt
to press the Romanian government into paying a much higher in-
demnity. Neither effort met with success. The patriarchs remained
141
 Russia and the Romanian national state
adamant. Their attitude was expressed in two notes to the Porte, dated
September 10/22, 1864, and March 16/28, 1865. In both the religious
leaders categorically declared that they would never "consent to the
alienation of the property of the church, nor accept any monetary in-
demnity whatsoever."87
Meanwhile, the relations of the Principalities with the Patriarchates
became even worse. In January 1865 the Romanian church was de-
clared autocephalous. Although the government was willing to raise
the indemnity, it would not, of course, compromise on the seizure.
Although his action increased the prince's popularity at home and re-
sponded to strong domestic pressures, it weakened his position with
the guarantors, who saw it as yet another flaunting of their decisions.
When visiting London at the end of May, Alecsandri was struck by the
strong reaction in Britain, which he blamed on the influence of Bul-
wer, on the question of the secularization.83 The opposition of Russia,
the Porte, and the Habsburg Empire was to be expected, but even the
French government, despite its outward support, was displeased.
The protecting powers had meanwhile also been faced by yet an-
other major crisis in Bucharest.

T H E COUP D'ETAT OF 1864

By the beginning of 1864 Cuza had thus gained the opposition of the
majority of the protecting powers. He faced a similar gathering of hos-
tile forces in internal politics. During 1863 he had taken measures
against the Liberals; Rosetti was arrested in August. The prince's op-
ponents, consisting of both Liberals and Conservatives, sent represen-
tatives abroad to try to win support against him; the growing distrust of
his government in Paris was due at least in part to their efforts. The
Liberals were actively working for the deposing of Cuza and his re-
placement by a foreign prince.
As before, Cuza found that his program of internal reform was
blocked by the assembly, dominated by Conservatives. Although the
question of franchise revision had been dropped while the recognition
of the administrative unification was being negotiated, the prince recog-
nized it as his first priority. Once again he chose to work through the
Porte. In June 1863 he sent Costache Negri a memorandum concerning
his problems in governing and his recommendations on how they could
best be solved.89 He proposed a simultaneous widening of the franchise
and limitation on the power of the assembly, objectives that were to be
achieved through a lowering of the property qualification for voting

142
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
and the creation of an additional legislative body, a council of state,
whose members would be nominated by the prince. Its function would
be to draw up laws and to defend the government's policies before the
assembly. To prepare for the new system the prince wished to suspend
the meetings of the legislature forfiveyears, during which time he would
introduce reforms and prepare a constitution. The prince's political
model was the Second Empire of Napoleon III. Negri presented the
Porte in the fall with a draft constitution, which included provisions
not only for a council of state, but also for a senate.
The protectors observed these events with growing apprehension.
As before, there was little that they could do. A military intervention
was impractical, and the only alternative to Cuza appeared the foreign
prince that no great power wished to see ruling in Bucharest. Gorcha-
kov instructed Offenberg to warn Cuza against further adventures. The
Russian foreign minister believed that Cuza was "taking a great gam-
ble. His faith in the doctrine of faits accomplis blinds him." Russian
opinion remained as before: Cuza did not have "the right to modify
on his own authority institutions invested with the mutual guarantee
of the great powers."90 On this issue Russian policy coincided with that
of Britain, the Porte, and Austria.
Although the relations between Russia and the Principalities reached
their lowest point in December, when the assembly secularized the
property of the Dedicated Monasteries, this measure, which enjoyed im-
mense domestic popularity, united all parties and factions at home.
The proposal was one of a number of reforms introduced by the
Kogalniceanu ministry, which had come into office in October 1863. The
second major question, that of the regulation of the relationship be-
tween the peasants and the landlords, involved the protecting powers
only in that reform had been mandated in the agreements, but it tore
the country apart. All of the Conservatives and some of the Liberals op-
posed it.
In the spring of 1864 this issue dominated all others. The prince and
his ministers stood in opposition to the Conservative legislature. On
April 13/25 the assembly voted a motion of no-confidence in the
Kogalniceanu administration. In the ensuing crisis Cuza first prorogued
the session until May 2/14, and then dissolved the assembly. He next,
in a bloodless coup d'etat made possible by the support and approval
of the army, took complete control of the government. He issued a
proclamation to the country and presented it with a new constitution
and electoral law. Next, following Napoleonic precedents, he held a
plebiscite on a widely expanded franchise to ask for approval of his

143
 Russia and the Romanian national state
measures. The elections were held from May 10/22 to May 14/26; Cuza
received 682,621 votes of approval and 1,307 votes of disapproval, with
70,220 abstensions. Romania was now in effect a dictatorship.
Once again Cuza had unilaterally broken the treaties that determined
the political organization of the Principalities; the protectors were
faced with another fait accompli. In Constantinople the familiar pat-
tern repeated itself. The French representative, Marquis Lionel de
Moustier, supported the coup;91 the majority of the other powers were
indignant about the repeated challenges to their authority. Ali, rep-
resenting their opinion, sent a letter to the prince again asserting that
he did not have the right to alter the laws established for his country
by the treaties.92
Of the powers, Russia expressed the strongest reaction. The coup
simply added to the resentment felt over the Polish issue and the Dedi-
cated Monasteries. The Russian statesmen had previously recognized
that some changes would have to be made in the Romanian political
system; the powers of the prince did need to be strengthened. The Rus-
sian position, however, was that the basic institutions could not be
altered without the prior consent of the Porte and the other powers.93
The major Russian problem continued to be the designation of a suc-
cessor to the Cuza regime, should the prince's position be rendered un-
tenable. There was always the threat of far worse alternatives. A more
conservative regime was obviously impossible to obtain. If Cuza were
overthrown, a foreign prince was probable, and Russia had no serious
candidates. The one Orthodox name, that of the Duke of Leuchtenberg,
was not likely to receive the approval of the other protectors. The
candidate would, it seemed clear, be named by the Liberals, and would
come from a Western European family. With so few choices, the Rus-
sian government stayed with its position of the defense of legality and
the Paris convention. Nevertheless, and despite the misgivings over the
replacement of Cuza, the Russian representatives were willing to take
the risk.
After the coup the Russian government made great efforts to induce
the Porte to take a firm stand. On May 25/June 6 Gorchakov wrote to
Novikov to try to influence the Ottoman ministers in this direction
and to emphasize that the "dignity of the sultan can only be safe-
guarded by himself."94 The other powers could approve whatever mea-
sures were taken, but the initiative had to come from Constantinople.
Although at first the Habsburg Monarchy also supported this view,
it soon adopted another position. France, as usual, blocked unanimity.
Without any chance that effective pressure could be exerted on Bucha-
rest, the powers had little choice but to accept the new situation.
144
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
In June Cuza visited Constantinople. It had been agreed that he
would come to an understanding with the Porte, which would then
submit the results of the discussions for the approval of the other pow-
ers. During his stay in Constantinople, Cuza was obviously under the
patronage of France. He completely ignored the Russian embassy and
did not even make a courtesy visit. Novikov was not a participant in the
negotiations, which were, in fact, kept secret from him. The final agree-
ment was based on a paper drawn up by Bulwer, which was agreed to by
Prokesch and the Porte.95 The project, which was communicated to
the ambassadors in a conference held on June 16/28, 1864, gave Cuza
the concessions he wanted on the reorganization of the government and
the franchise.
The powers' acceptance of the coup was a victory not only for the
prince personally, but also for Romanian national interests. As we have
seen, the protecting powers had hitherto asserted their rights to deter-
mine the internal organization of the Principalities and to interfere
constantly in their domestic affairs. In the new agreement, entitled "Ad-
ditional Act to the Convention of 1859," they in effect recognized the
futility of further efforts in this direction, but in an oblique fashion.
The preamble stated that although "the United Principalities may
henceforth modify or change the laws that regulate their internal ad-
ministration" without outside intervention, they could nevertheless not
alter their relations with the Porte or the treaties existing between the
Ottoman Empire and the other powers, whose terms were also obligatory
for the Principalities.96
Despite Russia's extreme aversion to the course of events in the Princi-
palities, the government had no alternative but to consent to the settle-
ment. In a dispatch to Knorring, Gorchakov expressed the opinion that
the main repercussions would be felt by the Porte and that Russia could
not concern itself about "the dignity of the sultan more than his minis-
ters themselves have shown." The example of Cuza was bound to have
an effect on the other Orthodox nationalities, which would not, however,
be harmful to Russia. In a revealing commentary on Russian Balkan
policy, Gorchakov continued:

One does not escape one's destiny, it is said. If the Porte blinds itself to what
is coming, the interests of Russia, capably managed, will not have to suffer from
the realization of that future which is more or less indicated. We have not en-
couraged nor do we encourage the attempts at emancipation of the Christian
populations under Ottoman domination.

Nevertheless, if the other Balkan people followed the Romanian path,

Russia could benefit by the traditional links with the region:
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
The confederation of emancipated Christian populations is a thought of Em-
peror Nicholas. If the Porte favors it by the course that it has adopted, we have
only to see that it develops on patriarchal bases corresponding to the primitive
nature of these people and to the exclusion as far as possible of the democratic
and revolutionary inspiration of the West.97
Such an occurrence would not be provoked or accelerated by Russia,
which had, however, no reason to fear it.
In 1864, while these events were taking place in the Principalities,
the great powers were far more concerned about other disturbances in
international relations, in particular the crisis over Schleswig-Holstein
and the subsequent Prussian-Austrian war against Denmark. None of
the governments wanted another Eastern crisis. Despite the many
grievances against the prince, Gorchakov in August 1864 instructed
Offenberg not to repulse any advances that the prince might make;
Cuza should not be led to believe that he had burned "his vessels ir-
revocably" in regard to Russia.98 His attitude on the question of the
Dedicated Monasteries would, nevertheless, remain the touchstone of
the relationship.

T H E OVERTHROW O F C U Z A

The prince had reached the high point of his career. He had success-
fully defied the powers, broken international agreements, and seized
dictatorial powers. In internal affairs he was free to carry through the
reforms that he believed necessary. His greatest accomplishment was
the passage of the Agrarian Law of August 1864, which regulated the
relationship of the peasants and the landlords. This settlement, which
was similar to the peasant reform in Russia in the same period, caused
no international repercussions and is therefore not discussed here,
despite its tremendous importance in Romanian history. The changes
were not revolutionary in any sense that could cause alarm in St. Peters-
burg. During the Kogalniceanu ministry a whole series of other laws
was drawn up by the State Council and introduced by decree. Of par-
ticular importance were the Law on Public Instruction and the Civil
Code, both enacted in December 1864.
The sweeping nature of the reforms inevitably increased the num-
bers of those inside the country who opposed the prince and his poli-
cies. In addition, as in the case of all radical reforms, years would be
needed before the favorable effects of the changes could be felt. The
period of radical readjustment, caused in particular by measures taken
in association with the agrarian reforms, was bound to be difficult. Un-
fortunately for Cuza, the Principalities also experienced at this time a

146
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
period of very bad weather, which hurt farm production and added to
the misery of life in the countryside."
Problems were also caused in Romanian political life by the per-
sonal characteristics of the prince. As we have seen, he had not sought
the position; he recognized the desire of his countrymen for a foreign
prince. Moreover, most contemporary accounts picture him as lazy and
erratic, although it is often difficult to coordinate such descriptions with
his very significant achievements.100 His position was in a sense strength-
ened by the fact that both the double election and the union were by
treaty tied to his reign. These stipulations, however, also aroused fears
for the future. Should he die or be overthrown, the country would face
an immediate crisis. Under the circumstances, it was natural that some
should consider the establishment of a hereditary dynasty in the Cuza
family. The problem here was that the prince had no legitimate heirs.
He did, however, have two children with his mistress, Marie Obrenovic.
In May 1865 he adopted the elder son, and later the younger. However,
even if his family relationships had been satisfactory, there was so much
opposition to the idea of a native prince, as well as to Cuza personally,
that this alternative had little chance of success.
By 1865 Cuza had won a formidable array of opponents on both
the right and the left.101 On January 26/February 7 the Kogalniceanu
government was replaced by a ministry headed by Constantine Bosianu;
the prince thus lost the services of perhaps his most able collaborator.
By the middle of 1865 the "monstrous coalition" was again active. Both
Liberals and Conservatives felt hampered by the prince's absolute rule.
Emissaries were sent out again to the capitals - for example, Ion Ghica
went to London and Ion Bratianu to Paris - to prepare the ground for
the future. The conspirators were joined by the conviction that the
Principalities should have a foreign prince chosen from a Western
dynasty.
Of the Cuza reforms, those relating to church matters continued to
arouse Russian anger. The problem of the Dedicated Monasteries had,
of course, not been solved. The Russian government also did not like
other legislation that weakened the ties of the Romanian church to
the Patriarchate. Despite its disapproval of Cuza, the Russian represen-
tatives were in a more difficult position than their colleagues, because no
alternate possibility of advantage to Russia existed should the prince
be overthrown. The Liberals, the "red" party, would undoubtedly
make the decisions, and French influence would increase even more.
After the Polish revolt, France replaced the Habsburg Empire as the
state that the Russian government regarded with the most suspicion.
After the coup and with the introduction of the new political or-
147
 Russia and the Romanian national state
ganization, Offenberg remained intensely pessimistic, as is shown in
his comments on the legislative bodies:
The work of the two assemblies, legislative so-called, which are at present meet-
ing in Bucharest, does not merit any mention. All that takes place in these
chambers has only the worth of a monologue in which the ministry replies to
itself. In spite of the parliamentary display with which the public is amused,
the executive power continues to promulgate organic laws without consulting
the national representation. In order to provide an occupation for the senators
and deputies, they are allowed to flatter the hospodar and his government in
addresses in response to the prince's message. Never perhaps have constitu-
tional forms been parodied in a more shameless manner.
Offenberg was equally critical of Kogalniceanu and his work.
Mr. Kogalniceanu takes us here by surprise every morning with some new law,
or some new institution. Nothing embarrasses that regenerator on paper, he
decides with equal facility the largest as well as the smallest questions . . . It
is true that the greatest part of his activity consists of having the French codes
and regulations translated and in applying them just as they are. 102
When Kogalniceanu left office, Offenberg was happy to see the depar-
ture of a man whose spirit was "restless and superficial" and whose
character was "greedy and despotic/'103
Meanwhile, the mild and conciliatory Novikov had been replaced in
Constantinople in 1864 by Nicholas Pavlovich Ignatiev, who was one of
the most aggressive Russian diplomats of the century.104 Although he
wished to inaugurate a more forceful policy, there was little he could
do to influence the situation in the Principalities. Like those of the
other powers, the Russian agents were at this time approached by rep-
resentatives of the groups or individuals who wished to secure the
overthrow of Cuza. Although they were in strong opposition to the
prince, the Russian leaders certainly did not intend to initiate any
positive actions. Their attitude was well expressed in a letter from Gor-
chakov to Ignatiev in June 1865: "Never will His Imperial Majesty
accord anywhere protection to conspirators. Although Prince Cuza has
given us several just causes for discontent, the emperor will not deviate
in his regard from this invariable principle." Nevertheless, Gorchakov
continued, the Russian government would welcome the formation of a
party in the Principalities that would favor the principles of order
supported by the Russian government and that would serve as a coun-
terweight to the dominating influences in the Principalities. It would
also be good if that party would seek the moral support of the Russian
government and in "strictly confidential ways" ask Ignatiev for advice.
However, "plots hatched in the dark" would not be supported: "It is

148
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
essential above all that nothing like clandestine intrigues even in ap-
pearance falsify the policy of Our August Master/'105
At the same time, Ignatiev was directed in another letter not to dis-
courage Cuza should he seek an agreement. On the contrary, the prince
should be told that a return to the correct path was assured of the
"benevolence" of the Russian government, and "even a warm coopera-
tion." The gauge of Romanian sincerity remained, of course, the treat-
ment of the question of the Dedicated Monasteries.106
Meanwhile, the political situation in the Principalities worsened.
In July 1865 Cuza, who had long suffered from asthma, among other
complaints, left Romania to go to Ems for a cure. In August, during
his absence, a riot was started in Bucharest by fruit and vegetable ven-
dors who did not like a new regulation requiring them to rent booths
in the market. This disturbance took on a different character when a
crowd gathered and proceeded to march against government buildings.
The army intervened, and about twenty people were killed. There were
examples of looting and unnecessary violence by the soldiers. Cuza's
enemies were able to use this incident to increase their own influence
and to discredit the prince abroad.
The opposition had by this time become formidable. A new secret
society was formed with a directing committee composed of representa-
tives of all political directions; it included Lascar Catargiu, Dimitrie
Ghica, Ion Ghica, C. A. Rosetti, Peter Mavrogheni, Ion C. Cantacuzino,
D. A. Sturdza, and N. Blaremberg. In November Ion Bratianu left
for Paris, where he laid the basis for the overthrow of the prince.107
This group was now painting Cuza as the tool of Russia, an attitude
that was reinforced by the reports of the French agent in Bucharest,
J. H. Tillos, who had a similar erroneous opinion.
The August incident not only delivered ammunition into the hands
of Cuza's enemies, but also led to international repercussions. In Sep-
tember Fuad, at this time foreign minister, wrote the prince a letter
on the riot and criticized the use of force.108 Cuza on October 29 / No-
vember 10 sent a strong reply.109 Although nothing came of this ex-
change, the prince was well aware of his weakening situation. There
were also numerous signs that he had lost the sympathies of France. At
the beginning of October he wrote to Napoleon offering to resign
should the French emperor wish it. He had never wanted the throne,
he insisted, and he would willingly return to private life. He would
accept any arrangement Napoleon indicated.110 In his speech opening
the assembly in December 1865 he expressed the same sentiments, de-
claring that he would never allow his "person to be an obstacle to any

149
 Russia and the Romanian national state
event which would permit the consolidating of the political edifice of
which I have contributed to lay the foundation."111
By the first months of 1866 Cuza had not only an unstable internal
situation, but also no strong personal support abroad. All of the pro-
tecting powers favored his maintenance only because they dreaded
another Eastern crisis. Relations between the Principalities and Russia
showed a decided upswing at the end of 1865; there were even some
improvements in the religious controversies. As in his previous instruc-
tions, Gorchakov directed his agents not to discourage any advances
from the prince, although the Russian foreign minister felt no great
confidence in any assurances the prince might give. The Russian atti-
tude was expressed by Gorchakov in October 1865: "We do not work for
the fall of Prince Cuza, but we have no interest in cooperating for his
conservation. If Cuza seriously mends his ways, so much the better, but I
doubt if that improvement will go beyond an obvious maneuver."112
The Russian agents were also aware of the conspiracies being orga-
nized against the prince. Offenberg, for instance, reported on December
31/January 12:
The secret organization of the party of action has made notable progress re-
cently as much in Wallachia as in Moldavia. It includes today all of the honor-
able and patriotic elements of the youth, alongside of many intriguers and a
great number of revolutionaries by profession and vocation. They hope to be
able to undertake something decisive in the spring, but I continue to believe,
my prince, that the government has less to fear from these plots than from the
misery and discontent of the agricultural classes.113
Should Cuza fall, the Russian government was prepared to call for
the separation of the Principalities. Gorchakov hoped to have British
support, but he felt that he could not count on the Porte. "It is diffi-
cult," he commented, "to lay any kind of plans when one is faced
with a government as fearful as that established on the shores of the
Bosphorus." lu The hesitations felt in St. Petersburg about supporting
the Ottoman Empire against a Christian state had obviously weakened.
Until 1866 Cuza had maintained himself in power because he was
able to retain a sufficient number of supporters, and, most important,
he kept the loyalty of the army. In the winter of 1856-1866 the major
factions and politicians joined against him, and they won to their side
some officers, in particular Colonel Nicholas Haralambie. On the night
of February 11 /23 the conspirators acted. Cuza was forced to resign, and
a provisional government representing all of the groups was formed. A
regency was named, and a government led by Ion Ghica was set up. The
overthrow of the prince, a matter long discussed in diplomatic circles,
was thus brought about as a result of an internal conspiracy. There was
150
 The Cuza era, 1859-1866
no foreign involvement. As far as the Russian government was con-
cerned, the time was inopportune: Russia still held some hope that
Cuza would change his policy and even establish a Conservative
government.115
After the abdication members of the consular corps were able to visit
Cuza. Offenberg reported that he was "very calm and resigned, de-
ploring only the part that the national army, created by him, had taken
in the last events." Far from protesting against his overthrow, he ac-
cepted fully and freely all the consequences, and he assured Offenberg
that he had always had the appointment of a foreign prince as his goal.
He would not regret his fate if it contributed to the consolidation of
the nation. He subsequently left for Transylvania.116
The Cuza period, which had thus come to an end, was not a time of
great success for Russian diplomacy. Russia had accepted the double
election, but had expressed severe doubts about the administrative
and legislative union. In two questions, those of assistance to revolu-
tionary conspiracies and of the sequestration of monastery lands, the
Romanian government had persisted in following policies that harmed
major Russian interests. A great handicap under which the Russian
agents worked had been the fact that they had no party with which they
could act in the Principalities, nor did they have political leaders
closely attached to them who would defend their policies. Cuza and
the Liberals looked to France. Although Russia supported the Con-
servatives, this group not only was disunited but it certainly could
never be called a Russian party in any sense of the word. The Russian
government had in fact very little to offer any Romanian political
group. The parties and their members all sought national advancement,
that is, unity and eventual independence. They differed on their in-
ternal, not their foreign, programs. Russia could give support only to
the maintenance of the status quo - not to hope for future gains.
In the years after the Crimean War the Russian leaders were, of
course, severely limited in what they could accomplish in foreign policy.
Gorchakov gave a clear statement of the situation in a letter to Ignatiev
in March 1866, after the fall of Cuza:
Our internal situation, the great reforms in the process of execution, impose
upon us the duty of reducing to the least possible extent our action abroad
and of avoiding all that can interfere with the great work that will be the glory
of the reign of Our August Master and that is called upon to develop in Russia
a strength which, once acquired, will give us all the alliances that we can de-
sire.11?
Russia should not deviate from this attitude, the foreign minister con-
tinued, unless a matter of national necessity arose, like the affairs of
 Russia and the Romanian national state
Poland or other questions having to do with the honor or integrity of
the country.
The policy of retrenchment had, of course, made necessary an entente
with France. Russia could not stand alone in a period of internal up-
heaval. However, France's sponsorship of national movements brought
real dangers in the Polish question and embarrassment in the Balkans.
Although support had traditionally been given to the Balkan Chris-
tians, the Russian government was not in a position in the 1860s to give
strong backing to any fundamental changes in their status. Moreover,
as far as Romania was concerned, the Russian leaders disliked the for-
mation on their borders of a strong Orthodox national unit that looked
to Paris rather than St. Petersburg. These feelings became even stronger
when after 1863 the French entente broke. Then the course of Ro-
manian national development under the leadership of Cuza appeared
to pose threats to Russian interests in the East.
From a Romanian national point of view, the reign of Cuza was a
period of triumphs. With the recognition of the union and the double
election the foundations for the modern state were laid. Despite his
continual problems in domestic politics, Cuza's leadership in foreign
affairs was excellent. He achieved the Romanian goals by the only
means possible for a weak and dependent state - by the use of the fait
accompli and by manipulating the divisions among the protecting
powers. As long as they remained divided, an outside military interven-
tion was impossible, and only such an action could have reversed the
process of national consolidation. Although at the end of the prince's
reign the state was still formally designated the "United Principali-
ties," a Romania in fact existed after 1861.

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 CHAPTER IV

Prince Charles, 1866-1871

T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

After the successful coup the conspirators established a government

whose composition reflected the interests of those associated with the
revolt. Replacing the prince as the executive power were three regents,
General Nicholas Golescu, Colonel Nicholas Haralambie, and Lascar
Catargiu. Ion Ghica, as premier and foreign minister, headed a minis-
try that included both Liberals and Conservatives, with, among others,
Dimitrie Ghica as minister of interior, Ion C. Cantacuzino as minister
of justice, Peter Mavrogheni as minister of finance, C. A. Rosetti as
minister of education and religious institutions, and Major Dimitrie
Lecca as minister of war.
The assembly that had been chosen after Cuza's coup remained in
place and was now called upon to ratify the choice of the foreign prince
named by the revolutionary leaders - Philip of Flanders. This candi-
date, the brother of the king of Belgium, had not been previously
consulted on his selection, and he refused the office. The principal task
of the new government then became to find another candidate as soon
as possible. As long as the uncertainty existed, the country was in a pre-
carious political situation. Moreover, the internal economic conditions
were very bad. The state had a debt of twenty-one million lei. Until a
stable regime could be established, this situation could not be ade-
quately dealt with.
The ouster of Cuza was accompanied by a repudiation of many of the
changes he had made in the political structure of the state. A new con-
stitution was thus necessary, and the drafting of such a document was
commenced in February under the direction of Rosetti. In March it was
153
 Russia and the Romanian national state
presented to the ministry, but it was not considered by the legislature
until June. In the meantime, new elections had to be held. On March
18/30 the chamber was dissolved, and the voting was held in April.
Although its task was clear, this chamber was not called a constituent
assembly.
In all these questions, it will be noted, the provisional government
acted as if it were not subject to the supervision of the Porte or the
protectors. The new leaders strongly maintained that the choice of a
prince and the reorganization of the government were matters of in-
ternal concern only and not subject to outside intervention. The great
powers, of course, had other views. The overthrow of Cuza, in fact,
brought into force sections of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, the conven-
tions of August 1858 and September 1859, and the firman of December
1861.
Although the European governments did not receive a direct fore-
warning of the coup, they all knew that the situation in the Principali-
ties was extremely unstable.1 After the event the immediate reaction
was toward cooperation on the basis of treaties to see that the procedure
laid out previously was followed; no attempt was made to restore the
prince.2 It was generally felt that his ouster was the result of his own
mistakes. Immediately after the coup became known, Ali called for
the convoking of a conference of the guaranteeing states at Constanti-
nople, and he sought the assurance that the terms of the understandings
of 1858, 1859, and 1861 would be applied. The agreement on union
had been only for the reign of Cuza; the Porte wanted separate elections
held in the two principalities. It also wished to send Ottoman commis-
sioners to supervise the situation. Hints were dropped that the best
guarantee of tranquility would be an Ottoman occupation.3
Observing the revolution from the Romanian capital, Offenberg
commented that the events taking place had more of a carnival than a
revolutionary character. Nevertheless, the usual Russian fears occa-
sioned by political changes in the Principalities were again aroused.
The consul was concerned over anarchical conditions and the possibility
of "excesses," such as the election of a foreign prince or a declaration of
independence should there be no intervention from the outside. He
recognized that the nomination of a foreign prince would not be to the
Russian advantage, since his chief support would rest on states whose
policies were inimical to Russia. The time was not right for this change.
At first Offenberg supported the idea of an Ottoman intervention, but
he soon changed his mind.4
Gorchakov's reaction was complicated. On February 14/26 he sent
instructions to Offenberg to maintain an "absolute reserve," but to

154
 Prince Charles, 1866-1871
keep his government informed of any changes.5 Gorchakov then turned
his attention to Constantinople and, as in 1864, attempted to persuade
the Porte to take actions in the Russian interest. In its negotiations with
the other powers the Russian government ostentatiously supported the
Porte. It was announced, for example, that the opinion of the Porte
would be sought before Russia accepted the French suggestion of the
convocation of a conference at Paris.6 Since the Ottoman reply was long
delayed, the Russian government could also put off any decisions. No
disapproval was expressed to the Ottoman desire to send a commis-
sioner, who would, according to the stipulations of the treaties, be ac-
companied by delegates of the other powers.
The Russian minister's real intentions were made clear in a letter
to Ignatiev. Russia, Gorchakov wrote, did not intend to act directly in
the Principalities; Offenberg had been instructed to remain quiet. Rus-
sian desires were to be secured instead through the instrumentality of
the Porte. Ignatiev was instructed to urge the Ottoman leaders to take a
strong stand and to strengthen their character and courage, but he was
not to apply direct pressure toward this goal. The ambassador, Gorcha-
kov suggested, could approach the matter indirectly, for instance, by
suggesting ideas that might have occurred to him had he by "accident
of birth" been called into "the councils of the sultan." It was clear, the
letter continued, that the majority in the Principalities - in fact, it was
perhaps a unanimous opinion - favored a foreign prince. It would, how-
ever, be very difficult to find a suitable candidate from an acceptable
dynasty who would consent to be a vassal of the sultan. Should the
Romanian people be convinced that a foreign prince was not a practical
idea, the Russian minister believed, they would return to the idea of
separation. Gorchakov, like most Russians in official life, was con-
vinced that this move would find support, particularly in Moldavia. The
Ottoman government was in the best position to act in this direction.
Its attitude was clear; it had accepted union only for the reign of Cuza.
A return to the former political conditions could be supported. The
Porte could also use any disillusionment with the impossibility of
finding an acceptable foreign prince "in order to incite the separatist
dispositions that exist already in these localities," and if the Ottoman
government had the competency, it could "lead the populations to de-
clare themselves for separation." The basis of the French arguments
for union was that it was the desire of the Romanian people; should this
be shown to be otherwise, then the powers would not support it. Britain,
Gorchakov recognized, would stand with France. The impossibility of a
return to Cuza was accepted.7
Ignatiev was instructed not to state the Russian views openly or to
155
 Russia and the Romanian national state
take any formal initiatives. Instead he was to argue for them indirectly
in conversations with Ottoman leaders. He could express as a personal
opinion the suggestion that a demarche of the Porte to the powers in the
sense outlined would be a good idea. Gorchakov also made it clear that
the opinions expressed in his letter were supported by the tsar. The
difficulty of this backdoor approach was recognized. On February 15/
27 Gorchakov wrote to Pavel Petrovich Oubril, the Russian representa-
tive in Berlin, that the task was delicate.8
The Russian position was based on an apparently strong conviction
that real sentiments for separation existed. The reports of Offenberg
and the Russian consul in Jassy strengthened this opinion. Gorchakov
had strong family ties with just that element in Moldavia which most
disliked union. As he wrote to Count Ernest Stackelberg, the Russian
ambassador in Vienna: "We have reason to believe that if pressure is
not exerted on Moldavia, such as the sending of troops that the pro-
visional government has directed there . . . Moldavia would return
voluntarily to the former order of things."9 Gorchakov, as we have seen,
admitted that the first wish was for union with a foreign prince; it was
thus important that this alternative be excluded. Any armed interven-
tion by the provisional government in Moldavia in support of union
also had to be blocked.
Since direct Russian intervention in the affairs of the Principalities
would cause severe international complications, Gorchakov throughout
the next weeks continued to seek to use the Ottoman government as
his instrument. In another letter to Ignatiev he again urged that the
Porte be encouraged to take a strong stand: "One cannot support a man
who gives up himself." He did not like the fact that the conference
would be held in Paris because he regarded Safvet, who as the ambas-
sador there would be the Ottoman delegate, as weak. He was also not
above encouraging positive Ottoman action in the Principalities to
secure a vote against union. It was important, he emphasized, that the
other powers see that separation was the desire of the people; and it
"remains to be known if the Porte has enough ability and credit to
obtain a local vote in favor of separation. It seems to me that the at-
tempt should be made or at least the Porte should take this endeavor
into its calculations."10
A further statement of Gorchakov's conviction of the importance of
encouraging a separatist movement is contained in his letter to Ignatiev
of February 24/March 8.
The instructions that I addressed to you previously by order of the emperor
will have made known to you the value that is attached to a separatist move-
ment declaring itself in the Principalities. It is the best argument to oppose
156
 Prince Charles, i866-i8yi
to the doctrines supported by France. I have told you that the Porte should
show here all its ability. We reserve for you to give our agents in Bucharest
and Jassy secret directions that they should follow with prudence.
We have touched on this question in our confidential instructions to Baron
Budberg. Our consuls should watch with the greatest vigilance the intrigues of
the provisional government having for their object the exercise of pressure on
the separatist dispositions in Moldavia and even, if there are any, in Wallachia.
They should give us an account in the greatest detail, in order that from our
side we can make use of it.11
Although separation was strongly desired, Gorchakov did not want
the Russian consulates to act in an open, blatant manner. Offenberg
was instructed to limit his activities to three tasks: he was to see that the
provisional government did not do more than assure public order;
he was to make certain that no pressure was exerted on those who
wanted separation; and he was also to "encourage discreetly" the sepa-
ratists, or at least let them know that care was being taken that "their
convictions were not done violence to." All of these actions were to be
carried through with caution.
Here you will find yourself on a very delicate ground that will require all your
tact and above all your prudence. We desire separation, because it is most in
conformity with our interests and we believe it also most favorable to those of
the Principalities. But we would follow a false path if we set ourselves up as
propagandists. Such an attitude, if it became obvious, would immediately bring
forward the action of contrary opinion abroad. - We should avoid local con-
tests.12
Although at this time the Russian government was supporting a
program directly opposed to Romanian national desires, the former
paternal attitude was maintained and the "people" were regarded as
apart from the "government." A ministerial instruction of February
23/March 7 stated:
Certainly, the hostile attitude of the Romanian government toward us and
toward the church of the East should give us the right to withdraw from it the
benevolent protection that we have at all times shown it. Nevertheless, the em-
peror does not consider the populations of Moldavia and Wallachia responsible
for the errors of the government that they have just overthrown. Besides, we
are not able to forget that it is a question here of a principle that includes the
entire body of the Christian populations of the East to whom our traditions
have always made us sympathetic.13
The Russian policy was thus set. In the negotiations with the powers
the representatives were to support legality; the terms of the treaties
calling for the separation of the Principalities were to be followed.
The argument was to be used that such a course of action conformed
to the wishes of the Romanian people. The powers, moreover, should
 Russia and the Romanian national state
exclude the possibility of a foreign prince. Once this alternative was
removed, it was believed that the Romanians, if consulted, would vote
against union. In the negotiations, however, the Russian government
would not lead in the insistence on the enforcement of the treaties. The
Porte was to take a firm stand and require the maintenance of its rights.
Although well expressing Russian interests, this program had certain
grave weaknesses that soon became apparent. Most obvious was the
mistaken belief that there was a strong undercurrent of support for
a division of the state should a foreign prince be excluded. Even worse,
perhaps, was the attempt to rely on the Porte. Russia certainly could
not stand openly as the champion of the Ottoman government in its
relations with its Christian subjects, but the Porte fully realized how
futile previous protests had been. Without a right of military interven-
tion, which the guarantors would not grant, there was not much that
could be done. Fuad told Ignatiev that his government was not con-
cerned as much about losing the Principalities as about the principle
of the integrity of the empire. Once the idea of national separation
crossed the Danube, the radical solution of the Eastern Question would
follow, to the benefit of France.14 Like the Russian, the Ottoman offi-
cials were particularly eager to avoid the choice of a foreign prince. Ali
even told Ignatiev that he would prefer the annexation of the provinces
by one of the conservative powers, because otherwise the other Chris-
tian people would be encouraged.15 The annulment of the union was
recognized as very difficult. If they had to retreat, the Ottoman leaders
were willing to accept another native prince, perhaps Ion Ghica.16
Another major flaw in the Russian, which was also the Ottoman, posi-
tion was the lack of strong supporters or a party through which the
Russian diplomats could work. The overthrow of Cuza had been ac-
complished by a coalition of the active and energetic forces in the
Principalities; they remained in control of the provisional government.
Cuza had accepted his abdication. There was no organized group of
aggrieved politicians. Moreover, the Russian government did not
even have possible friendly candidates for the position of prince, either
for a united country or for separate principalities. France had such a
man in Prince Bibescu.17 Other names that were being discussed, such
as Ion Ghica and Gregory Sturdza, had been hostile to Russian policies
at times in the past.18
Meanwhile, the Russian government prepared for the meeting of the
guarantors. Despite the Ottoman and Russian desire for a conference
in Constantinople, most powers agreed that Paris, where a meeting had
already been called to ratify an act concerning the European Com-
mission of the Danube, was a preferable site. Although Russian consent
 Prince Charles, 1866-1871
was given, the choice of Paris brought up another difficulty for Gor-
chakov, because Budberg would be the representative at the conference.
At the time that the decision was taken, Budberg was in St. Peters-
burg. In strong disagreement with Gorchakov on policy both toward
France and toward the Principalities, he wished to draw up his own in-
structions for the meeting. In contrast to his superior, he favored co-
operation with France and support of union. Gorchakov, it was re-
ported, threatened to resign over the issue.19 Although the foreign
minister gained his way, Russia was represented by a delegate who did
not really approve of the policy of his government and who was bound
to be less than enthusiastic in presenting the official position.
The instructions that Budberg received were similar to those ex-
pressed in the letters to Ignatiev, but in some respects weaker. Again
the Russian desire to secure a return to 1858 was stated, but the ambas-
sador was cautioned not to take a firm stand. The strong position was
to be assumed by the Ottoman delegate; Budberg was simply to offer
support. Should the Ottoman representative retreat, the Russian condi-
tions would be similarly modified. Although the tsar wished a separa-
tion of the Principalities and believed that this step conformed to the
Romanian wishes, Budberg was to take no initiative in this regard;
the Russians should not "give the appearance of ardently desiring such
a solution." He was to support the principle of the return to the conven-
tion of 1858; the Porte could be expected to demand its application.
However, should the idea of union prevail and "the opposition of the
Porte weaken before the pressure of the cabinets," then Budberg should
also shift his position. Should the question of consulting the wishes
of the population arise, the ambassador was to agree but to insist that
these be expressed without outside pressure. Should the question of
union come to the point of decision, Budberg was to refer back to St.
Petersburg. Russia also was not going to suggest a candidate to replace
Cuza. The instruction did not directly deal with the question of the
foreign prince.20
In this crisis, as previously, it will be noted that the Russian govern-
ment made a great effort to avoid openly opposing the national de-
mands of a Balkan Orthodox people. The separation was justified on
the grounds that it was the true wish of the Romanian people as well
as the legal condition based on the treaties. Russia was willing to sup-
port strong Ottoman decisions and measures, but not to initiate them
alone. The instruction cautioned Budberg to express himself with cir-
cumspection, particularly since Russia found itself on the side of the
suzerain power and opposed to the Romanians. It appeared that the
Western courts were now acting as their defenders even at the risk of

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 Russia and the Romanian national state
injuring the Porte, which they had previously supported. This position,
which was not in the Russian interest, perhaps explained the tolerance
of these governments for the Principalities. Budberg was thus, the
instructions cautioned, to be very prudent in his language:
We support the maintenance of treaties, because they exist and they are for
the Principalities themselves a guarantee of security; but, if deviations from
these treaties are admitted by the powers and should they conform to the real
and legally verified wishes of the populations, it is not fitting for us to place
an obstacle to them; our task would be, on the contrary, to extend this prece-
dent to all the Christian nationalities of the East.21
The policy of the Russian government, thus clearly stated, not only
conformed to that of the Ottoman Empire, but should also have won
the approval of Austria and Britain, two powers that supported Otto-
man integrity and that had not been strong partisans of union in the
past. However, once again Romanian events were to be decisively influ-
enced by parallel crises in other parts of Europe. The Austro-Prussian
quarrel over Schleswig-Holstein and the discussions over the fate of
Venetia were of more concern to the powers than the Romanian ques-
tion. Moreover, the general European situation had placed France
again in a pivotal position in diplomatic affairs. Austria, Prussia, Italy,
and Britain all sought its support, and it exerted great influence in
Constantinople.
French official policy remained at this time in line with the tradi-
tional support of union and a foreign prince. Nevertheless, since
France, like the other powers, considered Romanian issues as of sec-
ondary importance, its government was willing to sacrifice the concept
of a foreign prince in order to maintain the European concert. The
emphasis was thus placed on the maintenance of the union. French
policy was not exactly benevolent. In March, April, and May the gov-
ernment was again involved in discussions concerning the possibility
of using the Principalities as compensation to Austria for the surrender
of Venetia. Thus, despite the strong words expressed in support of
Romanian national aims, Napoleon III was willing to hand over the
country to the Habsburg Monarchy.
Whereas French aims appeared defined, British policy under the lead-
ership of Lord Clarendon was weak and contradictory. The government
was caught among conflicting desires: maintaining the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire, abiding by treaty stipulations, and following the
wishes of the Romanians. It was also felt that the powers should not use
force to carry through their decisions. Paramount in British calculations
was the attitude of France. Britain wished to maintain a close under-
standing with France in European and Mediterranean affairs. As will
160
 Prince Charles, 1866-18J1
be seen, the British government eventually met its dilemma over Ro-
manian affairs by simply following, although with protests, the French
direction.
The most difficult decisions were made in Vienna. As we have seen,
in previous crises Austria had stood strongly for the maintenance of
Ottoman rights and for the separation of the Principalities. Unlike
the Western powers, the monarchy had a direct interest in blocking
Romanian national gains. Logically, the government should have co-
operated with the Porte and Russia, with the aim of securing a return
to the conditions of 1858. However, in view of its strained relations with
Prussia and Italy, Austria could not afford to break with France. Openly
and officially the Austrian government thus had to associate itself with
the power whose friendship was needed in German affairs. It was recog-
nized that not only union but perhaps independence might have to be
accepted. Even the appointment of a foreign prince could be approved
as long as the candidate was not from the family of an enemy power,
for instance, the house of Savoy.22
Although the Habsburg first concern was relations with Paris, the
monarchy could not afford to antagonize the Russian government too
greatly. Moreover, the Russian stand reflected the basic Habsburg in-
terest. Indirect actions, such as encouraging Russia to support Ottoman
resistance to union, could be taken. The Habsburg government ap-
parently also shared the Russian belief that a really free election would
bring a vote for separation.
The reaction of the other two protecting powers, Italy and Prussia,
was strictly self-serving. Openly, Italy supported Romanian national
aims; privately, negotiations for the exchange of the Principalities for
Venetia were actively promoted. The Prussian position was directly
tied to the German question; the Prussian minister-president, Otto von
Bismarck, was eventually to find the Romanian problem a welcome di-
version and another card in his complicated game.
At first, it is interesting to note, all of the major powers shared
the common belief that the Romanian search for a foreign prince would
fail because no member of a suitable family would accept the position.
The states were also unanimous in their support in principle of the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire and their opposition to Romanian
independence. They all wanted to avoid an Eastern crisis at a moment
when hostilities threatened to break out in Central Europe. Similarly,
they approved of the concept of consulting the wishes of the Romanian
population, because each government was convinced that a free elec-
tion would produce an expression of its own desires.
Between February 26/March 10 and May 23/June 4 the conference
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
met in ten sessions in Paris. The president was the French foreign minis-
ter, Edouard Drouyn de Lluys. Britain was represented by Cowley,
Austria by Richard Metternich, Prussia by Count Robert von der
Goltz, Italy by Constantine Nigra, the Ottoman Empire by Safvet Pasha,
and, of course, Russia by Budberg. In these meetings the contradictory
positions of the guaranteeing powers soon became obvious. The first
meeting was largely formal in character.23 Budberg had not yet returned
from St. Petersburg. Although his second in the embassy, Chicherin,
attended, serious negotiations were delayed, on Russian insistence, until
the arrival of the ambassador.24 Safvet, however, did state the Ottoman
position: the conference should be based on the treaties, and the ques-
tion of a foreign prince should not be discussed. The representatives
all agreed that identical telegrams should be dispatched to the consuls
in Bucharest, instructing them to inform the provisional government
that its responsibility was principally to maintain order; no measures
were to be taken that would exceed its powers or prejudice the decisions
of the conference. The Romanian government was thus expected to wait
patiently until the conference should transmit its decisions on the future
political organization of the Principalities.
At the second meeting, held on March 6/18, Budberg stated the Rus-
sian position: the rules of 1858 were to apply on the vacancy in the
hospodarship.25 The problems to be met in this regard were then dis-
cussed. Since 1858 not only had a single prince been elected for both
principalities, but the administrations had been merged. The problem
of disengaging the political institutions of the country was recognized
as great. The representatives then proceeded to discuss the question of
union. Budberg expressed the Russian opinion that the Romanians
should have the opportunity to give their views on the subject; Russia,
he declared, was convinced that the majority of Moldavians wanted
their own government. They would agree to union with a foreign
prince, but that was not acceptable. He wished a separate vote taken in
Moldavia and Wallachia for assemblies that would choose two rulers.
At the end of this meeting the representatives agreed that they would
have to consult their governments before proceeding further.
Meanwhile, a Romanian delegation consisting of Falcoianu and
Bratianu had arrived in Paris, but the two were denied admission to the
conference. The French government, however, agreed to their sub-
mission of a memorandum stating the viewpoint of the provisional
government. Ion Balaceanu was at this time the official Romanian
agent in Paris. Through the delegation and the agency, the government
in Bucharest received full information on the actions of the powers,
although the meetings of the conference were in theory secret.26
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 Prince Charles, 1866-18J1
Again in the meeting of March 19/31 the representatives failed to
take any definite action.27 Budberg announced that his instructions
had not arrived, so no decisions could be taken. Cowley quite correctly
brought up the fact that the powers had to take action soon because of
the conditions in the Principalities. Nevertheless, the discussions con-
sisted primarily of restatements of each government's position. Budberg
repeated that union was not the desire of the Romanian population.
To prove his point he read a dispatch from the Russian consul in Jassy
stating that the provisional government had sent an agent to work for
union and had brought in a battery of artillery. Union was popular
only with a foreign prince.28 Russia could not, Budberg declared, agree
that "freedom of opinions be suppressed in Moldavia/' 29
By the session of March 23/April 4 Budberg had received further
instructions.30 Again the former arguments were repeated. Russia wished
two separate assemblies to be chosen; elections were to be held to de-
termine the true wishes of the population. It was argued that the major-
ity had wanted union in 1858, but the experience of the reign of Cuza
had caused a change of attitude. The Russian position was, of course,
supported by Safvet, who, in addition, wanted assurances that no foreign
prince would be allowed by the guarantor states. Russian agreement
was assured on this point. The opposing view was presented by France.
Drouyn argued that the Principalities should make their own decisions;
the powers should intervene only if there was a direct violation of
treaties. The French support of union was backed unenthusiastically
by Britain, whose government saw no practical way of separating the
Principalities. This measure could be accomplished only by the use
of force, which Britain opposed. Fears were also expressed that either
a republic or independence would be declared. It was also clear that
the British government would accept a foreign prince if one could be
found.
With this division of opinion the conference could accomplish little.
The Ottoman Empire and Russia stood together in favor of positive
action, but neither power was willing to risk separating itself from the
majority and acting alone. Since a common program could not be
adopted, the powers could do nothing. They agreed that the responsi-
bility would be placed on the provisional government and that they
would wait to see what happened in Bucharest. The consuls there were
instructed to warn the new government not to break the treaties and
not to change the basic relationship with the Porte. The conference
then adjourned; there was agreement only on the general principle of
Ottoman integrity. The conference would wait and only later examine
and pass judgment on the actions of the Romanian government. A new
163
 Russia and the Romanian national state
session could be held if necessary on the request of any of the members.
Gorchakov, as might be expected, was highly displeased with the
results of the conference and with the attitude of the powers. He was
particularly concerned that a clear position had not been taken on the
issue of a foreign prince. Since he recognized that this was the first
wish of the Principalities, he wanted this possibility clearly eliminated
before any sort of a vote was taken. Budberg was now sent instructions
in this sense. Gorchakov wanted the powers to make a categorical decla-
ration on the question and to destroy unrealizable Romanian illusions.
He also did not want the existing chambers, which had been appointed
by Cuza, to make the decisions. He would not accept "a bastard union
extorted by terror or falsehood by vote of deputies without a regular
mandate/' 31
In a conversation at this time with Count Frederick Revertera, the
Habsburg representative in St. Petersburg, Gorchakov expressed what
was undoubtedly a true Russian view of the situation in the Principali-
ties and the source of his exasperation:
The Principalities are the work of Russia, who made them by her battles and
by her treaties with Turkey. She has endowed them with institutions better
than those that were substituted afterward. And if the collective protectorate
of Europe had not come to take the place of that of Russia, tranquility would
reign there still, and Europe would have one embarrassment less on its hands.32
While the powers thus debated futilely in Paris, changes proceeded
in the Principalities. Two important events greatly affected the Rus-
sian position: first, the provisional government found the candidate
it needed for the vacant throne, and second, a separatist uprising oc-
curred in Jassy. Of the two events, the first was, of course, of far great-
er significance. As we have seen, the powers had acted on the assump-
tion that a suitable prince could not be found.

T H E ACCESSION OF A FOREIGN PRINCE

Who first suggested the name of Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen

is not clear.33 Most contemporary observers believed that he was the
French choice, but Napoleon III later categorically denied it. Neverthe-
less, Napoleon knew of the negotiations; Drouyn gave the impression
that he approved.34 The candidature probably resulted from the com-
bined efforts of Hortense Cornu, a close friend of Napoleon and of the
Sigmaringen family, and of Ion Bratianu, who recognized the immediate
need of his country for a prince. With the refusal of Philip, the pro-
visional government showed itself willing and eager to take any can-
didate suggested by France. Napoleon, who at the time felt that his
164
 Prince Charles, 1866-1871
interests were best served by cooperation with the powers, declined
to name a candidate officially. He was also still involved in the nego-
tiations that would have made the Principalities an object of compen-
sation for Austria.
There were, in fact, few available princes; the Romanian government
needed a candidate at once. Charles had from the beginning been con-
sidered along with other German princes. He had certain outstanding
advantages. Not only was he a member of the Catholic south German
branch of the Hohenzollern family, but his maternal grandmother was
Stephanie de Beauharnais, the adopted daughter of the first Napoleon.
His other grandmother was from the Murat family. He thus had ties
with both the Prussian king and the French emperor. His age, twenty-
five, was also suitable.
On March 18/30 Bratianu traveled to Diisseldorf to meet with
Charles and his father, Karl Anton. The Romanian agent proposed
that Charles take the throne and claimed that he spoke with the ap-
proval of Napoleon III. Charles, although he showed himself eager for
the position, replied that he could not accept without the permission
of the Prussian king, William. The prince did not consider the fact that
he would be an Ottoman vassal a hindrance to his acceptance. He
regarded the tie with the Porte as a protection until the state could
stand alone; then the connection could be broken. Despite the fact that
he had not received a clear acceptance, Bratianu telegraphed Bucharest
on March 20/April 1: "Charles of Hohenzollern accepts the crown
without conditions. He has been immediately put in touch with Na-
poleon III." 35 Balaceanu, at this time the Romanian agent in Paris,
similarly informed his government that Charles had accepted without
conditions. Bratianu then returned to Bucharest to assist in the prepara-
tions for a plebiscite that was to be held between April 2/14 and
8/20.
The candidacy of Charles raised serious misgivings in the Prussian
government, particularly on the part of the king. It had been a strength
of the Prussian position, especially in regard to Russia, that the state
had no interests in the Eastern Question. In his conversations and let-
ters on the subject William showed extreme hesitancy, fearing the
reaction of the powers. Should the conference accept the idea of a
foreign prince, the matter would be different, but the king felt bound
by his participation in the cooperative European action. The crown
prince, Frederick, and Bismarck were more encouraging. Largely con-
cerned with the German question, Bismarck was primarily interested in
seeing if the candidacy could be used to advance the Prussian cause.
Since he placed a first emphasis on relations with St. Petersburg, he had
165
 Russia and the Romanian national state
to pay close attention to the Russian views. Nevertheless, his advice,
always given as a "personal opinion," tended to become increasingly
optimistic. During this period Charles and his father both tried repeat-
edly, but without success, to obtain an open French reaction.
Meanwhile, the plebiscite was held in the Principalities. On April
4/16, before the vote was in fact concluded, Bratianu telegraphed to
Karl Anton: "Five million Romanians acclaim Prince Charles as their
sovereign."36 Although the results of the plebiscite did not involve
such a high number, the results were impressive. In a tightly controlled
election Charles received 685,696 votes out of 686,193 cast. After re-
ceiving Bratianu's telegram, Charles informed his father that he in-
tended to accept the throne even against the will of the conference
and to proceed to the Principalities.37 The problems of dealing with
the Prussian king and bringing the prince to Bucharest still remained.
William's reaction continued to be discouraging. However, although
he did not openly agree to the candidature, he certainly did not clearly
declare against it. In a letter to Karl Anton of April 2 /14 he advised the
prince to wait. The king was chiefly concerned about the conference
and the dangers of involvement in the Eastern Question. He also em-
phasized the importance of the Russian reaction and advised Karl
Anton: "If you want to follow the matter therefore further, then your
son must before all win the agreement of Russia."38
The most positive encouragement came from Bismarck, who had
come to see the candidacy as an advantage for Prussia. In a meeting with
Charles on April 7/19 he strongly urged the prince to act: "You are
by a whole nation unanimously elected as prince; follow this call, go
directly to the land to whose reign you are summoned."39 As far as the
problem of royal approval was concerned, Bismarck advised that the
prince should go without it and thus take from William's hands the
necessity of making a difficult and embarrassing decision. Charles was
an officer in the Prussian army. He should ask for leave from his military
command; the king would understand. Neither he nor Bismarck as
Prussian minister-president could give formal assent. Once Charles was
in Romania the matter would be settled; the powers would protest, but
do nothing further. The policy of the fait accompli was the best and
most honorable means of solving the problem. Bismarck further ad-
vised Charles to pay particular attention to Russia. The prince should
send the tsar a letter declaring that he saw Russia as his protector and
hoped with Russia "some day to solve the Eastern Question."40 The
idea of a Romanov marriage was also to be considered. Bismarck re-
garded the Russian reaction as of first importance.
Before making his final decision, Charles saw William again. The king
166
 Prince Charles, 1866-1871
not only wished Charles to wait, but expressed the opinion that it was
unworthy of a Prussian prince to be the subject of the sultan. Charles
replied that he would take the position only with the intention of win-
ning "full independence on the battlefield for the land that had today
elected him."41
Finally, on April 25/May 7, Charles informed Bratianu that he
would accept the throne.42 He then made preparations to leave. The
only practical route to the Principalities was through the Habsburg
Empire, but because both the Prussian and Austrian armies were in the
process of mobilization, utmost secrecy had to be observed. As a Prus-
sian officer, Charles could be detained by the Habsburg authorities. His
adventurous trip commenced in Switzerland, where he picked up a false
passport. Traveling under an assumed name and with elaborate prep-
arations to avoid identification, he finally reached Turnu Severin on
May 8/20. He arrived in Bucharest on May 10/22. After the arrival
of the prince a new ministry was formed and the provisional govern-
ment formally came to an end. Lascar Catargiu became prime minister,
with Peter Mavrogheni as foreign minister.
During the trip Charles prepared letters to Franz Joseph, Sultan
Abdul Aziz, and Alexander II. In the message to the Habsburg mon-
arch, he declared that he held no hostile intentions toward Austria and
that he hoped for future friendly relations. The letter to the tsar
similarly called for friendship and a continuation of the "entente that
has existed for such a long time between the two peoples, and in the
shade of which Romania has grown greater/' 43
Charles arrived in his new capital at a time of crisis, involving great
apprehension over the reaction of the neighboring states; both a Rus-
sian and an Ottoman occupation were feared. There was some agitation
in the country, and concern still existed about separatist feeling. In
fact, the major threat to the Romanian union from within had been
met before the arrival of the prince. As we have seen, the Russian gov-
ernment was convinced that, given a chance, the Moldavians would
show a preference for their own prince and assembly. In the middle of
April a movement in favor of this aim did occur.
The discontent of some of the Moldavians with their second-class
position in the state, as well as the difficulties in organizing a serious
separatist movement, have already been discussed. On April 3/15 the
first and last significant demonstration took place.44 The provisional
government in Bucharest was, of course, well aware of the problem in
Jassy and the desire of some to return to the pre-Cuza era. Immediately
after the coup efforts were taken to forestall the organization of opposi-
tion and to make sure that the police and the local administration were
167
 Russia and the Romanian national state
under control. §. Golescu, a brother of the regent, was appointed the
prefect of Jassy. Two special commissioners were also sent to assure
the loyalty of the other officials; those who could not be counted
on were replaced. The army and the police were firmly in Wallachian
and unionist hands. The press was controlled. Nevertheless, some signs
of opposition continued to appear.
In a further move to counter separatist agitation, two members of
the regency were sent to Jassy to answer criticisms and to organize an
active campaign in support of the regime and the choice of the prince.
These men and their followers organized meetings to arouse enthusi-
asm for the union. They, however, were met everywhere with mani-
festations of criticism and opposition. The separatists, as the Russian
officials well knew, did not have a strong organization or an able leader.
The major figure who now emerged was Nicholas Rosetti-Roznovanu,
a wealthy boyar with Russian connections. He also gained the support
of the metropolitan, Calinic Miclescu, and other Conservatives, in-
cluding Constantine and Alexander Moruzi.
After the provisional government announced Charles's candidacy,
the separatists issued a declaration against the impending plebiscite
and called for the election of a separate Moldavian assembly. Rumors
on preparations for some kind of protest soon began to circulate. On the
morning of April 3/15 some separatist supporters joined the metro-
politan in the cathedral after the service. A crowd then gathered and
accompanied Miclescu on a march toward the administration build-
ings. The people, expressing their feelings in antiunionist slogans, such
as "Long Live the Convention" and "Long Live Moldavia," were soon
challenged by government troops, and fighting commenced. In this
unequal battle, the demonstrators were easily crushed. Jassy was placed
under military rule. The separatist leaders, including Roznovanu and
the metropolitan, who was wounded, were imprisoned. The estimates
on the casualties ran from fifteen to seventy killed.
When the reports on the action were received in Bucharest, the gen-
eral feeling was, in particular in government circles, that it had oc-
curred as a result of a Russian plot. Although, as we have seen, Gor-
chakov and the Russian diplomats hoped for a strong and viable
separatist movement, they also knew that they could not themselves or-
ganize such an action. The leader of the demonstration did indeed have
some ties with Russia and with the consulates, but there is no evidence
that the demonstration resulted from anything but local initiatives.
Offenberg, in his first report to Gorchakov, placed the blame on the
provisional government and the pressure that it had exerted to secure
the election of the prince. It had, the consul believed, finally exhausted
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 Prince Charles, 1866-18J1
the patience of the Conservatives, the separatists, and "all of the men
devoted to the welfare of their country." The violence, persecutions,
and mistakes of the party in power had finally caused them to take
action: "The same people whose apathy had resisted seven years of
Cuza's reign could not endure two months of the democratic regime."45
The failure of this movement did demonstrate convincingly the weak-
ness of the Moldavian separatist movement. The powers were shown
that the union could not be dissolved without an outside military in-
tervention, a matter on which it was clear that they could never agree.
The provisional government in Bucharest obviously had complete con-
trol of the domestic scene.
When the powers met again on April 12/24,46 the results of the pleb-
iscite and the suppression of the separatist movement in Jassy were
known. Despite the fact that events had thus gone forward in the Prin-
cipalities, the powers continued to argue along the old lines. The ses-
sion had been called together on the request of Budberg, who was acting
on the instructions of Gorchakov. The intention was to secure the re-
jection of the concept of a foreign prince without reference to a specific
person.47 It is interesting to note that most of the diplomats were un-
aware of the specifically Prussian, or rather Bismarckian, role in the
Hohenzollern candidature and tended to regard Napoleon III as the
main supporter of the prince.48 The Habsburg foreign minister, Alex-
ander von Mensdorff-Pouilly, for instance, wrote Metternich that if
France abandoned the treaties, Austria would have to join with Russia
to fight Charles's election.49 When Safvet and Budberg asked for a
declaration on the Prussian role in the affair, Goltz, on instructions,
replied that his country stood aside and acted as an observer in Eastern
affairs. In a later meeting, the Prussian representative took the same
stand: the Prussian government was not responsible for the prince's
actions; Charles had acted spontaneously.50 Even Metternich appears
to have accepted these statements.
As instructed, Budberg at the conference again expressed the Russian
position. He declared that his country had no bias for or against union,
but that the government of Cuza had not been satisfactory. It was neces-
sary to have a vote, but the Romanians must be told the limits on their
actions. They hoped for independence through a foreign prince. As long
as the conference let them believe in this possibility, they would
support union as a step toward this major goal. Thus a true vote on
union could not be obtained unless the powers firmly excluded the al-
ternative of a foreign prince. Once this was accomplished, elections for
two assemblies, which would express the real will of the people, could
be held.
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
When asked by Cowley what should be done if the Romanian gov-
ernment refused the advice of the powers in this matter, Budberg de-
clared that the protocol of September 1859 should be applied; an Otto-
man commissioner accompanied by the delegates of the powers should
be sent to Bucharest. The Russian government would sanction the use
of force if necessary, but it did not think that such measures would be
necessary if the conference clearly expressed its opinion.
The session did meet the Russian demands to a limited extent. The
representatives agreed to refer back to their governments for ap-
proval the text of a collective declaration stating that the prince must
be a native. Gorchakov was pleased with the results of this session;
he declared to the Austrian ambassador that it was as if he had been
"transported himself to Paris, and had crushed the phantom of the
foreign prince/' 51
On April 20/May 2 the powers met again.52 The declaration on the
foreign prince that was approved at this point stated that the election
of Charles controvened Article 13 of the convention of 1858. The choice
of a ruler was to be made by a new assembly in which the Moldavian
and Wallachian deputies could vote separately should they so desire.
The candidacy of Charles was thus specifically rejected and the door
left open to a dissolution of the union. The Russian government had
the statement it desired. No provision was, however, made for action
should the Principalities reject the advice of the conference.
As we have seen, France had so far stood in principle as the chief
defender of Romanian national goals. Russia and the Ottoman Empire,
in contrast, had wished the Principalities to return to the conditions
of 1858. However, while France was standing openly for the idea of
union, its diplomats were still using the Principalities as an object of
negotiation with Austria and Italy. With enthusiastic Italian backing,
the question of an exchange was under active consideration during
the sessions of the conference. These negotiations collapsed finally owing
to the refusal of the Habsburg Monarchy once again to consider such
an arrangement. The Russian and Ottoman governments similarly
rejected the concept; Gorchakov made it clear that war could result.
The fact that such an arrangement was under discussion was known
in diplomatic circles; the Romanian agents were aware that their land
was a possible object of barter. It is significant that at this time Drouyn
in his conversations with Romanian representatives pressed them to
choose not a foreign prince, but a temporary ruler who would hold
office for a period of around four years. Then, it was argued, the situa-
tion might be more favorable for the election of a foreign prince.53
Austria also supported this suggestion. The arrangement had the ob-
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 Prince Charles, 1866-1871
vious advantage for France that it would be easier to deal with the
Principalities under a weak native ruler than under a prince of a recog-
nized European royal family. This solution was formally presented to
the conference by Safvet on May 5/17. He proposed that the powers
name a candidate for a short term. The discussions supported the
opinion that the Principalities should be given the chance to adopt this
measure and that the Porte should propose it.
Meanwhile, Charles arrived in the Principalities. He had been pro-
claimed ruler on April 16/28, but he was not received by the assembly
until May 10/22. The formal accession of the prince and the formation
of his first ministry led to the period of the greatest external danger
for the Romanian state. The threat of a foreign occupation appeared
acute. In Paris Safvet summoned another meeting of the conference.54
Here, on May 13/25, he read a strong note of protest from his govern-
ment in which the right of the sultan to enforce the treaties was em-
phasized. The discussion then centered on the question of an Ottoman
occupation. France again was the chief supporter of the Romanian
position, arguing that the Ottoman Empire could not act alone. In
conclusion, the delegates agreed to refer back to their governments
for further instructions. They also were to direct the consuls in Bucha-
rest to have only formal relations with Charles's government.
Gorchakov by this time had become completely disillusioned with the
collective action. He still wished Russia to take part in the sessions,
but he was prepared for a collapse of the discussions. As he told Talley-
rand: "It is up to the conference to act. If it accepts the fait accompli, I
will propose its dissolution. Russia will withdraw."55
The final meeting of the conference was held on May 23/June 4-56
Budberg stated that his government did not think that the powers had
acted strongly enough; Charles held his office in flagrant violation of
the treaties. The dignity of the great powers was at stake. An Ottoman
commissioner and the delegates of the powers should be sent to Bucha-
rest. These arguments were supported by Safvet, who further stated
that the legal order could not be restored without a threat of force.57
Metternich agreed that the powers had either to accept the prince or
to take coercive measures. Otherwise, European influence in the Prin-
cipalities would be destroyed. Should the conference not act, each pow-
er should then resume its freedom of action and protect its own inter-
ests. This position was also supported by Budberg.
In the further discussions it became clear that France, Britain, Prus-
sia, and Italy all opposed any attempt to force the Principalities to
follow the directives of the conference. Budberg, unable to secure the
adoption of the measures desired by his government, declared that the
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
failure of the delegates to take any common action would probably
result in a Russian withdrawal. He would request further instructions,
but he believed that his government would direct him to leave the
conference.
The failure of the great powers to act placed the burden of upholding
the treaties on the Ottoman Empire. The position of the Porte in the
Principalities had clearly been endangered; the legal order could ob-
viously not be restored without an occupation, or at least the threat of
one. The Ottoman government, of course, did not have the right to
intervene alone, and the majority of the powers opposed an occupa-
tion. The question thus arose whether the Porte would proceed in vio-
lation of the treaties to secure its rights according to these same agree-
ments. In this difficult situation the Ottoman government wavered. On
May 10/22 Britain was informed that troops would be sent; on May
12/24 t n e Council of Ministers decided on an occupation. Musurus on
May 30/June 11 gave the British foreign secretary, Lord Clarendon,
a note declaring a determination to use force.58 But still no positive
steps were taken. French and British opposition remained strong.
Russian policy toward the use of force remained unchanged. Gor-
chakov did not openly tell the Porte to take strong measures against
the Orthodox Christian state, but he did continue to advise that gov-
ernment to follow its own interests. Should these call for intervention,
Russia would not offer any opposition. All the responsibility lay on
the Ottoman government. In Constantinople Ignatiev continued to
urge a strong policy.59 Prokesch reported that Gorchakov's advice took
the line that "if he were the Turkish Minister then he would know
what he had to do."60
With the stalemate in Paris, it was obvious that the conference would
have no more practical value, and on May 31/June 12 Budberg was
instructed to obtain its dissolution.61 Austria supported this action.62
When, on June 5/ 17, war broke out between Austria and Prussia, it
was clear that the conference would have to close.63 In agreement with
Metternich and Drouyn, Budberg sent the French foreign minister, as
president of the conference, a note asking that the sessions come to an
end. The guaranteeing powers thus had been given a good excuse for
abandoning the attempt to act in concert in Romanian affairs. The
fait accompli had succeeded.
The outbreak of hostilities in Europe and the subsequent Prussian
victories were to have a most favorable effect on the Romanian position
in other respects too. As long as the war lasted in Central Europe no
power wanted complications on the Danube. In this period the Russian
attitude toward a foreign prince, specifically a Hohenzollern, also ap-
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 Prince Charles, 1866-1871
pears to have softened. As we have seen, when Bismarck urged Charles
to accept the Romanian throne, he warned him that it was very im-
portant to conciliate Russia. He had also met the protests of the pow-
ers with repeated denials of Prussian responsibility. It appears that
Russia as well as the other powers accepted these statements. Through-
out the negotiations on the Principalities the Prussian government had
ostentatiously declared its desire to consult and act in concert with
Russia.64
The news of Charles's arrival in Bucharest caused a strong reaction
from both the tsar and his wife.65 Revertera reported that the Russian
court was surprised that a member of the Prussian family would be
tempted by such an adventure, and without the approval of the king.66
Talleyrand also observed the discontent with Prussian actions.67 On the
eve of a war in which Russian benevolent neutrality was of utmost im-
portance, Bismarck had to be very careful of Russian feelings. His ap-
proach, as expressed in his instructions to the Prussian charge, Count
Heinrich von Redern, combined a denial of reponsibility with a subtle
appeal for support:
The royal government had not the smallest part in the enterprise of the prince.
He has undertaken it at his own risk and responsibility and, whether it suc-
ceeds or fails, we have no state interest in its development . . . Whether it
meets the interest of Russia more to oppose the position of the prince and to
remove him or rather to use his readiness to accept in fact Russian protection,
about that I abstain from any judgment and must leave this to the wisdom of
the imperial government.68
The same double approach was used by General Hans Lothar von
Schweinitz, the special military representative of Prussia in St. Peters-
burg. He told the tsar that he knew Charles, who was not a model
Prussian officer, but not a bad young man. If Russia could tolerate his
presence, he could restore order in the Principalities and prevent
France from dominating in Bucharest.69
Undoubtedly, from the Russian point of view, a Prussian candidate
was the least of evils if a foreign prince was to rule in the Principalities.
The Russian government had by this time adopted a policy of support-
ing Prussia in the German question. The tsar and his advisers had
consistently been concerned about maintaining political stability in
Bucharest and blocking revolutionary movements. The former French
influence had not been satisfactory, and the native prince, Cuza, had
aroused extreme Russian antagonism. Moreover, in the preceding
months the danger had arisen that the Principalities might be used to
compensate Austria for Venetia. Under no condition could Russia
accept Habsburg domination of the two provinces and control of the

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 Russia and the Romanian national state
entire course of the Danube. Gorchakov had repeatedly made it clear
that this question could lead to war.70 In March, in a conversation with
Talleyrand, he declared that he spoke in the name of the tsar in saying
that Russia would not permit the aggrandizement of Austria on the
Danube; he added, "Even if I had the nature of a sheep, I would rebel
at the very idea."71
It is also important to note that although the Russian position in the
conference and in the negotiations was extremely unfavorable in regard
to the provisional government, the Russian diplomats did not express
themselves similarly to the representatives of that regime. The attitude
was critical, but it did not exclude the possibility of agreement. The
Romanian representatives in Paris, Boerescu and Steege, spoke with
Budberg in April before the choice of Charles had been announced.72 At
this meeting the ambassador declared that Russia was not against union,
but that his government would not support it against the will of the
population. Moldavia did not want unification; only the force employed
by the provisional government kept the province in check. Moreover,
although union was acceptable, Russia would never agree to a foreign
prince. No suitable candidate would consent to be an Ottoman vassal.
At best the Principalities would obtain a little German prince, "a poor
prince of the third or fourth rank." He would not bring order to the
country, and he would soon be expelled. A republic, Budberg declared,
would be better than a foreign prince. In another conversation held
after the choice of Charles, Budberg repeated that Russia would not
support him and that union would be accepted, but only if the Mol-
davians approved. He warned that commissioners would be named if
the Romanian government did not follow the directives of the powers.73
He advised against the sending of a delegation to St. Petersburg to
speak with Gorchakov.
Nevertheless, soon after assuming office in Bucharest, Charles sent
Boerescu and Costaforu on such a trip.74 Arriving in the Russian capital
by way of Berlin, they first visited Bismarck, who strongly advised them
to deal carefully with the Russians. France would remain a supporter,
but Russian friendship would be of great use. He also suggested that
the two men visit high ecclesiastical functionaries while they were in
Russia.75
The Romanian agents arrived in St. Petersburg on May 18/30 and
saw Gorchakov on May 21 /June 2. In their report to their government
they stated the view that their visit was a success, but that Gorchakov's
attitude had changed only slowly. At first he was reserved and cold.
He repeated the familiar Russian grievances against the Principalities
and recalled past services. He characterized the country as politically
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 Prince Charles, 1866-1871
unstable and the center of Polish conspiracy. In the course of the con-
versation he also brought up the religious question and the reforms
made by Cuza, which he stated were against church dogma. As far as
the election of the prince was concerned, he attacked the action as
contrary to the treaties. He believed that the conference would break
up and each of the powers would regain full freedom of action. He did
not think that outside military force would be used against the new
government in Bucharest. He also complained that the delegation had
come to Russia last; the agents naturally replied that Budberg had
advised against their visit.
On May 26/June 7, in accordance with Bismarck's advice, Boerescu
and Costaforu visited the metropolitan of St. Petersburg, Isidore. His
chief concerns were about the alleged Catholic propaganda in Romania
and the changes that had been made in the church regulations. The
agents reassured him on both issues.
On the same day they paid a visit of farewell to Gorchakov, who
showed himself in a much more friendly mood. He claimed that Rus-
sia had always believed that the Romanians did not want union unless
they could have a foreign prince; he had thus supported in the confer-
ence what he believed to be the wishes of the country. He also stated his
dissatisfaction with the results of the meetings and his intention to take
the initiative in securing an ending of the conference. If the results
had been known beforehand, his country would never have partici-
pated in it. He believed that a dissolution would be favorable for
the Principalities. Each nation would then be able to act freely. Russia,
he assured his visitors, would use its freedom for the good of the Prin-
cipalities, but he wanted some guarantees.
The Romanian agents naturally asked to have these guarantees more
precisely defined. Gorchakov was chiefly concerned that the country not
become a center of revolutionary activity and that the church be pro-
tected. He wanted some assurances in regard to the political refugees,
particularly the Poles resident in Moldavia. Because the security of the
Russian borders was in question, he wished the government either to
expel these Poles or to imprison them in the interior of the country.
Gorchakov also complained about the "demagogic element" in the Ro-
manian government. As far as the religious issue was concerned, he
appeared content when he heard about the visit to the metropolitan.
He hoped that Cuza's reforms would be rescinded and the question of
the Dedicated Monasteries settled.
At the end of the visit the Romanian agents were well satisfied with
the results. It appeared that when Russia was free to act alone, and
after the Romanian authorities had taken some measures in regard to

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 Russia and the Romanian national state
religion and internal order, opposition to the changes in Bucharest
would be abandoned. The fait accompli would be accepted.
Not only did the Austro-Prussian War offer a welcome distraction,
but the Prussian victories gave added strength and prestige to the
Hohenzollern prince. By the summer of 1866 it was clear that his nom-
ination could not be reversed without a foreign occupation. As we have
seen, the Porte had contemplated such an action; indirect Russian sup-
port and Austrian moral backing could be counted on. Nevertheless,
the strong opposition of the sea powers, France and Britain, and the
fear of a rising of other Balkan Christians made the Ottoman govern-
ment hesitate. The decisive moment for action came at the time of
Charles's arrival in Bucharest. When neither the Porte nor the powers
made a move to enforce their decisions, it became clear that the prince
was safe from the threat of outside interference. For the Ottoman gov-
ernment the logical next move was to accept Charles, but with strong
conditions attached. On May 24/June 5 the grand vezir, Fuad, was
replaced by Mehmed Rushdi Pasha. On June 4/16 Ion Ghica was sent
to Constantinople.
During the subsequent negotiations the French government and the
ambassador in Constantinople, Moustier, played a major role. On June
21 /July 3 Napoleon received Balaceanu and agreed to use his influence
in Constantinople to obtain a settlement.76 In the next weeks the French
government pressed Charles to take an open and flexible position in
regard to the Ottoman demands and to come to an agreement as soon
as possible. Drouyn also advised the prince to go personally to Con-
stantinople to negotiate with the sultan. He believed that it would be
well "to profit from the prestige that Prussia exercises at this time in
Constantinople and which it owes to its victories/*77
The question of recognition by the suzerain court was also of first
importance for the prince and his government. Should this be obtained,
the approval of the other powers would soon follow. The financial
situation in the Principalities remained precarious; the much-needed
French loan would not be available until the question was settled.
The continued mobilization of Romanian troops, which had been
ordered in the spring, remained a severe drain on the country. Rumors
of separatist agitation continued to circulate. The prince, however, be-
cause of his own domestic situation, could not accept terms damaging
to his prestige. He was willing to travel to Constantinople, as the French
government had suggested, but he was discouraged by the Porte.78
Meanwhile, the Russian position had indeed shifted. Gorchakov's
conversations with the Romanian agents have been discussed. Ignatiev

176
 Prince Charles, i866-i8r/i
was now instructed to abstain from offering the Porte any advice and
to adopt an attitude of observation.79 Henceforth the ambassador lim-
ited his comments to stating that Russia was not responsible for the loss
of European dignity or for the fact that the rights of the Ottoman gov-
ernment were damaged by those who claimed to be its protectors. Rus-
sia could not be more Turk than the Turks; it could not urge the occu-
pation of an Orthodox nation. Open Russian opposition to Charles
was thus dropped - an action that, of course, signified the acceptance
of union. It was recognized that separatist activities would succeed
only if backed by an armed intervention, which, as a ministerial instruc-
tion noted, Russia could "support as long as the blame for its initiative
fell, in the eyes of the Romanians, on the Turks"; but Russia could
not, however, act itself in place of the Porte. It was also recognized that
the idea of union had made a deep impression on the mass of the Ro-
manian people; separatism did not offer a basis for serious action, "as
the disorders that occurred at Jassy during the summer [sic] of 1866
proved, on the occasion of the plebiscite of May 20."80
In the discussion of the rights and privileges of the Principalities,
which formed a part of the question of recognition, the most serious
dispute came over the Ottoman insistence that the Principalities be
described as an "integral part" of the Ottoman Empire. The prince
could not yield on this issue without compromising his position within
the state. The negotiations proceded more favorably from the Romanian
viewpoint after the outbreak of a revolt in Crete in August. At this point
the pressure was on the Porte to come to an agreement, because of the
danger that other parts of the empire might also rise. Finally, Charles
agreed to a formulation that made use of the limiting phrase "within
the limits fixed by the capitulations and the Treaty of Paris." With this
major matter settled, the recognition was accorded through an exchange
of letters between the prince and the grand vezir and in a firman based
on these documents. In the final agreement the Porte recognized Charles
as hereditary prince; the Principalities were described as "an integral
part of the Ottoman Empire."81 In return, Charles agreed that the Ro-
manian armed forces would not surpass thirty thousand; that no order
or decoration would be awarded in the name of the Principalities; that
money would be minted, but under conditions to be settled later; that
the amount of the tribute would be raised; and that no revolutionary
organizations that would menace the empire or the neighboring
states would be tolerated on Romanian soil. Most important for the
future, the treaties and conventions between the Porte and the powers
were recognized as obligatory on the Principalities as long as their

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 Russia and the Romanian national state
terms did not conflict with other engagements. The Principalities were
to conclude no treaties or conventions directly with other powers, al-
though "local arrangements" were not covered in this exclusion.
With these conditions settled, Charles paid a formal six-day visit to
Constantinople. At his departure from Bucharest all of the consuls but
Offenberg appeared in uniform, a sign of recognition. The Russian con-
sul explained that he had received no instructions.82 Similarly, in Con-
stantinople the Russian embassy did not officially receive the prince.
Ignatiev explained to Charles that the Russian attitude was occasioned
by the desire to be correct; the government was awaiting the formal
communication of the firman of investiture before recognizing the
prince. In this conversation Ignatiev emphasized the standard Russian
concerns: the dangers of the parti rouge, the church regulations, and
the Dedicated Monasteries.83 The prince blamed the difficulties of the
past on Cuza's policies and assured the ambassador that he desired a
rapprochement with Russia. His country understood that the Western
powers would not help with the realization of Romanian aims; they
sought chiefly to break the natural ties with Russia and bind Romania
more closely to the Ottoman Empire.
Gorchakov appeared well pleased at this time with the settlement
and with the prince. In a conversation with Revertera he reviewed the
events of the recent past.84 Charles would be recognized by Russia
because the sultan had accepted him. The minister thought that Charles
was better for the post than a native prince as long as he did not ally
with the revolutionary forces. Formal Russian recognition came a short
time later. On November 14/26 Offenberg gave Charles a letter from
Gorchakov in which the regular themes regarding Russian friendship,
the church, and the monasteries were repeated.85 In reply, Charles ex-
pressed the hope for a swift solution to the religious questions, and he
promised that he would not allow political agitation against neigh-
boring states.
Despite the Russian recognition, the accession of Charles marked a
failure of Russian policy. After the overthrow of Cuza, as we have seen,
the Russian aim was not only the separation of the Principalities, but,
before all, the blocking of the appointment of a foreign prince. It is
interesting to note how strongly, during the negotiations, Gorchakov
attacked not only this idea, but also the previously conceded union.
During the course of the discussions both Budberg and the French diplo-
mats accused the Russian government of taking a position in contradic-
tion to its previous stand on the unification of the provinces.86 Gorcha-
kov took pains to refute this argument and to justify his position as
consistent with previous Russian policy. He claimed that the sole aim of
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 Prince Charles, 1866-1871
Russia in dealing with the Principalities was securing the welfare of
the inhabitants.87 The Russian role in the drafting of the Organic
Statutes showed that no prejudice existed toward union if it was ap-
parent that it contributed to the prosperity of the area. The declara-
tion in support of union and a foreign prince that had been made by
Kiselev in the Paris conference of 1858 had been in fact contrary to the
views of the government. It was the personal opinion of an individual
and it did not bind Russia. The subsequent double election and the
"temporary union" had been accepted "as an expedient intended to
forestall regrettable complications."88 Russia had held no illusions
about the settlement and had pointed out its defects and warned of its
consequences. Russian policy had been based on the supposition that
union was necessary for the prosperity of the country; the experience
with Cuza had shown the contrary. To Talleyrand Gorchakov explained
further: "An objection has been raised [about] our past adhesion to
union; let me tell you that we have never been more than lukewarm
partisans and that it was only the desire to prove to you our friendly
dispositions that made us agree."89

T H E FIRST YEARS OF CHARLES'S REIGN,

1866-1869
With the arrival of Charles in Bucharest the basic program of the na-
tionalists - union and a foreign prince - was completed. Moreover,
despite dire predictions, in particular from the Russian diplomats, Ro-
mania had acquired a ruler with a most distinguished background.
Born on April 8/20, 1839, Charles was the second son of Karl Anton
von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. The prince had the typical family life
and education of a member of the highest European aristocracy. He was
educated in Dresden, he lived in Paris, and he had traveled. As an offi-
cer in the Prussian army, he had taken part in 1864 in the war against
Denmark. As far as political convictions were concerned, his back-
ground inclined him to moderation. His father was the Prussian minis-
ter president during the liberal "New Era" government, from 1858 to
1862, that preceded the conservative Bismarck era. Charles had, of
course, absolutely no experience with Romanian affairs, nor had he
held any public office.
In May 1866 the provisional government was replaced by a ministry
headed by the Conservative Lascar Catargiu. This group contained a
balance of Liberals and Conservatives, with Peter Mavrogheni in foreign
affairs, General Ion G. Ghica as minister of war, C. A. Rosetti for re-
ligion and education, and, most important, Ion Bratianu for finance. A
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
new constitution was also drawn up. Modeled on the Belgian constitu-
tion of 1831, the document provided for a two-house legislature and
ministerial responsibility. Although it contained most of the provisions
on civil liberties and legislative power desired by the Liberals, the Con-
servatives were able to obtain a restricted franchise. With a collegial
voting system, where the electorate was determined by income, the coun-
try was henceforth to be controlled by perhaps twenty thousand of the
population of five million. In July 1866 a new ministry was formed
under Ion Ghica, which was in essence a continuation of the previous
provisional government. In the fall elections were held for the legisla-
tures. Since no group won a clear victory, Romanian politics resumed
its previous discordant course.
Of the Romanian political leaders, Charles preferred working with
Bratianu and the Liberals. In March 1867 the moderate Liberal Con-
stantine Cretulescu was appointed prime minister in a ministry in
which Bratianu wielded the real power. This government remained in
office until August 1867, when it was replaced by another Liberal cab-
inet headed by §tefan Golescu. Although Bratianu was not the prime
minister, he remained the dominant figure in political life. Despite the
fact that the Liberals were clearly the strongest political grouping and
Bratianu was the most able Romanian politician, their control of the
government was to have unfortunate repercussions in foreign policy.
The new regime soon managed to win the distrust of all of the great
powers, although for quite different reasons.
The basic cause for the lack of faith in Bratianu abroad was the ob-
vious fact that both he and his party remained the nucleus of the na-
tional movement. When in power they could be counted on to continue
a forward policy aimed at gaining more sovereign rights for their state
and eventually an independent status. They were also likely to favor
the national movements in other provinces of the Ottoman Empire and
to support the idea of the cooperation of the Christian people against
the Porte. After 1866 France, Britain, and Austria wanted no more dis-
turbances in the Balkans connected with the national movements. At
first Russia was more sympathetic to such actions, but its policy soon
changed. Thereafter the Romanian government found itself faced
with a solid front of European powers opposed to any major moves
toward loosening the bonds with the suzerain power. Throughout this
period European opposition tended to center on the person of Ion
Bratianu, who was simply not trusted. Certainly, the policy of the fait
accompli, applied previously under his direction, meant that Romanian
statesmen had often misled or directly lied to foreign representatives.
Bratianu had also come to stand as the most obvious representative of
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 Prince Charles, 1866-1&J1
the "red" danger in the Principalities in the eyes of many conservative
leaders.
The general situation in Europe and the Near East, in addition, pre-
sented dangers for the state. In the years until 1871 Romania was to be
involved, although often only as a side issue, in two major areas of
contest. First in importance were to be the continuing Prussian moves
toward the unification of Germany, actions that were bound to involve
the Principalities not only because the prince was a Hohenzollern, but
also because of the strategic position of Romania in relation to the
Habsburg Empire. Second, in 1866 a revolt in Crete opened another
Eastern crisis. Although these events took attention away from Bucha-
rest, the new revolution gave impetus to the national unrest through-
out the Balkans, which directly involved sentiments in Romania.
As far as thefirstissue was concerned, despite the fact that the Prussian
government repeatedly denied responsibility for Romanian actions
to the other courts, it did not hesitate to use its undoubted influence
with the prince to its advantage when possible. Bismarck himself
constantly put strong emphasis on Romanian relations with Russia, a
country whose support was essential to the wider Prussian program.
Charles was repeatedly urged to remain close to St. Petersburg. Ro-
manian relations with the Habsburg Empire involved Prussian inter-
ests equally. After the great defeat of 1866, it was to be expected that the
Austrian government, whose foreign policy was now under the direc-
tion of Frederick Ferdinand von Beust, would pursue, if not an active
and aggressive policy against Prussia, at least one that resisted further
advances in German affairs of the victorious state. A tightening of
Habsburg relations with Paris could also be expected. With this situa-
tion it was obviously to Prussian interests to maintain a tie with the
Austrian border states, including Serbia as well as Romania.
For Romania, relations with the Habsburg Empire came to involve
increasingly other than strategic considerations. The fundamental re-
organization of the monarchy in the Ausgleich (Compromise) of 1867
gave the Hungarian minority not only control of a half of the empire,
but what was in fact often a deciding voice in foreign affairs. More-
over, the restrictive Hungarian nationality policies, aimed at maintain-
ing Magyar predominance, caused increasing unrest among the Ro-
manian majority in Transylvania. Similar Hungarian pressure in Slavic
areas led to friction there too. In a period of national upsurge Ro-
manian leaders could not be expected to remain indifferent to events
in Transylvania or to remain aloof from appeals for and from Ro-
manians in that area. Again the Liberal party and its press led the way.
Romanian agitation concerning Transylvania, official or unofficial, up-
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
set all of the powers, but in particular Prussia. Bismarck at this time
was cultivating close ties with Hungarian national leaders, whose sup-
port he wished to use to paralyze Vienna.
Although the diplomatic alignments in Europe remained, as before,
fluid, the Romanian government in the next years faced a situation
where, at least in matters involving its vital interests, Russia and Prus-
sia usually stood against France and Austria, often seconded by the Ot-
toman Empire and Britain. Thus, during the first period of his reign,
Charles and his Liberal governments tended to stand closer to Russia
and Prussia than to France, in a sense reversing the previous reliance
of Romanian national governments on Paris. This condition was caused
in part by the evolution of events in other parts of the Ottoman Empire
and the influence that the French government by then enjoyed in
Constantinople.
The uprising in Crete in 1866 turned the attention of the powers
once more to that restless island. At the same time, stimulated by Greek
events, the Balkan states, under the leadership of Prince Michael of
Serbia, carried on negotiations toward an eventual alliance against the
Ottoman Empire. At first, the Russian government, well informed on
the discussions, gave its approval to these efforts. In the Cretan question
the Russian diplomats worked to secure either an autonomous admin-
istration for the island or its union with Greece. The Russian govern-
ment preferred that these measures be introduced through common
European pressure. These policies conformed with the general direc-
tion followed by the Liberal ministry of Cretulescu, which came to office
in March 1867. This regime favored cooperation with the other Chris-
tian people against the Porte and assistance, even if only indirectly, to
the Bulgarian revolutionary groups located on Romanian territory.
Negotiations were commenced with other Balkan governments, par-
ticularly with Serbia. The climax of this policy was the ratifying of a
friendship treaty with Belgrade on January 21 /February 2, 1868. How-
ever, the endeavor of the Balkan leaders to form a common alignment
collapsed after the assassination of Michael in June 1868.
During this period, despite the support given to certain Balkan
aspirations, the basic aims of the Russian government remained, as be-
fore, limited and conservative. Prime attention remained concentrated
on internal affairs and on the eventual breaking of the Treaty of Paris.
Certain new trends, however, began to influence Russian opinion.90
Gorchakov, supported by men such as Michael Khristoforovich Reutern
and Peter Andreevich Shuvalov, retained the conviction that Russian
policy should emphasize cooperation with other powers; prime atten-
tion should still be focused on internal affairs, and adventures abroad
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 Prince Charles, 1866-18.J1
should be avoided. In contrast, Dmitri Alekseevich Miliutin, Nicholas
S. Gagarin, and Ignatiev came to favor a stronger national policy in-
cluding more support to Balkan national movements. This second
group represented a current of opinion that was to become increasingly
influential in the next decade.
The defeat in the Crimean War had naturally been felt deeply
throughout Russian society. Similarly, although the policy of reform
and recueillement was obviously the wisest course, it was difficult for
many to remain content with what was largely a passive attitude in for-
eign affairs, particularly in the face of the rising influence of Prussia
and the rapidly changing conditions in Central Europe. Of those who
favored a stronger and more active role in international relations, the
Panslavs were certainly the most influential. They also attracted the
most attention abroad. Although the Panslavs differed among them-
selves, all supported an active foreign policy, based on Russian assis-
tance to the Slavic people not only in the Ottoman Empire, but also in
the Habsburg Monarchy. Their ultimate aim was the formation of a
federation of Slavic states that would inevitably be under Russian
domination. The program excluded the Romanians and Greeks, except
as they were involved in the breakup of the two empires. Panslavs, in-
tensely Orthodox, were also usually hostile to Catholic Slavs, especially
the Poles, who were regarded as traitors. Since the movement was po-
litically conservative, cooperation with radical Balkan revolutionary
movements was largely excluded.
In 1858 the Slavic Benevolent Society was formed, with branches
opened in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev. It was the center of Panslav
activities, but its first endeavors were largely of an educational and
propagandistic nature. For instance, Bulgarian students were brought
to study in Russia. The movement, which had a sentimental and altru-
istic side, as well as obvious implications for the increase of Russian
power, attracted great attention. It won the sympathy of many with
strong nationalist convictions, who, while not supporting certain aspects
of the program, believed that Russia should assume a more active role
abroad.
Aside from Gorchakov, perhaps the single most important diplomat
for Russian policy in the Balkans for the next twelve years was to be a
man whom we have met before, the highly controversial diplomat
Nicholas Pavlovich Ignatiev, who represented both the national and the
Panslav alternative to official Russian policy.91 Although he usually
stood in opposition to the foreign minister and supported courses of
action that were in fact not adopted, his influence is to be seen in every
crisis in the next years. In July 1864 he was named the Russian min-
183
 Russia and the Romanian national state
ister to Constantinople; when the post was raised to an embassy in
1867, he became the ambassador. Previously he had undertaken a very
successful mission to China, and he had been the head of the Asiatic De-
partment. In foreign policy he was to stand for extreme nationalist
courses of action. His goal in the Near East was consistently to win
and maintain Russian predominance both through influence over the
Ottoman government and through control of the Balkan national
movements and their leaders, aims that were often contradictory. Be-
cause of his desire to win the first position among the foreign represen-
tatives in the councils of the Porte, he always strongly opposed whatever
power seemed to stand in his way. In 1867 France, with its support of
Ottoman reform, awakened his principal fears. That power was always
dangerous to his program because it too could stand sponsor to na-
tional liberation movements. Neither Britain nor Austria, on the other
hand, could easily compete with Russia in this field.
In his relations with the Balkan people Ignatiev also sought to use
the unifying influence of the Orthodox church. In the late sixties and
early seventies this endeavor faced increasing difficulty, as both the
Bulgarians and the Romanians attempted to break the Greek ecclesias-
tical influence on their own national religious establishments. 92 By the
middle seventies Ignatiev's policy was to rest instead on the Slavic
peoples - thus on race rather than on religion. In his relationship with
all of the Balkan nationalities his emphasis remained on securing Rus-
sian power and on using historic ties to strengthen Russian interests.
The Balkan people were to be instruments of Russian policy and
were to follow the directions of St. Petersburg. Ignatiev strongly sup-
ported the moves of the Balkan governments to cooperate against the
Porte, as long, of course, as they were supervised and coordinated with
those of Russia. As he wrote: "Indeed, Russia should always have the
supreme control over the destinies of the Balkan peninsula and be the
cement that binds the different co-religionist races to each other." 93
Ignatiev's relations with Romanian circles were never as close as
his links to Bulgarians, Serbs, and Montenegrins. He was, however, the
chief Russian diplomat concerned with the negotiations over the settle-
ment of Romanian ecclesiastical questions, and, as we shall see, he had
an immense influence over all aspects of Russian policy toward Ro-
mania. Conservative in political ideology, he could never approve of
Liberal regimes in Bucharest. He considered that the Liberal Party was
composed of "disorganizing elements, enemies of all social order, ser-
vile in relation to France and openly hostile to Russia/' 94
Within Russian official circles Ignatiev was regarded as the leading
contender for Gorchakov's position as foreign minister; Gorchakov in
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 Prince Charles, 1866-18.J1
turn recognized him as his principal rival. Ignatiev disliked his chiefs
diplomatic methods; he did not favor a policy of close cooperation with
the other great powers on Eastern questions or the use of European
alignments and conferences for the solution of problems that arose
in that area. In the future he was to be a strong proponent of unilateral
negotiations with the Porte on Balkan issues. Despite the fact that his
arguments usually lost out in imperial councils, Ignatiev was regularly
consulted by the tsar, who was undoubtedly influenced by his opinions.
In the Balkans the ambassador's views were often shared by the nu-
merous Russian consular employees who were under his jurisdiction
and whom he tended to use for the implementation of his own policies.
After the outbreak of the Cretan insurrection the Russian govern-
ment, although sympathetic with the Cretan demands, did not wish to
separate from the other great powers.95 Negotiations proceeded over
the winter and spring of 1866-1867, but basic differences among the
states prevented a solution by diplomatic means. As has been mentioned,
the Russian government at this time aimed at a Cretan settlement that
would give the Christian Cretans effective control of the island and
thus in fact weaken the hold of the Porte over a part of its domains. In
contrast, France, with an upper hand in Constantinople, proposed re-
forming the administration of the entire empire and strengthening the
central government. Since Turkish reforms owed much to French in-
fluence, France would retain the primary position in the empire. To
this end the French government wished also to cooperate with Aus-
tria, now a Russian opponent. In August 1867 Napoleon III and Franz
Joseph met at Salzburg. The official reason for the visit was the execu-
tion of Maximilian in Mexico, but the two rulers also discussed their
common interests in Europe and the Near East. They agreed on a joint
policy in Constantinople based on the encouragement of administrative
reform for the Balkans and the disapproval of further national upris-
ings. Thereafter France and Austria tended to cooperate in the East-
ern Question to the detriment of Russia and at this time also of Ro-
mania.
The division among the protecting powers, the instability within his
own political system, and the renewed national strivings throughout
the peninsula placed difficult choices before Charles. To secure his own
domestic position the prince had to rely on Bratianu and Liberal sup-
port and to make moves in the national interest. When he did so he
was attacked by France, Austria, Britain, and the Porte, who accused
him of being a Russian or a Prussian satellite. Despite the inevitable
criticism of the powers that did not wish him to endanger the status
quo, Charles did attempt to follow this course of action. In March
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
1867 Bratianu became minister of interior in the Cretulescu cabinet; in
August 1867 French pressure led to his dismissal. Charles, who regarded
him as the ablest Romanian statesman, brought him back into the gov-
ernment as minister of finance in November 1867, where he remained
until collective great-power pressure led to his removal in November
1868. During this period the Romanian government pursued a policy
of seeking to widen its autonomous rights and of cooperating with other
Balkan governments. As immediate aims, the Romanian leaders sought
the recognition by the powers of the name "Romania" to replace the
"United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia," the right to mint
coins of all denominations with a national symbol placed upon them,
and the authority to conclude postal and consular conventions with
other countries without the Porte's acting as intermediary. In addition,
the prince in particular was anxious to begin the construction of a rail-
road system. All of these measures involved the political or economic
interests of the protecting powers.
As far as cooperation with other Balkan states was concerned, discus-
sions were indeed carried on with Greek, Montenegrin, and Serbian
leaders. The prince and his advisers, however, were not eager to involve
themselves in what might be adventurous policies until they were in a
position to benefit from them. Charles put first emphasis on military
preparations. A French military mission was already in Bucharest. As
an officer in the Piussian army, with a military training in this tradi-
tion, the prince naturally preferred Prussian instructors. After a great
deal of friction over the matter, the French mission finally left in 1869.
Charles was able to purchase twenty thousand Prussian needle guns,
which had to be transported through Russia, since they could not cross
Austrian or Ottoman territory because of the opposition of these gov-
ernments to intensive Romanian armament. The prince also increased
the size of his army beyond the limitations indicated in the treaties and
strengthened the police and the militia. These moves, which were a
financial burden, were strongly criticized by France, Austria, Britain,
and the Ottoman Empire, but supported by Prussia and Russia.96
Difficulties with the protecting powers arose also from other Roma-
nian actions. Habsburg concern over possible Romanian propaganda di-
rected toward Transylvania has already been mentioned. In addition,
in this period outbreaks of violence against Jews drew strong protests
from abroad, but not from Russia, a country in which the Jewish posi-
tion was becoming increasingly difficult. The chief dissatisfaction with
the Romanian government was, however, caused by its failure to halt
Bulgarian revolutionary bands from crossing the Danube. The sus-
picion was strong that Romanian officials were in fact cooperating in
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 Prince Charles, 1866-1871
these actions. Again the chief pressure came from France and Austria.
The national feelings stirred up by the Cretan revolt and the Serbian
activities had a strong effect on the Bulgarians. The revolutionary
leadership was in the hands of Bulgarian nationals living either in
Constantinople or in the Principalities, mainly in Bucharest and in
Danubian port cities. There was no single central organization em-
bracing all factions, but the most influential group was the Benevolent
Society, commonly called the Elders. It was Russophile and in contact
with the Russian consulates in the Principalities. Another section of
the Bulgarian emigration held more radical ideas and was closer to
the West in political conviction. The major tactic that it used at this
time was the employment of small armed bands, chetas, that were sent
across the Danube with the hope that a revolution could be started in
the Bulgarian lands. The first attempts were made in the 1840s and
were unsuccessful. The defeat of Russia, on whose aid the Bulgarians
counted, in the Crimean War led to a period of inaction until the late
1860s.
Both Romanian and Russian officials in the Principalities were
aware of the organization on Romanian soil of Bulgarian conspiracies
against the Ottoman Empire, and some were indeed closely involved
in the preparations. Despite Charles's repeated assurances to the con-
trary, Romanians were implicated, and the government had a good
knowledge of the Bulgarian intentions. In April and May 1867 bands
led by Filip Totiu and Panaiot Khitov crossed the Danube. Rumors cir-
culated that preparations were under way for further similar attempts.
Although the Ottoman authorities in Bulgaria had no difficulty in
handling these groups, which failed completely in their efforts to
arouse the population, the Porte naturally protested strongly to Bucha-
rest and was supported in doing so by the powers, particularly France.
The Romanian government continued to reply with assurances that it
had no part in the conspiracies and that action was being taken to
prevent such events in the future.
The major raid across the Danube occurred in July 1868. The Rus-
sian government learned before the action of the preparations being
made, and on July 5/17 Offenberg warned Bratianu: "Around a hun-
dred individuals are gathered at Giurgiu and Zimnicea or are en route
to go there; I believe that it would be in your interest as in that of
peaceful men, who could be gratuitously compromised, that measures,
rapid and energetic, be taken in order to stop reprehensible and
thoughtless acts."97
On that same night a raid led by the Bulgarian revolutionaries
Hadzhi Dimitur and Stefan Karadzha took place. Although a failure,
187
 Russia and the Romanian national state
it created a truly dangerous situation for the Romanian government.
Once again the question of an intervention was discussed. The Porte
claimed that the bands had been armed with weapons from Romanian
arsenals, with the complicity of Romanian officials.98 Fuad demanded
that a European commission of inquiry be appointed to investigate the
situation, a proposal that was supported by France, Austria, Britain,
and Italy, but blocked by Russia and Prussia. Despite this stand behind
Romania, the Russian government opposed the Bulgarian activities:
the raids were being carried out without Russian approval or partici-
pation. They were compromising to Russian policy and to the interests
of the Bulgarian groups in Romania that were not involved and that
were close to the Russian consulate. The issue of the use of Romanian
territory for the organization of conspiracies in neighboring lands was
an extremely sensitive one in itself. Strong Russian protests had been
sent many times in the past over similar Polish activities.
Because of the Russian and Prussian attitude, international interven-
tion was limited to the sending of identical telegrams by the protecting
powers to their consuls in Bucharest. The Bulgarian question remained
the subject of diplomatic correspondence throughout the fall of 1868.
In September Ali sent a letter to Charles reminding him of his obliga-
tions and complaining that
the revolutionary committees continue to enjoy all their freedom of action and
plot new endeavors against the security of our adjacent provinces. They have
even obtained a large stock of arms. These facts are attested by the journals
of even the United Principalities . . . what we demand only, my prince, is that
the territory of the Principalities not serve as a point of reunion for agitators."
The activities of the Bulgarian revolutionaries also gave the Habs-
burg foreign minister, Beust, the opportunity to attempt to remove
the Liberal government, which he regarded as pro-Prussian, pro-
Russian, and a danger to Transylvania, and to propose an active in-
tervention by the protecting powers and the Porte. In November he
sounded these states on the possibility of changing the April 1856 con-
vention and Articles 22, 25, and 27 of the Treaty of Paris so that the
Porte could intervene in Romania. In Constantinople Prokesch pro-
posed that the Porte concentrate troops on the Danube and then send
Bucharest an ultimatum demanding the strict observance of the treaty
stipulations. Charles was to be forced to dissolve the Bulgarian com-
mittees and reduce his armaments and the size of his army to the legal
limits. If he refused, Ottoman armies should occupy certain points in
Romania. These Austrian moves had little chance of success. Britain
and France wanted no revision of the Treaty of Paris. The Porte con-

188
 Prince Charles, 1866-1&J1
sidered the occupation a good idea, but refused to act without a prior
change in the treaties. Gorchakov reacted very strongly against any
intervention, particularly against an Ottoman occupation, even if it
were a police action, and threatened a parallel Russian move. The Rus-
sian government, of course, was always willing to discuss the revision
of the Treaty of Paris.100
The final blow to the Liberal government came not from the Western
powers and the Porte, and not over the Bulgarian issue, but from Berlin,
and it was caused chiefly by Hungarian concern over Transylvania. By
this time all of the powers were opposed to the Liberal ministry and
sought its downfall. Although Bismarck continued to maintain the
fiction that Prussia had no direct interest in Romania, he certainly fol-
lowed events in the region closely.101 He did not want a European war
to commence over Romanian issues, or for that matter over any prob-
lem connected to the Eastern Question. The European alignment that
would probably result from a conflict there and its potential effect
on southern German opinion might favor the French and Austrian,
rather than Prussian, interests. He was also deeply concerned about the
effect in Hungary of Romanian propaganda concerning Transylvania.
Since he knew that Beust could not carry through a policy of close alli-
ance with France while Hungary was favorable to Prussia, he wished
to end a situation that could have disastrous repercussions on his Ger-
man policy. In November 1868 he instructed Count Heinrich Keyser-
ling, the Prussian consul in Bucharest, to warn the prince about rela-
tions with Budapest. If no satisfaction were obtained, he would ask
the Prussian king to recall the consul. Keyserling spoke with Charles
on November 11/23; o n December 16/28 the Liberal cabinet was dis-
missed.102 The new ministry, under the Conservative Dimitrie Ghica, but
also containing the moderate Liberal Kogalniceanu, was to embark on a
policy of attempting to conciliate the powers and the Ottoman Empire.
D. A. Sturdza, who had been successful in dealing with the Porte in
1866, was sent to Constantinople.
In the period previously discussed, when Bratianu was in power, the
chief attacks on the Romanian position had come from France, Austria,
and the Ottoman Empire. Russia and Prussia, although strongly critical
of many of the Romanian actions, had opposed outside intervention.
Bismarck had consistently urged the prince to remain close to Russia
and had argued that dependence on St. Petersburg was "a correct and
healthy policy." Karl Anton in writing to his son in January 1868, had
expressed similar opinions. Russia could be either a good friend or a
bad enemy for Romania. It appeared that in the future the East would

189
 Russia and the Romanian national state
fall into Russian hands. Although a complete break with France should
not be made, it would be better for Romania "to step voluntarily into
the sphere of influence of Russia" before it was forced to do so.103
At this time, although Russian-Romanian relations remained openly-
friendly, old issues continued to divide the governments. Religious
differences were still important. The Russian leaders, despite their lim-
ited support of Balkan national movements at this time, remained
deeply concerned about the revolutionary aspects of some of the develop-
ments in the Principalities. On June 8/20, 1867, the tsar wrote Charles
concerning his interest in the country and commented: "The hopes that
I maintain in that regard are based above all on the fact that a spirit of
order and authority prevail there over the passions that have been only
too excited lately."104 In order to try to settle the questions that re-
mained open between the governments, Charles decided at the begin-
ning of 1868 to send a special mission to Russia. He also wished to ob-
tain permission to send the guns that he had purchased in Prussia
through Russia, since the routes through Austria-Hungary and the Ot-
toman Empire were closed. Because of his awareness of the importance
of the religious issue, the prince included in the delegation, in addi-
tion to Ion Cantacuzino, a former minister of justice, the metropolitan
of Ismail, Melchisedek, who had received his training in Kiev and who
spoke Russian.
On January 13/25, 1868, Offenberg was informed of the intention of
sending a mission; five days later he told Charles that it would be re-
ceived with pleasure.105 The Russian government also welcomed an
opportunity to improve relations. The delegates took with them letters
from the prince to both the tsar and Gorchakov. The message to Alex-
ander was phrased in very general terms and placed the emphasis on
the religious theme. Charles assured the tsar that since his arrival in
the country he had made efforts to "revive the religious feeling that,
although innate in the people, has been nevertheless so much disturbed
under the last reign."106 The letter to Gorchakov mentioned in general
terms the questions to be raised. The prince also asked for assistance
in the arms question, writing that the time would come when he would
put to the test "all the forces of my country in favor of the sacred in-
terests that form the indelible bond between it and Russia."107
The two delegates arrived in St. Petersburg on February 6/18 and
stayed about a month.108 The visit was extremely important in that,
on a number of subjects, it started negotiations that were to continue
in the future. Most significant were the discussions on a consular con-
vention and on general church matters. The two representatives spoke
with the tsar, Gorchakov, Peter Nikolaevich Stremoukhov, Ignatiev, and
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 Prince Charles, 1866-18,71
other men closely connected with Eastern affairs. In addition, Melchise-
dek saw Metropolitan Isidore. The conversations with the tsar were
conducted on more general terms, with the emphasis placed on ideo-
logical and religious matters; Alexander II expressed his approval of
the mission. The metropolitan assured the tsar of the prince's religious
sentiments and of the efforts being made to repair the damage done to
the church during Cuza's reign.
The serious negotiations were undertaken with Gorchakov, who em-
phasized to the delegates the Russian good will toward their country.
He claimed that Russia had not in fact opposed a union or a foreign
prince in theory. The Russian position had been adopted only to show
concern for the Treaty of Paris. Gorchakov also brought up the question
of the Dedicated Monasteries, but Cantacuzino explained that he was
not empowered to carry on negotiations on this question. It had been
regulated by law in the Principalities and was still under discussion
in Constantinople. Although he could not negotiate, he knew that
Charles wanted the matter settled. The delegates would be glad to listen
to whatever Gorchakov had to say and to communicate it to their
government.
During the initial conversations Gorchakov requested that the Ro-
manian representatives draw up for him a list of the questions that they
wished to discuss. After this had been provided, Gorchakov was able
to give direct, and usually satisfactory, answers concerning almost all
the points mentioned. Because of the importance of the issues raised,
the major problems, with the Russian replies, are discussed here in
greater detail.
The first question that the Romanian government wanted settled
dealt with consular jurisdiction and the capitulations. Negotiations
on this extremely sensitive subject had already begun during the reign
of Cuza. As in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, in the Principalities
the great powers enjoyed rights of extraterritoriality that had been
gained through special agreements, or capitulations, concluded in the
past with the Porte. Through these the foreign consulates had acquired
unusual privileges, including administrative and police functions,
which they later expanded and often abused. Foreign merchants were
also exempt from taxes and from payment for patents, that is, the papers
allowing them to carry on business. The original justification for these
arrangements had been the difficulties of subjecting Christians to Mus-
lim laws and courts. The Romanian representatives now argued that
consular jurisdiction of this type was not necessary in a Christian state.
They thus requested that the capitulations should be annulled or a
new arrangement made that would regulate the position of Russian
 Russia and the Romanian national state
subjects in the Principalities. Gorchakov agreed to renounce the capitu-
lations and to make the requested arrangement. He refused to discuss
the details, but he said that he would instruct Giers, then minister to
Persia but at that time in St. Petersburg, to make a preliminary study.
The negotiations would take place in Bucharest. In these conversations
the Russian foreign minister emphasized the concession that Russia was
making in consenting to discuss this matter without first referring to
the other powers. He also warned that he could not allow Russian citi-
zens to be placed at a disadvantage in relation to other foreigners in
Romania and that provisions would have to be made on this matter.
In regard to the question of patents, the Romanian representatives
argued that it was unfair for foreign traders to refuse to pay the sum
established by Romanian law and for them to be protected in this by
the consuls; Romanian merchants were thus placed at a disadvantage.
Gorchakov agreed that Russian merchants should pay the same amount
for patents as did Romanian citizens. In a similar manner, the Roma-
nian delegates wanted an agreement reached on the question of the ap-
plication to Russian citizens of other Romanian civil laws, for example,
those pertaining to births, deaths, and marriages. Gorchakov agreed
that this too would be part of the new arrangement.
The Romanian requests concerning the passage of arms and the ne-
gotiation of a postal convention were similarly met. In a further con-
cession the Russian government agreed that the debt left from the costs
of the Russian army of occupation in the Principalities during the
Crimean War would be paid in four instead of eight years, a measure
that aided the financially pressed Romanian government.
Two matters were not settled by the foreign minister. The Romanian
delegates wished to discuss the revenue on lands in Bessarabia belong-
ing to Moldavian monasteries, payments that had been held back by the
Russian government during the reign of Cuza as a result of the quarrel
over church regulations and the Dedicated Monasteries. Regarding
this as an ecclesiastical matter, Gorchakov replied that it should be
handled by Ignatiev and that it belonged to the general negotiations
concerning church affairs. Gorchakov also declined to take any initia-
tive on a Romanian request that the foreign representatives in Bucha-
rest be given the title of minister or charg£ d'affaires, instead of consul
or consul-general. He believed that either Britain or France could better
persuade the Porte to accept this measure, which Russia would then
approve.
Apart from these discussions, Melchisedek had two conversations
with the metropolitan of St. Petersburg, in which the Romanian cleric
attempted to reassure this important church dignitary about conditions
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 Prince Charles, 1866-18,71
in his country. Isidore was extremely concerned about Catholic activi-
ties in general and about Catholic propaganda in Romania, which he
believed had commenced under Cuza. He was also suspicious about the
actions of the Catholic powers, France and Austria-Hungary; Polish and
Jesuit intrigue was similarly always a matter of deep concern and sus-
picion in Russian Orthodox circles. Melchisedek tried to reassure him
that Orthodoxy was not in danger in Romania and that the prince,
although himself a Catholic, did not serve as a tool of Catholic propa-
ganda. The Romanian cleric emphasized that Charles wished to re-
establish the church on the basis of the canons and historical rights
and to bring the Russian and Romanian churches back to their former
relationship.
The delegates returned from this successful trip with letters to Charles
from Alexander II and Gorchakov. The tsar in his message again
placed his major emphasis on the religious question, writing that he
was glad that Charles "shows himself filled with the desire to revive
religious feeling in the country." "Faith," he declared, "is the most
solid base of every social order. It has been in the past the traditional
bond that has united the Principalities to Russia."109 Gorchakov also
pressed this point. Negotiations on the still unsettled problem of the
Dedicated Monasteries were of particular importance, since the tsar
placed great weight on a question "that concerns the future of the
church of the East." This issue would have to be settled on the basis of
justice and general Orthodox sentiments. The matter, the foreign min-
ister continued, concerned primarily the church and the Holy Places;
Russia wished to conciliate the divergent positions.110
In the next months negotiations between the Principalities and Rus-
sia were concentrated primarily on the question of the church and the
consular convention. Despite strong protests from the other protecting
powers and the Porte, discussions were begun at once on the second
matter.111 On February 27/March 10, 1868, Offenberg received instruc-
tions from the Asiatic Department to begin conversations in Bucharest
on a new agreement to regulate the position of the consuls and the citi-
zens of Romania and Russia in each other's countries. Ignatiev also took
part in the discussions. A draft that offered many advantages to the Ro-
manian government was prepared and sent to St. Petersburg. In this
document the two negotiating states were regarded as being on an equal
political level; Romania was given the right to appoint consuls in
Russia; and the consular jurisdiction of Russian agents in the Princi-
palities was significantly limited.
Unfortunately for Romanian interests, the Russian government did
not accept this initial version, largely because of the protests of other
193
 Russia and the Romanian national state
powers. Ignatiev too objected to the section allowing official Romanian
representation in Russia. Since Gorchakov agreed with Ignatiev, Offen-
berg was directed in October to change the draft. The new instructions
involved chiefly the question of the equality of the contracting partners
and the appointment of Romanian consuls. Romania was to be allowed
only unofficial representatives. The Russian government thus accepted
the argument of the other powers that these questions, involving the
relationship of Romania to the Porte and thus the treaties, could not
be settled in this manner. The most important omission in the new
version concerned the consuls. Since in this agreement, as in others
made in the next years, the Romanian government was chiefly inter-
ested in securing a widening of its autonomous rights, this question
was of major importance; the Russian draft was thus rejected.
At the same time, at the end of 1868 and the beginning of 1869, after
the dismissal of Bratianu, the Ghica ministry made attempts to improve
its relations with Austria, France, and the Porte and to negotiate simi-
lar agreements with them. These efforts were unsuccessful. The Habs-
burg Monarchy wished to retain its special privileges connected with
consular jurisdiction; the Porte naturally continued to deny that the
Principalities could make agreements of this nature with another power
without its participation. The question of the status of Romanian
agents abroad also remained controversial.
In April 1869 Steege was appointed as the special Romanian agent
to Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.112 In May he went to the Russian
capital, where he was received with the honors customarily accorded to
an official representative. He discussed the consular agreement with
Stremoukhov and with members of the finance and justice ministries.
In writing to Charles, Steege emphasized his friendly reception and
pointed out the importance of the question of the Dedicated Monas-
teries. He advised that this issue should be settled at once and volun-
tarily.113 He also made arrangements for a visit of the prince to the tsar
in the Crimea, which was to take place in the summer. Returning to
Bucharest on July 5/17, Steege brought with him another draft of the
consular convention, which again raised difficulties. When Charles
journeyed to the Crimea in August the matter was discussed further.114
Throughout this period foreign opposition continued, but finally, on
November 29/December 11, an agreement was signed.
In this convention, for the first time, the name "Romania" was used
in an international document. In reporting on the course of the nego-
tiations in April 1869 Offenberg admitted that the Porte might object
to this designation. However, he argued, the Constitution of 1866 had
formally substituted this name for "United Principalities," and there

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had been no protest. Also "Romania" appeared on all the official papers
and had been accepted. Although the Habsburg Monarchy had tried
to refuse visas for passports with the designation, it had soon aban-
doned this effort. The postal convention between Vienna and Bucharest
had the name at the head in the printed versions.115 The Porte did in-
deed at first protest, but this usage was soon to be adopted by all of the
governments. In February 1870 Sturdza formally asked the Porte to
recognize the name.116 In that month Russia officially accepted the
designation, and the other powers soon followed.117
The signing of the draft of the consular agreement did not end the
controversies. Since the terms were not fully satisfactory, the Romanian
assembly refused to ratify the pact. Similarly, the Russian government,
under pressure from abroad, rejected a final approval.118 In 1871, in-
stead of a formal agreement, the Russian and Romanian governments
exchanged notes limiting the jurisdiction of the Russian consuls in
Romanian territory and putting into practice other sections of the
pact.119 The appointment of an official Romanian representative in
St. Petersburg was to be postponed until 1874.
Progress was also slow on the church controversies. Two questions
had to be settled. The first involved the new arrangement that had to
be worked out for the Romanian church to replace the one made during
the Cuza period, which had caused so many conflicts with St. Petersburg.
This matter concerned chiefly the Romanian church hierarchy and the
government, but the settlement had to have the approval of the patri-
arch. The second question, that of the Dedicated Monasteries, was
handled through negotiations in Constantinople, with Ignatiev as
moderator. The Russian ambassador had the unenviable task of trying
to mediate a conflict that was national as well as religious. At the same
time he was forced to deal with similar controversies between the Bul-
garian and Greek ecclesiastical authorities. Ignatiev's prime aim re-
mained the preservation of the unity of the Orthodox people and their
close ties with Russia. He thus worked hard to secure an acceptable
solution. In the same manner Charles too wished to find a satisfactory
arrangement, but he could not accept a settlement that involved losses
to the Romanian position, which would, in turn, damage his own pres-
tige within the country. In January 1869 he wrote to the patriarch con-
cerning the initiating of discussions.120 However, the entire question of
the Dedicated Monasteries was soon to pass from the scene as a major
issue in Russian-Romanian relations. Although negotiations con-
tinued, the Romanian government had in fact triumphed over the
Patriarchates. The secularization of the monastery property was main-
tained, and no compensation was ever paid.

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 Russia and the Romanian national state
At the same time work continued on the new church laws.121 Cuza
had made Romanian bishops civil officials who were appointed by him
and could similarly be dismissed by him. Article 21 of the Constitution
of 1866 had dealt with the church question and declared: "The Ortho-
dox church is and remains independent of any foreign hierarchy," but
it was joined to the ecumenical Eastern church as regards dogma - a
statement open to divergent interpretations. Because the interest of
the Romanian legislature was centered chiefly on other matters, it had
delayed regulating church affairs. There was also disagreement within
the government and among the church officials concerning the terms of
the settlement to be reached. The final version placed the control of the
church in the hands of a synod of church officials with the minister of
religion given only an advisory role in this body. Bishops were to be
chosen from members of the monastic orders by the synod, but the elec-
tion had to be confirmed by the prince. This settlement, once agreed
upon in Romania, had to be submitted to the patriarch. In February
1870 he responded, giving his conditions for acceptance: the metro-
politans elected in Romania were to be subject to his approval, his name
was to be mentioned in prayers, and the holy oil was to be obtained
from him.122 In addition, he found the necessity of securing the prince's
assent to the decisions of the synod unacceptable, since that body was
infallible and its decisions were not subject to review by a lay official.
Because the Romanian government did not accept these terms, the en-
tire question of the relationship with the Patriarchate remained open.
Despite the continuation of negotiations on these matters, Russo-
Romanian relations in fact were not close. As long as Bratianu was in
office the Russian government was constantly apprehensive about his in-
tentions. Concern arose in particular about the strengthening of the
revolutionary influences among the Bulgarian emigrants in Romania.
Moreover, Gorchakov, like the leaders of other governments, feared that
the Liberal ministry would proclaim independence without the consent
of the protecting powers. This action could bring about the intervention
of the states that could not tolerate a revolutionary center on their
borders. The Russian statesman shared the general distrust and dislike
of Bratianu. Although some European diplomats considered him a Rus-
ian tool, Gorchakov feared that he was trying to play the role of a
Bismarck in the East and to replace Russian influence with Romanian
in Balkan affairs. As we have seen, the Russian government did not sup-
port the Austrian proposal for an Ottoman intervention, but the fall
of Bratianu's ministry in November 1868 was certainly welcomed. With
the advent of the Ghica administration, relations improved.
During this period the Romanian government, under Conservative
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 Prince Charles, 1866-1&J1
leadership, sought not only to maintain ties with St. Petersburg, but to
improve relations with all of the protecting powers and the Porte. Em-
phasis was placed on making gains by diplomatic means. The Romanian
approaches were welcomed in Paris and Vienna. Throughout 1869 the
French and Habsburg statesmen, in particular, made an effort to change
what they believed was the strongly pro-Russian and pro-Prussian orien-
tation of the Romanian government. After seeing the tsar at Livadia in
August 1869, Charles visited the other European courts, where he was
received as a reigning monarch. In their conversations with the prince
and with other Romanian representatives, French and Habsburg
statesmen strongly emphasized the theme of the danger to Romania
from Russia. As Napoleon III told the Romanian agent in Paris, Ion
Strat: "One cannot say as much about Russia, whose traditional policy,
which has never been denied since the Treaty of Tilsit, has been and
can only be that of incorporating the Principalities."123 Instead of an
alignment with Russia, Romania was urged to form a dam against
"Slavdom" and to head a movement of Balkan states apart from Rus-
sia. As the French foreign minister, Lavalette, urged Strat, Romania
should "understand that your role in the East urgently demands that
you become the most civilized and strong nation among all the Chris-
tian populations of the east."124 The state would then be the center of
gravitation for the Balkan Christian peoples. Romanian interests were
declared identical to those of France in this respect.
In the Habsburg Monarchy both Austrian and Hungarian leaders
spoke in a similar manner. Beust argued that it was better for Romania
to remain under Ottoman control than to become independent and fall
under Russian domination.125 Good relations with Hungary were for-
warded in particular through the efforts of Marquis Gioacchimo Pepoli,
an uncle of Charles, who was the Italian ambassador in Vienna.126 He
urged that Romania cultivate close relations with Hungary and stop
the national propaganda in Transylvania. Hungary and Romania to-
gether could seek a solution of the Eastern Question to the exclusion
of Russia; in partnership they could form a dam against the Slavs.
Transylvania was the natural fortress of the Magyars against the Slavs.
For the present, Pepoli urged, the Romanian government should concen-
trate on its internal development so that the country could be a center
to which the Christian population of the Balkans could turn. In June
1869 D. A. Sturdza reported that all the Hungarians wanted a union of
their country, Romania, and the Ottoman Empire against the Slavs,
but with Romania remaining in a vassal position.127
Although the removal of Bratianu improved Romanian relations with
the powers, it left a very unstable domestic situation. The Conservative

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 Russia and the Romanian national state
ministry needed advances in the national interest to strengthen its posi-
tion within the country. The principal negotiations were of necessity
with the Porte, but these did not proceed smoothly. As we have seen,
the Ottoman government would make no concessions on the question
of the Romanian right to negotiate agreements with other powers with-
out the intervention of the suzerain state. The exact line of the Danube
frontier between the Romanian lands and those of the rest of the empire
was also in dispute. Equally important, however, was the controversy
over Romania's desire to mint its own coins.128
The agreements in effect in 1866 allowed Romania to have its own
coins, but of a low denomination and with an emblem representing
the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently, the Romanian chamber passed a
law providing that the money should have a national designation, and
coins of a small value were issued. After further discussions, in which
France supported the Romanian claims, the Porte accepted this action
and agreed that silver and gold coins could be minted in the same man-
ner. However, in March 1870, the Principalities issued a gold coin with
a picture of Charles and the title "prince of Romania " but with no
designation that the country was a part of the Ottoman Empire.129 All
of the protecting powers, including Russia, protested. The Porte was
particularly disturbed by this action, which in its eyes further demon-
strated the unreliability of the Romanian government and its unwilling-
ness to abide by the terms of the agreements made with it. This question
remained a matter of further negotiation in the next years.

T H E CRISIS OF 1870-1871
By 1870 the Romanian government had again succeeded in arousing the
concern of all of the protecting powers and the Porte. In a period of
reform designed to fortify the empire against further disintegration,
the Ottoman government naturally resisted any Romanian attempts to
throw off the few remaining links with Constantinople. All of the
powers were hostile to the continued efforts to weaken the relationship
with the Porte, and they were angry at the repeated violations of
treaties. No state in the disturbed European environment of the early
1870s wanted Romania to precipitate another Eastern crisis by further
moves toward independence. The Russian government, in addition,
was not satisfied with Romanian internal conditions. The revolutionary
spirit appeared to be rising; at the end of 1869 Offenberg reported on
the increasing political agitation in the country, on the struggle between
the "reds" and the conservatives, and on the growth of antidynastic sen-
timent.130 Russian concern over the Principalities as a revolutionary
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 Prince Charles, 1866-18.71
center had been a constant theme in the previous years. Even more sig-
nificant was the Russian apprehension over what appeared to be closer
ties between Romania and Russia's adversaries, which since the Polish
uprising were France, Austria-Hungary, and, in some instances, Britain
and the Ottoman Empire. In June 1870 an article in the Journal de St.
Petersbourg expressed old fears in stating that the Western powers in
1856 had seen the Principalities as a kind of "sentinel" against Russia:
Poland should be set up as a rampart against Muscovite ambition, Romania
should represent an outpost... It is thus that one sees, in defiance of the proto-
cols of Paris, the Moldo-Wallachians proclaim their union and later place at
their head a foreign prince, flaunting the conference and the suzerain power.
Europe and the Porte consoled themselves, thinking that they had played a
trick on Russia.131
In addition, relations were not proceeding smoothly on individual
matters. The consular convention had not been ratified, and negotia-
tions between the Romanian government and the patriarch on church
matters were progressing very slowly. In February 1870 Ignatiev spoke
with D. A. Sturdza, now the Romanian representative in Constanti-
nople, about the chamber's failure to approve the consular convention.
Sturdza in his comments to his government expressed his regret about
the delay, which he regarded as harmful to Romanian interests. The
advantage that a swift conclusion could offer in persuading other pow-
ers to make similar agreements was being lost. He concluded: "A diplo-
mat, who is in a position to know the details of this question, assured
me that what is happening is more especially unfortunate since the de-
cision taken by Russia was the result of the good impression that the
mission of Monsieur Ion Cantacuzino and the Bishop of the Lower
Danube produced at St. Petersburg."132
Meanwhile in Bucharest, Offenberg continued to comment in nega-
tive terms about the chaotic internal situation, although he was sympa-
thetic to the prince personally. It will be remembered that at the begin-
ning of his reign Charles had preferred to work with Bratianu and
the Liberals. Largely owing to foreign pressure, he had been forced to
change the basis of his government and to rely on moderates and con-
servatives for his ministry. The legislative bodies, in contrast, had re-
mained in the hands of the Liberals. After November 1868 Bratianu
was president of the assembly and N. Golescu of the senate. Amid the
wide sweep of opinion designated as "liberal," the far left now stood
for a strongly antidynastic position and for the establishment of a re-
public. The Liberals, who had been previously loudest in the call for a
foreign prince and who had been responsible for Charles's nomination,
were by this time his fiercest opponents. Although the prince had made
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
adjustments in his internal affairs to suit the wishes of the powers, he
had received no real gains from this policy of compliance that he could
use to calm domestic criticism. He desperately needed to show major
achievements in foreign affairs. It must also be remembered that Charles
had no personal party; he was not even surrounded by a coterie of in-
fluential friends of the kind that had aided Cuza.
In his reports to St. Petersburg Offenberg noted the increase in the
opposition to the prince. Bratianu, because of his role in bringing
Charles to power, retained a reserved position, but, the consul wrote,
his associates had deserted the prince in favor of a republican stand.133
Offenberg himself blamed the tense situation on the constitution, which
limited the powers of the executive and gave free rein to the expression
of "revolutionary" opinion. Friendly to the prince, Offenberg was ex-
tremely critical of both the opposition leaders and the political system.
He saw the conflicts in the government as simple struggles for power
among ambitious individuals, with "malice, jealousy, greed or bore-
dom" as the basis for the actions of groups with no ideals or plan of
operation. "What they call the parliamentary regime in Romania is
only the former game of intrigues in a modern form. Far from working
for the good of the nation, it only excites passions, perverts ideas, and
substitutes phrases for real progress."134
Neither the domestic nor the foreign situation was thus favorable
when the candidacy of Charles's brother Leopold for the Spanish throne
threw Europe into a major crisis. On June 7 / 19, 1870, Leopold accepted
the nomination, an act that had immediate effects on Romania. The
power most directly harmed by the candidacy was, of course, France. Al-
though Napoleon had accepted a Hohenzollern in Bucharest in 1866,
the Spanish throne was an entirely different matter. Not only had Prus-
sian power increased in relative terms since 1866, but a Hohenzollern
king in neighboring Spain could be a threat to French security, some-
thing a vassal prince on the lower Danube could never be. The French
government had also not been consulted directly or indirectly on Leo-
pold's nomination. A matter of vital importance for France had ob-
viously arisen.
The new crisis placed Charles in a most difficult position. As a Hohen-
zollern, whose brother was directly affected, the prince could only hope
for a Prussian success, but the majority of his countrymen were bound
to support France. Moreover, the question immediately involved
French-Romanian relations and the influence that France could exert
on Romanian internal policy. In July Strat telegraphed from Paris
that the candidature was a real danger for Romania and that Charles
should try to persuade his brother to decline. The French leaders did
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 Prince Charles, 1866-iSrji
not hide their intentions. The foreign minister, Alfred de Gramont, told
Strat that the moment Charles conspired against French interests, ef-
forts would be made to overthrow him. Should war start, France would
pursue a similar policy in order to give satisfaction to French public
opinion, which blamed Napoleon for allowing a Hohenzollern prince
to rule in Bucharest. Strat was so disturbed by the situation that he
traveled to Sigmaringen to speak with Karl Anton.135
Largely because of the French reaction, Leopold officially renounced
his candidacy on June 30/July 12. Thereafter relations between the
French government and the prince improved. Napoleon III told Strat
that Charles could count on him; the French government ended its con-
tacts with his political opposition.136 However, the entire situation
again became sensitive after France declared war on Prussia on July
7/19. The Romanian chamber immediately wished to express its pro-
French sentiments, despite the fact that the treaties prescribed a policy
of neutrality. A resolution was adopted stating that Romanian sym-
pathies lay with the Latin race meaning, of course, France.137 Fully
expecting a Prussian victory and believing that the war would remain
localized, Charles used his influence to try to avoid any Romanian in-
volvement. One issue, however, arose at once. After the war started it
was made clear that the Russian government would honor the promise
given previously by the tsar to Prussia to exert pressure on the Habs-
burg Monarchy to force it to remain neutral. Russia, although not a
belligerent, was clearly in the Prussian camp. On July 12 / 24. Strat tele-
graphed that the French government wished to know if Romania would
make a treaty should Russia enter the war. Romania would be obligated
only in case of an actual conflict and would win advantages at the peace.
The Romanian government replied:
If France categorically demands from us the signature of a treaty that would
influence our attitude toward Russia in case of an Eastern complication then
you are empowered to conclude this treaty on the following basis: The Ro-
manian government is determined hand in hand with the Western Powers and
Turkey to oppose any hostile step of Russia . . . We could provide a well-armed
army of 30,000 men.138
On July 13/25 Strat informed his government that there was no need
for an agreement. He also reported that Gramont had given further
assurances that the French government would support Charles, and that
he had spoken with D. Bratianu.139 The latter in turn had promised in
the name of his party that attacks would not be made on the prince or
his ministry.
The position of France in regard to Romania was complicated by
the French friendship with the Habsburg Monarchy. During the war in
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
particular the government wanted to maintain these good relations.
It therefore wished to assure that no event would occur that might
lead Vienna to fear an outside attack. Within Romania, of course, the
antidynastic pro-French faction was also vigorously irredentist and
anti-Hungarian. As such, it was bound to disturb Hungarian opinion,
which in turn would influence the monarchy's stand in other affairs.
Therefore, throughout this period, France stood behind Charles and
wished him to keep the throne. His relations with the French consulate
were good.
During the crisis the Russian government, as we have seen, took an
attitude favorable to Prussian interests. When the question of the can-
didacy of Leopold arose, the Russian reaction was in essence indiffer-
ence. Gorchakov compared it to the situation in 1866 when Russia
had protested over the election of Charles. Once Leopold withdrew,
the tsar and Gorchakov felt that no further grounds existed for French
discontent. On July 4/16 Alexander II gave Bismarck additional as-
surances of his attitude in case of a war; he told the Prussian representa-
tive, Pfuel, that if Austria declared war on Prussia, Russia would con-
centrate an army of 300,000 on the Habsburg border and, if necessary,
occupy Galicia. On July 11/23 the tsar informed the Habsburg govern-
ment that Russia would remain neutral only if the monarchy adopted
a similar attitude. Once the war commenced and the Prussian victories
occurred, Gorchakov wanted a European conference called to negotiate
the final settlement. When Prussia refused his solution, and when it
became probable that France would lose Alsace and Lorraine, the Rus-
sian government turned its main efforts toward seeking compensation.140
The war presented the Russian government with the welcome oppor-
tunity of breaking the section of the Treaty of Paris that it regarded as
the most damaging and the most humiliating - that concerning the
neutralization of the Black Sea. This action had been the major Russian
foreign policy goal since 1856. Even before his government had deter-
mined on such a course of action, Ignatiev had discussed the question
with Ali. On October 15/27, in a meeting attended by Gorchakov,
Miliutin, and other Russian advisers, Alexander II decided to denounce
the Black Sea clauses. According to his own account, Miliutin argued
against the retaking of southern Bessarabia, a matter that was also dis-
cussed.141 The method chosen, a unilateral denunciation, was to cause
more controversy than the act itself. On October 19/31 Gorchakov an-
nounced the Russian intentions in a circular dispatch to the Russian
representatives abroad. It is interesting to note that he used the repeated
Romanian violation of treaties during the previous years as his main
argument justifying the Russian move. In view of these previous ac-
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 Prince Charles, 1866-1871
tions breaking the Treaty of Paris, he wrote, "it would be difficult to
affirm that written law, based on respect for treaties as the base of pub-
lic law and the rule for relations between states, has conserved the
same moral sanction that it has had in other times." Concerning Ro-
mania he wrote:
We have seen the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, whose destiny has
been determined by the treaty of peace and by the subsequent protocols,
under the guarantee of the great powers, carry out a series of revolutions con-
trary to the spirit as well as the letter of these transactions . . . which have led
them first to union, then to the call for a foreign prince. These deeds occurred
with the recognition of the Porte, with the acquiescence of the great Powers, or
at least without these [states] believing it necessary to make their judgments
respected.
The Representative of Russia has been the only one to raise his voice to
point out to the cabinets that they put themselves in contradiction to the ex-
plicit stipulations of the treaty by that tolerance.142
In a further instruction to Brunnow, whose arguments were designed
to be communicated to the British government, Gorchakov elaborated
on the theme that treaties had been broken and that Russia alone could
not be expected to honor them. This document also carried the strong
implication that Russian interests had been harmed by the national
development of the Romanian state:
What should impress Russia in these modifications is not the tendency to fac-
tious hostility in her regard, of which they bear the imprint; it is not even the
consequences that the creation on its frontiers of a small semiindependent state
can have for a great country; it is above all the facility with which, scarcely ten
years after its conclusion, a solemn transaction, clothed in a European guaran-
tee, can be violated in its letter and in its spirit, under the eyes of the same
powers who should be the guardians.
In the presence of such a precedent, what value can Russia attach to the
effectiveness of that transaction and to the pledge of security that she had be-
lieved to find in the principle of the neutralization of the Black Sea? The
equilibrium established in the east by the Treaty of 1856 is thus disrupted to
the detriment of Russia. The resolution taken by Our August Master has no
other aim than to reestablish it.143
The Russian denunciation became immediately the subject of an
exchange of messages among the governments.144 No power was content
with the method, the timing, or the action itself. Even though Prussia
and Austria-Hungary had previously promised to support the Russian
desire to modify the treaty, both were displeased by the introduction
of a new issue in the general European crisis. Bismarck wanted no more
problems to arise until the conflict with France was settled. The strong-
est reaction, however, came from Britain, which saw its major gain
from the costly Crimean War nullified. Austria-Hungary supported the

203
 Russia and the Romanian national state
British stand. In his reply to the Russian government, Beust discussed
the question of Romania and argued that, because of its status, its ac-
tions could not be used as a justification of the denunciation: it was
not a signatory of the Treaty of Paris, and it was under the suzerainty
of the Porte.145 In a dispatch of November 10/22 Gorchakov answered
this argument in terms that well expressed the Russian frustration in
dealing with the Principalities in the past.146 He recognized, he stated,
that Moldavia and Wallachia were indeed not signatories of the peace
agreement.
These provinces, joined to the Porte by relations of vassality, cannot be con-
tracting parties of transactions concluded between great powers. They had
no part in them and cannot be made responsible for the infringements of which
they have been the pretext, in carrying through internal revolutions under the
inspiration of their local passions.
The infraction rests precisely in the fact that the great powers, meeting in
conference, after having in vain pronounced judgments that imposed a repri-
mand on the faits accomplis, have ended by tolerating them and recognizing
them, although they were contrary to the spirit as well as to the letter of the
treaty and although the Plenipotentiary of Russia pointed out that this toler-
ance placed them in formal contradiction with the stipulations of this treaty.
This infraction does not only invalidate the idea of law. It tends by its con-
sequences to modify the situation in the basin of the Black Sea, by introducing
a third riverain not foreseen by the treaty . . . which, connected to the center
of the continent by a network of commercial and strategic routes, can acquire
a political importance much superior to its geographic dimensions.147
In commenting on the Russian arguments, the British ambassador in
Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, pointed out:
It has perhaps escaped the memory of the Government of His Majesty, that it
was Count Kiselev, plenipotentiary of Russia at the conference of Paris, who,
in the meetings of May 22 and June 5, 1858, declared that the almost unani-
mous desire of the Principalities in favor of a union under the government of
a foreign prince was legitimate and rational, and that it was the same Count
Kiselev who invoked the same Treaty of Paris in favor of their right to have
their demand taken into consideration.148
The question of the Russian denunciation was finally settled in No-
vember when the powers agreed to hold a conference in London whose
discussions were to be limited to this question. The meetings did not
commence until January, however, and meanwhile an internal crisis
had occurred in Romania.
The crushing defeat of France had been a great shock to the Ro-
manian leaders, particularly to the Liberals. Despite disagreements in
the past years, France had been the major supporter of the Romanian
national movement. Romanian propaganda had repeatedly laid stress
on common Latin racial ties. D. A. Sturdza expressed his surprise and
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 Prince Charles, 1866-1871
chagrin in these words: "What a terrible lesson for little people and
weak states! If a great nation, so civilized, so well organized, so powerful
as the French, can suffer because of levity, of lack of prudence such great
defeats, Romania should tremble over the results of a policy, where folly
and anarchy dictate law."149
After the Franco-Prussian War broke out there was concern in Ro-
mania that Russia would make a move, and probably one involving
Bessarabia. Rumors abounded of Russian concentrations of troops
across the frontier. Aware of these fears, the Russian government on
July 22/August 3 published in the Journal de St. Petersbourg a denial
both of the troop concentrations and of the intention of intervening in
Romania unilaterally. On September 24/October 6 Offenberg gave
further assurances of Russia's peaceful intentions.150 Nevertheless, most
observers in Romania, like those in Europe, expected Russia to take ad-
vantage of the situation and to seek some compensation to balance
Prussia's great gains. After the denunciation of the Black Sea clauses
the Romanian government remained concerned over Russian inten-
tions, even though southern Bessarabia had not been mentioned. When
the question of a conference came up, fears arose that this issue might
be raised in such a meeting, where, of course, Romania would not have
a representative. Strat was sent to London to try to get support for the
Romanian interest. The foreign minister, Nicholas Callimachi Catargi,
wrote: "Our country is fully satisfied with its political situation; it
considers the Treaty of Paris with the subsequent international acts as
the best guaranty of its security; so that all its wishes are for a strict
status quo without as well as within."151
Meanwhile, Charles was preparing to move in a contrary direction.
Despite the Prussian victories, which had naturally aroused his great
enthusiasm, the prince was becoming increasingly discouraged with the
Romanian domestic situation and with his own position as prince. In
February 1870 he had replaced the Ghica cabinet with one led by the
Liberal A. G. Golescu, which lasted until May, when Monolache
Costache Epureanu, a Conservative, became premier. This weak gov-
ernment was the constant target of attack from its opponents, who con-
tinued to dominate the legislatures. In reporting on conditions in the
country, Offenberg commented on the attacks on the prince and the
pro-French manifestations in the assembly, where each speaker tried to
surpass the previous in praise of the "Latin races." The consul himself
believed that the intensity of the pro-French position was not entirely
sincere, but rather a cover for antidynastic actions. Many saw it as a
means of ridding the country of Charles by linking him to an antici-
pated Prussian defeat. Offenberg recognized that if France won, the
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
prince's position would be "difficult, if not desperate."152 France, of
course, was officially supporting the status quo exactly because the gov-
ernment feared such complications in the East at this time.
Once Prussia began to win victories on the battlefield, Offenberg
reported the resulting sensation in Romania. He believed that these
victories would help the prince, commenting: "This country resists
with difficulty the prestige of power and yields willingly to all those
who are able to serve its interests."153
Until the results of the war were clearly apparent, however, Charles
remained in a precarious situation. The outward signs of opposition
increased. The height of agitation occurred when on August 8/20 a
revolt broke out in Ploesti, the leaders of which supported an anti-
dynastic and republican program.154 Even worse, in October the par-
ticipants were acquitted, an act that Offenberg denounced as giving a
sort of legal sanction to armed revolt and as justifying in the eyes of
the population attacks against authority.155
Despite the Prussian military successes, culminating in the capitula-
tion of Napoleon III at Sedan on August 21/ September 2, the continued
opposition on the domestic front led Charles by the end of October to
consider abdication. First, however, he decided that he should address
himself to the protecting powers directly and inform them of his diffi-
culty in governing with the liberal constitution. This action would be a
first step toward his abdication. Although he had sworn to uphold the
constitution and would do so as long as he reigned, he hoped that his
successor would rule under better conditions. At the beginning of De-
cember, without the knowledge or approval of his ministers, he sent
personal letters to the rulers of Britain, Italy, the Habsburg Empire,
Prussia, and Russia. In these messages he attempted to "show clearly
to the guarantor powers the state of affairs in Romania in order to know
that the future of the country was assured before leaving/' 156 He also
wanted the powers to discuss the Romanian question at the conference,
a course of action that of course, his government opposed.
The prince also wrote to the journalist Auerbach, expressing his
displeasure at conditions in Romania. This letter, which was printed
in the Augsburger Zeitung, contained a direct attack on the Liberals
and a strong criticism of Romania's political system. He blamed the
difficulties on
these people who, forgetting the situation of their country, have had their
political and social education abroad, have no other thought than to apply at
home and without discrimination ideas accepted there and clothed in a certain
Utopian form.
It is thus that this unhappy country, which has always lived in the hardest
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servitude, has passed, without any transition, from a despotic government to
the most liberal constitution, a constitution the likes of which no other people
in Europe possess. I consider this, after my own experience, as a misfortune so
much greater in that the Romanians cannot flatter themselves as possessing
the domestic virtues indispensable for a quasi-republican constitution. 157
Neither Charles's letter to the rulers nor that just quoted remained
long a secret. Copies of both soon appeared in Romanian newspapers.
Charles not only had not discussed the letters with his ministers, but
he had also written directly to the rulers over the head of the sultan.
The prince in fact sent a letter to Abdul Aziz only after three weeks and
on the strong urging of the British consul in Bucharest, John Green.
Charles thus was acting without the consent or approval of his govern-
ment or the Porte. These events placed the Romanian representatives
abroad in an extremely awkward position. The reaction within the
country was, as could be expected, extremely negative, particularly on
the left. The prince had openly criticized the country and its institu-
tions. Moreover, his action had been taken at a time of international
crisis. On December 16/28 Charles appointed a Liberal government,
again headed by Ion Ghica, with Callimachi Catargi as foreign minis-
ter. Ghica was not regarded as a strong supporter of the prince, and he
felt that the constitution was workable.158 Thus neither the cabinet nor
the legislature could be expected to assist Charles.
From an international point of view the prince's initiative had been
exceedingly ill-timed. It provided an opportunity for all of the forces
inimical to Charles to come into play. The state most affected was,
of course, the Porte. The Ottoman leaders agreed with Charles that the
country could not be governed under the existing constitutional sys-
tem; a change would have to be made. The Ottoman government, how-
ever, did not like the prince's methods, which were considered illegal.
It also believed that Charles's intention was not to change the constitu-
tion as much as to alter the relationship of Romania with the em-
pire. Should this question be brought up at the coming conference, the
Ottoman delegates would leave.159
The letters did indeed strengthen the Ottoman position in regard to
Romania. Discussions were being carried on at this time in preparation
for the conference that was to be held in London. As the power most
severely injured by the Russian denunciation of the Black Sea clauses,
the Ottoman government could be expected to claim some sort of
compensation. Although its leaders would have preferred the mainte-
nance of the provisions intact, they recognized that this was impossible.
It was therefore decided that, as compensation, a change would again be
sought in Article 27 of the treaty, which, as we have seen, limited the
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
Ottoman right of military intervention in Romania.160 The Ottoman
Empire once more tried to have itself named specifically as the state
that would occupy the country in a time of crisis, although it was will-
ing to act only with the consent of the guaranteeing powers, and al-
though the Ottoman army would be accompanied by commissioners
of these states.
Charles's letters naturally gave support to the Ottoman arguments
about the instability of the Romanian political situation. If the prince
indeed abdicated, anarchy could prevail or a republic be established.
In either case a military force in the opinion of the Porte, would have
to be sent in to set up an acceptable regime. Therefore the powers were
to be asked to agree that the Turkish army should carry out this task.
A new government would then be organized, based on the international
agreements, with the separation of the Principalities and the appoint-
ment of native princes. The Porte, it was emphasized, could not permit
the formation of "a hotbed of anarchy" or a "Red Republic" because
of the effect on the other members of the Ottoman Christian popu-
lation.161
The Ottoman government thus proposed that Charles be allowed to
try to handle the situation. When he failed, as he was expected to do,
the powers should then take the responsibility of providing Romania
with a new administration. After the prince had left the country, the
Ottoman army, accompanied by commissioners of the powers, would
be sent in and Moldavia and Wallachia would be separated. A new
political system would then be introduced by the protecting powers.
Although the Ottoman proposals were not accepted, the sympathy
with which some sections were met, particularly from the Habsburg
Monarchy and Russia, clearly showed the precarious position of Ro-
mania after the defeat of France, the one power that had usually stood
behind the principle of unity. No other power gave similar assistance
or had the same direct interest in Romanian integrity. The prince him-
self had no real support among the great powers, including Prussia;
Bismarck at this time was highly annoyed by this added complication in
the international scene. On January 12/24 William replied to the
prince's letter and warned him that he must rely completely on his own
internal support and not count on aid from the outside.162 The British
leaders, who were in favor of the constitution and the principle that
the wishes of the Romanian people should be followed, consistently
expressed strong personal criticisms of the prince. Austria-Hungary and
Russia were more understanding of Charles's desire to change the con-
stitution, but they were also ready to consider separating the Prin-
cipalities.
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 Prince Charles, 1866-1&J1
A major complication at this stage was that Charles's letter was large-
ly misunderstood. In fact, some diplomats regarded it as little more
than an attempt by Charles to strengthen his personal position and to
change the constitution. Others agreed with the Porte that the real aim
was to use the international crisis to advance Romania toward inde-
pendence. Most of the European statesmen were also personally un-
sympathetic to the prince. Previous strong attacks on his government
and his person in the European and Romanian press had produced
their effect. It was widely felt, particularly in the West, that conditions
in the country were chaotic and that Charles was in a hopeless position.
He did not appear to have firm control of the army, and he did not
have a political party on which he could count.
Despite the almost universal criticism of Romanian political condi-
tions and of the prince, the powers were faced with the familiar and
unpleasant task of deciding what they should do about a Romanian
crisis. All of the alternatives available presented enormous difficulties.
The conservative powers feared that if the monarchy fell, either anarchy
or a republic would replace it; division of the Principalities and a
return to the old hospodarial system was thus seen as preferable. The
other states wished the maintenance of a constitutional system. None,
however, could see how any influence could be exerted in the area with-
out a military intervention, which the Porte desired to carry through.
On this issue, as on the others, the protectors split into opposing camps.
Romanian interests, in particular as regards a military intervention,
were probably best protected by Britain, despite that state's steadfast
determination to uphold Ottoman integrity. The Porte's desire to send
an armed force into the Principalities was firmly rejected. At the same
time, the actions of the prince were harshly criticized. For instance, the
Romanian agent in Constantinople, Balaceanu, reported that Elliot
"thinks that there are in the last letter of his Highness some matters
profoundly wounding for our country and that this letter in showing
that the prince of Romania still considers himself as a Prussian" harmed
him as much abroad as at home.163 Green described his position at this
time as that of "a complete nonentity, a mere ornamental expression of
mock sovereignty, in a country which had never been accustomed to
view their Princes in any other light than that of irresponsible Gov-
ernors invested with sufficient power to cause their decisions to be
respected."164
The British government at this time was headed by a Liberal cabinet
with William E. Gladstone as prime minister and the Earl of Granville
as foreign secretary. Gladstone was personally annoyed by the prince's
letter, which had been addressed to Queen Victoria. In January he
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
wrote to Granville: "What scandalizes me in P. (Prince) Charles' letter
is its shabby intriguing clandestine character. I hope it may be found
proper and practical to snub him."165 In his instructions to Green,
Granville told him not to support attempts to change the constitution.
On the question of abdication the foreign secretary advised that, if
Charles really intended to leave, he should inform the responsible Ro-
manian leaders. They could then plan for the future, and the powers
would subsequently judge if their actions were according to the treaties.
The British government opposed direct military intervention, such
as the Porte desired, since the political decisions should be made by the
Romanians without outside interference. Granville feared that if "the
Powers take a contrary course and assume the initiative of giving a gov-
ernment to the Principalities, they will in some degree be responsible
for its proper working."166 In contrast to the conservative powers and
the Porte, Britain, particularly during the Gladstone administration,
felt that the wishes of the Romanians should be determined before the
political institutions of the country were changed. Of course, by the
Romanian "people" the British government meant the restricted group
that held the franchise.
The Habsburg government too believed that Charles's true goal was
to increase his own power and make a move toward independence. Al-
though not sympathetic to the Hohenzollern prince, most Austrian dip-
lomats considered him the best available ruler. Like the British they
favored a moderate solution to the Romanian problem, and they did
not support any particular party. They were against a unilateral Otto-
man intervention, but were more willing to consider the eventual
separation of the provinces than the British. Nevertheless Count Rudolf
Apponyi, the Habsburg ambassador in Britain, told Granville that such
a change should not be imposed by the powers against the wishes of the
people. Beust instructed Prokesch along a similar line. The Habsburg
foreign minister himself felt that Ottoman policy was shortsighted.
When united, the Principalities were a barrier against Russia. Divided,
they might fall under exclusive Russian influence, Moldavia in par-
ticular.167
Russia's role in these discussions was not as active as that of Britain,
Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. Gorchakov was primari-
ly concerned with gaining the powers' acceptance of the ending of
neutralization of the Black Sea. The reannexation of southern Bessa-
rabia, the second major aim, was postponed for the future. Although
it had no immediate goals to secure, the Russian government continued
to be deeply concerned with the political evolution of the neighboring

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 Prince Charles, 1866-18,71
state. On February 16/28 the tsar finally responded to Charles's appeal.
He wrote that he understood the difficulties of the prince's position,
but that he regretted the decisions that had been taken. The protecting
powers could give only moral support. The emphasis in the message
was on the dangers of revolutionary activity.
Everywhere it is the inertia of men of good will that brings the success of revo-
lutions. Conservative elements exist in Romania. The fear of the disorder that
would follow your withdrawal will contribute perhaps to gather them around
you. In working for this with firmness and perseverence, I am pleased to be-
lieve that you will attain a better situation. Your task is arduous, but it is
worthy of your efforts.168
At the beginning of the crisis Gorchakov had believed that Charles
would abdicate. Because he feared that disorders would result, he was
at first not against an intervention, provided that it was not a unilateral
Habsburg action. Should a "red republic" be set up, he was willing to
consider an Ottoman occupation if it was on the basis of the treaties.
On the question of the separation of the Principalities, Gorchakov did
not object in principle to a return to the Treaty of Paris but he believed
that Russia should take no steps to initiate it. Like the British and the
Habsburg governments, the Russian hoped that the Romanian ques-
tion would be settled without the necessity of outside intervention.
Compared to other questions at issue in international relations at the
time, Romanian affairs were of secondary importance.
In his conversations with the Ottoman officials, Ignatiev stood for
a similar point of view. Sharing a common fear of what might happen
should the prince fall, the ambassador did not oppose an Ottoman oc-
cupation in principle. He similarly agreed that a return to the system
of two provinces was acceptable. Throughout the crisis he kept in mind
the possible Russian use of the situation to take back southern Bessa-
rabia. For instance, in a secret dispatch to Gorchakov of September
9/21, 1870, he reported the Porte's intention not to tolerate a repub-
lican government in the Principalities. If one were proclaimed, and an
occupation were agreed upon, Ignatiev thought that Russia could per-
haps reoccupy the lost territory.169
Meanwhile, Offenberg continued to write dispatches that were sym-
pathetic to the prince and intensely critical of the Liberal politicians.
The consul had known of Charles's abdication plans and, on instruc-
tions, had warned him not to act. In arguing the prince's case, Offen-
berg wrote that Charles did not want to remain the "involuntary play-
thing and flag-holder" for the parties fighting for power. He had ap-
pealed to the powers because he could not continue under the same

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 Russia and the Romanian national state
conditions. The consul thought that the prince would leave without
regret if he could do so in an honorable manner. He was also willing
to sacrifice himself for the situation in Germany.170
Offenberg's attitude toward the constitution and the laws of the
country remained, as before, highly critical. They placed the govern-
ment of the country, he complained, in the hands of "the most dan-
gerous class of Romanian society, that composed of lawyers, clerks,
journalists and other representatives of the ideas of republican France."
These people dominated the ministries and opposed Charles. He also
feared what would happen if the prince were overthrown. There was no
dominant party or individual. If the guarantors did not act, he expected
the establishment of a republic, which would be "restless, aggressive
and irresponsible."171
After the first of the year Offenberg became more optimistic about
the prince's chances of remaining in power. He felt that Charles could
win if he acted effectively and was able to gain changes in the constitu-
tion but, he noted with regret, "firm decisions and energetic actions"
were foreign to the prince's nature.172' On January 30/ February 11 he
wrote that Charles should seize the political leadership and should base
his actions on the Conservatives, whose interests he had often sacrificed
to constitutional practices. With another assembly and ministry the
prince could control the situation. The consul continued to believe that
the Prussian victory would aid the prince; the French disaster had been
a shock to those who took inspiration from that country. Aside from
his opinions on the immediate situation, Offenberg retained his nega-
tive sentiments on Romanian political life. In addition to the dynastic
question, he commented, there was also a Romanian question:
The Byzantine spirit and modern corruption, acting together on the rude in-
stincts of Moldo-Wallachian society, have produced a state of affairs absolutely
incompatible with the needs of the civilization and the positive interests of
Europe. Led on by their national vanity and encouraged by a too long im-
punity, the Romanians believe today that they can do anything they want.173
When by March there had been no improvement in the situation.
Offenberg, again pessimistic, reported that no one was paying any at-
tention to the prince and that the ministry and legislatures were doing
nothing, against a background of increasing financial disorder.174
Although the Romanian politicians did not know the details of the
great-power discussions, the extreme danger of the situation was ob-
vious. The domestic crisis was somewhat eased when Charles at the
beginning of the year was able to gain an expression of support from
both the senate and the chamber, although their statements conflicted
on the major issue: the question of the constitution. The declaration
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 Prince Charles, 1866-1&J1
of the chamber stated: "The chamber, as a result of explanations given
by the ministers, expresses with profound emotion its sentiments of de-
votion for the throne and the dynasty that are guaranteed by the Con-
stitution and full of confidence in the future of the country, determined
to hold steadfastly to the Constitution, it proceeds with the business of
the day."175 The more lengthy senate declaration read in part that the
current state of affairs had resulted from the "application of our new
laws in view of the degree of our political education and in part from
the propagation of certain erroneous ideas that are entirely foreign to
the spirit and to the patriotic sentiment of the great majority of the
nation."176
On February 3/15 the ministers asked the prince to reconsider his
decision to abdicate and to think "of the responsibility, which he would
assume before history if by his abdication he delivered the country to
ruin."177 Charles thus had received tokens of support from within the
country, but no similar signs of approval abroad either for his rule or
for his attempt to change the constitution.
On March 10/22 the final event in the abdication episode took
place. On this day the German colony in Bucharest held a dinner in
honor of the birthday of William I, with the German consul-general,
Joseph Maria von Radowitz, presiding. A large crowd invaded the hall,
and anti-German and antidynastic demonstrations disrupted the cele-
bration.178 The premier, Ion Ghica, did not handle the situation with
firmness. As a result, Radowitz delivered a strong protest and demanded
that his government resign. The prince asked D. Ghica to form a min-
istry, but he refused. Charles then announced his intention of calling
together the regency that had been in power before his accession and of
transferring to it his authority. In this crisis the Romanian political
leaders recognized finally the extreme danger in which their country
could be placed. An abdication could lead to internal chaos and foreign
intervention. The Conservatives, in particular, rallied to the prince's
support and were able to put aside for a time their individual differ-
ences. When Charles received appeals to change his decision, he agreed
not to resign if the legislature would approve a ministry that he could
accept and would vote the laws that he needed. On March 11 /2% a new
ministry, with Lascar Catargiu as premier and minister of interior,
George Costaforu as foreign minister, and General Ion E. Florescu as
minister of war, was appointed.
Since this ministry was based on a minority in the legislatures, elec-
tions soon proved necessary. They were conducted by the men in power,
who used tactics perfected previously by the Liberals, and a majority
was obtained. Offenberg regarded the results with satisfaction; he be-
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
lieved the ministry was the best one since the union had been estab-
lished. He also approved of the assembly; dominated by boyars, it had
a better attitude, in his judgment, than its predecessor. Although
Charles still declared his intention of abdicating if he could not work
with the new political order, there was every indication that he would
have fewer problems with the Conservative ministry under the deter-
mined leadership of Catargiu.
Despite the fact that the Porte took the occasion to deliver a strong
warning to Bucharest, the prince thereafter also tried to improve his
relations with the sultan. In May Charles received a personal letter from
Abdul Aziz, the first time that an Ottoman ruler had sent such a mes-
sage to a vassal prince.179 Although few of the main issues in either the
domestic or the international situation had been settled, political life
within Romania became more tranquil. Charles had not changed the
constitution, but he had acquired a government that would assure
stable internal conditions for the next five years. He had received no
support from the protecting powers, but their divisions had again pre-
vented them iii combination from intervening in Romanian internal
affairs. As far as relations with Russia went, the tsar had shown personal
sympathy, but his main concern was over the London Conference and
the status of the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits. The Russian gov-
ernment still preferred a division of the Principalities, but certainly
no active measures were to be taken to this end. The principal fear was
over the establishment of truly revolutionary governments in Bucha-
rest. Then an intervention might be necessary, but it was to be ac-
complished according to the treaties and with a general European
sanction.
The years since 1866 had thus brought about exactly those political
conditions which the Russian government had previously tried to avoid:
a foreign prince and a constitutional regime based on liberal principles.
Nevertheless, the picture was not entirely black. European international
relations in these years were dominated by the events culminating in
the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership, an event that
enjoyed Russian approval. During this period, as we have seen, Bis-
marck and the Prussian government used their influence to urge the
Hohenzollern prince to work with Russia. If a foreign prince was in-
evitable, Charles was from the Russian viewpoint perhaps the best
candidate. His ability to meet the internal domestic pressures and to
guide Romanian foreign policy had, of course, yet to be demonstrated.
Nevertheless, after the crisis of 1871 it could be expected that the prince,
with his new Conservative regime, would initiate a period of better
relations between Bucharest and St. Petersburg.
214
 CHAPTER V

Prince Charles, 1871-1878:

the Eastern crisis

T H E CATARGIU GOVERNMENT: THE FIRST PERIOD

With the successful conclusion for Russia of the London Conference

and the establishment of the government of Lascar Catargiu, a period
of comparative calm that was to last until the spring of 1876 was in-
troduced in the foreign policies of both Russia and Romania. General
European diplomatic affairs remained in a similar condition. Like the
other European states, both the Russian and the Romanian govern-
ments had to adjust to the new diplomatic balance that had come
about with the unifications of Germany and Italy, the reorganization of
the Habsburg Monarchy, and the weakening of France.
For Romania the elimination of France as a major element in East-
ern diplomacy was to be of prime significance for the future. Although
relations had not always been smooth, this power had contributed more
to Romanian national development than any other state. Since the two
countries were geographically separated, France could never pose the
same threat to Romanian territory as had the neighboring Habsburg
Monarchy, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia at different periods. The
new Germany was not to be a substitute despite Charles's Hohenzollern
family ties. Bismarck was to prove particularly difficult, as would be
shown in the negotiations over the controversial Strousberg railroad
concession. He was also a man to hold a grudge. In May, in a conversa-
tion with Peter P. Carp, he complained about the Romanian attitude
during the Franco-Prussian War, the comments in the press, and other
incidents that had occurred and concluded: "We are the friends of our
friends and the enemies of our enemies."1 He also showed no objection
to the possible separation of the Principalities. In future crises he was

215
 Russia and the Romanian national state
constantly to subordinate the interests of Romania to those of Russia.
His policy in the 1870s, as during the period of German unification,
was to maintain the close ties between Berlin and St. Petersburg. As far
as Balkan affairs were concerned, he favored the division of the penin-
sula into Austrian and Russian spheres of influence, a policy that, of
course, did not correspond to the interests of the Balkan states.
Britain also was to remain a power on whose support the Romanian
government could not reckon. Primarily interested in maintaining the
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the British government
consistently opposed the Romanians' efforts to widen their autonomous
rights. Moreover, the British diplomats and statesmen continued to hold
the critical and bitter attitude toward Bucharest that we have seen in
the past. No attempt was made to gain a political position in the Prin-
cipalities or to use this connection to balance Russia's improved posi-
tion at Constantinople after the end of the neutralization of the Black
Sea.
For both Romania and Russia the most important power for Balkan
affairs was the Habsburg Monarchy. This state, after the defeat of 1866
and reorganization of 1867, was undoubtedly in a weaker condition
than before. Moreover, the direction the country would take after the
Ausgleich - in particular, the major influence to be exerted in foreign
policy by the Hungarian interests - was not at first apparent. In No-
vember 1871 Julius Andrassy replaced Beust as foreign minister. The
advantages and disadvantages of his appointment for both Bucharest
and St. Petersburg were the subject of debate in both capitals. The
Hungarian emphasis that Andrassy introduced into Habsburg policy
was to be detrimental to the Romanian concern over conditions in
Transylvania. He was, however, a member of the generation of 1848,
the group that had brought about Romanian unification and the ap-
pointment of the foreign prince. His basic antagonism to Russia as-
sured that the monarchy would not come to an agreement with St. Pet-
ersburg that would seriously compromise Romanian integrity.
Undoubtedly, Russian influence on Balkan affairs was greatly
strengthened by the breaking of Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of
Paris. The change was principally in matters of prestige. Until Russian
Black Sea fortifications were restored and until a fleet could be built,
the balance of military power in the area remained the same. With
enormous internal problems, chiefly financial, the Russian government
was in no position to rush the remilitarization of the Black Sea. In fact,
at this time the principal Russian statesmen, recognizing the primacy of
internal concerns, had no interest in a militant foreign policy. They

216
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
desired no advancement in the Balkans, and they wished no complica-
tions to arise in the area.
The desire of Russia, the Habsburg Monarchy, and Germany for a
period of peace and stability on the Continent was expressed in the
Three Emperors' Alliance. This agreement, which was based not on a
formal treaty, but rather on understandings reached among the three
monarchs during their visits to one another, meant that these states
would act together in foreign affairs. As long as the partners remained
in agreement, they could, of course, dominate European diplomacy.
Since the preservation of the status quo was the basis of the alignment,
any radical Romanian attempts to move toward independence were
likely to be received unfavorably. In addition, like their predecessors
in the Holy Alliance, the three rulers agreed on a common defense
against revolutionary forces, an attitude that would also affect Ro-
manian internal affairs. The defeat of France and the subsequent join-
ing together of the three conservative powers signified for Romania
that a policy of playing the guarantor states against one another would
henceforth be very difficult. As long as Vienna and St. Petersburg re-
mained in agreement, they could dominate Romanian policy. If they
opposed changes in the Balkans, any Romanian steps forward would
be impossible.
Conditions within the Ottoman Empire after 1871 also favored the
maintenance of the status quo. After the death of Ali in 1871, the Ot-
toman government entered a period of decline. Sultan Abdul Aziz took
a leading part in state affairs. Although attempts were made to improve
internal conditions and to strengthen and modernize the military
establishment, the process of decomposition continued. Ministries
changed frequently between 1871 and 1876, but one minister, Mahmud
Nedim, emerged as the most influential figure in the government.
Working closely with Ignatiev and the Russian embassy, he assured
the primacy of Russian influence in Constantinople. With this advan-
tageous position, Ignatiev supported not Balkan liberation, but at least
a temporary return to the policy of Unkiar Iskelesi. Balkan problems
were to be settled by close agreement between St. Petersburg and Con-
stantinople; peace and the status quo were to be maintained in the
Balkans as well as in Europe proper. Of course, both Britain and the
Habsburg Empire continued to defend Ottoman integrity.
Despite the unity of the powers on the basic question of the main-
tenance of the empire, the Romanian government was able to make
some advances in the national direction and to resist Ottoman attempts
to infringe Romanian autonomous rights. Most of the incidents were

217
 Russia and the Romanian national state
minor, and Romania usually did receive support from St. Petersburg.
In July 1871 a crisis occurred over the railroad question when the Ro-
manian government terminated the contract with the German Strous-
berg concern because of mismanagement and fraud. In an attempt to
exert pressure on Romania in behalf of the company, Bismarck turned
to the Ottoman government, basing his action on the fact that, accord-
ing to the Treaty of Paris, the Porte represented Romania in foreign
affairs. The Romanian government countered that the railroad con-
troversy was a strictly internal matter, and support for this interpreta-
tion came from Russia.2 In 1872 the Romanian government and the
bondholders came to an agreement, but further controversies were to
arise over this question in the future.
In 1872 the Ottoman government made a proposal that would have
severely limited Romanian rights. The suggestion was that the empire
be reorganized in a manner that would give areas like Romania and
Serbia a position similar to that of Bavaria and Wiirttemberg in the
German Empire; the Romanian and Serbian armies would also be-
come part of the Ottoman army. In return, the Porte offered concessions
on matters such as the minting of coins and decorations. These plans
were supported weakly by Britain and Austria-Hungary, but not by
Russia, France, and Germany. Naturally, both Serbia and Romania
were violently opposed to any change in their status that would strength-
en the bonds with Constantinople. The idea had really no chance of
success, and it was soon abandoned.3
Despite the generally discouraging situation, Charles at the end of
1872 and in the first half of 1873 decided to embark on a more deter-
mined campaign directed toward the achievement of independence.
He received little encouragement from his ministers; Catargiu and
Mavrogheni opposed the idea.4 On April 30/May 12 Vasile Boerescu,
who had previously approved the prince's plan, became foreign min-
ister.5 Attempts were made to secure the support of the powers, but with-
out success. On August 24/September 5 a ministerial council was held
and, since the attitude of Russia was uncertain, it was decided to post-
pone action.6 The Romanian government then returned to the policy
of seeking the gradual acquisition of sovereign rights. In the next three
years some definite advancements were to be made: regular diplomatic
agencies were established in the major capitals, and, most important,
commercial treaties were negotiated with the Habsburg Empire and
Russia without the participation or approval of the Porte.

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 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8

T H E ST. PETERSBURG AGENCY

As we have seen, Romanian diplomatic relations with the outside world

had usually been carried on through the channel of the consuls resident
in the Principalities or by means of special missions sent to the European
capitals.7 A regular representative was assigned to Constantinople, but
the Ottoman Empire was not a "foreign" power. In i860 a permanent
agency had been established in Paris. Now several similar offices were
set up - in Vienna and Berlin in 1872 and in Rome in 1873. The first
agency in St. Petersburg was opened in 1874, with G. C. Filipescu as the
representative; Emil I. Ghica was also assigned to this mission.
Filipescu was received officially by the tsar in May.8 Alexander II
at this time expressed regret at the recent death of Charles's infant
daughter and then proceeded to emphasize the two themes that were al-
ways so important in Russian policy toward Bucharest - loyalty to St.
Petersburg and stability in the government. Filipescu reported the
tsar's remarks: "Affairs are going better with you . . . I have nothing to
complain about; only there are among you some men who forget the
blood that we have shed and that what you are, it is to Russia that you
owe it (this is textual and His Majesty laid emphasis on these words)."
Filipescu in reply stated that Romania had gone through a crisis and
that the tsar should not make the country responsible for the actions
of men who "pushed by a blind and guilty ambition do not hesitate
from anything in order to disturb order at home and discredit us
abroad."9 Every Romanian and the prince would remember what
was owed to Russia and the tsar's family.
The appointment of the Romanian agent was not accepted readily by
the Porte. Kamil Pasha, the Ottoman representative at St. Petersburg,
refused to receive Filipescu as a diplomatic agent, recognizing him only
as a "distinguished subject" of the empire and claiming with some jus-
tification that the Ottoman ambassador represented all of the imperial
provinces. In so handling the matter, however, Kamil, who was not in
favor in the Russian court, offended the tsar.10
In his conversations with other Russian statesmen Filipescu repeat-
edly emphasized the theme of the difficulties faced by Romania as part
of the Ottoman Empire. In general, his views were received sympa-
thetically, but he was urged to advise his government not to act pre-
cipitously, but to wait with patience. His most direct relations were
with Stremoukhov, the head of the Asiatic department. A strong sup-
porter of ties with Vienna and Berlin who was opposed to adventures
in the Balkans, Stremoukhov was not the man to encourage Romanian

219
 Russia and the Romanian national state
aspirations. Filipescu reported an interview held on December 7/19
in which the Russian official gave his opinions.
He emphasized with frankness his keen sympathy for the Christians of the
East. The Muslim downfall (textual) is for him an indestructible political be-
lief. M. Stremoukhov then told me next that in the different phases of our his-
tory, Russia has shown us interest and sympathy. "They say," he added, "fol-
lowing a trite expression, that Russia fattens its turkeys (textual) in order to
make a better mouthful; history is there to prove that occasions have not been
lacking for Russia to realize such ambitions; but Russia has never had such
intentions. Any augmentation of territory could be fatal for the empire. No
government would dare assume the responsibility . . . The Treaty of Paris is
a sword of Damocles that they wished to hang over our head. Today it is not
us who are inconvenienced; it is those who thought they were putting a spoke
in our wheels. Moreover, Russia has known, when she judged it opportune,
how to free herself from all the obstacles that impede her; but, as regards Ro-
mania she has always been the object of a benevolent disinterestedness on the
part of Russia. The sympathy of Russia for the Christians of the East has often
carried her too far, for she has attracted to herself the distrust of other powers
and even serious difficulties. It is for this reason that today the greatest reserve
is essential for her.11
In reply, Filipescu emphasized the strength of the Russian position
and claimed that Russia could support Romania's legitimate aspira-
tions without risk. Although Stremoukhov agreed that the Russian sit-
uation was favorable, he pointed out that in issues connected with the
Eastern Question suspicions were easily aroused. He continued to urge
moderation on the Romanian government, arguing that "the last
treaties had such an elasticity that with prudence, wisdom and a little
patience, you can infer from them what you need." At the end of the
conversation he emphasized this view: "As for your country, act like
Germany; the best policy is to know how to wait."12
Filipescu was aware of the rivalries within the Russian official circles,
the most obvious of which was the tension between Gorchakov and Ig-
natiev. In fact, Gorchakov warned him about Ignatiev. Thus in his
reports the Romanian agent advised his foreign minister to be prudent
in dealing with the Russian consul in Bucharest, Ivan Alekseevich
Zinoviev, who was in a difficult position between the two adversaries.
The policy of patience was advised in other conversations. In early
January, Gorchakov's closest associate, Alexander Genrikhovich Jomini,
admitted that the Ottoman government was difficult to deal with, but
he too concluded: "A little moderation . . . moderation! That is what I
advise you."13 The Ottoman army was strong and, Jomini warned, the
other Balkan people had not come to the aid of the Cretans during the
revolts on their island. Their support could thus not be assumed.

220
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878

T H E COMMERCIAL CONVENTIONS

The major achievement of the Principalities in the first half of the

1870s was the successful conclusion of commercial conventions with
both Austria-Hungary and Russia. In these negotiations the aim was
to secure international acceptance of the Romanian right to make
agreements directly with other nations. Political, not economic, objec-
tives were thus of first importance. The Romanian government was
primarily concerned with the form rather than the content of any
commercial treaties.
In 1873, when the question was first taken up, the international situ-
ation appeared most favorable. Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary,
partners in the Three Emperors' Alliance, tended to work together in
minor as well as in major questions in international relations. One
of the three, Austria-Hungary, was not satisfied with its trade relations
with Romania. Despite the fact that it was the major trading partner
of that state, it was facing increasing French and British competition.
The monarchy saw Romania as an important market for its manu-
factured goods, and it wished to purchase grain. It also wanted to
secure Romanian cooperation on the regulation of the Danube traffic.
Since its chief objectives were economic in nature, the Habsburg gov-
ernment was not concerned so much about the form of any future
agreement. Discussions on a treaty commenced during the winter of
1873-1874.^
The Russian government regarded the question from another point
of view.15 Having no major economic issues at stake, it did not want
to come into conflict with the Porte on the question. At this time
Ignatiev enjoyed good relations with the Ottoman government. It
would certainly not be in the Russian interest to jeopardize this advan-
tage for Romanian objectives. Nevertheless, despite these considera-
tions, the Russian government was soon virtually compelled to adopt
the Habsburg position.
The Romanian government, desiring to hasten the beginning of seri-
ous negotiations, decided to put pressure on the powers. In June 1874
it passed a new customs law that penalized states not having special com-
mercial arrangements with Bucharest. Despite its limited economic in-
terests in Romania, Russia joined with Austria-Hungary in the sum-
mer of 1874 in agreeing to negotiate trade conventions directly with
Bucharest. Both Russia and the Habsburg Empire took a similar posi-
tion on the question in their discussions with the Ottoman representa-
tives. The Romanian-Habsburg negotiations proceeded well in their

221
 Russia and the Romanian national state
first stages; in August Boerescu gave Andrassy the first draft of a pro-
posed convention.16
In the discussions between the governments, which, of course, cen-
tered on Romania's right to sign separate agreements, the representa-
tives of the powers allied in the Three Emperors' Alliance stood to-
gether. In London in July Beust, then the Austrian ambassador, and
his German colleague, Count George Herbert zu Miinster, attempted
to convince the British foreign secretary, Lord Derby, that Britain
should recognize the right of both Serbia and Romania to conclude
commercial treaties and should support this position in Constanti-
nople.17 In October the representatives of the three states sent a memo-
randum to the Porte, supporting the right of Romania to negotiate
separate agreements on customs, tariffs, and commerce and stating that
these arrangements "deprived of all political character, will be signed
only by competent departments and administrations, and will not be
countersigned by the Sovereign/'18 The debate on this question con-
tinued through the fall and early winter months.
Although strongly opposed to any concessions on the matter, the Ot-
toman government was in no position to take a strong stand. In a grave
financial crisis itself, it had suspended its commercial agreements with
other states. When in October 1875 it was forced to stop full payments
on its foreign debt, it was technically bankrupt. 19 Moreover, there was
no way that the Porte could force either Romania or the great powers
to accept its arguments on the question. The Ottoman officials certainly
felt that their position was justified and that Romania did not have
the right to conduct negotiations on any question directly with other
governments. Two documents - first, the treaty of August 1858 20 and,
second, the firman of investiture of 1866 - stated the position of the
Principalities. Article 4 of the firman read:
To consider as in times past, as binding upon the United Principalities, all
the Treaties and Conventions existing between my Sublime Porte and the
other Powers, insofar as they should not infringe the rights of the United Prin-
cipalities, settled and recognized by the acts relating to them; also to maintain
and respect the principle that no Treaty or Convention could be directly con-
cluded by the United Principalities with foreign Powers. My Imperial Govern-
ment will, nevertheless, not fail to consult the United Principalities upon the
dispositions of every Treaty or Convention that might relate to their laws and
commercial relations.
Arrangements of local interest between two neighboring administrations,
and not bearing the form of an official Treaty, or of a political character, shall
continue to remain as no part of these restrictions.21
This second paragraph could be used to advantage by both Austria-
Hungary and Russia, which were both, of course, "neighboring states/'
222
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
In addition, the Romanian and Habsburg officials argued that Romania
had the clear right to regulate its internal commerce, including customs
rates, and their adjustment involved direct negotiations with other
states.23
As could be expected, the Romanian government adopted an un-
compromising position on the question. In his instructions to the Ro-
manian agents, Boerescu urged a strong stand: "Our right is clear and
uncontestable . . . We will never solicit from Turkey a right that we
possess and that we have always exercised."23 "One does not beg a favor
when one possesses a right."24 The Romanian representatives further
claimed that the Ottoman commercial treaties had never been in force
in the Principalities, where a different tariff rate was in effect. The stip-
ulations of the firman of 1866 were dismissed as constituting unilateral
Ottoman declarations that had never received Romanian ministerial
approval.25 In the discussions on the question the Romanian represen-
tatives firmly refused to consider any compromises. They were also able
to use very effectively the argument that they should not be required
to remain closely bound to a government that was facing economic
catastrophe and whose actions were hampering Romanian economic
development.26
In the past Britain had been the state with the greatest interest in
Ottoman commercial policy, since it had previously negotiated treaties
with the Porte that were most beneficial to its interests. The British
government, however, at this time was aware that it would be impos-
sible to prevent Russia, Germany, or Austria-Hungary from concluding
trade agreements with Romania. The British representatives therefore
shifted their position. Derby advised the Ottoman government to allow
Romania the right to make trade treaties.27 In 1838 Egypt had been
given permission to negotiate such agreements. The British statesman
believed that such an action would not damage Ottoman interests and
would "at the same time raise stronger barriers against the agitation
for political independence so inadvisedly entered upon by Prince
Charles and his councils."28 Derby, who agreed with the Ottoman con-
tention that the negotiations were illegal, regretted that the powers had
not consulted the Porte and requested its consent before proceeding
with the discussions with Romania.29 In order to settle the controversy,
Derby advised the Porte to issue a firman granting Romania permission
to negotiate.
The Ottoman government, unlike the Romanian, was willing to
compromise and in fact to concede on some issues. It would not, how-
ever, issue a firman unless the powers and the Romanian government
made a formal request. The Porte would have preferred that Charles
223
 Russia and the Romanian national state
as a vassal prince address a suitably humble petition to the sultan, who
would then approve it as an act of royal grace. The authority of the
suzerain power would thus be upheld.30 Since this procedure was ex-
actly what the Romanian government would not accept, there was
little chance of a settlement on this basis. The Romanian leaders were
primarily interested in securing an international acceptance of their
right to negotiate treaties without consulting the Porte; the political
aspects of the question continued to be more important than the eco-
nomic. The Porte would have agreed to a conference on the matter,31
but the three allied powers were against it. In January 1875 the Otto-
man ambassador to Britain, Musurus Pasha, recognizing the difficulty
of his government's position, told Derby: "we shall let matters take their
course, and protest against an act that we consider a violation of the
treaties."32
Meanwhile, the negotiations over the treaty came to a conclusion.
In the final version the Habsburg government was able to gain impor-
tant economic advantages. Despite this drawback Charles was most
enthusiastic about what he regarded as a great political success. Al-
though he recognized that sacrifices had been made, he asserted, "The
fact that Romania concluded a treaty with one of the guaranteeing
powers is the beginning of the recognition of her independence."33 On
May 27/June 8, 1875 George Costaforu, the Romanian agent in Vienna,
was authorized to sign the treaty.34 The convention was formally con-
cluded on June 10/22; it had a duration of ten years. As the Romanian
government so strongly desired, the imperial authorization was given
the Habsburg signature. The Romanian government thus achieved its
primary political aim. Costaforu wired the prince: "It is the greatest act
of your reign! . . . Long live Romania!" Charles wrote his father with
similar enthusiasm: "This international act is of great significance, for
it contains in itself the seed of the independence of Romania."35
Although Charles thus achieved his main objective, the economic
aspects of the treaty were strongly criticized. When it was discussed in
the chamber, members of the Liberal opposition, in particular Kogal-
niceanu, Bratianu, and Rosetti, objected to the economic concessions.
In reply, Boerescu emphasized the importance of the political aspect.
The Romanian right to negotiate directly with other powers, which
he claimed was based on the capitulations previously made between
the sultan and the Wallachian and Moldavian princes, had been recog-
nized. "For three centuries," Boerescu asserted, "Romania has not exer-
cised this right in matters concerning her commercial interests, but
this right has not ceased to exist, and it is by virtue of this same right
that the negotiations have been opened with Austria-Hungary."36 Al-
224
 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8
though certain aspects of the agreement also caused strong objections
in the Habsburg Empire, both governments finally ratified the treaties.
During this period the Russian government, although supporting
the Habsburg position, had not attempted to inaugurate negotiations
itself. At this time Russia had no major economic ties with Romania,
so these questions did not play a significant role in their relations. In
fact, the greater economic interests of the monarchy were always ac-
knowledged. However, in May 1875 Gorchakov instructed Zinoviev to
begin negotiations on a trade convention.37 Despite its previous stand,
the Russian government was becoming concerned about the Habsburg
gains. Moreover, certain questions, in particular some that related to
the transit of grain from Bessarabia to Danubian ports, could best be
handled by a formal understanding. A draft convention, drawn up
according to the form of the French-Russian commercial agreement of
1874, was ready by the beginning of August.38 The negotiations then
were brought to a halt. The purely economic aspects had caused no
problems, but the Romanian insistence over who should sign caused
major difficulties. The Russian government, which did not want to give
a political significance to the treaty or to offend the Porte, wanted
the final document to be signed by the minister of finance, but not by
Gorchakov. Since this decision negated the value of the agreement for
Romania, its leaders could not accept the Russian decision. As Boerescu
told Zinoviev, the agreement gave Romania no economic gains; the
purpose was to win the political objective. Therefore the treaty had to
be signed on the Russian side with an imperial authorization, as the
agreement with the Habsburg Empire had been.39
Charles argued strongly along the same lines. He believed that he
would have to dismiss his ministry or dissolve the legislature before he
could obtain approval for an agreement that did not follow the form
of the Habsburg convention. In his reports to St. Petersburg Zinoviev
supported the Romanian arguments. A postponement of an agree-
ment would hurt not only Russian commerce, but also other interests
in Romania. The consul believed that it had been a mistake to allow
the Habsburg Empire to take the lead in this matter:
It has always seemed to me that the traditions of our policy in the Principali-
ties were of a nature to justify our taking the initiative in the conclusion of a
convention of commerce with Romania, although the commercial interests that
we possess in this country are much inferior to those of Austria-Hungary. We
would have been able in that case to exercise a considerable influence on the
subsequent arrangements.
But since the Russian negotiations followed the Austrian, it was very
difficult to avoid the consequences of the previous agreement.40
225
 Russia and the Romanian national state
At this time, with the discussions temporarily deadlocked, events
took place within Romania and in the Balkan peninsula that were to
influence the negotiations. In February 1876 the Conservative govern-
ment of Lascar Catargiu was reorganized, and Ion Balaceanu took the
place of Boerescu as foreign minister. Although this ministry remained
firm, the Russian attitude was increasingly influenced by the new
crisis in the Balkans. In 1875 a revolt that the Porte could not suppress
had occurred in Bosnia and Hercegovina. It was soon apparent that
Serbia and Montenegro might intervene in aid of the insurgents. Should
they do so, the Russian government might need Romanian cooperation.
Despite these circumstances, Zinoviev's instructions remained the same.
The Romanian government also refused to compromise and still in-
sisted that Zinoviev must sign with an imperial authorization. On Feb-
ruary 20/March 4 a ministerial council agreed that the convention
would not be accepted "if the consul general is not specially empow-
ered through an imperial authorization. The Romanian government
will not acknowledge only a ministerial authorization."41
The Romanian government finally achieved its goal. Zinoviev, who
favored granting the Romanian desires, on February 25/March 8
told Charles that he had received the necessary authorization.42 The
convention was finally signed on March 15/27. The agreement was
then sent to St. Petersburg to be approved by the Ministry of Finance.
In April the Romanian chamber considered its ratification. At this
time, however, the nation passed through a period of crisis. The Catar-
giu government fell on March 31/April 12 and was followed by a
ministry under General I. E. Florescu. This administration was re-
placed on April 27/May 9 by a Liberal government under M. C.
Epureanu, with Kogalniceanu as foreign minister and Bratianu as
minister of finance. Finally, on July 24/August 5, Bratianu organized
another Liberal ministry. The convention with Russia would now be
considered by just those men who had been most critical of the previous
treaty with Austria-Hungary.
As could be expected, the agreement was severely criticized in the de-
bates in the chamber. Conservative landowners and Liberals joined to
attack its economic provisions. Again a treaty had been concluded that
gave great concessions without securing adequate gains for the Ro-
manian side. The owners of large estates, for example, objected to the
aid given to the transport of competing Bessarabian grain across the
country.43 Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, it was recognized that
the agreement would have to be accepted; thus in July parliamentary
approval was given.

226
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
Despite the negative aspects on the economic side, this treaty was a
political success: it was formally ratified at the beginning of October
by Gorchakov, who signed with the authorization of the tsar. Ratifi-
cations were exchanged between Nicholas Ionescu, by then minister of
foreign affairs, and the new Russian consul, Dmitri Fedorovich Stuart.44
The two commercial conventions were thus concluded in the form de-
sired by the Romanian government. Its right to conclude such agree-
ments without the approval of the Porte had been accepted by the two
great-power signatories.
Although the first five years of the 1870s had thus been a period of
relative calm, gains had been made. The strongly conservative internal
administration had brought stability and aided in maintaining good
relations with Russia. The conclusion of the economic agreements had
been a major step forward. After 1876 the situation was to change dra-
matically - in regard to both domestic and foreign affairs.

T H E FIRST PHASE OF THE EASTERN CRISIS:

ROMANIAN NEUTRALITY

The period of tranquility had been in the best interest of both Rus-
sia and Romania, neither of which was prepared to face another
Eastern crisis. The chief emphasis was on internal affairs. Both govern-
ments would have preferred the continuation of these relatively peace-
ful conditions, at least until their domestic conditions improved and
their military establishments were strengthened. Thus neither wel-
comed the period of international tension that commenced with the
revolt in Bosnia and Hercegovina in the summer of 1875.45
At first the Romanian and the Russian governments were not directly
involved in these events. The revolt had been caused chiefly by the
strained relations between the Christian Slavic peasantry of the two
provinces and their Muslim Slavic landlords; the deteriorating financial
condition of the empire, which was reflected in higher taxes and more
violent and inefficient methods of collection, also played a part. If
foreign provocation was present, it came from the Habsburg, not the
Russian, side. Certain Habsburg Slavic and military circles wished to
acquire the provinces, which were the hinterland of Dalmatia, and a
visit of Franz Joseph to Dalmatia in the spring of 1875 gave encourage-
ment to these views. Once the rebellion was under way, however, Mon-
tenegro and Serbia became deeply involved. These principalities also
had designs on the territory, which was, of course, South Slav in ethnic
composition. Refugees from the rebellious areas poured into the neigh-

227
 Russia and the Romanian national state
boring states, and arms and volunteers crossed over these same borders
in return. The failure of the Ottoman military forces to control the
situation soon made it of concern to the great powers.
At first, the Russian government took only a secondary interest in
the matter. Recognizing the priority of the Habsburg government in the
affairs of the provinces that were directly adjacent, and wishing to act
within the framework of the Three Emperors' Alliance, the Russian
government joined in efforts to end the uprising that were largely of
Habsburg initiative. Thus Russia worked with the other five great pow-
ers in the establishment of a consular commission that sought to ne-
gotiate an ending of the revolt. When this move failed, Russia supported
the measures contained in the Andrassy Note of December 18/30, 1875,
which attempted to settle the question by granting special reforms to
the provinces.
Although cooperation with the "Vienna center" was the official pol-
icy of his government, Ignatiev objected strongly to the association
with the monarchy. He considered the revolt an Austrian provocation
designed to lead to the annexation of the territory. Since he wished the
conflict settled through bilateral negotiations between Russia and the
Porte and the granting of Hercegovinian territory to Montenegro, he
was in strong opposition to the policy he was forced to implement. He
nevertheless presented the Andrassy Note, which he condemned, to the
Ottoman government; the Porte accepted it in February 1876.
Throughout the spring of 1876 Russian policy remained that of co-
operation with the powers and recognition of the leadership of Andrassy
in the negotiations. No attempt was made to exploit the situation to
gain more influence for Russia among the Balkan nationalities. All
responsible Russian leaders, including Ignatiev, recognized the dangers
in another Eastern crisis as long as their country was not militarily pre-
pared: Russia could not afford another Crimean debacle. Nevertheless,
the involvement of a Slavic, Orthodox people in a bitter struggle against
the Ottoman Empire awoke the emotions and considerations that we
have seen in operation throughout the century.
Moreover, by the 1870s a large sector of Russian society had become
influenced by Panslav ideas. The movement served as a center for the
organization and expression of the conviction that Russia should indeed
go to the aid of the Balkan Slavs both for humanitarian reasons and
for its own national interests. Increasing concern was felt over the fate
of the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians. Conversely, many groups
among the Balkan people came to feel that they could rely on Russian
aid in a crisis. They were convinced that in the last resort, rather than
 Prince Charles, i8yi-i8y8
see a massacre of Balkan Slavs, the Russian government would go to
war with the Porte - an assumption that was, in fact, not in error.
For Romania the issues were quite different.46 Bosnia and Hercego-
vina were not adjacent territories. Although Romanians sympathized
with other Balkan Christians, the movement had from the beginning
a distinct Slavic rather than Christian overtone. A great Slavic state or
a Slavic federation was as dangerous to Romania as to the Habsburg
Monarchy and Greece. Most of the educated Romanian leaders con-
tinued to feel that Romanian history and the condition of the country
separated them from their neighbors across the Danube under the prin-
ciple that "the East commences at the right bank of the Danube; from
the left bank the West already begins."47
Moreover, the lines of combat were not clear during this crisis. The
issue was not so much the fate of the Ottoman Empire as the division
of its lands. The empire was assumed to be on the verge of extinction,
but the heirs had not been named. There was conflict and suspicion
not only between Slavs and non-Slavs, but also among the Slavic people.
For example, Nicholas of Montenegro and Milan of Serbia remained
in rivalry for the leadership of the Serbs. Each national group at this
time had to consider the new Eastern crisis from the point of view of its
own interests and of the future balance of power. The simple Cross-
against-Crescent division was no longer valid, if indeed it ever had
been. For the Romanian government the obvious policy was that of
abstention. Not only were no direct Romanian interests atfirstinvolved,
but all of the great powers advised neutrality.
Charles too was determined to remain neutral until at least the
Romanian economic and military position improved. Ottoman su-
zerainty, he recognized, was acceptable as long as it was empty
form and was limited almost completely to the payment of tribute.48
The real danger in the Romanian position was that the state lay on the
road to Constantinople. Should war break out between the Porte and
Russia on Balkan issues, the Principalities would be either the battle-
field or the route by which the Russian armies marched to Constanti-
nople. For the Romanian government the immediate danger appeared
to be a Russian rather than an Ottoman occupation. On November
24/December 6, 1875, a ministerial council was held on the question.
Unsure of the situation, the ministers advised caution.49 Romanian
fears seemed to have some justification. In December Ghica, the Ro-
manian agent in Constantinople, reported that Ignatiev had stated that
if a conflict arose with the Porte, Russia would perhaps have to occupy
Romania as a guarantee.50 Although the Romanian statesmen realized

229
 Russia and the Romanian national state
that Ignatiev did not always speak with official sanction, they had no
way of knowing whether he was acting by instructions or not.
Certainly the circular of January 4/16, 1876, issued by Lascar Catar-
giu, who was foreign minister briefly after Boerescu resigned in Octo-
ber, had an anti-Russian direction. The document stated that the Roma-
nian government was taking military measures. Should Romanian neu-
trality be menaced "whether by acts of acquisition on the part of Tur-
key, whether by the intervention of another power who wishes, no matter
what the objective, to occupy Romania, its duty toward the country
would not permit it to remain a passive spectator." At one time the
Principalities had been an "open field," but the country was now under
a collective guarantee. The policy of neutrality would be maintained
unless another power intervened in the country in violation of Article
27 of the Treaty of Paris. If a general conflict involving all of the states
occurred, Romania would cooperate with the guaranteeing powers if
its territorial integrity and rights were assured.51 This policy, of course,
had the full support of the prince. He did not expect a war, but he too
expressed his determination to resist an occupation. He recognized
that his army was not strong enough to defeat a great power, but it
could put up enough resistance to assert Romania's determination to
defend its rights and "not as before to advance to meet the army of
occupation as a liberator."52
The apparent anti-Russian direction of Romanian policy was noted.
The Romanian agent in Vienna reported that Novikov, the Russian
ambassador, reproached him on the critical tone of the circular; Russia
had given no cause for suspicion. There was no question of an occupa-
tion, since such an event would involve a conflict with the other powers.
Andrassy similarly assured Costaforu that there was no chance of such
a move. He also stressed the dissimilarity of the Romanian position to
that of other Ottoman Christian populations, which were "half bar-
barian."53
On January 30/February 11, 1876, Lascar Catargiu rebuilt his cabi-
net with Ion Balaceanu as foreign minister. In his circular instruction
of March 19/31 Balaceanu reiterated the principles of Romanian
policy. The country, separated from the Ottoman Empire by one of the
greatest rivers in the world, would remain outside the troubles that dis-
turbed the rest of the peninsula. Romania was sympathetic with the
problems of the other nationalities, although the nation was different
"in language, blood and the spirit of its people."54 Nevertheless, the
current disturbances would not turn it away from concentration on
its own economic and social problems. A policy of strict neutrality
and the observance of treaties would be followed. Romania would
230
 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8
remain a disinterested spectator of the events across the Danube.
Romanian neutrality received the support of all of the powers, includ-
ing Russia. On April 18/30 E. I. Ghica, now the Romanian agent in
St. Petersburg, reported that Giers, who had risen to the high post of
director of the Asiatic Department in the Foreign Ministry, expressed
his approval of the new ministry and the pacific policy shown in the
Balaceanu circular.55 After his return to Bucharest, Filipescu, too,
had commented on the tsar's desire for peace and the dangers in the
situation should the Porte not follow the advice of the great powers.56
Although there was general agreement within Romania on the policy
of neutrality, discontent with other facets of the Conservative regime
had grown. In the spring of 1875 the opposition was organized in the
so-called Mazar Pasha coalition, which was based chiefly on the left
but which also had members from the Conservatives. The disagreement
with the regime in power involved primarily internal policy. In foreign
affairs the coalition called for a "Romanian policy, a policy of peace
according to treaties with the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of
Paris"; this was, of course, also the view of the Catargiu government.57
On March 31/April 12, 1876, after elections had gone against the
Conservatives, Charles formed a new ministry without Catargiu. This
government, which marked a transition to what was to be a long period
of Liberal rule, was under the direction of General Ion Florescu, with
Bratianu as minister of finance and Dimitrie Cornea as foreign min-
ister. Again the policy of neutrality, based on treaty relations with the
Porte and the guarantee of the powers, was reaffirmed. A circular issued
by Cornea stated that the new ministry, like its predecessors, was con-
vinced that "it is in organizing the country, in avoiding dangerous
complications and in persevering in a wise and peaceful path that we
will succeed in safeguarding our rights and in assuring ourselves of the
sympathies and the support of the guarantor powers."58
The Florescu ministry was short-lived; on April 27/May 9 a purely
Liberal government was organized under the leadership of M. C.
Epureanu, with Bratianu as minister of finance and Kogalniceanu as
foreign minister. Although this government was to adopt slightly
different policies in the face of a changing situation, its initial declara-
tions on foreign policy repeated the previous assertions concerning
Romanian respect for the treaties and the unique position of the
country both in its ties with the empire and in its geographic location.
The necessity of maintaining a strong military force capable of defend-
ing the frontiers and the neutral stand were also asserted. Again the
Romanian position received Russian approbation.
The spring of 1876 witnessed a progressive deterioration in the Bal-
231
 Russia and the Romanian national state
kans and in Constantinople. The Romanian government and the prince
were well aware of the growing confusion and economic disintegration
within the empire. Rumors of the physical decline of the sultan and
the possibility of revolt grew. At the same time enthusiasm for war
increased in Montenegro and Serbia, despite the continued opposition
of Prince Milan. The Andrassy Note proved a failure. Although the
powers and the Porte accepted its terms, the rebels, since they had no
confidence in their implementation, rejected them. Faced by a growing
crisis, the rulers and the foreign ministers of the Three Emperors' Al-
liance met in Berlin on April 29/May 11. There Gorchakov called
for a European conference and extensive outside intervention in Otto-
man affairs. The opposition of Andrassy, however, resulted in the issu-
ance of the Berlin Memorandum, which was little more than an ex-
tension of the previous reform proposal. This document was accepted
by Italy and France, but Britain refused to associate itself with the
program.
Meanwhile, the chain of events that was to lead to revolution in Con-
stantinople and war in the Balkans began.59 On April 24 / May 6 a Mus-
lim mob in Thessaloniki killed the French and German consuls in a
riot provoked over an incident involving the conversion of a Christian
girl. The powers responded immediately with a naval demonstration.
Even more serious, on April 20/May 2 a revolt broke out in Kopriv-
shtitsa and then spread through the towns of the Balkan mountains. The
Bulgarian uprising was suppressed with massive reprisals by Ottoman
irregular troops. At the same time swift changes also occurred within
the Ottoman government. The failure to crush the rebellion in Bosnia
and Hercegovina, massive discontent with foreign intervention, and the
deteriorating internal conditions of the state led first to changes in
the leadership and finally to revolution. On May 11 Mahmud Nedim
left office; Russian influence thereafter declined precipitously. On May
18/30 a coup resulted in the replacement of Abdul Aziz with Murad V.
The change of sultans was not to bring an improvement in Ottoman
leadership. Severely shaken by the events surrounding his accession,
Murad proved incapable of carrying on the functions of his office. The
new government also could not deal with the growing rebellion in the
Balkans. At the end of June Serbia and Montenegro, acting against the
express wishes of the Russian government, but with the support of
Panslav organizations and a large segment of Russian society, declared
war on the Porte.
Despite pressure from influential sections of its own population,
the Russian government, at least at first, maintained an attitude of
neutrality toward the new Balkan war. Deeply concerned lest Russia
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 Prince Charles, i8yi-i8y8
find itself in a dangerous position of diplomatic isolation, the Russian
leaders sought close cooperation with the Habsburg Monarchy.60 In
conformance with this policy, Gorchakov met with Andrassy at Reich-
stadt on June 26/July 8; here the foreign ministers sought to define
a common attitude toward the war. The Reichstadt agreement, despite
later disputes concerning its exact terms, was extremely significant be-
cause it defined and limited future Russian objectives in the Balkans; it
was also a return to the traditional Habsburg-Russian cooperation to
settle Balkan disputes on the basis of a balance of power and the assign-
ment of spheres of influence. At this meeting it was agreed that, if the
Porte won the war, it should not be allowed to crush Serbia or Monte-
negro. If, on the other hand, the Christian principalities were victori-
ous, each would be given territorial advantages, and the great powers
would also claim rewards. Russia would take back southern Bessara-
bia;61 Austria-Hungary would receive compensation in Bosnia and
Hercegovina. Should the Ottoman Empire collapse entirely, the agree-
ment stated that independent Balkan states would be established from
its territory. The terms of the understanding, which were contained in
two separate memoranda, were secret, but the fact that a Russo-Austrian
compact did exist was known to the Romanian as well as to the other
governments.
Kogalniceanu as foreign minister thus faced a rapidly changing in-
ternational situation. His first instructions, issued in May, reflected
a continuation of the policy of strict neutrality and of nonintervention
in affairs across the Danube.621 Once again this abstention met with the
approval of St. Petersburg. Giers expressed the opinion that the Ro-
manian attitude offered moral support to the Christian population;
should the general situation deteriorate Romania could be a place of
refuge for these people.63 Neutrality, however, proved more difficult
to maintain as the Christian population began to suffer a series of dis-
astrous defeats. The Bulgarian revolt, the massacres, and the subsequent
Serbian and Montenegrin war against the Ottoman Empire placed
strong pressure on the Romanian government to abandon its passive
attitude. Moreover, the opportunity seemed at hand to use the situation
to make concrete gains and to broaden Romanian autonomous rights.
Even with such practical considerations left aside, it was also true that
many Romanians felt strongly sympathetic to their fellow Christians
and genuinely wished to join with them against the Ottoman Empire.
The April uprising in Bulgaria and the subsequent Ottoman repres-
sion, in particular, faced the government with difficult choices.64 As we
have seen, Romania had been a major center for the organization of
Bulgarian conspiracies against the Ottoman Empire. The protests of

233
 Russia and the Romanian national state
the Porte, as well as pressure from the guaranteeing powers, including
Russia, had forced the Romanian government to deport the leader
Liuben Karavelov, who went to Serbia in 1872. Romania nevertheless
remained the principal sanctuary for Bulgarian revolutionaries, whose
major organization was the Bulgarian Central Revolutionary Com-
mittee under the direction of Khristo Botev. Local branches existed in
the major Romanian cities with Bulgarian inhabitants. The last major
event in the Bulgarian uprising was especially compromising for Ro-
manian neutrality and relations with the Porte. On May 4/16 Botev,
with about two hundred followers, seized the Austrian steamship
Radetsky and forced its captain to land them in Bulgaria. Not only
was the enterprise a disastrous failure, but it was obvious that the
action had been organized on Romanian territory and that it had bene-
fited from the laxness of the Romanian authorities. As a neutral coun-
try, and according to the treaties with the Porte, the Romanian
government was obligated to prevent the organization of similar
conspiracies against neighboring countries.
The revolutionary activities in the Bulgarian lands had a far greater
significance for Romania than similar events in Bosnia and Hercego-
vina. It was estimated that about 200,000 Bulgarians lived in Romania,
chiefly in the Danubian port cities, and a similarly large number of
Romanians were to be found in Bulgaria. Many of these were in-
volved in the revolutionary movement or had witnessed Ottoman
atrocities during the suppression of the April revolt. The Liberal gov-
ernment thus was under great pressure to aid the rebels and the victims.
Sympathies aside, the Romanian government recognized that some-
thing would have to be done to prevent the organization of further
conspiracies on its soil, or its neutrality would be seriously compro-
mised. Measures were taken to limit the assistance that was crossing
the Danube; port captains were instructed to control the movements of
foreigners and block the shipment of arms. The authorities were to
confiscate any weapons they found that were bound for the other side
of the river. Some attempts were made to control the activities of the
Bulgarian organizations. However, the enforcement of these directives
was anything but stringent. Some Bulgarians were indeed arrested, but
usually they were released after a few days. The revolutionary commit-
tees remained active, and volunteers from Russia bound for Serbia
continued to cross Romanian territory. As might be expected, the Ro-
manian government was criticized severely by both the Porte and the
Balkan Christians. The Ottoman government did not give the Ro-
manians credit for the actions taken to preserve the neutral position;
the Christian belligerents expected massive active assistance.

234
 Prince Charles, i8yi-i8y8
The pressures on the Porte, owing to the war and the internal in-
stability, also appeared to offer the Romanian government an oppor-
tunity to make gains in its own interest. In June Kogalniceanu sent a
long memorandum to the Ottoman foreign minister summarizing in
seven points the chief matters at issue between Bucharest and Constan-
tinople. Here the difficulty in maintaining neutrality, because of the
large number of Bulgarians and the sacrifices that had to be made to
guard the Danube border against the Bulgarian rebels, was emphasized
in the attempt to demonstrate Romanian loyalty to treaty obligations.
As far as concrete demands were concerned, the Romanian government
proposed (1) Ottoman acknowledgment of Romanian "political indi-
viduality" and the historic name; (2) the acceptance of the Romanian
agent in Constantinople as a member of the diplomatic corps; (3) the
regulation of the status of Romanian citizens living in other parts of the
empire and the acknowledgement of Romanian consular jurisdiction
over them; (4) the recognition of the inviolability of Romanian terri-
tory and the settlement of the question of the ownership of certain
disputed islands in the Danube; (5) the conclusion of extradition, post,
and telegraph conventions; (6) the acknowledgement of the Romanian
passports and the nonintervention of Ottoman consuls in the affairs
of Romanian subjects abroad; and (7) the establishment of the Roma-
nian-Ottoman boundary along the middle line of the thalweg of the
Danube.65 As the Russian consul, Zinoviev, commented, although the
word independence was not mentioned, the character of some of the
demands showed the aim of ending Ottoman sovereignty.66
The Romanian memorandum received the approval and support of
no power. Giers told Ghica that the demands were badly timed. Europe
was absorbed by the war in the Balkans, which had just started; pressure
would not be put on the Porte except in matters relative to that event.
Most of the demands, he believed, were just and would be obtained
sooner or later; the last he considered the most controversial.67 The
Ottoman reaction, predictably, was negative.
The outbreak of the war between the Ottoman Empire and its
Serbian and Montenegrin vassals in the summer of 1876 did not sur-
prise the Romanian government. Charles had maintained contact with
Milan, and although the relationship was not close, the Romanian lead-
ers were well aware of the Serbian prince's internal difficulties. Like
Charles he had wished to avoid a conflict with the Ottoman Empire;
he was well aware that Serbian military preparations were not ade-
quate. However, unlike the Romanian prince, Milan faced enormous
pressure from a public that was eager for war and a strong political op-
position that exploited the situation.68 The Romanian agent in Bel-
235
 Russia and the Romanian national state
grade, Alexander Sturdza, reported the low quality of the Serbian
army and the illusions of the people concerning their military prowess.
Milan's unpopularity was also noted.69 When the revolt in Bosnia could
not be suppressed, the Serbian ruler found himself faced with the al-
ternatives of supporting a war or facing a revolution. Prince Nicholas
of Montenegro was more a rival than a friend; he sought to make his
small principality the center of Serbian and South Slav nationalism.
Milan also always had to be concerned about the activities of Peter
Karadjordjevic, the pretender to the Serbian throne, who in fact par-
ticipated in the Bosnian rebellion.
On March 25/April 6, 1876, Colonel George Catargiu, an uncle of
Milan, came to Bucharest and appealed in the name of his nephew for
Romanian assistance, arguing that both nations sought an end to Otto-
man domination.70 Charles refused the request and warned against
the initiation of a conflict that would not have Romanian support.71
Once Serbia was at war with the Ottoman Empire, relations became
even more difficult. Serbia needed to use Romanian territory for the
transit of men and of military equipment. The Romanian government,
concerned that its neutrality not be openly compromised, sought to
prevent any actions that would be obvious to the Porte and the powers.
The formation in Romania of bands organized to fight in Serbia was
stopped, but small groups and individuals continued to cross the
Danube. The committees also remained active and collected money
for the war.72 Sturdza was instructed to inform Milan that the transport
of guns would have to be halted: these could only be carried by the
railroads, which were administered by an Austrian company; any such
actions would be observed and Romanian neutrality endangered.73
In June rumors that an Ottoman fleet might be sent up the Danube
to attack Serbia seriously disturbed the Romanian government, which
began negotiations with the Porte and the other powers to try to neu-
tralize the river.74 The assent of the Porte was gained; Romania agreed
to supply the Ottoman military garrison on Ada Kale. This measure
assisted Serbia, by allowing it to concentrate on its other fronts.
During the summer of 1876 the Romanian situation was uncomfort-
able. Determined to keep a neutral position, because of both its own
interests and the urging of the powers, the government had to take
some measures detrimental to Serbia. The problem was compounded
by the massive aid that was dispatched by the Slavic Benevolent Com-
mittees to the belligerent Slavic states. Volunteers, military equipment,
and medical supplies destined for the battlefields were being sent
through Romania. The chief effort was directed toward blocking the
passage of arms; less attention was devoted to halting volunteers. Rus-
236
 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8
sian citizens with valid passports were allowed to travel on to Serbia,
although efforts were taken to stop large groups.75 Despite the Roma-
nian attitude of benevolent, rather than strict, neutrality, the Serbian
government became strongly critical, particularly after its armies suf-
fered a series of grave defeats.76 It was easy to blame Romania for these
disasters.
A similar reaction occurred in Russia. About five thousand Russian
volunteers fought with the Serbian army; the Russian general Michael
Gregorovich Cherniaev was in command. The Slavic committees were
active in the collection of money and the recruitment of volunteers.
Bucharest's less than enthusiastic attitude toward the war was natu-
rally condemned by that segment of public opinion which had been
caught up in the wave of support for the Balkan armies. In addition,
despite the fact that the Russian government approved of Romanian
neutrality, it wished it to be even more benevolent than it was - in par-
ticular, to allow the passage of men and arms. The Romanians were
also criticized for their apparent attempt to gain political benefits for
themselves from the situation.77
The Romanian government, meanwhile, had not been successful in its
dealings with the Porte. Having received no positive response to his
first approach, Kogalniceanu on July 19/31 dispatched an even strong-
er note.78 In this he referred to the Ottoman massacres of Bulgarians
and to the fact that his government by its silence was open to the accu-
sation that it sanctioned such actions. The demand for further gains
for Romanian autonomy were repeated. At the beginning of August
Safvet answered that the Ottoman government could not consider the
initial memorandum until the war was over; some of the points were
also in the competence of the great powers.79
Kogalniceanu's policies in this crisis were criticized from two sides.
On the one hand, some said that he had gone too far; on the other,
those who wanted to aid the warring states attacked his moderate course.
This opposition, together with the growing economic problems in the
state, led to the naming of yet another government. On July 24/August
5 Ion Bratianu formed a ministry that was Liberal-Radical in composi-
tion. Kogalniceanu was replaced by Ionescu, a strong partisan of strict
neutrality, who believed that the last memorandum to the Porte had
gone too far. The international situation was fast deteriorating. The
Ottoman victories at this time foreshadowed a quick Serbian disaster.
The humiliation of the South Slav armies, led by a Russian general and
filled with Russian volunteers, deeply wounded Russian sensitivities. As
the summer passed pressure on the Russian government to come ac-
tively to the aid of Serbia and Montenegro increased. The tsar, Miliutin,

237
 Russia and the Romanian national state
Gorchakov, and others who were strong nationalists at heart were
affected not only because of the ties with the South Slavs, but because
of the obvious repercussions that a crushing defeat of the Balkan Chris-
tians would have on Russian influence and prestige. With the growth
of these sentiments, Russian impatience with Romania increased. At
issue was not the policy of neutrality, but its definition. The Russian
government wished the state to remain formally neutral, but to close
its eyes to the passage of arms and volunteers, which, Giers said, Ser-
bia needed "to combat the savage hordes of Asia."80 Romania con-
tinued, nevertheless, to prohibit arms while allowing passage of in-
dividual volunteers.
By the end of August the rout of the Serbian forces had become clear;
on August 12/24. Milan asked for an armistice. In September and
October the tsar and his family were at their summer home in the Cri-
mean resort of Livadia, which became the center of the Russian gov-
ernment for these weeks. The principal Russian statesmen - Gorcha-
kov; Miliutin; the minister of finance, M. K. Reutern; General Nicholas
Nikolaevich Obruchev; Ignatiev; and the heir to the throne, Alexan-
der - spent all or part of this period in the Crimea, and the questions
of war and peace were thoroughly discussed.
The chief fear of the Russian leaders remained what it had been
before: that a war with the Ottoman Empire could lead to a reforma-
tion of the Crimean coalition and a repeat of the disaster of that conflict.
Reutern gave strongly pessimistic reports on the Russian economic sit-
uation; Miliutin believed that, although the military reforms were not
complete, a war could be contemplated. The Russian diplomats were
disturbed by the fact that should they decide on war, their potential
enemies could not be named with certainty. The chief opponents to a
Russian advance in the Balkans were, as before, Britain and Austria-
Hungary. British opposition had been severely blunted by the public
outrage at the reports of atrocities committed during the suppression
of the Bulgarian revolt. The attitude of the Habsburg Monarchy, de-
spite the Reichstadt understanding, still caused concern. In order to
ascertain the Austrian reaction to a Russian war with the Ottoman
Empire, a special envoy, Feliks Nikolaevich Sumorokov-Elston, was
sent in September to Vienna. The negotiations that commenced at this
time between Vienna and St. Petersburg ended in the agreements of
January and March 1877. Simultaneously, the Russian government
made an effort to learn whether the German government would main-
tain an attitude of benevolent neutrality should hostilities break out
between Russia and the Habsburg Empire as a result of the Eastern
crisis.
238
 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8
Although war had not yet been decided upon, the diplomatic prep-
arations had thus been launched. As part of this program, plans also
had to be made for a campaign in the Balkans. Of first importance was
the securing of Romanian consent for the passage of the Russian
army through the country to the Danube. Active Romanian military
participation was not desired, but the use of the railroads, cooperation
in the question of supplies, and, of course, an end to the policy of strict
neutrality were sought. I. Cantacuzino, who became the Romanian
agent in St. Petersburg in August 1876, reported that all of Russia
except the tsar wanted war.81 There was therefore dissatisfaction in St.
Petersburg with the Romanian attempt to adhere as closely as possible
to a truly neutral position. The passage of arms as well as volunteers
remained the delicate point.82
As the Russian attitude was becoming more belligerent, the consuls
observed parallel tendencies in Bucharest. The shift from Conservative
to Liberal political control in the first half of the year had aroused some
misgivings, because of the Liberals' past record of hostility to Russia
and because of their promotion of revolutionary causes. For example,
in June Zinoviev commented on the Liberal-dominated assembly that
it "would not hesitate to become a blind instrument of the subversive
tendencies and evil instincts" that distinguished the radical party. 83
He also was not favorably impressed by Kogalniceanu, and he had ad-
vised against sending the memoir to the Porte. His successor as consul,
D. F. Stuart, was even more critical of the Liberal ministries, but he too
saw the necessity of working with them.
The advent to power of a new Liberal government on July 24/August
5 was favorable to Russian interests in that its strongest figure, Bratianu,
adopted a foreign policy based on a program of national advancement
and cooperation with Russia. Despite their previous strongly critical
attitude toward this statesman, the Russian diplomats now found him
the most influential advocate of their position. In June Zinoviev re-
ported to the tsar that in the Epureanu ministry only Bratianu favored
the adoption of a pro-Russian stand: "According to this statesman," the
consul wrote, "Russia alone is able to assure the Romanian nationality
against an absorption that threatens it from the side of the Germans,
of whom the numerous Jews who invade this country would be only
the precursors." Bratianu, however, laid down a condition for coopera-
tion that he was to maintain firmly throughout the next turbulent
months. In order to attract Romania to its side, the Russian government
would have to renounce forever the three Bessarabian districts that
Moldavia had annexed in 1856. This territory was vital to Romania,
Bratianu emphasized, because it gave his country access to the Black

239
 Russia and the Romanian national state
Sea. In his report on this conversation Zinoviev commented that
Bratianu had held these views since the Franco-Prussian War.84
Once in power, Bratianu did indeed begin to implement a new
policy. Immediately after the formation of his ministry, he spoke with
Stuart and declared his sympathies for Russia. He and his government
were ready to cooperate fully and fulfill all the Russian desires "if they
could be sure that Russia would not abandon Romania and would
guarantee its integrity with its present boundaries." Stuart, of course,
understood the significance of this statement and refrained from com-
menting, only reminding Bratianu of all that Romania owed to Russia
and the advantages of a good relationship with a powerful neighbor,
standard themes for Russian consuls in their conversations with Ro-
manian leaders. Stuart also reported with approval that the policy
toward Serbia had become more favorable since the departure of
Kogalniceanu.85
Romania's increasingly pro-Russian stand was also shown in the
attitude of Charles. The prince had since his assumption of the leader-
ship of the country repeatedly stated his determination to end his vassal
status. In January he made a strong statement on this subject to Zino-
viev, who reported:
His Highness let me clearly understand that the present state of affairs by vir-
tue of which Romania sees itself chained to a state in full decomposition could
become intolerable, and that he hoped to see an end soon to a situation that
was as wounding for the national self-esteem as it was incompatible with the
moral engagements that he had contracted in his capacity as Prince of Hohen-
zollern in regard to the country that had confided its destinies to him.86
Determined to use the Eastern crisis for Romanian national interests,
the prince had few choices. Kogalniceanu's attempt to obtain conces-
sions from the Ottoman government by negotiation had failed. The
policy of strict neutrality had thus brought no advantages and had
annoyed the powerful Russian neighbor. An approach to Russia and a
more lenient attitude on aid to Serbia was the obvious alternate policy.
In October, when Stuart visited him in Sinaia, the prince's summer
home, Charles assured the consul that he and his government recog-
nized how much their country owed to Russia and expressed their
eternal gratitude for the benefits it had bestowed on Romania. The
prince regretted the disagreements of the past and promised he would
do all in his power to assure "the benevolent dispositions and the
powerful protection" of the Russian government. He hoped that in the
future this "protection and strong assistance to which the country owes
its existence and prosperity" would not be refused. Charles also gave
assurances on Serbia: volunteers could cross the country and refugees
240
 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8
would be aided. The victories of the Balkan Slavs, he declared, were
those "of Christianity and civilization over the barbarism and oppres-
sion represented by Islam."87
These themes were henceforth to be repeated in other conversations
between the Romanian leaders and the Russian representatives. For in-
stance, Charles assured Stuart that Romania would do all it could to
avoid "the reproach of ingratitude in regard to its benefactor Russia."88
These assurances quite convinced the consul. Despite his previous
strong criticisms of the left - the "reds" and "radicals" - he now believed
that their maintenance was "an absolute necessity." He was quite won
over to Bratianu, whom he believed was sincerely converted to the
Russian point of view. A "zealous patriot," the Romanian premier un-
derstood that the interests of his country called for close ties with Rus-
sia. In contrast, Stuart strongly disliked Kogalniceanu, who in the
consul's eyes was a man "without any principles, enemy of any straight-
forward action, and a partisan of the system of small deals (petits pro-
cedes)."8*
Even though a policy of seeking a closer association with St. Peters-
burg had thus been adopted, the Romanian government had received
no clear indication of exactly what the Russians wanted and what their
program for the future would be. In order to attempt to fathom Russian
intentions, Charles decided to send a special delegation to Livadia. In
the middle of September Bratianu informed Stuart of the mission. No
exact purpose was given; the visit was stated as the equivalent of a
meeting with Franz Joseph that had been held at Sibiu the previous
month. Thus ostensibly it was designed simply as an act of courtesy to
greet the tsar. After some hesitation, Alexander II agreed to receive the
delegation.

TOWARD A RUSSIAN AGREEMENT

The visit to Livadia marked the commencement of an extended period

of negotiation that was to end in the Romanian abandonment of neu-
trality and a decision for war.90 Although Russia in the fall of 1876 was,
like Romania, neutral, it was, of course, no secret to the Romanian gov-
ernment where Russian sympathies and interests lay. As the Serbian
armies suffered continual defeats, the possibility, even the probability,
of Russian intervention increased. Quite obviously, should Russia go
to war with the Ottoman Empire, the Russian armies would have to
march through Romania to the Danube as they had done in the past.
Old fears of the political domination involved in previous occupations
were aroused. Moreover, in the Treaty of Paris the Russian protectorate
241
 Russia and the Romanian national state
had been removed, and the three districts of southern Bessarabia had
been given to Moldavia. The Russian intention of breaking the treaty
was clear; the Black Sea clauses had already been changed. Military
cooperation with Russia thus brought up two major dangers: first, that
the former Russian political preponderance would be reestablished;
second, that southern Bessarabia would be lost. However, it was recog-
nized that, should Romania refuse to cooperate, then the country
might become the theater of war for the Ottoman and Russian armies.
The Romanian aim at Livadia was thus to discover the Russian ob-
jectives.
The importance and character of the visit was shown in the composi-
tion of the delegation. Headed by the prime minister, Bratianu, it was
also composed of the war minister, Colonel George Slaniceanu; a mem-
ber of the court, Teodor Vacarescu; and an adjutant of the prince's,
Singurov, who knew Russian. Ionescu, the foreign minister, was not in-
cluded. The mission arrived in Russia at a time when the war spirit
was at a high point; its members were presented to Alexander II on
September 28/October 10. Isolated at the Crimean resort, the tsar was
influenced by those who wanted a militant nationalistic policy in de-
fense of the South Slavs. Although the delegation received a warm re-
ception, the Russian leaders continued to press for a more positive
Romanian attitude in favor of the Balkan belligerents. Since Russian
entrance into the war was being considered, the question of Romanian
cooperation in the event of hostilities was of first importance. The
Russian government concentrated on obtaining an agreement on pas-
sage; at no time was Romanian active participation a matter of official
negotiation, although the question was discussed in detail within Rus-
sian political and military circles.
At Livadia the Romanian visitors talked with the tsar, Miliutin,
Gorchakov, Ignatiev, and others. According to Russian accounts, Bratia-
nu's attitude was most satisfactory; he made an effort to please the
Russians. He proposed that the Romanian army join in the war and
that a military alliance be made. In return, he asked for an assurance
of Romanian independence and territorial integrity. He suggested that
Russian officers should come to Romania to acquaint themselves with
the conditions in the country and to aid the Romanian army in pre-
paring for war. Most of the Russian leaders were well satisfied with
his words. Jomini, still Gorchakov's close assistant, wrote to Giers, who
was at this time in St. Petersburg: "The Romanians are very nice -
(so sincere). They offer to be our advance guard in return for compen-
sations: independence, royalty - annexation of Dobrudja as far as

242
 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8
Kustendje [Constanta]."91 The offer to be the "advance guard" was also
discussed with Ignatiev.92
From the Romanian point of view, the negotiations were not so satis-
factory, despite the fact that Bratianu was pleased by their friendly
tone. In these conversations the Russian diplomats had a very simple ob-
jective: they wished to negotiate with Romania a military agreement
that would facilitate the passage of the Russian army through the coun-
try to the Danube and would then assure lines of communication and
supply for the rest of the war. The use of the Romanian railroads was
essential. The Romanian delegates were willing to make an agreement,
but they sought a formal political understanding. We have seen the
Romanian concern over such matters previously in the negotiations
over the economic conventions. Such a treaty would place the Russian
and Romanian governments on an equal level, and it might even dis-
courage a Russian acquisition of southern Bessarabia.
The Romanian visitors discussed the question with Gorchakov, who
now adopted the tough and unyielding attitude that he was to main-
tain throughout this period and that was in contrast to the general
atmosphere of the conversations with other Russian leaders. Gorchakov
warned Bratianu that if Romania would not make an agreement, Rus-
sia would regard the country as an Ottoman province and march in. The
Romanian minister replied to this threat "that Russia would not aus-
piciously begin a war for the liberation of its Christian brothers from
the yoke of the infidel with the crushing of a Christian army."93
Since the Romanian first concern remained the possible fate of Bes-
sarabia, Bratianu asked Gorchakov directly if Russia intended to seize
the region. Avoiding a frank reply, the Russian minister said that he
would like his answer to be "guessed (devine)." Later Bratianu told
Gorchakov that he "guessed" that Russia wanted the territory back.
Gorchakov answered: "What! Aren't there treaties?" Bratianu found
Ignatiev more direct, although he too did not address the question
openly. He instead expressed his curiosity about why Bessarabia was so
important to Romania: there was no military problem on this border,
and a large compensation could be obtained. Bratianu replied that his
country had need of "frontiers to defend itself while the great Russian
empire did not certainly need to fear being invaded by Romania." 94
Alexander II also brought up the question. Later Bratianu confided
in Balaceanu, who wrote down the details of the conversation:
After dinner the tsar and the tsarina led Bratianu to take coffee in a part of
the park where they were alone. The tsar took out a cigar from his pocket,
offered it to Bratianu; then the empress, striking a match, offered the light to

243
 Russia and the Romanian national state
him, thus forcing Bratianu to light his cigar. Alexander II then phrased the
question in the following manner: It is not from the point of view of territory
that the question is important, because Russia possesses enough, but, from the
point of view of the tsar, there is here a question of principle. It is the first
time since Russia has existed that she has been obliged to cede a part, even a
small fragment, of territory that she has conquered by her arms. On these
grounds Alexander II would consider it as a pious duty toward his father to
return to the Russia of Nicholas I what the Treaty of Paris had made him lose.
Bratianu did not try to answer these arguments.95
Despite the frank discussions, the Russian government did not press
for an agreement. It was certainly not willing at this time to assume
any obligations toward Romania for the future. War with the Ottoman
Empire had not yet been decided upon. The Romanian government
had agreed in principle to accept passage of Russian troops and arms.
Although Bratianu had avoided direct answers on some issues, the Rus-
sian statesmen gained the impression that they would meet with no
great difficulties in Bucharest.
In contrast, Bratianu returned home greatly disturbed. At Livadia
the Russian leaders had made clear their desire for a military agree-
ment. The Bessarabian question had also been brought up, but certainly
Russia's intention of taking the territory had not been declared in the
open manner that had characterized the discussions with Austria-
Hungary and Germany. It was obvious that Russia was preparing for
war and that Bessarabia was in danger. Despite these negotiations, Ro-
manian policy did not change in essence. Neutrality remained the
official position, although a more lenient attitude toward the passage
of volunteers and supplies was adopted. Military preparations were
accelerated, and Russian military representatives arrived in the coun-
try to prepare for a possible future entrance.
Although other alternatives had thus been explored, most Romanian
leaders at this time preferred a continuation of the policy of neutrality.
Further attempts were made to ascertain what if anything other states
would do to support a neutral course and what could be obtained from
the Ottoman Empire without war. In October and November Ion
Ghica, the vice-president of the chamber, who was regarded as pro-
British and anti-Russian, visited Vienna, Paris, and London to attempt
to win European guarantees for neutrality. At the same time efforts
were continued to try to gain a widening of Romanian autonomous
rights. The Ghica mission was doomed to failure. The Habsburg gov-
ernment was in negotiation with St. Petersburg on a war agreement,
and it had no interest in assisting Romania in defending an indepen-
dent course. France, severely weakened after the Prussian defeat, was
not in a position to play its previous role in regard to Romania. The
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 Prince Charles, i8yi-i8y8
French advice was that Romania should remain neutral, but no concrete
guarantees of aid could be given. In London Ghica delivered a memo-
randum to the British government. Its tone was anti-Ottoman, but its
emphasis was on neutrality and the preservation of the Romanian
barrier between Russia and the Porte. The document stated the diffi-
culty of the Romanian position should Russia go to war. If passage
was allowed to the Russian troops, unless they were acting on a Euro-
pean mandate, this act would infringe the neutrality dictated by the
Romanians' "instinct of their national conservation and what is for
Romania an obligation imposed by the treaties as a duty." The inter-
vention of the powers was requested.96
Despite the failure to receive outside support, the neutral policy re-
mained in effect. It was particularly favored by Ionescu and was also
preferred by the prince and Bratianu. Until the general situation
changed and until the Russians were willing to give more satisfactory
guarantees for the future, the Romanian government could not take
the risk of placing its fate in Russian hands. This would be the case
should a military agreement be signed on a bilateral basis with St.
Petersburg without effective assurances on the questions of territorial
integrity and political independence.
Throughout the fall of 1876 the war fever in Russia remained at a
peak. The defeat of the Serbian army and the difficulties in the armis-
tice negotiations made hostilities seem imminent. The army was par-
tially mobilized, and troops were concentrated in Bessarabia. The tsar's
brother, the Grand Duke Nicholas, assumed command. Under these
circumstances a definite agreement with Romania on passage became
essential and was demanded by the army in particular. The major
problem was the form of the agreement. In conflict with his colleagues,
Gorchakov sought to disassociate himself from the negotiations; he
wished to make them a purely military matter. The Russian army
circles insisted on their diplomatic nature. At the beginning of Novem-
ber Gorchakov telegraphed Ignatiev, who had returned to Constanti-
nople, to begin the discussions. The foreign minister, however, directed
that the negotiations were to concern only technical questions connected
with the Russian passage; he remained firmly opposed to a political
treaty. Alexander Ivanovich Nelidov, who had been appointed the
head of Nicholas's diplomatic chancery, was sent to Bucharest for these
discussions.
In accordance with his instructions, Nelidov went first to Odessa,
arriving on November 4/16. There he had expected to receive further
directions from the army staff and perhaps a draft treaty. According to
his own account, his instructions and the information he was given

245
 Russia and the Romanian national state
were entirely insufficient. He was joined by Colonel Michael Cantacuzi-
no, a member of the Russian general staff with relatives in Romania. In
the forthcoming negotiations Cantacuzino took almost complete charge
of the military aspects of the agreement.97
Nelidov and Cantacuzino traveled from Odessa to Kishinev, which
was the army headquarters, and in great secrecy crossed over to Ro-
mania. A leakage of the news that a military agreement was under ne-
gotiation would have been extremely embarrassing for both govern-
ments, and in Bucharest extreme precautions were taken to conceal the
delegates' identity. They used false names: Nelidov became Alexandres-
cu and Cantacuzino, Karsky. Of the Russian representatives in Romania,
only Stuart and Colonel Ivan Fedorovich Zolotarev were informed of
the proceedings. Charles did not receive the Russian delegates. Nelidov
negotiated principally with Bratianu; Ionescu, still the proponent of
strict neutrality, was not told of the discussions. Bratianu and Nelidov
met at different places and usually at night. The Russian diplomats
were well informed on the differences within the Liberal Party on the
issue of cooperation with Russia.
The negotiations did not proceed smoothly. Nelidov arrived in Buch-
arest with two letters, one of which contained his confidential instruc-
tions. In these the Russian envoy was cautioned not to discuss political
matters. He was not to discourage the Romanian minister, an act that
might increase British and Austrian influence in Bucharest, but he was
to accept no obligations for the future in the name of the tsar. He could
assure Bratianu that Romanian wishes would be taken into considera-
tion if after a war major alterations were made in the map of the Otto-
man Empire. If political changes occurred at that time, then the tsarist
government would not oppose Romanian independence and would
grant other advantages, such as, for example, the cession of Tulcea on
the Danube and a port on the Black Sea. The issue of Bessarabia would
thus be avoided. The second letter, designed to be shown to Bratianu,
was little more than a letter of introduction.
Nelidov was thus closely circumscribed in the subjects that he could
discuss. Ignatiev, who would have preferred to allow him more latitude,
was overruled by the foreign ministry. There was also a difference within
the Russian official circles on the military aspects of the negotiations.
In contrast to Gorchakov and the foreign ministry, which wanted the
agreement limited to questions of passage and supplies, the army
wished an active Romanian participation in the war. A project of co-
operation had been worked out by the general staff that would have
placed the Romanian army under Russian control; the Russian com-
mand would thus have determined where the Romanian army would
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 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8
fight and who its commanders would be, and it would have assumed
jurisdiction in Romanian areas directly involved in military actions.
Miliutin personally favored active Romanian participation. On the
question of organization he would have allowed the Romanian army
separate fields of activity, but with these closely coordinated with the
Russian command. Ignatiev too advised that the Romanian army op-
erate as a separate unit.
In the discussions with Nelidov, Bratianu, as instructed by Charles,
continued to insist that a formal political convention guaranteeing
Romanian territorial integrity should be concluded. It would follow
the pattern of the previous trade agreement, and be signed by the
Romanian prime minister and then ratified by the prince and the legis-
lature. Gorchakov would be expected to sign it on behalf of the Russian
government. On the military side of the negotiations, Bratianu pro-
posed that the 50,000-man Romanian army participate in the war, but
he wanted to define clearly separate theaters of activity. He also asked
for 100,000 rifles, 50 canons, and 20 million francs. Romania lacked
both the economic means and adequate military equipment for a major
war.
Nelidov, in accordance with his instructions, tried to avoid the politi-
cal issues. He argued that he was empowered only to discuss the military
agreement, not the future political condition of Romania or its bound-
aries. When war actually came, he insisted, Romania could request to
join and then the future would be considered. In any case, because of
its geographical position, Romania could not remain out of the war.
If a pact were not signed with Russia, the fighting would take place on
Romanian territory. Nelidov personally appreciated Bratianu's difficult
position; he could not put his country into the dangerous situation that
the ending of neutrality would entail without assurances from Russia.
In their conversations Bratianu and Nelidov considered at length
the question of southern Bessarabia. From the Romanian side the in-
sistence on a guarantee of territorial integrity was, of course, designed
to protect this area. Although Nelidov did not know the terms of the
Reichstadt agreement, in which Russia assured itself of the Bessarabian
districts, he was well aware of the Russian intentions. In the discussions
he supported the Russian position to the best of his ability. He claimed
that an article containing territorial guarantees "wrongs Russia" and
that "the Russians have enough with Poland." At one point, Bratianu
later told Balaceanu, Nelidov burst into tears, declaring: "It is . . .
because you do not trust in the good faith of my government, and that
grieves me."98 Nelidov argued skillfully in his attempt to gain a Roma-
nian acceptance for treaty terms that would not limit future Russian
247
 Russia and the Romanian national state
actions. He declared that Russia could not sign a general agreement
that would provide for all eventualities; his country, for instance, could
not aid if Romania went to war with Austria-Hungary over Transyl-
vania. Bratianu too used devious means to try to gain a frank statement
of Russian intentions. He even asked what compensation might be of-
fered for a surrender of Bessarabia and inquired about the possibility of
a partition of Romania between Russia and the Habsburg Monarchy.
Meanwhile, because of the apparent imminence of war and the vital
importance of the military agreement, the Russian government was
forced to yield on the question of a political agreement. Bratianu then
pressed to secure inclusion in it of an assurance of the granting of in-
dependence, while Nelidov continued to try to limit the scope of the
arrangement. Then finally, in early December, an acceptable draft
convention was ready; Nelidov, however, was not authorized to sign it.
He had only a letter of introduction from Ignatiev. Because Nelidov
feared that his mission would be discovered if he remained longer in
Bucharest, it was agreed that the authorization should be telegraphed
to Stuart, who would then sign. Two separate agreements had been
drawn up: a short political convention and a special military pact. In
the first Romania agreed to passage and Russia promised to defend the
political rights and the territorial integrity of its neighbor. The second,
the military agreement, was more detailed and covered such items as
the use of the railroads and the provision of supplies. The Russian army
officials were completely satisfied with these arrangements when they
were communicated to them. The two agreements were based on the
equality of the signatories; Romania had thus advanced another step in
the assertion of autonomous rights.
Despite the fact that a political agreement had been obtained, the
Romanian government delayed its signature." The other great powers
were all advising neutrality; the assurances on territorial integrity
were in fact vague, and negotiations were also in progress with the Ot-
toman Empire. The Porte sent Ali Bey, the head of the Tulcea sanjak,
to Bucharest to try to obtain Romanian cooperation against Russia. He
arrived while Nelidov was still there. The Ottoman aim was to secure
the support of the vassal principality, and to this end economic and
military assistance was offered. The Porte also wished to send the regu-
lar Turkish army into the country, an action that would have made
Romania a battlefield; in return, more political privileges would be
granted. In Constantinople, Safvet Pasha, now grand vezir, made simi-
lar proposals, but the chances of securing an Ottoman-Romanian ar-
rangement were minimal. The Porte could offer little in exchange for

248
 Prince Charles, i8yi-i8j8
Romanian assistance. Moreover, any such agreement would have turned
Romania into a theater of war.
Neither the Russian nor the Romanian government pressed hard
for the completion of the agreement. The general diplomatic scene
had again altered; war fever in Russia declined. Most Russian leaders,
including the tsar, still preferred to settle the Eastern crisis by nego-
tiation and on a European basis. Because of this attitude, a British pro-
posal for a conference to be held in Constantinople was accepted. The
great powers agreed to send two representatives each to the Ottoman
capital to discuss the question of the peace terms for Serbia and Monte-
negro and reforms for Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Bulgaria. Until the
results of this conference were known, negotiations on military coopera-
tion were less urgent. Should the conference succeed, the agreements
would be unnecessary.
As a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, Romania, of course, was not in-
vited to attend the conference, which opened in December. Neverthe-
less, the Romanian government sent D. Bratianu, the brother of the
prime minister, to Constantinople to protect the Romanian interests,
which it was hoped would be discussed. He was instructed to attempt
to obtain the advice of the powers on what they believed the Romanian
attitude should be if Russia went to war with the Ottoman Empire.
He was also to find out if it were possible for Romania to secure some
sort of special guarantee for its neutrality and assurances on its terri-
torial integrity and political rights. In addition, discussions were to be
carried on with the Porte on the familiar issues of the Danube bound-
ary and the right to coin money and award decorations.100
Bratianu did not obtain a sympathetic hearing from the representa-
tives of any of the great powers. None wished to complicate the interna-
tional situation further; the Romanian problems were a side issue and
a nuisance. The major figure at the conference was Ignatiev, no parti-
san of Romania. He cooperated with the British chief delegate, Lord
Salisbury, to arrange a satisfactory settlement. Their main achievement
was the formulation of a plan for the establishment of two autonomous
Bulgarian states. The attention of the conference was directed toward
the problems of the Slavic peoples - not those of the Romanians or the
Greeks. A similar failure was met in the Romanian negotiations with
the Porte. In fact, here relations took a great step backward. On De-
cember 11/23 the Ottoman government issued a new constitution in
which the "United Principalities" was referred to as a "privileged prov-
ince" and was ranked with Egypt and Serbia. The Romanian govern-
ment wanted instead a statement that Romania was not a province,

249
 Russia and the Romanian national state
but a separate state linked with the empire through their mutual
treaties and international arrangements. The definition of Romania's
exact place in the imperial scheme had, as we have seen, been a subject
of constant controversy in the past.
The conference was similarly a failure for the great powers. Rejecting
international interference, the Ottoman leaders claimed that the new
constitution would meet the problem of the subject nationalities. Ac-
cording to its provisions, all were equal in the empire. On January
3/15, 1877, the powers reduced their demands. When these were not
accepted, the ambassadors left Constantinople on January 8/20 but
relations with the Porte were not broken. Once again a European con-
ference had failed to settle a major Balkan crisis. These results were
particularly unfortunate for the Romanian government. The probabil-
ity of an Ottoman-Russian war had increased, but, at the same time,
there was little likelihood that Russia would fight with a European
mandate, a situation that would have given Romania some protection.
A decision on the signing of the agreement with Russia now had to
be made. During the Constantinople discussions Charles and Bratianu
had wavered in their attitude, but in general the prince was more will-
ing to adopt a positive policy. When the conference appeared to be
failing, and after the issuance of the Ottoman constitution, Charles de-
clared that he was willing to sign the document on the condition that
it be kept secret until war was actually imminent. The agreement was
to be ratified and put into effect not earlier than twenty-four hours
before the beginning of hostilities. The prince then evidently had fur-
ther doubts. On December 22/January 3 Stuart proposed that the
agreement be signed. Charles was again willing, but Bratianu hesitated
and declared that public opinion would have to be prepared.101 On
January 8/20, when the failure of the conference was obvious, Charles
wrote to his father that he had decided on his course of action. He
would conclude the convention with Russia and actively enter the war
against the Ottoman Empire.102 Yet he changed his mind once more.
The vacillation in Romania had parallels in Russia. As before, Gor-
chakov had no desire to undertake political obligations in regard to
Romania, and he did not press for a written agreement. In contrast,
the military circles, anxious to be ready for war, wanted a signed docu-
ment. Direct contact between Charles and Grand Duke Nicholas was
established through Stuart. On January 12/24 Nicholas wrote the prince
and urged him to make a military arrangement. The purpose of the
Russian action was stated in exalted terms:
This objective, exempt from any idea of invasion, of conquest or of warlike
ambition, is no other than to defend the oppressed against the oppressor, to
250
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
have restored to our co-religionists of the East their too long unrecognized
legitimate rights, and to render forever impossible the return of those scenes
of horror and carnage which have moved the conscience of outraged Europe.
If war came, the Russian army would have to go through Romania, "a
friendly country, whose independence, authority and well-being we
have at heart to respect." The grand duke also stated the difficulties
of operating an army in a foreign country and the need of an advance
arrangement. He requested Charles to suggest how they could best ar-
rive at "a practical entente from a purely military point of view, exempt
from any political character."103 In his reply of January 24/February
5 Charles refused, explaining that if such a treaty were signed before
Russia declared war, it would seem to the other powers as if Romania
on its own initiative were breaking the agreements that guaranteed
the political existence of the state.104
Throughout February the Romanian government went through a
period of political crisis involving both foreign and domestic issues.
The conflict on foreign policy crossed political lines. The basic problem
facing the nation continued to be how a Russian war with the Ottoman
Empire should be handled. Three practical choices were discussed:
first, the continuation of the policy of neutrality; second, a limited
agreement with Russia, but no participation in the war; and, third,
full cooperation with Russia and a declaration of war on the Ottoman
Empire.
Undoubtedly, the maintenance of neutrality received the strongest
support. The Romanian leaders, like the Russian, hoped that the
Eastern crisis would be settled by negotiation and on a European basis.
Certainly, Romania had nothing to gain by a war that would outweigh
the dangers of having a Russian army in the country. The fears over
southern Bessarabia were constantly present. Unfortunately, the con-
tinuation of neutrality was obviously becoming impractical in face of
the fact that the guarantor powers would give Romania no concrete
assurances. Only if it were possible to recreate the Crimean War situ-
ation, when a combination of British, French, and Habsburg pressure
forced the Russian armies to leave the Principalities, could Romania
hope to keep out of a conflict. However, no state was willing to risk
war on the issue. Britain, France, and Italy all advised neutrality, but
none was in fact in a position to assist in Romania's defense. The two
powers with armies capable of backing the Romanian position, Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary, were allied with Russia. For Romanian
interests the attitude of Vienna was most important; only there could
adequate assistance be gained. In December, when asked what the Ro-
manian policy should be, Andrassy gave an answer that was to be the
 Russia and the Romanian national state
Habsburg standpoint thereafter; it did not encourage resistance to
Russian desires: "It is not our task to give Romania directions from
our standpoint; we could at the most make a declaration . . . about what
position its own interests demanded and what position we planned to
take in regard to it/' 105
Andrassy did not believe that there was any danger of a Turkish in-
vasion. If one should occur and the Romanians should resist the occu-
pation, the Habsburg government would not object. A Russian inter-
vention could scarcely happen before the end of the Constantinople
conference. Even if it took place, it would be a simpler problem than
the Romanian government appeared to believe. On the important
issue of the extent to which the monarchy would defend Romanian
interests against Russia, Andrassy declared:
Romania does not have to choose between ourselves and Russia. A connection
with us is always welcome to us in the interest of Romania, but that absolutely
does not imply an anti-Russian policy. Romania at the time of a Russian occu-
pation should simply declare that it would yield to superior force, withdraw its
troops, and remain neutral. This is the direct way; it is also the best. In this
manner Romania protects its political and territorial stability and comes into
conflict neither with us nor with Russia. For our part we could, as long as Ro-
mania maintains a correct attitude in regard to Austria-Hungary, categorically
assure that we, as much in the Romanian as in our own interests, would in no
case allow Romania to suffer any damage in regard to its political position or its
territorial interests.106
In February 1877, apparently on his own initiative, Balaceanu spoke
with Andrassy on the question. Appealing for Habsburg aid, he insisted
that his government did not want to sign a treaty with Russia and that
it would oppose Russian passage if it could be sure of support from
Vienna. Andrassy, who was deeply involved in further negotiations
with Russia, gave an evasive reply that was in fact similar to the pre-
vious advice: "We have not wanted to dictate to Romania its decision."
Although he was well aware that Russia did intend to annex southern
Bessarabia, he nevertheless told Balaceanu that he did not believe that
Russia would take actions that "infringed on the political position of
Romania guaranteed through the treaties or that would endanger its
territorial integrity."107 The Habsburg government, he declared, stood
by the European treaty system and would not allow such actions. How-
ever, he also made it clear that his government would not view a Rus-
sian entrance into Romania as a casus belli. In further conversations
Andrassy expressed the opinion that the Romanian government should
sign with Russia a treaty that was a simple modus vivendi providing
only for the passage of the Russian army. The Habsburg Monarchy
thus offered no support for a policy of resistance to Russia.
252
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
Despite the obvious difficulties, many Romanians continued to favor
a policy of strict neutrality, even if Russia should go to war.108 Ghica,
D. A. Sturdza, and Ionescu maintained this position until the spring.
Ghica believed that, if the Russian army entered, the Romanian gov-
ernment should protest to Europe. Charles should then withdraw his
troops to Oltenia. The great weakness of this policy was not only that
it had no foreign support, but that its implementation could turn Ro-
mania into a battlefield. At the outbreak of war, under these circum-
stances, it could be expected that Ottoman troops would cross the Dan-
ube to meet the advancing Russian army.
If the policy of strict neutrality was not followed, the Romanian
government had two obvious alternative paths of cooperation with
Russia. The first, as we have seen, was for Romania to remain tech-
nically neutral, but to allow the passage of the Russian army. The ne-
gotiations had been based on this choice; it was the solution preferred
by Gorchakov, and it appeared to involve the least danger to Roma-
nia. The second possibility, a full military alliance and war with the
Ottoman Empire, had the advantage of probably allowing the state to
press for the maximum gains in the future peace treaty. Any coopera-
tion with Russia, of course, carried with it the danger of the loss of
southern Bessarabia; the presence of the Russian army endangered Ro-
manian political freedom. The Liberal Party, the heirs of 1848, had no
trust in tsarist Russia. A Romanian declaration of war on the Ottoman
Empire would also nullify the great-power guarantee contained in the
Treaty of Paris.
The Romanian government had one other possible choice. As a vas-
sal state Romania should have cooperated with the Ottoman Empire
to resist a Russian invasion. Such a policy never received serious con-
sideration. As we have seen, the Porte was unwilling and unable to
meet the Romanian demands for an extension of autonomous rights.
The Ottoman revolution of 1876 had been based on the principle of
the strengthening of the state and not on its continuing dissolution.
The new regime could not grant Romania the equivalent of an inde-
pendent status. Moreover, in a war between Russia and the Ottoman
Empire, it was universally assumed that the northern state would tri-
umph; Romania could not afford to be on the losing side. Even more
important was the attitude of the vast majority of the Romanian people.
With five hundred years of Christian-Muslim conflict behind them, the
Romanians could not be expected to fight with the Ottoman forces
against Christian Orthodox neighbors. The average Romanian also
had a deeply rooted fear of any Ottoman military presence. In fact, as
Ottoman forces were concentrated on the right bank of the Danube in
253
 Russia and the Romanian national state
preparation for a possible war, virtual panic reigned on the Romanian
side of the river. Reports of the excesses of the irregulars in suppressing
the Bulgarian uprising gave real substance to this feeling.
Despite the obvious problems connected with a policy of strict
neutrality, this course of action remained the one preferred by the Ro-
manian government. A ministerial crisis at the beginning of February
led to a cabinet reorganization that brought to power the opponents
of an agreement with Russia. D. A. Sturdza became minister of finance,
and the military negotiations were halted. Bratianu, still the strongest
figure in the government, wavered, but he also continued to press addi-
tional demands on the Russians. Undoubtedly, the Romanian economic
position was critical. If war came, the country would need financial
assistance as well as military supplies. Requests were thus made for
horses, arms, torpedoes, heavy artillery, and other war supplies. The
Russian government was also asked to pay in gold for the cost of the
passage of the army.109 The Russian officials were reluctant to agree to
these conditions because their own financial position was precarious
and they had certainly no surplus of military equipment.
Like the Romanians, the Russians still hoped for a peaceful solution
to the crisis. Until April they sought to cooperate with the powers to
secure acceptable peace treaties for Serbia and Montenegro and reforms
for Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Bulgaria. As the weeks went by with no
solution in sight, pressures increased on the tsar to go to war; questions
of honor and national interest were at stake. The Russian army could
not remain mobilized forever; the financial strain was extreme. In the
first months of 1877 the Russian government continued its two sets of
negotiations: the first toward a settlement with the Porte, the second in
preparation for war. In February it was decided that if the powers
would agree to support a common program in the Balkans, and one
that would give them the right of supervision and intervention, and if
they would require the Porte to adhere to it, then the Russian forces
could be demobilized as long as the Ottoman army took similar steps.
Meanwhile, negotiations with Vienna continued. In November dis-
cussions had commenced between Gorchakov and Baron Ferdinand von
Langenau, the Habsburg ambassador, in St. Petersburg and between
Andrassy and Novikov, the Russian representative, in the Habsburg
capital. On January 3/15 a military convention was signed. The politi-
cal agreement was concluded on March 6/18, but it was postdated to
conform with the previous arrangement. Both pacts contained sections
pertaining to Romania. The military convention provided for Russia
the assurance of Habsburg neutrality and delimited the spheres of

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military activity of the two powers. Serbia, Montenegro, and Novi
Pazar were to be neutral zones, although individual Serbs and Mon-
tenegrins might fight with the Russian forces. Austrian responsibility
was to cover Bosnia and Hercegovina and was to be excluded from
Romania and Bulgaria. Russian forces could, of course, march through
Romania and Bulgaria. In the political agreement the Habsburg Mon-
archy was given control of Bosnia and Hercegovina; Russia took south-
ern Bessarabia. The bases of the Reichstadt agreement were reaffirmed
with the stipulations that
in case of a territorial rearrangement or of a dissolution of the Ottoman Em-
pire, the establishment of a great compact Slav state, or other, is excluded; in
return Bulgaria, Albania, and the rest of Rumelia could be constituted as inde-
pendent states; Thessaly, a part of Epirus and the island of Crete could be
annexed to Greece; Constantinople with a suburb, the boundary of which re-
mains to be determined, could become a free city.110
The convention was secret, but Bismarck was informed of its contents.
Throughout March preparations for war were accelerated. On March
14/26 Gorchakov telegraphed Stuart that a definite response was
needed.111 On March 17/29 the Russian consul tried again to obtain
from Bratianu a clear answer. The minister accepted in principle, but
he wished to sign only if war were inevitable. He requested a two-week
warning before the commencement of hostilities so that there would
be time for the chambers to ratify the agreement and the army to
mobilize. The tsar commented that it would be difficult to fulfill this
demand, since the Russian government itself did not know when it
would act. By this time Charles appears to have become even more
inclined toward signing the agreement and even fighting. He wrote to
his father on March 28/April 9 that neutrality was impossible; Romania
had to ally with the stronger power. An end to the vassal status could
be won. The prince did not believe that Russian control of the country
would result, since Austria-Hungary would never allow the "German
Danube" to be surrendered to Russia.112
After the first week in April, war became increasingly probable.
The powers had formulated another proposal, the London Protocol;
its rejection by the Porte on March 28/April 9 brought to an end the
attempt to find a settlement on a European basis. Ottoman negotia-
tions with Montenegro had also broken down. On March 30/April 11
the tsar set April 12/24 a s the day f° r t n e commencement of hostili-
ties.113 An agreement with Romania was needed at once, and from
March 29/April 10 through March 31 /April 12 Stuart repeatedly urged
the Romanian government to act.114 Miliutin and the military leaders

255
 Russia and the Romanian national state
saw the pact as absolutely essential. The Romanian demands for mili-
tary equipment were met; on April 1/13 the Russian government agreed
to pay in gold.115 During this time Russian officers were in Romania
preparing for the Russian entrance.
The Romanian government could not postpone its decision any
longer. War was inevitable. Ionescu, still supporting neutrality, had
resigned on March 25/April 6, and Ion Cimpineanu temporarily took
charge of foreign affairs. On April 1/13 Cimpineanu issued a circular
declaring that, since war could not be avoided, Romania would con-
clude an agreement regulating Russian passage; the country, however,
would remain neutral: "This modus Vivendi excludes any alliance and
all cooperation." Neutrality would be maintained as long as the Otto-
man Empire did not extend the hostilities to Romanian territory.116
On April 2/14 Charles convened a royal council that included not
only his ministers, but also leading politicians.117 The entire question
was once more reviewed. Of those present only Rosetti, Kogalniceanu,
and Charles were definitely in favor of an active policy. Kogalniceanu
supported an agreement concerning passage and supplies, but he did not
want a political or military alliance. Rosetti was willing to accept a
stronger stand. Despite the deep concern over the possible consequences
of cooperation with Russia, the decision to sign a convention was
finally made. Changes in the government were required to implement
the new policy. General Alexander Chernat became war minister. On
April 3/15 Kogalniceanu took the post of foreign minister.
The final agreement was signed on April 4/16 by Kogalniceanu and
Stuart. Suspicious to the last, the Romanian government had insisted
on a final change. Under extreme pressure because of the impending
war, the Russian leaders agreed to the insertion of the word present
in the last sentence of the second article of the political agreement.
When Baron Stuart telegraphed this demand to St. Petersburg, he
received authorization to make the alteration.118 The military agree-
ment, as has already been discussed, covered problems dealing with
the passage of Russian troops. The political convention had far greater
general significance. The first article provided for military passage.
Through the second article the Romanian leaders hoped that they had
secured themselves against a Russian seizure of Bessarabia or a takeover
of political control:
Article II. Should any inconvenience or danger result for Romania owing to
the passage of the Russian troops on its territory, the government of His Maj-
esty the Emperor of all the Russias undertakes to maintain and to respect the
political rights of the Romanian state, as they are established by the domestic

256
 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8
laws and the existing119
treaties, as well as to maintain and defend the present
integrity of Romania.
Despite the signing of this agreement, the Romanian government
was not yet ready to accept the entrance of the Russian troops. At the
time of the negotiation of the pact the Romanians had been assured
that the army would not cross the border until the chambers had ap-
proved the treaty and it had been formally ratified. The deadline for
the Russian declaration of war was fast approaching. After setting the
date of April 12/24 t n e t s a r n a d left for Kishinev, the army headquar-
ters. The meeting of the Romanian chambers was delayed because new
elections were being held for the senate, so that legislative approval
could not be obtained by the crucial date. One day before April 11/23,
some Russian troops crossed into Romanian territory. Kogalniceanu
immediately protested against this passage before the convention had
been approved by the legislature.120 On the insistence of Charles, Stuart
took the train to Kishinev. There the tsar, Grand Duke Nicholas, Miliu-
tin, and others discussed the problem, but rejected a postponement
because of the general military situation.121
On April 12/24 t n e Russian army crossed the frontier in the face of
Romanian protests.122 Relations became even more strained when
the Russian command put up posters with a proclamation addressed to
the Romanian people. Charles and his ministers regarded this action
as an affront; all such declarations should have been made by the
prince.123 Because of these disagreements, the prefects were instructed
not to cooperate with the Russian army; Romanian troops were ordered
to retire as the Russians advanced.124 In general, the Romanian authori-
ties were well satisfied with the conduct of the Russian soldiers, but
friction continued among the higher officials; there were complaints
that the Russian officers were not aware of the agreement and acted as
if a convention did not exist.
Russian and Romanian cooperation thus had a bad beginning. Not
only had the Russian government signed an agreement protecting
Romanian territorial integrity when it clearly intended to take southern
Bessarabia,125 but the Russian army had also entered the country before
the pact was legally in effect. Nevertheless, the convention was approved
by the chambers when they met on April 16/28 and 17/29. Kogalnicea-
nu defended the arrangements as the only possible choice for the coun-
try. Romania could not side with the Ottoman Empire or allow Otto-
man troops on its soil. The minister placed the blame for the Romanian
predicament on the Treaty of Paris, which did not guarantee neutrality.
Although there was opposition to the agreements, they were approved

257
 Russia and the Romanian national state
in the senate by 41 to 10 votes and in the chamber by 85 to 26. The army
had already been mobilized and ordered to concentrate on defending
the Danube line.
The Romanian government had thus allowed the Russian army to
enter the country and to make use of Romanian suppl ies and means of
transport. War, however, had not been declared. The policy in operation
had been adopted after long hesitation and with real fears for the fu-
ture. The guarantor powers had also not given their approval; Romania
had not acted with a European mandate. In his first circular to the Ro-
manian agents after the war had started, Kogalniceanu placed the blame
on those states which had not moved to defend either Romania's neu-
trality or its political existence. He wrote that the Romanians, aban-
doned by the powers,
in face of the imminent entry of the Russian army, had to draw from ourselves
the necessary moral force in order to face the perils of the situation. We there-
fore had to come to an agreement with the imperial Russian government, in
order to safeguard what we possess, that is to say our political individuality, our
institutions, and our frontiers, such as they are guaranteed to us by the Treaty
of Paris.
The circular also emphasized the limited nature of the agreement:
"These conventions have no other political character than that of
guaranteeing for us, during the war, our present political status quo.
There is no independence with regard to Turkey, no annulment of any
of the present ties with that power; no cooperation of the Romanian
army with the Russian armies; no alliance against Turkey." 126
Immediately before and after the outbreak of hostilities one of the
major concerns of the Romanian government was to protect the country
against Ottoman reprisals. Just before the war commenced the Porte
had called on its vassal to cooperate under the terms of the previous
treaties.127 At the same time the Romanian government requested the
powers to advise the Ottoman government not to extend military opera-
tions across the Danube to Romanian territory. The argument used was
that an Ottoman invasion could not be justified by the passage of Rus-
sian troops, whose actions had more or less the tacit consent of the
powers. Rumors of an impending Ottoman invasion were circulating;
the entrance of Ottoman irregular troops, Circassians or bashibozuks,
could turn Romania into a second Bulgaria.128 The diplomatic appeals
reflected the great concern not only of the government, but of the
Romanian population along the Danube. After the war started, some
of these fears proved justified. Danube port cities were bombarded, and
incursions of armed bands occurred. The Ottoman Danube fleet also
made attacks on the ports. There was no major Ottoman effort, how-
258
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
ever, to cross the river with a strong military force or to occupy Ro-
manian territory. The Ottoman government had long regarded the
Danube River as its true northern military boundary.
Once Russian troops had entered Romania, the Russian command
made a great effort to maintain smooth relations with the Romanians.
Alexander II sent his aide, General Vladimir Andreevich Dolgorukov,
to the prince with a letter explaining the failure to give an adequate
forewarning. Strategic necessities, the tsar wrote, demanded an imme-
diate entrance to defend the country for which Russian armies "already
more than one time have shed their blood."129 On April 14/26 Grand
Duke Nicholas wrote in the same sense and requested that a regular
correspondence be resumed.130 From this time until the end of the war
he and Charles regularly exchanged letters; the prince's direct relations
with the Russian command were thus with the grand duke rather than
with the tsar.
After the initial friction, the occupation proceeded with relatively
few problems. As the Russian army entered the country, the Romanian
forces moved to guard the line of the Danube. They then retired into
Little Wallachia on the other side of the Olt River. There they re-
mained separated from the Russian army, but they in fact formed a
protection for the Russian right wing.

WAR AND INDEPENDENCE

Despite the convention the Romanian government was in an uncom-

fortable position. The state was still officially neutral, but a foreign
army was encamped within its borders and some Ottoman attacks had
been made along the Danube. Romania was neither at war nor at peace.
On April 30/May 12 the chambers solved this problem by declaring
that a state of war existed because of the Ottoman actions. This act led
logically to another: a declaration of independence. On May 9/21 the
chambers voted for national independence; the date May 10/22, 1877,
when Charles signed the act, was celebrated as the official day marking
a new stage in Romanian development. With this event the program of
the nationalists attained yet another success. The step also marked the
achievement of what had been Charles's major aim since he ascended
the throne. Many months were to pass, however, before the great pow-
ers accepted the Romanian action.131
Although the declaration was of major significance in Romanian
domestic history, it had a negative effect abroad. The Russian gov-
ernment did not approve it: independence was to be awarded as a
prize at the peace table. Andrassy declared that Romania's political
259
 Russia and the Romanian national state
status was set by international agreements, and the powers would make
the decision; Romanian independence was de facto, not de jure.132 A
similar policy was followed by the other powers, who indicated that
they would reserve their judgment until after the war. Thereafter,
although the Romanian leaders considered their state independent, the
great powers dissented. Certainly Charles ceased to regard himself as a
vassal prince. The conviction also grew that "only on the battlefield
could the independence of the country be sealed."133
Once independence had been declared, the limited role of Romania
in the war came under increasing criticism. In the previous weeks the
question had divided Romanian opinion. Charles and Bratianu favored
an active policy; Kogalniceanu wished to wait.134 There were similar
disagreements on the Russian side. Gorchakov strongly opposed active
military cooperation with Romania; Grand Duke Nicholas and the
army commanders, in contrast, were eager to make use of the Roma-
nian army, which, although small, was in excellent condition. Even
should military action be decided upon, the question of the form and
manner of the cooperation of the two armies had yet to be settled. In
the conversations on this matter, two aspects had to be considered. The
first involved the place of the Romanian army in the Russian plans. The
Romanians insisted that their forces should be under their own com-
manders and be assigned a separate theater of operation. The second
problem concerned military supplies. Romania was unprepared for a
major conflict; all manner of military equipment and financial assis-
tance would be necessary for an offensive war against the Ottoman
Empire. The question of money was to cause much friction until the
end of the war and was one of the major reasons why the Russian gov-
ernment discouraged the cooperation of the Balkan states in the war.
Even before the war started, on April 10/22, Kogalniceanu asked for
five million francs.135 On the next day General Ion Ghica, the newly
appointed Romanian agent, received an assurance from the tsar that
financial assistance would be given.136
On April 20/May 2 Bratianu went to Kishinev, where he discussed
the question of a new military agreement.137 He wanted a clear state-
ment of the advantages that his country would receive from participa-
tion in the war, since he claimed that there was much opposition to it.
The subject was further considered when Charles and Bratianu visited
Ploesti, the Russian army headquarters. Bratianu made another series
of demands: he wanted a money subvention whose amount would be
determined by how many thousand Romanian soldiers crossed the
Danube;138 he also wanted a guarantee against a possible intervention
by Austria-Hungary139 and an assurance that Romanian interests would
260
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
be taken into consideration if the Ottoman Empire collapsed. The
report of these negotiations made a very bad impression on the tsar,
who commented: "One sees by this that they think only of squeezing
money from us under the pretext of a cooperation that we can quite
well do without."140
A similar approach was made at the same time in St. Petersburg,
where Ghica discussed with the Russian officials both the loan and
military cooperation. The request for five million francs, as could be
expected, did not receive much encouragement, but he did obtain a
lesser amount later.141 The suggestion of a Romanian participation in
the war was also received with disfavor. Gorchakov, in line with his
own opinion and official policy, declared:
His Majesty charges me to let you know that he does not depend on the co-
operation of Romania and that he does not advise it. If, in spite of that, the
Romanian government decides to make war on the Turks and orders its army
to cross the Danube, Romania must provide for the costs and expenses of the
campaign undertaken.142
A virtually identical reply was sent through Nelidov on May 17/29.
Again the statement was made that the tsar did not favor a Romanian
intervention across the Danube; "if the Romanian government wishes
to undertake such an action at its own expense and its own risks and
perils," it could do so, but only on the condition that the direction of
the entire operation remained in the hands of the High Command of
the Russian army. Although the Romanian military authorities had
previously shown a desire to act alone and in a separate theater, such a
plan was dangerous and impossible. Romanian participation was not
desired; "Russia does not need assistance from the Romanian army.
The forces that she has brought into action to combat Turkey are
more than sufficient to attain that noble objective that the emperor
has set in beginning the present war." If the Romanian government
insisted on a more active role, the Russian note emphasized, "that action
should not in any case impede the execution of the general plan of the
great operations of the Russian army, in whose shadow exclusively can
be laid the foundations of the future destinies of the Romanian
state."143
Despite the discouraging reception of the Romanian overtures,
Charles continued to desire a more active role in the war. He was con-
vinced that his army would have to fight to assert the position of the
country; he did not want Romania to be treated as an Ottoman prov-
ince.144 In June, when the tsar and Gorchakov were in Ploe§ti, the
prince continued to argue for a larger military role, but once again
Gorchakov discouraged Romanian military cooperation. Romania, he
261
 Russia and the Romanian national state
maintained, could gain the recognition of its independence without
fighting. At this time he brought up the question of the Russian desire
to obtain control of the Kilia Channel of the Danube Delta, an acqui-
sition that would, of course, involve southern Bessarabia.145 It would,
further, be in violation of the recently signed agreement with Romania.
Gorchakov discussed the question with Kogalniceanu too.146 Charles
during this visit also spoke with the Grand Duke Nicholas, who con-
tinued to favor Romanian participation in the war and who expressed
the opinion that the Foreign Ministry was meddling too much in ques-
tions that did not concern it.147
On June 14/26-15/27, two months after the entrance into Romania,
the Russian army crossed the Danube at Zimnicea. See map on page
facing p. 149. For the next month the Russian campaign was very suc-
cessful. It seemed that Russia would win a swift victory. During this
period Grand Duke Nicholas did want to make use of Romanian troops,
but only in minor matters. At the time of the crossing of the Danube he
requested Charles to send a regiment across the Olt and to extend
the line the Romanians were defending on the Danube to Flaminda.148
Charles agreed but with the proviso that the action would not be per-
manent.149 On July 7/19 a further request was made that Romanian
troops be provided to garrison Nicopolis and also to accompany seven
thousand Turkish prisoners to the Russian frontier. Charles, with the
strong support of his ministers, refused; he declared that it was against
the dignity of his army to escort prisoners that it had not taken.150 The
tsar then personally requested a Romanian occupation of Nicopolis to
free Russian troops for other actions.151
The victorious march of the Russian army came to an abrupt halt
on July 8/20 with the first Ottoman victory at Plevna. At the same time
the overextended forces of General Iosif Vladimirovich Gurko met their
first setbacks. These events put the value of Romanian military coopera-
tion on a much higher level. When the Russian army first entered Ro-
mania, the Russian leaders had expected a short and glorious war;
their rejection of both Romanian and Serbian offers of assistance had
been based on their conviction that Russian manpower would be
sufficient and that the small Balkan states would cause more difficulties
than their participation was worth.152 Plevna reversed this judgment.
The possibility of a long costly war had to be faced, and additional
manpower was urgently needed. Charles was thus requested to provide
immediate aid.
On July 13/25, under strong pressure from the tsar, Charles agreed
to send troops across the Danube to garrison Nicopolis.153 When Kogal-
niceanu protested,154 the prince justified his decision by the tsar's
262
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
request and argued that it was not the equivalent of a major crossing
of the Romanian army to face the enemy, for which the Romanian gov-
ernment would insist on the securing of supplies and a definite military
agreement.155 On July 30/August 11 an even stronger plea came from
Nicholas, who telegraphed: "The Turks having gathered in large
numbers at Plevna, I ask you to make a strong show of force and if
possible passage of the Danube . . . This show of force is indispensable
to facilitate my movements."156 The entire question of Romanian mili-
tary participation was now a matter of urgent importance.
The attractiveness of taking a major role in the campaign was under
these circumstances much lessened from the Romanian standpoint.
Moreover, the prince continued to believe that a convention defining
the role of the armies was essential. In contrast, Bratianu was convinced
that aid should be given in this crisis; he feared that the Russian army
might be forced back across the Danube and that Romania would be-
come a battlefield.157 The prince, Bratianu, and Kogalniceanu all fa-
vored assuming an active military role, but only after the conditions
had been settled. Of first importance was the place of the Romanian
army in the Russian operations, an issue that also involved the question
of command. Money and munitions were still a matter of concern, but,
under pressure, the Russian authorities were more willing to meet the
Romanian requests.
Despite the clear Russian need for Romanian support, the negotia-
tions were difficult. Both Bratianu and the prince remained suspicious
of the Russian intentions. On July 28/August 9 Bratianu wrote to
Charles that the Russians "wish to draw our army completely into their
embrace and thus make any individual action impossible."158 At the
same time Charles wrote to his minister: "My impression has always
been that the day when we would back up the Russians on the battle-
field or give them our assistance in any manner whatsoever, they would
try to wipe us out or absorb us."159
While these discussions were going on, a Romanian army of thirty
thousand prepared to move.160 Even the place of its crossing of the
Danube caused disagreement. The Russian commanders wished it to
use their major bridgehead at Nicopolis, whereas Slaniceanu advised a
separate crossing at Corabia so that the Romanian army could arrive
at Plevna by way of the valley of the Vid and Isker. This route, Slani-
ceanu believed, was "the last means of preserving for our army a distinct
line of operation as much in the undertaking against Plevna as in the
last periods of the campaign."161 A crossing at Nicopolis would lead to a
fusion of the armies. The Corabia crossing did not meet with Russian
approval; it was argued that Russia could not protect this second route.
263
 Russia and the Romanian national state
Nicholas wanted the Romanian army to assemble at Nicopolis and
then form the right wing of the Russian operation at Plevna.162
Under mounting pressure, Nicholas in a letter of August 6/18 agreed
that the main Romanian forces might cross at Corabia and also that
the army would conserve its individuality and be under its own com-
manders. Meanwhile, the military situation became worse.163 On Au-
gust 9/21, when the Russian forces were under strong attack, Nicholas
telegraphed the prince: "When can you cross? Do it as soon as possible.
They are fighting desperately at Shipka. Several attacks have been re-
pulsed since the morning of August 9."164
On August 10/22 Charles informed Nicholas that Bratianu and the
chief of staff would be sent to make an agreement. The Romanian army
would keep its individuality and its unity of command, but would
operate according to the general plan of the Russian staff.165 Romanian
troop passage across the Danube commenced on August 12/24.166 The
final hindrances to Romanian action were removed when Charles on
August 16/28 was offered the command of all of the troops at Plevna.167
The opportunity was too flattering for the Hohenzollern prince to re-
fuse; he did not continue to bargain. He thus did not use the opportu-
nity afforded by the Russian embarrassment to gain precise political
advantages for his country in the peace negotiations, and no detailed
military convention was prepared. The final decision was made by
Charles in direct negotiations with the tsar; the ministers were not
consulted. Kogalniceanu did not fully approve, but Charles argued that
his actions avoided greater complications and assured that the Roma-
nian army would not be under Russian command.168
Romania was now an active Russian ally; Romanian national en-
thusiasm was at a peak. Independence had been declared, and the Ro-
manian armies were "saving" the Russians. In September, when a dis-
astrous attack was made on Plevna, the Romanian troops achieved the
single memorable victory with the taking of the Grivitsa redoubt.
Thereafter it was decided that Plevna would be taken by siege; General
Eduard Ivanovich Totleben, the hero of Sebastopol, directed the opera-
tion. While this action was prepared, Romanian soldiers won victories
on other fronts. On November 9/21 a Romanian and Russian force
took Rakhovo; on November 18/30 Lorn Palanka fell. On December
4/16 Romanian troops took over the garrisoning of Nicopolis, and they
played a major role in the final assault on Plevna on November 28/
December 10.
During the war the Romanian government was able to carry out one
of the objectives that had been in dispute with the Ottoman govern-
ment - the awarding of a Romanian decoration. The prohibition had
264
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
been included in the firman of 1866. The government had previously
considered pressing the matter, but had been discouraged by the other
powers.169 On May 9/21, as the first act of Romanian independence,
the chamber voted for the institution of the order of the "Star of Ro-
mania."170 In September the tsar accepted the decoration in an act
intended to be a tacit recognition of independence. In November Grand
Duke Nicholas received the order "For Military Valor."171 In return,
Charles was awarded the Russian decorations of St. George and St.
Andrew.
At this time the Romanian and Russian leaders were cooperating
well, since they had a common military goal. Charles was on very good
terms with the tsar, Grand Duke Nicholas, and General Totleben. The
prince, of course, had the great advantage of being a Hohenzollern and
thus having excellent family connections with the Russian court. He
also gained the impression that he could use Alexander's apparent af-
fection for him to obtain advantages for Romania during the peace
negotiations.172 Certainly, the terms of the future treaty were on the
minds of the Romanian statesmen. In the months before the fall of
Plevna they made great efforts to try to obtain a declaration on the
matter from the Russian government. Both Charles and Bratianu
wished their troops to occupy certain cities on the right bank of the
Danube that would be held until the Porte paid a war indemnity.173
They also wished to assure that Romanian representatives would take
part in the peace negotiations.
The adamant Russian refusal to discuss these questions was particu-
larly apparent in November, when Bratianu attempted to obtain a
precise declaration of intentions from the tsar and Miliutin. The tsar
avoided any clear commitments and instead used the phrase that was
to become the standard Russian answer to Romanian requests for a
statement on the peace terms: Romania would not regret having entered
the war. In his conversations with Miliutin, Bratianu could speak more
directly. He discussed the Romanian desire to occupy Nicopolis, Ra-
khovo, Lorn Palanka, and Vidin, an action that the Russian officials op-
posed. He further strongly emphasized that he needed to know what
Romania would obtain in return for its participation in the war, in
order to reassure the public and the parliament, which was about to
open. At this time Miliutin, speaking "academically" and in cautious
tones, discussed the question of Bessarabia. He gave the standard argu-
ments: the Russians felt deeply about the loss of the land in 1856, and
its status would have to be altered. In reply, Bratianu also emphasized
the feelings of his countrymen about a territory that they were con-
vinced was justly theirs. Although he personally would accept a sur-
265
 Russia and the Romanian national state
render of the area, the Romanian public would not. The action would
cause bad relations between the countries, and certainly, he argued,
the Russian ties with the Balkan Christian populations should take
precedence over the ownership of this territory. Bratianu was also at
this time able to speak with Gorchakov, who was in Bucharest. Not at-
tempting to conceal his feelings, Gorchakov admitted: "Yes . . . the
emperor wants Bessarabia. It is stupid, but he wants it."174
Meanwhile, the expected Russian demand for the return of southern
Bessarabia was receiving full coverage in the Romanian opposition
press. There was every sign that its loss should be expected. Neverthe-
less, despite the domestic problems that these rumors caused, neither
the prince nor the Romanian political leaders dared to bring up the
subject directly with the tsar, the man who would, after all, make the
final decision. Charles, who apparently never discussed the subject with
Alexander personally, "considered it impossible after his relations with
the Russian ruler, that such a demand would be made of him." 175 The
prince continued to expect that the tsar, in whom he continued to
have great faith, would not break an agreement that he had made.
Bratianu, when he was at the Russian headquarters at Poradim, simi-
larly avoided the topic in his conversations with Alexander, on the
strong advice of General Ghica.176
After Plevna was finally taken on November 28/December 10, the
Romanian military activities were limited to the investiture of the Ot-
toman fortresses at Vidin and Belogradchik and to garrison duty along
the Danube. The Romanian army thus did not join the Russian forces
in the victorious campaign that brought them almost to Constantinople.
Close to complete victory, the Russian government had little need to
conciliate its Romanian ally or to take into consideration Romania's
desires for the future. When the tsar was in Bucharest in December,
on his way back to St. Petersburg, he spoke with both Charles and
Bratianu. Once again he avoided discussing specific terms and merely
repeated the assurance that Romania would not regret having fought.
He did not favor Romanian participation in the peace negotiations be-
cause of the nation's dubious status: no power had recognized its in-
dependence.177 The Russian determination to negotiate alone with
the Ottoman Empire was now clear. Neither the Balkan allies nor the
great powers were to have a significant influence on the first agreements.
Even before the fall of Plevna the grand duke's diplomatic chancery
had drawn up preliminary peace terms, w^hich were then sent to both
the tsar and Gorchakov. After they had been approved, with some small
changes, they were communicated to Germany and Austria-Hungary,
but not to Romania. The most important sections of the proposal
266
 Prince Charles, 1871—1878
called for the creation of a large Bulgarian state that would be occu-
pied by Russia for two years, reforms in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and
changes in the Straits settlement to the Russian advantage. Romania's
independence was to be recognized, and it was to acquire Dobrudja.
Southern Bessarabia was to be ceded to Russia. The negative reaction
to the terms, particularly in Vienna, led the Russian leaders to decide
to negotiate an armistice agreement with the Porte that would define
the future peace only in general terms. A more definitive agreement
would be drawn up later, and even this pact would be subject to re-
vision. The powers were to be informed that it would be "preliminary"
and that all questions involving general European interests would be
decided in consultation with them. The actual negotiation of the ar-
mistice was left in the hands of Grand Duke Nicholas and his staff.
Alexander II returned to St. Petersburg in December.
Repeated rumors arrived in Bucharest concerning the peace. No move
had been made by Russia to include Romanian representatives in any
of the discussions, nor had their views or desires been solicited. To meet
this situation Charles decided to send Colonel Eraclie Arion to Nicho-
las's headquarters and General I. Ghica, who was the Romanian agent
in St. Petersburg but who had been attached to the tsar's headquarters
during the war, back to his post. At the same time he wrote letters to
both the tsar and the grand duke. To the latter the prince stated that
he had heard that negotiations with the Porte had commenced, and
that public opinion in Romania was disturbed over the course these
discussions might take in regard to the interests of the country. The
prince requested that he be informed how Romania could participate
in the negotiations and how he could transmit his views on the condi-
tions that he wanted included in the agreement.178
In answer, both Nicholas and Nelidov replied that Romanian de-
mands should be sent directly to St. Petersburg.179 In his letter to
Charles, the grand duke gave the usual reassurances: "I propose for the
acceptance of the Turks only the essential bases of the peace that have
been sent to me from Petersburg and all Romanian interests [that] have
not been forgotten."180 He also assured the prince that once the armis-
tice was signed he would inform him of the details and the places the
Romanian troops were to occupy.
Despite this discouraging message, Arion did go to the Russian head-
quarters at Kazanlik, taking with him a list of the Romanian proposals
for the peace. These included the occupation of certain Danubian
cities and the land in between, the dismantling of Ottoman fortifi-
cations on the Danube, the Romanian acquisition of the Danube Delta,
including the St. George Channel, and an indemnity of one hundred
267
 Russia and the Romanian national state
million francs. The cities were to be held only until this amount had
been paid.181 At the Russian headquarters Arion was treated with cold-
ness and excluded from the deliberations. In a note to Stuart, Kogal-
niceanu backed up the Romanian claims, arguing that the Romanian
position was distinct, that the active participation in the war had come
about as a result of a Russian request, and that justice demanded that
Romania take part in the negotiations as in the fighting. Arion, he con-
cluded, had full power to negotiate.182
The prince and his ministers were now thoroughly alarmed. Not only
had the Russian government not sent the terms of the future peace, but
it had refused to accept Romanian cooperation or even to request a
statement of the Romanian desires. Charles continued to hope that the
Romanian participation in the war and his close relations with the tsar
would dissuade the Russian government from annexing southern Bessa-
rabia. Nevertheless, it was recognized that the support of other govern-
ments was needed. Kogalniceanu instructed Nicholas Callimachi Catar-
gi, the Romanian representative in Paris and London, to ask the
Turkish ambassador in Paris to inquire if his government would recog-
nize Romanian independence. The Russian government could then not
require the Ottoman government to give up a territory that was not
under its control. At this time Ion Ghica was sent to London and
Cimpineanu to Berlin to find out if the powers would back Romanian
resistance to Russian demands.
Finally, just before the signing of the armistice, the Russian govern-
ment stopped evading the question; it informed the Romanians that
southern Bessarabia would have to be surrendered.183 Ignatiev was
instructed to go to Bucharest to try further measures of persuasion.184
Russian interests would obviously be better served if the Romanian
government would accept the transfer without making an international
issue of it and also would bargain on compensation. The announcement
of Russian intentions, which was conveyed by Gorchakov to Ghica in
St. Petersburg and by Ignatiev to the Romanian government in Bucha-
rest, was not handled with tact. Ghica was simply informed that Russia
would take Bessarabia to the Kilia Channel; in return, Romania would
receive the Danube Delta and part of Dobrudja, including Constanta.
The argument used was that southern Bessarabia had been ceded to
Moldavia, not Romania, in a treaty that was no longer respected and
that Russia alone could not justly be compelled to honor, especially
since "that demand is for her a question of honor and of national dig-
nity." In reply, Ghica retorted that the territory was "a piece of our
body, a possession of ours from antiquity."185 In a later conversation

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 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8
with Ghica, Gorchakov disposed of Article 2 of the April convention
by declaring that it engaged Russia "to defend and to guarantee Roma-
nian rights and the integrity of her territory only against Turkey."186
In reporting these conversations to his government, Ghica made clear
the Russians' determination to take the area and their preference
for having the matter settled directly between Bucharest and St. Peters-
burg. During these same discussions the Russian diplomats made clear
that it was they who would represent Romanian interests at the peace
negotiations; Romanian independence had not been recognized, and
its direct participation was impossible. Strong objections were also
made to the visit of Ion Ghica to London.
Ignatiev carried a similar message when he arrived in Bucharest
on January 19/31, bringing with him a letter from the tsar and one
from Gorchakov. Alexander's letter introduced Ignatiev and urged
Romania to cooperate with Russia for its own good.187 Gorchakov's
words were more ominous. He stated that Russia wished to do every-
thing possible for Romania diplomatically, but that "we have also
interests and rights to safeguard about which we cannot compromise.
What we expect from the Romanian government is a just and rational
appreciation of its situation and of ours."188 The letter did not mention
the word Bessarabia, but Ignatiev told the prince that Alexander II
was personally determined to take the territory; Charles refused to
believe that the initiative came from the tsar. The Ignatiev mission
failed; the Romanian attitude remained firm. Charles, from his conver-
sations with the Russian envoy, gained the impression "that he did
not always move within the boundaries of reality, but often let his
imagination have free reign."189 In a letter to the tsar Charles wrote
that the question of border rectification that had been discussed with
Ignatiev was delicate because of national sensibilities; the matter
would cause domestic difficulties in Romania.190
This blatant understatement in no way reflected the outburst of
indignation that resulted from reports of the Russian demands. The
strong Romanian reaction was well expressed in an impassioned dis-
patch from Kogalniceanu to Ghica, written on January 14/26, 1878,
when the news first arrived:

It is unworthy of a great empire to thus deceive a country that had given up

everything on the assurances alone that the word of an emperor is worth more
than a treaty. If they had wanted to despoil the Romanians of a part of their
patrimony, it would have been honest to tell them that before the conclusion
of the convention of April 4, before we crossed the Danube, before we saved the
imperial army and perhaps the emperor at Plevna . . . Then it would have been

269
 Russia and the Romanian national state
better to let the Turks be victorious, for they certainly would not have taken
from us some of Bessarabia in case of victory.191
In later instructions to Ghica, Kogalniceanu objected that the Rus-
sians handled Romania like a conquered province and that "never
had the Bulgarians been treated by the Turks in the manner that the
Russian authorities treat the Romanians in the towns and villages of
the Danube."192 Kogalniceanu further requested Ghica to find out
what boundaries Romania could expect in Dobrudja and to investi-
gate the possibility of an indemnity.
An armistice between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was signed at
Adrianople on January 19/31, at which time Nicholas informed Charles
that all military operations were to cease; Romanian troops should
prepare to occupy Vidin and Belogradchik.193 On January 21 /Febru-
ary 2 the grand duke forwarded a copy of the agreement with the as-
surance that Romania would find in it provision for the satisfaction
of its interests by "the recognition of its independence on the part of
the Porte and by a territorial compensation that is assured to it in
principle."194 Charles was directed to discuss the terms with Ignatiev
in Bucharest. The provisions of the armistice were very general; specific
details were not given. However, the agreement provided for the forma-
tion of an autonomous Bulgaria; the granting of independence and
some additional territory to Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania; ad-
ministrative changes for Bosnia and Hercegovina; and the provision
that the Ottoman Empire would pay an indemnity, either in territory
or in money, for the Russian expenses of the war. An understanding
was to be reached later on the Straits between the sultan and the tsar.
Bessarabia was not mentioned specifically. In a letter of January 23/
February 4 to Nicholas, the prince expressed his dissatisfaction with
the fact that a Romanian delegate had not participated in the negotia-
tions. The government was thus placed in a difficult position before
the country.195 Charles also announced that he intended to occupy
Vidin and Belogradchik until he was awarded an indemnity and terri-
torial advantages.
Although Charles and his ministers soon found that their defiant
attitude would receive no backing from abroad - Cimpineanu and
Callimachi Catargi both reported a lack of concern over the Bessarabian
question196 - they did obtain the enthusiastic approval of the Romanian
parliament and people. The fate of southern Bessarabia became a mat-
ter of public controversy when the armistice terms were announced on
January 22/February 3.197 The matter was heatedly debated, and
there was no difference of opinion on the stand that should be taken.
On January 28/February 9 the chambers passed a motion opposing
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 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
the loss of the territory. This action virtually precluded any settlement
with Russia that involved the loss of southern Bessarabia. Neither party
would accept a deal with Russia; the opposition attacked the ministers
for weakness in face of Russian demands, not for a failure to compro-
mise on the Bessarabian question.
Although the country appeared united on the Bessarabian issue,
a division of opinion had developed between Kogalniceanu and Bratia-
nu. The foreign minister by the beginning of February feared that the
territory would be lost and that the Romanian public should be pre-
pared for the inevitable.198 Bratianu, making a firm stand, came to
believe by the beginning of March that Kogalniceanu, who had signed
the April treaty, would have to be replaced to soothe public opinion.199
This disagreement between the two most important Romanian minis-
ters remained a disturbing element in Romanian political life through
the Congress of Berlin. With the lack of a firm, united stand among his
chief advisers, Charles was forced to come to a decision. He gradually
came to realize that southern Bessarabia was lost. He recognized that
the press campaign taking place at the time wrould only anger the
Russian government.200 Because of the unanimity of public opinion on
the issue, he could not, however, express his feelings openly, or he
might endanger his position as prince.
Meanwhile, relations between Russia and Romania were still bad.
Gorchakov, adopting his usual menacing attitude, strongly protested
the vote in the chamber, which he regarded as an insult to Russia.201
The terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, which was signed on February
19/March 3, further embittered the atmosphere. The Romanian gov-
ernment learned of its content on March 7/19, when Ghica read a
report in the Journal de St. Petersbourg.202 The agreement spelled out
in precise terms the general stipulations of the armistice. Of the sec-
tions concerning Romania, Article 5 recognized its independence and
Article 19 provided that the Ottoman Empire would cede Dobrudja
and the Danube Delta to Russia, which in turn "reserved the right to
exchange them against the part of Bessarabia detached by the Treaty
of 1856." The treaty also contained an unpleasant surprise. Article 8
stated that Russian troops would occupy Bulgaria for two years; this
force would "preserve their communications with Russia not only by
Romania, but also by the ports of the Black Sea, Varna and Burgas,
where they can organize, for the duration of the occupation, the neces-
sary depots."203 This provision meant that for the two years during
which Russian troops were to remain in Bulgaria Russian supply lines
and the right of passage would be maintained through Romania. The
significance of this continued presence of Russian soldiers for the free-

271
 Russia and the Romanian national state
dom of action and the independence of the country was obvious. No
Romanian government could accept such a proposal.204 The fears were
too strong that Russia would use the opportunity to reestablish its
former protectorate.
To meet the new situation Bratianu on March 19/31 left again to
seek aid from the other powers.205 The message that he was to carry
was clearly stated in a Kogalniceanu instruction to Balaceanu:
Our resolution to refuse any compromise on Bessarabia has been taken from
the day when the demand was made of us. We are appealing to the great powers
in order to have their support. The government does not understand how after
a demarche so categorical and after acts so formal and solemn there could still
remain a doubt in the mind of anyone about the sincere and unanimous de-
cision of the ministry not to compromise at all. 206
The announcement of the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano caused
a violent reaction not only within Romania, but also among the great
powers. The provisions were in contradiction to recognized interna-
tional treaties and to the agreements that the Russian government had
made with the Habsburg Monarchy prior to the war. An immediate and
severe crisis followed, which lasted until the opening of the Congress
of Berlin in June. In this period, or at least until the end of May, the
Russian government had to face the possibility that it might have to
go to war with Britain and Austria-Hungary. And, indeed, at this
time the Russian military position was dangerous. From the beginning
of the war the Turkish navy had commanded the Black Sea; in Febru-
ary a British squadron entered the Straits and anchored in the Sea of
Marmora. The bulk of the Russian army engaged in the campaign lay
encamped south of the Balkan mountains. If war broke out, these
troops could be cut off by a combined Austrian and Romanian action.
With the British and Ottoman navies dominating the sea, the supply-
ing or even withdrawal of this army would not be possible. This threat-
ened entrapment perhaps explains the bitter reaction of Russian states-
men such as Gorchakov to the Romanian attitude at the time. Should
war break out with the other powers, an angry Romania could be a
danger.207 Nevertheless, despite the fact that Russia could not afford
to antagonize its war ally, the tsar continued to place a first priority
on the reacquisition of southern Bessarabia.
Throughout this period of international crisis the Romanian leaders
were operating in the dark. They were not a part of the general Euro-
pean negotiations; they did not know of the secret understandings.
Since France was not playing a major role in international affairs at this
time, Romania had no great power advocating its interests. The policy
of resistance was followed to a great extent because of internal political
272
 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8
considerations. The Liberal Party, which had consistently stood for a
policy of national advancement and which had made the agreement
with Russia, could with difficulty accept this disappointment of its
hopes. At this time, the focus of concern was not only on southern Bes-
sarabia, but on the more immediately dangerous question of military
passage. This issue became all the more sensitive when it soon appeared
that the Russian army was in the process of carrying out a redeployment
of forces that would assure it full military control of Romania.
The relations between the governments at this point were, as could
be expected, extremely strained. At a reception on February 26/March
10 the tsar told Ghica that he wished Romania would remember "the
great services that Russia had rendered it and the blood" that had
been spilled.208 On March 16/28 the Journal de St. Petersbourg pub-
lished an article on the Bessarabian question that justified the Russian
standpoint and declared: "The participation of Romania in the war
has not been a sacrifice, or an act of devotion, but a careful calculation
from which she has benefited, without taking into account the rain of
gold that the war caused to fall on the country."209 In reply, the Roma-
nian leaders and writers emphasized their historic rights to Bessarabia,
the treaty of April 4/ 16, and their sacrifices in the war. In addition to the
dead and injured, the Romanian arguments stressed the material dam-
ages caused by the Russian passage and the supplying of these troops.
A dispatch from Kogalniceanu to Ghica of March 8/20* pointed out:
Our sacrifices are shown by the loss of two harvests, and by the deterioration of
our lines of communication. In fact, on the one hand, the appropriation of our
railroads to the almost exclusive service of the imperial armies has condemned
our products to rot in place instead of being disposed of; on the other hand,
our highways and our roads are all ruined, and it will be very burdensome, if
not even impossible over the long years for us to reassemble the immense
capital absorbed by their construction.210
In their arguments against the cession of southern Bessarabia, the
Romanian statesmen protested not only against the loss of the three
districts, but against the original acquisition of the entire region by
Russia. On March 10/22 Kogalniceanu wrote to Ghica that after the
devastating war of 1806 to 1812 Moldavia had seen stolen from it
"half of its territory by that same protecting power to whose success the
Romanians have so often dedicated and sacrificed themselves."211 In a
review of the issue, entitled "Memoir on the question of Bessarabia," de-
signed for circulation abroad, Kogalniceanu gave the reasons why
the region should remain with Romania and again emphasized the
theme that all of Bessarabia belonged to Moldavia and that the Treaty
of Paris had brought about a return to the principality "of a portion of

273
 Russia and the Romanian national state
its former territory."212 As a Moldavian and a historian, Kogalniceanu
was particularly sensitive to these issues.
The threatening tone to the Russian communications was to become
even more pronounced. In a conversation with Ghica on February 28/
March 12 Gorchakov objected that Romania was forcing Russia to
make the question an international one.213 The tsar, the foreign minis-
ter emphasized, had definitely decided to take Bessarabia. He preferred
to negotiate directly with Romania rather than submit the issue to
a congress.214 If the Romanians refused an agreement, Gorchakov
warned, "we will take from you the territory demanded and you will
not have any compensation. What will you do? Oppose us with
arms? That would be useless and dangerous for you."215 Gorcha-
kov's words were even harsher weeks later, on March 20/April 1,
when asking Ghica if his government truly intended to object to the
section of the treaty concerning the future passage of troops. The tsar,
he warned, "has lost all patience and he has charged me to tell you to
let your government know that if you have the intention of protesting
or of opposing the article in question, he will have Romania occupied
and the army disarmed."216 Two days later Jomini told Ghica that
the tsar was beginning to put this policy into execution "in the sense
that orders have been given to increase and reinforce the Russian troops
that are in Romania."217
To the menace contained in the last statements the Romanian gov-
ernment again gave a firm reply. Kogalniceanu instructed Ghica to
answer that the prince wished it to be known that "an army which has
fought at Plevna under the eyes of Emperor Alexander II may well
be crushed and slaughtered, but it will never let itself be disarmed."218
Charles told Stuart personally that Russia should not forget that "there
is a Hohenzollern on the throne of Romania who will oppose the dis-
armament of the army, it is an army that knows how to do its duty
toward the throne and the fatherland."219
Throughout the month of April Romanian concerns centered not
so much on Bessarabia as on the fact that the threat of military occu-
pation appeared to be in the process of implementation. In addition,
Miliutin had decided that a new military convention needed to be
formulated, and efforts were made to gain Romanian acceptance. Again
the government refused to accept a Russian proposal. Kogalniceanu
argued that there was no point in concluding another treaty when the
first had been violated even before the chambers approved it.220 The
intensification of Russian pressure on Bucharest coincided with the
international crisis caused by the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano.
Ghica, observing the scene from St. Petersburg, recognized that Russia
274
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
was preparing for war with Britain and Austria-Hungary by new mil-
itary measures and by securing its communications across Romania.221
To meet the situation Charles in March had withdrawn his troops
from Vidin and brought them back across the Danube, with the inten-
tion of concentrating his army in western Wallachia. The obvious in-
crease in the number of Russian troops in the country naturally caused
extreme concern. On March 27/April 8 Kogalniceanu wrote Bratianu,
who was in Berlin, that the Russians were taking steps to occupy the
land; more soldiers were entering and officers were studying the geog-
raphy of the area.222 A few days later he wrote to Ghica that an occupa-
tion was becoming a sad fact. Russian troops were surrounding Bucha-
rest on the excuse of returning to Russia.223 On April 5/17 Kogalniceanu
informed Balaceanu that Romania was under a real occupation: "Bu-
charest is literally encircled by a corps of the Russian army."224
At the same time cooperation between the military authorities was at
a standstill. More and more conflicts occurred between the Russian
military and civil authorities and their Romanian counterparts. The
government also faced many protests from the public. Russian officials
appeared to be continually violating the clauses of the April 4/16
treaty. The Romanian leaders feared not only a Russian occupation,
but a move to overthrow the government. On April 28 in a telegram to
Balaceanu, Bratianu expressed the Romanian panic:
The tsar proposes a convention while menacing us; we do not want one at any
price. The Russians are taking possession of our country and are installing
themselves without taking account of the government. Even in Bucharest they
have, under different pretexts, four times more soldiers than we have. A fake
revolt would suffice to legitimize the government of Florescu. New troops arrive
daily from Russia.225
The Liberal ministry's fear of a Russian-sponsored coup was at least
partially based on an exchange of communications between the prince
and the tsar in which Alexander II directly attacked the Romanian po-
litical leaders. On February 21 /March 5 Charles wrote the tsar a letter
congratulating him on the peace and declaring: "During all this terrible
and bloody war, there has been for me a bright point: It is the figure
of Your Majesty, serene and calm amid the storm, heroically enduring
without lament and without complaint, what many others would find
unbearable."226 In reply to this piece of blatant and servile flattery the
tsar over one month later sent both a telegram and a letter. The tele-
gram stated: "I can only regret the conduct of individuals who are at
the head of your government and who have created such strained
relations, completely in contradiction to the true interests of Roma-
nia."227 The letter, dated March 28/April 9 but delivered by Stuart
275
 Russia and the Romanian national state
on April 7/19, restated the point; the tsar declared that "the difficult
relations created by the conduct of your ministers" could not alter his
constant and cordial interest in the prince, and that he regretted the
measures he had been forced to take because of "their manner of acting."
He also announced that he was sending a representative to negotiate a
new military arrangement, an action that, as we have seen, was not
desired by the Romanian leaders.228
Despite the belligerent declarations, the Russian government did to
an extent soften its attitude in April. Gorchakov delivered no more
threats; he was to enter a period of sickness. Ghica recognized the
signs of a change in attitude, caused by the pressure from Europe, but
he did not think Romania would benefit from it. On his own request,
he returned to Bucharest in April. At this last meeting with Gorchakov
the minister advised "calm and moderation" and expressed the opinion
that the situation would quiet down.229
By this time it was clear that the fate of Bessarabia and the entire
question of Romania's future would hinge not on the negotiations
between Romania and Russia, but on those being carried on among
the great powers. Since the transfer of Bessarabia involved an alteration
of the Treaty of Paris, this question should obviously have been de-
cided by the signatories. In March Gorchakov had accepted in principle
the holding of a European congress, with Berlin as the site, but pro-
tracted negotiations defining its scope were to follow. Similar compli-
cated discussions were held among the powers on the terms to be
finally agreed upon. Romanian representatives took no part in these
negotiations, nor did they have a patron state that specifically repre-
sented their interests, as France had done previously.
By this time the hopelessness of the Romanian position on Bessa-
rabia was evident. Bratianu had returned from Berlin and Vienna
empty-handed. Quite obviously, no government would challenge Rus-
sia over the Bessarabian issue. Romania could expect to hold the terri-
tory only should a general war break out over other issues and result in
a Russian defeat. After it became evident that the powers would adjust
their differences peacefully, the Romanian government could not real-
istically hope to retain the land. Nevertheless, the Romanian leaders,
largely because of public opinion, could not easily alter their stand and
bargain with Russia over the issue. Bratianu still believed that a con-
ference of great powers might give support to his position. He thus
had hopes that the Congress of Berlin, which opened in June, could
be used to protect Romanian interests. Even though Romania was ad-
mitted only as an observer, and not a full member, its representatives
would have an opportunity to state their arguments.
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 Prince Charles, 1871-1878

T H E CONGRESS OF BERLIN

Meanwhile, in negotiations carried on without the knowledge of the

Romanian government, the representatives of the great powers had
settled many of the problems at issue, using the principles of the balance
of power and mutual compensation. Before the outbreak of the war
and during the hostilities, the Russian government had been in con-
tinuous communication with the states most directly affected by its
actions, the Habsburg Empire and Britain. The Budapest Convention
of January and March 1877, as we have seen, assured that Russian
armies would not operate in the areas of principal Habsburg concern:
Bosnia, Hercegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. The British govern-
ment in a note of April 24/May 6 similarly indicated where its inter-
ests lay: the Suez Canal, Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and the Straits.230 In a
reply of May 18/30 the Russian government acknowledged this decla-
ration with a reservation regarding Constantinople. The Russian in-
tention of annexing southern Bessarabia and compensating Romania
with Dobrudja and independence was also communicated to London.231
The Habsburg government on May 17/29, in a note that discussed
the general situation, let St. Petersburg know that it would not accept
the incorporation of Romania into Russia or its reduction to the status
of a dependency. Austria-Hungary had, of course, already conceded
Bessarabia to Russia in the Reichstadt and Budapest agreements.232
Until the fall of Plevna in December 1877, the Russian leaders had
been primarily concerned with winning the war. They had made, of
course, the preliminary political arrangements with other powers.
However, once victory appeared assured, the Russian appetite grew. In
December, at his headquarters at Poradim, Alexander II accepted as a
basis for peace proposals that went beyond what had been agreed upon
with the other governments. Most important was the Russian intention
of establishing a large, autonomous Bulgarian state, which was to be
under Russian military occupation for two years and thus under ob-
vious Russian political domination. Not only would this act upset the
diplomatic balance in the Balkans, but it was also in conflict with
previous agreements with Austria-Hungary.233 The expanded Russian
program was expressed in the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano. This
agreement called for the formation of a large Bulgarian state, the
cession of Ottoman territory to the Balkan nations, and compensation
to Russia in the annexation of southern Bessarabia as well as terri-
tories in Asia Minor.
The terms of the treaty were acceptable neither to the Habsburg
Empire nor to Britain, but the two powers placed emphasis on different
277
 Russia and the Romanian national state
issues. Lord Salisbury, the British foreign minister, was primarily in-
terested in protecting his country's imperial interests. He was thus
chiefly concerned with the status of the new Bulgarian state, the Russian
intention to annex the major Black Sea port of Batum, and the main-
tenance of Ottoman control over the Straits and Constantinople. The
British government believed that Vienna should take the responsibility
for Danubian and Romanian affairs; the Russian annexation of south-
ern Bessarabia would not affect British vital interests. This attitude
was well expressed in the report of a British cabinet committee of
March 15/27:
The restoration of Bessarabia to Russia, and the control thus given to Russia
over the Danube, are serious departures from the Treaty of Paris, and are in
themselves open to grave objection. These matters, however, concern primarily
Austria and Romania, and our policy should be rather to support them in such
objections as they will make than to originate objections of our own.234
This decision was not made clear at once to the Romanian represen-
tatives. The Romanian defiance of Russia was an asset to both Habs-
burg and British policy. Until it was absolutely certain that war would
not break out, the British government needed to give encouragement
to the Romanian leaders. Sir William White, the British representative
in Bucharest, was instructed: "Of course, you will do all you properly
can to encourage the plucky attitude of Roumania." 235 However, the
British government would certainly give no assurance on Bessarabia,
and as a British diplomat commented, "Europe is not likely to go to
war for the sake of saving Romania from being plundered by her
ally."236
Moreover, the British government had no hesitation about using the
Bessarabian issue as a bargaining point in the negotiations with Russia.
The decisive discussions toward a settlement of the crisis were carried
on between Salisbury and Peter A. Shuvalov, the Russian ambassador,
in May. In these Russia made the major concession of allowing the
partition of San Stefano Bulgaria, but insisted on the Bessarabian an-
nexation. In the agreement of May 18/30 the British government ac-
cepted the Russian position on Bessarabia:
The government of Her Britannic Majesty believes that it should express its
profound regret in case Russia should definitely insist on the retrocession of
Bessarabia. As, however, it is sufficiently established that the other signatories
of the Treaty of Paris are not ready to support with arms the delimitation of
Romania stipulated in the treaty, Britain is not so immediately concerned with
this question that she would be justified in incurring alone the responsibility
for opposing the proposed change, and thus she agrees not to contest the final
decision of Russia in regard to the retrocession of Bessarabia.237

278
 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
Thu8, by the opening of the congress, Russia had gained the approval
of Britain for the reannexation. The German government had already
given its assent. In fact, at this time German influence was used to
back the Russian position. Bismarck strongly urged the Romanian gov-
ernment to come to an agreement with the Russian government. Thus
in spite of Charles's membership in the Hohenzollern family and his
illusions about the protection of the "German Danube," it was very
clear that the Romanian leaders could not rely on Berlin.238
The Habsburg attitude was to prove equally detrimental, but the gov-
ernment did not make its position immediately clear. The major Habs-
burg interest in the negotiations was to concentrate on the fate of Bosnia
and Hercegovina. In December 1877 the tsar had sent to William I
and Franz Joseph his conditions for peace. These, as we have seen,
included the establishment of a large Bulgarian state, but they did not
give Austria-Hungary control of Bosnia and Hercegovina, as had been
agreed upon previously.239 Franz Joseph, replying on December 26/
January 7, 1878, protested in particular about those stipulations which
violated the previous understandings, especially the agreement that a
large Slavic state would not be created. The Habsburg emperor also
pointed out that the Russian acquisition of southern Bessarabia was
directly linked to the Austrian interest in Bosnia and Hercegovina.
Alexander's answer on January 4/16 was not conciliatory. He insisted
on the large Bulgarian state and on the reacquisition of southern Bes-
sarabia. He was, however, willing to grant the monarchy control of
Bosnia and Hercegovina.240 The Habsburg government, nevertheless,
maintained its strong objections to a Bulgarian state that would cover
a large area and be under Russian domination.241 In April Ignatiev was
sent to Vienna to try to reach an understanding. His failure made the
Russian government all the more eager to attain a settlement with
Britain.
Despite the continuing negotiations, the Russian government was
unable to come to an agreement with Austria-Hungary similar to that
concluded with Britain on May 18/30. In the further discussions it
became clear, however, that southern Bessarabia was never a major
issue. If the other Habsburg demands were met, then Austria-Hungary
too would agree to the cession. This decision was, of course, not com-
municated to the Romanian diplomats. Although no understanding
was reached with Russia, the Habsburg Empire concluded with Britain
on May 25/June 6 an agreement whose most important section dealt
with the Bulgarian question. The British government also backed the
Habsburg demand that Russia should under no circumstances acquire

279
 Russia and the Romanian national state
242
Dobrudja. Other issues involving Romanian interests did not play
a major role in these negotiations.
Even though Habsburg interests were predominantly involved in
other areas, the Romanians' best hope lay clearly in Vienna. The rela-
tions of the Habsburg government with Russia were obviously bad.
Although Andrassy had previously agreed to the Russian military
actions in return for compensation, the breaking of the Budapest agree-
ments at San Stefano caused deep uneasiness. There was also continual
pressure from the Hungarian half of the monarchy, where pro-Ottoman
and anti-Russian feeling predominated. The Russian government, as
we have seen, was constantly concerned over possible Habsburg reac-
tions. One of the considerations that had led to the discouragement of
Romanian participation in the fighting had been the Habsburg atti-
tude. In the spring of 1878 the common strategic interests of the mon-
archy and Romania were clear. Should war break out, their armies
acting together could effectively trap the Russian forces south of the
Balkan mountains.243
The Romanian representative in Vienna during the war and post-
war years, Ion Balaceanu, was a strong partisan of cooperation with the
Dual Monarchy. He felt that he was on intimate terms with and was
trusted by Andrassy. He also seems to have been convinced that the
foreign minister would not lie to him. When both Bratianu and Kogal-
niceanu heard indirectly about the provisions on Bessarabia in the
Reichstadt agreement, Balaceanu refused to believe them. In fact, until
after the Congress of Berlin he remained convinced that Vienna had
not made a bargain on the subject with another power. Of course,
throughout the Eastern crisis Andrassy did what he could to strengthen
these convictions. He was anxious to preserve the ties with Bucharest
without at the same time openly contravening the secret agreement
with Russia; his attitude on Romanian affairs was thus largely negative.
When consulted on a possible treaty between Russia and Romania, it
will be remembered, he advised that a simple modus vivendi providing
for passage be concluded; he did not like the agreement of April 4/
16, which he believed went too far. On April 10/22, 1877, Balaceanu re-
ported the foreign minister's attitude toward Romanian cooperation
with Russia:

The last time that I saw Andrassy, he told me that when we ask him for the
hundredth time that question about what Austria will do he would not have
a word to change in the clear and precise declarations that he made to me on
three different occasions. Austria does not oppose the passage of the Russians
through Romania, but she will not permit the passage to change into an occu-
pation nor that Russia exercise the slightest act of government over us nor
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 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
above all that she annex an inch of our territory. These declarations are official,
but dependent on our absolute neutrality - in case of an alliance or coopera-
tion with Russia we would act at our own risk and peril and Austria would
attend only to her own interests!244
On the question of the declaration of independence, Andrassy, like
the other European statesmen, asserted that the issue would be deter-
mined after the war. He did, however, oppose the Romanian decision
to enter the conflict. He did not advise the crossing of the Danube, but
he did not object as long as the army did not operate beyond the Timok
River, and no attempt was made to annex territory on the right bank
of the Danube. After January, when the question of Bessarabia arose,
Andrassy refused to make a statement, to the intense disappointment
of Balaceanu. Throughout the spring the Romanian government sent
continual appeals to Vienna for aid in protecting the threatened terri-
tory and in blocking a Russian occupation. As long as there was a
chance that negotiations might break down and a European war follow,
Andrassy encouraged the Romanians in their attitude of resistance. On
the eve of the opening of the Congress of Berlin the two states came the
nearest to discussing the question of fighting. The initiative came from
the Romanian side. At the beginning of June Bratianu directed
Balaceanu to appeal to Andrassy for aid:
We will not cede an inch of Bessarabia for the most brilliant of compensations.
We have sixty thousand men in strong positions and the country is ready to
rise as one to defend its right. We wish to know if Austria-Hungary is resolute
enough so that you can obtain a categorical declaration from Count Andrassy.
The moment is critical for Romania is on the verge of playing its last card.245
Andrassy, in answer to these Romanian attempts to obtain a clear
statement, encouraged resistance, but he did not offer definite as-
surances of aid. He advised Balaceanu that "a right that one does
not oneself renounce is never lost."246 He also declared his belief that
the congress would probably lead to war. The furthest that the Habs-
burg minister was willing to go was reported by Balaceanu in a letter to
Charles of May 28/June 9. After hearing Bratianu's message, just
quoted, Andrassy commented:
I have heard that the Russians have passed beyond Ploe§ti; it is the first serious
demonstration that they have made against us. For my part I am sending troops
into Transylvania. I have been unfortunately delayed by the parliamentary
maneuvers that you know of and without which I would be already prepared;
but I will arrive just the same on time!247
Although the Romanian government could have some hope of sup-
port in Vienna, no change in attitude was, quite rightly, expected from
St. Petersburg. Not only was the annexation a pet idea of the tsar's,
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
but it had become increasingly apparent that Russia was going to gain
very little indeed from the war and its attendant expenses and losses.
The Romanian question had a major place in the instructions that were
drawn up for the Russian delegation that was going to Berlin. The doc-
ument noted the relationship of the cession of southern Bessarabia to
the Habsburg compensation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Even if Vienna
should abandon its claims to these provinces, Russia would still insist
on southern Bessarabia. As for passage to Bulgaria, the Russian govern-
ment wanted the congress to insist that Romania allow Russian troops
through the country. The details could then be arranged by a special
bilateral convention. It was felt that the obligation would not weigh
too heavily on Romania, since the military forces could also travel by
sea and through the reclaimed parts of Bessarabia. Dobrudja was not
to be ceded until an engagement had been obtained on passage. The
instructions firmly opposed any idea of Romanian neutrality, since
"that would in effect close to us forever access by land to the Balkan
peninsula."248
Despite the ever-diminishing chances of success, the Romanian gov-
ernment remained determined to resist. No offer was made to bargain
for increased gains in Dobrudja. The first emphasis for the future peace
remained the retention of Bessarabia. Romanian possession was justi-
fied not only by treaty rights and the part played by Romanian troops
in the war, but also by the danger that a cession would create for the
freedom of the Danube. Once in possession of the territory Russia
would have a vote on the Danube commissions, and it would be sup-
ported by Serbia and Bulgaria.249
Despite the lengthy negotiations preceding the congress, all the issues
had not been decided. Major problems were to arise over both the
areas that Russia wished to annex - Batum and southern Bessarabia.
On June 2/14, as the conference commenced, the newspaper Globe in
London published the contents of the Russo-British agreement. The
strong and highly critical public reaction to the acceptance of the
Russian acquisition of Batum embarrassed and hampered the work of
the British delegation. In addition, Austria-Hungary now insisted on
control not only of Bosnia and Hercegovina, but also of the sanjak of
Novi Pazar. The Habsburg government wished to assure that this
area, which separated Serbia and Montenegro, would fall under its
domination. It did not want the two Slavic states to have a common
frontier. The Habsburg diplomats thus tied their approval of the Rus-
sian annexation of southern Bessarabia and the changes on the Russian
Asiatic frontier to the acceptance of their wishes on the sanjak. In
order to gain Habsburg support on the acquisition of territories in
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 Prince Charles, i8yi—i8y8
Asia and southern Bessarabia, the Russian government during the
congress accepted the Habsburg demands on the sanjak.
The Congress of Berlin, one of the three great international gather-
ings of the nineteenth century, thus opened with most of the questions
of interest to Romania settled, but without Romanian participation.
Assembled under the presidency of Bismarck, the delegates included
most of the leading diplomats of the great powers, among whom num-
bered Andrassy and Heinrich von Haymerle for Austria-Hungary, Ben-
jamin Disraeli and Salisbury for Britain, Count Corti for Italy, and
William Waddington for France. The Russian delegation consisted of
Gorchakov as first plenipotentiary, with Peter Shuvalov and M. K. Onou
as second and third. Other Russian officials accompanied them, includ-
ing Jomini, Nelidov, Colonel D. G. Anuchin, Major General Bogoliu-
bov. and Colonel G. I. Bobrikov. Gorchakov, now eighty years old, was
long past his prime as a statesman and was frequently ill; Shuvalov thus
had to handle the major problems. The principal issues that caused
conflicts at the congress did not involve Romanian interests. Since the
reacquisition of the three districts of southern Bessarabia was to be one
of the few Russian gains at the peace, its representatives continued to
remain adamant on the question.
The Romanian delegation, consisting of Bratianu, Kogalniceanu,
George Liteanu, the representative in Berlin, and Callimachi Catargi,
arrived in Berlin on May 29/June 10. The question of the role that
Romania would play in the congress had not yet been settled. In the
first days the Romanian representatives paid visits to the other delega-
tions to argue the Romanian case, but although much sympathy was ex-
pressed, no assurances of aid were given. Kogalniceanu remained pessi-
mistic; he believed that the congress would succeed but at the expense
of weak states like Romania. The prince's opinion was close to that of
his foreign minister. Charles judged the situation impossible and
thought that it would be sensible to negotiate for better conditions,
perhaps the Ruschuk-Varna line for Dobrudja.250 Bratianu, still hope-
ful, continued to search for support. The German diplomats were firm
in their advice that Romania come to an agreement with Russia.251
The head of the French delegation, Waddington, also expressed the
opinion that Bessarabia was lost.252 Once they had an agreement with
Russia, the British representatives were cool; Disraeli told Kogalniceanu
that "in politics ingratitude is often the reward of the best services."253
The Romanian delegation brought with it a memorandum to present
at the congress on the policy that had been followed in the past crisis.254
This statement argued that the country had been compelled to make
a treaty wTith Russia in order to protect Romanian territorial integrity;
283
 Russia and the Romanian national state
the pact would not have been signed without the inclusion of the words
present integrity. Five demands were then presented. The Romanian
government wished to cede no part of its territory, and it opposed grant-
ing Russia a right of passage to Bulgaria. On the positive side, it claimed
the islands at the mouth of the Danube, in particular Serpent's Island,
and an indemnity; it also asked to have Romanian independence and
neutrality recognized. This statement was the Romanian program for
the conference, and it remained unchanged. Even after the congress
opened, the Romanian Council of Ministers again reaffirmed the de-
cision that there would be no bargaining concerning Bessarabia. If the
congress forced the cession of the territory, the government would pro-
test and await a more favorable occasion to gain its desires. Dobrudja
thus was not claimed openly by the delegation.
On June 19/July 1 the congress heard the Romanian arguments. By
this time the major differences among the great powers had been settled;
Bessarabia was no longer an issue. Nevertheless, both Kogalniceanu and
Bratianu placed first emphasis on the question. The principal speech
before the delegates was made by Kogalniceanu, who discussed the other
four points of the memorandum as well as the Bessarabian question.
Bratianu concluded with a few short remarks. After the Romanian
representatives had withdrawn, the great powers continued their dis-
cussions and made their final decisions. Romanian independence was
recognized, but with political restrictions attached. Shuvalov announced
that his country would not agree to independence until the cession
of Bessarabia had been accepted. Waddington, arguing that the Roma-
nians had been treated "a little harshly," suggested that they should
be given increased compensation in the form of the Silistria-Mangalia
line in Dobrudja. The congress accepted this proposal.255
The Romanian delegates were well aware how little impression their
arguments had made; Kogalniceanu wrote home at once advising that
Romania try to get as large a compensation as possible, perhaps the
Silistria-Mangalia line.256 On June 22/July 4 the Romanian ministers
agreed that, despite the previous decision, compensation would be
taken.257 Both Bratianu and Kogalniceanu realized the political reaction
that would occur in Bucharest when the terms were announced. Both
wrote from Berlin that great restraint would have to be shown; there
was even danger to the national existence. In the final treaty, signed
by the representatives of the great powers on July 1/13, Romania was
given the Danube Delta and part of Dobrudja, but the recognition of
independence was tied to the acceptance of conditions that were to be
fiercely resented inside the country.258 The boundary of Dobrudja,
whose exact definition was to be determined later, was to be drawn from
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 Prince Charles, 1871—1878
a line running just east of Silistria to a point south of Mangalia on
the Black Sea. As far as the question of passage was concerned, Article
22 of the treaty provided that the Russian troops, who were to occupy
Bulgaria for nine months, would communicate with Russia by way of
Romania and the Black Sea ports. However, a definite time limit was
thereby placed on the continued presence of Russian troops in the
country.
Romania had thus made two major gains at the conference: the rec-
ognition of independence and the acquisition of the Danube Delta and
Dobrudja. Neither was, however, without drawbacks. At the urging
of the Western powers, but not Russia, Romanian and Serbian inde-
pendence was made dependent upon the acceptance of a guarantee that
within either state "the difference of religious creeds and confessions
shall not be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or in-
capacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political
rights, admission to public employments, functions, and honours, or
the exercise of the various professions and industries in any locality
whatsoever."259 This clause, which involved principally the Jewish
problem in Romania, was resented in Bucharest as interference in the
internal affairs of the country. Independence also meant that the former
great-power protection, although weak and unreliable, had been re-
moved. Romania was a free agent in international relations, but this
situation could be dangerous for a weak state. As far as the new terri-
tory was concerned, the Romanian leaders welcomed the acquisition
of the delta and Dobrudja, but no one would admit publicly that these
territories were a fair exchange for southern Bessarabia.
Not only were the advantages gained less than desired, but the treaty
contained much else that was unpleasant for Romania. Bessarabia and
the conditions attached to independence, of course, ranked first. The
failure to provide for an indemnity or the neutrality of the country was
also criticized. But most significant were the great political changes
that the agreement introduced in the Balkans. Russia was once again a
Danubian power; an autonomous Bulgaria, which was expected to be a
Russian satellite, had been established across the Danube. In the future,
however, largely owing to Austria-Hungary, which took care to have its
preponderance preserved through the international organization of the
river, Russian influence on the Danube did not become a significant
issue. Romania eventually joined the European Commission of the
Danube, which controlled the river to Galatz. Effective domination
remained in the hands of Germany and the Habsburg Empire.
For the Russian statesmen the decisions taken at Berlin were equally
devastating. The settlement was regarded by most as a national humili-
285
 Russia and the Romanian national state
ation. Using the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano as a standard,
Russia had indeed been forced to retreat. The greatest loss was un-
doubtedly the three-part division of Bulgaria.260 The area north of the
Balkan mountains, called Bulgaria, was to be established as an au-
tonomous state with a foreign prince; it was tacitly recognized by the
powers that Russia would have predominant influence here. To the
south a second political unit, called Eastern Rumelia, would have a
semiautonomous position and a Christian governor; here all of the
powers would have an equal position. The rest of the territory was
returned to direct Ottoman rule. Not only did the Russian program
for Bulgaria receive a severe setback, but difficulties were also en-
countered in the negotiations over the Asiatic territory. In the treaty
Russia had to agree that Batum, the major city, would be maintained
as a free port and demilitarized. Only in the acquisition of southern
Bessarabia did the Russian government receive what it had originally
designated as a major war aim.
In contrast to the Russian disappointments, Britain and Austria-
Hungary had done quite well, particularly in view of the fact that they
had not been forced to pay the costs of a war. In conformance with the
prewar agreements Austria-Hungary was able to gain compensation in
important areas. Habsburg officials took over the administration of
Bosnia and Hercegovina and the army occupied the sanjak of Novi
Pazar. Moreover, the altered diplomatic relations assured that Vienna
would be able to exert in Serbia much the same predominating in-
fluence as that which Russia intended to exercise in Bulgaria. Britain
too received rewards. In a separate agreement with the Ottoman Em-
pire, this government took control of the island of Cyprus. The war
also assured that in the next years the British - and certainly not the
Russian - representatives would have the first voice in the councils of
the sultan. The real winners in the crisis of the years 1875 to 1878 thus
appeared to be these two powers, which were able to exploit the Rus-
sian military effort to secure major prizes for themselves and to with-
hold rewards from the victor in the war.

T H E IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
TREATY OF BERLIN

Not only were the Russian and the Romanian governments - and,
needless to say, also their citizens - unhappy with the treaty, but its
provisions were to separate the former war allies for many years to come.
Neither had made gains that justified the enormous expenditures or the
casualties of the war. For Russia the chief advance was the establishment
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 Prince Charles, i8yi-i8y8
of an autonomous Bulgaria, even with its diminished area. This state,
it was recognized, would be under the political direction of St. Peters-
burg, and the treaty allowed Russian troops to remain in occupation
for nine months. In this period Russian officials were to aid in the
establishment of the new political institutions much as they had done
in the Principalities after 1829. The Russian government took this task
very seriously. Since Bulgaria was expected to serve henceforth as the
major base for Russian influence in the Balkans, every effort was made
to make the state as strong and secure as possible. The measures taken
were often to the detriment of Serbian as well as Romanian interests.
Nevertheless, despite the establishment of a dependent Bulgaria and,
of course, the annexation of the Bessarabian and Asiatic lands, the
war, which many had regarded as a crusade for Balkan Christianity,
had not brought the expected results. Public anger turned not against
Britain and Austria-Hungary, which were chiefly responsible for the
setbacks, but against Germany, from whom official Russia had expected
more support. The Russian resentment was so strong that for a short
period the Three Emperors' Alliance, which, although not based on
a written treaty, had functioned efficiently in the previous years, was
broken. In 1878 Russia thus found itself again, as in 1856, in a position
of diplomatic isolation.
The consequences of the war were, if anything, even worse for Ro-
mania. The state had no reliable ally or dependable friend on whose
aid it could count. Nor did it have a patron who would defend its
interests in the discussions among the great powers as France had once
done. In addition, the government was faced with the task of imple-
menting the highly unpopular terms of the treaty. The major problems
here were, first, the territorial transfers in regard to Bessarabia and
Dobrudja, and, second, the securing of the necessary alterations in
the Romanian constitution in regard to the Jews. The first issue in-
volved primarily relations with Russia, the second, relations with Ger-
many and to a lesser extent with France and Italy.
The loss of southern Bessarabia had by this time been accepted as in-
evitable. Thus, in October, without internal turmoil, the legislature
voted the necessary measures. A Russian occupation of the area fol-
lowed immediately. Although the entire matter led to more friction
between Russian and Romanian officials, there were no major questions
that had to be settled. The boundaries of the lands in question were
not at issue. In contrast, the transfer of Dobrudja and the delta caused
further conflicts.261
Although the Russian government had itself offered Romania the
territory as compensation for Bessarabia, the Russian statesmen were
287
 Russia and the Romanian national state
forced to recognize the problems that this exchange would cause them.
Once the region was in Romanian hands, Russia would have no direct
access to Bulgaria. The terms of the Treaty of Berlin assured a right of
passage, but only for the nine-month period to May 1879. Foreseeing
the difficulties that might arise in assuring access to its new client state,
the Russian government pressed the Romanians to negotiate another
agreement which would prolong the term of the Russian right of
passage and assure that the treaty of April 1877 would apply to Do-
brudja. Since Russian troops were still in occupation of the region, a
refusal to remove them before a convention had been accepted was a
viable threat.
The Romanian reaction to this proposal, particularly after the ex-
periences of the war and the peace negotiations, was predictable. The
Russian demands were firmly rejected, and appeals for support were
addressed to the other great powers. The Russian moves were particu-
larly disturbing to the British and Habsburg governments, both of
which wrere determined to preclude Russian control of Dobrudja. A
lengthened duration for the Russian right of military passage could not
be allowed. In November 1878, after a series of bitter exchanges be-
tween Bucharest and St. Petersburg, and in the face of outside disap-
proval, the Russian government gave up its attempt to secure such an
agreement.
However, other problems still had to be solved. Although the treaty
specified the transfer of Dobrudja to Romania, the boundaries of the
area to be ceded were to be decided by a European commission. Pri-
marily interested in a strong Bulgaria, the Russian officials used their
full influence to gain the maximum territory for it. The Romanian gov-
ernment did not receive similar support for its interests. The main point
in dispute was the ownership of Silistria. In January 1879, in an effort
to strengthen its arguments by a fait accompli, the Romanian govern-
ment ordered its forces to occupy Arab Tabia, the most important of
the fortresses commanding Silistria. The Russians, of course, strongly
protested against the action. At first it appeared that Britain and the
Habsburg Empire might back the Romanian stand, but they joined
the rest of the powers in opposition; in February the Romanian gov-
ernment was forced to remove its troops. In the final drawing of the
boundary Romania received Arab Tabia, but not Silistria itself.
The firm Russian support of Bulgaria and the loss of Silistria, to
which Romania never acquiesced, gave emphasis to another aspect of
the peace settlement that was to have serious implications for the
future. The establishment of Bulgaria as a Russian client state and an
expected stronghold of Russian power was no more to the interest of
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 Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8
Bucharest than to that of any other state. Moreover, like the Habsburg
Empire, Romania had in the past not welcomed the idea of strong
Slavic states in the Balkans. Keenly aware of their own background,
which they believed linked them to a Latin heritage and French
culture, the Romanian leaders were particularly sensitive to the impli-
cations of a strengthening of their Slavic neighbors' position. The recent
conflicts with Russia and the continuing fear of control by that state
heightened such apprehensions. Certainly, Romanian-Bulgarian rela-
tions were not at this time on a particularly friendly footing, despite
the past services of the Romanians, in particular the Liberals, to the
Bulgarian revolutionaries. Moreover, the Romanian government, which
had previously had some hopes of further annexations on the left bank
of the Danube and influence in the new Bulgarian state, was not happy
about the treatment of Romanian nationals under Bulgarian and Rus-
sian authority. In a circular of May 17/29, 1878, Kogalniceanu pro-
tested: "Today the Romanians are mistreated more by the Bulgarians
than they were by the Turks, with whom they maintained harmonious
relations. Now they see themselves persecuted for their language; their
schools and national churches are closed."262 Future Romanian-Bul-
garian relations would depend largely on the direction of Russian pol-
icy in autonomous Bulgaria.
In contrast to the question of territorial transfers, the problems at-
tendant on the securing of great-power recognition of Romanian inde-
pendence did not involve an increase in Russian-Romanian animosity.
As we have seen, the change in political status had been made condi-
tional on alterations in the Romanian legal structure that would give
non-Christians an equal position with Christians. Although the Habs-
burg Monarchy and Britain were willing to proceed with the formal
recognition after Romanian assurances of compliance were received,
Bismarck took the lead in insisting that changes would have to be made
in the constitution before this assent would be given. This stand was
supported by the French and Italian governments, which like the Ger-
man were under strong pressure from influential Jewish leaders and
organizations.
The entire question of the Jews, a highly sensitive Romanian internal
issue, now became closely intertwined with another delicate domestic
problem, that of the railroads built as a result of the ill-fated Strous-
berg concession.263 After the collapse of the original enterprise, and
at the strong urging of Bismarck, the financiers Gerson Bleichroder and
Adolph Hansemann, both Jews, in 1871 undertook the organization of
a new joint-stock company that took over the obligations of the defunct
Strousberg concern. An Austrian company was entrusted with building
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 Russia and the Romanian national state
the railroads. Meanwhile, the financial burdens had increased further.
From the German side the best solution was obviously to persuade
or force the Romanian government to buy the railroads and thus to
shoulder the immense financial obligations. With his prime interest in
protecting the German investors in what had been a highly corrupt
and mismanaged affair, Bismarck was perfectly willing to use the power
of his government and the weapon of the threat to withhold a recog-
nition of independence.
Meanwhile, and with enormous difficulty, the Romanian govern-
ment was attempting to persuade the legislative bodies to act in con-
formity with the desires of the great powers. The entire matter dragged
on until finally, in October 1879, agreement was reached on a change
in Article 7 of the constitution to read: "Difference of religious creed
does not constitute an obstacle to the acquisition or exercise of civil
and political rights."264 However, Romanian citizenship, which would
allow the enjoyment of such privileges, was henceforth to require a
special legislative act for each individual. Although the changes did,
in fact, not fulfill the intentions of the treaty, the powers did not delay
action longer. Since the railroad question had been settled to its
satisfaction previously, the German government withdrew its oppo-
sition. Moreover, in October 1879 Germany signed the treaty forming
the basis of the Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary, a state that was
anxious to win Romania as an ally against Russia. By the end of Feb-
ruary 1880 Romanian independence was accepted by all of the powers.
This major step in Romanian national development was followed by
another in May 1881, when Charles, after a legislative action in March,
was crowned king of Romania.
The newly independent kingdom, however, was to remain in a pre-
carious position. The dangers of the previous years had shown the need
for a strong diplomatic alignment. France, the power to which most
Romanian statesmen felt most closely attached, was still not in a posi-
tion to play a major role in the Eastern Question. Britain, maintaining
a policy of "splendid isolation," consistently refused to make any alli-
ances of a general nature. The Hohenzollern link with Germany had
certainly not proved a major advantage previously. Since Russia was
regarded as the major national threat, only Austria-Hungary was left
as a potential ally. In October 1883 Romania signed with the monarchy
a defensive pact directed against Russia, to which Germany adhered.
Through this treaty Romania remained linked with the Triple Alliance
until World War I. The alignment gave Romania some protection
against Russia, and it assured the maintenance of the status quo in the
Danubian area. In June 1881 the Three Emperors' Alliance was re-
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 Prince Charles, 1871-1878
formed, this time on the basis of a treaty. As long as Russia and Aus-
tria-Hungary remained partners, it could be assumed that conditions
would remain stable. Moreover, as a result of their experiences in the
previous years, both Russia and Romania were to hesitate before em-
barking on further adventures in foreign relations.

291
 Conclusion

In the previous pages the close relationship between tsarist Russia and
the Danubian Principalities has been traced from the 1820s to the
achievement of Romanian independence in 1878. The narrative has
shown, on the one hand, the extreme difficulties that can be encoun-
tered by a great power in dealing with a small peripheral state occupy-
ing a strategical geographic position, whose policies might at times
contain dangers for its large neighbor. On the other hand, the account
has stressed the parallel problems met by a Balkan nation, with a highly
conscious national leadership, in handling the great power whose atti-
tude was critical for its political development. The support or at least
the acquiescence of Russia was essential for the attainment of the major
Romanian goals. The intervention of tsarist officials was thus often
requested. Care had to be taken, however, that this assistance did not
result in the complete domination of the country or in its annexation.
The balance, as we have seen, was precarious. Romanian leaders usu-
ally followed a policy of seeking Russian aid against the Ottoman su-
zerain, but also of calling upon other governments to block a domina-
tion of their nation by Russia.
Russian policies toward the Romanian national movement were
similarly ambivalent. Although some plans were indeed made for the
partition of the Balkan peninsula, with the Principalities as a part of
their sphere, the majority of the Russian leaders, tsars and diplomats
alike, favored an indirect approach. In fact, the preferred policy
throughout much of the nineteenth century, exemplified by the Treaty
of Unkiar Iskelesi, was the control of the central Ottoman government
and thus of the entire empire. Only when this objective failed did
they fall back on the alternatives of a partition of influence with other
292
 Conclusion
great powers or a patronage of national liberation movements. As far
as the Principalities were concerned, their location in relation to
Constantinople made their political alignment of particular signifi-
cance. Successive Russian governments wished the road to the Ottoman
capital kept open. In addition, the position of these lands, bordering
on the Habsburg Empire and, most critical, near Polish-inhabited ter-
ritories under Russian or Habsburg rule, posed additional questions.
Under an unfriendly regime, the Principalities could block Russian
access to the rest of the peninsula and serve as a haven for Polish and
other revolutionary groups hostile to Russia. The country could also
become a staging area for an invasion of Russia should a European
coalition, such as that formed in the Crimean War, again be organized.
In friendly hands, the provinces gave Russian forces easy access to the
rest of the Balkans. The significance that a complete Russian military
control of the Romanian lands would have for Habsburg strategy was
always clear to Vienna. During the nineteenth century the opposition of
the Habsburg Empire to total Russian dominance, and, conversely, the
Russian refusal to contemplate an Austrian annexation, was a major
safeguard for Romanian freedom of action.
In addition to the military, diplomatic, and political aspects of the
relationship, this account has given much attention to the ideological
considerations, including both the Russian concern for Orthodoxy and
the Romanian sympathy for liberal-national movements that might
have grave implications for tsarist policy, not only in Europe but within
Russia itself. In the eighteenth century few problems arose; Russians
and Romanians combated Ottoman control under the banner of Chris-
tian Orthodox solidarity. The internal regimes of the Phanariot period
had no effect on the political fortunes of other areas, certainly not on
those of tsarist Russia. After 1821, however, another element was intro-
duced. Tsar Alexander I and Tsar Nicholas I both stood against the
overthrow of legitimate governments by violent means. In Europe prop-
er they cooperated with Austria and Prussia to suppress the revolu-
tions of the 1820s, the 1830s, and 1848-1849. In all of these movements,
the Romanian lands played some part, although at times a limited one.
The Greek revolt broke out first in Moldavia; Polish refugees fled into
the Principalities after the Polish revolution of 1830. Wallachia had a
revolutionary government in 1848. In addition, after 1856 the Roma-
nian governments were usually in the hands of leaders and parties that,
although not always liberal, did feel that their primary political ties
were with the West, in particular Paris, and not with autocratic, Ortho-
dox Russia.
At the same time, while denouncing revolutionary activity in theory,

293
 Conclusion
the Russian leaders did show much concern over the fate of the Balkan
Christians. They thus had great difficulty in dealing with revolutionary
conspiracies that had programs aimed at an improvement of the condi-
tion of these people, and they also felt a certain obligation to intervene
should Orthodox interests come under attack. In 1821 they broke rela-
tions with the Porte and in 1828 went to war on issues connected with
the protection of Orthodoxy. The disastrous Crimean War broke out
largely because of the undefined nature of the rights that the Russian
government believed it held in regard to the Balkan Orthodox. Even
after this conflict the Russian government could not easily take an open
stand against revolutionary movements of Orthodox people, although
the leaders of these actions often held political principles abhorrent to
the Russian officials. The conflict between the support of Orthodoxy and
the denunciation of revolutionary ideas caused considerable confusion
in Russian policy in this liberal-national era. In regard to the Princi-
palities, the Russian government tended to support Romanian demands
for autonomous rights against the Ottoman government, but, while
doing so, it used its role as protector or guarantor to attempt to assure
that friendly, conservative, and pro-Russian regimes would rule in
Bucharest and Jassy. This intervention in time came to be seen by
many Romanians as a greater burden than the control exercised by the
Porte. It also strengthened the position of the liberal, anti-Russian ele-
ments in the country. The picture, however, was never clear; the rela-
tionship fluctuated over the years.
Reviewing the period under consideration, these conflicting ele-
ments - the Romanian desire to use Russian support against the Porte
but to resist Russian control and the Russian determination both to
aid an Orthodox neighbor and to assure a continuing strong influence
over its government - are reflected in the events that have been dis-
cussed. Russia's influence in the Principalities was effectively secured
in the eighteenth century, when the repeated wars with the Ottoman
Empire brought its armies into the region. Special rights in regard to
the provinces were gained in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, the
pact of 1802, and the Treaty of Bucharest. In this period Russian
backing was extremely effective in weakening the links of the Princi-
palities with Constantinople. At the same time, however, the relation-
ship did little to improve domestic conditions. The Phanariot rulers
continued their exploitative polices.
The European national movements of the early nineteenth century,
with their basic programs of nationalism and political reform, modified
the attitude of not only the Romanians but also the other Balkan people
toward both the Porte and Russia. Western ideological influences,

294
 Conclusion
given wide circulation during the period of the French Revolution and
Napoleon, had lasting effects in the Balkan lands. Even the new con-
servatism after 1815, with its strong romantic overtones and its emphasis
on past history, contributed to the formation of the Balkan revolution-
ary mentality. The growing awareness of national identity and the ideal
of the national state clashed with both Ottoman overlordship and Rus-
sian protection. After 1826, as we have seen, the Russian policy toward
the Principalities was that of dominating the internal regimes through
the protectorates established in the Convention of Akkerman and the
Treaty of Adrianople. Viewing its role as that of a father toward his
children, or a patron toward his clients, the Russian government did
indeed attempt to improve political conditions. The Organic Statutes
were progressive for their time and place. Moreover, the officials en-
trusted with the handling of Russian policy, for instance, Kiselev, Kot-
sebu, and Giers, were all extremely sympathetic to the country, and
they had close friends and relatives among the wealthy landowners. De-
spite the benevolence of their intentions, however, the methods used
by the Russian officials to assure their influence aroused enormous an-
tagonism. Moreover, the very fact that they involved themselves in do-
mestic squabbles made it necessary for them to form internal alliances
with individuals and factions. When joining one side in a political quar-
rel, they inevitably won the enmity of the other.
In a sense the Russian officials, no matter what policies they adopted,
were fighting a losing battle. Their aim was bureaucratic reform in a
conservative direction. They also wished to maintain the integrity of
the Ottoman Empire, at least for a time, since in the 1830s and 1840s
they exercised much influence in Constantinople. In internal Roma-
nian politics they allied, as could be expected, with the great land-
owners, the high clergy, and those who wished to maintain the status
quo. Meanwhile, in the Balkan peninsula as throughout Europe, times
were changing. The great liberal-national movement, which swept
through Europe from 1820 to 1848, had, as we have seen, repercussions
here too. Romanian opinion was affected by the general European po-
litical current chiefly through the activities of the privileged youth of
the Principalities, who went to Paris and other European cities for
their education. Thus in 1848 Romanian liberal-nationalist reformers
joined with those who disliked the internal social and political condi-
tions and the protectorate to overthrow the pro-Russian regime in pow-
er in Bucharest. Their principal target was the Russian control, not
Ottoman suzerainty. The revolutionary leaders, in fact, attempted to
appease the Porte and to reassure it about the aims of the revolt.
The Russian military intervention in 1848, although successful in
 Conclusion
the attainment of the immediate goals, assured the future enmity of
those who had participated in the revolt or who had approved of the
revolutionary goals. The national program remained intact; the Lib-
eral leadership became in the future the most active and able element in
Romanian political life. It should be strongly emphasized that its ob-
jectives were liberal, not democratic or socialistic. Its goal was the
unification of the Principalities under a constitutional regime in which
a legislature, dominated by property owners, would control the state.
The Liberal leaders also wanted a foreign prince, who would give added
stability and prestige to the government. The principal enemy remained
tsarist Russia; Ottoman suzerainty was an affront to national sensibili-
ties, but it involved no overwhelming burdens. Although the opposition
to Russian influence remained strong after 1848, it was recognized that
little could be accomplished unless some event would occur that would
sharply reduce Russia's ability to dominate the Romanian lands.
The Crimean War thus proved to be an unexpected and welcome
opportunity for the national leadership. Although the conflict at first
brought a foreign occupation, the Russian defeat created a situation
greatly to the advantage of the national movement. In the Treaty of
Paris Moldavia received three districts of southern Bessarabia, giving
it an important position at the mouth of the Danube. Even more sig-
nificant, the Russian protectorship was replaced by a general European
guarantee. This latter occurrence immensely aided the Romanian
national leadership. In the future Romanian affairs were in theory to
be decided on an international basis; no important changes could be
made in the political condition of the country without the consent of
the seven guarantors. Moreover, among these the Romanians now had
a powerful friend and patron. France, under the leadership of Na-
poleon III, willingly accepted the trust placed in it by the national
leaders. Napoleon's support, at least at first, also had a great effect
on the Russian attitude. After the Crimean disaster, as we have seen,
the Russian government, recognizing its grave internal problems, turned
inward to concentrate on domestic reform. In a period of weakness,
believing that they could not stand alone in international relations,
the Russian statesmen established an entente with France. Thus after
1856 the Romanian nationalists, because of the intricacies of the diplo-
matic situation, could count on the support of four of the powers in
any moves to increase their autonomous rights - France, Russia, Prus-
sia, and Sardinia. At times even Britain joined this group.
The opposition to Romanian advancement at this point came almost
exclusively from the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire.
Habsburg actions, however, were largely neutralized by the national
296
 Conclusion
movements in Italy and the German states, which absorbed the full
attention of Vienna. Ottoman opposition was effectively blocked be-
cause of the difficulties connected with the enforcement of the treaty
stipulations. Obviously the governments of the Danubian Principalities
could not be compelled to follow the directives of the great powers un-
less at least the threat of force existed. Yet such action was clearly at all
times difficult to contemplate. The obvious policeman, the Porte, was by
treaty prevented from occupying the provinces without the unanimous
consent of the other guarantors, which was impossible to obtain. The
cooperation of Russia and the Habsburg Empire in a joint intervention
also brought up insurmountable difficulties.
Thus, although in theory bound by treaty restrictions and the de-
cisions of the guarantors, the Principalities were in fact in a good posi-
tion to do what they wished. The policy of the fait accompli could suc-
ceed. As we have seen, several changes were made in the administration
of the Principalities, all of which involved the guarantors but were
put into affect without their prior consent. The double election of Alex-
ander Cuza, the amalgamation of the legislatures and administrations,
and the later changes in the electoral laws were all allowed to stand
because a majority of the guarantors opposed active measures to com-
pel their change. The Romanian leaders were also very able in their
exploitation of the opportunities offered in international relations.
They kept in close touch with current European affairs, and they sent
emissaries to the Western courts. They cultivated the favor of Napoleon
III, their best hope for foreign support, and they took care not to an-
tagonize the Ottoman government needlessly.
After the election of Cuza and the union of the administrations of
the two provinces, a Romanian state had indeed come into existence.
Previously, the two principalities, with their separate governments,
had been extremely vulnerable to outside pressure. Now a single gov-
ernment with a strong national policy could confront Europe. Although
weakened by internal opposition, Cuza played his role in international
relations well. The Russian government viewed the new situation with
mixed feelings. The Romanian leadership was openly, enthusiastically
pro-French. As long as Russia worked with France, this alignment was
to a degree acceptable, but certainly not to be favored as a permanent
factor in the affairs of the lower Danube. The strong position of the
Liberal Party was also viewed with suspicion. The former revolution-
aries of 1848 had lost none of their distrust of St. Petersburg and their
tendency to view Russia as representative of all that was backward and
despotic. The Russian government therefore supported the double elec-
tion, following the French example, but then began to shift its position.

297
 Conclusion
Gorchakov was certainly not pleased by the administrative unification,
and he soon came into open conflict with Cuza over the question of the
Dedicated Monasteries and the Romanian links with other revolution-
ary national movements, in particular that of the Poles. Although no
overt attempts were made to overthrow the prince, the Russian govern-
ment called for a separation of the Principalities and a return to the
old order at the end of his reign.
An attempt to implement this policy was made when in February
1866 Cuza was forced to abdicate by an internal conspiracy. Aware of
the outside dangers, the revolutionary government made haste to find a
new prince and adopt a constitution. The acceptance of the throne by
Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen strengthened the Romanian posi-
tion considerably. Since the prince was a member of the Prussian royal
dynasty, a family traditionally close to the Russian imperial family, it
was difficult for the Russian government to oppose him on personal
grounds. As far as Habsburg opposition was concerned, the outbreak
of the Seven Weeks' War with Prussia in 1866 played the same role as
the Franco-Austrian War in 1859; Vienna could do little with its major
strength concentrated elsewhere. The program of 1848, the unification
of the Principalities with a foreign prince, was thus achieved.
Despite the fact that Prince Charles, like his predecessor, had great
difficulty in controlling his domestic opposition, his accession did im-
mensely strengthen the position of the Romanian state. Although still
in theory an Ottoman vassal, the government conducted a foreign policy
worthy of an independent nation. Agencies were established in other
capitals, and treaties were negotiated. Every opportunity was exploited
to gain more rights at Ottoman expense. Although friendly relations
were established with St. Petersburg, the chief ties remained with
France. The defeat of that power in 1871 was thus a damaging blow
to Romanian interests. Nationalist sentiment, with its emphasis on the
Latin origins of the Romanian people, felt its principal outside links
to be with Paris and Rome. The old feelings of Orthodox solidarity
with Russia had largely died with the secular emphasis of the new age.
Romania did not really have an acceptable alternate close ally. Despite
the Hohenzollern prince, the new Germany, under the leadership of
Bismarck, did little to aid Romanian interests. With his principal con-
cern directed toward maintaining close relations with St. Petersburg,
the German chancellor continually urged the importance of good rela-
tions between Bucharest and St. Petersburg.
The Eastern crisis of 1875 to 1878 thus found Romania in an unhappy
position. The events of these years could offer no positive rewards or
opportunities equal to the dangers that threatened. The Romanian na-
298
 Conclusion
tionalist irredenta were Transylvania, under Habsburg rule, and Bes-
sarabia, a Russian possession. There were no more major claims on
Ottoman territory. Moreover, the Slavic emphasis in the revolt in Bos-
nia and Hercegovina, in the Bulgarian uprising, and in the war of
Montenegro and Serbia against the Ottoman Empire all aroused fears.
Old nightmares of a Roman people drowning in a Slavic sea resurfaced.
The policy of neutrality adopted at first reflected the Romanian inter-
ests, as well as the advice offered by all of the great powers.
Despite the fact that they could hope to gain few advantages from a
war, the Romanian leaders were forced to recognize the realities of the
European situation. When the diplomatic efforts of the powers failed,
it became obvious that Russia would go to war. If such a conflict broke
out, a Russian military passage through Romania became inevitable.
This unpleasant fact faced the nation with two dangers: first, that once
in occupation of the country the Russian government would take back
the Bessarabian districts lost in 1856, and, second, that it might reimpose
the former exclusive political control. Seeking to avoid these possible
consequences, the Romanian leaders attempted to make an agreement
with Russia that, while allowing military passage, would protect Ro-
manian territorial integrity and political freedom. The Treaty of April
4/16, 1877, was designed to guard the basic national interests. In May
1877 Romanian independence was declared. Although the original
intention had been to remain neutral, Romania entered the war and in
July joined the Russian army in the campaign across the Danube.
Thereafter the Romanian government expected to be treated by
Russia as a full partner in the war and in the peacemaking. The disap-
pointments of Romania, as well as of Serbia and Greece, have been de-
scribed. The Treaty of San Stefano, largely the work of Ignatiev, gave
the territorial rewards to the Bulgarians and the Montenegrins. The
Romanian fears over the loss of southern Bessarabia were fully realized;
Dobrudja was not considered an adequate compensation. Moreover,
during the international crisis of the spring of 1878, the Romanian gov-
ernment was made acutely aware of the dangers that the Russian army,
encamped on its soil, posed for the country's independence. Although
it overturned many of the stipulations of San Stefano, the Treaty of
Berlin also did not fulfill the Romanian hopes, in particular regarding
the retention of southern Bessarabia. It did, however, contain some
favorable features, including the division of the large Bulgaria and the
limitation of the term of the Russian occupation; Romania received
Dobrudja, and, of course, the independence of the state was recognized.
With the establishment of an independent Romania, our narrative
comes to an end. Despite the close ties that Russia had maintained with

299
 Conclusion
the Principalities in the first stages of their national development, the
attainment of the final objective of complete independence found the
two governments in opposition. Before the Crimean War the Russian
statesmen had placed a major emphasis on their relationship with the
Principalities. Russian officials had acted as political advisers and had
blocked much Ottoman interference. They had considered themselves
the patrons and protectors of the neighboring Orthodox people; the re-
lationship was thus paternal and unequal. Although many sections of
Romanian society had accepted this situation, the next generation, led
by the Liberal Party, sought other allies. The outside inspiration for
the major stages in the Romanian national movement in the second
half of the century - the double election, the unification, and the foreign
prince - thus came from France, the land to which the Romanian na-
tionalists felt the closest ties. In a sense rejected, the Russian govern-
ment naturally shifted its major concern to the fate of the Slavic people.
Although the Russian diplomats would have preferred no crises in the
area, when events finally pulled them into a conflict with the Ottoman
Empire, they felt no desire or obligation to deliver particular advan-
tages to the "ungrateful" Romanians.
In conclusion, it can thus be seen that the Russian government did
play a major role in the establishment of the modern Romanian state,
with the major achievements concentrated in the first half of the cen-
tury. Russian treaties with the Ottoman Empire secured the Principali-
ties a protected autonomous position. Even after 1856 the Russian oppo-
sition to an Ottoman military intervention made it possible for the
Romanian leaders to use the policy of the fait accompli. The Romanian
preference for a Western connection and the cultivation of links with
France were bound to affect the relationship with Russia. Although
wishing to retain a friendly regime in Bucharest, the Russian govern-
ment turned increasingly to other Balkan nations. The relations of the
two states after 1878 were not close; the Romanian government re-
mained deeply affected by the events of the war and the immediate
postwar period, particularly by the loss of southern Bessarabia. Roma-
nia thus joined in a close diplomatic association with Germany and
Austria-Hungary. This alignment, however, was not to withstand a
major European cataclysm. In 1916 Romania entered World War I
as an ally of Russia.

300
 Notes

Introduction
The terms are printed in Dimitrie A. Sturdza et al., Acte si documente
relative la istoria renascerei Romdniei (Bucharest: Carol Gobi, 1900), I,
15-21. This work will henceforth be cited as Acte si documente.
For a consideration of the economic aspects of Ottoman rule see Nichita
Adaniloaie, "Implicajiile economice ale dominatiei otomane asupra prin-
cipatelor romane, 1750-1859," Revista de Istorie 34, no. 3 (i98i):44i-463.
On the effect of the wars on the Principalities see Constantin Cazani§-
teanu, "Urmarile razboaielor ruso-austro-turce din secolul al XVIII - lea
aspura tSrilor romane," Revista de Istorie 34, no. 2 (1981) 1259-269. Aus-
trian policy is discussed in Karl A. Roider, Jr., The Reluctant Ally: Aus-
tria's Policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737-1739 (Baton Rouge: Louisi-
ana State University Press, 1972).
The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji is printed in Acte si documente, I, 125-

For Russian policy in the next years see G. S. Grosul, Dunaiskie knia-
zhestva v politike Rossii, 1774-1806 (Kishinev: Izdatel'stvo "Shtiintsa,"

6 The terms are in Acte si documente, I, 219-225.

7 Consular reports for this period are printed in A. Otetea, ed., Rapoarte
consulare ruse, 1770—1796, Vol. I, new series, of Documente privind istoria
Rominiei: Colectia Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki (Bucharest: Editura Acade-
miei Republicii Populare Romine, 1962).
8 See Norman E. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 64-65.
9 Acte si documente, I, 260.
10 Brune to Napoleon I, Pera, March 14/26,1803, Documente privind istoria
Rominiei: Colectia . . . Hurmuzaki, II, supp. 1, no. 2, p. 266.
11 George F. Jewsbury, The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia, 1774-1828:

301
 Notes to pp. 14-26
A Study of Imperial Expansion (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quar-
terly, 1976), pp. 51-52.
12 See Acte si documente, I, 296-302.
Chapter I
The Russian protectorate
1 For events in the Principalities see Dan Berindei, VAnnee revolution-
naire 18 21 dans les pays roumains (Bucharest: Editions de l'Acad^mie
de la Re*publique socialiste de Roumanie, 1973); L. E. Semenova, "Vos-
stanie 1821 g. v Valakhii i Rossiia," in Mezhdunarodnyi otnosheniia na
Balkanakh (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1974), pp. 61-70; and the
documentary collection, Andrei Otetea, ed., Documente privind istoria
Rominiei: Rdscoala din 1821, 5 vols. (Bucharest: Academia Republicii
Populare Romine, 1959-1962). Two other books cover this period as well
as later episodes: Radu R. N. Florescu, The Struggle against Russia in
the Roumanian Principalities, 1821-1854 (Munich: Societatea academica
Romana, 1962); and V. la. Grosul and E. E. Chertan, Rossiia i formiro-
vanie rumynskogo nezavisimogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo
"Nauka," 1969). For the ideological background see Vlad Georgescu, Po-
litical Ideas and the Enlightenment in the Romanian Principalities, 1750—
1831 (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1971).
2 See Andrei Otetea, Tudor Vladimirescu si revolutia din 1821 (Bucharest:
Editura §tiintifica, 1971).
3 Andrei Otetea, ed., The History of the Romanian People (New York:
Twayne, n.d.), p. 317. Much the same language was used in a letter writ-
ten by Vladimirescu. Russian support was sought, and Pini was asked to
use his influence with the Wallachian government to prevent it from
using force. Tudor warned: "For I must inform you, sir, that, if a single
shot is fired against the nation, there will not be a single soul of the boyar
race left in the Wallachian lands. For the entire nation is aflame with the
desire for vengeance against that class and waits only the first signal to
satisfy it" (Vladimirescu to Pini, Ceovirno§ani, January 20/February 1,
1821, Revolutia din 1821 condusd de Tudor Vladimirescu: Documente
externe [Bucharest: Editura Academiei Socialiste Romania, 1980], pp.
69-70).
4 Nesselrode to Pahlen, circular no. 8, Laibach, March 18/30, 1821, Bar-
bara Jelavich, Russia and Greece during the Regency of King Othon,
1832-1835: Russian Documents on the First Years of Greek Independence
(Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1962), pp. 123-124. Docu-
ments from the various foreign ministry archives on the revolts of Vladi-
mirescu and Ipsilanti can be found in the collection Revolutia din 1821.
Of the relatively few that concern Russian policy in this period, those
of the greatest interest are the instructions sent from Laibach to the Rus-
sian representative in Constantinople, Baron G. Stroganov, for February
23/March 7, 1821, pp. 98-102; March 14/26, pp. 166-168; and from St.
Petersburg on June 4/16, pp. 322-328; as well as the instructions from
Laibach to Pisani, March 13/25, pp. 161-162. A description of events in
the Principalities is given in two reports by Lieutenant Colonel I. P.
Pestel, March 9, pp. 138-150, and April 15, pp. 245-255.
5 Confidential dispatch to General Pozzo di Borgo, Count Golovkin, Count
 Notes to pp. 26-39
Alopeus, and Baron Nikolai, St. Petersburg, June 22/July 4, 1821, pp.
124-128. The Russian position is also given in two notes presented to the
Porte by Stroganov on July 6/18, in Revolupa din 1821, pp. 363-371.
6 Dimitrie A. Sturdza et al., Acte si documente relative la istoria renascerei
Romdniei (Bucharest: Carol Gobi, 1900), I, 310-318. Cited hereafter as
Acte si documente.
7 See loan C. Filitti, Les Principautes roumaines sous Voccupation russe,
1828-1834 (Bucharest: Imprimerie de T'lndependance Roumaine,"
1904).
8 The treaty is discussed in V. I. Sheremet, Turtsiia i AndrianopoVskii mir
1829 g. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1975).
9 The terms of the treaty, as well as of the Separate Acts, are printed in
Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty (London: Butterworths,
1875), II, 813-831 (p. 817 quoted here), and Acte si documente, I, 318-332.
10 Hertslet, Map of Europe, II, 826.
11 Ibid., p. 825.
12 Two important books for this period are loan C. Filitti, Domniile Ro-
mdne sub regulamentul organic, 1834-1848 (Bucharest: Librariile Socec,
1915); and V. la. Grosul, Reformy v Dunaiskikh kniazhestvakh i Rossiia,
20-30 gody XIX veka (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1966). See also
Georges Bibesco, Regne de Bibesco, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1893-
1894); Panaioti Rizos, ed., Memoires du Prince Nicolas Soutzo: Grand-
Logothete de Moldavie, 1798-1871 (Vienna: Gerold, 1899); and Alex-
andre A. C. Sturdza, Regne de Michel Sturdza: Prince Regnant de Mol-
davie, 18'34-1849 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1907).
13 The Moldavian regulation is printed in Great Britain, Foreign Office,
British and Foreign State Papers (London: Ridgeway, 1859), XXXII, 586-
789-
14 On Polish activities see in particular Robert Allen Berry, "Czartoryski
and the Balkan Policies of the Hotel Lambert, 1832-1847" (Ph.D. diss.,
Indiana University, 1974).
15 Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, eds., The Education of a Russian
Statesman: The Memoirs of Nicholas Karlovich Giers (Berkeley, Univer-
sity of California Press, 1962), pp. 146, 144.
16 Ibid., pp. 194-195.
17 Giers described Dashkov with sympathy: "I liked his noble manners and
restrained politeness. He could pass more easily for an Englishman than
for a Russian. This is not surprising because he was born in America
when his father was ambassador to the United States and had received an
entirely English education. Several years spent in the Pages Corps could
not efface his English mannerisms. He spoke Russian rather badly" (ibid.,
P-/53)-
18 Ibid., pp. 192-193.
19 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
20 For the national movement see Cornelia Bodea, The Romanians' Struggle
for Unification, 1834-1849 (Bucharest: Publishing House of the Academy
of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1970); and John C. Campbell,
"French Influence and the Rise of Roumanian Nationalism: The Genera-
tion of 1848" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1940). On student activity
see E. A. Dzhaparidze, "Kul'turno-prosvetitel'skoe 'Obshchestvo Rumyn-
 Notes to pp.
skikh Studentov' v Parizhe i ego rol' v natsional'no-osvoboditernom
dvizhenii, 1845-1848," in Formirovanie natsionaVnykh kul'tur v stranakh
Tsentral'noi i lugo-V ostochnoi Evropy (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka,"
1977), pp. 230-236; and Alexandru Zub, "Rumanische Studierende an
europaischen Universitaten," Zeitschrift fur Siebenbiirgische Landes-
kunde, no. 1 (1979): 21-40.
21 Nesselrode to Dashkov, St. Petersburg, November 15/27, 1846, enclosure
in Dashkov to Kotsebu, no. 20, Bucharest, November 30/December 12,
1846. Russian Foreign Ministry documents on microfilm, Bucharest. Cited
hereafter as RFM.
22 Kotsebu to Nesselrode, no. 188, Jassy, January 5/17, 1847, RFM.
23 This section on the revolution of 1848 is based on Barbara Jelavich, "The
Russian Intervention in Wallachia and Transylvania, September 1848 to
March 1849," Rumanian Studies 4 (1979)116-74. See also N. Adaniloaie
and Dan Berindei, Revolutia de la 1848 in tdrile romdne: culegere de
studii (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania,
1974): E. Andics, Das Bundnis Habsburg-Romanow (Budapest: Akade*-
miai Kiado, 1963); R. Averbukh, Tsarskaia interventsiia v bor'be s ven-
gerskoi revoliutsiei, 1848-1849 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Sotsial'no-
ekonomicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1935); N. V. Berezniakov, Revoliutsionnoe
i natsionaVno-osvoboditeVnoe dvizhenie v dunaiskikh kniazhestvakh v
1848-1849 gg. (Kishinev: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Moldavii, 1955);
and the documentary collection Anul 1848 in Principatele Romdne, ed.
I. C. Bratianu, 6 vols. (Bucharest: Gobi, 1902-1910).
24 Nesselrode circular to the Russian diplomatic missions, July 19/31, 1848,
Acte si documente, II, 4-8.
25 Draft of a letter to Fuad Effendi, no. 1, September 13/25, 1848, B. Jela-
vich, "Russian Intervention," p. 40.
26 Kotsebu to Cantacuzino, Bucharest, October 1848,, Anul 1848, V, 85.
27 The Convention of Balta Liman is in Hertslet, Map of Europe, II, 1090-
1094.
28 Nesselrode to Khaltchinskii, no. 251, St. Petersburg, January 26/Febru-
ary 7, 1851, RFM.
29 Duhamel to Tumanskii (in Jassy), no. 302, Bucharest, September 6/18,
1849, RFM.
30 Duhamel to Nesselrode, no. 329, reserve, Bucharest, January 12/24, 1^5i»
RFM.
31 For instance, Tumanskii to Nesselrode, no. 2, Jassy, February 7/29, 1849,
RFM. Tumanskii also reported the strong feelings of sympathy, especially
among the young, for the Hungarian revolutionaries who were fighting
the Russians; some thought they might even win. Songs were sung in
honor of Bern. The consul commented: "Such are unfortunately the
fruits of the benefits and the generous institutions that have been given
to these perverse people, unworthy of appreciating them, who pay for
them by the most black and revolting ingratitude" (Tumanskii to Senia-
vin, no. 12, Jassy, August 21/September 2, 1849, RFM.
32 Khaltchinskii to Nesselrode, no. 70, Bucharest, September 21/October
3, 1851, RFM.
33 Khaltchinskii to Tumanskii, no. 49, Bucharest, April 14/26, 1851, in RFM.
34 Nesselrode instructed the consuls to deliver this warning to the princes
3°4
 Notes to pp. 52-77
and their councils (Nesselrode to Khaltchinskii, no. 991, March 26/April
7, 1851, enclosure in Khaltchinskii to Tumanskii, no. 55, Bucharest, May
4/16, 1851, RFM).
35 Florescu, The Struggle against Russia, pp. 223-248.
36 Quoted in Ernst Birke, Frankreich und Ostmitteleurapa im 19. Jahrhun-
dert (Cologne: Bohlau Verlag, i960), p. 227.
37 The background and events of the Crimean War are discussed in Ann
Pottinger Saab, The Origins of the Crimean Alliance (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1977); John Shelton Curtiss, Russia's Cri-
mean War (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979); and Paul W.
Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1972). Also see Radu R. Florescu, "The Ruman-
ian Principalities and the Origins of the Crimean War," Slavonic Review
43 (December 1964): 46-67.
38 See Leonid Boicu, Austria si principatele romdne in vremea rdzboiului
Crimeii, 1853-1856 (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste
Romania, 1972).
Chapter I I
The European guardianship
1 The diplomatic aspects of the Romanian question for this period have
been discussed in a number of books. Of first importance is T. W. Riker,
The Making of Roumania (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931); the
Russian position is covered in V. N. Vinogradov, Rossiia i ob'edinenie
rumynskikh kniazhestv (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR,
1961). See also Dan Berindei, L'Union des principautes roumaines (Bu-
charest: Editions de l'Acade'mie de la R^publique socialiste de Roumanie,
1967); Leonid Boicu, Diplomatia europeand si triumful cauzei romdne,
1856-1859 (Jassy: Editura Junimea, 1978); W. G. East, The Union of
Moldavia and Wallachia, 1859 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1929); Dumitru Vitcu, Diplomatii unirii (Bucharest: Editura Academiei
Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1979); and three volumes of documents:
A. Otetea, ed., Documente privind unirea principatelor (Bucharest: Edi-
tura Academiei Republicii Populare Romine, 1959-1963); Documente
interne, 1854-1857, ed. Dan Berindei et al. (n.d.); vol. II, Rapoartele
consulatului Austriei din lasi, 1856-1859, ed. Dan Berindei et al. (1959);
vol. Ill, Corespondents, politico,, 1855-1859, ed. Cornelia C. Bodea (1963).
2 Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty (London: Butterworths,
1875), II, 1255.
3 Gorchakov to Butenev, reserve, St. Petersburg, July 14/26, 1856, Russian
Foreign Ministry documents on microfilm, Bucharest. Cited hereafter as
RFM.
4 The protocols of the conference meetings are printed in Great Britain,
Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers (London: Ridgeway,
1865), XLVI, 63-138.
5 Hertslet, Map of Europe, II, 1262.
6 Ibid.
7 Report of Sadyk Pasha, Braila, April 30/May 12, 1857, Otetea, Documente
privind unirea principatelor, III, 247-249.
8 The protocols of the meetings and the final report of the International

305
 Notes to pp. 77-89
Commission are in Dimitrie A. Sturdza et al. Acte si documente relative
la istoria renascerei Romdniei (Bucharest: Carol Gobi, 1900), VI, pt. 2,
399-672. Cited henceforth as Acte si documente.
9 See Vasile Maciu, "Diplomatul C. Baisly §i adunarile ad-hoc," Studii:
Revista de Istorie 25, no. 3 (1972): 485-510.
10 Basily to Popov, no. 107, Bucharest, June 15/27, 1857, RFM. The same
ideas were expressed in Gorchakov's instructions to Kiselev: "Along with
France, Prussia and Sardinia we insist on complete freedom for the ex-
pression of the wishes of the populations. We do not seek to influence
them in any sense. We do not prejudge any question; we await the vote
of the divans in order to express at the conference of Paris the final judg-
ment that we will declare" (Gorchakov to Kiselev, June 1/13, 1857, RFM).
11 Basily to Gorchakov, no. 30, Bucharest, April 12/24, 1$57, RFM.
12 Riker, Making of Roumania, p. 61.
13 A. D. Xenopol, Domnia lui Cuza Voda, II, p. 569, trans, in Riker, Mak-
ing of Roumania, pp. 111-112.
14 Note of the representatives of France, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia to
Ali Ghalib Pasha, Constantinople, June 13/25, 1857, Acte si documente,
IV, 967.
15 Protocol no. 9; meetings of June 20/July 2 and June 21/July 3, 1857,
Acte si documente, VI, pt. 2, 430-433.
16 Riker, Making of Roumania, p. 125.
17 Gorchakov to Balabin, private letter, July 1857, RFM.
18 Vinogradov, Rossiia i ob'edinenie rumynskikh kniazhestv, p. 166.
19 Quoted in East, Union of Moldavia and Wallachia, p. 131.
20 Gorchakov to Balabin, private letter, August 17/29, 1857, RFM.
21 Riker, Making of Roumania, p. 144.
22 I. Balaceanu, a moderate, wrote very bitterly about the victory of these
men, whom, he said, the press had made into real heroes, martyrs, and
statesmen. "The halo of persecution glitters around their heads" (Bala-
ceanu to I. Ghica, Nice, October 20/November 1, 1857, O.tetea, Docu-
mente privind unirea principatelor, III, 327-331).
23 See three dispatches of Basily to Gorchakov: no. 81, Bucharest, Septem-
ber 27/October 9, 1857; no. 88 (quoted here), October 18/30, 1857; n o -
94, November 17/29, 1857, RFM.
24 Basily to Gorchakov, no. 88, Bucharest, October 18/30, 1857, RFM.
25 Vinogradov, Rossiia i ob'edinenie rumynskikh kniazhestv, pp. 209-223.
26 The protocols are printed in British and Foreign State Papers, XLVIII,
81-132.
27 The text of the treaty is in ibid., pp. 70-81.
28 Article 8 stated in part: "The suzerain court will, in case of external ag-
gression, come to an agreement with the Principalities for measures of
defense of their territory; and it is the responsibility [of the Porte] to
initiate, by an entente with the guarantor courts, the measures necessary
for the reestablishment of order should it be compromised" (Ibid., p. 72).
29 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
30 For Giers's background see Barbara Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian
National Cause, 1858-1859 (Bloomington, Ind.: Slavic and East Euro-
pean Series, 1959; reprint ed., Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1974), pp. 23-

306
 Notes to pp. 89-102
37; R. V. Bossy, "La Diplomatic russe et l'union des prindpaute's rou-
maines, 1858-1859," Revue d'Historie Diplomatique 3 (1962): 255-266.
31 Included in Giers to Popov, no. 14, Bucharest, October 10/22, 1858, B.
Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, pp, 139-142.
32 Ibid., p. 142.
33 See Vasile Maciu, "S. I. Popov §i luptele politice din Moldova in octom-
brie-decembrie 1858," Studii: Revistd de Istorie 26, no. 1 (1973): 5-31-
34 Popov to Giers, private letter, Jassy, September 26/October 8, 1858, Bar-
bara Jelavich, "Russia and the Double Election of Alexander Cuza, 1858-
1859: The Letters of S. I. Popov to N. K. Giers/' Sudost-Forschungen 24
(1965): 124.
35 This section on the double election is based on B. Jelavich, Russia and
the Rumanian National Cause, pp. 38-60.
36 Popov to Giers, Jassy, private letter, November 14/26, 1858, B. Jelavich,
"Russia and the Double Election," pp. 126-127.
37 Popov to Giers, private letter, Jassy, December 12/24, 1858, B. Jelavich,
"Russia and the Double Election," pp. 129-130.
38 Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Pera, December 22/January 3, 1859, B.
Jelavich, "Russia, the Great Powers and the Recognition of the Double
Election of Alexander Cuza: The Letters of A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to
N. K. Giers, 1858-1859," Rumanian Studies 1 (1970): 20-22.
39 Giers to Butenev, no. 26, Bucharest, November 24/December 6, 1858, B.
Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 47.
40 Ibid., p. 36, n. 28; Vinogradov, Rossiia i ob'edinenie rumynskikh knia-
zhestv, p. 251.
41 Giers to Balabin, private letter, January 8/20, 1859, B. Jelavich, Russia
and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 48.
42 Giers's dispatch on the election in Wallachia is printed in B. Jelavich,
Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, pp. 143-146.
Chapter I I I
The Cuza era, 1859-1866
1 For Cuza's reign see Gerald J. Bobango, The Emergence of the Romanian
National State (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1979); Con-
stantin C. Giurescu, Viata si opera lui Cuza Vodd (Bucharest: Editura
§tiintifica, 1966); Alexander D. Xenopol, Domnia lui Cuza Vodd (Jassy:
Tipografia Editora "Dacia" P. Iliescu and D. Grossu, 1903); and the
articles in Cuza Vodd in memoriam (Jassy: Editura Junimea, n.d.). For
the diplomacy of the period see in particular E. E. Chertan, Russko-Ru-
mynskie otnosheniia v 1859-1863 godakh (Kishinev: Izdatel'stvo "Kartia
Moldoveniaske," 1968); and Irina Radulescu-Valasoglu, Alexandru loan
Cuza si politica europeand (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii
Socialiste Romania, 1974).
2 On the diplomatic aspects of this question see N. Corivan, "Lupta diplo-
matica. pentru recuno§terea dublei alegeri a lui Al. I. Cuza," in Studii pri-
vind unirea Principatelor (Bucharest: Editura Academia Republicii Popu-
lare Romine, i960), pp. 387-412; N. Corivan, "Russko-frantsuzskie vzai-
mootnosheniia v 1859 gody i ob'edinenie rumynskikh kniazhestv," in
O Rumyno-russkikh i rumyno-sovetskikh sviaziakh (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo

307
 Notes to pp. io2-1 op
inostrannoi literatury, i960), pp. 158-186; and B. Jelavich, "Russia, the
Great Powers and the Recognition of the Double Election of Alexander
Cuza: The Letters of A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to N. K. Giers. 1858-
1859," Rumanian Studies 1 (1970): 3-34.
3 Chertan, Russko-Rumynskie otnosheniia, pp. 75-76.
4 Gorchakov to Lobanov, private letter, January 26/February 7, 1859, Bar-
bara Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, 1858-1859
(Bloomington, Ind.: Slavic and East European Series, 1959; reprinted.
Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1974), p. 65.
5 Werther to the Prince Regent, no. 15, St. Petersburg, February 4/16,
1859, Christian Friese et al., eds., Die auswdrtige Politik Preussens, 1858-
i8yi (Oldenburg: Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1933), I, 247-248.
6 Gorchakov to Lobanov, private letter, February 9/21, 1859, B. Jelavich,
Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 66.
7 Lobanov to Gorchakov, no. 471, Pera, February 28/March 12, 1859, B.
Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 69.
8 The protocols of the meetings of March 26/April 7 and April 1/13 are
in Great Britain, Foreign Office British and Foreign State Papers (Lon-
don: Ridgeway, 1858-1859), XLIX, 454-457.
9 Giers to Lobanov, no. 7, Bucharest, February 10/22, 1859, from the col-
lection of the private papers of Nicholas Karlovich Giers. Cited hereafter
as NKG.
10 Giers to Gorchakov, no. 12, Bucharest, February 21/March 5, 1859, Rus-
sian Foreign Ministry documents on microfilm, Bucharest. Cited hence-
forth as RFM.
11 Alecsandri to Cuza, Paris, February 13/25, 1859, R. V. Bossy, Agentia
diplomaticd a Romdniei in Paris sub Cuza Vodd (Bucharest: Cartea Ro-
manesca, 1931), pp. 164-165.
12 Cuza to Alecsandri, Bucharest, April 13/25, 1859, Bossy, Agentia diplo-
maticd a Romdniei in Paris, pp. 165-167.
13 B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 71. Gorchakov
declared very strongly to the Habsburg ambassador, Revertera, that Rus-
sia would never allow another power to hold the mouths of the Danube
(Friedrich Count Revertera, "Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten in St.
Petersburg, 1860-1868," Deutsche Revue 29, no. 2 [1904]: 30).
14 Gorchakov to Lobanov, no. 338, June 4/16, 1859, B. Jelavich, "Russia,
the Great Powers and the Recognition of the Double Election," pp.
17-18.
15 Gorchakov to Giers, no. 267, May 2/14, 1859, B. Jelavich, Russia and the
Rumanian National Cause, p. 75.
16 Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Buyukdere, June 8/20, 1859, B. Jelavich,
Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 72.
17 T. W. Riker, The Making of Roumania (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1931), p. 248. The protocol of the final conference is in British
and Foreign State Papers, XLIX, 457-459.
18 The diplomatic aspects of this period are discussed in Dan Berindei,
"Lupta diplomatic^ a principatelor unite pentru desavisirea unirii, 24
Ianuarie 1859-24 Ianuarie 1862," in Studii privind unirea Principatelor,
pp. 413-449; and B. Jelavich, "The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers

308
 Notes to pp. 109-124
and the Legislative and Administrative Union of the Principalities,"
Rumanian Studies 2 (1973): 48-83.
19 Bobango, Emergence, p. 89.
20 Giers to Gorchakov, no. 32, Bucharest, June 13/25, 1859, NKG.
21 Giers to Gorchakov, no. 62, Bucharest, October 17/29, 1859, NKG.
22 Cuza memoir to Negri, Archives diplomatiques (Paris: Librairie diplo-
matique d'Amyot, 1866), pt. 2, pp. 179-188. For Negri's reaction see Negri
to Cuza, Constantinople, July 2/14, i860, Alexandru loan Cuza si Cos-
tache Negri: Corespondent a, ed. Emil Boldan (Bucharest: Minerva, 1980),
pp. 129-131. Cited hereafter as Cuza si Negri: Corespondentd.
23 Chertan, Russko-Rumynskie otnosheniia, pp. 110, 111.
24 Cuza to Napoleon III, Jassy, October i860, Bossy, Agentia diplomaticd
a Romdniei in Paris, pp. 198-199.
25 Giers to Olga Giers, private letter, Bucharest, July 7/19, 1859, NKG.
26 Popov report, no. 10, Jassy, March 31/April 12, 1861, RFM.
27 Circular note to the ambassadors and ministers of the Porte at the courts
of the guaranteeing powers, Constantinople, April 19/May 1, 1861, Ar-
chives diplomatiques (1866), pt. 2, pp. 188-190.
28 Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Pera, February 13/25, 1861, NKG.
29 Rechberg to Prokesch-Osten, March 5/17, 1861, R. V. Bossy, VAutriche
et les Principautes-Unies (Bucharest: Imprimerie nationale, 1938), pp.
316-317.
30 Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Pera, February 13/25, 1861, NKG.
31 Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Pera, February 27/March 11, 1861, NKG.
32 Thouvenal to the French representatives in London, Vienna, St. Peters-
burg, and Berlin, May 1/13, 1862, Archives diplomatiques (1866), pt. 2,
pp. 191-192.
33 Gorchakov to Oubril, Peterhof, July 12/24, 1861, B. Jelavich, "The Otto-
man Empire . . . and the Union of the Principalities," pp. 70-73.
34 Chertan, Russko-Rumynskie otnosheniia, p. 136; Negri to Cuza, Constan-
tinople, July 31/August 11, 1861, Cuza si Negri: Corespondentd, pp. 244f.
35 Note of the Porte communicated to the representatives of the powers,
October 2, 1861, Archives diplomatiques (1861), pt. 4, pp. 285-286.
36 Firman on the administrative and legislative organization of the Prin-
cipalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, December 2, 1861, Archives diplo-
matiques (1863), pt. 3, pp. 102-104.
37 Ibid., pp. 104-108.
38 Russell to the British consuls at Bucharest and Jassy, January 1/13,
1862, Bossy, L'Autriche et les Principautes-Unies, p. 333.
39 Gorchakov to Lobanov, St. Petersburg, September 19/October 1, 1861,
B. Jelavich, "The Ottoman Empire . . . and the Union of the Princi-
palities," pp. 79-80.
40 This section on internal conditions in the Principalities is based in part
on material in Paul E. Michelson, "Conflict and Development in Ro-
manian Politics, 1861-1871" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1975).
41 Giers to Gorchakov, no. 4, Bucharest, February 9/21, 1862, RFM.
42 Giers to Gorchakov, no. 49, Bucharest, November 2/14, 1862, RFM.
43 Ibid.
44 On the general question of revolutionary activities see Alexandru Marcu,

3°9
 Notes to pp. 124—135
Conspiratori si conspiratii in epoca renasterii politice a Romdniei, 1848-
18JJ (Bucharest: Cartea Romaneasca, 1930).
45 Riker, Making of Roumania, p. 266.
46 See Dan Berindei, "Mihail Kogalniceanu, Prim-Ministru al Moldovei, §i
emigratia maghiara, 1860-1861," Studii si materiale de istorie modernd 2
(i960): 223-244.
47 This episode is described in Riker, Making of Roumania, pp. 265-281.
48 See Constantin C. Giurescu, "Tranzitul armelor sirbe§ti prin Romania
sub Cuza-Voda, 1862," Romanoslavica 11 (1965): 33-65. See also R. V.
Bossy, Agentia diplomaticd a Romdniei in Belgrad si legdturile politice
romdno-sirbe sub Cuza-Vodd (Bucharest: Imprimeria nationala, 1934);
and Riker, Making of Roumania, pp. 373-402.
49 See V. la. Grosul, "Deiateli pol'skogo osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia v
Iugo-Vostochnoi Evrope, pervaia polovina 60-x godov XIX v," Mezhdu-
narodnye otnosheniia na Balkanakh (Moscow: IzdateFstvo "Nauka,"
1974), pp. 96-122; P. P. Panaitescu, "Unirea principatelor romine, Cuza
Voda §i Polonii," Romanoslavica 5 (1962): 71-84.
50 Cuza to Napoleon III, November 11, 1863, Bossy, Agentia diplomaticd a
Romdniei in Paris, pp. 294-296.
51 Napoleon III to Cuza, December 8/20, 1863, Bossy, Agentia diplomaticd a
Romdniei in Paris, p. 309.
52 Thun-Hohenstein to Rechberg, St. Petersburg, December 20/January 1,
1864, Bossy, L'Autriche et les Principautes-Unies, pp. 359-360.
53 Gorchakov to Offenberg, January 9/21, 1864, Gerhard Hilke, "Russlands
Haltung zur rumanischen Frage, 1864-1866," Wissenschaftliche Zeit-
schrift der Martin-Luther-Universitdt Halle-Wittenberg 14, no. 4 (1965):
196.
54 Gorchakov to Knorring, February 18/March 1, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands
Haltung," p. 197.
55 Gorchakov to Novikov, March 9/21, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung,"
pp. 197-198.
56 On the diplomatic aspects of the problem see Riker, Making of Roumania,
pp. 342-372. See also Bobango, Emergence, pp. 142-157; C. C. Giurescu,
"Suprafata mo§iilor manastire§ti secularizate la 1863," Studii: Revistd de
Istorie 12, no. 2 (1959)- !49-i56; and a report of Prokesch of April 11/23,
1863, in Bossy, L'Autriche et les Principautes-Unies, pp. 351-353. An ex-
cellent collection of documents on the problem of the Dedicated Mon-
asteries is contained in Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, pp. 163-339.
57 See article 416 of the Moldavian regulation, British and Foreign State
Papers, XXXII (1859), 784.
58 Memorandum, Buyukdere, August 1/13, 1843, Archives diplomatiques
(1864), pt. 2, pp. 256-259.
59 Khaltchinskii to Titov, no. 31, Bucharest, March 22/April 3, 1851, RFM.
60 See Nesselrode to Ozerov, May 23/June 4, 1852, Archives diplomatiques
(1864), pt. 2, pp. 259-263.
61 Basily to Popov, no. 91, May 1857, RFM.
62 Ibid.
63 See the protocols and reports of the European Commission, Acte si docu-
mente, VI, pt. 2, 399-672.
64 Ibid., p. 637.
310
 Notes to pp. 135-141
65 Ibid., pp. 638-639.
66 Riker, Making of Roumania, p. 357.
67 See B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, pp. 106-108.
68 Quoted in Giers to Popov, no. 38, Bucharest, May 30/June 11, 1859, NKG.
69 Giers to Gorchakov, no. 40, Bucharest, July 11/23, 2^59» NKG.
70 Extract from the protocol of the conference, Archives, diplomatiques
(1864), pt. 2, p. 162.
71 Balabin to Giers, private letter, Vienna, date illegible, 1859, NKG.
72 Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Buyukdere, September 28/October 10,
1859, NKG.
73 See the invitations, January 22/February 3, i860, Archives diplomatiques
(1864), pt. 2, pp. 162-163.
74 Letter of the patriarchs and the Greek community to Negri, March 10/22,
1860, and note of Kogalniceanu to the delegates from the Holy Places,
June 23/July 5, i860, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, pp. 164-165.
75 Note of the guaranteeing powers to the Porte, June 22/July 4, i860, Ar-
chives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, p. 165.
76 AH to Cuza, August 9/21, i860, Archives diplomatiques (1864), P*- 2,
p. 166.
77 Notes of the delegates to the representatives of the powers and the Ro-
manian government, October 13/25, i860, Archives diplomatiques (1864),
pt. 2, pp. 167-175.
78 December 13/25, i860, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, p. 176.
79 Memorandum of the government of the United Principalities on the
convents, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, pp. 197-226; Negri to
Cuza, Pera, June 15/27, and Constantinople, September 5/17, 1863, Cuza
si Negri: Corespondent a, pp. 325-326, 347-350.
80 Gorchakov to Brunnow, January 17/29, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Hal-
tung," pp. 196-197.
81 Gorchakov to Knorring, January 18/30, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Hal-
tung," p. 197.
82 The extremely difficult position of the Principalities is reflected in the
many dispatches written in this period on the details of the negotiations
with all of the powers. In defending the rights of the patriarchs, the Brit-
ish government was, of course, supporting a position similar to that of
Russia. Negri's dispatches reflect his difficulty in convincing the other
representatives of the justice of the Romanian arguments. In 1864 n e
wrote: "The majority of the powers, while having no direct interest in
the question, lean however much more toward Russia than toward us
and that is very understandable" (Negri to Cuza, Constantinople, Novem-
ber 25/December 7, 1864, Cuza si Negri: Corespondentd, pp. 390-391).
Negri considered the question of the monastery property "the most ar-
duous affair that I have dealt with during six years" (Negri to Cuza, Con-
stantinople, October 15/27, 1864, Cuza si Negri: Corespondentd, pp.

83 Gorchakov to Novikov, March 8/20, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung,"

P- !97-
84 Gorchakov to Novikov, March 26/April 7, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Hal-
tung," p. 198.
 Notes to pp. 141-14J
85 The protocols of the conferences are in Archives diplomatiques (1864),
pt. 4, pp. 421-423-
86 Gorchakov to Novikov, May 10/22, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung,"
P- *99-
87 Declaration to Ali by the heads of the Holy Places, Constantinople, Sep-
tember 10/22, 1864, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 4, p. 424; note of
the patriarchs to Ali, Phanar, March 16/28, 1865, ibid. (1865), pt. 3, pp.
1
53"154-
88 Alecsandri to Cuza, June 15, 1864, Paul Henry, L'Abdication du Prince
Cuza et Vavenement de la dynastie de Hohenzollern au trone de Rou-
manie (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1930), pp. 116-125.
89 Cuza to Negri, Bucharest, June 15/27, 1863, Cuza si Negri: Corespon-
dentd, pp. 506-521.
90 Gorchakov to Offenberg, October 19/31, 1863, Hilke, "Russlands Hal-
tung," p. 196.
91 Prokesch to Rechberg, May 11/23, 1864, Bossy, L'Autriche et les Princi-
pautes-Unies, pp. 370-371.
92 Ali to Cuza, n.d., Archives diplomatiques (1866), pt. 2, pp. 228-229.
93 Grosul and Chertan, Rossiia, p. 134.
94 Gorchakov to Novikov, May 25/June 6, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Hal-
tung," p. 199.
95 In 1894 Ignatiev wrote a long memoir on the events of this time, which
was published under the title "Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignatieva, 1864-
1874," in various issues of Izvestiia ministerstva inostrannykh del in 1914
and 1915. This work will be cited hereafter as Ignatiev, "Memoir," with
a reference to the issue appropriate for the note. Here, see 1 (1914): 104-
105.
96 Documents diplomatiques, 1864 (Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1865),
P-94-
97 Gorchakov to Knorring, June 26/July 8, 1864. Hilke, "Russlands Hal-
tung," p. 200.
98 Gorchakov to Offenberg, August 18/30, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Hal-
tung," p. 201.
99 In February 1865 Offenberg wrote: "Providence seems to have really
abandoned the Moldo-Wallachians, or it wishes to chastise them by moral
and material trials. The excessive humidity of the past autumn, at least
in part, made the harvest less and the fall of cereals on the markets of
Europe has paralyzed the exports. The precipitate and blundering ap-
plication of the dispositions of the agrarian law, by putting everything in
doubt and by throwing the greatest confusion into the territorial delimi-
tations, has had as a consequence that the autumn work has been com-
pletely neglected." Because of this situation, he continued, good spring
weather was necessary. Instead, the season was worse than normal, with
floods hurting the fields and with epidemics reducing the number of ani-
mals. This situation was having a bad effect on public credit, with interest
running from 18 to 24 percent (Offenberg, private letter, Bucharest, Feb-
ruary 19/March 3, 1865, in RFM). In March the consul reported the great
damage done by floods (Offenberg dispatch, no. 9, Bucharest, March 16/
28, 1865, RFM).
100 J. H. Tillos, the French agent in Bucharest, was particularly critical of
312
 Notes to pp. 147-154
the prince. In January 1866 he wrote: "Prince Cuza . . . has the qualities
neither of an organizer nor of an administrator and his incurable casual-
ness never allows him to be concerned with details that are distasteful to
him." The consul also commented on his "laziness" and his "intrigues"
(Tillos to Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys, January 2 and 6, 1866, in Henry,
VAbdication, pp. 146-153).
101 On the background of these events see Gr. Chirifa, "Preludiile §i cauzele
detronarii lui Cuza VodaV' Revista de Istorie 29, no. 3 (1976): 347-371.
102 Offenberg to the Asiatic Department, Bucharest, December 25/January
6, 1865, RFM.
103 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 3, January 29/February 10, 1865, RFM.
104 See Ignatiev, "Memoir." Although Ignatiev did in fact feel strongly about
the Holy Places issues, Negri found him "less stubborn (tenace)" than his
predecessor (Negri to Cuza, Constantinople, September 2/14, 1864, Cuza
si Negri: Corespondentd, p. 367).
105 Gorchakov to Ignatiev, June 3/15, 1865, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p.
203.
106 Gorchakov to Ignatiev, June 7/19, 1865, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p.
203.
107 Michelson, "Conflict and Development," p. 92.
108 Fuad to Cuza, September 2, 1865, Archives diplomatiques (1866), pt. 2,
pp. 266-267.
109 Cuza to Fuad, October 29/November 10, 1865, Archives diplomatiques,
(1866), pt. 2, pp. 272-277.
110 Cuza to Napoleon III, October 1, 1865, Henry, L'Abdication, pp. 132-133.
111 Riker, Making of Roumania, pp. 481-482.
112 Gorchakov to Budberg, October 6/18, 1865, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung,"
p. 204.
113 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 46, Bucharest, December 31/January 12,
1866, RFM.
114 Gorchakov to Ignatiev, November 21/December 3, 1865, Hilke, "Russ-
lands Haltung," p. 205.
115 Ignatiev, private letter, Constantinople, February 15/27, 1866, RFM.
116 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 6, Bucharest, February 13/25, 1866, RFM.
117 Gorchakov to Ignatiev, secret letter, St. Petersburg, February 27/March
11, 1866, RFM.
Chapter IV
Prince Charles, 1866-1871
1 On the diplomatic background of the event see the chapter "England,
Russia and the Roumanian Revolution of 1866" in W. E. Mosse, The
Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 1855-18JI (London: Macmillan,
1963), pp. 131-157; E. E. Chertan, "Velikie derzhavy i gosudarstvennyi
perevorot 1866 g. v. Rumynii," in Voprosy istorii i istoriografii iugo-
vostochnoi Evropy (Kishinev: Izdatel'stvo "Shtiintsa," 1977), pp. 17-65;
T . W. Riker, The Making of Roumania (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1931), pp. 507-566; and Gr. Chirija, "Romania in 1866: Coordonate
ale politicii interne §i internationale," Revista de Istorie 31, no. 12 (1978):
2197-2220.
2 Gorchakov to Brunnow, St. Petersburg, February 22/March 6, 1866, Ar-

3*3
 Notes to pp. 154-161
chives diplomatiques (Paris: Librairie diplomatique d'Amyot, 1868), pt. 1,
pp. 274-276; Mensdorff to Metternich, telegram, Vienna, February 12/
24, 1866. Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (cited hereafter as HHS).
3 Prokesch to Mensdorff, tel., February 14/26, 1866, HHS; Apponyi to
Mensdorff, no. 16, London, February 15/27, 1866, HHS.
4 V. la. Grosul and E. E. Chertan, Rossiia i formirovanie rumynskogo
nezavisimogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1969), pp.
146-147.
5 Gorchakov to Offenberg, February 14/26, 1866, Gerhard Hilke, "Russ-
lands Haltung zur rumanischen Frage, 1864-1866," Wissenschaftliche
zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universitdt Halle-Wittenberg 14, no. 4
(1965): 206. See also Drouyn to La Tour d'Auvergne, no. 21, February
19/March 3, 1866, Paul Henry, L'Abdication du Prince Cuza et Vavene-
ment de la dynastie de Hohenzollern au trone de Roumanie (Paris: Li-
brairie Felix Alcan, 1930), pp. 210-211.
6 Talleyrand to Drouyn de Lhuys, tel., February 15/27, 1866, Henry,
L'Abdication, p. 199.
7 Gorchakov to Ignatiev, very secret, February 14/26, 1866, Hilke, "Russ-
lands Haltung," pp. 205-206.
8 Gorchakov to Oubril, February 15/27, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p.
206.
9 Gorchakov to Stackelberg, February 23/March 7, 1866, Hilke, "Russlands
Haltung," p. 209.
10 Gorchakov to Ignatiev, February 21/March 5, 1866, Hilke, "Russlands
Haltung," pp. 206-207.
11 Gorchakov to Ignatiev, February 24/March 8, 1866, Hilke, "Russlands
Haltung," pp. 207-208.
12 Gorchakov to Offenberg, February 24/March 8, 1866, Hilke, 'Russlands
Haltung," p. 208.
13 Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, February 23/March 7, 1866, Ar-
chives diplomatiques (1868), pt. 1, pp. 270-273.
14 Ignatiev to Gorchakov, no. 38, Pera, February 22/March 6, 1866, in Rus-
sian Foreign Ministry documents on microfilm, Bucharest. Cited here-
after as RFM.
15 Ignatiev to Gorchakov, very secret, Pera, March 30/April 11, 1866, RFM.
16 Ingatiev to Gorchakov, no. 60, Pera, March 15/27, 1866, RFM.
17 Ignatiev to Offenberg, no. 121, February 21 /March 5, 1866, RFM.
18 Offenberg report, no. 9, Bucharest, March 5/17, 1866, RFM.
19 Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 10D, St. Petersburg, March 15/27, 1866, HHS.
20 Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, February 23/March 7, 1866, Ar-
chives diplomatiques (1868), pt. 1, pp. 270-273. See also N. P. Ignatiev,
"Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignatieva, 1864-1874," Izvestiia ministerstva inostran-
nykh del 1 (1914): 115 (cited hereafter as Ignatiev, "Memoir"); and Re-
vertera to Mensdorff, no. 7D, St. Petersburg, February 24/March 8, 1866,
Henry, L'Abdication, p. 228.
21 Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, February 23/March 7, 1866, Ar-
chives diplomatiques (1868), pt. 1, p. 272.
22 Mensdorff to Metternich and Apponyi, no. 3, Vienna, February 17/March
1, 1866, HHS; Mensdorff to Metternich, no. 4, reserve, Vienna, February
17/March 1, 1866, HHS.

3*4
 Notes to pp. 161-169
23 The protocols of the conference are to be found in Demetre A. Sturdza,
ed., Charles ler, Roi de Roumanie: Chronique-Actes-Documents (Bu-
charest: Charles Gobi, 1899), Vol. I. The first meeting is covered on pp.
12-15.
24 Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 8, February 25/March 9, 1866, HHS.
25 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 22-32.
26 Steege, Falcoianu, and Boerescu, confidential letter to Ghica, March 19/
31, 1866, ibid., pp. 61-64.
27 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 57-61.
28 Similar opinions were expressed by Gorchakov to Talleyrand (Talley-
rand to Drouyn de Lhuys, no. 28, March 16/28, and no. 32, March 29/
April 10, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication, pp. 271-272, 296-297).
29 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 60.
30 Ibid., I, pp. 64-73.
31 Gorchakov to Budberg, March 18/30, 1866, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung,"
pp. 208-209.
32 Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 11B, reserve, St. Petersburg, March 26/April
7, 1866, HHS.
33 There is no satisfactory biography of Charles. For foreign policy consult
Frederick Kellogg, "Rumanian Nationalism and European Diplomacy,
1866-1878" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1969).
34 Boerescu, Steege report, very confidential, March 30, 1866, State Archives,
Bucharest, Casa Regala, 16/1866. This important collection of documents
on Charles's reign will be cited hereafter as CR.
35 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 64.
36 Aus dem Leben Konig Karls von Rumdnien (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'schen
Buchhandlung, 1894), I, 9. This work will be cited hereafter as Aus dem
Leben.
37 Ibid., p. 10.
38 Ibid., pp. 11-14.
39 Ibid., pp. 16-19.
40 Ibid., p. 18.
41 Ibid., p. ig.
42 Ibid., p. 28.
43 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
44 This section is based on B. Jelavich, "Russia and Moldavian Separatism:
The Demonstration of April, 1866," in Russland-Deutschland-Amerika:
Festschrift filr Fritz T. Epstein, ed. Alexander Fischer, Giinter Molt-
mann, and Klaus Schwabe (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1978), pp.
73-87. See also Gh. Cristea, "Manifestari antidinastice in perioada venirii
lui Carol I in Romania, aprilie-mai 1866," Revista de Istorie 20, no. 6
(1967): 1073-1091.
45 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 17, Bucharest, April 4/16, 1866, RFM.
46 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 126-135.
47 Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, April 4/16, 1866, Archives diplo-
matiques (1868), pt. 1, pp. 277-280.
48 Drouyn, in contrast, saw the affair as an intrigue between Prussia and
Russia. The advantage had been gained by Russia, which would now
dominate Romania. Drouyn swore to Metternich that he knew nothing
of the matter (Metternich to Mensdorff, no. 27B, Paris, May 9/21, and

3*5
 Notes to pp. 169-173
Metternich to Mensdorff, no. 28D, May 11/23, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication,
pp. 385-386, 387-388; Metternich to Mensdorff, no. 28B, May 11/23,
1866, HHS).
49 Mensdorff to Metternich, no. 3, reserve, Vienna, April 7/19, 1866, HHS.
50 The Austrian government appears to have accepted the Prussian declara-
tion at face value. On May 13/25 Mensdorff informed Count Aloys
Karolyi, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, of Werther's assurance that
Prussia had nothing to do with Charles's actions (Mensdorff to Karolyi,
Vienna, May 13/25, 1866, HHS).
51 Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 17B, St. Petersburg, April 18/30, 1866, HHS.
52 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 140-143.
53 Boerescu, Costaforu, and Steege reports, Paris, April 11/23 an( * April
20/May 2, 1866, CR 21/ 1866 and CR 27/1866.
54 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 270-274.
55 Talleyrand to Drouyn, tel., May 12/24, 1866, Henry, VAbdication, p. 390.
56 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 279-288.
57 Ignatiev described Russian policy as follows: "Under these conditions
we believed it possible to bring about a change in our favor on the Lower
Danube, in allowing the carrying out of the occupation that the Turks
considered indispensable to bring back order and tranquility in the Prin-
cipalities. Conforming myself to the orders of the imperial cabinet, I
therefore applied myself - without compromising myself by an ostensible
action, or binding our final decisions - to support the Ottoman govern-
ment in the path that it had adopted on its own initiative." However,
the Porte became more hesitant as the situation became more dangerous.
The Ottoman Empire would not oppose France and Britain unless Rus-
sia offered serious support, which was lacking "at the decisive moment.
The attitude that had been prescribed for me at Constantinople was in
flagrant opposition to the declarations of our ambassador at Paris, who
in the meeting of May 25 of the conference, declared himself very warmly
against the project of the Porte, while supporting the point of view of
the French government." Safvet, "who had been instructed to act in
everything with our plenipotentiary, was embarrassed and the Porte be-
gan to doubt our sincerity" (Ignatiev, "Memoir," 1 [1914]: 112).
58 Mosse, Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, p. 151.
59 AH told Prokesch that Ignatiev was speaking strongly in favor of an oc-
cupation. Prokesch to Mensdorff, no. 32B, May 27/June 8, 1866, HHS.
60 Prokesch to Mensdorff, no. 31AB, Constantinople, May 24/June 5,
1866, HHS. Gorchakov told Talleyrand that Russia never advised the
Porte to take violent measures. Rather, the government had been in-
formed that, if Ottoman interests demanded such action, Russia would
not oppose it. The responsibility, the Russian minister believed, thus lay
with the Porte (Talleyrand to Drouyn, no. 56, June 4/16, 1866, HHS;
Henry, L3Abdication, pp. 423-424).
61 Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, May 31/June 12, 1866, Archives
diplomatiques (1868), pt. 1, pp. 280-282.
62 Mensdorff to Metternich, no. 3, Vienna, June 3/15, 1866, HHS.
63 Metternich to Mensdorff, no. 34B, Paris, June 11/23, 1866, HHS.
64 See Bismarck to Redern, tel., no. 27, Berlin, February 13/25, 1866, Chris-
tian Friese et al., eds., Die auswdrtige Politik Preussens, 1858-1871 (Ol-
 Notes to pp. 173-179
denberg: Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1933), VI, 602-603; and Oubril to
Gorchakov, secret tel., Berlin, February 13/25, 1866, ibid., p. 605.
65 Hans Lothar von Schweinitz, Denkwiirdigkeiten des Botschafters General
von Schweinitz (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1927), I, 218.
66 Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 20C, St. Petersburg, May 11/23, l 8 6 6 » HHS.
67 Talleyrand to Drouyn, no. 49, May 16/28, 1866, Henry, ^Abdication,
PP- 394-395-
68 Bismarck to Redern, confidential, Berlin, May 18/30, 1866, Otto von
Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke (Berlin: Otto Stollberg Verlag, 1928),
V, 516-18.
69 Schweinitz, Denkwurdigkeiten, I, 220-221.
70 See, for example, Talleyrand to Drouyn, no. 23, March 2/14. Rever-
tera to Mensdorff, no. 19 A-C, St. Petersburg, May 4/16, and Revertera
to Mensdorff, no. 19B, May 4/16, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication, pp. 241-
242, 377, and HHS.
71 Talleyrand to Drouyn, no. 27, March 9/21, 1866, Henry, U Abdication,
PP- 255~258-
72 Falcoianu, Boerescu, and Steege report, Paris, April 2/14, 1866, CR 17/
1866.
73 Costaforu and Steege report to Ghica, Paris, April 20/May 2, 1866, CR
27/1866.
74 Boerescu and Costaforu wrote three reports, dated May 27/June 8, in St.
Petersburg on their visits to Berlin and St. Petersburg (CR 37, 38, 39/
1866).
75 Karl von Eder, the Austrian consul general in Bucharest, later reported
that Bismarck had advised the Romanian delegates on how they should
act in St. Petersburg in order to win Russian favor. They should, he em-
phasized, come to know church dignitaries who could introduce them
around; they should also visit churches diligently and behave in a very
"godfearing and orthodox" manner (Eder to Mensdorff, no. 114, Bu-
charest, August 3/15, 1866, HHS).
76 Aus dem Leben, I, 78.
77 Balaceanu to Charles, Paris, July 27/28, 1866, CR 30/1866.
78 Aus dem Leben, I, 90-94. Charles did not like being an Ottoman vassal.
He told Eder of his aversion to acknowledging the suzerainty of the
sultan: "This step had cost him a great effort; as a German prince, Chris-
tian and Catholic he had done it with reluctance" (Eder to Mensdorff,
no. 84, Bucharest, May 16/28, 1866, HHS).
79 Moustier to Drouyn, tel., June 4/16, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication, p. 423.
80 Ignatiev, "Memoir," 1 (1914): 115-116.
81 Aus dem Leben, I, 132-135.
82 Filek to Mensdorff, no. 132, Bucharest, October 14/26, 1866, HHS.
83 Ignatiev, "Memoir," 1 (1914): 116-117.
84 Revertera to Beust, no. 32 A-C, St. Petersburg, November 7/19, 1866,
HHS.
85 Aus dem Leben, I, 160-161.
86 Drouyn to Talleyrand, no. 24, March 19/31, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication,
pp. 282-284.
87 Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, March 10/22, 1866, Archives dip-
lomatiques (1868), pt. 1, pp. 276-277.

317
 Notes to pp. 179-193
88 Gorchakov to Budberg, March 18/30, 1866, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung,"
pp. 208-209.
89 Talleyrand to Drouyn, no. 21, March 9/21, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication,
PP- 255-S58-
90 On general Russian policy in the Balkans see Dietrich Beyrau, Russische
Orientpolitik und die Entstehung des deutschen Kaiserreiches, 1866-
1870/71 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1974). See also B. Jelavich, "Russ-
land und die Einigung Deutschlands unter preussischer Fiihrung," Ge-
schichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, September 1968: 521-538.
91 See Gisela Hiinigen, Nikolaj Pavlovic Ignat'ev und die russische Balkan-
politik, 1875-1878 (Gottingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1968). On Pan-
slavism see Michael Boro Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslav-
ism, 1856-1870 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).
92 See Thomas A. Meininger, Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bul-
garian Exarchate, 1864—1872 (Madison: State Historical Society of Wis-
consin, 1970).
93 Ignatiev, "Memoir," 3 (1914): 108.
94 Ibid., p. 111.
95 For Russian policy on Crete see I. G. Senkevich, Rossiia i kriskoe vos-
stanie, 1866-1869 g. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1970).
96 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 406, 489-490.
97 Ibid., p. 438. On Bulgarian affairs see also Traian Ionescu-Ni§cov, "Unele
aspecte in mi§carea de eliberare nationala a bulgarilor in nordul Dunarii
intre 1850-1870," in Relatii Romdno-Bulgare de-a lungul veacurilor (Bu-
charest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1971), I, 369-
400.
98 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 438-439.
99 Aus dem Leben, I, 292-293.
100 Beyrau, Russische Orientpolitik, pp. 119-124.
101 See Z. R. Dittrich, "Bismarck und Rumanien: Die turbulenten Jahre
1866-1868," in Romanian History, 1848-1918, ed. A. P. van Goudoever
(Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1979), pp. 19-45- See also Claus Bor-
mann, "Bismarck und Siidosteuropa vom Krimkrieg bis zur Pontuskon-
ferenz" (doctoral diss., Hamburg, 1967).
102 Aus dem Leben, I, 306; D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 464-465.
103 Aus dem Leben, I, 239-240.
104 Ibid., pp. 209-210.
105 Ibid., pp. 241-243. See also Nicolae Ciachir, "Donne'es concernant la
mission diplomatique roumaine de 1868 en Russie," in Nouvelles etudes
d'histoire (Bucharest: Academia Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1970),
IV, 223-234.
106 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 410.
107 Charles to Gorchakov, Bucharest, January 22/February 3, 1868, CR 32/
1868; Aus dem Leben, I, 242-243.
108 The reports of this visit are Cantacuzino to Charles, St. Petersburg, Febru-
ary 24/March 8, 1868, CR 40/1868; Melchisedek report, CR 41/1868; and
Cantacuzino to Golescu, Bucharest, April 3/15, 1868, in the Romanian
Foreign Ministry archives in Bucharest. Documents from this latter
source will be cited as MAE (Ministerul Afacerilor Externe).
109 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 421.
318
 Notes to pp. 193-198
n o Ibid., pp. 421-422.
111 For the negotiations on the consular convention see E. E. Chertan, "Iz
istorii zakliucheniia Russko-Rumynskoi konsul'skoi konventsii 1869 g.,"
Izvestiia Moldavskogo filiala Akademii Nauk SSSR 80, no. 2 (1961):
39-55-
112 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 8, Bucharest, April 3/14, 1869, RFM. On the
establishment of regular relations between Russia and the Principalities
see the chapter "Petersburg" in Reprezentantele diplomatice ale Ro-
maniei, 1859-191J (Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1967), I, 187-214.
113 Steege to Charles, St. Petersburg, May 25/June 6, 1869, CR 52/1869.
114 Offenberg approved of the visit, which, he noted, preoccupied Romanian
public opinion. The opponents were silent, but the "enlightened" men
saw it "as an indication of the return of the Principalities to the only
political path that is in conformity with their traditions and their inter-
ests" (Offenberg to Westmann, no. 12, Bucharest, July 25/August 6, 1869,
RFM). For the trip see Aus dem Leben, I, 369-378.
115 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 7, March 25/April 6, 1869, RFM.
116 Ignatiev to Gorchakov, no. 27, Constantinople, February 3/15, 1870,
RFM.
117 Golescu to Strat, February 5/17, 1870, Nicolae Iorga, Correspondence
diplomatique sous le roi Charles ler, 1866-1880 (Bucharest: Au Siege de
l'lnstitut, 1938), p. 56.
118 For instance, Prokesch protested to Ignatiev concerning the text of the
convention. He considered the document a recognition of the Romanian
independence, and he feared that the encouragement given to Romanian
desires would result one day in the monarchy's loss of Transylvania (Ig-
natiev to Gorchakov, no. 10, Pera, January 13/25, 1870, RFM).
119 On November 16/28, 1871, Offenberg wrote a strong dispatch on the
need to conclude such conventions to protect Russian interests, since
"Romanian autonomy" signified "for foreigners: confusion, arbitrari-
ness, and anarchy. In introducing here the Code Napoleon and French
procedure, the Moldo-Wallachian government has virtually abolished
consular jurisdiction and all the exemptions that derive from the capitu-
lations with the Porte" (Offenberg to Stremoukhov, Bucharest, Novem-
ber 16/28, 1871, RFM; see also Grosul and Chertan, Rossiia i formirovanie
rumynskogo nezavisimogo gosudarstva, pp. 167-172).
120 Aus dem Leben, I, 324-325.
121 Ibid., II, 55-56.
122 Ibid., p. 64; Ignatiev, "Memoir," 1 (1915): 170.
123 Strat to Charles, Paris, January 29/February 10, 1869, Iorga, Correspon-
dance diplomatique, pp. 36-38.
124 Strat to Ghica, no. 27, Paris, January 26, 1869, CR 27/1869.
125 For Habsburg policy toward Romania after 1866 see Beyrau, Russische
Orientpolitik, pp. 114-126.
126 Strat to Charles, Diisseldorf, January 17, 1869, CR 23/1869.
127 Aus dem Leben, II, 96, 97.
128 The question of the minting of money is discussed in Victor Slavescu,
Recunoasterea dreptului de a bate moneta: Actiunea diplomaticd a Ro-
mdniei in 1866-18jo (Bucharest: Fundatia Regele Carol I, 1941).

319
 Notes to pp. 198-206

129 Aus dem Leben, II, 69; Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 5, Bucharest, March
2/14, 1870, RFM.
130 Grosul and Chertan, Rossiia i formirovanie rumynskogo nezavisimogo
gosudarstva, pp. 167-168.
131 Beyrau, Russische Orientpolitik, p. 179.
132 Very confidential report of D. A. Sturdza, January 30/February 11, 1870,
CR 26/1870.
133 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 7, Bucharest, March 26/April 7, 1870, RFM.
134 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 2, Bucharest, January 29/February 10, 1870,
RFM.
135 Aus dem Leben, II, 97-101; D. A. Sturdza, Charles lev, I, 589-592.
136 D. A. Sturdza, Charles Ier, I, 593. Aus dem Leben, II, 101-102.
137 Aus dem Leben, II, 106.
138 Ibid., pp. 107-108.
139 Ibid.
140 For the diplomacy of this period see in particular W. E. Mosse, The Euro-
pean Powers and the German Question, 1848-1871, with Special Refer-
ence to England and Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1958), pp. 291-358. See also Beyrau, Russische Orientpolitik, pp. 184-224.
141 Mosse, European Powers and the German Question, pp. 342-343; Beyrau,
Russische Orientpolitik, pp. 231-232.
142 Gorchakov to Brunnow, Tsarskoe Selo, October 19/31, 1870, D. A. Sturd-
za, Charles Ier, I, 610-613.
143 Gorchakov to Brunnow, Tsarskoe Selo, October 20/November 1, 1870,
D. A. Sturdza, Charles Ier, I, 613-615.
144 For the reaction of the powers to the Russian denunciation see Barbara
Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Ques-
tion, 1870-1887 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); and
Serge Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles (Paris: Plon-Nourrit,
1910).
145 Beust to Chotek, Vienna, November 4/16, 1870, D. A. Sturdza, Charles
Ier, I, 623.
146 Gorchakov to Venikov, Tsarskoe Selo, November 10/22, 1870, D. A. Sturd-
za, Charles Ier, I, 628-631.
147 Ibid., p. 630.
148 Elliot to Granville, Therapia, August 16/28, 1870, D. A. Sturdza, Charles
Ier, I, 628.
149 Sturdza to Carp, very confidential, Therapia, August 16/28, 1870, MAE,
127, Politice 1870-1873.
150 Aus dem Leben, II, 123.
151 Callimachi Catargi to Strat, Bucharest, January 14/26, 1871, MAE.
152 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 19, Bucharest, July 4/16, and no. 20, July
11/23, 1870, RFM.
153 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 24, Bucharest, August 2/14, 1870, RFM.
154 Aus dem Leben, II, 115-117. Offenberg thought that the radicals were
using the reports of French victories to provoke an antidynastic move-
ment. He believed that the leaders "wrapped themselves" in the French
flag so that they could attack the Prussian prince, whom they themselves
had brought into the country (Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 25, Bucharest,
August 10/22, 1870, RFM).

320
 Notes to pp. 206-218
155 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 31, Bucharest, October 19/31, 1870, RFM.
156 Aus dent Leben, II, 134.
157 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 642-644. For further details on the abdi-
cation question see Barbara Jelavich, "The Abdication Crisis of 1870-71:
The International Aspects," Revue roumaine d'histoire 21, no. 1 (1982):
89-99-
158 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 646.
159 Ibid., pp. 646-648.
160 Musurus to Ali, confidential, London, January 15/27, 1871, B. Jelavich,
The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, pp.
175-180.
161 Prokesch to Beust, no. 5 A-F, Constantinople, January 8/20, 1871, HHS
XII/98.
162 William to Charles, Versailles, January 12/24, 1^71$ D. A. Sturdza,
Charles ler, I, 656-657.
163 Balaceanu to Callimachi Catargi, personal letter, n.d., MAE.
164 Green to Granville, no. 88, confidential, Bucharest, October 4/16, 1870,
Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Despatches, 195/967. Cited
hereafter as PRO.
165 Gladstone to Granville, Hawarden Castle, December 24/January 5, 1871,
Agatha Ramm, ed. The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and
Lord Granville, 1868-18j6 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1952), I,
205.
166 Granville to Elliot, FO 195/971, Foreign Office, January 11/23, ^ I ,
PRO.
167 Bloomfield to Granville, FO 7/788, no. 121, confidential, Vienna, March
4/16, 1871, PRO.
168 Alexander II to Charles, St. Petersburg, February 16/28, 1871, CR 14/
1871; D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 667-668.
169 Ignatiev to Gorchakov, no. 209, secret, Buyukdere, September 9/21, 1870,
RFM.
170 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 28, Bucharest, September 15/27, 1870, RFM.
171 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 35, Bucharest, November 29/December 11,
1870, RFM.
172 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 1, Bucharest, January 10/22, 1871, RFM.
173 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 3, Bucharest, January 30/February 11, 1871,
RFM.
174 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 5, Bucharest, March 2/14, 1871, RFM.
175 Callimachi Catargi circular, January 30/February 11, 1871, MAE.
176 Callimachi Catargi to Balaceanu, February 6/18, 1871, MAE.
177 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 661.
178 Ibid., pp. 669-670.
179 Ibid., p. 681.
Chapter V
Prince Charles, 1871-1878
1 Report of P. P. Carp, Berlin, May 2/14, 1871, Nicolae Iorga, Correspon-
dance diplomatique sous le roi Charles ler, 1866-1880 (Bucharest: Au
Siege l'lnstitut, 1938), pp. 83-84.
2 Aus dem Leben Konig Karls von Rumdnien (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'schen
 Notes to pp. 218-221
Buchhandlung, 1894), II, 212-213. A major Russian concern, Ignatiev
wrote, was that an Austrian company not take over the Strousberg con-
cession. With Romania's commercial and industrial dependency on the
monarchy and Austria's leading position on the Danube, control of the
railroads would give clear predominance to the Habsburg government (Ig-
natiev, "Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignatiev, 1864-1874," Izvestiia ministerstva
inostrannykh del 1 [1915]: 168-169; cited hereafter as Ignatiev, "Mem-
oir").
3 Ghica dispatches, Constantinople, November 3/15, 6/18, and 7/19, 1872,
Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 97-99. Ignatiev commented
that the changes the Porte sought would have to be approved by a con-
ference. Should one take place, Russia could use the opportunity to ask
for southern Bessarabia (Ignatiev, "Memoir," 1 [1915]: 170-172).
4 Aus dem Leben, II, 298, 301.
5 Ibid., p. 310.
6 Ibid., p. 333.
7 On the establishment of permanent agencies see Reprezentantele diplo-
matice ale Romaniei, 1859-191J, Vol. I (Bucharest: Editura Politica,
1967).
8 Aus dem Leben, II, 372.
9 Filipescu to Boerescu, no. 21, St. Petersburg, April 23/May 5, 1874, Ro-
manian Foreign Ministry archives in Bucharest, 267, Corespondenta cu
agentia din Petersburg, 1856-1879. Cited hereafter as MAE.
10 Filipescu to Boerescu, confidential letter, no. 15, St. Petersburg, April
16/28, 1874, MAE, 267; Kamil to Filipescu, particuliere, St. Petersburg,
April 15/27, 1874, R. V. Bossy, Politica externd a Romaniei intre anii
1873-1880 privitd de la agentia diplomatics, din Roma (Bucharest: Cul-
tura Nationals, 1928), p. 103; Silvian Costin, "Un episod din lupta diplo-
matica pentru independenta de stat a Romaniei," Romanoslavica 15
(1967): 237-243.
11 Filipescu to Boerescu, no. 14, confidential, St. Petersburg, April 15/27,
1874, MAE, 267.
12 Ibid.
13 Filipescu to Boerescu, no. 83, St. Petersburg, December 26/January 7,
1875, MAE, 267. At a meeting in Berlin Gorchakov gave Cretulescu simi-
lar advice to abide by the treaties (Aus dem Leben, II, 374; Cretulescu to
Charles, April 23/May 5, 1874, State Archives, Bucharest, Casa Regala
4/1874 [cited hereafter as CR]).
14 For the negotiations with the Habsburg Empire see Frederick Kellogg,
"Conventia comerciala din 1875, un pas catre independenta?" Studii
Revistd de Istorie 25, no. 5 (1972): 989-1003; and Uta Bindreiter, Die
diplomatischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Osterreich-
Ungarn und Rumdnien in den Jahren 1875-1888 (Vienna: Hermann
Bohlaus Nachf., 1976), pp. 42-100.
15 This section is based on B. Jelavich, "Russia and the Rumanian Com-
mercial Convention of 1876," Rumanian Studies 3 (1976): 39-60. Only
the political aspects of the negotiations are discussed here. For the eco-
nomic issues see in particular E. E. Chertan, "Russko-Rumynskaia tor-
govaia konventsiia, 1876 g.," in Vekovaia druzhba (Kishinev: "Shtiintsa,"
1961), pp. 436-463. See also Cornelius G. Antonescu, Die rumdnische
322
 Notes to pp. 221-224
Handelspolitik von 1875-ipio (Leipzig: W. Schunke, 1915); and Georges
D. Cioriceanu, La Roumanie economique et ses rapports avec Vetranger
de i860 a 1 pi5 (Paris: M. Giard, 1928).
16 Aus dem Leben, II, 384-385.
17 See Derby to Buchanan, Foreign Office, June 24/July 6, 1874, and Derby
to Elliot, Foreign Office, July 10/22, 1874, Great Britain, Foreign Office,
Accounts and Papers, Vol. LXXXIII, Turkey, no. 4 (1875), Correspon-
dence respecting the Question of the Negotiation of Commercial Con-
ventions by the Principalities, 1875 (C-1242), pp. 1-3 (cited hereafter as
Accounts and Papers [C-1242]).
18 Elliot to Derby, Therapia, October 11/23, ^74, Accounts and Papers (C-
1242), pp. 13-14. See also Derby to Elliot, Foreign Office, October 19/31,
1874, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), pp. 11-12.
19 Donald C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), pp. 80-84.
20 The convention of August 1858 is printed in Archives diplomatiques
Amyot (Paris: Librairie Diplomatique d'Arnyot, 1866), pt. 2, pp. 102-111.
21 Quoted from Accounts and Papers (C-1242), p. 21. The firman of investi-
ture is to be found in Archives diplomatiques (1867), pt. 1, pp. 270-272.
22 Elliot to Derby, Therapia, October 29/September 10, 1874, including a
Memorandum by Prince Ghica on the Romanian Customs Law, Accounts
and Papers (C-1242), pp. 5-10.
23 Boerescu to Esarcu, Rome, July 12/24, 1874, Bossy, Politica externa, pp.
103-106.
24 Boerescu to Esarcu, October 18/30, 1874, Bossy, Politica externa, pp.
106-109.
25 Boerescu to Esarcu, Rome, July 12/24, x^74» Bossy, Politica externa, pp.
103-106.
26 Charles wrote to his father, Prince Karl Anton, on November 15/27,
1875: "As long as the suzerainty was an empty form, which was limited
to the payment of a tribute or to difficulties in affairs relating to treaties,
coinage or decorations, our complaints could be rejected by Europe;
however, if our dependent relationship to the Porte holds up our eco-
nomic development, our financial reforms, hurts our credit, then we
could with justice demand that a sharp political line of demarcation be
drawn between an empire that is incapable of any reform, and a young,
flourishing state, which has in the last years given Europe real guaran-
tees" (Aus dem Leben, II, 477).
27 Derby to Elliot, Foreign Office, November 8/20, 1874, Accounts and Pa-
pers (C-1242), pp. 20-22. See also Elliot to Derby, Therapia, September
3/15, 1874, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), pp. 10-11.
28 Derby to Elliot, Foreign Office, October 2/14, 1874, Accounts and Papers
(C-1242), p. 11.
29 Derby to Russell, Foreign Office, September 28/October 10, 1874, Der-
by to Russell, November 1/13, 1874, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), pp.

30 Arifi Pasha to Musurus Pasha, Constantinople, October 11/23, 1^74» c o m "

municated to Derby on October 26/November 7, Accounts and Papers
(C-1242), pp. 14-17.

3*3
 Notes to pp. 224-230
31 Derby to Elliot, Foreign Office, December 5, 1874, Accounts and Papers
(C-1242), pp. 24, 25.
32 Derby to Elliot, Foreign Office, January 8/20, 1875, Accounts and Papers
(C-1242), p. 26.
33 Aus dem Leben, II, 441.
34 Ibid., pp. 441-442.
35 Ibid., p. 446.
36 Zinoviev to Jomini, no. 19, Bucharest, July 7/19, 1875, Russian Foreign
Ministry documents on microfilm, Bucharest. Cited hereafter as RFM.
37 Chertan, "Russko-Rumynskaia torgovaia konventsiia," p. 452; Zinoviev
to Jomini, no. 14, Bucharest, June 2/14, 1875, RFM.
38 Zinoviev to Jomini, no. 25, Bucharest, August 9/21, 1875, RFM.
39 Chertan, "Russko-Rumynskaia torgovaia konventsiia," pp. 452-454.
40 Zinoviev to Jomini, Bucharest, September 7/19, 1875, RFM.
41 Aus dem Leben, III, 11. See also Zinoviev to Giers, Bucharest, February
20/March 4, 1874, B. Jelavich, "Russia and the Rumanian Commercial
Convention," pp. 53-55.
42 Aus dem Leben, III, 11; Zinoviev to Gorchakov, no. 8, Bucharest, March
7/19, 1876, RFM.
43 Chertan, "Russko-Rumynskaia torgovaia konventsiia," pp. 457-458.
44 Ibid., p. 462. The convention is printed in Great Britain, Foreign Office,
British and Foreign State Papers, 1875-1876 (London: Ridgeway, 1883),
LXVII, 698-704, and in Documente privind istoria Rominiei: Rdzboiul
pentru independentd (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Popu-
lare Romine, 1954), I, pt. 1a, 304-312.
45 Russian and Romanian policy during the years 1875 to 1878 is covered
in Nicolae Ciachir, Rdzboiul pentru independenta Romdniei in con-
textul European, 1875-1878 (Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica §i Enciclo-
pedica, 1977); N. Corivan, Lupta diplomaticd pentru cucerirea indepen-
dentei Romdniei (Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica §i Enciclopedica, 1977);
M. M. Zalyshkin, Vneshniaia politika Rumynii i rumyno-russkie otnosh-
eniia, 1875-1878 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1974); and Diplomatia
romdna in slujba independentei (Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1977). Rev-
olutionary action is analyzed in V. la. Grosul, Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia i
Balkany, 1874-1883 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1980).
46 See Nicolae Ciachir, "Rumyniia i vostochnyi vopros, 1875-1878," Revue
roumaine d'etudes internationales 2, no. 8 (1970): 69-95, an< ^ "La Po-
sition de la Roumanie a Te'gard des soulevements de Bosnie et de Her-
ze"govine durant la periode 1875-1878," Posebna izdanja 30 (1977): 363-
366.
47 Cantacuzino to Boerescu, August 30/September 11, 1875, Bossy, Politica
externd,pp. 119-123.
48 See M. M. Zalyshkin, "Politika neitraliteta praviashchikh krugov Rumynii
v 1875-1876 gg.," Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, no. 3 (1957):
27-78.
49 Aus dem Leben, II, 480.
50 Ibid., II, 483, III, 6.
51 Catargiu instructions for the Romanian agents, January 4/16, 1876, Iorga,
Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 160-161.
52 Aus dem Leben, III, 7.

324
 Notes to pp. 230-237
53 Costaforu report, Vienna, January 23, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance dip-
lomatique, pp. 163-166. After Costaforu read the circular to him, Novikov
reported to his government that the document was a curious indication
of the desires and hopes of the Romanians, who no doubt hoped to
profit from the situation (Novikov to Gorchakov, no. 25, Vienna, Janu-
ary 30/February 11, 1876, RFM).
54 Balaceanu to Esarcu, March 19/31, 1876, Bossy, Politica externd, pp. 133-
134; Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 168-169.
55 Ghica to Cornea, tel., St. Petersburg, April 18/30, 1876, Iorga, Corre-
spondance diplomatique, p. 171.
56 Aus dem Leben, III, 16.
57 Ibid., pp. 13-15.
58 Cornea circular, April 9/21, 1876, Bossy, Politica externd, p. 137.
59 On European diplomacy in this period, see especially B. H. Sumner, Rus-
sia and the Balkans, i8yo-i88o (Oxford: Oxford University Press [Claren-
don Press], 1937).
60 For Habsburg policy see B. Jelavich, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania and
the Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878," Siidost-Forschungen 30 (1971): 111-141.
61 On the Russian determination to retake the three districts of southern
Bessarabia and the effect of this decision on general diplomacy see B. Jela-
vich, "Russia and the Reacquisition of Southern Bessarabia, 1875-1878,"
Siidost-Forschungen 28 (1969): 199-237.
62 Aus dem Leben, III, 27; Kogalniceanu circular, April 30/May 12, 1876,
Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, p. 172 (also printed in George
Macovescu et al., eds., Mihail Kogalniceanu: Documente diplomatice
[Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1972], pp. 164-165).
63 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, May 12/24, 1876, Iorga, pp. 173-
174.
64 Constantin N. Velichi, "Rascoala antiotomana bulgara din aprilie 1876,"
Revista de Istorie 29, no. 3 (1976): 373-394; B. Jelavich, "Russia and
the April Uprising," Southeastern Europe 4, no. 2 (1977): 217-232; Aus
dem Leben, III, 27, 34, 38-40.
65 Aus dem Leben, III, 42-43. The memorandum is printed in Macovescu,
Kogalniceanu: Documente diplomatice, pp. 106-113.
66 V. la. Grosul and E. E. Chertan, Rossiia i formirovanie rumynskogo neza-
visimogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1969), p. 190.
67 Ibid.; Ghica report, July 18/30, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplo-
matique, pp. 204-205.
68 Aus dem Leben, II, 457-458.
69 Ibid., pp. 408-409.
70 Ibid., Ill, 15.
71 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
72 Sturdza report, Belgrade, June 14/26, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance dip-
lomatique,-pip. 178-179.
73 Kogalniceanu to Sturdza, June 16/28, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance dip-
lomatique, pp. 179-180.
74 Aus dem Leben, III, 44.
75 Kogalniceanu to Costaforu, June 28/July 10, Kogalniceanu to Sturdza,
June 28/July 10, instructions to the Mehedinti prefect, Iorga, Corre-
spondance diplomatique, pp. 187, 188, 202. See also Kogalniceanu cir-
325
 Notes to pp. 237-245
cular dispatch, Bucharest, July 15/27, 1876, in Macovescu, Kogdlniceanu:
Documente diplomatice, p. 132.
76 The Serbian complaint that the Romanians living in Serbia did not fight
well was denied by Sturdza, who commented that the Serbian govern-
ment was just "harvesting what it had sowed." The Romanians in Serbia
were not justly treated; they could have only Slavic priests who were for-
bidden to use the Romanian language (report of Sturdza, Belgrade, July
6/18, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 193-195).
77 Ghica report, St. Petersburg, July 8/20, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance
diplomatique, p. 196.
78 Kogalniceanu circular, July 19/31, 1876, CR 19/1876.
79 Ghica report, tel., Constantinople, July 24/August 5, 1876, Iorga, Corres-
pondance diplomatique, pp. 209-210.
80 Ghica report, St. Petersburg, August 10/22, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance
diplomatique, pp. 216-217.
81 Aus dem Leben, III, 60.
82 Cantacuzino report, October 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique,
pp. 225-226. Gorchakov wanted the Romanian government to "close its
eyes to the passage of Russian aid" and to make certain that its neutrality
did not seem more sympathetic to the Porte than to the Christians (ibid.).
83 Zinoviev to Alexander II, no. 21, June 15/27, 1876, RFM.
84 Zinoviev to Alexander II, no. 2, Bucharest, June 9/21, 1876, RFM.
85 Stuart to Gorchakov, no. 27, Bucharest, July 28/August 9, 1876, RFM.
86 Zinoviev to Gorchakov, no. 1, Bucharest, January 19/31, 1876, RFM.
87 Stuart to Gorchakov, no. 30, Bucharest, September 22/October 4, 1876,
RFM.
88 Stuart to Gorchakov, no. 31, Bucharest, October 11/23, l876> RFM.
89 Stuart to Gorchakov, no. 34, Bucharest, November 19/December 1, 1876,
RFM.
90 For the negotiations in the Crimea see Zalyshkin, Vneshniaia politika
Rumynii, pp. 127-139.
91 Jomini to Giers [1876], Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, eds., Rus-
sia in the East, I8J6-I88O: The Russo-Turkish War and the Kuldja Crisis
as Seen through the Letters of A. G. Jomini to N. K. Giers (Leiden: Brill,
*959)> P- 3°-
92 D. A. Miliutin, Dnevnik (Moscow: Biblioteka SSSR imeni V. I. Lenina,
!949)> n , 92.
93 Aus dem Leben, III, 62-63.
94 An account of the meeting at Livadia is to be found in the memorandum
"Notes on the Participation of Romania in the War," written by Dimitrie
Sturdza. It is located in the State Archives, Bucharest, in the Bratianu
papers, dosar nr. 162/1877 and 164/1877-78, and is printed in the ap-
pendix to B. Jelavich, "Russia and the Reacquisition of Southern Bes-
sarabia," pp. 233-237. The Bratianu collection in the State Archives will
be cited hereafter as Bratianu papers.
95 From the Balaceanu memoir "Souvenirs politiques et diplomatiques,
1848-1903." This unpublished manuscript is to be found in the library
of the Romanian Academy of Sciences in Bucharest.
96 Report of Ghica, London, November 15/27, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance
diplomatique, pp. 229-230.
326
 Notes to pp. 246-257
97 The most complete account of these negotiations by a participant is given
in A. I. Nelidov, "Souvenirs d'avant et d'apres la guerre de 1877-1878,"
Revue des deux mondes 28 (July 1915): 244-255. See also Aus dem Leben,
III, 76-87; and Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 113.
98 Balaceanu, "Souvenirs," p. 127.
99 Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 114-115; Aus dem Leben, II, 85; Stuart to Gorcha-
kov, tel., secret, St. Petersburg, December 16/28, 1876, Osvobozhdenie
Bolgarii ot Turetskogo Iga, 3 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk
SSSR, 1961-1967), I, 567. Cited hereafter as OBTI.
100 Aus dem Leben, III, 76-77; V. Maciu, "Romania §i conferinta de la Con-
stantinopol din decembrie 1876-ianuarie 1877," Analele Universita\ii
Bucuresti: Istorie, no. 11 (1962): 165-184.
101 Aus dem Leben, III, 91.
102 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
103 Grand Duke Nicholas to Charles, January 12/24, 1877, CR 16/1877.
104 Charles to Grand Duke Nicholas, January 24/February 5, 1877, CR 16/
1877.
105 Andrassy to Bosizio, Pol. Archiv, XXXVIII, tel., Budapest, December 5/
17, 1876, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna. Cited hereafter as HHS.
106 Ibid.
107 Andrassy to Bosizio, Vienna, February 9/21, 1877, HHS; also Balaceanu
report, Vienna, February 7/19, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, p.
238.
108 The difficult choices before the Romanian government are discussed in
B. Jelavich, "Diplomatic Problems of an Autonomous State: Romanian
Decisions on War and Independence, 1877," Southeastern Europe 5, no. 1
(1978): 26-35.
109 Aus dem Leben, III, 80, 116; Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 114-116.
110 The secret conventions are printed in Sumner, Russia and the Balkans,
pp. 596-601.
111 OBTI, I, 629.
112 Aus dem Leben, III, 112-115.
113 Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 153.
114 De"metre A. Sturdza, ed., Charles ler, Roi de Roumanie: Chronique-Actes-
Documents (Bucharest: Charles Gobi, 1899), II, 531, 545.
115 Aus dem Leben, III, 116.
116 Cimpineanu circular, April 1/13, 1877, Iorga, Correspondance diploma-
tique, pp. 243-244.
117 Ibid., pp. 244-248.
118 In his memoirs Nelidov expressed his disapproval of the action: "I did
my utmost to spare my country that humiliation" ("Souvenirs," Revue
des deux mondes 28 (July 1915): 253, 254).
119 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, II, 550-551; Stuart to Gorchakov, tel., April
4/16, 1877, OBTI, I, 636.
120 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, cipher tel., Bucharest, April 11/23, 1&77> i n Gen-
eral R. Rosetti, ed., Corespondenta Generalului Iancu Ghica, 2 aprilie
i8yy-8 aprilie 18j8 (Bucharest: Cartea Romanesca, 1930), pp. 34-35.
This valuable collection, which contains the diplomatic correspondence
of the Romanian agent in St. Petersburg, is hereafter cited as Corespon-
denta . . . Ghica.

327
 Notes to pp. 257-260
121 Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 155-156.
122 Aus dem Leben, III, 130. Kogalniceanu telegraphed Ghica: "The en-
trance of the Russian army before the legislative bodies have decided and
without being warned 24 hours beforehand strikes us with amazement.
The proclamation of the grand duke is in patent contradiction to that
convention. It neither takes into account our right nor does it safeguard
the dignity of the country and the prince, [by] asking the country for per-
mission for the passage of troops and considering [it] as a sovereign
friend" (Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, April 12/24, 1877, Cores-
pondenta . . . Ghica. pp. 37-38).
123 Aus dem Leben, III, 132.
124 Kogalniceanu circular, April 12/24, 1^>11> Vasile M. Kogalniceanu, ed.,
Acte si documente din corespondenta diplomaticd a lui Mihail Kogal-
niceanu relative la resboiul independentei Romdniei, 1877-1878, 2 vols.
(Bucharest: Tipografia Basilescu, 1893). Hereafter cited as Kogalniceanu,
Corespondenta, with the date for the document noted. Here the reference
is to pp. 44-45 of the volume for 1877.
125 Bratianu's strong defense of an agreement with Russia was to cause him
embarrassment later. In the senate on March 15/27, in answer to a direct
question, he denied that the return of Bessarabia was in question (Nico-
lae Iorga, Histoire des Roumains et de la romanite orientale [Bucharest:
Academie roumaine, 1945], X, 207).
126 Kogalniceanu circular, April 17/29, 1877, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta
1877, pp. 70-71.
127 Edhem Pasha to Charles, Constantinople, April 13/25, 1877, Kogalni-
ceanu, Corespondenta 1877, p. 41.
128 Kogalniceanu circular, April 10/22, 1877, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta
1877, pp. 39-41.
129 Alexander II to Charles, Kishinev, April 13/25, 1877, CR 16/1877.
130 Grand Duke Nicholas to Charles, Kishinev, April 14/26, 1877, CR 16/
1877. Charles replied that he appreciated the strategic necessity of the
Russian action and that he also would like to remain in correspondence
(Charles to Nicholas, Bucharest, April 17/29, 1877, OBTI, II, 30-31).
131 See Gr. Chirita, "Atitudinea puterilor europene fata de proclamarea in-
dependentei Romaniei," Revista de Istorie 30, no. 4 (1977): 673-690.
132 On the Austrian attitude see B. Jelavich, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania
and the Eastern Crisis," pp. 121-122. Franz Joseph commented on the
act that it was "curious to see the Romanians choose the moment when
their country is occupied by foreign troops to declare themselves inde-
pendent" (Novikov to Gorchakov, no. 65, Vienna, May 4/16, 1877, RFM).
Andrassy told Novikov that he was not against Romanian independence
but that "this question, like so many others, should be reserved for the
time when a European conference will have to decide the final fate of the
Balkan peninsula" (Novikov to Gorchakov, no. 72, Vienna, May 22/June
3, 1877, RFM).
133 Aus dem Leben, III, 179.
134 Ibid., p. 141.
135 Kogalniceanu wrote to Ghica: "Our negotiations consist before all, as
the beginning and the end, to obtain at least five millions without which
we cannot move. These millions should not be delayed a single day"
328
 Notes to pp. 260-262
(Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, April 10/22, 1877, Corespondenta . . .
Ghica, p. 33).
136 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, very urgent, Kishinev, April 11/23, 1877, Kogal-
niceanu, Corespondenta 187 j , p. 36.
137 Aus dem Leben, III, 142.
138 Alexander II wrote comments on Nelidov's report of the meeting. On the
question of money he noted: "That is too much! (C'est trop fort!)" (Neli-
dov to Gorchakov, secret, Ploe§ti, May 7/19, 1877, OBTI, II, 67).
139 The tsar's comments here were: "She [Austria] does not dream of attack-
ing them" {OBTI, II, 67).
140 OBTI, II, 67.
141 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, May 7/19, 1877, CR 7/1877.
142 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, May 9/21, 1877, Corespondenta
. . . Ghica, pp. 74-75.
143 Gorchakov to Charles, Aus dem Leben, III, 167-169. Nelidov wrote to
Ignatiev that the Romanians were requesting participation in the fight-
ing and money, arms, and assurances for the future. He found them very
difficult to please and thought that Russian relations with the Bulgars
should be considered first (Nelidov to Ignatiev, Ploe§ti, May 15/27, 1877,
N. P. Ignatiev, "Zapiski," Istoricheski Vestnik 137 [1914]: 65-66).
144 Aus dem Leben, III, 172-173.
145 Ibid., pp. 178-179.
146 Kogalniceanu explained his past policy in a secret meeting of the Ro-
manian parliament on January 23/February 4, 1878 (Bratianu papers,
P- 25)-
147 Ignatiev favored Romanian participation because it would let Russia
take southern Bessarabia with greater ease. He told Gorchakov: "The
Turks . . . probably will defeat our allies or place them in a critical posi-
tion; then we will come to their assistance, save their army and we can
demand in compensation that the part of Bessarabia which is inhabited
primarily by Russians and Bulgars be added to Russia. Otherwise, that
is, without this direct assistance, rendered by us to Romania, it would be
awkward to seize territory from our allies at the end of the war and it
would make it very difficult to satisfy them territorially without damage
to our interests." Gorchakov considered this plan "Machiavellian" (Igna-
tiev, "Zapiski," pp. 70-71).
148 Nicholas to Charles, Zimnicea, June 18/30, 1877, CR 16/1877.
149 Charles to Nicholas, Bucharest, June 20/July 2, 1877, CR 16/1877.
150 Charles to Kogalniceanu, Poiana, July 7/19, 1877, CR 16/1877. Kogal-
niceanu was indignant at the Russian request (Kogalniceanu to Charles,
Bucharest, July 7/19, 1877, CR 16/1877).
151 Aus dem Leben, III, 204.
152 The Russian opinion of the value of the Balkan allies was given by A. F.
Hamburger, an assistant to Gorchakov. "In my humble opinion all these
miserable allies have cost us much money and one has already had suf-
ficient proofs of what they can provide . . . What services has Romania
rendered us until now?" (Hamburger to Giers, Bielo, July 28/August 9,
1877, C. Jelavich and B. Jelavich, Russia in the East, p. 164).
153 Ghica to Charles, July 11/23, 1877, CR 7/1877; Aus dem Leben, III, 205.
154 Kogalniceanu to Charles, July 13/25 (or 12/24), C R 7/1877.

3*9
 Notes to pp. 263-268
155 Charles to Kogalniceanu, Poiana, July 13/25, CR 7/1877 (two letters).
156 Nicholas to Charles, Trnovo, July 30/August 11, 1877, CR 16/1877.
157 Aus dem Leben, III, 212-213.
158 Bratianu to Charles, Turnu Magurele, July 28/August 9, 1877, CR 7/
1877, Aus dem Leben, III, 222.
159 Charles to Bratianu, Simnic, August 9, 1877, Bratianu papers, 22.
160 Charles to Nicholas, Poiana, July 22/August 3, 1877, CR 16/1877.
161 Slaniceanu to Charles, Corabia, July 28/August 9, CR 16/1877.
162 Nicholas to Charles, Bulgareni, July 27/August 8; Nicholas to Charles,
very confidential, Gorni Studen, August 3/15, 1877, CR 16/1877.
163 Nicholas to Charles, Gorni Studen, August 6/18, CR 16/1877.
164 Nicholas to Charles, Gorni Studen, August 9/21, CR 16/1877.
165 Charles to Nicholas, Simnic, August 10/22, CR 16/1877.
166 Charles to Nicholas, Simnic, August 13/25, CR 16/1877.
167 Aus dem Leben, III, 237-238.
168 Kogalniceanu to Balaceanu, August 25/September 6, 1877, Iorga, Cone-
spondance diplomatique, pp. 292-293. Charles was not keeping his min-
isters informed of his actions. Kogalniceanu requested that he do so,
commenting, "Public opinion in Bucharest is very apprehensive and very
agitated"; this feeling was increased "by the ignorance in which even the
ministers find themselves" (Kogalniceanu to Charles, August 25/Septem-
ber 6, 1877, CR 16/1877).
169 For example, see Boerescu to Charles, Bucharest, July 5/17, 1874, and
Boerescu to Charles, July 11/23, l874> CR 13/1874.
170 Aus dem Leben, III, 158.
171 Ibid., pp. 276, 355-356.
172 Ibid., pp. 173-174, 323, 358-359; see also Ghica to his wife, Poradim, No-
vember 14/26, 1877, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 113-115.
173 Aus dem Leben, III, 337, 469.
174 For the conversations held at this time, see Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 238-
239; and Aus dem Leben, III, 337.
175 Aus dem Leben, III, 354, 469-470. Charles, it appears, never spoke to the
tsar about Bessarabia.
176 For Bratianu's discussions at this time see the appendix to B. Jelavich,
"Russia and the Reacquisition of Southern Bessarabia," pp. 236-237.
177 Aus dem Leben, III, 379-380.
178 Charles to Nicholas, Bucharest, December 29, 1877/January 10, 1878, CR
16/1877.
179 Aus dem Leben, III, 446-447.
180 Nicholas to Charles, Kazanlik, January 10/22, 1878, CR 16/1877.
181 Aus dem Leben, III, 436-438.
182 Kogalniceanu to Stuart, Bucharest, January 11/23, 1878, Kogalniceanu,
Corespondenta 1878, pp. 19-21.
183 Miliutin commented in his diary on January 14/26: "Finally Prince Gor-
chakov has recognized the necessity of categorical declarations to the Ro-
manians. Too bad that it is rather late" {Dnevnik, II, 14). See also Aus
dem Leben, III, 450-453.
184 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, January 14/26, 1878, Corespon-
denta . . . Ghica, p. 128.
 Notes to pp. 268-2J3
185 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, January 14/26, 1878, Corespon-
denta . . . Ghica, p. 128.
186 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 1/13, 1878, Corespondenta
. . . Ghica, p. 161.
187 Alexander II to Charles, St. Petersburg, n.d., CR 16/1877; Aus dem Le-
ben, III, 457.
188 Aus dem Leben, III, 456.
189 Ibid., p. 458.
190 Charles to Alexander II, n.d., CR 16/1877.
191 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, January 14/26, 1878, Corespondenta
. . . Ghica, p. 129; see also Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, January
15/27, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp. 23-24.
192 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, January 18/30, 1870, Corespondenta
. . . Ghica, pp. 133-134.
193 Nicholas to Charles, Adrianople, January 19/31, 1878, CR 16/1877.
194 Nicholas to Charles, Adrianople, January 21 /February 2, 1878, CR 16/
1877.
195 Charles to Nicholas, Bucharest, January 23/February 4, 1878, CR 16/
1877.
196 Aus dem Leben, III, 459-462.
197 The text of the armistice agreement is given in Sumner, Russia and the
Balkans, pp. 625-626.
198 Aus dem Leben, III, 458. It will be noted that despite Kogalniceanu's
personal attitude, the Romanian notes sent under his name to the powers
on the Bessarabian question are strong.
199 Ibid., Ill, 501; IV, 9.
200 Ibid., IV, 4.
201 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, January 29/February 10, 1878,
Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 141-142.
202 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 7/19, 1878, Corespondenta
. . . Ghica, p. 166; Aus dem Leben, IV, 9.
203 The Treaty of San Stefano can be found in Sumner, Russia and the Bal-
kans, pp. 627-636. For the Russian objectives see B. Jelavich, "Negotiating
the Treaty of San Stefano," Southeastern Europe 6, no. 2 (1979): 171-193.
204 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, March 23/April 4, 1878, Corespon-
denta . . . Ghica, pp. 176-178.
205 Aus dem Leben, IV, 13-15.
206 Kogalniceanu to Balaceanu, Bucharest, March 15/27, 1878, Indepen-
denta Romdniei: Documente (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Repub-
licii Socialiste Romania, 1977), IV, 346.
207 The consideration that the Romanian leaders were giving to a possible
war with Russia is shown in the Sturdza notes. It was estimated that Ro-
mania had 78,800 troops available, of which 60,000 were stationed in a
favorable position against the mountains. There were believed to be
40,000 Russian soldiers in Romania, 60,000 in Bulgaria, and 150,000 near
Constantinople. The Romanians had suffered 900 to 1,000 dead in the
assaults on Plevna and 500 to 600 losses in the Rakhovo-Vidin operations
(Bratianu papers, 165/1877-1878).
208 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, February 26/March 10, 1878,
Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 159-160.

331
 Notes to pp. 2J3-2J5
209 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 16/28, 1878, Kogalniceanu,
Corespondenta 1878, p. 81.
210 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, March 8/20, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta
1878, pp. 59-63.
211 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, March 10/22, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespon-
denta I8J8, pp. 64-73.
212 "Memoir on the question of Bessarabia," Bucharest, February 25/March
9, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp. 186-190.
213 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, February 28/March 12, 1878,
Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 160-161.
214 The Russian government later denied this statement. Since the cession
to Moldavia of southern Bessarabia had been a part of the Treaty of
Paris, it was obviously a question that would be dealt with at a congress.
See Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 29/April 10, 1878,
Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 184-185.
215 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, February 28/March 12, 1878,
Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 160-161.
216 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 20/April 1, 1878, Cores-
pondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 171-173.
217 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 22/April 3, 1878, Cores-
pondenta . . . Ghica, p. 175.
218 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, March 21/April 2, 1878, Corespon-
denta . . . Ghica, p. 174.
219 Kogalniceanu circular dispatch, March 25/April 6, 1878, Kogalniceanu,
Corespondenta 1878, pp. 95-96. The Romanian leaders were proud of
their army, in particular of its accomplishments at Plevna. In contrast,
the Russian judgment was not so favorable. For example, in an interview
published in the French newspaper Gaulois, it was reported that Ignatiev,
"questioned on the conduct of the Romanian soldiers, began to laugh
and answered that they had turned their backs to the enemy two times
in succession" (B&laceanu to Kogalniceanu, Vienna, October 5, 1877,
Bratianu papers, 22).
220 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, April 7/19, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta
1878, p. 118.
221 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 23/April 4, 1878, Kogal-
niceanu, Corespondenta 1878, p. 93. In answer to Ghica's request for an
explanation of the Russian troop movements, Giers said that they were
in preparation for a return of the army, but he admitted "that they could
have an aim to deal with certain eventualities that could menace the
communications of the army in Bulgaria" (Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Pet-
ersburg, April 6/18, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 203-204).
222 Kogalniceanu to Bratianu, March 27/April 8, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Cores-
pondenta 1878, p. 101.
223 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, St. Petersburg, March 31/April 12, 1878, ibid.,
p. 107.
224 Kogalniceanu to Bratianu, tel., Bucharest, April 17, 1878, HHS.
225 Bratianu to Balaceanu, tel., confidential, Bucharest, April 28, 1878, HHS.
226 Charles to Alexander II, February 22/March 6, 1878, Aus dem Leben,
IV, 2-3.
227 Alexander II to Charles, tel., March 28/April 10, 1878, Ibid., pp. 20L

33*
 Notes to pp. 276-282
228 Alexander II to Charles, private letter, March 28/April 9, 1878, CR
16/1877.
229 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, April 8/20, 1878, Corespondenta
. . . Ghica, p. 204.
230 George Hoover Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria, I8J6—
i8y8 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 371.
231 Ibid., p. 379; Gorchakov to Shuvalov, reserve, St. Petersburg, May 18/30,
1877, OB TI, II, 83-87.
232 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, pp. 391-392.
233 The Poradim proposals are to be found in ibid., pp. 421-422; and OBTI,
ll
> 339-341.
234 Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, Foundations of British For-
eign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), p. 370.
235 Salisbury to White, April 22/May 4, 1878, H. Sutherland Edwards, Sir
William White (London: Murray, 1902), p. 134. During this period the
Romanian leaders were attempting to gain some assurances of British
support. On May 1/13 Bratianu in a meeting with White expressed alarm
about a possible clash with the Russian troops and requested British as-
sistance, in particular ten thousand carabines for the cavalry (White to
Salisbury, no. 91, secret, Bucharest, May 1/13, 1878, Independent^ Ro-
mdniei, II, pt. 2, 318-319). White reported further on May 12/24 o n t n e
Romanian attitude of resistance and on May 15/27 on the Romanian
regret concerning British reserve on the question of Bessarabia (White
to Salisbury, no. 98, secret, Bucharest, May 12/24, and no. 105, secret,
May 15/27, 1878, ibid., pp. 323-326).
236 Elliot to White, Vienna, May 5/17, 1878, Edwards, White, pp. 135-136.
237 Summer, Russia and the Balkans, p. 648.
238 Aus dem Leben, IV, 25-27. See also Nothomb to Aspremont-Lynden, no.
199/119, Berlin, April 1/13, 1878, Independent^ Romdniei, II, pt. 2,
296-298.
239 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, pp. 422-424. The Russian government too
acknowledged the connection between southern Bessarabia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina. In the instructions drawn up for the Russian representa-
tives to the Congress of Berlin it was stated: "The two annexations were
dependent upon one another in the terms of our agreements" {OBTI,
III, 126-132).
240 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, pp. 439-441.
241 Ibid., pp. 445, 446.
242 W. N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After (London: Cass, 1963),
pp. 25-26.
243 This section is based on B. Jelavich, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania and the
Eastern Crisis," pp. 111-141.
244 Balaceanu to Bratianu, tel., Vienna, April 10, 1877, Bratianu papers, 15.
245 Bratianu to Balaceanu, Bucharest, June 3, 1878, HHS.
246 Balaceanu to Bratianu, very confidential, Vienna, May 26/June 7, 1878,
Bratianu, Acte si Cuvdntdri, IV, 55. Balaceanu in his memoir noted that
Andrassy, before leaving for Berlin, declared, "Keep your powder dry"
("Souvenirs," p. 135).
247 Balaceanu to Charles, Vienna, May 28/June 9, 1878, CR 32/1878.
248 OBTI, III, 131.

333
 Notes to pp. 282-290
249 Kogalniceanu circular, Bucharest, March 16/28, 1878, Kogalniceanu,
Corespondenta 18y8, pp. 191-195.
250 Aus dem Leben, IV, 59. Charles was also interested in being elected prince
of Bulgaria: when Ignatiev had visited Bucharest, he had mentioned this
possibility (ibid., Ill, 458, 460).
251 On June 12/24 Br^tianu wrote Rosetti that only Bismarck had been
truthful with him; the other representatives, in contrast, had wished Ro-
mania to cause difficulties for Russia to serve their own interests (ibid.,
IV, 72).
252 Kogalniceanu to Cimpineanu, Berlin, June 9/21, 1878, Kogalniceanu,
Corespondenta 1878, pp. 164-167.
253 Bratianu and Kogalniceanu to Cimpineanu, Berlin, June 19/July 1, 1878,
Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp. 173-174.
254 The memorandum is printed in Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp.
166-170.
255 The protocol of the session is given in ibid., pp. 203-219.
256 Kogalniceanu to Cimpineanu, Berlin, June 20/July 2, 1878, ibid., p. 229.
The telegrams sent by Bratianu and Kogalniceanu from Berlin during
the congress all emphasize the importance of the Bessarabian question
and the hopelessness of the Romanian position. Quotations from some
of these can be found in Barbara Jelavich, "Romania at the Congress of
Berlin: Problems of Peacemaking," in Der Berliner Kongress von 1878,
ed. Ralph Melville and Hans-Jiirgen Schroder (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner
Verlag, 1982), pp. 189-204.
257 Aus dem Leben, IV, 75.
258 The text of the Treaty of Berlin can be found in Edward Hertslet, The
Map of Europe by Treaty (London: Butterworths, 1891), IV, 2759-2798.
259 Ibid., pp. 2785-2786, 2790-2791.
260 For the Russian experiences in Bulgaria see Charles Jelavich, Tsarist
Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Af-
fairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886 (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1958).
261 Medlicott, Congress of Berlin, pp. 178-179, 214-217, and "The Recog-
nition of Roumanian Independence, 1878-1880," Slavonic Review 11
O933): 354-372, 572-589-
262 Kogalniceanu circular, May 17/29, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta
1878,p. 151.
263 The interrelationship of the railroad issue, the Jewish question, and the
recognition of Romanian independence is discussed in Fritz Stern, Gold
and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichroder, and the Building of the German Em-
pire (New York: Knopf, 1977), pp. 351-393.
264 Quoted in R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 352.

334
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the private papers and official reports of Nicholas Karlovich Giers, who was
consul general in Bucharest from 1858 to 1863, was kindly made available to
the author by Serge Giers, his grandson. The second consists of a selection of
documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives on relations with Ro-
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Bucharest. This material gives an excellent view of Romanian-Russian rela-
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Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv in Vienna have also been used. Historians in-
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to this study have been listed here.
Since it is impossible to include all of the many books and articles on Euro-
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Russian and Romanian events. The attempt has been made to include as many
of the major books and articles in Romanian and Russian as possible, but here
again it has been necessary to impose limitations. For other books and articles
on Romanian history, the reader is referred to Bibliografia istoricd a Romdniet,
4 vols. (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1970-
1975). Further titles of Russian material can be found cited in the bibliogra-
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Jelavich, Barbara. Russia and Greece during the Regency of King Othon,
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Kog&lniceanu, Vasile M., ed. Acte si documente din corespondenta diplomaticd
a lui Mihail Kogdlniceanu relative la resboiul independentei Romdniei,
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Macovescu, George, et al., eds. Mihail Kogdlniceanu: Documente diplomatics
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Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot Turetskogo Iga. 3 vols. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akad-
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Revolutia din 1821 condusd de Tudor Vladimirescu: Documente externe. Bu-
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Temperley, Harold, and Lillian M. Penson. Foundations of British Foreign
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Aus dem Leben Konig Karls von Rumdnien. 4 vols. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'schen
Buchhandlung, 1894-1900.
Boldan, Emil, ed. Alexandru loan Cuza si Costache Negri: Corespondenta. Bu-
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Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich, eds. The Education of a Russian States-
man: The Memoirs of Nicholas Karlovich Giers. Berkeley: University of
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1982.
Russia in the East, 1876-1880: The Russo-Turkish War and the Kuldja
Crisis as Seen through the Letters of A. G. Jomini to N. K. Giers. Leiden:
Brill, 1959.
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Books and dissertations

Adaniloaie, N., and Dan Berindei, Revolutia de la 1848 in tdrile romdne: Cule-
gere de studii. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Ro-
mania, 1974.
Andics, E. Das Bundnis Habsburg-Romanow. Budapest: Akade*miai Kiad6,

Antonescu, Cornelius G. Die rumdnische Handelspolitik von 1875-1910. Leip-

zig: W. Schunke, 1915.
Averbukh, R. Tsarskaia interventsiia v bor'be s vengerskoi revoliutsiei, 1848-
1849. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Sotsiarno-ekonomicheskoe Izdatel'stvo,
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Berezniakov, N. V. Revoliutsionnoe i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v
dunaiskikh kniazhestvakh v 1848-1849 gg. Kishinev: Gosudarstvennoe
Izdatel'stvo Moldavii, 1955.
Berindei, Dan. L'Annee revolutionnaire 1821 dans les pays roumains. Bucha-
rest: Editions de l'Acade'mie de la Re'publique Socialiste de Roumanie,
1973-
L'Union des principautes roumaines. Bucharest: Editions de l'Acad^mie
de la Re'publique Socialiste de Roumanie, 1967.
Berry, Robert Allen. "Czartoryski and the Balkan Policies of the Hotel Lam-
bert, 1832-1847." Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1974.
Beyrau, Dietrich. Russische Orientpolitik und die Entstehung des deutschen
Kaiserreiches, 1866-1870/71. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1974.
Bezviconi, G. Contributii la istoria relatiilor romino-ruse. Bucharest: Academia
Republicii Populare Romine, 1962.
Bibesco, Georges. Regne de Bibesco. 2 vols. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1893-1894.
Bindreiter, Uta. Die diplomatischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen
Osterreich-Ungarn und Rumdnien in den Jahren 1875-1888. Vienna: Her-
mann Bohlaus Nachf., 1976.
Birke, Ernst. Frankreich und Ostmitteleuropa im 19. Jahrhundert. Cologne:
Bohlau Verlag, i960.
Blaisdell, Donald C. European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1929.
Bobango, Gerald J. The Emergence of the Romanian National State. Boulder,
Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1979.
Bodea, Cornelia. The Romanians' Struggle for Unification, 1834-1849. Bucha-
rest: Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Ro-
mania, 1970.
Boicu, Leonid. Austria si principatele romdne in vremea rdzboiului Crimeii,
1853-1856. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania,
1972.
Diplomatia europeand si triumful cauzei romdne, 1856-1859. Jassy: Editura
Junimea, 1978.
Bormann, Claus. "Bismarck und Siidosteuropa vom Krimkrieg bis zur Pontus-
konferenz." Doctoral dissertation, Hamburg, 1967.
Campbell, John C. "French Influence and the Rise of Roumanian Nationalism:
The Generation of 1848." Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1940.
Charles-Roux, Francois. Alexandre II, Gortchakoff et Napoleon III. Paris: Li-
brairie Plon-Nourrit, 1913.
Chertan, E. E. Russko-Rumynskie otnosheniia v 18'59-1863 godakh. Kishinev:
Izdatel'stvo "Kartia Moldoveniaske," 1968.
Velikie derzhavy i formirovanie rumynskogo nezavisimogo gosudarstva.
Kishinev: "Shtiintsa," 1980.
Chirot, Daniel. Social Change in a Peripheral Society: The Creation of a Bal-
kan Colony. New York: Academic Press, 1976.
Ciachir, Nicolae. Rdzboiul pentru independent^ Romdniei in contextul Euro-
pean, 1875-1878. Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica §i Enciclopedica, 1977.
Cioriceanu, Georges D. La Roumanie economique et ses rapports avec Vetran-
ger de i860 a 1915. Paris: M. Giard, 1928.
Corivan, N. Lupta diplomaticd pentru cucerirea independentei Romdniei. Bu-
charest: Editura Stiintifica §i Enciclopedica, 1977.
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Curtiss, John Shelton. Russia's Crimean War. Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1979.
Cuza Vodd in memoriam. Jassy: Editura Junimea, n.d.
Diplomatia romdnd in slujba independentei. Bucharest: Editura politica, 1977.
East, W. G. The Union of Moldavia and Wallachia, 1859. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1929.
Edwards, H. Sutherland. Sir William White. London: Murray, 1902.
Emerit, Marcel. Les Paysans roumains depuis le traite d'Andrinople jusqu'a la
liberation des terres, 1829-1864. Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1937.
Filitti, loan C. Domniile Romdne sub regulamentul organic, 1834-1848. Bucha-
rest: Librariile Socec, 1915.
Les Principautes roumaines sous Voccupation russe, 1828-1834. Bucharest:
Imprimerie de T'lndependance Roumaine," 1904.
Florescu, Radu R. N. The Struggle against Russia in the Roumanian Princi-
palities, 1821-1854. Munich: Societatea Academica Romana, 1962.
Friese, Christian. Russland und Preussen vom Krimkrieg bis zum polnischen
Aufstand. Berlin: Ost-Europa Verlag, 1931.
Fryer, Bruce C. "Nicolae Balcescu: Rumanian Liberal and Revolutionary."
Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972.
Georgescu, Vlad. Political Ideas and the Enlightenment in the Romanian Prin-
cipalities, 1750-1831. Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1971.
Giurescu, Constantin C. Viata si opera lui Cuza Vodd. Bucharest: Editura §tiin-
tifica, 1966.
Goriainow, Serge. Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles. Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1910.
Grosul, G. S. Dunaiskie kniazhestva v politike Rossii, 1774-1806. Kishinev:
Izdatel'stvo "Shtiintsa," 1975.
Grosul, V. la. Reformy v Dunaiskikh kniazhestvakh i Rossiia, 20-30 gody XIX
veka. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1966.
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia i Balkany, 1874-1883. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nau-
ka," 1980.
Grosul, V. la., and E. E. Chertan. Rossiia i formirovanie rumynskogo nezavisi-
mogo gosudarstva. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1969.
Hiinigen, Gisela, Nikolaj Pavlovic Ignafev und die russische Balkanpolitik,
1875-1878. Gottingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1968.
Iorga, Nicolae. Histoire des relations russo-roumaines. Jassy: Edition du journal
"Neamul Romanesc," 1917.
Histoire des Roumains et de la romanite orientale. 10 vols. in 11. Bucharest:
Academie Roumaine, 1937-1945.
Politica externd a Regelui Carol I. Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice Lu-
ceafarul, 1923.
Jelavich, Barbara. History of the Balkans. Vol. I. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1983.
The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870-
1887. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.
Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, 1858-1859. Bloomington, Ind.:
Slavic and East European Series, 1959. Reprint ed., Hamden, Conn.:
Archon, 1974.
St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814-1974.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974.
Jelavich, Charles. Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in
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 Bibliography
the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1958.
Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich. The Establishment of the Balkan Na-
tional States, 1804-1920. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.
Jewsbury, George F. The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia, 1774-1828: A
Study of Imperial Expansion. Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly,
1976.
Kellogg, Frederick. "Romanian Nationalism and European Diplomacy, 1866-
1878." Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1969.
Marcu, Alexandru. Conspiratori si conspiratii in epoca renasterii politice a
Romaniei, 1848-1877. Bucharest: Cartea Romaneasca, 1930.
Medlicott, W. N. The Congress of Berlin and After. London: Cass, 1963.
Meininger, Thomas A. Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exar-
chate, 1864-1872. Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1970.
Michelson, Paul E. "Conflict and Development in Romanian Politics, 1861-
1871." Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1975.
Mosse, W. E. The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-1871, with
Special Reference to England and Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1958.
The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 1855-1871. London: Macmillan,
93
OJetea, A. Tudor Vladimirescu si revolutia din 1821. Bucharest: Editura §tiin-
tifica, 1971.
Ojetea, Andrei, ed. The History of the Romanian People. New York: Twayne,
n.d.
Petrovich, Michael Boro. The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1956.
Radulescu-Valasoglu, Irina. Alexandru loan Cuza si politica europeand. Bu-
charest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1974.
Reprezentantele diplomatice ale Romaniei, 1859-1917. Vol. I. Bucharest: Edi-
tura Politica, 1967.
Riker, T. W. The Making of Roumania. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

Roider, Karl A., Jr. The Reluctant Ally: Austria's Policy in the Austro-Turkish
War, 1737-1739* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972.
Rupp, George Hoover. A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria, 1876-1878.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941.
Saab, Ann Pottinger. The Origins of the Crimean Alliance. Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1977.
Saul, Norman E. Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1970.
Schroeder, Paul W. Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1972.
Semenova, I. V. Russko-moldavskoe boevoe sodruzhestvo, 1787-1791. Kishinev:
Izdatel'stvo "Kartia Moldoveniaske," 1968.
Senkevich, I. G. Rossiia i kritskoe vosstanie, 1866-1869 g. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo
"Nauka," 1970.
Seton-Watson, R. W. A History of the Roumanians. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1934.

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Sheremet, V. I. Turtsiia i Adrianopol'skii mir 1829 g. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo
"Nauka," 1975.
Sliivescu, Victor. Recunoasterea dreptului de a bate moneta: Actiunea diplo-
maticd a Romdniei in i866-i8yo. Bucharest: Fundatia Regele Carol I, 1941.
Stern, Fritz. Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichroder, and the Building of the
German Empire. New York: Knopf, 1977.
Sturdza, Alexandre A. C. Regne de Michel Sturdza: Prince Regnant de Mol-
davie, 1834-1849. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1907.
Sugar, Peter F. Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804. Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1977.
Sumner, B. H. Russia and the Balkans, i8yo-i88o. Oxford: Oxford University
Press (Clarendon Press), 1937.
Vinogradov, V. N. Rossiia i ob'edinenie rumynskikh kniazhestv. Moscow: Izda-
tel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1961.
Ocherki obshchestvenno-politicheskoi mysli v Rumynii. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo
"Nauka," 1975.
Vitcu, Dumitru. Diplomatii unirii. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii
Socialiste Romania, 1979.
Xenopol, Alexandru D. Domnia lui Cuza Vodd. 2 vols. Jassy: Tipografia Edi-
tora "Dacia" P. Iliescu and D. Grossu, 1903.
Zalyshkin, M. M. Vneshniaia politika Rumynii i rumyno-russkie otnosheniia,
1875-1878. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1974.

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Berindei, Dan. "Lupta diplomatica a principatelor unite pentru desavir§irea
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"Mihail Kogalniceanu, Prim-Ministru al Moldovei, §i emigratia maghiara,
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"Un moment din legaturile romino-ruse in timpul lui Cuza Voda: 'Aran-
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345
 Index
Abdul Aziz, 117, 167, 207, 214, 217, 232
Abdul Mejid, 117
Additional Act (to Convention of 1859),
145
Additional Article, 37, 38
see also Organic Statutes
administrative reform
and Convention of Akkerman, 28
Kiselev draft statutes for, 32-34
see also Organic Statutes
Adrianople, Treaty of (1829), 30-31, 34,
62, 131, 295
Afif Bey, 93, 95
agents and agencies, 8, 106, 114, 127, 193,
194, 195, 218, 219, 298
Agrarian Law (August 1864), 146
aims, Russian, 7, 10, 15, 64-65, 151, 182
Ainali Kavak, Treaty of (1779), 6
Akkerman, 9
Akkerman, Convention of (1826), 27-28,
30, 31, 295
Alecsandri, Vasile, 96, 106, 107, 120, 142
Alexander I, 10, 12, 16, 17, 23-24, 25, 26,
27, 35, 293
Alexander II, 83, 84-85, 90, 103, 109, 117,
141, 197, 219, 259, 270, 277, 279, 281-
282
and Charles, 190, 193, 211, 214, 264-
265, 266, 269, 274, 275, 276
denunciation of Black Sea neutraliza-
tion, 202, 203
early policy as emperor, 59-60, 61-62
and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878, 237-
238, 241-246, 255, 261, 262, 265-267
Alexandrescu, see Nelidov, Alexander
Ivanovich
346
Ali Bey, 248
Ali Pasha, 58, 69, 72, 104, 138, 144, 154,
158, 188, 202, 217
Andrassy, Julius, 216, 222, 228, 233, 251-
252, 254, 259-260, 280-281, 283
Andrassy Note (1875), 228, 232
Anuchin, Colonel D. G., 283
Apponyi, Count Rudolf, 210
Arab Tabia, 288
Arion, Colonel Eraclie, 267-268
Armistice of January 1878, 270
army
Romanian, militia, 106, 111, 113
Romanian, as part of Ottoman, 218
Romanian, in Russian operations, 260-
266
Arsache, A., 120
Association of Romanian Students, 53
Auerbach, 206
Ausgleich of 1867, 181, 216
Austria, see Habsburg Monarchy
ayans, 10-11
Azov, 1, 4
Balabin, Viktor Petrovich, 80-81, 82, 137
Balaceanu, Ion, 75, 162, 165, 176, 209, 226,
230,243,247,252,272, 275,280-281,
306 n22
Balcescu, Nicholas, 40, 42, 53
Baleanu, Emanoil, 92, 95
Balkan campaign of Peter the Great, 2
Bals, T., 72, 73, 92
Balta Liman, Convention of (1849), 50,
51, 52, 56, 62, 306 n28
ban, 4
Banat, 3, 4
 Index
bashi-bozuks, 258
Basily, Constantine Mikhailovich, 77,
78-79, 80, 84, 134-135
Batum, 282, 286
Baudin, Charles, 82
Bazili, see Basily, Constantine Mikhailo-
vich
Beauharnais, Stephanie de, 165
Beclard, Louis, 91, 96
Belogradchik, 267, 270
Bender, 8-9
Benevolent Society (Bulgarian), 187
Benzi, Rafaello, 77
Berlin, Congress of (1878), 272, 276-286
Berlin, Treaty of (1878), 284-288, 299
Berlin Memorandum (1876), 232
Bessarabia
and Congress of Berlin, 278, 279
as part of Dacia, 7
and Filiki Etairia, 22
grain of, 225
and Journal de St. Pe'tersbourg, 273-
274
Livadia discussion about, 243-244
and Reichstadt Agreement, 233
and Russia, 15, 45, 52, 57, 58, 61, 62, 66t
124, 239, 265-284, 287, 299
territory of, 14
transfer of, 77
and Treaty of San Stefano, 271, 277
and unification with Principalities, 41,
54
Beust, Frederick Ferdinand von, 181,
188, 189, 197, 210, 216, 222, 345
Bibescu, George, 38, 43, 44, 50, 72, 73, 83,
95, 96, 132, 158
Bismarck, Otto von, 161, 165, 166, 169,
173, 179, 181, 186, 189, 196, 202, 203, Budberg, Baron Andreus F., 56, 103, 157,
215, 216, 218, 255, 279, 289, 290, 298,
317 n75
Black Sea
free navigation of, 5
neutralization and demilitarization of,
57, 58, 61-62, 202, 210, 216
Blaremberg, N., 149
Bleichroder, Gerson, 289
Bobrikov, Colonel G. I., 283
Boerescu, Vasile, 96, 97, 174, 175, 218, 222,
223, 224-226
Bogoliubov, Major General, 283
Bolgrad, 77
Bolintineanu, Dimitrie, 120
Bosianu, Constantine, 147
Bosnia, 6, 227, 286
Botev, Khristo, 234
347
Bourqueney, Baron Francois A., 58, 69
boyars
and Bibescu, 38
Cantemir and, 1
changes sought by, 20
division among, 16, 19-20, 35, 41, 50
and Filiki Etairia, 22
and Habsburg Monarchy, 3
in official positions, 27, 28
and Organic Statutes, 33
and Ottoman Empire, 2, 8, 16
and Phanariot rule, 3, 4, 16, 20, 41
and Russia, 20
and Michael Sturdza, 38-39
Braila, 30
Brasov, 26
Bratianu, Dumitru, 40, 53, 54, 75, 201,249
Bratianu, Ion C,
and the Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878, 226,
231
and the election of Charles, 162, 164,
165, 167
as leading politician, 1866-1870, 179,
180-181, 185-189, 194, 196, 197
and the liberal movement, 40, 42, 53,
120
and the overthrow of Cuza, 147
as prime minister, 237-250, 254, 255,
260-266, 271, 272, 275, 276, 280, 283,
284
Brincoveanu, Constantine, 1, 2
Brune, General M. G. A., 11
Brunnow, Baron Filip Ivanovich, 58, 139,
203
Bucharest, as Romanian capital, 113, 118
Bucharest, Treaty of (1812), 14, 17, 294
159, 160, 162, 164, 169, 170, 171, 172,
174, 178
Bug River, 5, 6, 7
Bukovina, 5, 41, 54
Bulgaria, 46, 117, 123, 188, 270, 277, 279,
285-289
emigrants from, 196
revolutionaries from, 117, 186-188, 234
Bulgarian Central Revolutionary Com-
mittee, 234
Bulwer, Sir Henry, 77, 80, 135, 140, 142,
145
Buol-Schauenstein, Count K. F., 58, 69
Butenev, Apollinarii Petrovich, 62, 63, 81
Callimachi, Alexander, 9
Callimachi, Scarlat, 12, 19
 Index
Callimachi-Catargi, Nicholas, 205, 207, of 1864, 143-144
268, 270, 283 of 1866, 153, 179-180, 194, 196, 206-207,
Cantacuzino, Constantine, 47, 48 209, 213-214
Cantacuzino, George, 3, 89 of 1876 (Ottoman), 249, 250
Cantacuzino, Ion C, 149, 153, 190, 191, Consular Convention (1869), 194, 195
192, 193,199, 239 consular jurisdiction, 87, 191
Cantacuzino, Colonel Michael, 246 consuls, 5, 37
Cantacuzino, §., 73 convention
Cantemir, Dimitrie, 1-2 of April 1856, 63, 188
capitulations, 191-192 of August 1858, 87, 88, 105, 109, 113,
Capodistrias, Ioannis, 21-22 114, 121, 154, 170,222
Caragea, loan,19 of January and March 1877, 238, 277
Carp, Peter, 215 of September 1859, 109, 118, 154
Catargiu, Barbu, 120, 121, 122 Cornea, Dimitrie, 231
Catargiu, Costin, 72-73, 92 Cornu, Hortense, 164
Catargiu, Colonel George, 236 corruption
Catargiu, Lascar, 96, 120, 149, 153, 167, after 1848, 51
179, 213, 214, 215, 218, 226, 230, 231 of caimacam elections, 73, 75
Catargiu, §., 92, 93, 94 of loan Caragea, 19
Catherine the Great, 4, 5, 6-7, 8, 9, 15 of Catargiu, 72-73,75
Cavour, Count Camillo de, 58, 69, 125 of Dedicated Monasteries, 131, 133
Central Commission (1858), 87-88, 106, of Moldavian elections (1857), 79-80
110,111-112, 113,115,137 of Phanariot rule, 20
Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and railroads, 218
164-182, 185, 223-224 of Michael Sturdza, 38
abdication threatened, 206-214 of Vogoride, 72-73, 75
and the army, 186, 188 see also electoral corruption
crowned king, 290 Corti, Count Luigi, 283
and the Eastern crisis, 227-291 Costaforu, George, 174, 213, 224, 230
and foreign occupation, 171-172, 176, Costangalia, 128
188 coup d'etat (1864), 143-145
and independence, 167, 218, 259 Cowley, Earl Henry R. C, 58, 69, 85-86,
opposition to, 199-200 105,162,170
and Russia, 177, 178, 240 Cracow, 42
Charles XII, King of Sweden, 1 Crete, 7
Chernat, General Alexander, 256 insurrection in, 1866, 177,181,182
Cherniaev, Michael Gregorovich, 237 Cretulescu, Constantine, 180, 182, 186
chetas, 187 Cretulescu, George, 53
Chicherin, 162 Cretulescu, Nicholas, 120, 121
Cimpineanu, Ion, 256, 268, 270 Crimea, 4, 5, 6
Circassians, 258 Crimean War, 29, 56, 59, 61, 62, 294
Civil Code (1864), 146 customs administration of Principalities,
Clarendon, Earl of, 58, 160, 172 113
collegial voting system, 180 customs union, 38
commercial conventions (1875,1876), 221- Cuza, Alexander loan, 40, 71, 96,120-122,
227 162, 164,173,175,196, 200,297,312-
commercial privileges of Russia, 5, 6 313 nlOO
Congress Kingdom of Poland, 17 and coup of 1864, 143-144
Conservative Party, 55, 75, 91-92, 111, 112, and desire for union and foreign prince,
114, 120, 121, 122 102, 107, 114
Constanta, 242-243, 265, 268 double election of, 97-98, 101-102
Constantine, 7 economic situation during early reign
Constantinople, Conference of (1876), 249 of, 110
constitution great power reaction to election of,
of 1863, 143 102-109

348
 Index
internal order under, 110-111
and Napoleon III, 102, 113, 122, 128-
129
opposition to, 121, 139, 142, 146-148,
149, 150
overthrow of, 150, 153, 154, 159
and Polish revolution, 128-129
and revision of electoral laws, 112, 115,
117
Cyprus, 286
Czartoryski, Prince Adam, 35, 42, 127
Czartoryski, Ladislas, 127
Dacia, 7, 15
Daco-Roman kingdom, 45, 54
Dalmatia, 6, 227
Danube Delta, 14, 30, 67, 284-285, 287
Danube frontier, 198, 249
Dashkov, I. A., 37, 38, 40, 303 nl7
decorations, issue of national, 218, 249,
264
Dedicated Monasteries, 19, 87, 117, 122,
130-142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 175, 178, Florescu, General Ion E., 120, 213, 226,
191-195, 298
Denmark, 146, 179
Derby, Lord, 222, 223
Dimitur, Hadzhi, 187-188
Disraeli, Benjamin, 283
Dnieper River, 5, 6, 7
Dniester River, 14
Dobrudja, 268, 277, 279-281, 283, 284, 285,
287, 299
Dolgorukov, General Vladimir Andree-
vich, 259
Draga§ani, 25
Drouyn de Lluys, Edouard, 162, 163, 164,
170,172,176
Druses, 113
Dual Alliance, 290
Duhamel, General Alexander Osipovich,
44-45,47,48,51
Eastern Rumelia, 286
Egypt, 7, 9, 27, 28, 34, 62, 223, 249
Elders, see Benevolent Society
elections of 1857, 79-84
electoral corruption, 73-75, 79-80, 83
electoral laws, 112, 115, 117
Elliot, Sir Henry, 204, 209
emigration problems, 51-55
enlightened despotism, 17
Epureanu, Monolache Costache, 120, 205, Frederick, Prince of Prussia, 165
226, 231, 239
Erfurt, 12
Etairia, see Filiki Etairia
349
European Commission of the Danube,
285
European Democratic Committee, 53
fait accompli, policy of
and Arab Tabia, 288
Bratianu and the, 180
Charles and the, 166, 171, 172, 176
Cuza and the, 114, 115, 143, 144, 152
as policy, 297
Falcoianu, S., 136, 162
Filiki Etairia, 21-26
Filipescu, G. C, 219-220, 231
Filipescu, I. A., 92, 95
Filipescu, I. I., 106
firman
of 1822,26
of 1838, 37, 38
of 1848,47
of 1861,154
of 1866,177,178,222,223,265
flag, issue of the common, 86-87
231
Foc§ani, 112
foreign prince, issue of a
great power attitude toward, 79, 116,
118, 160-164, 169-171
and Paris Conference, 66-70
and Romanian emigres, 54
and Romanian people, 73, 155
Russian attitude toward, 83, 88, 154,
158, 169-170, 173, 174, 191
France
and 1872 partition proposal, 7
and Ottoman Empire, 8-9
and Principalities, 8-9, 40, 68, 215
and revolutionary movements, 39-41,
71
and Russia, 65, 122-124,129,152
franchise, issue of the
and Convention of Paris, 89, 91, 95
in 1850s, 119
and International Commission, 71, 76
limited, 110, 120, 180
reform, 115-142
widening sought, 112, 113, 114, 142-144
Franco-Prussian War (1870), 201-205
Franco-Russian alignment, 65, 122-123,
129,152
Franz Joseph, 49, 167, 185, 227, 241, 279
French Revolution, 7, 17, 76, 96, 295
Friendly Society, see Filiki Etairia
Friendship, Treaty of (1868), 182
 Index
Fuad Pasha, 47, 48, 72, 86, 104, 149, 158,
176, 188
Gagarin, Nicholas S., 183
Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 113, 125
generation of 1848, 78, 89, 102, 216
George I, King of Greece, 126
Georgia, 10
Germany, 217, 221
and Charles, 215-216, 298
and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878, 228,
279, 290
and the railroad question, 289-290
unification of, 181, 215
Ghica, Alexander, 34, 36, 37, 38, 72, 73, 95
Ghica, Dimitrie, 120, 149, 153, 189, 194,
196, 205, 213
Ghica, Emil I., 219, 231
Ghica, Gregory, 26, 28-29, 37
Ghica, Gregory A., 50, 51, 56, 57, 72, 73,
95
Ghica, Ion, 101, 121, 149, 158, 253
as emissary, 42, 46, 147, 176, 244, 245,
268, 269
positions in government of, 150, 180,
207,213
Ghica, General Ion G., 179, 229, 260, 261,
266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 273, 274,
275, 276
Ghica, V., 92
Giers, Nicholas Karlovich, 36, 39, 94, 103,
192, 295
and caimacamie, 95-96
and Cuza, 105-106, 108, 114, 121-122
on Dashkov, 37-38
and Dedicated Monasteries, 136, 137
and Eastern crisis of 1875-1878, 231,
233, 235, 238, 242
moderate conservative position of, 91,
111
and Organic Statutes, 36
personal ties to Principalities of, 89
Giers, Olga, 89, 114
Giurgiu, 30
Gladstone, William E., 209-210
Gltick, Dr. Theophil, 127
Godel de Lannoy, 71, 93, 94
Golescu, Alexander G., 53, 121, 205
Golescu, Nicholas, 40, 75, 96, 153, 199
Golescu, Radu, 40
Golescu, §tefan, 75, 106, 168, 180
Goltz, Robert von der, 162, 169
Gorchakov, Alexander Mikhailovich,
127, 184, 185, 196, 211, 220, 225, 227,
308 nil
350
and administrative unification, 116-117
appointed foreign minister, 59-60
and Cuza, 103, 104, 108, 111, 129-130,
139-140, 143, 144, 146, 148-151, 155
and Dedicated Monasteries, 136-141
and denunciation of Black Sea neutrali-
zation, 202-204
and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878, 232,
233, 238, 246, 250, 253-255, 260, 262,
264, 268, 270-275, 280, 283, 284, 289
and election of Charles, 154-160, 164,
168-176
foreign policy after 1856, 62-65
and organization of Principalities,
1856-1859, 79-87, 90-91
personal ties to Principalities, 89
and Romanian delegation, 1868, 190—
194
Gorchakov, Michael D., 107
Grabbe, General, 50
Gramont, Alfred de, 201
Granville, Earl of, 209, 210
Great Britain, 54, 55, 56, 58
and Charles, 160-161, 208, 209-210,
216, 223
and Cuza, 104-105, 115, 125-127, 140
and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878, 277-
280, 282, 283
policy after 1856, 67-68, 79, 81-82, 85
Greece, 43, 123, 126, 134
Greek revolution of 1821, 21-28, 131
Green, John, 126, 207, 209,210
Grivitsa, 264
Gurko, General Iosif Vladimirovich, 262
Habsburg Monarchy, 3-4, 6-7, 9
and Charles, 161, 169, 172,181-182,188,
197, 216
commercial convention, 221-224
and Cuza, 102, 104, 105, 110-111, 115-
116
and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878,
227-228, 232, 251-252, 254-255, 277,
279-281,286,289,290
occupation of Principalities, 1854, 57
policy toward Principalities after 1856,
67, 71, 85-87, 90, 93, 94, 95
Hangerli, Constantine, 8, 10
Hansemann, Adolph, 289
Haralambie, Colonel Nicholas, 150, 153
hatti sherifs
of 1774,6, 11
of 1784,6,11
of 1802, 11,28,30,294
Hatzfeldt, Maximilian von, 58, 85
 Index
Haymerle, Heinrich von, 283
hegumens, 131, 132, 133
Hercegovina, 6, 227, 286
higher education in the Principalities,
39-40
Holy Alliance, 16, 55-56, 59, 217
Hiibner, Count J. A. von, 58, 85, 86, 87,
105
Hungarian emigres, 125-126
Hungarian nationality policies, 181
Hungarian revolutionary activities, 123,
124, 125, 126, 129, 304 n31
Ibrahim, 27
Ignatiev, Nicholas Pavlovich, 148-149,
151, 155, 156, 158, 159, 172, 176-178,
190-195, 199, 202, 211, 217, 220, 228,
313 nlO4, 316 n57
and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878, 229,
238, 242, 243, 245-249, 329 nl47
and the Eastern Question, 183-185, 217,
228
and the peace negotiations, 1878, 268,
269, 270, 279, 299
independence, Romanian
declaration of, 259
recognition of, 259-260, 267, 270, 281,
285, 290, 299
International Commission (1856)
and Dedicated Monasteries, 134, 135,
136
duties of, 76, 77
establishment of, 69, 71
and Principalities, 83
report of, 84
Ionescu, I., 237, 242, 245, 246, 253, 256
Ionescu, Nicholas, 227
Ionian Islands, 9, 10
Ipsilanti, Alexander, 9, 12, 22-23, 24
Ipsilanti, Constantine, 12,13, 22
Isidore, 175, 191, 192-193
Islaz Proclamation (1848), 42-43
Ismail, 9
Istria, 6
Italian unification movement, 124-125
Italy, 105-107, 113, 116,124-125, 161, 283
Jassy, 4, 7, 74
Jassy, Treaty of (1792), 7-8
Jews, 88, 118, 119, 186, 239, 285, 287, 289,
290
Jomini, Alexander Genrikhovich, 220,
242-243, 274, 283
Joseph II, Habsburg Emperor, 6-7
35*
Journal de St. Petersbourg, 199, 205, 271,
273
July Monarchy, 43
Kamil Pasha, 219
Karadjordjevic, Prince Alexander, 126
Karadjordjevic, Peter, 236
Karadzha, Stefan, 187-188
Karavelov, Liuben, 234
Karl Anton, Prince, 165, 166, 179, 189-190,
225
Karsky, see Cantacuzino, Colonel Michael
Keyserling, Count Heinrich, 189
Khaltchinskii (Halcinski), J., 51-52, 133
Kherson, 6
Khitov, Panaiot, 187
Kilia Channel, 14, 262, 268
Kiselev, Paul Dmitrievich, 24, 47, 295
administers Principalities, 1829-1834,
31-32, 36, 37, 39, 56, 132, 295
and agrarian reform, 34, 51
as ambassador in Paris, 81, 84-85, 86,
87, 103, 105, 179
Klapka, General G., 125
Knorring, Karl von, 139, 145
Kogalniceanu, Michael, 40, 73, 119, 120,
121, 138, 143, 146, 147, 148, 189
and Bessarabia, 268-274
and Congress of Berlin, 283-285
as foreign minister, 226, 231, 233, 235,
237, 239-241, 256-258,260,262, 264,
268, 270-275, 280, 283, 284, 289
and Hungarian activities, 125
and seven-point memorandum of 1876,
235
and Treaty of San Stefano, 272
and war role of Romania, 260, 262-263
Roller, Baron, 77
K,oprivshtitsa, 232
Kossuth, Lajos, 125
Kotsebu, Karl Evstafevich, 41-42, 44-45,
48, 295
Krasno-Milashevich, V. I., 13
Kuchuk Kainardji, Treaty of (1774), 1,
5-6, 17,20,31, 34,294
Kushnikov, Sergei S., 13
Kustendje, see Constanta
Laibach, Congress of (1821), 23-24
Lallemande, Count A. de, 103
Lamartine, Alphonse de, 53
Langenau, Baron Ferdinand von, 254
Latinity, 54, 102, 116
Latin racial ties, 41, 54, 201, 204, 205, 289,
298
 Index
Lavalette, Charles Felix, Marquis de, 113,
197
Law on Public Instruction (1864), 146
Lecca, Major Dimitrie, 153
Leopold I, 7
Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen,
200-201, 202
Leuchtenberg, Duke of, 144
Liberal Party
and Charles, 199
and Cuza, 110, 111
objectives of, 55, 91-92, 295
and peasant concerns, 75-76
program of, 74, 75, 120
and Russia, 89, 239, 253
and unification, 74, 91, 97, 180
Liehmann von Palmrode, 77, 80
Liteanu, George, 283
Livadia, 241-244
Lobanov-Rostovskii, Aleksei Borisovich,
94-95, 96, 103, 104, 105, 108, 113, 115,
116, 136, 137
Lorn Palanka, 264, 265
London, Conference of (1871), 204, 207,
214, 215
London Protocol, 255
Louis Napoleon, see Napoleon III
Louis Philippe, 39-40, 42, 43, 52, 53, 54,56
Luck, Treaty of (1711), 1
Liiders, General Alexander Nikolaevich,
48
Magheru, Colonel George, 43, 47
Mahmud Nedim, 217, 232
Mahmud II, 12, 27, 28, 34
Malinescu, V., 73
Malta, 9
Manteuffel, Otto von, 58
Manu, L, 92, 95
Maria Theresa, 6
Marmora, Sea of, 272
Maronites, 113
Mavrocordat, Alexander, 6
Mavrocordat, Constantine, 4
Mavrogheni, Peter, 73, 96, 120, 149, 153,
167, 179, 218
Maximilian, 185
Mazar Pasha Coalition, 231
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 53
medical services administration of Princi-
palities, 113
Mehmed Ali, 27, 34
Mehmed Djemil Bey, 58
Mehmed Rushdi Pasha, 176
Melchisedek, 190, 191, 192, 193, 199
"Memoir on the Question of Bessarabia,"
273-274
Mensdorff-Pouilly, Alexander von, 169
Menshikov, Prince Alexander Sergeevich,
63
Metternich, Prince Clemens von, 11, 17
Metternich, Richard, 162, 169, 172
Michael, Prince of Serbia, 182
Michelet, Jules, 53
Miclescu, Calinic, 168
Milan, Prince of Serbia, 229, 232, 235, 236,
238
Miliutin, Dmitrii Alekseevich, 183, 202,
237, 238, 242, 247, 255-256, 257, 265-
266, 274
Milkowski, Colonel Zygmunt, 128
Minchaki, see Minciaky, Matei Leovich
Minciaky, Matei Leovich, 32
minting of coins, 198,218,249
Moldavia
as buffer state, 6
and Bukovina, 5
and Hungarian movement, 124
and Organic Statutes, 32-33
Polish emigrants in, 35, 124, 175
Polish rebels in, 9
reforms in, 4
"The monstrous coalition," 121, 147
Montenegro, 123, 232, 235-238, 241
Moruzi, Alexander, 168
Moruzi, Alexander, Prince of Wallachia,
9,12
Moruzi, Constantine, 168
Moustier, Marquis Lionel de, 144
Muhammad (Mehmed) Ali, 27, 34
Miinchengratz, Treaty of (1833), 34
Miinnich, General, 4
Miinster, Count George Herbert zu, 222
Murad V, 232
Mustafa IV, 12
Musurus Pasha, Kostaki, 105, 172, 224
Napoleon I, 9, 12, 14, 16, 165, 295
Napoleon III, 56, 65, 90, 185, 206, 297
and British alignment, 79, 81, 82, 83
and Charles, 160, 164, 165, 169, 197,
200-202
and Congress of Paris, 58
and Cuza, 102, 107, 113, 122, 124, 143,
149
and Polish revolution, 128-129
and Principalities as compensation, 160
and revolutionary nationalism, 65, 124,
296
and Romanian cause, 54, 68, 81, 86-87

35*
 Index
and Russian intention toward Princi-
palities, 197
Naturalization Law of 1847, 38
Navarino, 28
Negri, Costache, 96, 106, 112, 120, 142-
143,311 n82
Nelidov, Alexander Ivanovich, 245-248,
261, 267, 283
Neofit, Metropolitan, 43
Nesselrode, Karl Vasil'evich, 21, 24,40, 41,
44, 50-51, 52, 65
neutrality, policy of, 230, 233-241, 244-
259,299
Nicholas, Grand Duke, 245, 250-251, 257,
259, 260, 262-265, 267, 270
Nicholas, Prince of Montenegro, 229, 236
Nicholas I of Russia, 27, 39-40, 43, 45,
48, 49, 56, 59, 69, 244, 293
Nicopolis, 262-265
Nigra, Constantine, 162
Novikov, Evgenii Petrovich, 129, 141, 144,
145, 148, 230, 254
Obolenskii, Prince, 106
Obrenovic, Marie, 147
Obrenovic, Michael, 126
Obrenovic, Milos, 126
Obruchev, General Nicholas Nikolae-
vich, 238
occupation
of Bessarabia (1878), 287, 299
of Bulgaria (1878), 271-273, 277, 287
of Peking (1860), 113
of Principalities, Austrian and Otto-
man, 1854, 57, 70; Ottoman, 1821,
24-27; Russian, 1806-1812, 12, 13;
Russian, 1828, 28-29, 31, 33; Russian,
1848, 45, 48-49, 50, 52; Russian,
1853, 56; Russian, 1877-1878, 257-
259, 274-275
of Transylvania (1849), 49
Offenberg, G. G., 129, 143, 146, 147-148,
150, 151, 154, 155, 157, 168, 178, 193,
194, 198, 199, 200, 205-206, 211-214,
319 nll9
Oltenia, 3-4, 6, 43
Omer Pasha, 47, 57
Onou, M. K., 283
Organic Statutes (1831 Wallachia, 1832
Moldavia)
assessment of, 59, 295
centers of influence under, 36, 37
and Convention of Paris, 88
and limit of Russian reform, 49
organization under, 32-34
353
overthrow of, sought, 43
restoration of, 44, 47
revision of, 50, 51, 66
revolutionaries and, 40, 41
and Russian rule, 35, 39, 58, 66, 179
Orlov, Prince Aleksei Fedorovich, 58, 69
Orthodoxy, 17, 62-65, 123, 130-142, 195,
196
see also Ottoman Empire, Balkan
Christians under
Osborne Agreement (1857), 81, 82, 83, 85,
86
Othon, King, 126
Ottoman Empire
Balkan Christians under, 2, 56, 62-64,
145-146, 195, see also Orthodoxy
integrity of, 67, 79, 161, 216
military reform of Selim III in, 8-9
right of intervention of, 70, 98,108, 117,
207-208
right of preemption of, 30, 59
and Russia, 10, 16, 58-59, 122
Oubril, Pavel Petrovich, 156
Pade§ declaration (1821), 23
Pahlen, Count F. P., 29
Palmerston, Lord, 55, 79
pandours, 23, 29
Panslav movement, 183, 228-229
Panu, A., 73, 92, 93, 95
Paris, Conference of (1858), 85
(1864), 161-162
Paris, Treaty of (1856), 58-59, 61, 64,
75, 82, 154, 182, 189, 202-204, 205,
241-242, 244, 257, 273, 276, 296
Article 22 of, 188
Article 23 of, 77
Article 25 of, 188
Article 27 of, 105, 188, 207-208, 230
Articles 20-27 of, 69-70
partition
of Ottoman possessions, 6-7, 9, 12, 56
of Romania, 248
passage
of arms, 125-128, 192, 236, 237, 238
of supplies, 236, 244, 271
of troops, 236, 237, 239, 243, 245, 246,
248, 251-258, 271, 273, 274, 282, 288
of volunteers, 238, 240, 244
Passarowitz, Treaty of (1718), 3, 4
Pasvanoglu Osman Pasha, 11, 12, 13
patents, 191-192
Patriarchate of Constantinople, 17-19,
130, 132, 134, 147
Paul, Emperor of Russia, 9, 10
 Index
peasants Quinet, Edgar, 53, 54
emancipation of, 88
emigration of, 51 Radetsky, 234
grievances of, 19 Radowitz, Joseph Maria von, 213
and land reform, 75-76, 112, 114-115, railroads, 67, 186
121 Rakhovo, 264-265
and national issues, 75 Rallet, D., 73
and Organic Statutes, 33-34 Rechberg, J. B. von, 115
and regulations of 1851, 51 recueillement, 64
Peking, 112-113 Redern, Count Heinrich von, 173
Peloponnesus, 7 Reichstadt agreement (1876), 233, 238,
People's Assembly, 23, 43 247, 255, 277, 280
Pepoli, Marquis Gioacchimo, 197 religion
Peter the Great, 1, 2, 3 free exercise of, 5
Pfuel, 202 during reorganization, 133, 142
Phanar, 2 see also Orthodoxy
Phanariot rule, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 26, 58- Reshid Pasha, 72
59, 131, 294 Reutern, Michael Khristoforovich, 182,
background of, 2-3 238
lowest point of, 8 Revertera, Count Frederick, 164,173
Philip of Flanders, Prince, 153, 164 revolts and revolutions
Philo-Romanian Society, 54 1804: Serbia, 12, 17
Pini, Alexander, 22, 24 1815: Serbia, 17
Pisani, Andrei, 22 1821: Greece, 21,25, 26, 293
Place, Victor, 71, 72-73, 74, 91, 94-95, 105 1821: Principalities, 22
plebiscite of 1866, 166, 168 1830: Polish territories, 35, 293
Plevna, 262-264, 266, 277 1846: Cracow, 42
Ploe§ti, 106 1848: Moldavia, 42, 44, 45-46, 295
Poland, 4, 5, 8, 9, 43-44 1848: Wallachia, 42-43, 44, 45-46, 293,
emigrants from, 293 295
revolutionary movement in, 9, 35, 42, 1848-1849: Hungary, 49
53, 85, 89, 123, 124, 126, 127-129, 1862: Greece, 126
139, 147, 174, 175, 293 1863: Poland, 124, 125
Poltava, 1 1866: Crete, 177, 181, 182, 185
Popov, Sergei Ivanovich, 74, 77, 78, 91, 1866: Jassy, 164, 177
94-95, 105, 111, 114-115, 134 1870: Ploe§ti, 206
postal administration of Principalities, 1875: Bosnia and Hercegovina, 226,
87-88, 113 227-229
Postal Convention, 192 1876: Bulgaria, 232, 233
Potemkin, Gregory, 7 1876: Constantinople, 232, 253
Pourtales, Count Albert, 105 see also revolutionary activities
press law (1856), 73 revolutionary activities
Prokesch-Osten, Anton von, 72, 81, 83, Bulgarian, 187-188, 232-234
145, 172, 188, 210, 319nll8 and exiles, 40-41, 49, 51-55
protectorate, Russian, 16-52, 58-59,71 Hungarian, 123, 125
protocol of September 1859, 109, 170 Polish, 123, 127, 175
Protocol 13 (1858), 136-142 and Principalities, 114, 124, 129-130,
provisional government (1866), 150, 154, 175, 177, 187-188, 198-199, 211, 214,
157, 158, 162, 164,167,179 233-234
Prussia, 9, 16, 105, 129, 135 Romanian, 39-50, 52-55
and candidature of Charles, 161, 165- Transylvanian, 181-182, 189
167,172-173,176 see also revolts and revolutions
Franco-Prussian War and Romania, Richthofen, Baron E., 77
201-213 Rikman, see Riickmann, P. I.
Pruth River, 2, 14 roads, 67

354
 Index
Rolla, K., 73
"Romania," adoption of name, 186,
194-195
Romanian Democratic Committee, 53
Romanian emigres, 52-55
Romdnul (The Romanian), 120
Rosetti, C. A., 40, 42, 53, 75, 95, 96, 120,
142, 149, 153, 179, 224, 256
Rosetti, Lascar, 96
Rosetti-Roznovanu, Nicholas, 168
Riickmann, P. I., 34, 37
Ruschuk-Varna line, 283
Russell, Lord John, 115
Safvet Pasha, 77, 78, 80, 156, 162, 163,
169, 171, 237, 248, 316 n57
St. Petersburg, Convention of (1834), 34
Salisbury, Lord, 249, 278, 283
Salzburg, meeting at (1867), 185
Sanjak of Novi Pazar, 282, 286
San Stefano, Treaty of (1878), 271-
272, 274, 277, 278, 280, 286, 299
Sardinia, 104, 105, 110, 116, 125-126, 135,
296
Schleswig-Holstein, 146, 160
Schweinitz, General Hans Lothar von, 173
Sculeni, 25
Sebastopol, 57
secularization of monasteries, 139-143
Sedan, battle of, 206
Selim III, 8, 12
Senedof 1783,6, 11
separation of the Principalities
great-power position on, 156-157, 159,
161, 163, 168-169, 208-209, 215
and Moldavia, 74-75, 79-80, 167-168
separatist uprising in Jassy, 164, 167-169,
177
Sepoy Rebellion, 112
Serbia, 6, 17, 27-28, 30, 123, 126-127, 181
Serpent's Island, 77, 284
Seven Weeks' War (1866), 298
Seymour, Sir Hamilton, 56
Shchulepnikov, E. R., 77
Shipka, 264
Shuvalov, Peter Andreevich, 182,278, 283,
284
Sibiu, 26
Silistria, 288
Silistria-Mangalia line, 284
Singurov, 242
Slaniceanu, Colonel George, 242, 263
Slavic Benevolent Society, 183, 236
Stackelberg, Count Ernest, 156
Star of the Danube, see Steaua Dundrii
355
"Star of Romania," 265
state debt, 153
Steaua Dundrii (The Star of the Danube),
73
Steege, Ludovic, 106,174, 175, 194
§tirbei, Barbu, 50, 51, 56, 57, 72, 73, 83,
95, 96, 98, 136
§tirbei G., 120
Strat, Ion, 120, 197, 200, 201, 205
strategic importance of Romanian lands,
4,31, 181,229,293
Stratford de Redcliffe (Stratford Can-
ning), 72, 81, 82, 83
Stremoukhov, Peter Nikolaevich, 190-
191, 219-220
Stroganov, G. A., 26
Strousberg railroad concession, 215, 218,
289, 321-322 n2
Stuart, D. F., 227, 239, 240, 241, 246, 248,
250, 255, 256, 257, 274, 275-276
Sturdza, Alexander, 235-236
Sturdza, Dimitrie A., 120, 149, 189, 195,
197, 199, 204-205, 253, 254
Sturdza, Gregory, 73, 92-93, 96, 111, 120,
158
Sturdza, Ion, 26, 28-29
Sturdza, Michael, 34, 36, 38-39, 42, 44, 73,
89, 91, 92-93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 132
Sturdza, Vasile, 92, 93, 96
Stuttgart, meeting at (1857), 83
Suleiman Pasha, 47
Sumorokov-Elston, Feliks Nikolaevich,
238
Sutu, Alecu (Alexander), 12, 19, 22
Sutu, Michael, 9, 22
Suvorov, General Alexander Vasirevich, 7
Sweden, 7
Syria, 7, 113
Talaat Effendi, 44
Talleyrand-Perigord, Charles A., 77, 79,
173, 174, 179
tariff union, 87
telegraph, 67, 87
telegraph administration of Principali-
ties, 113
Teriachi, A., 93
term of office for prince, 11, 28, 88
Thouvenel, Edouard Antoine, 72, 80, 81,
113
Three Emperors' Alliance, 217, 221, 222,
228, 232, 287, 290-291
Tillos, J. H., 149, 312nlOO
Tilsit, Treaty of (1807), 12, 197
Timkovskii, 34
 Index
Titov, Vladimir Pavlovich, 46-47
Totiu, Filip, 187
Totleben, General Eduard Ivanovich,
264, 265
Trandafilov, Alexander, 38
Transylvania, 26, 41, 54, 181-182, 186,
189, 197,298-299
Treaty of April 4/16, 1877, negotiation
of, 241-257
Treaty of Paris, March 1856, terms of,
58-59, 68-69
tribute, 30, 34, 36, 56, 87, 177, 229
Triple Alliance, 290
Turnu Severin, 30
Turr, General S., 125
Union, the (Unirea), political society, 73
union of Principalities
administrative, 32, 111-116
electoral call for (1857), 83
as goal of Romanian emigres, 54
and great powers, 78-79, 83, 88, 114-
118, 153-164, 174, 191
and landowners, 74
and Paris Conference, 66-68, 179
and Romanian people, 74, 83, 163
1794 agreement on, 9
statistics after, 118-119
Unkiar Iskelesi, Treaty of (1833), 34, 62,
217, 292
Vacarescu, Teodor, 242
Venetia, exchange for Principalities, 107—
108, 160, 161, 170, 173-174
Victor Emmanuel I, 116
Victoria, Queen, 81, 209
Vidin, 265, 267, 270, 275
Vienna, Congress of (1814-1815), 16
Vienna Four Points (1854), 57, 66
Villafranca, Armistice of (1859), 105, 109
Villamarina, Marquis de, 58, 85, 105
Vladimirescu, Tudor, 22-25, 27, 42,
302 n2-4
Vogoride, Nicholas, 72-73, 74, 75, 80, 83,
84, 92, 93, 102, 137
Waddington, William, 283, 284
Walewski, Count Alexander, 58, 68, 69, 80,
81, 82, 83, 86-87, 105
356
Wallachia
as buffer state, 6
naturalization law for, 38
and Organic Statutes, 32
and Pasvanoglu, 13
reforms in, 4
revolutionary government of, 293
wars
1711: Ottoman Empire against Russia,
2
1736: Ottoman Empire against Russia,
4
1768: Ottoman Empire against Russia,
4
1787: Ottoman Empire against Russia,
7
1788: Sweden against Russia, 7
1805: France against Russia, 11
1806: Ottoman Empire against Russia,
12
1828: Ottoman Empire against Russia,
28, 294
1853: Ottoman Empire against Russia,
56
1859: Habsburg Empire against France
and Sardinia, 105, 298
1864: Denmark against Prussia and
Austria, 146, 179
1866: Austria against Prussia, 172, 176,
298
1870: France against Prussia, 201
1876: Ottoman Empire against Serbia
and Montenegro, 232, 235-236
1877: Ottoman Empire against Russia,
65
see also Crimean War
Wellington, Duke of, 28
Werther, Karl von, 103
White, Sir William, 278
William I, King of Prussia; 1871 Emperor
of Germany, 165, 166-167,208, 213,
279
Wittgenstein, General, 24,28
Zheltukhin, General P. F., 29, 31, 32
Zinoviev, Ivan Alekseevich, 220,225,226,
235, 239, 240
Zolotarev, Ivan Fedorovich, 246
Zurich, Treaty of (1859), 105, 125