Causality: Confucianism and Pragmatism

Author(s): Joseph S. Wu
Source: Philosophy East and West , Jan., 1975, Vol. 25, No. 1, The Problems of
Causation: East and West (Jan., 1975), pp. 13-22
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press

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 Joseph S. Wu Causality: Confucianism and pragmatism

The main theme of this article is to compare the concept of causality in the
philosophy of John Dewey with the concept of causality as presupposed in the
I Ching, or The Book of Changes. There seems no need to justify my attempt
here since the legitimacy of comparing Dewey with the I Ching was established
in my previous paper "Philosophy and Revolution: Confucianism and
Pragmatism."' In what follows, I will first explain Dewey's theory of causality
with some contrast against the traditional Western view. Second, I will explicate
the notion of causality underlying The Book of Changes with an emphasis on
its pragmatic nature. Third, I will bring forth the problem of "freedom and
determinism," and discuss how it is resolved in Dewey as well as in the I Ching.
In my conclusion, I will point out some important differences between the two
philosophies in spite of their striking similarities.

II

The dominant factor in the concept of causality in traditional Western philoso-

phy is the instinctive belief in necessity. Such an instinctive belief was clearly
evidenced long before modern science began to develop. What I mean here is
the concept of fate in Greek tragedy. Whitehead is quite right in suggesting
that the Greek notion of fate is the precursor of the concept of causality in
science:

Fate in Greek Tragedy becomes the order of nature in modern thought. The
absorbing interest in the particular heroic incidents, as an example and a
verification of the working of fates, reappears in our epoch as concentration of
interest on the crucial experiments. .. This remorseless inevitableness is what
pervades scientific thought. The laws of physics are the decrees of fates.2

The first Western philosopher who sharply questioned the validity of such
an instinctive belief is David Hume whose Treatise constitutes a great landmark
in the history of scientific thought.3 For Hume, there is no objective ground
for any belief in necessary connections. All we observe is mere sequence of
similar occurrences based on which we imagine the existences of a necessary
connection between causes and effects. In a word, such a belief is grounded on
instinctive habitual expectation and is thus subjective and arbitrary. In spite of
Hume's criticism, the stubborn habits of the thinking of the Western peoples
continue to persist. Men of science and philosophy still find comfort in the
belief that there are genuine causal forces and necessary connections.
Notwithstanding the continuities between the past and the present, the
twentieth century philosophic scene marks the age of revolution against the

Joseph S. Wu is Associate Professor at the Califjrnia State University, Sacramento.

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14 Wu

tradition. The positivists' attack on metaphysics, the linguistic analy

criticism of "pseudo-problems," and the existentialists' reaction a
system and rational thought, all generate the revolutionary spirit of t
Pragmatism is, of course, no exception. Charles Peirce, the ingenius pionee
the pragmatic movement, proposes that the doctrine of necessity be exam
For Peirce, in the formulation of natural laws in science, there is necessar
significant element of convention and arbitrary choice, and we do o
irregular departure from laws. This leaves sufficient room for chance
operative force in nature.5 Peirce's theory of causality, particularly hi
view, represents more a challenge to the tradition than a construction
pragmatic theory. A pragmatic theory of causality is not established
John Dewey, a student of Charles Peirce, a friend of William James, a coll
of George Herbert Mead, and a great synthesizer of the pragmatic movem
The concept of necessity in Dewey's pragmatic philosophy has been
carnated into a logical one. In the meantime Dewey has formulated a
logical theory which is intended to be free from any ontology in the trad
sense. For him, the category of causality is logical rather than ontolo
By logical it is not meant as purely formal or being devoid of any em
content. In Dewey's philosophy, logic is the theory of inquiry, which
process of problem solving.8 Since inquiry is to be understood as conte
situational, instrumental, and operational, and that the components of a gi
situation are organically interrelated, the concept of causality has to
understood in the same way.
Apart from a problematic situation, the concept of causality is arbitrary
meaningless. "No event comes to us labelled 'cause' or 'effect'. An eve
to be deliberately taken to be cause or effect."9 The common concepti
causality maintains a sharp distinction between the antecedent and consequ
the former being the cause, and the latter, effect. But for Dewey, the antec
and the consequent are not two distinct events but are two integral consti
of the same event. The fundamental logical function of the concept of cau
is to institute a single unique continuous history rather than linking two se
events together. ? This is the organic nature of the relation between cause
effect. Suppose a man is found dead. It is a problematic situation
investigation. Was it a case of murder, accident, or suicide? Examinati
existing conditions may lead the investigators to formulate a hypothes
is a case of death by the entrance of a bullet into the person's heart. Accor
to the common notion of causality, the entrance of the bullet is the antec
and the man's dying is the consequent. But Dewey maintains that the even
the entrance of the bullet is a constituent element in the singular eve
dying rather than an antecedent of it. If we conceive "cause" and "effe
constituents of the same event, the concept of necessary connection
ontological necessity, becomes meaningless. Since cause and effect are b
phases of a historical continuum or an organic process, there is no n

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15

postulate any necessary connection. The constituent element which we call

"cause" and the constituent element which we call "effect" are related con-
textually and organically to form a historical continuum. When one of the
elements, namely, the cause, is missing from our knowledge, we have a
problematic situation. One of the purposes of inquiry is to establish such a
historical continuity by transforming the indeterminate situation into an
intelligible and unified context for our knowledge and action. This follows
that the concept of causality performs a function of guiding our inquiry in
attaining its goal-problem-solving, or removal of a problematic situation.
To say that the concept of causality performs the function of guiding inquiry
is a recognition of its instrumental nature. For Dewey, ideas or concepts are
not objects for contemplation, rather, they are guidelines for action. The
concept of action does not mean activities at random, instead, it indicates
deliberate operation. Causal laws are generally expressed in "if-then" pro-
positions. This means "if certain operations are performed, then certain
phenomena having determinate properties will be observed.'"' It is commonly
held that a causal law performs the function of prediction in science. But for
Dewey, prediction is not some sort of prophecy with a contemplative attitude,
it involves operation. "The prediction is not," he explains, "a completely
warranted proposition until the required operations are performed and are
found to have their consequence the observed material whose occurrence has
been predicted."'2 In Dewey's theory of inquiry, the relation between means
and ends is strongly emphasized. Means can be classified as material means and
procedural means.13 Material means consists in the facts observed in the
relevant context while procedural means is supplied by the reservoir of concepts
or ideas established by previous inquiries. A causal law is a procedural means
leading to the solution of a given problem. It prescribes a procedure, a formula
for effective operation. This follows that, in Dewey's philosophy, the relation
between cause and effect has become the relation between means and ends.
Cause and effect form a continuum, so do means and ends.14 This marks the
highlight of Dewey's instrumentalism in philosophy of science.
My presentation of Dewey's theory of causality, so far, is not a thorough
and complete exposition. A full treatment requires a discussion of his logica
theory and, particularly, an exposition of his theory of propositions. In a
comparative study of philosophy, selective emphasis is inevitable. In spite of
the brevity and simplification of my treatment, my presentation of Dewey
here is sufficient for our purpose-a comparison of the pragmatic concept of
causality with the causal presupposition of the I Ching.

III

To contrast the Chinese concept of causality as embodied in the I Ching with

the traditional Western view is not an innovation. Carl Jung, who has learned
the I Ching from Richard Wilhelm, made the following observation:

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16 Wu

Our science, however, is based upon the principle of causality, and

is considered to be an axiomatic truth. ... The Chinese mind, as I
work in the I Ching, seems to be exclusively preoccupied with th
aspect of events. What we call coincidence seems to be the chief co
this peculiar mind, and what we worship as causality passes almost
... The manner in which the I Ching tends to look upon reality seems t
our causalistic procedures. The moment under actual observation a
the ancient Chinese view more of a chance hit than a clearly define
concurring causal chain processes. 5

Jung's comment is indeed refreshing, suggestive, and perhaps original

interpret the Chinese view of causality as embodied in the I Ching
terms of chance or coincidence is both inadequate and misleading. I
quate because there are important aspects (which will be disclo
herein) of the Chinese view of causality which can hardly be explained
by the concept of chance. It is misleading because the term "chanc
absence of a clear stipulative definition, may suggest "randomness
order," and even "chaos."
The whole text of the I Ching presupposes a strong conviction of the
of an order in the universe although such an order may be very differ
the one prevailing in traditional Western thought. The most dominant
the traditional Western view of a cosmic order is the operation of
in the universe, be it in the form of Greek tragedy or in the form of n
in Newtonian physics. The Chinese concept of nature, on the other
that nature is an organic whole. Thome H. Fang in his characteriz
Chinese cosmology pointed out concisely: "The Universe, in our r
not merely a mechanical field of physical actions and reactions, b
magnificant realm of the concrescence of Universal Life. Such a th
be called Organicism as applied to the world at large." 6 It was half
ago, the ingenius student of the I Ching, Richard Wilhelm, grasped
very well. In his commentary on the Ta Chuan of the text,17 he r
"For according to Western ideas, sequent change would be the realm
causality operates mechanically; but the Book of Changes takes seque
to be the succession of the generations, that is still something organic.
This reminds us what Dewey has said in his Logic. Cause and effec
two distinct events but are constituents of the same event. The entrance of a
bullet and dying of the person form an inseparable continuum. In fact, they
are two aspects, or two phases of the same event. Only through our analysis,
based on a typical Western mode of thinking, we label the entrance of the bullet
"cause," and the dying of the person "effect." If we believe that in reality they
do form two separate events and one "causes" the other, we may commit
what Whitehead called the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness."' 9
Another important feature of the concept of causality underlying the I
Ching is its situational character and instrumentality. This feature is sufficiently
revealed as we study the hexagrams. The Ta Chuan says: "The holy sages

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17

instituted the hexagrams, so that phenomena might be perceived therein.

They appended the judgments, in order to indicate good fortune and mis-
fortune."20 As to who the holy sages are, this is not a philosophically relevant
question here. Nor could it be answered without any dispute. The important
questions are: What are the hexagrams? Are they merely symbolic diagrams
or that they bear significant in human experience? By what method are these
hexagrams instituted? What is a judgment? What is the purpose of a judgment
appended to a hexagram? Perhaps, the most important question for our
purpose is: What is the concept of causality underlying all these? A descriptive
or explanatory definition of hexagrams is that they are symbolic devices
exhibiting types of possible situations a human individual may encounter.
The relation between hexagrams and actual experience is a twofold one. It is
genetic and functional. It is genetic in the sense that a hexagram is generated by
previously experienced situations. It is not a formal diagram without any
empirical content. It is functional in the sense that a hexagram, when applied
properly may perform the function of refining, guiding, or regulating our
actual experiences. There is no doubt that the method by which the hexagrams
are instituted is descriptive generalization with genetic and functional con-
sideration in view. A judgment is an interpretation of what is revealed in a
hexagram. The significance of a judgment was pointed out by the Ta Chuan
that the "superior man takes pleasure" in them and "ponders on" them.21
Nevertheless, the superior men in the Confucian tradition ponder over the
judgments not because of any sense of wonder, but because of care and concern.22
The role of the judgments is to provide a tool or guidance for action. It indicates
that if we take certain steps, certain consequences may follow. This kind of
"if-then" propositions is what we have described as causal statements, which
prescribes "means-ends" formula for operation. It is very obvious that the
concept of causality underlying the I Ching is a pragmatic one, having a strong
emphasis on instrumentality and relevance to human action. A judgment
appended to a hexagram in the I Ching functions as a hypothesis leading to the
settlement of a problematic situation that one may encounter in one's social
or natural environment. It is now very clear that both pragmatism (as re-
presented by Dewey) and Confucianism (as represented by the I Ching) share
similar views of causality. There is, however, still another important aspect of
their commonness that has not yet been discussed. This is their concept of
freedom of the will. Since the problem has been complicated by our long philoso-
phic tradition, it deserves an independent discussion and will be treated in the
next section.

IV

The problem of "freedom and determinism" is complicated in two ways.

First, these two terms are words of many meanings, and the term "freedom"

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18 Wu

is particularly heavily loaded with tones of values and interests. Second

are different ways of formulating this problem, and once a philosoph
mulates this problem his philosophical commitment is presupposed.
In its simplest form, the main thesis of determinism can be stated
following proposition: "Everything that happens has a cause," or "Ever
that happens is determined." If we accept this thesis that everythin
happens has a cause, we have to accept that every human act is caus
determined. Then what place is left for human action, human choice, or h
volition? Nevertheless there seems evidence in our experience suggesti
we do have a power to choose among alternatives and act upon them.
we order a meal in a restaurant, we seem to be free in making our ch
accordance with our tastes. Even when we choose a career, we seem
aware of our power to make such a choice. Furthermore, our sense of obli
or responsibility is justified only when we recognize that we do have free
of making our choices. But, if we hold that we do have freedom of c
we seem to be denying the proposition that everything that happens is ca
or determined and at the same time this proposition appears so true
Consequently we seem to be caught in the middle of this dilemma.
Strange enough, this problem has bypassed the main stream of the C
philosophic tradition. This problem has never captured the attention
prominent Chinese philosophers except those who were exposed to W
philosophy. This interesting phenomenon is indeed a worthwhile to
investigation in comparative philosophy. There have been cases that w
problem in one philosophic tradition ceases to be a problem in another tra
For example, the validity of the ontological argument for the existence of
has been a significant problem in the history of Western philosophy, and
virtually unknown to the Chinese philosophers, for the Chinese peopl
had an Almighty God of the Hebrew version. But the problem of "freedom
determinism" cannot be explained away so easily. Both the Chinese p
and the Western peoples share the experience of making choices, and
them live in the same universe and are surrounded by the same kind of p
environment-mountains, waters, sunshine, moonlight, storm, snow,
clouds, even mud and dirt. Why were they so different regarding this pr
of "freedom and determinism"? To me, the fundamental difference
different concepts of nature, and particularly different concepts of the r
of man and nature.
Shortly after the publication of his masterpiece Process and Reality. White-
head delivered two lectures to the students of the University of Chicago,
summarizing his metaphysical point of view.23 The first was entitled "Nature
Liveless," and the second, "Nature Alive."24 Whitehead had no intention of
doing any comparative philosophy, yet these two lectures, surprisingly enough,
serve as a good contrast between the traditional Western view and the concept
of nature dominant in the Chinese tradition. The position of determinism

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19

presupposes a concept of nature in which the universe is conceived of as a giant

machine, a conglomeration of lifeless substances governed by the physical laws
of nature. This concept of nature is totally alien to Chinese metaphysics. The
concept of nature as embodied in the I Ching is that the universe is an organic
whole, a process of never-ceasing growth. All the existences within this growing
context are organically interrelated, and form a comprehensive continuum
advancing into novelty.2 5
As to the relation between man and nature, we also see a noticeable contrast
between the Chinese point of view and the one traditionally held in the West.
Roughly speaking, in traditional Western view, man, nature, and supernature
(God), are clearly distinct from God as the creator of both man and nature.
But in the Chinese philosophic tradition, as embodied in the I Ching, Heaven
(roughly supernature), Earth (roughly physical nature), and Man form an
intimate trinity exhibiting congenial congruence and harmony. For the Chinese,
man is a co-creator of the universe. Wilhelm was very perceptive in observing
that even "the six lines of each hexagram are divided among the primal powers,
heaven, earth, and man."26 This means that, in understanding any given
situation as represented by a hexagram, nature, supernature, and man have
to be taken into account. If we take the position of determinism, we may say
that man participates in determining his own act. If we advocate free will,
we may say that man has freedom (but not unlimited, since he has to get the
"consent" from his co-creators) to choose to make himself, and to create
his physical and spiritual environment. This may suggest the reason why the
problem of "freedom and determinism" has been bypassed the Chinese
philosophic tradition.
How about our American philosopher John Dewey? Whitehead once
commented in a joking manner: "... if you want to understand Confucius,
read John Dewey. And if you want to understand John Dewey, read Con-
fucius."27 The Life principle in the I Ching has become a major concept in
Dewey's philosophy of experience and ethical theory. The key words for
Dewey are "growth," "development," and "emergence." In general, Dewey
makes a distinction of three levels of existences (rather than three categories
of being), namely, physical, psychophysical, and mental.28 According to
this theory, the higher level (the more complicated level) emerges out of the
lower level (less complicated level) without any break or gap. The higher level,
in turn, performs the function of refining, regulating, and reconstructing the
lower level. Each level has its modes of interaction. The difficulty of mechanistic
determinism is that it interprets all levels of existences merely in terms of the
interaction of the lowest level-the purely physical. This is the fallacy of
reductionism. The free-will philosophers perhaps commit the opposite fallacy,
introducing something transcendent or a priori categories for interpretation.
In short, their fallacies can be called "fallacy of selected emphasis" which
leads to the arbitrary character of "reality."29

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20 Wu

The concept of freedom, for Dewey, lies in the growth of the in

Growth implies learning, modification of character, and readapting
to new natural and social environment. We do not call a stone free "because
it is not capable of changing its mode of conduct, of purposely readapting itself
to new conditions."30 An animal shows plasticity but it plays only a passive
role in the change of its habits and it cannot initiate and direct the change.31
A human individual is different. We can break our old habits and form new ones
with the direction or guidance of our intelligence. A voluntary action exhibits
freedom because it is a conscious remaking of the self. For Dewey, every
human individual is endowed with potential freedom, but the degrees of
actualization depend on the individual's development. He explains:

Potentiality of freedom is a native gift or part of our constitution in that we

have capacity for growth and for being actively concerned in the process and
the direction it takes. Actual or positive freedom is not a native gift or endow-
ment but is acquired. In the degree in which we become aware of possibilities
of development and actively concerned to keep the avenues :f growth open,
in the degree in which we fight against induration and fixity, and thereby
realize the possiblities of recreation of our selves, we are actually free.32

We have to note that Dewey does not reject determinism or unconditionality.

Even if we were to recognize the existence of the necessary connection between a
cause and an effect, it would not lead us to deny the existence of freedom.
Freedom emerges when we use one necessity to alter another. Thus Dewey
pointed out, "When we use the law to foresee consequences and to consider
how they may be averted or secured, then freedom begins."33 This is the spirit
of the I Ching. Each hexagram is a foretelling of possible consequences and a
suggestion of how they can be secured or averted. Freedom begins with know-
ledge and understanding.

I have thus far presented Dewey's pragmatic theory of causality and the causal
presupposition of the I Ching, stressing their similarities. Both philosophies
conceive causality as organic, situational, contextual, instrumental, and
operational. Both philosophies offer a mediating ground between freedom and
determinism. Nevertheless, similarities should not be exaggerated so much as
to undermine their diversities. First, the metaphysics of the I Ching is pre-
scientific exploration while Dewey's logical theory is a postscientific critique.
Prescientific exploration very often carries elements which are religious or
spiritual in nature, and postscientific critique tends to be empirical, and
sometimes, even positivistic. Second, for Dewey, causality has to be conceived
of as purely a logical concept, while for the I Ching, its causal presupposition
is inseparable from metaphysics. Finally, for Dewey, the concept of causality
is straightly instrumental. But for the I Ching, the ultimate purpose of the study

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21

of the hexagram is "to know all the universal principles, to fulfill one's nature,
and to approach the Mandate of Heaven."34 This sounds more akin to Plato,
Aristotle, Plotinus, and St. Augustine, where contemplative knowledge recovers
its dignity. Whether this concept of knowledge will meet Dewey's approval
or not, I would like to leave the answer to my readers.

NOTES

1. Philosophy East and West 23, no. 3 (July, 1973): 323-332.

2. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (1925; reprint ed., New Y
Free Press, 1967), pp. 10-11.
3. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1888; reprint ed., London: Oxford Un
Press, 1965). Hume's concept of causality as referred to in this paper is discussed in Bk.
Sect 14.

4. 'The Doctrine of Necessity Examined," The Monist 2 (April, 1892): 321-337; reprinted in
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), 6.35-65.
5. I am quite aware that Peirce's views of causality are different in his early and later periods.
Only his earlier view is referred to here, for I view Peirce as a pioneer and forerunner of John Dewey
in the movement of American pragmatism.
6. In his Philosophy and the Modern World (Bloomington, Ind.: Indian University Press, 1959),
Albert William Levi commented on Dewey saying: "Less brilliant perhaps than the intermittently
inspired methodologist Charles Saunders Peirce, less metaphysically and religiously oriented than
the lovable and neurotic William James, and less restricted in his emphasis then the Darwinian
social psychologist George Herbert Mead, Dewey combines James' sense of Weltanschauung with
Peirce's feeling for method and with Mead's ever-present acknowledgment of the social matrix of
all human life" (p. 283).
7. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938),
pp. 459, 462.
8. The entire book, Logic, is an explanation of this theme. For particular references, consult
chapters 1 and 6.
9. Dewey, Logic, p. 459.
10. Ibid., p. 445.
11. Ibid., p. 456.
12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 136.

14. Dewey's best treatment of the means-ends relations is in his short treatise on Theory
Valuation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939). He discussed this problem throughou
the book.
15. Cary F. Baynes, trans., The I Ching or Book of Changes. The Richard Wilhelm Translation,
3d ed., Bollingen Series, no. 19 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), pp. xxii-xxiii.
16. The Chinese View of Life (Hong Kong: The Union Press, 1957), p. 50.
17. Ta Chuana is also called Hsi Tzu Chuanb, which is a synoptic commentary on the I Ching
and has become an integral part of the classic. Its authorship has been attributed to Confucius, but
some modern scholars doubt its authenticity.
18. Baynes, The I Ching, p. 285.
19. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, pp. 51, 58.
20. Baynes, The I Ching, p. 287.
21. Ibid., p. 289.
22. The distinction between wonder and care as a key to the understanding of the fundamental
differences between traditional Western culture (as represented by the Greeks) and Chinese culture

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22 Wu

(as represented by Confucianism) was formulated by Lik-Kuen Tong of Fairfield University

paper "Platonic Eros and Confucian Jen" presented to the panel on The Concept of Love in C
Philosophy at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies held in Chicago on Mar
1973. I was given the privilege of being a commentator on Tong's paper (among others). Alt
this distinction may appear an oversimplification, it is, however, very insightful and suggest
23. Process and Reality (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929).
24. Modes of Thought (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), Lectures 7 and 8.
25. The whole Ta Chuan can be a footnote to my interpretation here. Thome H. Fang'
Chinese View of Life provides a thorough explanation of such a world-view.
26. Baynes, The I Ching, p. 289.
27. Lucian Price, ed., Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead (New York: The New Ame
Library, 1956), p. 145.
28. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (1929; reprint ed., New York: Dover Publicati
1958), chap. 7 of provides a thorough discussion.
29. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 26.
30. John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1
p. 171. This is a republication of the chapters written by Dewey in Dewey and Tuft, Ethics, r
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1932).
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 172.
33. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (1922; reprint ed., New York: Modern Library,
1957), p. 286.
34. This is a paraphrasing translation of tsung li chin hsing i chi yu mingc. An alternative English
rendering is found in Baynes, The I Ching or Book of Changes, p. 262.

a b

C VW &gaU_1it

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